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THE CONCEPT OF LAW IN ISLAM¹

S. A. Rehman

Law in Islam is a complex concept. It includes the divine ordinances contained in the Quran, the reported decisions of the Holy Prophet (peace be on him) on issues or concrete cases that arose for decision in his lifetime and such other laws were derived, in the course of our history, by juristic deduction from the corpus of revealed law or the general regulatory principles of life enunciated in the book of God. The Quran, at places, leaves the Muslims to adjust their mutual relations according to Urf (Custom or Usage) such as prevailed in the Arab society of those days and which was not incongruent to the ethical spirit of the Quran. In other words, Islamic Law is either God-given law or such juristic Law as has the general sanction of the Quran behind it. The evolutionary legal process was aided by the principle that what is not expressly or impliedly forbidden by the Quran is lawful—the principle of *Ibaha* or permissibility. There is a significant verse in the Quran which enjoins the faithful to refrain from putting too many questions to the Prophet lest a revealed command might add to their existing obligations and restrict their freedom of action. For God, according to another verse, in His infinite mercy, desires facility for them rather than hardship.

The various components of Islamic law, however, do not occupy the same position in respect of priority and prestige. Islamic society is God-oriented and God alone is the supreme sovereign and law giver in such a society. The Divine Ordinances, therefore, are not only the fundamental basis of the legal system, but they are also unalterable and eternal. The Quran occupies a unique position in the religious literature of the world for no religious scripture other than the Quran can claim to be intact today in its

¹ Iqbal Memorial Talks 1977.

pristine purity. The Quranic texts are not amenable to amendment or variation according to human whims, though in their practical application to changing socio-political environment, they may receive a fresh interpretation demanded by the exigencies of time and place. Of course, such a fresh interpretation must not do violence to the Quranic norms of human conduct. It may be clarified that the Islamic system of values (the Shariah) makes no cut and dried distinction between positive law and morality. For the Quran is not merely a legal code. Its principal objective is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his true relation to God and the universe. Islam is a way of life rather than a mere ritualistic religion. The Quran provides guidance in all departments of human behaviour and its legal realm, both in theory and practice, is permeated through and through by its ethical spirit. Even a so-called secular act acquires a sacred character when performed under inspiration from the Quranic text. The Quran occupies a more exalted status in the legal hierarchy of Islam than a basic constitutional instrument in a modern democracy. It is the touchstone for deciding the legitimacy of any man-made law and thus provides the Muslim community with the sheet-anchor of stability in a changing world.

The positive legal rules in the Quran are limited in number and they are confined either to the family sector which is the basis of any social organization or the stability of the social order. They provide specific punishments for transgressions against what are described as the limits of Allah (Hudud) i.e. invasions on the domains of faith, life, property, reason and paternity or honour. Imam Shatibi has said in his *Al-Muwafiqat*: “These pre-determined punishments are themselves termed Hudud (Limits) in Muslim Fiqah”. For offences like murder or bodily injury, the principle of Qisas or requital by like retaliation is laid down in the Quran. An alternative of retaliation is monetary compensation. Contravention of other Quranic precepts, which are more in the nature of ritual or general principles regulating social behaviour, is left to be dealt with in the discretion of the

community itself, through its chosen representatives (Ulul-Amr), by the process of Shura (mutual consultation in this sphere).

Those in authority can prescribe such punishments as they deem fit in a particular case or leave the matter to be regulated by moral persuasion and admonition. The underdetermined punishments are known as Tazirat. As they are based on human opinion, they can be suitably varied from time to time by the same process by which they were originally prescribed. It is obvious that existing customary rules forming part of the corpus of Islamic civil law, may also be amended if the collective wisdom of the community so requires, in view of changes in circumstances. It will thus be appreciated that elements of stability and change are both embodied in the Quranic machinery for administration of human affairs so as to serve needs of a dynamic and progressive society.

The general principles enunciated in the Quran furnish ample guidance for Muslims in respect of all matters germane to the good life of the individual or to the creation of a well knit fraternity of Muslims, which could serve as the nucleus of a universal human brotherhood. Thus there are principles that may underly the constitutional structure of an Islamic state and regulate its relations with its own subjects or with foreign states. There are others that provide us with norms for establishing a just social or economic order. The principles of equality before the law and equality of opportunity for every one can be easily spelt out of them but class-war and expropriation are not countenanced. Instead, the concept of the affluent being trustees of their surplus wealth for the benefit of the needy and the distressed, receives strong emphasis. The field of guidance in all essential matters is thus comprehensively covered.

Whereas the Quran is the primary source of Islamic law, the authentic traditions of the holy Prophet (peace be upon him) constitute an important secondary source. The reported words or actions of the Prophet, when duly established, may be described as a commentary or the summary or general

provisions of the Quran and would give us invaluable guidance in understanding their true import or scope. Difficulties are however, created by the fact that every school of Islamic Jurisprudence (I prefer to call them schools rather than sects) insists on the exclusive authenticity of their own compilations of traditions and no general consensus exists or any one collection being beyond cavil. Unfortunately, many spurious traditions were put into circulation by interested parties, after the Prophet had passed away. All honour to those experts in the science of Hadith who devoted their entire lives to the collection and scrutiny of traditions and tried to sift the true ones from the false. But despite their indefatigable researches, differences persist to the present day. The well-known collections in our hands date only from the Abbasid period and no earlier comprehensive collection has come down to us. This may partly be due to the fact that, at one stage, the Holy Prophet is himself reported to have forbidden the taking down of his sayings and the second Caliph, Umar al-Farooq had also discouraged the unnecessary narration of Ahadith for fear that confusion may arise between the/word of God and that of the Prophet. The traditions concerning religious ritual have been consistently and continuously transmitted from generation to generation and there are no essential differences among the Muslims with regard to them. A serious effort is called for on the part of our scholars to reassess our most valuable heritage of legal traditions in order to eliminate all suspect matter. Several tests have been laid down by competent scholars for judging their genuineness. For one thing no true tradition can contradict an explicit Quranic text Nass or the general spirit of Quranic teachings, and, among other criteria, Ibn Taimiyyah mentions that traditions contrary to sound reason should also be rejected. Perhaps, in due course, this process may result in a generally acceptable collection.

Allama Iqbal has approached this subject from a bolder angle in his lecture on “The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam”. He says:

“For our present purposes, however, we must distinguish traditions of a purely legal import from those which are of a non legal character. With

regard to the former, there arises a very important question as to how far they embody the pre-Islamic usages of Arabia, which were in some cases left intact, and in others modified by the Prophet. It is difficult to make this discovery, for our early writers do not always refer to pre-Islamic usages. Nor is it possible to discover that the usages left intact by express or tacit approval of the Prophet, were intended to be universal in their application”².

The Allama then refers to the views of the great scholar, Shah Wali Allah, in respect of the nature and antecedents of a prophetic mission to people who are its first recipients and highlights the fact Imam Abu Hanifa made very little use of tradition in his juristic formulations. He proceeds to say further:

“On the whole, then, the attitude of Abu Hanifa towards the traditions of purely legal import is to my mind perfectly sound; and if modern liberalism considers it safer not to make any indiscriminate use of them as a source of law, it will be only following one of the greatest exponents of Muhammedan Law in Sunni Islam.”³

He however, advocated a further intelligent study of the Hadith literature to imbibe the spirit in which the Prophet himself interpreted his revelation That would, in his opinion, help us greatly in understanding the life-value of the legal principles enunciated in the Quran He thus favours the introduction of *Darait* (rational criticism of content) with *Rivayat* (Tradition). As I mentioned in the beginning of my talk, a considerable portion of the corpus of Islamic Law has been the result of juristic *Ijtihad*. The principles of analogy (*Qiyas*) and equity (*Istihsan*, *Masaleh Mursalah*, *Istislah* and *Istishab*; have played their part in this process. Where no specific provision of the Quran or Sunnah was found to cover a case, the scholars drew upon their own experience of men and matters and their own understanding of the

² The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (Lahore Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 171.

³ The Reconstruction, pp. 172.73.

spirit of the Divine dispensation. The rules thus evolved by the labours of individual scholars have in some cases been elevated to the status of consensus of the learned of a particular era (Ijma), if a majority of them had accepted the views involved. Historically speaking, this process has never been formally institutionalized but it has that potentiality. Allama Iqbal has approved of the Ijtihad of the Turks that the power of Ijma can be vested in a representative Legislative Assembly., elected by the people.

To claim that the door of Ittihad is now barred, on the supposition that the law has been finally settled by the existing Fiqh schools, as a section of the orthodox 'ulema' suggest, would amount to flying in the face of the very process by which these schools were born. The heads of these schools never claimed finality for their views and left possibilities of revision open on discovery of a better opinion at any time. After-all their compendiums embody only human interpretation or opinion regarding the effect of fundamental Quranic or Sunnah texts and there is no rational reason why later generations of Muslims should be debarred from solving their own legal problems, in the changed circumstances of their time, afresh, within the framework of the fundamental source of law, if the need for such a course is felt. The well-known hadith reporting the Prophet's conversation with Muaz b. Jabal on the eve of his departure for Yemen as Qadi, is ample authority for this view. This one method of breaking the enervating circle of stagnation that has restricted the intellectual horizon of the community to its past achievements. Even a previous Ijam decision should not be sacrosanct, as Allama Iqbal has pointed out, on the authority of Karkhi.

The spirit of the Islamic law is egalitarian, liberal and progressive under its auspices, there can be no privileged persons above the law. Even the head of the Islamic state is emendable to the ordinary legal process, for any remedy, whether civil or criminal, against his person or property. The doctrine of immunity of the sovereign from legal process, embodied in the maxim of Western jurisprudence: "The King can do no wrong," is foreign to Islamic law which functions under the august sign of the unity of God and

the equality of man. The solicitude of Islamic law for the independent personality of an individual is reflected in the principle of Fiqh that the state cannot grant pardon in respect of offences that affect individual human interests (Huquq al Ibad) though such power exists in respect of offences within the domain of “Huquq Allah”, God’s rights, which in effect means the collective interests of the community.

I have concerned myself with the general concept and the spirit of Islamic law in this short talk without going into explanatory details. I would like to wind up this talk with a quotation from the “Ilam-al Muaqqien” of Ibn-al Qayyim wherein he has summed up the spirit of the Islamic law in a nutshell:

“The ground and foundation of the Shariah is wholly justice, beneficence and wisdom, so whatever deviates from justice to wards tyranny, from beneficence towards its opposite from social welfare towards disruption and from wisdom towards futility, is not part of the Shariah although it may have entered its circle through the process of interpretation”.

This seems to me to be an apt commentary on the Quranic dictum that Islam is the Din al-Fitrat (the religion of Nature).

THE CONCEPT OF PAKISTAN IN THE LIGHT OF IQBAL'S ADDRESS AT ALLAHABAD⁴

Ehsan Rashid

Pakistan was demanded on the fundamental basis that the Indian Muslims constituted a nation by themselves and were, therefore, entitled to the right of self-determination. During the period of the struggle for Pakistan, this was made clear by the Quaid-i-Azam more than once. For instance, he refused Mr. Gandhi's offer in 1944 that the Muslim majority areas could separate from an all-India union by invoking the right of self-determination on a territorial basis. And he emphatically told him that the Muslims claimed the right of self-determination as a nation and not as a territorial unit; indeed, they were entitled to exercise their inherent right as a Muslim nation which was their birthright.

This at that time, appeared to be a novel concept of Muslim nationhood, but its theoretical foundations had already been worked out by the poet-philosopher Iqbal in his brilliant Allahabad Address. He said; "Islam as an ethical ideal has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups, and finally transform them into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own." "Islam as a people-building force," he said, "has worked at its best" in no other country than India.

In other words, Islam was the main factor. which set the Indian Muslims apart from the rest and made them into a nation. True, even at the height of

⁴ Iqbal Memorial Talks 1977.

their political supremacy in India, the Indian Muslims allowed themselves to be Indianised and influenced by their Hindu neighbours in several spheres. But they ever stuck firmly to the anchor of their Islamic heritage. They retained their own distinct individuality in the Indian body politic and to this, several European travellers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries bear testimony.

The loss of their political power was the signal for the Indian Muslims to begin exhibiting their old intense feeling of nationality. In the eighteenth century for instance, the Muslims exhibited a growing separation from the Hindus which they had never thought necessary in the days of their supremacy. This growing anxiety on the part of the Indian Muslims to keep their entity separate and intact, was amply reflected in the movements launched by them since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Sayyed Ahmad Shahid's Mujahidin movement, uprising of 1857, the Aligarh movement, the Muslim League and the Khilafat movements were all raised on the basic assumption that the Indian Muslim community represented a distinct politico-cultural unit on the broad canvas of India. The words "nation," "nationality" and "people" were freely used in the speeches and writings of eminent Indian leaders like Sayyad Ahmad Shahid, Sayyad Ahmad Khan, Hali, Shibli, Maulana Muhammad Ali and Allama Iqbal to denote the Indian Muslims and to focus attention on their distinct, national identity.

The idea of a religious community entitling itself as a nation could hardly fit into the prevalent Western concept of nationalism in which considerations of race, language or territory occupy an important place. The Indian Muslims did not come from a single racial stock, nor did they manifest any linguistic similarity. On the other hand, they comprised a host of linguistic groups possessing certain well-defined characteristics; they differed considerably from each other in social customs, food and even national predilections.

What explained the concept of Muslim nationhood were not these mundane factors but a spiritual principle which Iqbal termed as the ethical

ideal. This ethical ideal, as Iqbal said in his Allahabad Address, does not regard man as an earth-rooted creature, bound by this or that portion of the earth. On the other hand, it regards man as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. Thus, it is not land, race or language that would go to constitute a nation. Iqbal visualized a nation as a living soul, the product of a spiritual principle. And viewed from this angle, a people dedicated to a spiritual ideal, sharing a rich heritage of memories and possessing a desire to live together would fully qualify itself for the status of a nation.

Indeed, this spiritual factor more than others is basic to the very idea of a nation. It is not altogether absent even in the Western concept of nationalism. It is now generally agreed in the West that no polity can endure or make progress unless it is based on some set of moral principles and moral values. Thus even the Western national states are obliged to seek some moral concept from whatever source they can to base their actions and policies upon. Evidently, in their case, this source could not be other than the old Greek and Judge-Christian traditions which serve as the fountainhead of all Western thought streams.

In the case of Indian Muslim nationalism, however, this ideological factor was of supreme significance and was represented by Islam. There could be no doubt that Islam provided the strongest link binding the Indian Muslims into a single living soul and thus welding them into a nation. It was Islam which, through the centuries, had developed in them a tradition of loyalties, emotions and discipline. Islam alone provided them the aspiration to dream and the energy to actualize their dreaming and the discipline to keep personal interests within the bounds of community goals.

And this sense of unity created by Islam was further heightened by a common history which the Muslims shared in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. They felt proud of the glorious victories won by their forefathers against formidable odds in the sub-continent of cultural

achievements that gave the world unique cultural and architectural gems; of establishing empires like the Moghul Empire that either in territory or in splendor excelled every other empire in that age; of giving the subcontinent an administration that stood the test of time leading towards humane integration of diverse elements. They also shared the memory of the humiliation to which they were increasingly subjected since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the humiliation of defeat at the hands of an alien power and of their own subjugation. Nor could they forget the fact that they were treated with hostility in every walk of life by the dominant community living in the subcontinent simply because they believed in Islam.

Thus when Iqbal pleaded for a separate Muslim state in India, he was not asking for the creation of yet another independent territorial unit in the subcontinent. What he emphasized in his address was that the life of Islam as a cultural force in India very largely depended on its centralization in a specified territory. The driving force behind the concept of Indian Muslim nation-hood was, therefore, essentially ideological in character. It was not merely a question of establishing a state but of giving Islam a political and territorial expression. And it was on this plank that the Quaid-i-Azam subsequently launched the struggle for Pakistan. The creation of a state of our own, he said, was a means to an end and not an end in itself. The idea was that we should have a state in which we could live and breathe as free men and which we could develop according to our own lights and culture, and where the principles of Islamic social justice could find free play. The Quaid-i-Azam exhorted the Muslims to sacrifice their all in building up Pakistan as a bulwark of Islam and as one of the greatest nations.

On more than one occasion, the Quaid-i-Azam tried to elaborate the theoretical basis of Pakistan which had earlier been spelt out by Iqbal. He tried to impart a definite meaning to the Muslims struggle for territory and to provide the motive force so essential to carry it to a fruitful end. The Quaid-i-Azam knew that without an intellectual basis to nourish and sustain it, no movement stood any chance of success. He knew that, devoid of its

ideological content, the movement for Pakistan would fail to draw any support from the Indian Muslims. And the very fact that this movement galvanized a scattered community into a determined, united nation, which ultimately wrested its freedom from unwilling hands, goes to prove the existence of a powerful ideological force behind it.

The object of the Pakistan movement, it cannot be over emphasized, was not the separation of a few provinces in the sub-continent. If it were merely that, the Muslims of the minority provinces would never have gladly agreed to bear the main brunt of the freedom struggle. For, no one can deny the fact that the Muslims of these provinces were the greatest sufferers, both before and after partition. They knew that they would stand to gain nothing, indeed might lose everything, if Pakistan was created. And yet they joined the Muslims of the majority provinces whole solidly in their struggle simply because the battle was not for territory, but as Iqbal put it, for the preservation of the life of Islam in the subcontinent.

Again, it was this ideological force that enabled the new state of Pakistan to survive the stresses and strains to which it was subjected in the first crucial months of its existence. As a noted Western scholar on Islam then put it ; “It is Islam alone that holds the new state together. It is only this Islamic quality that can call forth the morale and loyalty without which it would never have survived its first six months and would hardly survive the numerous other challenges with which for some times it would doubtless continue to be faced.”

If, as Iqbal visualized, the ethical ideal or the spiritual principle was the very fountainhead of the concept of Indian Muslim nationhood, there can be no doubt that Pakistan can organise and build herself up only by honouring that principle. In other words, it is only in the Islamic atmosphere which facilitated her birth, that Pakistan can hope to survive and make progress.

Rooted as it is in the Islamic ideology, Pakistani nationalism can never hope to sustain itself on any other plank. Indeed, we know it to our own cost

how a turning away from that ideology brought us to the verge of national extinction. We seemed to have lost sight of our destiny and loosened our hold on the basic ideology which had given birth to our country. We took the achievement of the immediate goal as the culmination of our march towards our destiny; we could not see the woods for the trees. We lost ourselves in a mad rush for power and pelf and completely forgot our ultimate aim. Materialism soon dominated our thoughts and actions and before long we started drifting into a spiritual vacuum.

A nation, no less than an individual, cannot hope to live without idealism, without that driving force which impels it forward to energetic action, to lift itself above petty material gains and to expend itself in the service of noble worthwhile ends. And when such a force ceases to be of any consequence in the life of a nation, a terrible crisis of character results as it did in Pakistan since the death of Quaid-i-Millat and particularly after 1953. Indeed we have been through a period of the worst spiritual stagnation and moral degradation. Such were the depths to which we lowered ourselves that it had become a fashion to look down upon morality and good conduct, in such an atmosphere the very word “ideology” might come to be regarded as a taboo. No wonder the country almost came to the very brink of ruin.

Islam thus remains central to the concept of Pakistani nationalism. Through its ideological orientation Pakistan has presented a new concept to the world: ideological nationalism. And the measure of Pakistan’s progress will be a measure of the soundness of this concept. Indeed, by putting this concept into practice honestly we shall not only be making a positive contribution to our generation but also paying a befitting tribute to the poet-philosopher Iqbal who dreamt of a Muslim state in the sub-continent and to the great Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah who crystallized that dream into a living, pulsating reality.

GULCHN-I-RAZ AND GULSHA N-I-RAZ-I-JAD1D

The Nature and Role of Reason

C.A. Qadir

It is said that Philosophy is the art of asking deliberative and significant questions⁵. Significance is sometimes equated with meaningfulness which no doubt it is, but if by meaning-fulness we understand the verifiability or un-verifiability of a proposition in the light of facts, we restrict thereby the range and scope of significant propositions and confine them to scientifically testable statements. In philosophy the term significance is to be used or should properly be used for all such questions or problems which touch the ultimate bottom of human life and raise issues which go deeper than the one raised by physicochemical sciences.

Questions can be raised at two levels-the physical and the metaphysical, to use Aristotelean phraseology. At the physical level, the questions are concerned with the phenomenal and mundane reality and can be very deep, as requiring a research by a host of competent scientists or a research extending over centuries of observation and experimentation. But, despite the tremendous importance that scientific research has, and the long laborious work and study that the scientists have to undertake the question that sciences raise, do not touch the ultimate bottom of life. They concern the physical aspect of life-very vital and very significant no doubt, but by no means does it comprehend the entire gamut of human existence. For the materialistically oriented world of today, science is everything and scientism the best type of philosophy. By scientism is understood a creed which firmly believes in the cogency, validity and relevants of science implying thereby

⁵ Ethics for Policy Decision Wayne A, R. Leys Bunting Hall, 1961.

that only science can provide genuine knowledge about every thing including of course man and society. Scientism, however, is a denial of all that is noble and sublime in life and also that which is amenable not through scientific techniques but through intuition.

At the second level, namely the metaphysical, such questions are asked as are not mundane or phenomenal in nature but are noumenal and of ultimate significance. When, for instance Omar Khayyam, in his Quatrains, asks, “who the potter and who the pot” or questions death, by saying, “Surely not in vain, my sub-stance from the common earth was taken, that he who subtly wrought me into shape should stamp me back to common earth again”, or when he demands explanation of the discrimination on the earth, by making an ungainly vessel say, “they sneer at me for leaning all awry. Did the hand of the potter shake?” or when he doubts the existence of hell by saying “they talk of some strict testing-pish, he is a good fellow, and it will all be well”, Omar Khayyam is trying to know how ultimately every thing is going to turn out or what in short is the nature of metaphysical reality. To distinguish the nature of scientific enquiry from the quest of a metaphysician it is sometimes said that while a scientist raises questions, a metaphysician is concerned with riddles. Life and death are great mysteries for human being and when an effort is made by a metaphysician at the metaphysical level to offer an explanation of them in human language, it is mystery from whose face he is trying to lift veil. It is for this reason that procedures and techniques of physical science fail when dealing with supersensible reality. No amount of scientific observation and experimentation can ever resolve the mystery of life and death or that of hell and heaven. But because of their inaccessibility to the methodology of strict sciences, it cannot be held that the issues raised by Metaphysics are of no account or that they are no questions but moods and fancies of human beings in their hours of distress and helplessness.

To clarify further the type of questions that philosophy raises in contradistinction to the questions generally raised by the illiterate and the

untutored, it can be said that philosophical questions are deliberative, meaning thereby that they are the product of deep thinking and can be resolved through deliberation or deep thinking alone: For instance, the first question of Omar Khayyam, who the potter and who the pot, is a question about the creator of the universe and the nature of the creation. It is also a question about the relation which the creator has with its creation and of the distinction between the two, if any. Omar Khayyam, thus raises the question of the unity of Being as contrasted with that of the Duality of Being. The problem whether ultimately everything is one and the same or that there are differences is the age-old question of one and many. It is a deliberative question. It is the result of thinking and requires deliberation for its solution.

In *Gulshan-i-Raz*, Mahmud Shabistari, a poet, mystic and thinker of the thirteenth century raised metaphysical questions on the asking of a certain student and tried to solve them in the light of knowledge available at that time and also in keeping with the high traditions of Islamic mysticism. Generally speaking the Islamic mystics, that is to say, sufis believed that God alone is reality and therefore it is God alone that exists. In his *Lectures*, Allama Muhammad Iqbal records the talk of two sufis, one of whom says that there was a time when nothing existed save God and the other replying that the same is the case even now. Since the only reality is God and all else a manifestation or an emanation, the apparent distinctions between the primal Source and the world is illusory. God is everything and everything is God. This belief goes by the name of Pantheism, according to which the ultimate reality being one, all else is but a mode, an appearance or a projection. The doctrine of Pantheism, in its extreme form, is not held generally by sufis, for not all of them were astute and consistent thinkers. Among the Western thinkers Spinoza was a pantheist and among the Muslim thinkers Ibn-i-Arabi was a thorough-going pantheist. The Medieval mysticism of which Mahmud Shabistari is a product, is surcharged with pantheistic ideas and practices. In the Medieval Islam, it was Mad-Arabi whose thoughts were accepted and

incorporated in the general body of literature particularly poetry and metaphysics.

According to Edward G. Brown,⁶ in the *Gulshan-i-Raz*, Shabistari asks fifteen questions. It may be mentioned, however, in passing that when these questions are elaborated many other questions crop up so that in reality the *Gulshan-i-Raz* is a. discussions of all those issues that a student or a follower of sufism feels or countenances in his pursuit of gnostic knowledge. The questions are:-

1. What is the nature of Reason?
2. Why is reasoning sometimes a duty, sometimes a sin and when is reasoning incumbent upon a mystic?
3. What am 'I'? What is meant by travelling into one's self?
4. What is meant by the Pilgrim and the Perfect Man?
5. Who is gnostic and who attains to the secret of unity?
6. Is the Knower and the Known one in essence? If so, can the knower have a sense of responsibility?
7. What does one mean when he says "I am the 'Truth'?"
8. When a creature is called "united", then what does "travelling" and journey" mean?
9. What is that Sea whose shore is speech and what pearls can be found in its bottom.
10. How can the 'Necessary' and the "Contingent" go together? What is Quantity and Space?
11. Which part is greater than the whole? How can such a part be found?
12. How are Eternal and Temporal separate? Can we call the one as God and the other as the world?
13. How can the symbolical and the allegorical language be interpreted? What does it really mean when the "eye", "curls", "down" and "mole" of God are mentioned? What do "stations" and "states" mean when they are said to occur in the "journey" undertaken by a mystic towards the

⁶ Literary History of Persia, Vol III Cambridge 1956, pp. 147.48.

ultimate source of every thing?

14. What do “Beauty”, “Wine” and “torch, really mean?
15. Is the talk about Idols, Girdles and Christianity tantamount to talking about infidelity? If not, how should it be taken?

If one were to put all these questions in philosophical language, one would say that they are questions either concerning Epistemology or Entomology. There are some questions about the nature, the possibilities and the limitations of human know-ledge including reason and some about the ultimate nature of reality. When, for example, Shabistari discusses is the nature of the reasoning process and the role of discursive reasoning in the realm of subjective and objective reality or when he is dealing with the problem of reaching the ultimate truth, he is concerned with epistemological problems. When on the other hand, he is dealing with the problem of One and Many, Transcendentalism or Immanentism, the nature of the three-dimensional world, human destiny, life after death, creation, and pantheism, he is raising ontological questions. There are many other problems that he raises incidentally. He asks about the nature of the supra-spatial and supra-temporal reality, the distinction between the Observer and the Observed, whether numbers are absolute or relative, the difference between prophetic and mystic consciousness and the meaning of ‘far’ and ‘near’, ‘great’ and ‘less’, and ‘part’ and ‘whole’.

It can be easily seen that the questions posed by Shabistari are the ever-recurring questions of Philosophy. Right from the beginning, the questions of human destiny, creation of the world and the nature of the universe have occupied the attention of the philosophers of every age and of every country. Among the Greeks a person who knew who created the world, what its attributes are and what relation it bears to what it created, and also knew whether the story of a human being ends with his/her physical death and whether the world is basically and essentially spiritual or material was regarded a ‘wise’, a sage or a philosopher. Shabistari raises precisely these questions and many other besides showing thereby his allegiance to the ‘past’

and also to the “present” in which he lived. The ‘present’ for Shabistari is the ‘past’ for Allama Muhammad Iqbal and the ‘future’ for the Greeks. The ‘present’ they say, is a razor edge dividing the past from the future. What is ‘present’ now, becomes instantaneously past. Hence the present is over determined, not by the time-span it occupies, for the time-span is incredibly small but by the will of the people. The important point to remember is the relative and contingent nature of the ‘present’. The ‘present’ dies every moment and comes into being every moment.

The ‘present’ of every age is constituted by the aims and ideals as well as the hopes and disappointments of the people of that age. In some cases there is a leading idea which epitomizes the psyche of an age and so guides and inspires it. It may be said that the leading idea of Shabistari’s age is the metaphysical one, as inherited from Plotinus through Ibn-i-Arabi with modification introduced by the Islamic way of thinking. The idea of Wandat-ul-Wujud seems to be the dominant idea and it is in reference to this idea that all else is explained. Ibn-i-Arabi is a staunch supporter of this idea and also of the theory of emanations, a necessary corollary of this creed. In explaining the nature of the ultimate source and the emanation of the world, Ibn-i-Arabi takes recourse to Muslim terminology and thought and so presents a picture of the metaphysical reality in a way which does not sound bizzare to the Muslim ear, but a closer look can detect departure in it from the strict orthodox point of view. Hence in the history of Muslim thought, one finds many thinkers taking up cudgels with Ibn-i-Arabi and holding the doctrine of Wandat-ul-Wujud as a heresy. But it can be said that inspire of what the opponents say, the doctrine of Wandat-ul-Wujud has remained the corner stone of all types of sufistic thought. Persian as well as Urdu poetry is surcharged with the idea of unity of being and the concepts related to it.

It is however important to note that every thinker including Shabistari had his own “present’ and he accordingly refused to acknowledge any other “present, no matter how powerful and meaningful it once was. Nor did Allama Muhammad Iqbal, for he wrote *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, that is to say,

a new ‘Garden of Mystery’. Allama Muhammad Iqbal has used the word ‘jadid’, which not only means new and fresh, but also modern. Hence Allama Muhammad Iqbal attempts in *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid* an interpretation of the mysteries of theosophic thought in the light of modern knowledge as available to him. Allama Muhammad Iqbal could not accept the ‘present’ of Shabistari as his ‘present’. What was ‘modern’ for Shabistari was not ‘modern’ for him, for there was a distance of seven centuries between them. Knowledge ever advances though the speed of its advancement was never so great as it is now. It is said that the quantity of knowledge doubled in the fifteenth century but after the invention of the press, the revival of Learning as well as the development of the rapid, easy and quick means of communication and transport, the speed of the development of knowledge increased tremendously, so that now knowledge doubles every five years. Allama Muhammad Iqbal in writing *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, acknowledged the advancement of knowledge during his time and the need of writing afresh whenever a significant change takes place in the body of knowledge. Allama Muhammad Iqbal not only wrote a new *Gulshan-i-Raz* but also wrote a *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. In spite of the fact that there had been Reconstructions of Religious thought in the past. Every philosopher of Islam attempted a reconstruction in the light of knowledge of his own time. Mutazilites, Asharites, the great Moghal king Akbar, Shah Wali Ullah, Sir Sayyed Ahmad Khan, and a host of others who initiated new movements of religious thought in Islam reinterpreted Islamic thought in the light of scientific and philosophic thought of their time, and the requirements of their own age.

Unfortunately for static, unprogressive and unthinking people, the ‘present’ of the ‘past’ remains the ‘present’ for them. For them the ‘present’ of the bygone times perpetuates itself and covers the ‘presents’ of the future. This however is a grievous mistake. The ‘present’, as observed already, is a razor edge having no dimension of its own, except the one given by people and so constituting what is called the ‘spacious present’. Allama Muhammad

Iqbal never thought the 'present' could be perpetuated, and that is why he held that with the advancement of know-ledge a fresh and a better reconstruction of religious thought in Islam could be offered. The same he would say about his rendering of Gulshan-i-Raz in modern diction of his time. Between the Gulshan-i-Raz and Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid there is a distance of seven centuries and between Allama Muhammad Iqbal and us there is a distance of seventy years, but from the point of view of knowledge, the distance between us and Allama Muhammad Iqbal is the same as it was between him and Shabistari. Hence both his Reconstruction and Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid need fresh thinking.

Allama Muhammad Iqbal admits that though the questions in their philosophic aspect are the same yet their understanding and their solution would be different. Iqbal Says:

بطرز دیگر از
مقصود گفتم
جواب نامئه
محمود گفتم⁷

Shabistari wrote, as a result of the invasion of Tatars and the havoc it wrought in the intellectual, social and spiritual life of the people, But after him for centuries no one was born to cognize and to understand the new challenges that arose now and then. It was Allama Muhammad Iqbal who realized the meaning, the significance and the extent of the revolutions which came about in his own time due to the colonisations of Asia by the Western powers Since the revolution of his time was different from that of Shabistari, a new challenge had arisen, necessitating rethinking and reconstruction. Allama Muhammad Iqbal has accordingly offered an explanation of the

⁷ Gulshan-i-Rat-i-Jadid p. 145/537

problems raised by Shabistari in the light of the revolution that had come about in Muslim thinking due to the secularization of knowledge and the acquaintance with new instruments and techniques for identifying, sifting and evaluating data. Iqbal Says:

نگاہم انقلابیے
دیگرے دید
طلوع آفتابیے
دیگرے دید
کشودم از رخ
معنی نقلیے
بدست ذرہ دادم
افتابیے⁸

Iqbal insists that his rethinking should not be regarded as simply a new poetical rendering of Shabistari's 'Gulshan-i-Raz'. His rethinking is an exploration in the realm of Khudi, it is in fact an "inner fire", an exhibition of the "pangs of the heart". He supposes that if Gabriel were to read what he has written, he would cry.

تجلی را چنان
عریاں نخواہم

⁸ Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid, p. 146/538

نخواہم جز غم
پنہاں نخواہم
گزشتہم از وصال
جاودانے
کہ بینم لذت آہ و
فغانے
مرا ناز و نیاز
آدمے دہ!
مرا ناز و نیاز
آدمے دہ!
بجاں من گداز
آدمے دہ⁹

In Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid, Allama Muhammad Iqbal has employed the terminology of Shabistari but has given it a new meaning. Allama Muhammad Iqbal has not discussed all the questions of Shabistari but has chosen a few and showed how his interpretation differs and why it differs. It will be seen that Allama Iqbal's interpretation registers a real advance in knowledge.

In this article it is not possible to compare and contrast Iqbal and Shabistari on all points raised and discussed by them. That would be too lengthy and would require a separate book. I am limiting myself to one

⁹ Ibid p. 147/539.

question, namely, the first one, which concerns the nature, the limits and the source of human know-ledge. It will be evident that this is a question of epistemology and lies at the bottom of all metaphysical knowledge. In the philosophy of the Anglo-American world, it is epistemology that is reigning supreme, while ontology has been thrown into the background.

The first question as stated is:

نخست از فکر
خویشم در تحیر
چه چیز است
آنکه گویندش
تفکر
کدامین فکر مارا
شرط راه راست
چراگه طاعت و
گاہے
گنداوست¹⁰

The term used by Shabistari is ‘fkr’ which has several meanings like deliberation, thinking, reasoning, rationality etc. It would be deer that in the sense of deliberation, ‘fkr’ becomes an instrument through which thought process can be carried on to its logical end. With Aristotle and his followers, Logic was an organon, an instrument which could aid thought and lead it to its right path. When Bacon replaced deductive method of enquiry by the

¹⁰ Gulshan-i-Raz-i-ladid, p. 148/540.

inductive one, he called it Mourn Organon, meaning thereby, a new instrument. Hence it was never the intention of the logicians, barring a few one, that Logic gave any information about any thing. It was regarded as purely formal, dealing with the ‘shape’ of arguments, not with the matter of arguments or the content of knowledge. There were some logicians who thought that the laws of Logic were the laws of reality, that the laws of Identity, non-contradiction and excluded middle were true of thought as well as of reality. But this point of view was severely criticised by mathematical logicians who took logic on the analogy of mathematics and held that both logic and mathematics had their stand on certain definitions which do not necessarily reflect the nature and complexion of physical reality as it is. When Euclid defined a point as something, having neither depth, nor length, nor width, he was not giving the definition in reference to any physical reality, for there can be no point, if it is actually drawn on a piece of paper, which had neither depth, nor length, nor breadth. In Radd-ul-Mantiqeen, Imam Ibn Taimiyyah, has precisely taken this position. He is of opinion I that logic is empty of content and can yield no knowledge of external or internal reality. In logic, Ibn Iaimiyyah is a nominalist which, by the way is the standpoint of Russell and of many other mathematical logicians.

In Radd-ul-Mantiqeen Imam Ibn Taimiyyah, is concerned with the refutation of Aristotelian Logic as Imam Ghazali of Aristotelian Philosophy. Though the primary aim of both these thinkers was to clear the way for the justification of religious beliefs and dogmas, indirectly and negatively, by demolishing what the philosophers and logicians had claimed to be true, they nevertheless succeeded in making any points which are cogent even today. But their aim was not to demolish philosophy or logic as such. Logic is an instrument of enquiry and no enquiry whatever its motive, can proceed, an such without following the laws of right thinking. When therefore Shabistari or Allama Muhammad Iqbal denounce reason, it cannot be reasoned as an instrument of enquiry, for otherwise their own ‘denunciation’ would stand condemned, as being without logic, that is to say, without sense and meaning.

Deductive logic as an instrument of research and enquiry, is primarily, though not exclusively, used in mathematical sciences and inductive Logic, for the same purpose, again primarily, though not exclusively in empirical sciences. As research proceeds these 'two methods cooperate and jointly lead the enquiry to its successful end. Thus if enquiry is to be carried on in any domain of thought, religious or non-religious, it is absolutely essential that laws of logic be followed directly or indirectly.

As there is a widespread misconception regarding the role and function of reason in human thought, I want to pursue the matter a little further. The first question is, as Shabistari himself has pointed out, what the nature of Tafakkur or reason is. In answer it can be said:

1. Reason is creative. This point has been very well brought out by Plato when he says, "For generation of the Universe was a mixed result of the combination of Necessity and Reason. Reason overruled Necessity by persuading her to guide the greatest part of the things that become towards what is best; in that way and on that principle this Universe was fashioned in the beginning by the victory of reasonable persuasion over Necessity (Plato 1957; 48 A Cormford, tr). In this contrast which Plato suggests between reason the guiding and controlling activity, and necessity the blind, compulsive force, the creative role of reason becomes obvious. It is through persuasion, that is, through working with natural forces and not by opposing or negating them that reason creates. It encourages some forces, redirects others, it combines and balances some, changes others. Thus it brings order out of chaos. The forces of necessity pushing about aimlessly and at random are organized into enduring structures. These structures are always breaking down, so the task of reason is never finished; there is always repair work, correction, adjustment left to do.

2. Reason is the discovery and the application of rules to cases. Man is distinguished from the animals by this rationality and this consists in the ability to apprehend general principles and freely act on them. Animals, in

contrast, perceive only particulars and have therefore no free-will. The general principles, man apprehends, are part of the nature of things, they are eternal and universal. Kant says, “Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles the deduction of actions from principles requires reason”.¹¹

3. Reason is calculation-adding and subtracting. Hobbes says, “When a man reasons he does nothing else but conceives a sum-total, from addition of parcels; or conceives a reminder from subtraction of one sum from another... reason in this sense is nothing but reckoning, that is adding and subtracting.”¹² This conception of reason is basic to the theory underlying the construction of decision-making machines, since these machines operate by addition, subtraction and simple comparison.

It may be held that rationality or reason works differently in different spheres. It is creative in social and political matters, it is the application of law to cases in legal and moral reasoning and it is calculation in technical and economic spheres. Thus the three conceptions of rationality work differently in different departments of human knowledge, but basically they are not incompatible. The difference is primarily in emphasis. Each approach must eventually include the other within itself in some fashion. We can look at reason from a different angle and say that it has three functions;

(1) It can generate purely non-empirical or a priori ideas. When Euclid said that a straight line is the shortest distance between two points, he was intuiting an idea for which there was no empirical ground. The earth being spherical and not flat, it was not possible to draw a line which could be called straight in the light of what Euclid had said. Any line drawn on the surface of the earth must have curves, because of the spherical nature of the earth and so could not be the shortest distance between two points. In the same way

¹¹ Paul Diesing in *Reason in Society*, Illinois, 1962, p 245.

¹² *Leviathan*, 1939, p 143.

when Euclid said about point that it had neither length, nor breadth, nor depth, he was defining point without reference to empirical reality, for in the real world there could be no point without length, breadth and depth.

(2) Among the priori ideas reason establishes necessary and universal relationship. For instance, it is reason which tells us that all equilateral triangles are equiangular, that is to say, that it is on the strength of reason that it can be said that all triangles whose sides are equal have also their angles equal. In sciences nearly all concepts are non-empirical and the relation established between them is the work of reason.

(3) It is reason which enables a person to draw inferences. Since the nature of intellectual disciplines is not one and the same, reason works, as shown above, in different manners in each one of them. In some it works deductively, in some inductively, in some it creates, while in others it calculates or works through application of laws to specific cases.¹³

From the nature of reason as creative, calculating or implementing laws, or from the function of reason as intuiting a priori concepts or establishing necessary relations between such concepts or in enabling human beings to infer there is nothing that can be singled out for ridicule, criticism or denunciation. Reason is needed to denounce reason and therefore reason cannot be denounced in the last analysis, for how can reason be denounced through reason?

When Shabistari denounces logic or reason it can not be reasoned as defined and described above but it is, as he says, as employed in the domain of religion, to prove and to seek God. Shabistari says:

پر آنکس را که
ایزد راه نمود

¹³ See Broad C.D., *Five Types of Ethical Theory*.

ز استعمال
منطق ہیچ
نگشود 14

It means that Logic cannot open the door to God. To know and to understand God, there are doors other than the one of Logic. Again he says:

خرد را نیست
تاب نور آن
روی
برو از بہراو
چشمی دگر
جوی¹⁵

This couplet supports the above idea that reason is incapable of reaching God. In order to reach God, some other method has to be devised.

Shabistari's denunciation of reason can be understood in the light of the objective he has fixed for reason. He thinks that the primary, if not the sole function of reason is, to lead a person from untruth to truth or to enable him to perceive the whole in the part. This definition of reason is not in accord with the one usually found in books of logic or philosophy. Shabistari is conscious of it, but he says that all other definitions of reason as found in books and accepted by all and sundry are conventional and customary but that his definition, is original, in the sense that it is a product of his own research and thinking.

¹⁴ Gulshan-i-Raz, Mahmud Shabistari.

¹⁵ Ibid.

When Shabistari accepts a definition of reason which suits his way of thinking, he stands philosophically on sure grounds, for all definitions are man-made and accepted, because together with other definitions of a certain type, they have the capacity to generate new idea or schemes of ideas. Euclid, for instance, laid the foundation of geometry on the basis that a straight line could be drawn on the surface of the earth. Those who differed from him and thought that this could not be done as the earth was not flat but spherical laid the foundation of non-Euclidean geometries. What is different in both these systems is the initial assumptions, together with their definitions. That both these systems have their own valid system of deductions does not invalidate the claim that both are man-made and that both stand on certain assumptions and definitions about which there is nothing sacrosanct. If therefore Shabistari has adopted a certain definition of reason together with its objectives, there is no harm provided it generates a system of ideas and assists in the flow of ideas. It is undoubtedly true that religiously considered the object of knowledge should be the realization of God, but to say that the object of reason is to attain God looks odd, as reason is simply an instrument of knowledge and as such it has no objective save to assist thought in its journey from untruth to truth. In Muslim thinking much confusion has arisen because of the fact that reason and knowledge have not been properly differentiated and consequently what is true of one has been attributed to the other.

Shabistari thinks that reason is faulty since no philosophical argument for the existence of God has ever turned out to be valid. He is of the opinion that the effort to reach God through the manifestations of God is misleading, since whatever receives light from God, who is the Source of all existents and therefore the existents can throw no light on the primal source. The argument as stated is spacious, but there is no denying the fact that no argument for the supersensible reality can be built on the basis of what is true of the sensible world. The sensible and the supersensible worlds differ fundamentally and essentially; hence nothing that is true of one can form a

basis for drawing inference about the other. So far Shabistari is right, but he is not right when he says that all the “signs’ or the manifestations of God can prove is that the world is not absurd, that is to say, without reason or logic. Existentialist philosophers of today would take exception to this statement. Both Albert Camus and J.P. Sartre together with other existentialist thinkers hold that no reason can be found why what happens should happen. There is facility but no necessity.

Shabistari is also right in holding that knowledge gained through the channels of sense-organs and reason is utterly in-adequate or should we say, utterly irrelevant to the knowledge of God. Indeed the much maligned logical positivists said nothing but what Shabistari has said. Only logical positivists put the matter in modern terminology and maintained that no proposition could be true as had no empirical verification. Since empirical verification is possible in the case of sense of knowledge, the data received from sense-organs can never be appropriate for reaching God –a supersensible reality and so incapable by definition of empirical verification. Those people who condemn reason should consider:

1. If reason has ever claimed that it is the organ of God’s knowledge,
2. If reason has ever held that its findings are final.
3. If reason has ever maintained that the data on which proofs for the existence of God rest, can not be improved, or that new disciplines cannot arise throwing fresh light on the problem. Indeed Para-Psychology and Occultism have supplied fresh data to philosophers and religionists to think and to draw inferences.

To these considerations, there is only one answer and that is in the negative. No philosopher has ever held that reason is final or that it is the gateway to God-knowledge. All philosophers worth the name, have recognized the limitations of reason and have used it where its competence is acknowledged.

Allama Muhammad Iqbal agrees with Mahmud Shabistari in thinking that the source of true thought in man is his “Qalb’-usually translated as heart, and thought is the Light which is present in the heart. It is through that light that the absent is converted into the Present. Our bodily existence is bound up with time and space, but the light is supra-temporal and supra-spatial. The assumption behind this idea is that though the light resides in the body which is material and so subject to the laws of Time and Space, yet the light which illumines the hearts of men and turn them towards the Almighty is above time and space. The entire world is a manifestation of this light.

About the characterization of Qalb, Shabistari and Iqbal differ substantially while Shabistari supposes that Qalb is meant to reveal the world within, Iqbal thinks that it reveals not only the inner reality but also the outer reality. The extension in the application of Qalb in Iqbal comes about as a result of a large number of physical, biological, psychological and social sciences that had come into existence during Iqbal’s time but were not present in Shabistari’s time. These sciences are the product of observation and experimentation with the help of sophisticated instruments and techniques, not available before the nineteenth century. These sciences together with the technology they had given birth to had caused an intellectual revolution in European countries and had enabled the Europeans to control the forces of Nature. Iqbal was conscious of the fact that in the twentieth century it was as essential to subjugate the forces of nature, which constitute the world without as it was to conquer the forces within which Constituted the world within. Hence to confine Qalb to the inner world only and to exclude from it the objective world was suicidal. The shift from the subjective to the objective and the extension in the meaning of Qalb so that it covers both subjective and objective, marks the triumph of a spiritual cum material point of view. Iqbal accordingly says:-

به چشم خلوت

خود را به بیند
به چشمے جلوت
خود را به بیند
اگر یک چشم بر بند
گنا ہے است
اگر باہر دو بینہ شرط
را ہے است¹⁶

Iqbal however thinks that in the conquest of the subjective and the objective world, the priority belongs to the subjective world. First the inner world is to be ordered, refined and oriented towards the source and then the task of the subjugation of external forces can be taken in hand, in religion as well as in mysticism, the spirit takes precedence over the nature and therefore it should be attended to before anything else. Iqbal says:

منہ پادر بیابان طلب
سست
تختین گیر آں عالم
کہ در تست
اگر زیری زکود
گیری زبر شو

¹⁶ Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid p. 19/541.

خدا خواهی بخود
نزدیک تر شو
به تسخیر خود
افتادی اگر طاق
ترا آسان شود
تسخیر آفاق¹⁷

For Iqbal both the objective (Alam-i-Afaq) and the subjective (Alam-i-Anfas) are important and should be made to serve the interests of life.

Shabistari is the product of Mideaval philosophy and mysticism, popularly known as Scholasticism and could not go beyond the inner subjective world of reality. But despite his mystic learning's, Shabistari could not ignore the objective world and therefore held that though the application of reason in the domain of religion is a sin, it is not so when used in the field of material reality. Shabistari however believed that it is the spiritual world that really matters and the material world with all its charms and variegated phenomena, is but an illusion. Accordingly he built his argument for the spiritual world on the basis of the illusory character of the phenomenal world. Iqbal's procedure is different. His argument for the spiritual world does not rest on the illusoriness of the phenomenal world. He fully realizes the importance of the sciences and the conquest of nature for the advancement and enhancement of life. For him both the sense knowledge and rational knowledge are true with-in certain limits and have to be sought by all means at our disposal. It is only that in seeking God, a different organ has to be utilized, as sense-knowledge and reason are incompetent. Shabistari taking his stand on Ibn-i-Arabi's philosophy could condemn the external

¹⁷ Ibid p. 150/542.

world as illusory, ephemeral and an obstacle to spiritual advancement, but Allama Muhammad Iqbal' could not do so, for in the period of seven centuries that separated these two thinkers, knowledge had advanced considerably. Hence he was constrained to attach value to objective as well as to subjective knowledge. Gone were the days when a saint, a sadhu, a guru or a sufi was alone looked up in society. Now the scientist, the philosopher and the thinker had as much claim to public esteem as any body else. The experimentally tested knowledge was extolled, in some cases above the subjective data. This was not so in Shabistari's time. That is why Shabistari, holding the aim of knowledge as union with the ultimate source of life, recommended with draw from the world of objective reality. Both Plato and Plotinus recommended such a view of life and Muslim thinkers who followed in the footsteps of these two great thinkers were so much enamoured of the so called world of reality that they held in derision what they called the world of appearance and condemned it as illusory, insubstantial and utterly worthless. Iqbal could not subscribe to this view, and was, as a result, deadly opposed to the classical spirit of Greek thinking and the anti-worldly attitude of the mystics. (For details refer to Allama Muhammad Iqbal The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, 1965, Chapter V. The Spirit of Islamic Culture).

Despite the fact that Iqbal does not consider reason an instrument to reach God and dislikes the supremacy of reason over intuition or other means of mystic and prophetic knowledge, he does admit openly the value of objective knowledge and regards the conquest of nature, an essential ingredient of the Islamic way of life. That is modern touch in him and is the consequence of the wide-spread influence of experimental sciences.

Since for Shabistari, the inner life alone constituted essence, it was but natural, that he should emphasise self-realization and therefore the individual as against society. In mysticism one can observe the tendency towards self involvement and personal development. A sadhu or a sanyasi would retire to jungles or to any other place away from the noise and din of cities and

villages to engage himself whole heartedly in self elevation. The life of a recluse, a mendicant or a solitary, lonely wayfarer was preferred over the life of social responsibilities. Shabistari recommends individual and personal development and attaches no importance to social living and the duties consequent upon such a living. Iqbal was conscious of the fact that a human being was both an individual and a member of his own community. Hence communal living was as much important to him as individual living. Very often it is said that among the Muslims of today what is lacking or at least weak is the social ethics that is to say, the sense of belonging together and a spirit of working in cooperation and in unison with others. This may be due to the fact that for centuries the monastic way of life was much extolled and regarded as the sole gateway to God and to His grace. Iqbal, unlike Shabistari, recognizes that for full development both individual and social aspects of life have to be nurtured. Iqbal may have received inspiration for this as well as for other points in which he differed from Shabistari from Islamic traditions but there is no doubt that his wide acquaintance with Western knowledge and the Western way of life had an impact on him and so provided to him an impetus towards re-evaluation and reassessment of the problems and solutions of Shabistari in *Gulshan-i-Raz*.

In the end it may be said that though in certain respects there is similarity in the thinking of Iqbal and Shabistari on the nature and role of reason in human life, yet there is also a significant difference in their understanding, due to the advancement of knowledge in the seven centuries that separated these two thinkers, Iqbal's version is nearer to times but not the nearest as he is separated from us by a period of seventy years which from the point of view of knowledge and its advancement is as great as the period of seven hundred years that separated Shabistari from Allama Muhammad Iqbal.

IQBAL ON MARX

Shaheer Niazi

In the light of the Holy Quran, the world population or say the mankind is divided into two major groups, i.e. the theists (who believe in God) and the atheists (who do not believe in God). Beyond doubt Iqbal was one of the keenest observers of the world affairs and he concerned very much with the expected consequences of the preaching of new gospels in this century. When we peep into the past we find that after the revolution in Russia in 1917, the writers and thinkers over the world were deeply influenced by the socialist slogans about the equity of human beings. It is 'evident that this revolution was basically against the tyrant Tzar, the Emperor of Russia, blood-sucking capitalism and humiliating Christian Church domination. The hero of this revolution was Lenin, a great Marxist. Two out-standing Urdu poets namely Iqbal and Hasrat Mohani were influenced to the extent of the merits of socialism without departing from the belief in one God and the teachings of the Holy Quran. After the creation of Pakistan in 1947, I remember some of our progressive writers made an abortive attempt to prove that Iqbal was a socialist. The base of their contention were the following verses of Iqbal:

اٹھو میری دنیا کے
غریبوں کو جگا دو
کاخ امرا کے در و دیوار بال
دو
برمائو غلاموں کا لہو

سوز یقین سے
کنجشک فروماہی کو
شاہیں سے لڑادو
سلطانی جمہود کا آتا ہے
زمانہ

جو نقش کہن تم کو نظر
آئے مٹا دو
جس کھیت سے دہقان کو
میسر نہیں روزی
اس کھیت کے ہر خوشہ
گندم کو جلا دو¹⁸

The caption of this poem is 'Farman-i-Khuda' (God's Ordain) and it indicates that God is not pleased with the institution of Capitalism which is synonymous to cruelty and injustice specifically in relation to labour and wages. In Islam hoarding of the commodities and piling up the wealth in the vaults are regarded as sin and social crime. In the verses noted above God issues orders to His angels: 'Rise and awake the poverty-stricken people on earth and shake the wall of the palaces of richmen. Kindle a new fire in the hearts of the slaves and enable the poor sparrow to fight against eagle. Now the days of democracy are coming; therefore you destroy every sign of the yore, you find in the world. The corn-fields which are not for feeding of the peasants then burn every heap of wheat therein. There is no reason why the

¹⁸ Bal-i-Jibreel, pp. 109-401/110-402.

Elders of the Christian Church remain standing as intercessors between God and His creature; therefore remove them from their seats Iqbal has uttered many verses about Marx and Socialism in Urdu and Persian languages. Here I quote some verses from his collection:

روح سلطانی رہے یا قی تو پھر
کیا اضطراب
ہے مگر کیا اس یہودی کی
شرارت کا جواب
وہ کلم بے تجلی وہ مسیح بے
صلیب
نیست پیغمبر و لیکن در بغل
دارد کتاب¹⁹

In this poem which is in the form of poetic dialogues between Satan (Iblis and his advisers (members of his high command). Iqbal vigorously attacks those religious leaders who are the pets of the Capitalists. In his opinion the present type of democracy in the East is nothing but a cover for dictatorship. In the following verse Iqbal calls Marx a Prophet or a messenger without divine revelation:

وہ کلیم بے تجلی وہ مسیح بے
صلیب
نیست پیغمبر و لیکن در بغل

¹⁹ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, (Urdu), p. 8/650.

He a Moses without divine manifestation; he a Christ without a Cross? And though not a Prophet or Messenger of God but has got a Book in his bossom).

In Iqbal's 'Armaghan-i-Hijaz', the fifth adviser of Satan calls Marx, an Incarnation of Mazdak, a revolutionist of Iran before Islam who had introduced a new type of Socialism which granted the freedom of sex without reservation of blood relations or private property. Wealth and women were common. No one could be the only master of a woman in his time but it must be kept in mind here that Marx or Lenin had no idea of such a sex free society. Marxism grants freedom of sex life but within the limits of regulations. Iqbal's own words are:

وہ یہودی فتنہ گر وہ روح
مزوک کا بزور²¹

Iblis (Satan) in his presidential address assures his lieutenants that the Socialism or Communism cannot disturb us due to the evils which are planted in the hearts of human beings and these evils cannot be removed in these systems. The only danger that we can confront in future is from Islam. Iqbal becomes very difficult for the narrow minded Muslims when he utters the following verse:

جانتا ہے جس پہ
روشن باطن ایام ہے

²⁰ Ibid, p. 8/650.

²¹ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, p. 10/652.

مزو کیت فتنه مزدا
نہیں اسلام ہے²²

“I know as I am aware of the secret of the future that Mazdakiyat is not a menace ahead but it is Islam that worries.”

Apparently the verse seems to be pseudo-Islamic but the fact is reverse because in the following verses the Satan admits the importance of the Islamic Shari’ah which may defeat the Satanic powers therefore the danger for the Satanic designs is Islam and Islam alone. There is no other force on earth that may destroy evil.

Socialism:

Before we proceed further to discuss the views of Iqbal let us have an idea about Marx and Marxism, Communism and Socialism etc. After the Industrial revolution in Europe, the hydra-headed monster of Capitalism threatened the lives of the poor thus a social change became incumbent. Karl Marx (1818-1883 A.C.) who came forward with a new gospel called Das Kapital (The Capital) was the son of a German Jewish lawyer who became a Christian later on. Marx was educated in Germany and he remained under the lure of Hegel’s philosophy of dialectical process which was for Marx a dominating factor in sociology. Marx as young man started his career as a working Journalists before leaving Germany for Paris (France) where he met French Socialists including Proudhon, St. Simon, Louis Blanc and Fourier but very soon he was disgusted and called them Utopians. Then Marx left France for London in the days of orthodox economists like Richardo. Here in 1848 the Manifesto of the Communist Party was prepared. It still guides the Russian Government today. Soon after its publication a revolution took place in Germany. Marx also took part in it but after the failure of this

²² Ibid., p. 12/654.

revolution he was exiled and from there he came to London. He started his research work in the British Museum, the abode of the revolutionists. The first volume of his marvellous book *Das Capital* was published in 1867. Marx lived in England till 1883 as a poverty-stricken person. He was then suffering, starving and could not afford to procure medicine for his dying daughter. Some people think that Marx was a blind follower of Hegel but this is not true. He disagreed with him on many points. Here I quote an example. Hegel was of the opinion that thoughts are more important than things, the real is the abstract ideal, hence ideals such as Nationalism creates institution like state. Marx contrarily observed: the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into terms of thought²³. It seems imperative at his juncture to take into considerations some of the fundamentals of Communism (Socialism is a lesser form of it). To abolish the institution of Capitalism- it is necessary to nationalise everything to be controlled by the government for the sake of equity and equality; therefore there should be no private property. Every citizen has an equal right to live according to his requirements and efficiency. The basic formula for the new economic order is C-M-C. Commodity-Money-Commodity), then it further emanates C-C., M-C-M, M-M and so on so forth.²⁴ What Marx owed to Hegel was his concept of history as the evolution of society by means of dialectical process but the economic theory of Marx was of his own. Since Communism is a bit abstract in nature and needs revision as it was demanded even in the life-time of Marx by the revisionists, it seems practicable only in its premature form which is called Socialism. According to Lloyed Socialism is simply a tendency and not a body of dogmas.²⁵ At the initial stage when it is implemented, it is positively a conglomeration of communism, capitalism and fascism because on the one hand it crushes the social evils but on the other hand it bans the freedom of speech freedom of thought and the freedom of the Press. At the same time

²³ Democracy and its Rivals, Christopher Lloyd, Karachi, 1961.

²⁴ World's Famous Books in outlines, London, 1946, p. 130.

²⁵ Democracy and its Rivals by Lloyed, p. 112.

the class struggle is not finished, it simply changes its style under the patronage of the ruling class. Peon and Premier are both equal as human beings but not equal in status. Such equality is a dream as yet that is why Bernard Shaw demanded simply the equality of income in Socialism and nothing else.²⁶ However we once again return to Iqbal who pronounces about Socialism as under:

قوموں کی روش سے مجھے
ہوتا ہے یہ معلوم
بے سوع نہیں روس کی یہ
گرمئی گرفتار
اندیشہ ہو شوخی افکار پہ
مجبور
فرسودہ طریقوں سے زمانہ ہوا
بیزار
انساں کی ہوس نے جنہیں
رکھا تھا چھپا کر
کھلتے نظر آتے ہیں بتدریج وہ
اسرار²⁷

Another verse of Iqbal that needs clarification is as following:

²⁶ Ibid., p. 114.

²⁷ Zarb-i-Kalim, p. 1 37/598.

صاحب سرمایہ از
نسل خلیل
یعنی آن پیغمبر ہے
جبرئیل²⁸

(Trans Marx the author of Das Capital; being one of the children's of Abraham is also a Messenger but without Gabriel i.e. Divine Revelation).

It should be borne in mind that the word 'Paighamber' (messenger) is composed of two Persian words, 'Paigam, (message) and 'Bar' (the Carrier) thus who carries any message is a messenger but in day to day use it never means the Prophet of God unless the word God is not added to it. What this verse means is that Marx is a man who gave a new message of economic order to the suffering mankind. He knew what suffering means because he suffered himself a lot. He himself starved and his child died without medicine. Iqbal was a very good critic and he did not simply admire Socialism but also criticized it in the following verses:

وہ یہودی گر، وہ روح مزدک کا
بروز
ہر قبا ہونے کو ہے اس کے جنون
سے تار تار²⁹
غربیاں گم کردہ اند افلاک را

²⁸ javid Nama, p.64/652.

²⁹ Artnaghan-i-Hijaz, 10/652.

در شکم جویند جان پاک را³⁰
دین آن پیغمبرے حق ناشناس
بر مواوات شکم دارد اساس

(i) In the verse from 'Armaghan-i-Hijaz', he calls Marx the Incarnation of Mazdak who had freed man from morality in Iran before the advent of Islam. In Mazdakiyat there was no private property and no privacy of sex, Woman was for one and for all. Mazdak was killed by the king because fornication had become a popular fashion rather an order of the day in Iran.

(ii) In the Persian verses noted above, Iqbal criticises Marx for placing the foundation of equality on stomach (Shikam) i.e. the physical needs and for the same reason the calls him a messenger unaware of the truth [پیغمبر

[حق ناشناس] Now it be-comes clear that Iqbal was not at all a Socialist.

Muhammad and Islam

Sigmund Frued, the founder of modern sex-psychology once said that human life passes through three distinct psychological phases; superstition, religion and science and now being the era of science, all the religions are out of date. But he is absolutely wrong because a divine religion generally and Islam particularly are not the psychological phases of human life. Islam is not a social, commercial or a political revolution or reaction confining itself to a particular or specific field or walk of life. It is a natural urge to know the self, it's origin and its relation with the Originator. It is evident that a code of morality is always necessary for the solidarity of a nation. No nation can survive without a law. It is an incontrovertible fact that the life of the holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him) was the most perfect life, a human

³⁰ Ibid., p. 64/652.

being could lead on this earth. Humanitarianism and social justice for which people cry so much were perfectly translated into action that we can witness in the life of the holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him). He was just, truthful and trustworthy (Ameen) and he taught the same to mankind in the name of one God Almighty.

Before coming down to Iqbal's own remarks about the social justice in Islam, I should make it clear that the Islamic structure of social justice is altogether different from all the Isms in the world. In nature Islam is neither democracy nor dictatorship (or kingship) and in it there is no accommodation for Communism, Socialism, Capitalism or Feudalism etc. (for detailed discussion see, 'Islam, The Mis understood Religion' by Mohammad Qutb, Kuwait edition). Islam is not the religion for extremists at all; it is rather a balanced middle way of life. In Islam a Muslim can have private property but for his own needs only i.e. a house to live with family but not for rental purposes because rent is also a kind of interest since no tenant can become the owner of the house for which he has already paid a sum more than it's real cost, in the form of rent for so many years of his tenancy. He does not become even a share-holder or a partner in this property therefore it is un-Islamic way of dealing. It is a social injustice also. A Muslim is allowed to earn and save little money for himself and his family but hoarding and the accumulation of wealth to keep in steel boxes for years together is not allowed. The money should remain in circulation so that all the men are benefitted by it. There is a freedom of thought and action within the religious limitations and there is no compulsion in Islam, In civil life an ordinary Muslim is free to question the greatest Caliph of Islam, if he is in doubt about anything. As human beings all the rulers and the ruled are equal and they are the servants of the people and not the Masters. All the things belong to Allah who is the real master of this universe. Iqbal has emphasized this point in this verse:

اس سے بڑھ کر اور کیا فکر و

نظر کا انقلاب
پادشاہوں کی نہیں، اللہ کی
ہے یہ زمین³¹

(What more can be a change in thought and observation that the land belongs to Allah and not to the longs).

According to a tradition of the holy Prophet one should pay the wages of a labour before his sweat dries. Islam has given full protection to an employee. Women are free to marry and remarry and to have a divorce. She can have property and she shares inheritance. Man is allowed to have four wives in case of war, when there are many female war prisoners with children or when there are more women in number than men in a Muslim society whatever the cause may be but the men are bound to do justice to all of them and treat them equally. The maximum number of wives is four. The Quraishites cried for the basic changes brought by the Prophets as Iqbal speaks of in the following verses:

‘His creed cuts through the rulership and Lineage of Quraish, denies the supremacy of the Arabs; in his eyes lofty and lowly are the same thing, He has sat down at the same table with nis slave. He has not recognized the worth of the noble Arabs but associated with the uncouth Abyssinians: redskins have been confounded with the black skins; the honour of tribe and family has been destroyed. This equality and fraternity are foreign things. I know very well that Salman is a Mazdakite’³²

This is the cry of Abu Jahl in ‘Tawasin-i-Muhammad’ in Iqbal’s ‘Javid-Nama’. One gathers from these verses that the proud Arabs were not prepared to accept the philosophy of social justice. It will not be out of place

³¹ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, p. 13/655.

³² Javid Nama, Eng: Trans. A.J. Arberry London 1966 pp. 51, 57.

here if I quote a saying of Hadrat ‘Umar bin - Al-Khattab, the second righteous caliph of Islam who said on an occasion:

ان عشت فسا جعل
الناس بيانا واحدا

‘If could find a chance in my life-time, I will put all the people on equal footings economically according to their talents and needs’.

The word ‘Babban’ (بيانا) means method (tariqah), way of life (rawish) and a kind (qism) according to Arabic lexicology.³³ Salman Farsi and Abu Zar Ghifari were also of the same opinion. It should be borne in mind here that Salman of Persia was one of the Companions of the holy Prophet and he was not at all Mazdakite as Abu Jahl cried, However social justice is the need of the hour. The Muslim states should not play in the hands of the capitalists because Capitalism is also pseudo-Islamic. Neither Communism nor Capitalism Iqbal is for Islam, the religion revealed to him by Allah as the last and hence the most perfect code of life for all humanity.

³³ Lughat-ul-Hadis, Allama Waheed-uz-Zuman, Aram Bagh Karachi—Vol II p. 7.

WAS IQBAL A PANTHEIST?

Nazir Qaiser

What is Pantheism

Pantheism (Pan-, 'all', & theos, 'God', & ism), is the doctrine according to which "God is everything and everything is God". It is termed as Hama Ust in Persian literature. Wandat-ul-Wujud, in sufism, carries the same meaning. Wahdat-ul-Wujud or Unity-ism also identifies man, universe and God. Man dissolves his ego or existence in the essence of God. He is just a drop of water which slips into the ocean and loses its individuality. Shaikh Mohi-ud-Din Ibn-ul-Arabi clearly says in 'Fasus' "Being is One and the being of creation is nothing but the being of Creator". Ibn-i-Arabi is the leading upholder of this concept.³⁴ Thus Pantheism, Hama Ust and Wahdat-ul-Wujud are synonymous. Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim rightly says that Pantheism "maintains that all things are God or 'All' is God, which is exactly how Persian terminology describes it—Hama Ust, All is He. The Arabic expression for it (Wahdat-ul-Wujud, "The Unity of Being") is tinged with metaphysics and is a philosophical way of putting the same simple idea".³⁵ This concept of Wandat-al-Wujud is understood still in a better way, if read along with the opposing philosophy of Wahdat-al-Shahood, which means everything is not God but from God.

Iqbal was not Pantheism

³⁴ Tarikh-i-Tasawwuf-e-Islam, p. 307.

³⁵ The Metaphysics of Rumi, p. 139.

Iqbal was not a pantheist. His view of human self, his concept of fana, God's relationship to man and universe, his dynamic philosophy, and his writings against pantheism—all stand testimony to his anti-pantheistic position.

(1) Human Self: Iqbal believes in the reality of the human self. To him, the self is a fact. Iqbal says:

اگر گوئی کہ من وہم و
گمان است
نمودش چوں و نمود این
و آن است
بگو بامن کہ دارائے
کیست؟
یکے در خود نگرآن بے
نشان کیست؟³⁶

“If you say that ‘I’ is a mere imagination.

And its appearance is mere ‘appearance’;

Then tell me, who is it that entertains these imagination
Then tell me,
who is it that entertains these doubts

Just look within and think what this ‘appearance’ is.”

³⁶ Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid, p. 1701562.

To him, the self or the ego as a fact becomes more visible when “we appreciate the ego itself in the act of perceiving, judging, and willing.”³⁷ And “The main purpose of the Quran is to awaken in man the higher consciousness of his manifold relations with God and the universe”.³⁸ Dr. R.A Nicholson rightly argues that the capacity for action which is vehemently advocated by Iqbal’ depends ultimately on the conviction that Khudi (selfhood, individuality, personality) is real and is not merely an illusion of the mind”.³⁹

Again, Iqbal regards the self as actuality, which when developed, brings revolutionary changes and attains tremendous power. Man has not only to develop his own ego by adopting different measures but also to shape the destiny of the universe by establishing the kingdom of God on earth.

One of the most important characteristics of the self is its uniqueness, i.e. the personal individuality of man. Iqbal refers to ‘Rabbi’ (My Lord), used in the Quran as personal pronoun, To Iqbal it means to suggest the individuality and specificness of the soul.⁴⁰ While explaining this view Iqbal writes to Dr. R.A. Nicholson, “The moral and religious ideal of man is not self negation but self-affirmation, and he attains to this ideal by becoming more and more individual, more and more unique.”⁴¹

If man’s self is a fact and he possesses his own uniqueness and individuality according to Iqbal, then how it can be reconciled with pantheism which negates these -characteristics of the self?

(2) Concept of ‘fans’ Iqbal’s philosophy of Fana removes all doubts regarding his position as a non-pantheism. To Iqbal, ego is not to be

³⁷ The Reconstruction, p. 102.

³⁸ Ibid., pp, 8, 9.

³⁹ Iqbal’, *Asrar-i-Khudi*, (Trn) p. 11.

⁴⁰ The Reconstruction, p. 103,

⁴¹ The Secrets of the Self, (Trans) by Nicholson, p. xviii.

dissolved. It is to be fortified. "In higher sufism of Islam unitive experience is not the finite -ego effecting its own identity by some sort of absorption into the infinite ego: it is rather the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite."⁴² Thus to Iqbal the ego is no soluble when fully developed. It is not a drop of water which slips into the ocean and gets lost. He says:

به بحر ش گم شدن انجام ما نیست
اگر او را تو در گیری فنا نیست
خودی اندر خودی گنجد محال است
خودی را عین خود بودن کمال است⁴³

"It is not the goal of our journey to merge ourselves in His ocean. If you catch hold of Him, it is not fana (extinction)

It is impossible for an ego to be absorbed in another ego. For the ego to be itself is its perfection."

He further says;

The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality: it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it."⁴⁴

To Iqbal the test of self-realization and the development of ego is the retention of individuality. "And the climax of this development is reached when the ego is able to retain full self-possession even in the case of a direct contact with the all embracing ego".⁴⁵ Iqbal here gives the example of the

⁴² The Reconstruction, p. 110.

⁴³ Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid, p. 159/551.

⁴⁴ The Reconstruction, p. 198.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p, 118.

Holy Prophet's ascension (mi'raj) when he viewed the very essence of God and his own self was retained.⁴⁶ Again, in the Javid Nama he says:

‘That man alone is real who dares

Dares to see God face to face

No one can stand unshaken in His presence; and he who can, verily, he is pure god.’

To Iqbal, fana means the annihilation of those experiences which bar the revealing of the real self’. He said in 1936. When ‘the Divine orders have penetrated the Ego so much that private tendencies and inclinations are no more left, and only Divine satisfaction is its goal, then, some great men of the Sufis of Islam have called this state of life fana...’⁴⁷ Dr. A. Schimmel explains it thus: “Essentially it is the annihilation of human qualities and their substitution by more sublimated even Divine qualities, according to the prophetic tradition ‘Create in your-selves the attributes of God.’”

Iqbal belongs to that group of Sufis who interpreted the conception of fana metaphorically. Ali Hujwiri (known as Data Gunj Baksh), Jalal-ud-Din Rumi, and Mujaddid Alf Sani among many others, are the glaring examples of this group. To Hujwari, in the words of Khalifa Abdul Hakim, fana is the “moral transformation caused by the substitution of the lower by the higher self.”⁴⁸ It is to live in the attributes of the beloved. Rumi gives a subtle and beautiful example of iron and fire in connection with the relationship of God to man. The iron when put in fire, assumes the colour of the latter, but still it is not fire, it is different. Though looks like fire, it possesses its own individuality.⁴⁹ This means that man possesses-his own individuality and is not dissolved in the essence of God. Mujaddid's views are well known. “The

⁴⁶ The Reconstruction, p. 198.

⁴⁷ Gabriel's Wing, pp. 366-7.

⁴⁸ The Metaphysics of Rumi, p. 117.

⁴⁹ Matheawi, ii, 1348.55.

relation between man and God is according to the Mujaddid that of ‘Abd and Ma’bud or the worshipper and the worshipped. ‘Abdiyyat or servitude means that man should change his whole life according to the divine will and should obey His commandments of commission and commission simply because they are his commands.’⁵⁰

Iqbal’s views are diametrically different from Hindu mystic-ism according to which fana is the goal of man’s life and that is Nirvana according to which man, by dissolving himself, gets salvation. “Hindu outlook is that of an all-inclusive world-soul, a pantheistic substance or supreme being which is the sum of all that exists. Such a monotheistic conception implies that the ideal of life is found through unity of one’s self with this one ultimate reality and the consequent transcendence of all finite existence, including karma and transmigration.”⁵¹

(3) God’s Relationship: God’s relationship to man is both of immanence and transcendence though He is neither immanent nor transcendent in the absolute sense. Iqbal has beautifully discussed the transcendence and immanence of God in Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid. Iqbal answers to a question:

خودی را زندگی ایجاد غیر است
فراق عارف و معروف خیر است

از و خود را بریدن فطرت ماست
تپیدن نا رسیدن فطرت ماست

⁵⁰ Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi. The Mujaddid’s Conception of Tauhid p. 93.

⁵¹ Harold H. Tetus, Ethics for Today, pp. 506-7.

نہ او بیے ماء، نہ ما بیے او، چہ حال
است

فراق ما فراق اندر وصال است⁵²

“The life of the ego is to bring non-ego into existence, The separation of the knower and known is good.

To sever ourselves from Him is our nature,

And also to be restless and not to reach the goal.

‘Neither He without us, nor we without Him’. How strange; our separation is separation-in-union.”

Again, in *Asrar-i-Khudi*, he says:

اے چوں جاں اندر وجود عالمی
جان ما باشی و از ما می رمی⁵³

“O Thou that art as the soul in the body of the universe, Thou art our soul, and thou art ever fleeing from us.”

To elaborate, Iqbal believes that God is Immanent, in the sense that He himself is the ideal of human ego and is present in it as a possibility. He is Immanent because man and the universe are not ‘other to Him’. “He is Creator from within”. God is transcendent also because man develops his self by assimilating the attributes of God. Iqbal refers to the saying of the Prophet: ‘Takhallaqu-bi-Akhlaq qillah’—‘create in yourself the attributes of

⁵² *Gulshan-i-Raz-i-Jadid*, p. 157/549.

⁵³ *Asrar-i-Khudi*, p. 75/75.

God'. The question of assimilation would not have arisen if God were not transcendent and man's self were not separate from the essence of God.

But still he is neither immanent nor transcendent in the absolute sense of the word. God is not totally transcendent, according to Iqbal, because it will mean that God is sitting at some throne in the Heavens far away from man. Iqbal ironically tells the believers of such God;

بٹھا کے عرش پہ رکھا ہے تو
نے او واعظ
خدا وہ کیا ہے جو بندوں سے
احتراز کرے⁵⁴

O pious man; you have made God sit on 'Arsh' but what is that God who shuns the company of men.

He is not immanent as believed by the traditional pantheism. Iqbal does not believe that man becomes God at any stage, Rather man retains his personality even in the presence of God. As regards God's relationship to the universe, to Iqbal the not-self does not present itself as a confronting 'other' to God: the universe is character to the ultimate ego. He says, "nature, as we have seen is not a mass of pure materiality occupying a void. It is structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the ultimate Self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the picture squee phrase of the Quran it is the habit of Allah."⁵⁵

To Iqbal "nature or not-self is only a fleeting moment in the life of God." (Ibid) It reminds us of the Prophet's saying, 'the world is but a

⁵⁴ Bang-i-Dara, p. 106/106.

⁵⁵ The Reconstruction, p. 56.

moment” which means ‘a flash of Divine illumination (tajalli) revealing the one as the many and the many as the one’⁵⁶

This view of Iqbal far from the pantheistic view of Upanisads, according to which God and universe are not two separate entities and God “who pervades and controls the whole universe, is the whole universe.”⁵⁷ Further, it is opposed to Samakara’s view according to whom “Brahman has no genus, possesses no qualities does not act, and is related to nothing else.”⁵⁸

This relationship of God to man and to the universe clearly reveals that according to Iqbal, God, man, and universe are not identical.

(4) Iqbal’s dynamic philosophy: In the context of Iqbal’s whole philosophy, one cannot consider him a pantheist. To Iqbal self is not a datum. It is not given in complete form. Its capacities are to be developed harmoniously into a full grown personality with a definite purpose. And it is the result of this development that it earns freedom and immortality, the great assets of human life. Iqbal’s philosophy is dynamic. Action is his pivotal point. He clearly maintains “In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without any loss of his own identity, and transcends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation.”⁵⁹

(5) Iqbal’s own criticism: Wahdat-al-Wujud is a philosophical concept, and this is precisely the place where Iqbal says, “My spirit revolts against it.”⁶⁰ Further, he says, “Indeed the sufis committed a great mistake in understanding Tauheed and Wandat-ul-Wujud. These terms are not synonymous. The former is purely religious and latter philosophical.⁶¹ Besides these remarks, there are many writings, passages and verses which

⁵⁶ Dr. Nicholson’s Commentary on Rumi’s Mathuawi, i, ii, p. 92.

⁵⁷ R. C. Zaehrer, *Mysticism*, pp. 135 - 36.

⁵⁸ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 535.

⁵⁹ *Self in the Light of Relativity*, p. 401.

⁶⁰ *Iqbal Name*, part I, p. 53.

⁶¹ *Marha-i-Asrar-i-Khudi*, *Majallah Iqbal*, Oct. 53).

establish Iqbal's anti-pantheistic position. Above all, his whole book, *Asrar-i-Khudi*, was especially written against pantheism. Dr. Schimmel rightly says, "The *Asrar* had been written as a protest of *Arabi' Islam as a challenge against the Monism which permeates Persian poetry".⁶²

Accusation Refuted:

Some critics quote Iqbal's verses which prove him as a pantheist. But they deplorably ignore the chronological development of Iqbal's thought. The fact is that while he was in England from 1905 to 1908 he was a pantheistic mystic. But afterwards he changed his position. The letter which his teacher, Dr. McTaggart, wrote to him proves him to be anti-pantheistic. Dr. McTaggart wrote to Iqbal after seeing his changed position

"Have you not changed your position very much? Surely in the days when we used to talk philosophy together you were much more a pantheist and mystic."⁶³ To my mind this change in Iqbal was due to the influence of Rumi, whose *Mathnawi* he read thoroughly after 1908. It is why his respect and tribute to Rumi are paid in his books written after 1908.

Again, some casual observers hold that Iqbal reverted to Pantheism from 1926 till his death. But this too is not a fact. It is clear from his writings appearing after 1926 e.g. in *Zabur-i-Ajam* (1927) Iqbal said: "it is not the goal of our journey to merge ourselves in His ocean. If you catch hold of Him it is not *fana* (extinction). It is impossible for an ego to be absorbed in another ego. For the ego to be itself is its perfection. In his Lectures, delivered in December, 1928 Iqbal clearly repudiated the concept of Pantheism. He asserted "The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is, on the other hand, a more precise definition of it."

⁶² *The Reconstruction*, p. 198. (Iqbal's own trans)

⁶³ Prof. M.M. Sharif, *About Iqbal and His Thought*, p. 13.

That man does not become God at any stage and can retain his personality even in the presence of God, is enunciated by Iqbal in Javid Alma (1932) thus:

“That man alone is real who dares—Dares to see God face to face

No one can stand unshaken in His presence and he who can, verily, he is pure gold”.⁶⁴

To believe in such reversions is to negate his philosophy of the self with all its implications to distort his real thought and diminish his position as a dynamic thinker.

Further, some hold that Iqbal’s theory of time proves Iqbal as a Wujudi. Undoubtedly Iqbal identified ‘Dahr’ with God. But as the quotation says, time (serial) and space (universe) are “reflections of Dahr” Then how is the reflection of God Himself? To Iqbal “universe is a reality to be reckoned with”⁶⁵

Whereas to Wandat-ul-Wujud the universe is identical with God.

To conclude, a casual study of some of the verses of Iqbal may give the impression that he was a pantheist; but this impression is dispelled after one studies his total system of thought which includes his views on man, God, and the Universe.

⁶⁴ Jabriel’s Wing, pp. 339—40.

⁶⁵ The Reconstruction, p. 10.

IQBAL'S THOUGHT ON ECONOMIC BEVEL OPENT"

Muzaffar Hussain

The function of art is to transmute ideas into sentiments so that they can be infected to other people without rigour. Art and poetry are therefore media of complete and unhindered communication which are used as cultural tools to create and sustain a social mood for establishing a community of experience. This is why art and poetry are often employed for the inculcation of cultural values as through them the values are easily assimilated and become part of personality immediately. In view of the formative influences of art and poetry on the spirit of a people, their role in a nation-building, and programmes of economic development cannot be ignored. It is not well realized that a psychological climate must be created before any drama of development is staged. Iqbal is keenly aware of the constructive role of art and poetry in the overall development of a nation. "The spiritual' health of a people," says he, "largely depends on the kind of inspiration which their artists and poets receive.

He, therefore, attaches great importance to the poets and the life-quality of the inspiration received by them. In his view spiritual health enables a people to conquer nature and muster material power." From the view point of art he regards only that type of inspiration as genuine, which synthesizes Beauty with Power. "To seek what is scientifically called adjustment with nature is to recognize her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimuli and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance of 'What is' with a view to create 'what ought to be' is health and life. All else is decay and death. Both God and man live by perpetual

creation." Life is thus an idealistic enterprise and an creative activity. Elucidating his concept of a true artist he says:

The artist who is blessing to mankind defies life. He is an associate of God and feels the contact of Time and Eternity in his soul. In the words of Fichte, he sees all Nature full, large and abundant as opposed to him who sees all things thinner, smaller and emptier than they actually are."⁶⁶

Philosophy of Change and Power

Iqbal idealizes power; so much so that he visualizes God as Power and eulogizes the 'powerful man'. Defining his concept of the powerful man he says:

"The powerful man creates environment, the feeble have to adjust themselves to it."⁶⁷ Through the human assimilation of Divine attributes the powerful man is infused with infinite aspiration and through the realization of his aspirations he attains the status of God's representative on earth. To win such a position under the Heaven he must create a new physical and social environment, or, in other words he should strive to bring the 'God's kingdom on earth.

Iqbal is the prophet of change and his yearning for change assumes almost a passionate fervour Change is a key-word in his philosophic system and poetic flourishes. In his world-view, change is a permanent phenomenon in the Universe.

سکوں محال ہے قدرت کے کارخانے میں
ثبات ایک تغیر کو ہے زمانے میں⁶⁸

Nothing is at rest in Nature Permanence is only for change

⁶⁶ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal; S.A. Vahid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal; S.A. Vahid.

And speaking of the human individual he says:

ملا مزاج تغیر پسند
کچھ ایسا
کیا قرار نہ زیر فلک
کہیں میں نے⁶⁹

So change-loving a nature was bestowed on me

That I could not be at rest under the heaven

In the-life of society, too, it is the change and the capacity for incessant struggle which bestows on it life and virility:

جس میں نہ ہو انقلاب موت ہے وہ زندگی
روح امم کی حیات کشمش انقلاب⁷⁰

A life bereft of revolution is nothing short of death, For in revolutionary struggle lies the life of nations.

نشان یہی ہے زمانے میں زندہ قوموں کا
کہ صبح و شام بدلتی ہیں ان کی
تقدیریں⁷¹

The cardinal sign of living nations Lies in their ever-changing destinies

⁶⁹ Bang-i-Dara / Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 148/148.

⁷⁰ Bal-i-Jibreel /K/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal. p. 100/392.

⁷¹ Armaghan-i-Hijaz/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 42/684.

Cultural Approach to the Problem of Poverty

One of the very basic changes which Iqbal yearned to bring in the Muslim society was the eradication of poverty from the masses. He had a great repugnance for poverty and economic backwardness, and loathed it.

کیا یہ ممکن نہیں کہ ہر فرد مفلسی کے دکھ سے آزاد ہو؟ کیا ایسا نہیں ہو
سکتا کہ گلی کوچوں میں چپکے چپکے کراہنے والوں کی دل خراش صدائیں
ہمیشہ کے لیے حرف غلط کی طرح مٹ جائیں۔⁷²

Were it possible that every individual is rid of the bane of poverty?

Can't it be that the harrowing sobs and groans of those who rot unnoticed in the lanes could be silenced from the world for good.

However, his approach in dealing with the problem of poverty was determined by the Islamic cultural pattern according to which life must be regarded as a unity. In contradistinction to Sensate and Ideational cultures, the Islamic culture insists on reciprocal relationship between economy and morality. In Sensate culture the supreme object of life is pleasant thrill whereas in Ideational culture passive contemplation is the highest ideal. In the idealistic culture of Islam, however, the highest ideal is the creation of a society free from fear and want and in this perspective the eradication of poverty from the society becomes the highest virtue of man prompted by love of God. "While the early Christians glorified in poverty and unworldliness", says Iqbal, "Islam looks on poverty as a vice". A society steeped in abject poverty cannot participate in higher cultural activities which

⁷² Ilmui Iqtisad.

are so essential for the development of the transcendental aspects of human personality. Says Iqbal:

مفلسی کا آزار انسان کے روحانی قوی کا دشمن ہے۔⁷³

The malady of poverty is inimical to man's spiritual faculties.

غریبی قوائے انسانی پر بہت برا اثر ڈالتی ہے بلکہ بسا اوقات انسانی روح کے مجلی آئیہ کو اس قدر زنگ آلود کر دیتی ہے کہ اخلاق اور تمدنی اعتبار سے وجود و عدم برابر ہو جاتا ہے۔⁷⁴

Poverty stunts human potentialities. Sometimes, it tarnishes his soul to the extent of completely eliminating the difference between his existence and extinction as a moral and cultural entity.

تم جانتے ہو کہ مفلسی تمام جرائم کا منبع ہے۔ اگر ایسی بلائے بے درماں کا قلع قمع ہو جائے تو دنیا جنت کا نمونہ نظر آئے۔⁷⁵

You know full well that poverty is the source of all crimes. If this persists evil could be eradicated, the world would become a model of Paradise.

Taking moral-cum-economic view of the problem of poverty he emphasizes the vital relationship between the economy and morality.

⁷³ Ilmui Iqtisad.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

علم الاخلاق کا موضوع وہ افعال ہیں جو زندگی کے اعلیٰ ترین مقصد کے حصول کی شرائط ہیں اور علم الاقتصاد وہ اشیاء ہیں جو انسان کے معمولی مقاصد کے حصول کے لیے ضروری ہیں۔ اس سے یہ نتیجہ نکلتا ہے کہ انسان کے معمولی مقاصد کی پوری قدر سمجھنے کے لیے ان پر اخلاقی مقاصد کے لحاظ سے نظر ڈالنی چاہیے۔ مثلاً خوراک، لباس اور مکان ہماری زندگی کے لیے ضروری ہیں اور ان کی قدر ان مقاصد کی قدر پر منحصر ہے جن کو یہ پورا کرتے ہیں مگر زندگی کے ان معمولی مقاصد کی اصل وقعت صرف اسی صورت میں معلوم ہو سکتی ہے جو ہم ان پر زندگی کے اعلیٰ مقاصد کے لحاظ سے غور کریں۔ اس لیے علم الاقتصاد کو وضاحت سے سمجھنے کے لیے کسی قدر مطالعہ علم الاخلاق بھی ضروری ہے۔ اکثر مصنفین نے اس صداقت کو محسوس نہیں کیا۔ جس کا نتیجہ یہ ہوا کہ دولت بلا لحاظ زندگی کے افضل ترین مقاصد کی بجائے خود ایک مقصد تصور کی گئی جس سے بعض تمدنی اصلاحوں کے ظہور پذیر ہونے میں بے جا تعویق ہوئی اور دولت سے پیار کرنے والوں کی حرص و آز پہلے سے زیادہ تیز ہو گئی۔

کسی شے کی حقیقی قدر و منزلت اس پر منحصر ہے کہ وہ کہاں تک ہماری زندگی کے اعلیٰ ترین مقصد کے حصول میں ہم کو مدد دیتی ہے یا یوں کہیے کہ

ہر شے کی اصل وقعت کا فیصلہ تمدنی لحاظ سے ہوتا ہے۔ دولت کو ہی لے لیں۔
اگر یہ شے ہمارے افضل ترین مقاصد کے حصول میں ہمیں مدد نہیں دیتی تو
پھر اس کا فائدہ؟

Ethics discusses those subjects which are connected with the achievement of highest human ideals; while economics takes into account only those activities which lead to the attainment of ordinary goals of life. It can be inferred that in order to understand man's ordinary goals properly these should be looked in the perspective of moral values. For example, food, clothing and shelter are essential for our life. Their value depends upon the value of those objectives which are achieved through them. But the importance of the ordinary goals of life can only be understood if we consider them in the light of the highest ideals of life. Study of Ethics is, thus, necessary for full comprehension of economics. But most of the authors have not realized this fact with the result that wealth in itself became the highest objective, irrespective of highest values of life. This caused inordinate delay in the realization of cultural values and love and lust for money became rampant.

The real worth of a thing depends upon its efficacy in the realization of the highest ideals of life. Stated otherwise, the real value of a thing can only be adjudged in cultural perspective. Take the example of wealth. If it does not help achieve our highest ideals of life it is nothing but useless."⁷⁶

He strongly believed in the reciprocally of morality and economics. In his view both had a symbiotic relationship in which the ethical factor plays a vital role in economic motivations. Says he, "If we want to turn out good

⁷⁶ Bond Iqtisad.

working men, good shop-keepers, good artisans and above all good citizens, we must first make them good Muslims."⁷⁷

Iqbal regards the world of matter as subservient to man in the realisation of his social goals

مقام بندہ مومن کا ہے ورائے

سپہر

زمین سے تا بہ ثریا تمام لات

و منات⁷⁸

The destination of Momin is beyond Heavens,

From the Earth to the highest galaxy are the idols of Lat-O-Manat.

یہ نیلگوں فضا جسے کتے

ہیں آسماں

ہمت ہ وپر کشا تو حقیقت

میں کچھ نہیں

بالائے سر رہا ہے تو نام اس

کا آسماں

زیر پر آگیا تو یہی آسماں

زمین⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Tasanif-i-Iqbal, (Fahqiqi Aur Tauzihi Mutala), Dr. Raeuddin Hashmi.

⁷⁸ Armaghan-i-Hijaz/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 26/668.

⁷⁹ Bal-i-Jibreel/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 132/424.

This blue vault, named as the sky,
Is nothing before the determination of man
Above your head it is known as the sky,
Underneath the wings this very sky is named as Earth.

ہیں تیرے تصوف میں یہ
بادل یہ گھٹائیں
یہ گنبد افلاک، یہ خاموش
فضائیں
یہ کوہ یہ صحرا یہ سمندر
یہ ہوائیں
تھیں پیش نظر کل تو
فرشتوں کی ادائیں
آئینہ ایام میں آج اپنی اپنی
ادا دیکھ⁸⁰

Subjugated to you are these clouds,
This cupola of the skies, this silent void.
These mountains, these deserts, these oceans, these winds.

⁸⁰ Bat-i-Jibreel/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 132/424.

Heretofore thou looked on them as if these are manipulated by the angels.

Henceforth thou art to manipulate them according to thine own designs.

The obstruction of the world of matter in the realization of human ideals in fact an incentive for struggle and a favourable circumstance for the development of his self. According to the teachings of the Holy Quran, the universe that confronts us is not 'Batil' (Jbt); it has its uses and the most important use of it is that in our efforts to overcome the obstructions offered by it we "sharpen our insight and prepare ourselves for an insertion into what lies below the surface of phenomenon coming closer to God" for, "it is the power and capture over the concrete which enables us to go beyond the concrete."⁸¹ Iqbal therefore suggests:

"The world of matter which confronts the self as its 'other' is an indispensable obstruction which forces our being into fresh formation."⁸²

Men of Action of Practical Attitude

Practical attitude therefore, gets an extremely important place in the philosophic system of Iqbal because it is through the con-quest of natural environment that the human self grows to attain its higher spiritual positions. In this context, Iqbal regards action as the "highest form of contemplation" which produces its results every moment.

یہی آئین فطرت ہے یہی
اسلوب فطرت ہے
جو ہے راہ عمل میں گامزن

⁸¹ The Reconstruction

⁸² Ibid.

Such is the law of Nature; such is the style of Nature, The man of action is the beloved of Nature.

یہ گھڑی محشر کی ہے تو عرصہ
محشر میں ہے
پیش کر غافل عمل کوئی اگر
دفتر میں ہے⁸⁴

Thou stand right in the midst of the Day of Judgement. Bring forth record of good actions, if thou has Lany.

ہزار کام ہیں مردان حر کو دنیا میں
انہیں کے ذوق عمل سے ہیں امتوں کے نظام⁸⁵

The free men have a thousand errands to perform in this world,
Through their love for action the nations are organized.

Iqbal deplors and laments a human specimen who does not act for the realization of ideals:

ناپید ہے بندہ عمل مست
باقی ہے فقط نفس درازی⁸⁶

⁸³ Bang-i-Dara/Kuiliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 71/71.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 260/260.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 159/621.

⁸⁶ Zarb-i-Kalim/Kuiliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 88/550.

The man of action is non-existent, merely breathing creatures exist.

He strongly denounces such knowledge which does not invoke action. He therefore condemns all such literature and philosophy which do not lead to action:

نادان! ادب و فلسفہ
کوئی چیز نہیں ہے
اسباب ہنر کے لیے لازم
ہے تگ و دو⁸⁷

O Ignorant! Literature and Philosophy are naught,

Struggle is essential for the acquisition of skills.

افکار کے نغمہ ہائے بے
صوت
ہیں ذوق عمل کے
واسطے موت⁸⁸

The voiceless melodies of Polemics, Spell death for motivation and action.

For him firm conviction is the elixer of life and only such philosophies which are inspired by strong convictions and emanate into action are worthy of note:

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 167/629.

⁸⁸ Zarb-i-Kalim/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 18/480.

حرف اس قوم کا بے سوز
عمل زار و زبوں
ہو گیا پختہ عقائد سے تمہی
جن کا ضمیر⁸⁹

Letters become uninspiring and action a medley of confusion, When a nation is devoid of firm convictions.

جہاں تازہ کی افکار تازہ سے ہے
نمود
کہ سنگ و خشت سے ہوتے
ہیں جہاں پیدا⁹⁰

New worlds are born-of new ideas. Bricks and stones do not create new worlds.

But both conviction and action emanate from high ideals and lofty objectives which are held supreme in life.

دے ولولہ شوق جسے لذت
پرواز
کر سکتا ہے وہ ذرہ مہ و مہر

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 100/562.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 17/479,

Enthused and inspired to soar high,

Even a tiny particle can conquer the moon and the sun.

A nation inspired by high ideals cannot rest contented with the prevailing situation and must therefore work incessantly to change and mould its environment according to its needs. Motivated by the urge to bring into being an ideal social order with a view to seek the pleasure of God, a momin is never at rest. He has to conquer the whole world. He has to manipulate the physical environment in order to make it more productive and create a social environment free from fear and want. A continuing revolution is thus a life mission:

میسر آتی ہے فرصت فقط
 غلاموں کو
 نہیں ہے بندہ حر کے لیے
 جہاں فراغ⁹²

Idleness is the pastime of the slaves

The free have not a moment of leisure in the world.

He therefore exhorts man to wage a continuous struggle against an imperfect universe which has to be perfected through his own efforts. He must create his own environment.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 85/547.

⁹² Zarb-i-Kalim\kulliyat-I-Iqbal, p. 85/547.

بڑھے جا یہ کوہ گراں توڑ
کر

طلسم زمان و مکان توڑ
کر

جہاں اور بھی ہیں ابھی بے
نمود

کہ خالی نہیں ہے ضمیر
وجود

ہر اک منتظر تری یلغار
کا

تری شوخی فکر و کردار
کا

تو ہے فاتح عالم خوب و
زشت

تجھے کیا بتاؤں تری

Excelsior Overcome Himalayan obstacles

Mitigate the magic of Time and Space

Many a world are yet to be born

The essence of belong is not barren

Everything awaits thine invasion, and

Thine dashing ideas and action

Thou are the conquerer of the worlds of the beautiful and the ugly What a glorious life has been bestowed on thou.

Iqbal's poetry is thus a message of hope and confidence, will and determination aroused by high ideals. In one sentence his entire philosophy can be summed up as under:

"The higher the ideal the more strenuous the effort, the more strenuous the effort the more sedulous the action, the more sedulous the action the more positive the results."

ہے آب حیات اسی جہاں

میں

شرط اس کے لیے ہے تشنہ

کامی⁹⁴

⁹³ Bali-Jibreel/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, pp. 128-29/420-21.

⁹⁴ Zarb-i-Kaiim/Kulliyat-i-Iqbai, p. 88/550.

The elixir of life is available in this very world,

The only condition is that thou developeth a crave for it.

ہمت کو
شناوری
مبارک
پیدا نہیں
بحر کا
کنارا⁹⁵

Hail determination to swim, The ocean is boundless

چاہے تو بدل ڈالے ہمیت
چمنستان کی
یہ ہستی دانا ہے، بینا ہے،
توان ہے⁹⁶

If he willeth, he can refashion this worldly garden, Man hath been blessed with wisdom, vision and-power.

It will thus be seen that the intellectual and emotional climate created by Iqbal's poetry is highly conducive to the popularization of the ideology of

⁹⁵ Bal-i-Jibreel/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 103/395.

⁹⁶ Bang-i-Dara/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 179/179.

economic progress. His philosophic visions and poetic flourishes have a special appeal for our masses. These characteristics of Iqbal's art and thought make his message exceedingly relevant to economic development. It can be used to spearhead all developmental efforts as it enables us to grasp the cultural rationale of economic achievement and creates a social mood in people without which no economic progress can be made.

IQBAL, KANT, McTAGGART AND WARD

Dr Muhammad Maruf (a) Iqbal and Kant

I

When Iqbal was studying philosophy, Kant had a very potent influence in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics. He, in fact, laid down the fundamentals of knowledge on which modern epistemology got its footings Iqbal in the very beginning of his first lecture.⁹⁷ endorsed the Kantian model of human knowledge thus: ... knowledge is sense-perception elaborated by understanding'.⁹⁸ And again in the same lecture he brings out the conceptual nature of human knowledge thus: '... the character of man's knowledge is conceptual, and it is with the weapon of this conceptual knowledge that man approaches the observable aspects of Reality'.⁹⁹ Thus, human knowledge, in so far as it deals with (Phenomena' as stressed by Kant), is conceptual, i.e. involves concepts, and in the words of the Quran the superiority of man to other beings, including angels, lies in his capability to use concepts.¹⁰⁰ Again, what is really important in Iqbal is that according to him the model of all human knowledge, including the highest form of mystical or religious knowledge, is basically the same as the empirical knowledge.¹⁰¹ This led him to reject the doctrine of patent 'Pantheism' to which the final goal of human experience is 'fama', the abnegation of one's own 'individuality' and 'personality' in the Individual and Person of the highest Being; Iqbal affirms

⁹⁷ The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, (ed) Dr. 'avid Iqbal, (Lahore: Ashraf, 1978).

⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 12.

⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 13.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 13.

¹⁰¹ See my articles on "Iqbal's Philosophy of knowledge" in Contributing to Iqbal's Thought (ed) by the author, chapter I.

'bags' as the final end of all human life and religion, as we have said before. In his model of knowledge, as that of Kant, the situation demands a necessary trio of elements, namely, (i) the subject, (ii) object, and (iii) the relationship of 'sensing' to use a term from Spinoza. The same trio is involved even in the highest form of human knowledge. This position of Iqbal is really original.

Iqbal regrets that, like al-Ghazali, Kant 'failed to see that thought, in the very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude'.¹⁰² Kant's analysis of human thought or reason in his famous First Critique led him to the position that 'human understanding is limited to the phenomena of sensory experience',¹⁰³ and was forced by his own premises to the impossibility of "rational metaphysics"; though he tried on practical and moral grounds to re-establish the ideas of God, freedom and immortality in his Critique of Practical Reason as working hypotheses having their utility for practical purposes. He failed to establish them on purely rational grounds or on the basis of any direct experience of man. Iqbal regrets that this great genius failed to capitalize on his great findings due to the limitations imposed on his thought by the Western "climate of opinion" within which he had to move and think. He puts forward two very potent pleas against Kant's agnostic position regarding reality ; (i) in the face of the more recent scientific developments the case for rational theology is not so hopeless and (ii) 'Kant's verdict can be accepted only if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible',¹⁰⁴ says Iqbal. Imam al-Ghazali undertook the same mission of curbing the excesses of reason centuries before Kant; but unlike the latter, he sought positive aspect of knowledge in mystic experiences which rendered the knowledge of reality possible.¹⁰⁵ Iqbal. However, partly agreeing with both, surpasses them

¹⁰² The Reconstruction, pp. 6-7.

¹⁰³ John Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, (London SCM Press, rev. ed. 1981), p. 75.

¹⁰⁴ The Reconstruction, P. 182.

¹⁰⁵ "Mission of al-Ghazali, Kant and, Iqbal" The Pakistan Times.

in his view of knowledge of reality when he holds that it is not possible through any one single source only; knowledge of the real, according to him, is possible through all the three sources amenable to man, viz., Nature, History, and 'Qalb' (i.e., inner intuition), as said before. This renders his view of knowledge much more comprehensive and concrete.

In his later two Critiques, *The Critique of Practical Reason* and *The Critique of Judgement*, laid ample stress on the importance of value. In his former Critique he concentrated on the good will as the highest good, while in the latter Critique his discussion centered round the category of 'numinosum',¹⁰⁶ the two great values in human life Lotze and the neo-Kanians mostly based their thought on the axiological aspects of Kant's theory. Lotze held that our ultimate convictions are of three kinds: (i) logical necessities, (ii) facts of experience, and (iii) the determinations of value.¹⁰⁷ For him these convictions are all independent; whereas, as seen before, for Iqbal values, facts and logical necessities all form part of the organic whole, and none can be understood independently. Both Kant and Iqbal agree that respect for humanity is one of the highest human values as well as the principle of conduct. Although respect for humanity is one of the chief subjects discussed by Iqbal, both in his prose and poetry, he reproduces Kant's own formula. In his lectures when he writes: "Treat humanity always as an end and never as a means only".¹⁰⁸

Kant and Iqbal differ substantially on the concepts of space and time. Iqbal would certainly agree with him that we should approach them subjectively, and Kant was not without his sufi predecessors in the world of Islam in this regard. But for Kant both space and time were the "Forms of Sensibility",¹⁰⁹ the moulds which organize sense-data into rounded-off

¹⁰⁶ "Numinosum" is the category round which Kant's whole aesthetic structure revolves.

¹⁰⁷ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 75.

¹⁰⁸ *The Reconstruction*, p. 119.

¹⁰⁹ Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*

objects. He described them as both ideal and subjective. However, like other on, (Eng. tran.) N. K. Smith,

Westerners he takes them in a unilateral sense¹¹⁰ Iqbal, though taking both space and time subjectively, treats of them as veritable "realities"; for him they are the aspects of divide life, as said before. He agrees with Bergson that time, in its real sense, is the stuff of which the reality is made.¹¹¹ One can refer to the saying of the Holy Prophet quoted (p.b.u.h.) before, according to which God is Time. Again, Iqbal rejects the unilateral treatment of Kant and his followers. He agrees with the Muslim scholars Jala-ud-Din Dawwani (1427-1502) in his book *Zaura* and Shaikh Fakhr-ud-Din al-Iraqi (d. 1287), the Sufi poet of Baghdad, that time and space are both "multi-lateral". They conceive 'infinite varieties of time', says Iqbal, 'relative to the varying grades of being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality'.¹¹² Among the Muslim theologians and thinkers it was Imam Fakhr-ud-Din al Razi (1149-1209) who discussed time on multi-lateral basis in his book *Eastern Discussions*.¹¹³ Again, they have conceived the concept of space on parallel multi-lateral basis, relative to the nature of the being or sphere to which it belongs. A similar view of time was advocated by Mir Muhammad Baqir,¹¹⁴ especially his view of real time is instructive. However, as said before, Iqbal conceived time and space as the interpretations which thought puts on the creative energy of God Thus, space and time both are subjective according to him and in this respect he agrees with Kant.

Regarding the question of 'immortality', Iqbal appreciates Kant's moral argument. He urges that in modern times the line of argument for personal immortality is on the whole ethical. Iqbal says, 'With Kant immortality is beyond the scope of speculative reason: it is a postulate of practical reason,

¹¹⁰ Western approach to all subjects is mostly unilateral. Their only difference lies in accepting or rejecting a position; they seldom approach a problem on more than one planes.

¹¹¹ *Creative Evolution*, (Eng. trans) Arthus Mitchell, chapter on "Duration."

¹¹² *The Reconstruction*, p. 75.

¹¹³ Al-Razis book *Uloom-al-Sharqiyah*, (Eng. tram used).

¹¹⁴ *The Reconstruction*, p. 76.

an axiom of man's moral consciousnesses. According to Kant, man pursues the Supreme Good which comprises both virtue and happiness, the two heterogeneous notions. As their confluence is not possible in the narrow span of an individual's ephemeral life, we are, says Kant, driven to postulate immortal life and the existence of God; it is the demand of justice that virtue and happiness must go together Iqbal remarks on this position;¹¹⁵ It is not clear, however, why the consummation of virtue and happiness should take infinite time, and how God can effectuate the confluence between mutually exclusive notions'.¹¹⁶ However, Kant's theory implies that immortality is the lot of every individual human being (being a moral being); while as we have said before, Iqbal, like the great Persian sufi poet Jalal-ud-Dm Rumi (1207-1273) believes in the doctrine of "earned immortality",¹¹⁷ a concept not known to the West till as late as Dr Mc Taggart Again, for Kant and Iqbal both 'self' is a reality ; Kant calls it "noumenon" which is the subject of "rational psychology". And "rational psychology" according to him was impossible. Iqbal will agree with him on the unintelligibility of the self when he admits that its reality is too profound to be intellectualized"¹¹⁸ However, Iqbal takes refuge in the sentimental (intuitive) approach and holds that we can reach the self in us through direct "feeling" (i.e., the feeling of Iamness', as he calls it)¹¹⁹ which is both "ultimate"¹²⁰ and "spontaneous".¹²¹ Thus for Iqbal 'self' is not wholly unknowable as claimed by Kant. Also, both Kant and Iqbal reject the "simple substance theory" of the self, and, what is interesting, Iqbal follows his argument to show that self need not be a "simple substance" in order to be immortals.¹²²

¹¹⁵ The Reconstruction, p. 112.

¹¹⁶ . Ibid. p. 113.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p. 119.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, p. 98.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p. 56.

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 98.

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 106.

¹²² Ibid, p. 101.

Iqbal appreciates Kant's rejection of the ontological argument for the existence of God. He uses his patent example of imagined one hundred thalers to prove that mere idea of a thing or being nowise leads to its existence.¹²³ This argument is well popular with the students of modern philosophy who have studied this German genius. His criticism of the argument under review is based on his criticism of Descartes' fundamental position: 'Cogito ergo sum' (his famous saying which is also his basic philosophical proposition). Iqbal states his criticism in his lectures thus; The "I think" which accompanies every thought is, according to Kant, a purely condition of thought, and the transition from a purely formal condition of thought to onto-logical substance is logically illegitimate'.¹²⁴ He endorses his line of argument as thoroughly convincing and may rightly be called as final against any line of thought following the pattern of the Cartesian first principle.

However, what is fundamentally different between Kant and Iqbal is the former's rejection of metaphysics as an impossibility. It was one of the ultimate conclusions drawn by Kant on the basis of his premises in the First Critique. He rejected the possibility of "rational Cosmology", "rational psychology" and "rational theology" which ultimately led him to the rejection of all metaphysical knowledge. But his conclusions were based on his initial supposed bifurcation between "Phenomenon" and "Noumenon", and that between, what he called, "sensible intuition" and intellectual intuition",¹²⁵ which led him to the dogmatic conclusion that the "Noumenon" was unknowable to the human reason. Iqbal, on the other hand, as said before, was led to emphasise the need for a rational or metaphysical basis for religion. He says, Science may ignore a rational metaphysics ; indeed, it has ignored it so far. Religion can hardly afford to ignore the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the

¹²³ Ibid, p. 130.

¹²⁴ The Reconstruction, p. 101.

¹²⁵ Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, p. 42.

environment in which humanity finds itself'.¹²⁶ Thus for Iqbal what religion lacks today is a metaphysical foundation, and herein lies the fundamental difference between Kant and Iqbal.

(b) Iqbal and Dr. McTaggart

John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, a British contemporary and teacher of Iqbal at Trinity College, originated an atheistic pluralistic idealism. He was rated among the top thinkers of Anglo-American idealism. He expounded his religious ideas in his book *Some Dogmas of Religion* Where he basically differs from Iqbal is his belief that the existence of a personal God is not essential for religion. Macquarrie describes his system as "religious atheism" which sounds paradoxical. McTaggart discusses the ideas of God, immortality, and freedom. Of immortality he declared that there were arguments strong enough to justify such a belief. He rather refutes arguments against immortality of the self.¹²⁷ Iqbal, however, rejects his view that 'the self is elementally immortal'¹²⁸ on the ground that it participates in the elemental eternity of the Absolute, that 'the individual ego is a differentiation of the eternal Absolute...'¹²⁹ To this Iqbal objects, 'To my mind such a differentiation should give it only a capacity for immortality and not immortality itself. Personally I regard immortality as an inspiration and not something eternally achieved. Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego'.¹³⁰ However, he appreciates Dr. McTaggart because he 'emphasized personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in Europe...'¹³¹

¹²⁶ *The Reconstruction*, p. 2.

¹²⁷ *Some Dogmas*, p. 77.

¹²⁸ Iqbal's article on "McTaggart's Philosophy" S.A. Vahid, p. 122.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

Iqbal compares him even to the great Muslim mystic al-Hallaj in this regard. He regards his position on immortality as "almost apostolic".

Like Iqbal and other idealists, McTaggart believes that the self is differently constituted from material things. He wrote to Iqbal in 1919, 'I agree with you, as you know, in regarding quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolutes. Whatever they are, it is quite certain to me that they are not that'.¹³² Even if the body were regarded as a necessary accompaniment of the self, it might be the case that on the destruction of one body, the self passes to another body,¹³³ He believed on the possibility of "a plurality of lives".¹³⁴ Like Iqbal he believes in the continuity of self and life: what is gained in one life may be strengthened, not only carried over, in the next life. However, unlike Iqbal, he believed in the "substance theory of the self".¹³⁵ According to McTaggart, selves are the ultimate reality, a real substance. Iqbal remarks, 'All that I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the results of English neo-Hegelianism'.¹³⁶

Again, unlike Iqbal, McTaggart believed in a finite God. He discusses God's omnipotence in this connection. He argues, 'An omnipotent person is one who can do anything', including altering the laws of thought or the multiplication tables.¹³⁷ Now in this sense omnipotence is incompatible with personality (which requires some thing existing outside of its own will), and irreconcilable with goodness (in view of the presence of evil in the world). This leads him to the idea of a finite God who can be called personal, good, and even 'supreme' in the sense of having more power than any other being. He goes on to reject the idea of God on the ground, 'If all reality is a

¹³² Dr. McTaggart's letter to Iqbal written Dec. 1919, rep. Ibid, p. 118

¹³³ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, pp. 51-52.

¹³⁴ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 52.

¹³⁵ Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, p. 121f. Iqbal rejected the "substance theory" of the self in *The Reconstructions*, also my article on "Allama Iqbal on 'Immortality' " *Religious Studies*, vol. 18, No. 3, Sep. 1982.

¹³⁶ Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, p. 121.

¹³⁷ McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 202.

harmonious system of selves, it is perhaps itself sufficiently Godlike to dispense with a God'.¹³⁸ Again unlike Iqbal, he believes that God cannot be a person or self, for no person can include another self. For him ultimate reality is eternal system of selves united in the harmony of a lose 'so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystical rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection'.¹³⁹ He compares this system to a college, whose members have more reality than the college itself. Iqbal urges that McTaggart's position on the mutual inclusion of egos is based on his idea of love as a passivity. He says, 'Love is no passivity. It is active and creative'.¹⁴⁰ Dr McTaggart's real difficulty stems from the position that the 'self is unique and impervious. How could one self, however superior, include other selves? Rumi, the mystic poet, felt the same difficulty. Iqbal concedes, 'Perhaps it is not possible intellectually to conceive this ultimate unity as an all-embracing self. It is my belief,... that McTaggart's Hegelian inspiration marred the vision which was vouchsafed him'.¹⁴¹ For Iqbal the ultimate reality is 'a rationally directed life which,... cannot be conceived except as an organic whole,...'¹⁴² He rather conceives God as an ego, what he chooses to call, "the Ultimate Ego".¹⁴³

Again, time and matter are unreal for Dr. McTaggart. Iqbal subjects his concept of time to a searching criticism in his Lectures. He says, 'Time, according to Dr. McTaggart, is unreal because every event is past, present, and future' . Thus each event 'combines characteristics which are incompatible with each other'.¹⁴⁴ He begins his criticism by saying that 'the argument proceeds on the assumption that the serial nature of time is final... This is taking time not as a living creative moment, but as a static absolute,

¹³⁸ Macquarries, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 53.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁴⁰ Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, pp. 124-25.

¹⁴¹ *Ibids* p. 125.

¹⁴² *The Reconstruction*, p, 78.

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 71

¹⁴⁴*Ibid*, p. 57

holding the ordered multiplicity of fully-shaped cosmic events, revealed serially, like the pictures of a film'.¹⁴⁵ Iqbal replies to him that 'the future exists only as an open possibility, and not as a reality. Nor can it be said that an event combines incompatible characteristics when it is described both as past and present. When an event X does happen it enters into an unalterable relation with all the events that have happened before it. These relations are not at all affected by the relations of X with other events which happen after X by the further becoming of reality. No true or false proposition about these relations will ever become false or true. Hence there is no logical difficulty in regarding an event as both past and present'¹⁴⁶ Iqbal concludes with the remarks, personally, I am inclined to think that time is an essential element in reality, But real time is not serial time to which the distinction of past, present, and future is essential ; it is pure duration, i.e. change without succession, which Dr. McTaggart's argument does not touch'.¹⁴⁷ Perhaps Dr. McTaggart's misconceptions regarding God and the ultimate reality stemmed from his defective concept of time.

McTaggart believes that religion needs 'rehabilitation' which can be effected only on the basis of a complete metaphysics, proving that the universe is on the whole good.¹⁴⁸ Here he agrees with Iqbal who also embarks upon a Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (in his case), and looks for a metaphysical basis He says, 'Indeed, in view of its function, religion stands in greater need of a rational foundation of its ultimate principles than even the dogmas of science'.¹⁴⁹

Iqbal proposes the real test of a self to be its response. Does reality respond to us? His answer is "yes"; 'sometimes by reflection, sometimes by the act of prayer which is higher than mere reflection. He remarks that 'In

¹⁴⁵Ibid, p. 57

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 58

¹⁴⁷ The Reconstruction, p. 58.3

¹⁴⁸ The Reconstruction, p. 58.3

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, p. 2

McTaggart's' case reflection took the place of worship'.¹⁵⁰ Iqbal adds, "The truth, however, is that neither worship nor reflection nor any kind of practices entitle a man to this response from the ultimate love. It depends eventually on what religion calls "grace".¹⁵¹ As said before for McTaggart the self passes into another body after death, but he admits that there is no guarantee that this process will be end-less ; "it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself, and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change". In this eventually', says Iqbal, 'we come back to the Absolute again, and McTaggart's system defeats its own purpose'.¹⁵²

(c) Iqbal and James Ward

James Ward was the most important thinker as regards his impact on Iqbal. He was first a Fellow (from 1857) and then a Professor of Philosophy (from 1897) at Trinity College, Cambridge, through the period when Iqbal's was studying at Trinity for higher studies. As a result, Ward appears to have exerted one of the most direct and profound influences in determining the directions and main trends of Iqbal's thought ; he may rightly be called among the Western progenitors of his thought. A comparative study of their respective systems will reveal the magnitude of impact which I am going to deal with briefly in this section.

Ward was 'one of the most acute critics of naturalism and one of the most powerful defenders of theism,¹⁵³ says John Macquarrie. He constructs a world-view in which the ultimate reality, is "active spirit" — a surely vitalist position. He emphasises upon concrete and whole experience, and condemns the abstract character of natural sciences, and like Iqbal he says that sciences are one-sided fragmentary. The error of science, according to him, is that of 'ascribing objective existence to abstractions'.¹⁵⁴ Again, like Iqbal, Ward

¹⁵⁰ Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p

¹⁵¹ Vahid, Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal, p

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 127

¹⁵³ Macquarrie, Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, p. 64.

¹⁵⁴ Naturalism and Agnosticism, vol. II, p. 66.

emphasises 'the essentially practical and purposeful character of experience, in which conation is more fundamental than cognition. The theoretical subject is a bare abstraction from the organic unity of experience.'¹⁵⁵ Of experience Ward says, 'in a word, it is life—life as it is for the living individual'.¹⁵⁶ Ward's emphasis on concrete experience underlies his criticism of the mechanistic naturalism. Both Iqbal and Ward agree that naturalism falls because it concerns itself with a partial aspect of the concrete reality known in experience, and sets up this partial aspect as the whole of reality.¹⁵⁷ Both assert that nature demands a spiritual interpretation. However, Ward holds that the requisite spiritual aspect is found in history ; he claims that 'the historical is what we understand best and what concerns us most'.¹⁵⁸ Only history can disclose to us a spiritual world of conative subjects striving for ends and realizing values'.¹⁵⁹ For Iqbal, on the other hand, history is one of the three sources of knowledge amenable to man, the other two being Nature and "Qalb", i.e. heart which is a kind of inner intuition or insight,¹⁶⁰ he says. In other words, history, or for that matter any single source, alone cannot afford a complete knowledge of the ultimate reality.

Ward stresses the need for a spiritual interpretation of nature, which he believes, in company with Iqbal, is complementary to scientific interpretation. He says, "There is nothing in nature that is incompatible with a spiritualistic interpretation".¹⁶¹ He presumes that nature is continuous and there are no gaps or leaps in it.¹⁶² This led both Ward and Iqbal to a doctrine of "pan-psychism". Nature is teleological and there is some sort of rudimentary spiritual life even in the dead matter. This leads him to remark

¹⁵⁵ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 64.

¹⁵⁶ Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 111.

¹⁵⁷ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 280.

¹⁵⁸ Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, vol, II, p. 280.

¹⁵⁹ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 280.

¹⁶⁰ *The Reconstruction*, p. 15.

¹⁶¹ Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 20.

¹⁶² Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 65

that 'nature thus resolves into a plurality of conative individuals'.¹⁶³ Ward, however, refuses to rest content with a pluralism and, like Iqbal, he moves to reconcile plurality of the selves with the unity of one reality which is God in the case of both. He argues that the unity and order in the world point to a doctrine of theism. He holds that God is at once the source of the spiritual world and the end towards which it moves.¹⁶⁴ In this connection Iqbal quotes from the Quran which describes God as 'the First and the Last,...'¹⁶⁵ that is, the beginning and the end. As said before, God is not only the source of everything, but also the destination to which each thing will return. Again he agrees with Iqbal that God is personal, both immanent and transcendent (the doctrine of panentheism) ; that he has created free conative subjects and thereby has imposed a certain limitation on himself, but this by no means involves his own diminution for by bestowing more freedom on His creatures he has enhanced his own greatness.¹⁶⁶ In the same vein Iqbal admits that 'the emergence of egos endowed with the power of spontaneous and hence unforeseeable action is, in a sense, a limitation on the freedom of the all inclusive ego. But this limitation', he adds, 'is not externally imposed. It is born out of his own creative freedom...'¹⁶⁷ They will both agree that men work together with God for the realization of his purpose, that is, men are co-workers with him: to use Iqbal's words, they are the 'participators of His life, power and freedom'.¹⁶⁸ Professor Ward also preached the doctrine of "meliorism" and held like Iqbal that men could better the world through love and their own concentrated effort ; and in this mission, Iqbal adds, 'God is a helper to man, provided he takes the initiative'.¹⁶⁹ It may be noted that one distinct feature of the thought of both Ward and Iqbal is their reconciliation between absolutism and personalism, monism of the Hegelians and pluralism

¹⁶³ Ward, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 21

¹⁶⁴ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 66.

¹⁶⁵ *The Reconstruction*, p. 107.

¹⁶⁶ Macquarrie, *Twentieth-Century Religious Thought*, p. 66.

¹⁶⁷ *The Reconstruction*, pp.79-80.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 80-81.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 80-81.

of the thinkers like Dr. McTaggart. This has bestowed immense depth and richness to their philosophical systems.

IQBAL'S CONCEPT OF THE SELF

(A Philosophical Analysis)

Asif Iqbal Khan

Self is taken to mean a sort of system or unity of psycho-physical experiences. We may analyse our mental states, at any moment of our life, into certain elementary experiences, which, however, never exist in a vacuum, These experiences are found as parts of an organic unity but this unity does not exist apart from its constituent states, The questions that crop up in this context involve the very crucial issue whether this unity is something above and beyond its contents ; how these disparate psycho-physical experiences are -united ; its quality of uniqueness and persistence through changes, etc., etc.

The meaning of the self, with its metaphysical, psychological and semantic distinctions, has become so ambiguous that many contemporary philosophers prefer to avoid the word 'self' altogether. They discuss the problem exclusively in terms of the word 'person'. Some philosophers have doubted and even denied the existence of the self. For Hume, for example, apart from the bundle of successive bits of perception, nothing justifying the concept of the self can be discerned by introspection. The problem of the self, it may be pointed out, derived its significance as well as relevance from the traditional method of starting with one's own case. The contemporary approach, on the other hand, is based on the contention that there is no distinction between identity in ones own case and identity in the case of others. This amounts to the contention that an understanding of the identity of persons in general is ipso facto an understanding of ones own identity. This is the reason why most of the contemporary philosophers refuse to

proceed to the problem of personal identity through that of the self. Rather, they are wont to reject the latter as a pseudo problem. In Iqbal's case, however, the problem of the self is of paramount importance. He sticks to the traditional approach of starting with one's own case and treats the whole issue in the context of 'self' rather than that of 'person'.

Iqbal begins by criticising those who regard the self to be a separate entity over and above the mental states and experiences. He attacks the position taken by al-Ghazali, for whom the ego is a simple, indivisible and immutable soul-substance. The multiple experiences come and go but the 'soul-substance' remains the same for ever. This definition of self, however, does not give us any clue as to its nature. Firstly, it is a metaphysical entity and it has been assumed to explain our experiences. But, do our experiences inhere in it as colour inheres in a body — are they related to it as qualities are related to material substance? Iqbal's reply is in the negative. Secondly, Iqbal agrees with Kant that the unity of experience on which the simplicity and hence the immutability of the soul-substance is based neither proves its indivisibility nor immutability.

Iqbal also rejects 'the bundle theory of the self' as represented by Hume and the psychologists. It regards the self to be a mere flux of sensations, feelings and thought. It studies them separately and does not specify how the one is connected with the other. This reduces the self to a mere accumulation of experiences. The self, however, is not a mere bundle of experiences. There is, behind all the multiple experiences, an inner unity also. For Iqbal, it is this unity which is the pivot of all experiences. It is the nucleus of our existence.

Obviously, Iqbal formulates his theory of the self with reference to both Kant and Hume. His most comprehensive statement on this issue is that follows: "I do not mean to say that the ego is over and above the mutually penetrating multiplicity we call experience. Inner experience is the ego at work. We appreciate the ego itself in the act of perceiving, judging and willing. The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the

environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as a directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience.”¹⁷⁰ For Iqbal, the experience of consciousness is “a case of tension, a state of self-concentration, by means of which life manages to shut out all memories and associations which have no bearing on a present action it has no well-defined fringes, it shrinks and expands as the occasion demands... Thus consciousness is... not a substance but an organizing principle, a specific mode of behaviour essentially different to the behavior of an externally worked machine.”¹⁷¹

Apparently, it is in Hume’s view of consciousness that one fails to find any ‘organizing principle’ at all. It was Hume who refused to provide any link among the atomic units of sensations. There is, on the other hand, obvious sympathy on the part of Iqbal for Kant’s standpoint that thinking implies prior unity of consciousness, though Iqbal is not willing to forego empirical consciousness for the sake of reason. He agrees with Kant that human reason has its utility within the sphere of the natural world. But he rejects Kantian division of the scopes of will and reason, reality and phenomenon, on the grounds that it does not truly represent man as we find him in experience. So, Iqbal rejects both the Humean brand of empiricism and Kantian rationalism.

It is obvious that neither Hume’s atomic sensations nor Kant’s rational categories are acceptable to Iqbal for his idea of the self. Iqbal, however, agrees with Kantian objections to the conception of the soul as a metaphysical entity. “The ‘I think’ which accompanies every thought is, according to Kant, a purely formal condition of thought, and the transition from a purely formal condition of thought to ontological substance is

¹⁷⁰ Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought* In Islam*, Lahore, 1968, p. 102.

¹⁷¹ *The Reconstruction*, pp. 40-41.

logically illegitimate.”¹⁷² Further, Kant asserts that indestructibility of the substance cannot be logically inferred from its indivisibility ; for the indivisible substance either gradually or all of a sudden may disappear into nothingness. Iqbal accepts this argument and, agrees with Kant that indestructibility of the soul cannot be proved from its indivisibility.

These difficulties led Iqbal to assimilate contrasting ideas from rationalism, empiricism and transcendentalism. This mode of action, however, cannot provide the sort of reality he wishes to assign to his ‘self’ or ‘ego’. while on the one hand he turns to the experience of consciousness as we find it in ourselves he also brings in the more private concept of ‘inner experience’. He, however, clearly accepts normal experience as the point of departure for understanding his ‘ego’. There are striking remarks throughout his work which betray his desire to keep himself within the domain of experience while dealing with the concept of the ego. In the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* he equates it with “the system of experiences”,¹⁷³ while in the *Secrets of the Self*, he is convinced that the “inexplicable finite centre of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe.”¹⁷⁴ In fact, his criticism of the ego regarded as soul-substance follows from his view that “the interpretation of our conscious experience is the only road by which we can reach the ego, if at all.”¹⁷⁵ Iqbal, even, tends to make body as the basic element in the construction of the ego — “The body is accumulated action or habit of the soul...”¹⁷⁶ Elsewhere, he calls the soul an organ of the body and again claims that “yet another make of man develops on the basis of physical organism.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁷³ *The Reconstruction*, p. 106.

¹⁷⁴ Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Secrets of the Self (Asrar-i Khudi)*, translated by RA. Nicholson, London, 1920. Preface, p. xvii.

¹⁷⁵ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 101.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 106.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 104-5.

Iqbal, then, shifts ground and concludes, in Kantian manner, that there had to be an “I”—a profounder ego, which constantly acts through the physical ‘colony of sub-egos’, enabling one ‘to build up a systematic unity of experience’. So after rejecting both parallelism and interactionism as unsatisfactory and trying to visualize mind and body as ‘one in action’, he agrees to admit the supremacy of the mental over the physical.

Here, Iqbal introduces an enlarged concept of thought which in its “deeper movement” is supposed to be “identical with life.” Obviously, he is in search of a unifying element which may synthesize diverse experiences which go to make the self. In his own words: “While it (thought) appears to break up reality into static fragments, its real function is to synthesize the elements of experience by employing categories suitable to the various levels which experience presents.”¹⁷⁸ He, however, gives no precise list of such categories, nor does he tell us how to apply them to the level of consciousness. Elsewhere, he takes thought “not as a principle which organises and integrates its material from the outside, but as a potency which is formative of the very being of its material.”¹⁷⁹ So, Iqbal visualises thought as a potency which has the capacity to provide a link between diverse experiences. In order to explain this unifying quality of thought he likens it to “the seed from which the very beginning carries within itself the organic unity of the tree.”¹⁸⁰ In this manner, he intends to provide an active, continuous and unified self. He further explains the nature of this unifying agent by equating it with an act as against a thing. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, and held together by the unity of a directive purpose. “Hence, the true essence of the ego lies in the directive and purposive attitudes, in judgments, will-attitudes, aims and aspirations.”¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ The Reconstruction, p. 52.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. b.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 103.

It may be argued that Iqbal has come full circle from his criticism of Hume's 'bundle theory of the self' for not providing a precise and tangible unifying element, and then himself refusing to give a clearly defined formulae according to which the multiplicity of mental states merge and interpenetrate one another. But, since he characterises life as only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention cannot be explained without referring to ends and purposes, it is obvious that purpose plays a significant role in the activity of the ego. He warns, however that the purpose here is not a predetermined, fixed goal, which acts from outside. Ego as a unity of active experience is self-directed. Apparently, Iqbal is trying to ward off the danger of a mechanistic, lifeless element intruding into his concept of the self.

Iqbal also faced the problem ; how to reconcile unity with activity. Personal activity characterising his view of the ego is 'a peculiar type of organisation which transcends the concept of homogeneous unity as well as the sheer multiplicity of numerical states. But, the crucial question is: is it logical to claim 'a unity in multiplicity'. The dilemma he faced was seemingly unsolvable. By keeping the self firmly grounded in the realm of experience he tried to avoid the artificial and empty ego of Kant — on the other hand, in asserting that self transcends any particular mental state, he appears to take the self outside the realm of experience. Iqbal's 'finite centre of experience' or 'a directive energy' are nothing but metaphysical substance come to life again. It is a difficult problem which Iqbal faced in the same spirit as al-Ghazali and Kant. One must appreciate the fact that Iqbal was conscious of this difficulty and himself tried to find possible ways out. Finally, he seems to have fallen back upon a vague type of mental substance for, formulating his concept of the self.

Personal Identity

Personal identity is individual identity as possessed by a person or self. An individual, whether an in-animate thing, a living organism or a conscious self, is identical in so far as it preserves from moment to moment a similarity

of structure. Personal identity involves in addition the conscious recognition of sameness. Various empiricists have stated that we can know that P is one and the same person as an earlier person only if we can show bodily continuity of memory and character. This is called the identifying criteria. Such criteria could hardly be fulfilled by bodily persons since lack of body rules- out one definite check right away. It also prevents us from having performance against which to check memory claims and with which to assess character. Since a criteria based purely on bodily continuity fails to explain all the various aspects involved in the concept of person, philosophers have used various other notions to explain personal identity, e.g., rational and intentional system, ability to use language, being conscious and self-conscious, being a moral agent etc.

As pointed out above, Iqbal's main concern was with the problem of the self rather than with that of person. Moreover, he was essentially interested in personal immortality rather than personal identity, There is, therefore, no thoroughly worked out theory of personal identity as such in his writings. However, he shows some interest in this issue to merit consideration. He approaches the issue from various angles. To begin with he claims that "the unity of human consciousness constitutes the centre of human personality."¹⁸² In this context he refers to "the unity of inner experience" as well as to the "unknown levels of consciousness"¹⁸³ He also asserts that ego reveals itself as a unity of what we call mental states — it is a unity which, grows out of body — 'the colony of sub-egos from which a profounder ego emerges'. Mind and body become one in action, and ego is a system of acts. He also mentions insight and striving in this context ¹⁸⁴

Perhaps, the most comprehensive statement concerning the problem of personal identity is found in the following passage by Iqbal. "In order to recognise you, I must have known you in the past. My recognition of a place

¹⁸² The Reconstruction, pp. 95-96.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. pp. 96-106.

or person means reference to my past experience, and not to the past experience of another ego. It is this unique inter-relation of our mental states that we express by the word 'I'¹⁸⁵ So, the criteria of personal identity, for Iqbal, finally lies in the nature of this 'I'. Moreover, "to be a self is to be able to say 'I am' ".¹⁸⁶ It means, in effect, that for Iqbal, the self is the criterion or standard (f personal identity. By maintaining itself in a continuous state of tension, and in its "effort to be something" the ego discovers "its final opportunity to sharpen its objectivity and acquire a more fundamental 'I am'"¹⁸⁷

Objections have been raised against such use of the word in this context. The problem is largely that of meaning. Obviously, the use of the word 'I' as the criterion of personal identity suffers from a certain grammatical confusion. The 'I' in the phrase 'I am' cannot be said to refer to something particular. But can this purpose be served by converting 'I' into 'it'. For, if 'I think' creates problems, it is in the fitness of things to say that 'It thinks in me' just as we say 'It rains here'. But the word is not used to name a person just as the word 'here' is not used to name a place. It is much more informative to say that 'John thinks' as does 'It rains in London', Hence, self-identification in the sense of 'I am' itself is illusory and cannot give meaning to a view of personal identity.

The above criticism loses much of its sting if it is realized that (i) Iqbal was not using the word 'I' in the frame-work of a theory of meaning. It would, therefore, be a bit misplaced to criticise him in this context. (ii) Iqbal's use of 'I' in his 'I am' stands for what he terms as self and the problem of personal identity is thus regarded as the problem of the self. My contention, here, is that Iqbal was primarily concerned with the problem of the self and treated the issue of personal identity only by implication.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 100.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 56.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 198.

A NOTE ON MUQADDIMAH IBN KHALDUN

A Paganish Philosophy of History.

Salahuddin Ayyubi

The pivotal point in introducing the Ibn Khaldun's philosophy of history is the miraculous part played by "Group Feeling", Ibn Khaldun's "Muqaddimah" was certainly a great work not of its own times only. It was a great achievement in the field of philosophy for all times to come. Yet it is also true that similar esteemed jobs have been done by thinkers of different ages. We cannot believe a certain theory to be true just because it was most imaginative, nicely treated, beautifully presented or that it came from one of our own clan. We as Muslims would only believe that truth lies in whatever has been revealed to us by God Almighty and explained and presented by the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) or whatever can achieve testimony of these two sources.

We believe that in his "Muqaddimah" Ibn Khaldun has not truly characterized the meanings of "عصبيته" group feeling, whereas the Holy Quran has distinctly spoken about it. The Quran says that the prime most hurdle in the path of those who have been presented the "Call" (دعوة) to prostrate to the One Almighty and believe in the authority of the Prophet (peace be upon him), is العصبية الجاهلية a group feeling based upon untrue and unhealthy norms. Thus the very idea of group feeling has been stated to have more than one connotation. A group feeling which leads to the right

path is the only desired one. This type of group feeling can also be named as (حمية) (Hamiyyah) a term that connotes much higher values.

The group feeling Ibn Khaldun has spoken of, is based "on lineage or place and culminates in the establishment of royal authority". Now we as Muslims know that those group feelings which generate the ideas of آباء پرستی (worship of kinship) are the abominable one. Again, a group feeling that persuades a man to stick to the culture and ideology of his own tribe or sect (be it right or wrong) is the greatest hinderance in the evolution of moral values. No change in the ideology of a people can take place if they are not willing to change their cultural pattern.

Thus it is evident that عصبية "Asabiyyah" should have been dealt with by Ibn Khaldun, just as it has been treated by the Quran. By ignoring the real significance of Quranic concept Ibn Khaldun made certain other misjudgements as well He talks of religion as a dynamic force that makes the group powerful. In fact Ibn Khaldun should have talked of Ideology and not Religion. He should have talked of Faith as the basic dynamic force Yet another and the basic fact that Ibn Khaldun ignores in the character of religion to nullify all the prevelant groups and evolve a unique group of its own.

Ibn Khaldun talks of "enthusiasm" as "when the enthusiasm dies" but he cannot pin point the root cause of its death. It is not, so to say "reliance on others, urbanization, getting accustomed to easy and luxurious life, gaining control over substantial amounts of wealth" etc as enumerated by Ibn Khaldun. It is none of these, yet it is all of them at the same time. In fact it is the idea of supreme value that matters. It is the goal that counts. If you have before you a goal which you achieve, you will definitely feel pleased after achieving it. This can be observed in so far as worldly affairs are concerned. But if the goal is a higher one, one that is constantly going under the process of an evolution, you will never be able to get it not to talk of

getting the pleasure of satisfaction. You will illuminate your abilities, broaden your horizons and zealously make the best use of your qualities to get nearer to your goal, thereby never leaving your enthusiasm to weaken; never of course permitting it to die.¹⁸⁸

یہ کائنات ابھی ناتمام ہے شاید
کہ آرمی ہے دمام صدائے کن
فیکوں¹⁸⁹

This universe is perhaps still not complete for every moment, Things are being ordered to 'become' and they are 'becoming'.

زشرر ستاره جویم ، زستاره
آفتابے
ہر منزله ندارم کہ بمیرم از
قرارے¹⁹⁰

I leave the spark for a star and from the star I pass on to the sun. I have no destination before me to stay at for if I stay, I die.

It is here that we see the most tragic scene of our past and we come to know how *عصبیة جاهلیة* has ruined us. How the group feeling caused damage to the glorious state of Islam and how the luxuries of life weakened the structure of values actually within a very short span of time, the goals were changed. Materialism took charge from spiritualism. Worldly concerns

¹⁸⁸ Bal-i-Jibreel/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 28/320.

¹⁸⁹ Bal-i-Jibreel/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 28/320.

¹⁹⁰ Payam-i-Mashriq/Kulliyat-i-Iqbal, p. 127/297.

overruled higher values and the result is evident. In the words of Ibn Khaldun:

"Excessive sedentary culture and the consequent luxury brings about corruption, decay and finally destruction. This is the lesson of History".

The rise of the first Islamic regime was not based upon **عصبية** جاهلية. It was based on Religion, an ideology nay on a faith and faith alone. The norm prescribed by Ibn Khaldun "Nobility and prestige are the results of personal qualities" did nothing to do with our 'faith'. The decay started when a tribe who had a very strong group feeling, accepted Islam as its religion at a time when there was no alternative left. Chieftain of this tribe could not get sufficient training from the great source of inspiration,) **معلم** **عصبية** اخلاق (peace be upon him). When their real and the most abominable **عصبية** جاهلية unveiled itself, not long after the death of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), the great catastrophe started taking place. Now there was no more faith, no more ideology-Whatever was left was the ancient paraphernalia of tyranny, injustice and pleasure seeking.

The rival groups became a prey to another. This was the outcome of such a group feeling, i.e. superiority of the clan and kinship. They forgot what the Prophet (peace be upon him) had stressed upon while educating his beloved daughter. They forgot what the Prophet (peace he upon him) had announced at the time of **حجة الوداع** the last pilgrimage **ان اكرمكم عند الله** **اتقاكم** (verily most respected amongst you is he who is the most God fearing). By adopting royal sur-names and royal trappings, Abbasids could not strengthen their dynasty. They weakened their faith and became extinct.

We have got to believe in one of the two things: either we say that *حمية اسلامية* does not and did not need any other feeling for its growth - or - we say that the emergence of an Islamic state was the outcome of a group feeling of Arabs "the tough and courageous Bedouin group" that joined hands in realizing the goal of "Royal Authority".

But how can we choose the second alternative? would not the edifice of Islam tumble down as we dynamite its foundations? Ibn Khaldun just ignores that the emergence of Islamic civilization took place under the flag of faith. It was based upon annihilation of all types of group feelings. Had this not been the fact, that the strong feelings of kinship and lineage could not be demolished. Only once the Arabs had done so and the result was that new vistas opened upon them and in the real sense of the phrase. They took a great leap and turned into *ضمير کن فکان* (The conscience of being).

In general we can say that the standards laid down by Ibn Khaldun in his *Muqaddimah* are true as far as the pagan world is concerned. But things have occurred otherwise too. For Muslims it has been mainly due to the dynamism of Islamic faith. Ibn Khaldun holds that the expansion and power of a dynasty corresponds to the numerical strength of those who obtained superiority in the beginning. Nevertheless with Muslims it was not (and it should not be) a matter of gaining superiority over others. Islam holds *انما المؤمنون اخوة* (verily the believers of faith are brothers to each others). All of them are equal. They have equal rights and duties, hence are to be treated equally.

تو راز کن فکان ہے اپنی آنکھوں پر

عیاں ہوجا
 خودی کا راز داں ہو جا خدا کا
 ترجمان ہوجا
 غبارہ آلودہ رنگ و نسب ہیں بال و
 پیر تیسرے
 تو امے مرغ حرم اڑنے سے پہلے پر
 فشان ہوجا¹⁹¹

You are the secret of being. Disclose yourself to your eyes.

Know the secrets of your self and become a spokesman of God.

O'thee fowl of Haram! Dispose off from your feathers the filthy.

(group feelings) of colour & lineage, before taking your flight.

The Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) treated all his followers equally.

Bilal-e-Habshi رضی اللہ عنہ was one of the most beloved. Salman-e-Farasi

رضی اللہ عنہ was one of the most honoured. Thus the number of those who

obtained superiority in the beginning did not matter. Those who were few, expanded into many without gaining superiority over each other. So much so

that at the time of فتح مکہ Fath-e-Makkah, no material lust was at work. The

renowned saying of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) goes ازہبوا فانتم

¹⁹¹ Bane-i-Dara/Kalliyatd-Iqbal, 273473.

الطلاق (Go — for all of you are free!); the superiority gained was only the moral and spiritual one. Blood shedding was not the purpose, show of ruthless force was not the aim.

But alas ! in the course of time the real sense of faith disappeared. Once again the tribes of Arab started playing their satanic game of al-asabiyya. Their group feelings reappeared and they started thinking of gaining superiority over other groups. So much so that for the expansion of their regimes, they even refrained from converting the pagans into Muslims—fearing that, the amount of *جزية* Jizya would decrease. And perhaps there lurked also a feeling that without non-Muslim subjects, the heady pleasure of superiority might vanish.

We are very proud of Mughal dynasty and we own it as if it were a direct descendent of our magnificent early caliphate. Could not we see that not even an iota of effort was made by the emperor for the spread of Islamic faith ? They did not increase the number of Muslims. They could not read the writings on the wall. The non-believers in Indian sub-continent were several times more than the believers. Neither Moghals nor their predecessors, the Lodhies, ever tried to take any lesson from the destructions of the Muslim Society in Spain.

Another principle laid down by Ibn Khaldun connotes that it is easy to establish a dynasty in lands which are free from group feelings. Islam has proved to be the greatest exception to this rule. When we speak of the primitive Arab, the first and fore most thing that comes to our mind is "their tribes" and their tribal scuffles". But Islam spread inspite of most difficult conditions. This could happen only because in Islam group feelings were condemned most vehemently. No Superiority for the 'Arabi' over the 'Ajami' and vice-versa except on account of purity and virtue. No "Qureshi" could be treated as more important than a 'Habashi' only for being a Qureshi. The poor and the needy and also the disabled were shown respect. The Quranic

Sarah **عيس و تولى ان جاعه الاعمى** stands as a minaret of light in the bewildering darkness of racial group feelings.

**عيس و تولى .. ان جاء ه الاعمى- وما يدريك لغله يزكى او يذكر
فتنفغه الذكرى**

"(The Prophet) frowned and turned away. Because there came to him the behind man (interrupting). But what could tell thee — But that perchance he might grow (in spiritual understanding)? Or that he might receive—Admonition and the teaching might profit him".

Tribal and personal pride was turned into the honour of the Muslim Ummah.

We can, therefore, rightly hold that Islamic Philosophy of History is not simply to derive some conclusions out of the lives of those tribes and clans who could not rise to the sublime heights of morals. Islam on the other hand, demands a radical change and on account of this the very first principle of the history in common stands defeated. A new magnificent edifice has been constructed by Islam on the ruins of group feelings.

After giving a brief account of the -early caliphate in Islam

(**خلافت راشدہ**) Ibn Khaldun goes forward to say:

"Soon the desert attitude of the Arabs and their simple living approached its end. Royal Authority — which is the necessary consequence of group feeling showed itself and with it came its struggle for superiority and thus the use of force."

Thus it seems that according to Ibn Khaldun, Faith did not carry substantial weight in the advancement of Islam. It is strange that Ibn Khaldun, knowing the real meaning and significance of Caliphate **نيابت الہیہ** (becoming representative of God/the vicegerent of God) makes a false statement that "Islam does not censure royal authority as such". We have

already pointed out earlier that a change in the cultural pattern of a people entails a change in their ideology. Islam therefore, creating its own standards in respect of all aspects of life suggested (and of course it was beautifully exemplified) its own form of Government. This form of government had got nothing to do with the group feeling of jahiliyya. The so-called caliphs (except for Khilafat-e-Rashida خلافت راشدہ closed their ears to the God Almighty's call: افحکم الجاهلیہ بیغون الماءہ) (Are they after the jahiliyya order!

Muslims emperors one after the other, went on switching over to Jahiliyya in almost all modes of their lives. It was not a gradual change as stated by Ibn Khaldun. Rather it was an abrupt change and we hold this view-point because of the following:

(a) Islam has put forth clear-cut ideas and the believers are required to show a clear and distinct attitude towards the good and evil Not to mention a form of Government; Islam condemns even assuming the looks of non-Muslims.

(b) Islam has vehemently condemned the act of killing people without moral justification. (قتل مسلم) Qatl-e-Muslim is one of those sins for which there is no chance of forgiveness, Yet we can see that the so-called caliphs did not hesitate in killing of their Muslim brothers just to ensure the stability of their royal authority.

(c) After the death of the fourth Caliph, tyranny, brutality, injustice, lust for worldly wealth, pleasure seeking and what not prevailed in the entire Muslim World. Even the change brought about by the Omer-e-Sani i.e. Omer Ibn Abdul Aziz رضى الله عنه could not live long.

A common Muslim has always had a strong love and devotion for the Sufis صوفياء Reason being that the early ones of them could not persuade themselves to accept the drastic changes in the life pattern of the ruling class.

They had their own genuine reasons in not accepting the royal dynasties and not becoming a tool in the hands of emperors.

Now if Islam has reached us nearer to truth in letter and spirit, it is through the Sufis and not through the so-called caliphs One must confess that "Royal Authority has no relation with the spirit of Islam. Any group feeling that kills the spirit of faith within us, is not acceptable to we Muslims.

While presenting the principles of Sociology, Ibn Khaldun does not speak much about higher values. He talks of "what ever is" and not of what should be". Although being a Muslim him-self, Ibn Khaldun does not explain the Islamic principles of Sociology and History.

Ibn Khaldun's history is that of the "creatures of history" and not of the "makers of history". He says that all what took place during the early days of Islam, was nothing less than a "miracle". But he forgets that if were men and not angels who turned the tides of history.

The early Muslims **السابقون الاولون** were the makers of history, They did not accept uncritical the age-old fashions and patterns. These magnificent people rejected all types of "group feelings" and on the strength of their faith, they made possible the realization of supreme values. For them their own values were only Utopia". They accepted the challenge of time and chime **ستيز زمانه تو با زمانه**. They marched forward to attain their own "Destiny" **تقدير** A change in the value structure was then the pressing need of mankind.

We conclude by quoting Karl R. popper (The open Society and its Enemies)

"There can be no history of the past as it actually did happen; there can only be historical interpretations and none of them final ; and every generation has a right to frame its own".

Nevertheless while making historical interpretations, we must not forget the basic principles of Islam. The past as it actually transpired during the life of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and the Khulafa-e-Rashedin is **خلفاء راشدين** in fact contradictory to the past as it appeared otherwise. We must not therefore, try to apply the commonly, sought interpretation to Islam. Hence a paganish philosophy of history has got nothing to do with our faith. The basic principle for the formulation of an Islamic Society **امة مسلمة** is not the group feeling of Jahiliyya. The principle laid down in the Holy Quran is beautifully summed up in the following 'Surah' AI-Asr:

والعصبر ان الانسان لسفى خسر
- الا الذين آمنو
و عملو الصلحت و تواصو بالحق
و تواصو بالصبر

"By (the token of) Time (through the Ages) Verily Man is in loss, Except such as have Faith and do righteous deeds, and (join together) in the mutual teaching of truth and of patience and constancy."

Time is always in favour of those who unite themselves (to make an Ummah) on the basis of Truth. Patience and Constancy. This is the basic principle of Islam. A complete philosophy of history (interpretation, course of action and prophecy—past, present and future) has been summed up in this single unique paragraph.

IQBAL ON MAN'S METAPHORICAL DEATH

Muhammad Munawwar

One of the most renowned poets of Egypt late Ahmad Shauqi (احمد شوقي) had said:

الناس صنيان
موتى فى
حياتهم!
وآخرون يبطن
الاض الحياء

"Human beings are of two kinds, those who are dead in life, and others who are alive in their graves."

By metaphorical death, here, is meant the first kind of death. Dead, metaphorically, are persons who exist but are not counted among the living. They are rather counted out. They are "breathing-dead" bodies on foot, sorry creatures, rejected by their graves and always in search of graves. They do not walk on God's earth ; they only drag their corpses. Their breathing is only a process of evaporation. If someone insists on calling them alive, then they are so only figuratively. They are far removed away from the reality of life. Their souls are as good as dead wood. Their perception is petrified. No aim, no determination. For them nothing is good, nothing bad. They cannot

discriminate good from evil. Their vision is sightless. They are for ever astray and know not. How can such persons be called human beings? They are not unlike the dancers depicted in Oscar Wilde's poem "The Harlot's House".

"Sometimes a clock-work puppet pressed.

A phantom lover to his breast.

Sometimes they seemed to try to sing.

.....

Then turning to my love I said,

"The dead are dancing with the dead,

The dust is whirling with the dust".

Such persons whose actions are not of their determined choice have aptly and justly been called puppets by Oscar Wilde. They hug each other but they do so as robots. They do not qualify even for Hawthorne's description, "Sensuous sympathy of dust for dust". They seem to be human beings but are in fact, nothing more than solidified dust.

A society is alive if the individuals belonging to that society are exceptionally animated and have definite goals to win and ideals to achieve. But a society clogged with puppets, shadows and phantoms, is a dying society, if not already dead. Whirling phenomena of dust, breathing existences with no soulful activity, put together do not make a living and energetic community. A multitude of zeroes put together, do not come to more than zero.

To live means living in a responsible manner, to be account-able for deeds done. Puppets move but their movements are not actions. A senseless deed is not a role. Only a conscious act of one's own choice is a responsible performance. And how rarely do persons perform acts of their own. To be

responsible entails self-knowledge. Without self-knowledge, a person cannot attain cognisance of his station in the process of creation and as such cannot realise himself fully. Without self-knowledge there can be no notion of duties and rights. Self-knowledge is, in other words, the perception of man's ultimate function and final stage of his achievement. But to grow from a homo sapien to a man is a long and arduous journey. He is born as a lump of matter. Innumerable material elements build his physique. But in his material frame or form is deposited a soul-particle as well.

That soul-particle grows into what is called man's spiritual aspect. Man hungers for good and other sensual materials. That is his material aspect. Then comes a stage when a faculty of discrimination begins to operate and the question of what, how much, through which means, raises its head. It means a person begins to distinguish what is good, just and suitable to aspire for and what is evil, unjust and hence not suitable to aspire for. This discriminating faculty when it comes to operate in a person's conscious behaviour entitles him to be called the captain of his fate and the master of his soul.

Man's material aspect is always after dragging him down to dust by conquering- the spiritual. The spiritual aspect, on the contrary, is always after subjugating the material and soaring to higher spheres. This tussle goes on. When there is spiritual dominance, there is life because values are upheld. Where there is material in command, there is death because values are not operative. Says Allama Iqbal.

دلے چون صحبت گل می
پنڈیره
ہمان دم لذت خواہش بگیری!
شود بیدار چون من آبریند
چون من محکوم تن گردد

"A spirit which accepts clay as an associate, begins to take pleasure in sleep, without delay.

It wakes up whenever it creates "self." But when 'self' becomes a slave to the body, the spirit dies out."

As is clear, it is not actual death. It is rather death in life or say death operative in life — death dominating life. God Almighty defining the Quran declares:

ان هوالا ذكر و قرآن مبين لينذر من كان
حيا و يحق القول على الكافرين!¹⁹³

"This is no less than a Message and a Quran, making 'things clear that it may give admonition to any one who is alive and the charge may be proved against those who reject".

Explaining the world "alive" Abdullah Yusuf Ali states:

"Alive, both in English and Arabic, means not only 'having' physical life but having all the active qualities which we associate with life. In religious language, those who are not responsive to the realities of the spiritual world are not better than those who are dead. The Message of God penetrates the hearts of those who are alive in the spiritual sense."¹⁹⁴

¹⁹² Armaghan-i-Hijaz, p. 98.

¹⁹³ Al-Quran, 36: 69, 70.

¹⁹⁴ The Holy Quran, Sh. M, Ashraf, Lahore, (1936), pp. 1185, 1186.

Those who are spiritually alive are impressed by the Quran and hence take to the right path. Those who are not alive in the Quranic sense do not pay heed to what the Book of God enjoins. They remain astray and take pride in it. But the Quran admonishes and also warns in clear words and thus stands as a proof against those who are rebellious willfully. They, on the Day of Judgement, will not be able to say that they had not received guidance or that they were not warned.

Similarly the Quran while addressing the Prophet explains:

وما يستوى الاحياء ولا الاموت ان الله
يسمع من يشاء
وما انت مسمع من في القبور ان انت الا
نذير!¹⁹⁵

"Those that are living and those that are dead are not alike. God can make any that He will, to hear. But you cannot make hear those who are buried in graves."

Here it has been made clear that persons who are spiritually dead cannot be expected to accept guidance. In this regard they are like those buried in graves. Thus it is obvious that the Prophet of God had only to inform, teach, direct, admonish and warn. He was not to compel them to comply with his directions or act according to what he imparted to them. Those who were not alive were to be left alone. Those who were spiritually alive would listen. An Arab poet says in a similar vein, addressing, perhaps, himself:

لقد اسمتغ لونا ديت حيا

¹⁹⁵ Al-Quran, 35: 22.

"Had you addressed someone alive, you would have been lighted to. But he whom you address, is lifeless."

The Quran explaining the inner condition of unbelievers sets forth:

فهم قلوب لا يفقهون بهما ولهم اعين لا يبصرون بهما ولهم اذان لا يسمعون بهما اولئك كما لا نغام بل هم اضل
اولئك هم الغافلون!¹⁹⁶

"They have hearts wherewith they do not understand. They have eyes wherewith they do not see. They have ears wherewith they do not hear. They are like cattle. Nay, they are more astray than cattle." It is they who heed not."

Such persons who eat, drink, and loiter hither and thither, are merely like animals. As human beings they are lifeless. They do not perceive though they look. They do not listen though they hear. They do not understand though they observe. Alive they are, but as animals even worse than animals. They are left alone. God has nothing to do with them. Says Iqbal.

تیرا تن روح سے نا آشنا ہے
عجب کیا آہ تیری نارسا ہے!
تن ہے روح سے بیزار ہے حق!
خدائے زندہ زندوں کا خدا
ہے!¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁶ Al-Quran, 7: 179.

¹⁹⁷ Bal-i-Jibreel, p. 90/382.

"Your body has no soul. No wonder if your sighs are not answered The Creator is diseasted with a souless frame. God is all life and He is God of those who are alive."

Allama Iqbal has repeated the same theme in the following verse ;

خدا ے زندہ دل زندہ کی تلاش
میں شکار مردہ سزاوار شاہباز
بے شکار
نہیں! ¹⁹⁸

"The living God is in search of a living soul. A dead prey does not deserve an eagle's assault."

It is obvious that a society is not something suspended in the air. It is a concrete collection of wide awake and soulful individuals. It merits being called a living society if harmony between the spiritual and material, physical and mental and above all the individual and collective aspirations is maintained. No doubt different individuals possess different qualities. Standards are also different. All cannot be equal in every respect. Yet it is incumbent upon every individual that whatever one attains is aimed at the collective good of the society or the nation to which he or she belongs. No individual should, on account of his higher faculties of attainment pounce upon and appropriate the rights and fortunes of others. If some person or a group of persons does so it is done to the detriment of the society or the nation. This creates imbalance which in sociological terms is a kind of disease. Hence Iqbal's message to every person is to always keep in mind that ;

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 38/330.

افراد کے ہاتھوں میں ہے اقوام
کی تقدیر!
ہر فرد ہے ملت کے مقدر کا
ستارا! 199

"The destiny of nations is vested with the individuals. Similarly every person belonging to the Muslim Ummah is its destiny's star."

Every star should be an ascending star of collective well-being. Charles W. Morris explains:

"The individual must know what he is about ; he himself and not merely those who respond to him, must be able to interpret the meaning of his own gesture. Behaviouristically, this is to say that the biological individual must be able to call out in himself the response his gesture calls out in the other and then utilize this response of the other for the control of his further conduct. Such gestures are significant symbols. Through their use the individual is taking the role of the other in the regulation of his own conduct. Man is essentially a role-taking animal. The calling out of the same response in both the self and the other, gives the common content necessary for community of meaning."²⁰⁰

Man is not only a social animal, it is in the opinion of Charles Morris a role-taking animal. When this role-taking process slackens or comes to a stop it indicates bad omen. Gestures are then not exchanged. Individuals become egotists. They eat one another. The society is consumed by the mutual egotistic exchange of individuals wrath. A lustful over, ambitious person or a

¹⁹⁹ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, 15/657.

²⁰⁰ George, H. Mead: Mind, Self and Society: University Press, Shicago, (1959), p. (Introduction xxi)

group of persons is like dead limbs of a body They are as dangerous as the lazy and idle hippies or their coterie of cocaine high persons. Individual physical health rests on the harmony amongst all constituting elements. Loss of harmony is illness. If not cured properly and in time it results in death. Similarly societies where balance is lost, cannot last. This is leprosy of covetousness. This is anarchy of emotions. This is paralysis of foresight This is no self which is strengthened. This is short sightedness that finds an opportunity for free play rather a free for all To shrink towards self-seeking gradually leads to death. Allama Iqbal explains thus:

تن بخویش اندر کشیدن مردن
است
از جهان درخود رسیدن مرد
است!
برتر از فکر تو آمد این سخن!
زانکه جان تست محکوم
یدن!!²⁰¹

"To shrink within oneself is tantamount to death. Leaving the world and receding towards self is to accept extinction.

These words are beyond your ken because your soul is over-powered by your body. (Within you it is material aspect that rules)."

Albert Schweitzer, in the following lines discusses almost the same subject i.e. what it is that promotes life and what it is that deminishes it ;

²⁰¹ Javid Nama, p. 120/690.

"My life carries its own meaning in itself. This meaning lies in my living out the highest idea which shows itself in my will-to live, the idea of reverence for life. With that for a starting point —I give value to my own life and to all the will-to-live which surrounds me. I preserve in activity, and I produce values. Ethics grow out of the same root as world and life affirmation for ethics, too, are nothing but reverence,for life. That is what gives me the fundamental principle of morality, namely that good consists in maintaining, promoting, and enhancing life, and that destroying, injuring, and limiting life are evil."²⁰²

Egotists and self-seekers look as if they were alive though in actual fact they are worthless and as dead as a dodo. All sorts of advice fall flat on them. Even if they join colleges and universities and obtain enviable certificates and Degrees, testifying to their acumen and scholarship, in this field of knowledge or that, yet if they are lust-ridden, they cannot be counted amongst the living ones. To be a scholar is one thing. To be human is something else. Scholarship is not a surety of a scholar's integrity, sincerity, truthfulness, good neighbourliness, kindness and magnanimity. A person may possess a character in inverse pro-portion to the height of his educational qualifications. Purity of heart cannot be had through instructional institutions where knowledge is imparted but morals are neither taught nor-practised. And according to those who have been leading moral lives, it is only through purity of heart that moral teaching leaves lasting impact. Without the deligent receptivity of a pure heart all pieces of advice and ethical demonstrations run out leaving almost no effect as if all teachings in that regard, were like water poured on duck's back. Ab-dal-Qahir. (عبدالقادر)IAT.a) b. Abdullah al-Suhrawardi explains the above subject in examples as follows:

"A grain-sower went with grain. He picked up a handful of it. Some of the seeds fell on the path. In no time birds descended and picked them up.

²⁰² Civilization and Ethics, Unwin Books London, (1961). p. 11.

Some of the grains fell on a slab of stone covered with a thin layer of earth and a bit wet on account of dew drops. The grain sprouted and grew a little. Then the roots touched the stone. They could not penetrate it hence dried up. Some grains of seed fell on a good earth where there was a thorny growth. When seeds sprouted and the seedlings gained some height, they were strangled by the thorny growth. Thus they became useless and got intermingled with thorns. And some of the seeds fell on a good earth which was neither a path, nor a layer on a stone, nor replete with thorny growth. Here the seeds grew into what they should"²⁰³

Abd-al-Qahir, proceeding further elucidated these examples and told the readers that the heart which is like a path cannot retain good lesson. The devil descends and takes it away in no time. The listener forgetting all of it. When the other who listens but has been likened with a slab of stone, is a person who listens diligently but his heart has absolutely no intention to act accordingly. Therefore, the lesson does not take root in his heart and vanishes. He likened the grain that fell on a good earth but with thorny growth, to a person who listens and intends to act accordingly, but his lusty ambitions prevent him from translating his good intentions into actions, therefore, he turns away from the desire to do good. His desire becomes unaffectionate like the seedling strangled by the thorns. Abd-al-Qahir likens the seed falling on good- earth without thorns, to the listener who understands and acts according to the advice he listens to and keeps aloof from lusts. He likes and keeps to the right path—Such a person is a Sufi. Sufis, define Sufism, as purity of heart and shunning all sorts of pollution. In short all these examples are degrees of being alive—to what extent and how much.

People are alive in proportion to good deeds done by them and they are dead according to the quantum of their misdeeds. And those who do nothing, neither good nor evil, are worst among the dead in the particular

²⁰³ Awarif-al-Ma'arif, Dar-al-Kitab-al-Arabi, Beirut, (1966), p, 22.

sense, operative in this article. There are people who cannot discriminate between good and evil. There are others who can, but still do evil, and cannot overcome evil temptations. Socrates is often quoted as saying that people do not know evil otherwise they would not have indulged in it. Our observation and experience proves quite the contrary. To know and to understand evil is something else but to over-come the unbridled desire to do evil is quite a different matter. People know the dangers of over-smoking. They know the dangers of cocaine and marijuana. Everybody understands to what gambling leads. Every addict to strong drinks knows what the addiction results in. All such helpless people are slaves to their material selves. They cannot exert their will. They cannot implement their determinations. Such persons are not alive in reality. They say, if not all of them, millions, of them certainly, that it was their luck. They were made to remain earth-rooted. Palmists had told them like that. Astrology had indicated that they could not rise above a certain level of will power. But Iqbal declares:

تو اپنی سر نوشت خود اپنے قلم سے لکھا!
 خالی رکھی ہے خامہ حق نے تیری جبین!
 یہ نیلگوں بضا جسے کہتے ہیں آسماں!
 ہمت ہو پر کشا تو حقیقت میں کچھ نہیں!²⁰⁴

"You should write your destiny with your own pen. God's pen has left your brow blank."

"This azure atmosphere which we call sky is in reality nothing provided we muster courage to fly."

At an other place Allama Iqbal again lays stress on the same point:

²⁰⁴ Darb-i-Kalim, p. 1761638.

تیرا زمانہ تاثیر تیری!
نادان نہیں یہ تاثیر افلاک!
ایسا جنوں بھی دیکھا ہے میں نے
جس نے سہمے ہیں تقدیر کے چاک²⁰⁵

"Your age (Time) must have your impact You are ignorant of the fact that it is not under the influence of stars"

"I have seen such madness as well (determination that looked like madness) which has sewn what the destiny had torn up."

Apparently things do look impossible. There are hurdles which people find unsurmountable. Yet there are individuals determined, unswerving and sure who take upon themselves to prove they can defy any opposition to their will And History stands witness to the fact that such intents as were termed a definite mark of madness, turned the impossible into possible. Perhaps it was G B. Shaw who stated that all progress of the world was due the unreasonable persons. When self-confident persons resolve to do something then cowardly calculations of reason do not stand in their way. Life is will. Where there is no will there is death.

And there are persons and groups who become mentally lethargic. They do what others especially the well-to-do, usually do. They do not apply their mind whether what they do or desire to do is correct or plausible in itself. And the majority of people are blind followers of others, individuals as well as societies, Sometimes people do something and the reason for their doing so is that many others were doing the same. Care should always be taken in copying others. Sometimes, the great majority of the members of a society

²⁰⁵ Aarb-i-Kalim, p. 113/576.

may choose a wrong path and thus bring about destruction. Mirza Ghalib, one of the most celebrated poets of Urdu and Persian, very rightly had said:

ازاں کہ پیروی خلق گمربی آرد!!
نمی رویم برا بے کہ کارواں رفت
است

"As following others can result in putting ourselves to a wrong path-hence we are not going to choose the path for us only because the whole caravan had taken to it (the whole caravan could go wrong),"

Allama Iqbal States:

اگر تقلید بودے شیوہ خوب
پیمبر ہم راہ اجداد رفتے²⁰⁶

"If to copy others, (without critical analysis) were a good habit and profitable mode of life then the Prophet (S.A.S) would have gone the way his forebears had gone."

Therefore, according to Islam the leaders, dignitaries and celebrities in all walks of life are advised to act with utmost responsibility. People follow the big ones whether they be big as academicians as religious scholars, politicians or rulers. If they adopt an evil mode of life and uppish manners; they misguide thousands, rather millions of people belonging to the lower strata who take pride in looking and behaving like those who are at the higher pedestal. All those who are looked upto for standards should set beautiful standard. They should uphold positive and life-enhancing values. If

²⁰⁶ Payam-i-Mashriq, p. 222/392.

they set bad examples they will have to account for those who followed them out of awe or respect.

Anyway to follow others blindly is a sort of mental slavishness. A person who has a self i.e. confidence in himself, acts responsibly. He follows where he should. He goes his own way where he should. He does not go against others on account of sheer malice or conceit, even if others do the right. A conceited person is also a slave---a slave to his own animal self. In short, it is not easy to act independently in the real sense of the word. The majority of the individuals and groups act as slaves. And hence they are not fully alive.

In the field of literature too it is observed that a person who becomes a "celebrity" assumes the status of a reference. His ideas, words, terms and sentences are quoted uncritically. If he gains much in fame, then his pet sentences and phrases become quotes. To follow him and to quote him becomes rather a literary fashion. Gradually, there emerges a circle of like minded people who give airs to themselves for belonging to each other, the integrating element being the reverence for that particular "celebrity", For some years they treat themselves as high-brows and those who lack confidence crouch before them. But Allama Iqbal would like to ask them whether they were sure that they had not fallen in the traps of something flashy and flaunting. This is why he admonishes ;

کر بلبیل و طاءوس کی تقلید
سے توبہ!
بلبیل فقط آواز ہے طاءوس
رنگ²⁰⁷ فقط

"Foreswear, following the nightingale and the peacock. The nightingale is nothing more than voice and the peacock is nothing more than colour."

The "literary high-brows" and "bullies" are selling their aphorisms, symbols and pet idioms. There is nothing in them. It is all flashy, beautiful crust and no kernel. An Arab poet, addressing a friend of his, who was following a group of cultural high-brows rightly castigated this kind of complex

يا بن سعيد يا ابا جعفر !
أظهرت ديننا غير ما تخفى
لست بزنديقى و لكنمها!!
أجبت ان تغرف بالظرف

"O Aba Ja'fer b. saeed, you show off a religion which is not your real creed.

You are not an atheist but you crave for renown as a liberal person."

Such slavish attitude diminishes self. One should be independent and not slavishly "liberal". One should look at things with one's own eyes and should obtain lesson, pleasure and vision of his own. Lacking independent vision is a mark of diminished self-confidence and denotes diminished life.

Societies and nations who become politically -enslaved and subjugated by other societies and nations present the worst kind of death in life. They are the most wretched form of breathing dead bodies. Politically enslaved people lose all confidence in themselves. They look with utmost reverence upon whatever belongs to their masters, howsoever, inferior or abominable,

in actual fact, that might be. They look down upon whatever is their own howsoever valuable and worth-while that might be. The potentialities of the enslaved societies remain unrealized

از غلامی مرد حق رنا ریند
!!

از غلامی جو پر سش نا
ارجمند!!

کو ذوق و نیش دانسته لزش
مردہ بے مرگ و نغش خود
بدوش

آبروئے زندگی در باختہ!
چوں خراں با گاہ و جو در

ساختہ²⁰⁸

"In slavery, a believer in one God, adopts the manners of idol worshippers. In slavery, a bolivers' potentialities remain dormant" "His taste dies out hence he takes poison for honey. He is a corpse without death carrying his dead body on his shoulders."

"He has gambled away the respect for life and has reconciled filling his belly with trash like donkeys."

According to Allama Iqbal slavery, of all deaths is the worst death. Slaves are the most miserable breathing dead bodies ;

موت ہے اک سخت تر جس کا
غلامی ہے نام
فکر و فن خواجگی کاش سمجھتا
غلام²⁰⁹

"There is much brutal kind of death. Name of that death is slavery. Would that the slave could understand the trickery and artifice of the masters."

Allam Iqbal doubts the capacity of a slave to experience resurrection ;

بانگ اسرافیل ان کو زندہ کر
سکتی نہیں!
روح سے تھا زندگی میں بھی تہی
جن کا جسد!
مرکے جی اٹھنا فقط آزاد مردوں کا
ہے کام
گرچہ ہر ذی روح کی منزل ہے
آغوش²¹⁰ لحد

"Israfil's trumpet cannot resurrect those whose body remained soul-less even when they were alive".

²⁰⁹ Armathan-i-Hijaz, (Urdu), p. 35/677.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p. 20/662.

"All who possess life have to go to the lap of the grave but it is only the free and emancipated who will regain life after experiencing death".

And, then there is a dialogue between the dead body of a slave and the grave. Several times Allama Iqbal has used the technique of making others express his opinions. It has a dramatic tinge and is meant to add strength to his exposition. He succeeds, invariably ;

قبر----- (اپنے مردے سے)

آہ ظالم تو جہاں میں بندہ محکوم تھا !!
 میں نہ سمجھی تھی کہ کیوں بے خاک میری
 سوز ناک
 تیری میت سے مری تاریکیاں تاریک تر !!
 تیری میت سے زمین کا پردہ ناموس چاک
 الحذر محکوم کی میت سے سو بار الحذر!!
 اے اسرافیل، اے خدائے کائنات، اے جان
 پاک²¹¹

"Grave (addressing the corpse it contained) O you gloomy impact of oppression— were you a slave person in the world? I could not understand why my frame had kept burning Your corpse has turned the darkness that surrounds me, still darker. On account of your corpse earth has suffered utter disgrace."

"I shun the grave of a slave vehemently. I declare it a hundred time to you O Israfil! O the Creator of the universe! and O the Sacred spirit!".

²¹¹ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, pp. 20, 21/662, 663.

In the same vein Allama Iqbal alludes to the youngmen who were being educated in the institutions where instruction was imparted and subjects were taught with a view to kill the spirit of the students so that they would begin to think as their Masters thought and start looking at things as their masters did. They would even adopt the morals, tongue and the costume of those who ruled them. They do uncritically just to copy their rulers. Emerson was right whom he said ; "Slavery is an institution for converting men into monkes." And they did so without being conscious of the loss they incurred. They got transformed in such a tricky way that instead of feeling ashamed of their trans-formation they took pride in looking like their western chiefs. Allama says and the rub of these words cannot be fully tasted by us now as we are no longer slaves. Yet the reflection of an injured sense or self respect experienced by an enslaved society is, vividly expressive ;

گرچہ مکتب کا جوان زندہ نظر آتا
ہے!!
مردہ ہے مانگ کرے لایا ہے فرنگی سے
نفس! ²¹²

"This college—going young man looks alive. In fact he is a dead body who has borrowed breath from the West."

The over all policy of the conquerors in respect of subjugated peoples is always meant to weaken the spirit of slaves so that, by and by they reconcile to their slavish plight, rather they start looking with pride at things which are

²¹² Darb-i-Kalim, p. 171/633.

in fact the token of their enslavement. This is how Allama Iqbal shows his utter disgust with the educational policies of the colonialists:

چومی بینی کہ رہزن کاروان
کشت
چہ پرسی کاروانے را چان
کشت
مباش ایمن ازاں غلمے کہ
خوانی
کہ از وے روح قومے را توال
کشت²¹³

You are looking at how the plunderer has destroyed the whole caravan. Then why should you ask me of the way in which he did so. Do not feel yourself immune from the effects of the knowledge you are obtaining. With this kind of knowledge the spirit of a whole nation can be killed.”

There are poisonous foods or at least foods that do not suit the requirements of a physique. If no change in the menu takes place in time, the body dies. Similarly there are philosophies, thoughts, principles and theories that diminish mental and spiritual vitality and inch by inch lead to a mental and spiritual demise. It is the positive and invigorating bringing up which changes the outlook for the better and the negative and attenuating indoctrination which brings about a change for the worse. Through one mode societies gain courage and vitality and through the other they attain despair, langour and cowardice.

²¹³ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, 101/983.

We have seen that improper food results in disease and death of the body. We have perceived that incongruous education kills the spirit of individuals and societies. Foreign rulers impose particular syllabi on the subject peoples to mould their outlook in a mode that would suit colonial interests. A slave society cannot run away from this calamity easily. This is why, according to Allama Iqbal slavery is the worst kind of death.

But Allama Iqbal saw that sermons emanating from the mosques and monasteries were also not life-giving. They were life killing. This is why Allama Iqbal castigated the religious leaders, with not less biting phrases than those used against the foreign rule. If the religious leaders and scholars begin to inject into the soul of their society, the feeling of despondency and an inclination towards relinquishing the battle-field of life to seek comfort in seclusion, it is clearly a bad omen and it suits the purpose of the alien authority. Speakers and writers who teach and propagate defeatism, are in a way allies of foreign masters. All such teachers, preachers, writers and speakers are according to Allama Iqbal, accursed persons ;

سخت باریک ہیں امراض امم کے
اسباب!
کھول کر کہیے تو کرتا ہے بیان کوتاہی!!
دین شیری میں علاموں کے شیوخ اور
امام!
دیکھتے ہیں فقط اک فلسفہ روباہی!
ہو اگر قوت فرغون کی در پردہ مرید!
قوم کے حق میں ہے لعنت وہ کلیم
اللہی! 214

"Causes of ailments of nations are extremely subtle. Words fail us if we try to state it openly. Preachers and saints of enslaved peoples discern only fox-philosophy in the life-style of lions.

If Mosaic revelation be inwardly devoted to pharaoh's power and authority, it surely is a curse for the nation (of Moses)."

At another place Allama chastises the defeatist attitude of both the religious leaders who preach in mosques and saints who teach in monasteries, in the following quatrain

فونگی صد بست از
کعبه و دیر!!
صدا در خانقاهان رفت
لاعیر!
حکایت پیش ملا باز
گفتم!!
دغا فرمود یا رب
غافیت خیر!²¹⁵

"The Europeans bagged their game from the Sanctuary of Kaaba and other places of worship, but the voice that was raised in the monasteries spoke. None else (God Himself ordains all things)

I related this story to the Mullah who prayed, O, Lord make end (life hereafter) pleasant."

Similarly Allama Iqbal addressing the Mullah says ironically:

²¹⁵ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, p. 73/955.

سخن زنامه و میزان دراز تر

گفتی!

بحیرتم که نه بیستی قیامت

موجود!²¹⁶

"You have delivered prolonged lectures on the book (of man's deeds) and the balance (of God's Justice)

I am amazed you do not look at the Doomsday which is already upon us."

The turmoil life in our society and injustice prevalent here and now, was not being discussed by our preachers and scholars. How the nation could fight its battles of day to day life, was not their concern. They only talked of what could happen on Doomsday when human beings would be called upon to account for their deeds 'performed in this world. They dwelt much more upon the description of God's balance and record of men's deeds than upon the inculcation in the minds and souls of their listeners as to how to be brave, how to be just, how to live a life free. of the shackles of slavery, how to mould the lives of their pupils and devotees according to the ego-strengthening principles of Islam.

Teachers, preachers and mentors told their devotees to adopt the mode of seclusion which meant monasticism, inertia, langour and a reluctance to face realities. Such guides according to Allama Iqbal, were preachers of death ;

²¹⁶ Zabur-i-Ajam, p. 118/510.

گر صاحب ہنگامہ نہ ہو
منبرو محراب!
دین بندہ مومن کے لئے
موت ہے با خواب
اے وادی لولاب²¹⁷

"If mosques be unstimulating then the religion of a believer can be nothing more than a dream or death Listen ! O, the Valley of Laulab."

تیرے دین و ادب سے آرہی ہے
یوئے رہبانی
یہی ہے مرنے والی امتوں کا عالم
پیروی²¹⁸

"Your way of life and your literature smack of monasticism. This verily marks the decay of dying nations,"

Allama Iqbal has an idea of his own regarding abandonment. In his view abandonment of the world does not mean seclusion from day to day problems of life, it is rather abandonment of greed, lust, covetousness, unbridled and sinful ambitions to pose as a bully to society. For Allama Iqbal Islam is the only means of enabling human beings to become truly human. And this he cannot be unless he is the master of his own self. A man who stands emancipated from all wantonness and carnality, is in fact the conqueror of the lower world. To forsake is one thing and to free of worldly avidity is another says Allama Iqbal:

²¹⁷ Darb-i-Kalim, p. 34/676.

²¹⁸ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, (Urdu), p. 38/680.

کمال ترک نہیں آب و گل
سے مسجوری
کمال ترک ہے تسخیر خاکی
و نوری 219!

"Height of abandonmeant lies not in forsaking the world. Height of abandonment lies in sujugating the terrestrial as well as the celestial."

In Allama Iqbal's opinion, the alive and truly so, are persons who willingly accept the challenge of life and fight against various types of evil. They do not mind whether they succeed in their mission or fail. A believer knows that there is yet a life after death which is everlasting. Such a person lays down his life trying to strengthen the forces of good. A man of conviction never surrenders before untruth and injustice. Therefore, according to the Quran such a person lives on. To live, for dying on the path of righteousness is living genuinely. Lite is a constant toil for the preservation and Implementation of good. And a life sacrificed for the preservation and implementation of good is not cut short. It attains constancy, martyrdom makes life ripe for eternity. In the words of Allama Iqbal:

نہ پنداری کہ مرد امتحان مرد!
نمیرد گرچہ زیر آسمان مرد!
ترا شایان چنین مرگ است ورنہ
زیر مر گئے کہ خواہی میتوان
مرد! 220

²¹⁹ Dal-i-Abel, p. 42/334.

²²⁰ slrmaghan-i-Hijas, p. 1141996.

"Never consider a man as dead who stood the test, He does not in reality expire although he passes away under the sun.

Such is the death as you should deserve, otherwise you can die in whatever manner you like."

A believer strives in the path of Allah. When he succeeds he says: "Allah be praised". When he fails he says:

"Allah be praised". This behaviour is the hall-mark of a believer. He neither feels elated nor frustrated. His conviction is that everything belongs to Allah, including life. From Allah to Allah. Elation and frustration indicate a feeling of personal gain and personal loss, whereas a believer is a trustee of Allah regarding whatever apparently is his. A trustee, a real trustee, is one who is always ready to return what is entrusted to him to the owner. Life also is a trust and can be claimed back by the Master. Then why should a believer be afraid of death. But Allama Iqbal says:

مسلمانے کہ مرگ از ولے
بلزد
جهان گردیدم و اورا
ندیدم!!²²¹

"I have not been able to find out a single Muslim of whom death be afraid, although I have travelled far and wide in the world."

²²¹ Armaghan-i-Hijaz, p. 40/922.

Life can never flourish under constant fear of death. That is not a full life. It is always the good practical examples which inspire hearts to do good. It is the example of bravery that inspires bravery. But in a society where inspiring examples be not available life begins to shrink. High hopes lie scuttled and sink into the minds, unconscious layer. Under such despondent circumstances a voice of hope sounds odd. Allama Iqbal had to shake his despairing society into becoming awake to their appalling condition. They were to be made aware of the fact that they were not alive. They were dead and they did not know it. Says Allama Iqbal:

والے قومے دل زحق پر
داخته!!
جهان گردیدم و اورا
ندیدم!!²²²

"Woe be to a nation which stands far removed from Truth (God) and hence has died but is not ware of her death."

Such persons are fugitives from life. They enjoy the society of only those who do not talk of life. Like-minded people are a fraternity. Lovers of escape from the challenges of reality are also a closely-nit brotherhood. Tavern tots have their own circles. Hunters like hunters. Lovers are fond of lovers. "Birds of a feather flock together" Hazrat Sheikh Abd-al-Qadir al-Jilani states:

²²² Pas Chili Bayed Kard, p. 16/812.

انت میت و صحبتک ایضا لموتی القلوب، غلبک بالنجباء والبد لاء و انت قبر تاتی قبراً مثلاً، الت زمن یقورک،
زمن مثلاً انت اغمی یقودک اغمی مثلاً.²²³

"You are spiritually dead hence you keep company of those who are spiritually dead. You should adopt the company of the alive, the noblemen and the sons of noblemen. But you are a grave hence you come to a grave like you. You are a corpse. you come to a corpse like you. You are a cripple and a cripple like you is your leader. You are blind and a blind man like you is your guide."

Allama Iqbal had admonished the Muslim Ummah the enslaved people, for their death-like lethargy. He exhorted them to be up and doing and urged them to check the account of their deeds everyday to know whether they found them selves better than what they were the day before.

اگر امروز تو تصویر
دوش است
بخاک تو شرار زندگی
نیست!²²⁴

"If your today is a true copy of your yesterday then your body of clay contains no spark of life."

Breathing-dead bodies can be reenlivened and Allama Iqbal tells us how. But it is a different subject and demands separate treatment.

²²³ Al-Fath-ur-Rehmani, Egypt. p. 199.

²²⁴ Payam-i-Mashrlq, p. 37/207.

IQBAL'S IDEAL PERSON AND RUMI'S INFLUENCE

Riffat Hassan

A cursory glance at any part of Iqbal's philosophy, in particular his conception of "Mard-e-Mo'min", would reveal Rumi's profound influence. Rumi was Iqbal's acknowledged 'murshid', Professor Hakim has observed, "If a free man like Iqbal could be called the disciple of any man, it is only of Rumi".²²⁵ Rumi is Iqbal's intellectual progenitor, and it is only with reference to this great mystic-poet that Iqbal admits with frank pride:

تو بھی ہے اسی قافلہ شوق
میں اقبال
جس قافلہ کا سالار ہے
رومی 226

You too belong to the caravan of Love—that caravan of Love whose chief is Rumi.

Iqbal's view of evolution has been greatly influenced by Rumi whose ideas on the subject were a message of hope and joy and did not bring the

²²⁵ Hakim, K.A., "Rumi, Nietzsche and Iqbal", Iqbal as a Thinker, Lahore, 1966, p. 201.

²²⁶ Bal-i-Jibril, p. 200.

gloom and despair which came in the wake of Darwin's theory.²²⁷ For Rumi the lowest form of life is matter but matter is not dead or inert:

باد و خاک و آتش بنده اند
بامن و تو مرده باقی زنده
اند²²⁸

Air and Earth and Fire are slaves,
for you and I they are dead, but not for God.

According to Rumi, the self originated in the form of matter consisting of dimly—conscious monads. Rumi's theory is stated thus

آمده اول با قلمم جهاد
و زچهادی در نباتی او فتاد
سالها اندر نباتی غمر کرد
و از جمادی یاد ناورد از نبرد
وزنباتی چون بحیران او فتاد
نامدش حال نباتی هیچ بساد
جز همان میلی که دارد سوی آن
خفاصه در وقت بهار و ضمیران
همچنین اقلیم تا اقلیم رفت
تا شد اکنون غافل و دانا و زفت

²²⁷ The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Lahore, 1962, pp. 121-122

²²⁸ Rumi, J. Masnawi-e-Ma'nawi, (edited by Furuzanfar, B and Dovish, M) Tehran, 1963, Book I, p. 53.

First man appeared in the class of inorganic things Next he passed therefrom into that of plants

For years he lived on as one of the plants,

Remembering nought of his inorganic state so different, And when he passed from the genitive to the animal state, He had no remembrance of his state as a plant,

Except the inclination he felt to the world of plants, Especially at the time of spring and sweet flowers ;

Like the inclination of infants towards their mothers. Which knew not the case of their inclination to the breast. Again the great Creator, as you know,

Drew men out of the animal state into the human state. Thus man passed from one order of nature to another,

Till he became wise and knowing and strong,as he is now Of his first souls he has now no remembrance,

And he will be again changed from his present soul.

(Translation by Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, pp. 121-122.)

Iqbal's concept of the evolution of human beings expressed in lines such as the following is strongly reminiscent of Rumi's thought on the subject:

²²⁹ Masnawi-e-Mo'nawi, Book IV, pp. 173-174.

جو ہے بیدار انسان میں وہ گہری نیند سوتا ہے
شجر میں، پھول میں، حیوان میں، پتھر میں،
ستارے میں²³⁰

That which is conscious in human beings sleeps a deep sleep in trees,
flowers, animals, stones and stars.

And

کس کس جتن سے میں نے بنایا
رتبہ بہ رتبہ پایہ بہ پایہ
جامد کو جامی، جامی کو حیوان
حیوان کو وحشی، وحشی کو انسان²³¹

With great effort have I made,
rank by rank, part by part,
inorganic into organic, organic into animal, animal into brute, brute,
into, human.

For Iqbal, as for Rumi, God is the ultimate source and

²³⁰ Bang-e-Dara, p. 143.

²³¹ Cited in Badvi, L. "A Forgotten Composition of Iqbal", Iqbal Review, January 1965, pp. 77-78.

ground of evolution.²³² He does not regard matter as something dead because from the Ultimate Ego only egos proceed

نریزد جز خودی از پر
تو او
نخیزد جز گهر اندر
زو او!²³³

From its ray nothing comes into being save egos,

From its sea, nothing appears save pearls.

(Translation by Dar B.A. Iqbal's *Gulshan-e-Raz-a-Jadid* and *Bandagi Namah*, Lahore 1964, p. 36.

The Ultimate Ego is immanent in matter and makes the emergent emerge out of it. There are various levels of being or grades of consciousness. The raising note of egohood culminates in human beings.²³⁴

Iqbal shares Rumi's belief that evolution is the outcome of an impulse of life manifesting itself in innumerable forms. The vital impulse determines the direction of evolution as well as evolution itself. Life is that which makes efforts, which pushes upwards and outwards and on. All the striving is due to the *elan vital* in us, "that vital urge which makes us grow, and transforms this wandering plant into a theatre of unending creation"²³⁵

²³² Khatoon, J. *The Place of God, Man and Universe in the Philosophic System of Iqbal*, Karachi 1963, p. 121.

²³³ *Zabur-e-'Ajam*, p. 224.

²³⁴ *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, pp. 71-72.

²³⁵ Durant, W. *The Story of Philosophy*, New York, 1933, pp. 345-346.

Like Rumi, Iqbal also looks upon evolution as something great and glorious, not as something signifying human sinfulness and degradation. The "Fall" is the beginning of self-consciousness—the stage from where persons of God would begin their conscious search for perfection. Greeting Adam, the Spirit of Earth says

خورشید جہاں تاب کی ضو تیرے
 شرر میں!
 آباد ہے اک تازہ جہاں تیرے ہنر
 میں!
 جچتے نہیں بخشنے ہوئے فردوش
 نظر میں!
 جنت تری پنہاں ہے ترے خون جگر
 میں!
 اے پیکر گل کوشش پیہم کی جزا
 دیکھا!²³⁶

The light of the world-illuminating sun is in your spark,
 a new world lives in your talents ;
 unacceptable is a paradise which is given
 your paradise lies hidden in your blood.
 O form of clay, see the reward of constant endeavour.

One of the most notable characteristics of Rumi's thought is his ardent belief in the efficacy of constant endeavour.²³⁷ Iqbal shares with Rumi this

²³⁶ Bal-e-Jibril, p. 179.

²³⁷ Vahid, S.A. Studies in Iqbal, Lahore, 1967, p. 102.

special kind of mysticism—sometimes referred to as the mysticism of struggle—the kind of mysticism which strengthens and fortifies, rather than weakens or puts to sleep, the potentialities of the Self. In his Introduction to *The Secrets of the Self*, Professor Nicholson comments, "As much as he (Iqbal) dislikes the type of Sufism exhibited by Hafiz, he says homage to the pure and profound genius of Jalaluddin though he rejects the doctrine of self-abandonment taught by the great Persian mystic and does not accompany him on his pantheistic flights".²³⁸ Although, as has been observed above, Iqbal could not follow Rumi into all the regions of mystic ecstasy, yet their mysticism—Rumi's and Iqbal's—have a lot in common. It was 'positive', it affirmed life and upheld passionately both the dignity and divinity of human beings. This mysticism may perhaps be best described in terms of Love—a concept which forms the chief link between Iqbal and Rumi. For both Rumi and Iqbal the ideal person is an embodiment of love, a paragon of "Ishq". For both of them love is assimilation and expansion. It is linked with the doctrine of hardness, and the sole mean of attaining "the Kingdom, the Power, and the glory". It is this attribute which distinguishes more than anything else, Iqbal's ideal person from Nietzsche's Superman and places him or her in close proximity to Rumi's "Mard-e-Haqq"

Not only do Rumi and Iqbal regard the advent of human beings on earth as a happy event, they are also staunch believers in the personal creation of destiny and the freedom of the will. In numerous places Rumi has reiterated the thought of the following lines:

اختیارے ہست مارا بے گمان
 حس را منکر شافی شد غیابان²³⁹

²³⁸ Nicholson, R.A., *Introduction to the Secrets of the Self*, Lahore, 1964, pp, xiv-xv.

²³⁹ Masnavi-e-Ma'nawi, Book V.

It is certain that we possess freedom of the will

you cannot deny the manifest evidence of the inner sense.

خورشید جہاں تاب کی ضو تیرے
شرر میں!
آباد ہے اک تازہ جہاں تیرے ہنر
میں!
جچتے نہیں بخشے ہوئے فردوس
نظر میں!
جنت تری پنہاں ہے ترے خون جگر
میں!
اے پیکر گل کوشش پیہم کی جزا
دیکھ!²⁴⁰

Through action life is made heaven or hell,

for this person of clay, by origin, is neither from heaven nor hell.

Both Rumi and Iqbal go beyond upholding the freedom of the will to a belief in "tawwakul" or trustful renunciation. "Tawwakul" is born not out of an awareness of one's helplessness, but is the result of "Iman", the vital way of making the world our own.²⁴¹ "Iman", says Iqbal, "is not merely a passive belief in one or more propositions of a certain kind, it is a living assurance

²⁴⁰ Bang-e-Dara, p. 307.

²⁴¹ The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p. 109.

begotten of a rare experience".²⁴² Only "strong personalities are capable of rising to this experience and the 'higher fatalism' implied in it".²⁴³

This 'higher fatalism' described thus by Tennyson:

"Our wills are ours, we know not how,

Our wills are ours to snake them Thine"²⁴⁴ is described variously by Rumi and Iqbal. The former says:

لفظ جبرم عشق را بے صبر کرد
وانکہ عاشق نیست جسو جبر کرد²⁴⁵

The word 'Determinism' causes Love to grow impatient,

only one who is not a lover regards 'Determinism' as a prison.

and the latter writes:

چوں فنا اندر رضائے حق
شود
بندہ مومن قضاائے حق
شود²⁴⁶

²⁴² Ibid., p. 888.

²⁴³ Ibid., pp. 109-110.

²⁴⁴ Tennyson, A "In Memoriam, A.H.H.", The Poetical Works, London, 1954, p. 239.

²⁴⁵ Masnawl-e-Ma'nawi, Book I.

²⁴⁶ Pas Che Bayad Bard A Aqwam-a-Sharq ? p. 14.

When he (she) loses himself (herself) in the will of God The Mo'min becomes God's instrument of destiny.

Both Rumi and Iqbal believe that the Ideal Person's life in God is not annihilation but transformation. "The Ideal Man freely merges his own will in the will of God in the ultimate relation of Love".²⁴⁷ It is more than likely that Iqbal's ideas about the deep love between human beings and a personal God which form one of the most profound and inspiring part of his writings, were clarified and strengthened through his contact with Rumi's thought.

The resemblance between Rumi's "Mard-e-Haqq" and Iqbal's "Mard-e-Mo'min" is quite unmistakable. In both cases the Ideal Person is a combination of the contemplative, person and the person of action. Iqbal places more stress on action than Rumi does but this hardly constitutes a fundamental differenc.

Both Rumi and Iqbal believe that the whole course of evolution is steered towards the creation of the Ideal Person. "He is the final cause of creation and, therefore, though having appeared last in point of time, he was really the first mover. Chronologically, the tree is the cause of the fruit but, teleologically, the fruit is the cause of the tree".²⁴⁸ To his Ideal Person, Rumi says:

پس بصورت غالم اصغر توئی
پس بمعنی عالم اکبر توئی
ظاہر آ آں شاخ اصل میوہ است
باطنا پھر ثمر شد شاخ ہست
گر بنودی میل و امید ثمر

²⁴⁷ Hakim, K.A. The Metaphysics of Rumi, Lahore, 1959, p. 110.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 93.

کی نشاندی باعبان بیچ شجر
پس بمعنی آن شجر از میوه زاد
گر بصورت از شجر بودش نهاد²⁴⁹

Therefore, while in form thou art the microcosm, in reality thou art the macrocosm

Externally the branch is the origin of the fruit ;

Intrinsically the branch came into existence for the sake of the fruit.

Had there been no hope of the fruit, would the gardener have planted the tree ?

Therefore in reality the tree is born of the the fruit, though it appears to be produced by the tree.

(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. Rumi, Poet and Mystic, London, 1950, p. 124.)

about his 'Na'ib-e-Ilahi" Iqbal says:

مدعای	علم	الاسماستے
ستر	سبحان	الذی
	اسراستے	²⁵⁰

He is the final cause of "God taught Adam the name of all things."
(Sura, 2: 29)

²⁴⁹ Masnawi-e-Ma'nawi, Book IV, p. 27.

²⁵⁰ Asrar-e-Khudi, pp. 50-51.

He is the inmost sense of "Glory to Him that transported His servant by night" (Sura, 17: 1)

(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self, Lahore, p. 81)

and then turning to "the Rider of Destiny" proclaims

نوع انسان مرغ و تو حاصلی
کاروان زندگی را منزلی²⁵¹

Mankind are the cornfield and thou the harvest,

Thou art the goal of Life's caravan.

(Translation by Nicholson, R.A. The Secrets of the Self, p. 84)

For both Rumi and Iqbal, the concept of the Ideal Person constitutes a democratic ideal which does not have the aristocratic bias of Nietzsche's Superman. Both Rumi and Iqbal believe that the Ideal Person can work miracles which do not, however, "mean the annihilation of causation but only bringing into play causes that are not within the reach of common experience".²⁵² Iqbal, we may remember, said the "the region of mystic experience is as real as any other region of human experience."²⁵³

It is not possible within the purview of these few pages to discuss in any depth the subject of this essay. However, an attempt has been made to indicate-in broad outline-some of the most striking similarities between the

²⁵¹ Asrar-e-Khudi, pp. 50-51.

²⁵² The Metaphysics of Rumi, p. 110.

²⁵³ The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, p, 23.

thought of Rumi and Iqbal in so far as they have a bearing on the genesis and growth of the Self and the emergence of the Ideal Person. Rumi's influence on Iqbal has been so all-pervading that it is not possible either to describe or to circumscribe it exactly. *Asrar-e-Khudi*—with Iqbal began his preaching of doctrine of incessant struggle, carries as its introduction the following lines of Rumi (quoted again in *Javid Nama*

دی شیخ با چراغ همی
گشت گردی شهر
کز دام ورد بلوم و انسانم
آرزوست
زین پمربان سست عناصر
ولم گرفت
شیر خدا و رستم و ستانم
آرزوست
گفتم که یافت می نشود
جسته ایم ما
گفت آنکه یافت می نشود
آنم²⁵⁴ آرزوست

Last night the Elder wandered about the city with a lantern Saying, 'I am weary of demon and monster: man is my desire. The Lion of God and *Rustam-e-Dastan*, are my desire. I said, 'The thing we quested after is never attained!' He said, 'The unattainable—that thing is my desire'. (Translation by Arberry, A. J. *Javid Nama*, London, 1966 p. 29)

²⁵⁴ *Asrar-e-Khudi*, p. 2.

and in conclusion one can hardly be better than to observe with one of Iqbal's biographers that "a more accurate and difficult description of Iqbal's own approach to ideals would be difficult to find".²⁵⁵

²⁵⁵ Singh, I, *The Ardent Pilgrim*, London, 1951, p. 103.

PUNJAB IN IQBAL'S LIFE-TIME

Riaz Hussain

This Essay attempts to survey the social, political and economic forces at work in the Punjab from 1901—1938 and Iqbal's reaction to men and matters in the Punjab during most of his working life.

During the period under review the population of the Punjab was composed of Muslims (55%), Hindus (35%), located mostly in districts East of the Ravi, and Sikhs (13%). The three communities lived in a state of perpetual conflict in almost all walks of life, religious; economic, political, educational and social. In the rural areas the Muslims formed 57% of the population.

The Peasants' Economic Burden in Iqbal's Time

The Muslims during their rule had treated the Hindus with complete and unbiased justice. In the Punjab while Muslims owned the agricultural land, the Sultans and Mughal Kings had allowed the Hindu money lender²⁵⁶ a monopoly in trade and finance. The economic position of the two communities was thus balanced. This balance was maintained under the Sikh regime.

When the British wrested the Punjab in 1849, they materially changed this economic balance between the Muslim and the Hindu. The Mughal and Sikh Governments had kept a restraint on the power of the moneylender to

²⁵⁶ The main Hindu bania (moneylending) castes were Aggarwal, Khatri and Arora.

extort unreasonably high rate of interest from his debtors. But the British gave a free rein to the Hindu moneylender to extort as much interest from his debtors as he could. The British magistrates zealously Supported the moneylender in recovering his debts, even allowing him to confiscate the property, house, goods, tools and animals of the defaulting debtor. The entire weight of the British power was thus thrown behind the Hindu bania. The poor debtor, mainly Muslim, found himself entirely at the mercy of his creditor. In 1870 when Punjab was in the grip of a severe famine, the moneylender found his golden opportunity to expropriate the houses, lands and animals belonging to the Muslim masses mortgages had been rare in Mughal times, but under the British mortgages of land, houses and golden and silver ornaments appeared in every village and town of the Punjab.

In 1875—78 the total land area under mortgage was 1,65,000 acres. Within ten years it trebled so that in 1884—88, the land area under mortgage to Hindu moneylenders was 3,85,000 acres. In 1868, the number of moneylenders in the Punjab was 53,263. Under British patronage the money lending class proliferated and in 1911 the number of moneylenders rose to 1,93,890.²⁵⁷

At this stage the British grew frightened by the enormous economic power they had themselves put in the hands of the Hindu Moneylender. The British passed what was called the Land Alienation Act (1900) which was put into effect in 1901. The Act debarred the non-agricultural classes from owning land. Land could not be transferred to non-agricultural buyers. Non-agriculturist classes were also debarred from keeping the land in mortgage for more than twenty years.

The British reaped immense advantages from this Act. The peasant proprietor, looking upon the British as his deliverers, became a staunch supporter of British Imperialism. The Act also served the Imperial Policy of

²⁵⁷ These staggering statistics are recorded in M. Darling *The Punjab Peasant*, (London, Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 172-73

"Divide and Rule" by creating a sharp division between urban and rural interests. Henceforth all political, economic and social issues in the Punjab were understood, debated and resolved in rural and urban frame of reference.

And yet the Act did not eliminate the debts of the peasant proprietor. The irony was that the Democles' Sword of debt hung over the heads of even farm labourers and tenants who did not own an inch of land. About 1.25 million of them were under a debt liability of Rs.20 crores. Another 120 crore rupees were owed to the moneylenders by small landowners. The total debt liability of landless peasants and landowners, thus added up to the enormous sum of Rs. 140 crores, out of which a major portion i e. Rs.80 crores was the liability -of Muslims alone.²⁵⁸

The Big Landlords were by and large free of debt. The areas where big Muslim Landlords could be found were Multan, Jhang, Mianwali, Muzaffargarh, Sargodha, Dera Ghezi Khan and Campbellpur. The big Hindu Landholdings were located east of the Ravi in Rohtak, Hissar and Ambala.

The Punjab Landowner's and the British Officer's Style of Life

The Landowners extracted rents and several kinds of tributes including women from their tenants. The British Government backed the Landowners to the hilt in the recovery of these levies from the poor tiller of the soil. To satisfy the demands of the Landlord and the British Revenue Officer, the peasant worked to the last ounce of his energy, yet neither the landowner nor the British Government did anything to improve the quality of peasants' life by providing schools, dispensaries, sanitation etc. It was a wholly one-sided relationship, where the tenant gave everything and received nothing. While the money flowed from the rural areas, both the landlord and the British

²⁵⁸ Riaz Hussain, Politics of Iqbal, Islamic Book Service, Lahore, 1977, pp. 52-56.

Officer enjoyed in Lahore the most comfortable style of living. The British Officer sent his sons and daughters to public schools in Simla, Missouri or England; the landowner sent his son to Aitcheson and daughter to Queen Mary in Lahore. Both classes maintained deluxe cars and lived in spacious villas.

Developments in Education and Rise of the Middle Class

Towards the close of the 19th century many colleges and universities were founded all over the subcontinent. In the Punjab the first batch of graduates passed out from Government College, Lahore in 1870. The University of the Punjab was founded in 1882. Forman Christian College was established in 1864. The Punjab Public Library was set up in 1888. This same period saw the opening of Islamia College in Lahore. Thus in the early part of the twentieth Century there appeared in towns a sizeable body of well-educated, intelligent and highly articulate middle class which was poised to answer the British in their own tongue in legal, constitutional and economic spheres. The British were bewildered. They began to confer liberally titles of Khan Bahadur and Nawab Sahib on Muslim landlords and Rai Batiadur and Rai Sahib on Hindu land-holders and set them up as countervailing force to the rising middle class in the cities. The British exploited the rural Punjab for Revenue for the civil administration and infantry for the Armed Forces.

Both the landlord and the British were frightened of the Urban middle class (of which Iqbal himself formed a part). The middle class was beginning to grasp the barbarity of the British-Landlord Exploitation and take steps to gain political strength by evolving All India social, educational and political organizations.

Politics of the Punjab

In order to insulate rural Punjab from the influence of the strident middle class the British resolved to keep the province backward in constitutional reforms. Legislative councils were set up in Bombay and Madras in 1861 ; in Bengal in 1863 and U P. in 1866.

Punjab was the last in getting a council in 1897. The council was restricted to nine members nominated by the Governor. The Indian councils Act of 1892 which provided for the enlargement of councils by indirect elections from public and municipal boards was not implemented in the Punjab.

Assam with a population of only 7 million was paired with Punjab (Population 20 million) in the Minto-Morley Scheme (1909), under which thirty member legislatures were set up in both provinces.

The Governor of the Punjab had no executive council till 1920. The first Punjab legislative council under Montague-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) was formed in 1921. Under these

reforms another dastardly blow was dealt to the Muslims. The Muslims had an over-all majority of 55% in the Punjab, but they were allotted only 50% seats in the Legislature. This position was however further reduced by seven representatives from Special Constituencies and nominated members. The Muslims were thus virtually reduced to a minority forming only 45% of the council²⁵⁹.

The council was composed of:

(a) Elected Members

Muslims 35

Sikhs = 15

²⁵⁹ Azim Hussain, *Fazl-i-Hussain*, Longman's Green (Bombay) 1947, pp. 150—153)/See also Riaz Hussain, *Politics of Iqbal*, (Islamic Book Service, Lahore, 1977), pp. 55-56.

Hindus and others = 21

71

(b) Nominated Members

(Official and Non-official) = 23

Total = 94

The Minto-Morley Scheme (1909) had provided that separate constituencies shall be clearly demarcated for every community in the provinces. In 1916 the All India Muslim League and the Indian National Congress concluded an agreement at a joint session at Lucknow (later known as the "Lucknow Pact")

A weightage scheme outlining the mode and quantum of communal representation in the Indian legislative councils was agreed upon by the two parties. Weightage meant that Muslims would forego a percentage of seats in their majority provinces. In return they would get more representation in those provinces where they were in a minority. For instance, according to the Lucknow Pact, Muslims would get 29% seats in Bihar where their population strength was 13% ; 15% in C.P. where they were 4% and so on.²⁶⁰ In their majority provinces, however, the Muslims had to make a great sacrifice.

Political vacuum on the Eve of Iqbal's Entry into the Punjab Legislative Council

In the back drop of these economic, educational and constitutional developments, Iqbal entered the Punjab legislative council in November 1926. He found the council dominated by big landowners, who were pet of

²⁶⁰ Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, (Karachi University Press, 1965), pp. 46-47.

their British masters. They were naturally conservative in their Political and economic stand-point. In a clash between the urban middle class and rural landowning interests, the feudal lords were always ready to trample under-foot the urban interest. In this they were invariably abetted by the British.

The landowners, shrewd though they were, lacked intellectual sophistication. Ironically, they looked for a leader from among the elite urban middle class. They were lucky to have Sir Mian Fazl-i-Husain, an astute political manipulator, who staunchly believed in maintaining the stranglehold of the British landowner Axis on the Punjab. To this end he founded the Unionist Party. The Party had no existence outside its Secretariat on Davis Road, Lahore. It was a club of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh feudal legislators presided over by Fazl-i-Husain. The Party never wanted, nor had any contacts with rural or urban masses. Parties of all India stature, the Congress or the Muslim League, had no effective organization in the Punjab. On the eve of Iqbal's entry into the council chamber, there was thus a complete political Vacuum in the Punjab. Iqbal's first care was, therefore, to fill this Vacuum. His affiliation with the Muslim League dated back to his Studentship days in London²⁶¹. He now resolved to turn the Muslim League into a party of the masses.

A Political Dilemma

But before he could do that, he had to face the most difficult political dilemma of his life. Iqbal had to decide whether to sit on the Unionist benches in the Assembly or form a separate party of like-minded urban Muslim members. With his characteristic clear-minded-ness, Iqbal found an answer without compromising his cherished principles.

The unionists were committed to support the land alienation Act and Separate Electorates for Muslims. If Iqbal and other like-minded Muslims had formed a Separate bloc, this would have seriously weakened the Unionist

²⁶¹ Riaz Husain, politics of Iqbal, (Islamic Book Service, Lahore, 1977), p. 59.

Party Vis-a-vis the Congress and the Hindu Maha Sabha who were opposed to the land alienation act and separate electorates. Iqbal, therefore, chose the lesser of the two evils and decided to sit on the Unionist benches.

Though he was now technically a member of the Unionist Party, Iqbal had serious ideological differences with the party leader Mian Fazl-i-Husain.

Fazl-i-Husain's main loyalty was to rural feudal lords and the British rulers. Iqbal, on the other hand, wished to serve the interests of the Muslim masses and was vehemently opposed to the exploitation of workers and peasants by the landlords, banias and the British administration. He exasperated Fazl-i-Husain, British civil servants and the landed aristocracy by his forthright views on many vital issues.

The Doctrine of the Imperial ownership of Land

The land policy during the Hindu and Muslim rule in India had been to divide the land into three categories:

(1) Fallow and wasteland was the property of State. This was generally given by way of salary to servants of the Stat.

(2) Crown Land was the property of the Royal Family.

(3) Private Land over which the Proprietors had full rights The State never claimed any proprietary rights over this land. The State, however, levied rates of taxes on this land which varied from age to age.²⁶²

The British radically departed from this Land Policy on the assumption of Power in India. Unlike the Mughals who made India their home, the British viewed India as an alien conquered land. They, therefore, promulgated the theory that all Indian Land was the Property of the British Crown.

²⁶² Romila Thapar, A History of India, (Baltimore, 1966), I, 46.

Iqbal was one of the first men in India and certainly the only man in the Punjab to publically denounce this doctrine of the British. Another iniquity to which Iqbal drew pointed attention was the British land revenue system. Since it made no distinction between a small landholder and an absentee land-lord, Iqbal demanded that land tax should be converted into a graduated income tax. Iqbal's forthright views on land policy met with indignant reaction from Fazl-i-Hussain and his party men. This was natural, because had Iqbal's demands been accepted and implemented, the feudal society of the Punjab would have become egalitarian.

Having assailed the barbaous Land Policy and the interest of the feudal class, Iqbal now demanded curbs on the vested interests of the elite bureaucracy, composed mainly of the British. The British civil servants drew enormous salaries, and allowances which coupled with Spacious housing facilities, servants, furloughs, pensions and gratuities, gave them a much higher Standard of living than any other comparable class of bureaucracy in the World. Iqbal categorically stated in a speech on the floor of the Punjab Assembly." We spend much more than any other country in the world on the present system of administration."²⁶³ British officials reacted sharply to this Statement and their henchmen on the Assembly floor dismissed out of hand Iqbal's suggestion that large cuts be made in the salaries of the bureaucrats.

Iqbal, however, remained undaunted. In an attack on the combind interest of all the three parasites on the Punjab peasants, namely, the bania, the British official and the feudal landlord, Iqbal suggested imposition of an inheritance tax on all property valued above twenty or thirty thousand rupees. The legislative council, dominated by all the above three classes naturally did not adopt Iqbal's sane suggestion.

Muslim Backwardness in Edcuation

²⁶³ Riaz Hussain, Politics of Iqbal, p. 65.

In the Sphere of education, Muslims were the most depressed community in the Punjab. It must be pointed out, however, that on the whole Punjab was not a very advanced Province in India. The statistics upto 1920 show that on an average only 2.4% out of a population of 20 million were receiving education.

The cause for this, in Iqbal's view was that "the disinterested foreign Government in this country wants to keep the people ignorant."²⁶⁴

The Muslim educational institutions, already poor, were starved of Government Grants-in-aid under a deliberate policy to favour the wealthy Hindu community.

In his Assembly speech on the subject Iqbal quoted statistics to high light the disparity in the treatment meted out to Muslim educational institutions In 1922-23 out of the fifty-two new Schools receiving Government grant-in-aid, only sixteen were Muslim Schools. The financial break down was as follow;;

Year	Total Amount of grants	Share of Muslim Institutions
1922-23	Rs 1, 21, 996/ (Rs one Lakh, twenty one thousand nine hundred and six)	Rs 29,213/- (Rs Twenty Nine thousand two hundred and fourteen)
Year	Total Amount of grants	Share of Muslim Institutions
1927-28	Rs 10,13,154/- (Rs Ten lakh thirteen thousand one	Rs 2,04,330/- (Rs two lakh, four thousand three

²⁶⁴ Riaz Hussain, Politics of Iqbal, p. 65.

	hundred	
	fifty four)	hundred thirty)

During the fiscal year 1928-29 the statistical table showed a more glaring discrimination against the Punjab Muslim community.²⁶⁵

Year	Number and Amount of grants-in-aid
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1928-29	Hindu Schools	Sikh Schools	Muslim Schools	
	13	6	2	
	(Rs 16973/-)	(Rs 9908/-)	(Rs 2200/-)	

An Anglo-Hindu alliance was working against the interests of the Muslims. Politically the Unionist Muslim members of the legislature were dependent for patronage on the all-powerful British bureaucrats and for ministry-making on the support of the Hindu members of the Assembly.

A stark example of the Anglo-Hindu alliance is furnished by Azim Hussain son of Sir Fazl-i-Husain. Azim Hussain reveals that Mahasbha members like Manohar Lal and Dr Gokal Chand Narang were kept in office against the wishes of the Muslim members of the Unionist Party and that the British Governor used the officially nominated members to give majority to the unpopular minister of education Manohar Lal.²⁶⁶

Communal Relations

During the period under review, that is, during Iqbal's working life, communal relations in the Punjab, indeed throughout India, went from bad to worse.

²⁶⁵ See Iqbal's Speech in the Punjab Assembly, 7 March 1930, also Riasa Hussain, Politics of Iqbal, (Islamic Book Service, Lahore, 1977), p. 66.

²⁶⁶ Azim Husain, Fazl-i-Husain, (Longman's Bombay), p. 165.

In a five year period (1922-27), no less than fourteen major riots involving hundreds of casualties occurred between the Muslim and Hindu-Sikh communities. Iqbal stated on the floor of the House: "We are actually living in a state of civil war..."²⁶⁷ Next day he told the members. "In this country one community is always aiming at the destruction of the other community."²⁶⁸ Under these circumstances Iqbal wondered whether it was desirable to become one nation with the Hindus in the Punjab or in India.

²⁶⁷ Iqbal's Assembly Speech, dated 18 July 1927.

²⁶⁸ Iqbal's Assembly Speech, dated 19 July 1927.