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TIME, SPACE, AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF ETHICAL NORMS: THE TEACHINGS OF IBN AL-'ARABI

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Introduction

Ibn al-'Arabi was born in Murcia in present-day Spain in 1165 CE, fifty years after the death of al-Ghazali and 130 years after the death of Ibn Sina. He eventually settled down in Damascus, where he died in 1240. He wrote numerous books, some of them extraordinarily long. All of his writings maintain an exceedingly high level of discourse, which helps make him one of the most difficult of all Muslim authors.

Ibn al-'Arabi's name is associated with the expression *wahdat al-wujud*, the "oneness of being" or the "unity of existence". However, to connect this expression to him is historically inaccurate, and doing so has led to gross oversimplifications and extreme misunderstandings of his writings. What in fact the expression *wahdat al-wujud* meant for those who used it and what it might have meant for Ibn al-'Arabi, had he used it in his own writings, are complex issues. I have written a good deal about them, so I will not repeat myself here.[1] In any case, *wahdat al-wujud* has little direct bearing on the concept of time and space. I only mention it because, if we want to understand what Ibn al-'Arabi is saying, we need to put aside any preconceived notions about *wahdat al-wujud*.

Another common idea that needs to be discarded is that Ibn al-'Arabi was a "Sufi". Here also we have a complicated historical problem. Although Ibn al-'Arabi does on occasion mention the word Sufi in a positive light, he does not use it to refer to himself, nor would he be happy to be called by it without serious qualification.

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[1] On the general concept, see, Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-'Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), chapter one. On the history of the expression and the various meanings that were given to it, see idem, "Rumi and *Wahdat al-wujud*", in *Poetry and Mysticism in Islam: The Heritage of Rumi*, edited by A. Banani, R. Hovannisian, and G. Sabagh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 70-111; idem, arts. "*Wahdat al-Shuhud*" and "*Wahdat al-Wudjud*", in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, forthcoming.

My point in bringing up the issues of Sufism and *wahdat al-wujud* is simply to suggest that anyone who has doubts about Ibn al-'Arabi because "he was a Sufi", or because "he believed in *wahdat al-wujud*" should put aside those doubts, at least for the duration of this paper, because neither Sufism nor *wahdat al-wujud* – as these concepts came to be reified in much of later Islamic thinking and especially in modern times – is part of Ibn al-'Arabi's self-understanding. Both are labels that were applied to him by later generations, often for reasons having little to do with his own writings. This is not to deny that the words can be defined carefully enough so that they would coincide with Ibn al-'Arabi's own thinking on the relevant issues.[2]

If Ibn al-'Arabi was not a "Sufi" in the most common meanings of this word, neither was he a philosopher, a theologian, a jurist, a Hadith expert, or a Qur'an commentator – if we use any of these words in a restrictive sense. Rather, Ibn al-'Arabi was all of the above, because he had mastered all the Islamic sciences. If we still want to have a single descriptive label with which he himself might be happy, the best choice is probably *muhaqqiq*, that is, "verifier" or "realizer". Both Ibn al-'Arabi and his immediately followers frequently refer to their own intellectual position as *tahqiq*, "verification" or "realization".[3]

In order to grasp the role of time and space in Ibn al-'Arabi's thinking, we need to reflect on *tahqiq* as a methodology. The word comes from the same root as *haqq*, which is a verb, a noun, and an adjective carrying the meanings of reality, truth, rightness, properness, appropriateness, and justness. *haqq* is a name of God, and it is also applied to created things. As *haqq*, God is the Real or the Reality, the True or the Truth, the Right or Rectitude, the Proper,

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[2] I have used these two expressions rather loosely in some of my own writings, but in Ibn al-'Arabi's case, I have tried to recover the meaning that he would have understood from the terms and to avoid the inappropriate meanings. See Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), especially chapter one. On some of the problems connected with the word "Sufism", see Carl Ernst, *The Shambhala Guide to Sufism* (Boston: Shambhala, 1997); also Chittick, *Sufism: A Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oneworld, 2000).

[3] On this concept, see Chittick, *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabi's Cosmology* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), index under "realization"; also idem, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, index under "verification". For one of Ibn al-'Arabi's longer discussions of *tahqiq*, see chapter 165 of his *al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah*, translated in *Self-Disclosure*, pp. 96-98.

the Just. When the word is used in relation to creatures, it does not simply mean their "truth" or their "reality". Rather, it also designates the just and proper demands that creatures make upon human beings. When someone has perceived the *haqq* of a thing, he has perceived not only the truth of the thing, but also what is properly and rightfully due to the thing. Hence, he has understood his own appropriate and just response to the thing. In other words, *haqq* refers not only to the object, but also to the subject. It designates not only the objective truth and the actual reality of a thing, but also the subjective obligation and internal responsibility of those who encounter it.

One of Ibn al-'Arabi's several scriptural sources for his discussion of the *haqq* of things is a well-known hadith, which has come in many versions and in most of the standard sources. A typical version reads like this: "Your soul has a *haqq* against you, your Lord has a *haqq* against you, your guest has a *haqq* against you, and your wife has a *haqq* against you. So, give to each that has a *haqq* its *haqq*.[4]

"Giving to each that has a *haqq* its *haqq*" is the key to the meaning of *tahqiq*. According to Ibn al-'Arabi, *tahqiq* or "verification/realization" is to recognize the reality, the truth, the rightness, and the properness of things, and, on the basis of this recognition, it is to give to them what is properly due to them.

The first *haqq* that people must recognize is that of God himself, who is the Absolute *haqq*, the basis for every other *haqq*. The only way to "verify" and "realize" God is to begin by perceiving him as the truth and reality that has a rightful claim upon all creatures, a claim that supersedes all other claims. The Qur'an is totally explicit about God's rightful claim in many verses. Obviously, he is the Creator, so all creatures owe everything that they have to him. But people tend to put other things in place of God. They want to observe the *haqq* of themselves and their families and their possessions without taking God's *haqq* into account. The Qur'an repeatedly criticizes this attitude, calling it by such names as *kufr* (unbelief), *zulm* (wrongdoing), and *fisq* (unrighteousness). In one verse, the Book lists all the things that have a

[4] Wensinck's *Concordance* (vol. I, p. 486) lists variants of this *hadith* in Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, Nasa'i, Ibn Majah, Darimi, and Ahmad ibn Hanbal.

claim on people, and then it tells us that nothing is rightfully due to any of them if it interferes with what is rightfully due to God. The verse reads:

> Say: If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives, your clan, your possessions that you have gained, commerce you fear may slacken, and dwellings you love – if these are more beloved to you than God and His Messenger and struggle in His path, then wait till God brings His command. God does not guide unrighteous people". (9: 24)

So, the first *haqq* that needs to be verified and realized is that of God. This means, among other things, to carry out all human obligations toward God. The first of these obligations is *tawhid*, or the assertion of God's unity, the first principle of Islamic faith and practice, a principle that is encapsulated in the formula "No god but God". After *tawhid* comes everything that *tawhid* demands, including the observance of God's commands as revealed specifically in the Qur'an and generally to the prophets.

As for the *haqq* of things other than God, the key to *tahqiq* in these cases is again provided by the meaning of the word *haqq* itself. The primary Islamic meaning is God, the absolute Truth, the absolutely Real, the absolutely Proper and Right. If each thing has a *haqq*, it is because each thing is created by the Absolute *haqq*. Thereby it receives a relative *haqq*. Here, Ibn al-'Arabi likes to cite the Qur'anic verse, "Our Lord is He who gave each thing its creation, then guided" (20: 50). God, who is the Absolute *haqq*, has given each thing in the universe a creation and a guidance, and the thing's creation and guidance are its *haqq*, because they tie it back to the First *haqq*. The thing's "creation" can be understood as its actual reality, and its "guidance" as the path it must follow to achieve the fullness of what it is to become. In other words, "creation" refers to the fact that each thing has come from God, and "guidance" refers to the fact that God has provided each with a path that it follows in returning to its Creator. Everything except human beings follows its own proper guidance simply by virtue of being a creature. In contrast, human beings – because of certain unique characteristics that give them free will – need to make the right choices if they want to be happy when they return to God. In short, each thing's creation and guidance situate it in the grand scheme of *tawhid*. Nothing is

unrelated to the Absolute *haqq*. To give things their *haqq*s is first and foremost to understand them in relation to God.

So, the process of *tahqiq* or "verification/realization" is first to discern the *haqq* of things, beginning with those things that are explicitly commanded by the tradition, such as your own self, God, your visitor, and your spouse. Second, and just as important, it means to act in keeping with the demands that things make upon us because God has created them not only as they are, but also with a goal and purpose in their existence.

It is not too difficult to see that discerning the *haqq*s of things is the primary issue in all the Islamic sciences *qua Islamic* sciences. It is intimately bound up with the interpretation of revealed scripture. Scholars who specialized in the transmitted learning (*al-'ulum al-naqliyyah*) were primarily interested in interpreting the Qur'an and the hadith. But, scholars who specialized in intellectual learning (*al-'ulum al-'aqliyyah*) were interested in the interpretation and understanding of *all* things, not just scripture. They did not investigate only the *haqq* of the Qur'an, but also the *haqq* of everything else. This is why the Muslim philosophers and those scholars who specialized in *'irfan* ("gnosis" or theoretical Sufism) set out to understand the nature of the objective world and the reality of the knowing subject.

In explaining why it is necessary to investigate everything, not just the Qur'an, Ibn al-'Arabi and others often remind us that revealed scripture comes in three varieties, not just one. The first variety is the oral or written kind given to the prophets, the Qur'an in particular. The second variety is the universe, and the third variety is the human soul. As the Qur'an itself tells us, each of these reveals the *ayat* – the "signs" or "verses" of God – so it is God who is the author of all three books.

One of Ibn al-'Arabi's outstanding characteristics is that he synthesizes the transmitted and intellectual learning and pays keen attention to the interpretation of all three scriptures. However, it is not simply explanation of the meaning of the signs that he wants to accomplish. His purpose is always to realize his knowledge by taking the signs all the way back to the Absolute *haqq*. For him, whichever scripture we interpret – the Qur'an, the universe, or our own soul – we are dealing with the same principles, the same realities, and the same ultimate *haqq*. In each case, God

makes demands upon us, and it is our duty as God's creatures to act in keeping with those demands.

In short, the way to verify and realize something – that is, to discern its *haqq* and act accordingly – is to see how it displays the signs of God. This is not an abstract, theoretical enterprise. Rather, it is a spiritual discipline. It is a way of training the soul to find God's names and attributes in all things and to realize God in oneself. The Qur'an says, "Wherever you turn, there is the face of God" (2: 115). The goal of *tahqiq* is to see the face of God wherever you turn, in every creature and in oneself, and then to act according to the *haqq* of God's face. If we understand anything in the universe without taking the divine face into account, then we have lost the thing's *haqq*. By losing sight of the thing's *haqq*, we have lost sight of God, and by losing sight of God, we have lost sight of *tawhid*.

II

Let me now turn to the question of how Ibn al-'Arabi understands and employs the words that are commonly used to discuss what we call "time and space". The standard Arabic pairing is *zaman wa makan*. I would translate this not as "time and space" but as "time and place", or "time and location". The Arabic word *makan* does not conjure up the vast empty reaches that are understood from the English word "space". Rather, it implies the fixed and exact locations in which things exist. If we want to find a concept analogous to the modern idea of space in the writings of Ibn al-'Arabi, the best candidate is probably *khala'*, which I would translate as "the Void". However, this is a topic for another occasion.[5]

When Ibn al-'Arabi discusses *zaman* and *makan*, he typically speaks of them as "relations" (*nisab*). By doing so, he means to contrast them with "entities" (*a'yan*), which are real things (though not necessarily existent

[5] *Khala'*, "void", is the opposite of *mala'*, "plenum". The "plenum" is everything that fills the Void, and the Void is the "place" of the universe. But there is no Void *per se*, because the creative act has filled it up. Thus Ibn al-'Arabi calls the Void "an imagined extension". See Chittick, *Self-Disclosure*, pp. 60-61, and index. Certainly, our modern concept of "space" is more imagined than real, which is to say that it is precisely a concept that serves to explain "where" the universe is found.

things). He is saying that time and place designate the interrelationships among things, but they themselves are not things. There is nothing out there that can properly be called "time" or "place". Relations per se do not exist, so it is always difficult to say exactly what they are. We can explain his point in modern terms by saying that time and space are two abstract concepts that do not designate anything in the objective universe. Rather, they refer to how human observers relate things together through their subjective experience. Using the terms tells us as much about ourselves as it tells us about the universe. The two are flimsy hooks on which to hang a theory of the universe, because they do not in fact denote anything out there. They come closer to designating our own minds than the external world.

From Ibn al-'Arabi's standpoint, if we want verify the real, objective world and come up with a valid theory of how things hold together, we need to go beyond appearances and surface relationships. We need to penetrate into verities and principles and essences and *haqq*s. Time and space are abstract concepts and insubstantial relationships, which helps explain why Ibn al-'Arabi – like most other Muslim thinkers – discussed them with only passing interest.[6] It is far more important to discern what exactly is there, not simply how things appear to us. To discern what is there, we need to address the whole question of what *being there* means. Hence, the intellectual tradition was constantly concerned with the issue of "being", though it also recognized that we can only understand being in terms of nothingness. The key term here is *wujud*, which plays a central role in Ibn al-'Arabi's thinking as in the thinking of most Muslim philosophers. For the purposes of this discussion, I translate *wujud* as "existence", though any translation is problematic, especially in the context of Ibn al-'Arabi's thought.[7]

Existence is the most real and concrete of all entities, because it underlies every object, every subject, every concept, and every relationship. Ultimately, existence is God. As al-Ghazali and others had long since told us,

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[6] Ibn al-'Arabi was more interested in explaining the nature of time than place, mainly because reflective people find it a truly puzzling concept, as Saint Augustine famously remarked. For one of Ibn al-'Arabi's most detailed expositions of the *haqq* of time, see chapter 390 of his *Futuhat*, translated in Chittick, *Self-Disclosure*, pp. 128-31.

[7] On some of the difficulties with translating *wujud*, see Chittick, *Sufi Path*, p. 6 et passim; idem, *Self-Disclosure*, xix-xxi et passim; idem, *Imaginal Worlds*, pp. 15ff.

"There is nothing in existence but God" (*laysa fi'l-wujud illa'llah*), which is to say that true and unsullied existence belongs to God alone, and everything else partakes of nothingness.[8] What is truly there can only be God, because existence does not belong by essence to anything else. As for time and space, they tell us much more about nonexistence than about existence, because they are abstract and insubstantial relationships.

Of the two concepts, place is easier to understand. For Ibn al-'Arabi, the basic question in *tahqiq* is always how a thing or a concept is related to the Absolute *haqq*. How then is the concept of place related to God?

One way to grasp this relationship is to reflect on the Arabic word *makan* itself. The grammatical pattern of the word is called *maf'al*, and it designates a "name of place" (*ism makan*). In other words, the grammatical pattern indicates a location. *Maktab*, for example, originally means a "location of writing", and it has come to mean a grammar school. *Makan* itself is the most general word in this pattern, so much so that it gives its name to the pattern. This is because the root of the word *makan* is *kawn*, a noun that can be translated as "being".[9] Being is a word that embraces all created things. So, the word *makan* means literally "the location of being", meaning the specific location in which a specific thing exists.

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[8] See Chittick, "Rumi and *Wahdat al-Wujud*".

[9] One can argue that this word should be translated in a philosophical context as "becoming" in order to differentiate it from *wujud*, which can then be translated as "Being" with a capital B. "Becoming" would then be existence as we experience it in the world, and "Being" would be the absolute and unchanging reality of God. For several reasons, however I prefer to translate *wujud*, if I must translate it, as "existence". This is the most common translation among scholars of Islamic thought, and the word allows us to differentiate clearly between "existence" and its past participle "existent" (*mawjud*), which designates any specific being, whether God or anything other than God (though in Ibn al-'Arabi's usage, it most commonly means "existent things", that is, anything that God has brought into existence by saying "Be" to it. Moreover, Ibn al-'Arabi is constantly trying to recover the Koranic meaning of words in his writings, and he frequently reminds us that "Be"! – the *fiat lux* that gives existence to the cosmos – is a "word of existence", by which he means to say that it means "Enter into existence!" (see Chittick, *Sufi Path*, pp. 88, 204, 393n13). Hence, to translate *kawn* as "becoming" introduces a meaning to the word that Ibn al-'Arabi himself does not make explicit, though it may help Westerners to understand what he is getting at. In my writings on Ibn al-'Arabi, I have normally translated *kawn* as "engendered existence", to indicate that the type of existence that is at issue is that relating to the realm of *kawn wa fasad*, "generation and corruption".

In the Qur'an, *kawn* or "being" plays an important role in the discussion of creation. When God desires to create something, "He says 'Be', so it comes to be" (*qala kun fa-yakun*). In other words, God gives *kawn* to the thing, and *kawn* is its specific being. Once the thing has *kawn*, the word *makan* can designate where the thing's being is found relative to the being of other things. Typically, *makan* is used for the corporeal world, because spiritual beings do not have physical locations.[10] Nor, with even greater reason, does God have a location or place.

Note that the word *kawn* is almost never used for the "being" of God. Instead, the word *wujud* is used. In this case, *wujud* designates God's very reality, his absolute existence, his necessary being that cannot not be. In contrast, *kawn* is a being that is acquired by things when God creates them out of nothingness. The very use of the word *makan* or "place" tells us that something has acquired being in the universe. Indeed, the universe as a whole is often called simply *al-kawn*, that is, "the being."

Since *makan* designates the place and locatedness of something in the visible world, the concept involves a certain fixity. But, things are not in fact fixed, and both their being and their place change. As soon as we mention "change", time enters the picture. The word *zaman* or "time" designates change and movement within the realm of *kawn*. It refers to changing relationships in the appearance of *kawn*. *Kawn* can never be fixed and stable, because permanence and stability are attributes of God, not of creation. They

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[10] As for things that dwell in the "imaginal world", they stand halfway between the spiritual and corporeal realms. Ibn al-'Arabi describes them as possessing the characteristics of both spirit and body. Thus, imaginal things are perceived by the senses, but the senses need to be sufficiently disengaged from physical objects in order to do so, and typically this takes place only in dreams. After death, the hold of the corporeal organs is broken, and at that point the sensory powers of the soul are enormously intensified. As a result, people perceive sensory things in the imaginal realm with extreme clarity. As the Qur'an says, speaking about death, "We have removed from you your covering, so your eyesight today is piercing" (50: 22). Inasmuch as imaginal things dwell in a sensory domain, they have places, but inasmuch as they pertain to the spiritual domain, they are placeless. Where, after all, do our dreams take place? Or, if one wants to be a scientific reductionist and answer this question by saying, "In the brain", then where do people experience the delights and torments of the postmortem realm called the "grave" (*qabr*) and the "isthmus" (*barzakh*)? For an introduction to the role of the imaginal realm, see Chittick, *Imaginal Worlds*, especially chapters 5-7.

belong to *wujud*, not to *kawn*. So, "time" is simply a name that we give to the ongoing changes that occur in the face of *kawn*.

Ibn al-'Arabi points out that both time and place are demanded by the realm of *kawn wa fasad*, or "being and corruption", an expression that is applied philosophically to everything that can have a place.[11] Its common English equivalent is "generation and corruption". "Generation" here means simply "coming to be". It designates the being that results when God says "Be" to a thing. In contrast, "corruption" denotes the disappearance of things. As we saw, to speak of "being" is to speak of place, because *kawn* needs *makan*. Similarly, to speak of "corruption" is to speak of change, and the relationship among the changes is called "time".

God of course is untouched by time, just as he is untouched by place. This is what is meant by words like *qadim* and *sarmadi*, both of which mean eternal or outside of time or beyond time. In contrast to "eternal", which is strictly an attribute of God, "temporal" (*zamani*) refers to the changing relationships of created things.

How then are eternity and time related? Is the relationship between God and the world a fixed relationship of eternity or a changing relationship of time? This question is one version of the central issue in *tawhid*: "How is the many related to the One"? It has always posed major difficulties for theologians and philosophers. One of the several ways in which Ibn al-'Arabi answers it is in terms of the word *dahr*, which I would translate as "Aeon".[12]

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[11] Which is to say that purely spiritual beings, although they appear as the result of "Be"! do not undergo corruption. Their non-corrupting status is maintained by God, of course. It does not belong to them by their very essences. There is a great deal of discussion in the intellectual tradition about their exact status.

[12] I have also translated it as "Time" with a capital T, and scholars have used other translations as well. "Aeon" (a word derived from the Greek) is certainly appropriate in the Western context, given that St. Thomas makes its Latin equivalent, *aevum*, an intermediary stage between eternity and time. Meister Eckhart, who follows St. Thomas in this, offers us a statement that could be a translation of the words of Ibn al-'Arabi or several other Muslim philosophers: "Eternity [refers to] the divine existence; 'aeon' to the existence of unchangeable created things; and time to the existence of changeable things" (*Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher*, edited by B. McGinn, New York: Paulist Press, 1986, p. 72). Ibn al-'Arabi often calls the "unchangeable created things" the "fixed entities" (*al-a'yan al-*

Dahr is often considered a name of God, and Ibn al-'Arabi treats it as such. In some passages he says that the word is synonymous with *zaman* – that Aeon and time are the same thing. In many other passages, however, he differentiates between the two. Certainly, God as Aeon is not identical with the time that we experience, because God is eternal and unchanging, and time is constantly in movement. So, Aeon is God's name inasmuch as he gives rise to the changing conditions of the universe, conditions that we call "time". In Ibn al-'Arabi's view, it is precisely this divine name that designates the relationship between eternity and time.[13] To gain an insight into how this relationship works, we can look at various ways in which the Qur'an talks about God.

In one verse the Qur'an mentions "the Days of God" (*Ayyam Allah*) (14: 5). Ibn al-'Arabi takes this as a reference to the prefiguration of temporal differentiation within the divine reality. In other words, it is the Days of God that give birth to the unfolding temporal cycles of our world. Ibn al-'Arabi says all these Days belong to the name Aeon, which designates God as the principle of time. Just as God's attribute of Knowledge is the root (*asl*) of all knowledge and awareness in the universe, and just as his Compassion is the root of all compassion, so also God as Aeon is the root of time.

Ibn al-'Arabi points out that God has several days of differing length, and that these are related to various divine names. Thus, the Qur'an says that the angels and the Spirit rise up to God in a day whose length is fifty thousand of our years, and it relates this fifty-thousand-year day to the divine name *dhu'l-ma'arij*, "the Possessor of the Stairways" (70: 3-40). The Qur'an also speaks of a one-thousand-year day (32: 5), and Ibn al-'Arabi explains that this is connected to the name *rabb*, "Lord". In addition, Ibn al-'Arabi mentions several other days of varying length, all of them related to specific divine names and attributes.

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thabitah), and he makes clear that he means by them what the philosophers mean when they discuss "quiddities" (*mahiyyat*), a word that is frequently translated into English as "essences" in opposition to "existence".

[13] Note that for Ibn al-'Arabi, the terms *ism* (name), *sifah* (attribute), and *nisbah* (relation, relationship) are synonyms when applied to God. God's "names and attributes" are his "relationships." See Chittick, *Sufi Path*, pp. 33-36.

The most all-embracing of the Days of God is what Ibn al-'Arabi calls the "Day of the Essence" (*yawm al-dhat*). He finds a reference to it in the Qur'anic verse, "Each day He is upon some task" (55: 29). God's Essence, denoted by the pronoun "He" (*huwa*), is the absolute, real existence (*al-wujud al-mutlaq al-haqq*) of God himself, which is eternal and unchanging. So, the "day" of the Essence pertains to the Absolute Reality that is eternal and beyond time. One might conclude that it is the longest of all divine days. However, Ibn al-'Arabi points out that, humanly speaking, it is the shortest of all days. This is because, in our terms, its length is one instant, and that one instant is the present moment. There is no time shorter than the present moment, which is defined precisely as the instant that cannot be divided into parts. But, this shortest of divine days in fact lasts forever. We never leave the present moment, because we never leave the presence of God. If, as the Qur'an puts it, "He is with you wherever you are" (57: 4), then he is also with us "whenever" we are.

To come back to the divine name Aeon, Ibn al-'Arabi says that it designates God inasmuch as he is the possessor of days. Every "day" (*yawm*) is divided into night and daytime (*layl wa nahar*). When Ibn al-'Arabi writes, "The Aeon is nothing but daytime and night",[14] he means the daytimes and nights of the Days of God, not of our worldly days. "Daytime" is when the properties and traces of a divine name become manifest, and "night" is when the properties and traces stay hidden. Each of the "Days of God" has cycles of manifestation and nonmanifestation, or cycles of display and concealment. It is these cycles that explain all the changes that occur throughout the universe for all time.

As for the day and night time of the indivisible Day of the Essence, it is the fact that God is forever present and absent, or the fact that what prevents us from seeing God's face is precisely the face of God before our eyes. As Ibn al-'Arabi says in a short invocation that expresses the paradox of

[14] *al-Futuhat al-makkiyyah* (Cairo, 1911), volume IV, p. 87, line 18.

this situation, "Glory be to Him who veils Himself in His manifestation and becomes manifest in His veil!"[15]

In several passages, Ibn al-'Arabi tells us that the specific characteristic of the divine name Aeon is *tahawwul*, that is, constant change and transformation. So, inasmuch as God is the Aeon, he brings about transformation and alteration in the universe, which never stops moving and changing. Change is so basic to creation that, as Ibn al-'Arabi frequently reminds us, God's signs never repeat themselves, whether in time or in place.[16] At each moment, every sign of God – every creature in its momentary reality – is unique, because it manifests God's own uniqueness. Nothing is ever the same as anything else, and no moment of anything is ever repeated. Each creature at each moment has a unique *haqq*, and the final goal of verification is to perceive and act upon all these instantaneous, never-repeating *haqq*s, in every time and in every place, just as God perceives and acts upon these *haqq*s in the Day of the Essence.

If every creature is constantly changing, do creatures have nothing permanent? Do we and other things not have a real and fixed identity? Ibn al-'Arabi answers this question by having recourse, once again, to the divine names. We know that God is both omniscient and eternal. It follows that God knows all things for all eternity. "Not a leaf falls", says the Qur'an, "but He knows it" (6: 59). So, all things are permanent in the knowledge of God. They do, in fact, have fixed identities, and we can be sure that our persons are eternal in the presence of God's eternal knowledge. However, everything within the corporeal universe, which is the domain of *kawn wa fasad*, "being and corruption", undergoes change and disappearance, which is to say that all things experience time.

We can sum up this very brief discussion of the *haqq* of time and space in terms of two specific names of God – Speaker and Aeon. As Speaker, *al-qa'il*, God says *kun* – "Be"! – in the Day of the Essence, so he is always recreating *kawn* and *makan*. And as Aeon, *al-dahr*, he manifests his

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[15] Ibid., III 547.12. The "paradox of the veil" is a common theme not only in Ibn al-'Arabi (see *Self-Disclosure*, Chapters 3-4), but also in Sufi literature. See Chittick, *Sufism: A Short Introduction*, Chapter 10.

[16] See Chittick, *Sufi Path of Knowledge*, Chapter Six.

names and attributes through the diversity of his Days, whose daytimes and nights display and conceal the never-ending signs of God.

III

This brief summary of Ibn al-'Arabi's view of time and place should help make clear that the perspective of *tahqiq* demands a radically different standpoint from that which infuses modern thinking – whether we are talking about science, cosmology, philosophy, sociology, political ideology, or even theology. The contrast between *tahqiq* and modern thought is so stark that it might be imagined that there is no relationship between what Ibn al-'Arabi is saying and what modern thinkers are saying. In one sense, this is true. However, from another point of view, *tahqiq* can be applied to every form of modern learning. If we try to do so, we might gain an insight into some of the difficulties inherent to contemporary theories of reality, which themselves are constantly being modified by the changing circumstances of historical becoming – the never-ending, never-repeating display of God's signs.

Remember first that for Ibn al-'Arabi, it is impossible to know things properly and truly if we do not combine the knowledge of the objective reality of things with that of the rightful demands that things make on the knowing subject. This is precisely *tahqiq*. If we break things out of the context of the divine signs – which are the divine faces or the divine *haqq*s – then we have disassociated things from God. By doing so, we have negated *tawhid*, because we have put God on one side and, on the other side, things, which are no longer signs but simply "objects" without any *haqq*.

From the standpoint of *tahqiq*, every knowledge that is not built on finding the *haqq* of things and acting in accordance with these *haqq*s is not in fact knowledge. The Prophet said, "Knowledge without deed is a tree without fruit". There is no reason to limit "knowledge" (*'ilm*) here to transmitted knowledge, and there is no reason to extend "deed" (*'amal*) to include every sort of activity whatsoever. Rather, "knowledge" designates true and proper knowledge, and "deed" designates right and proper activity, or what the Qur'an calls "wholesome deeds" (*a'mal salih*). Knowledge and deed of this sort can only be achieved by recognizing and acting upon the *haqq*s of things, and this means that knowledge must embrace both the

objective reality of the thing and the demand that the thing makes on the knowing subject.

So, in the perspective of *tahqiq*, any knowledge not built on recognizing both the objective and the subjective reality of things is in fact ignorance. It purports to explain things, but what it ignores is far more significant and far more real than what it takes into account. What it ignores is precisely the *haqq* that gives divine, cosmic, and human significance to all things.

One of the many implications of the perspective of *tahqiq* is found in the issue of morality and ethics. Since this alone is a complex problem, let me limit my concluding remarks to suggesting what *tahqiq* might tell us about the place of ethics in modern thought.

Modern thinking in all its forms investigates objects, relationships, and concepts while, at the same time, stripping them of their *haqq*s. This means that the issue of right activity is relegated to the human observer, the side of the subject, and it is negated from the side of the object. The object itself is largely thought to be indifferent, unless it be a human being. Nowadays, of course, ecologists and others are striving mightily to give rights to non-human creatures as well, but "hard science" cannot take this seriously. Despite the critiques of numerous philosophers and thinkers, the predominant view among practicing scientists and popular scientism[17] has been and continues to be that "objective knowledge" is value-free.

From the standpoint of *tahqiq*, to talk in these terms is to abuse the words "subject" and "object" (which, by the way, have no real equivalents in Arabic). If the word "objective" is to have any real significance, then it must designate knowledge that is rooted in the actual reality of things. The "actual reality of things" is incomprehensible without the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, the Unique *haqq*, the Origin (*mabda'*) and Returning Place (*ma'ad*) of all things, the Absolute Object who is also the Absolute Subject. In God, subject and object converge, because they are two sides of the same absolute Existence. In Ibn al-'Arabi's terms, one might say that the divine root (*al-asl*

[17] By "popular scientism" I mean the prevalent belief that science provides the only true and reliable knowledge about things, objects, and reality itself.

al-ilahi) of all subjectivity is the fact that God is the "Knower" (*'alim*), and the divine root of all objectivity is the fact that God's "object of knowledge" (*ma'lum*) is himself along with the realities of everything that has existed and will exist in whatever mode throughout all time and all space.

So, finding the *haqq* of things is to find both the objective reality of the things and the subjective demands that the things make upon us. We cannot disassociate object from subject and then maintain that the known thing has no divine rights, that it makes no claims upon me as a human subject. No, all things have rights and all things have claims. Anyone who wants to investigate "objective" truth must at the same time investigate "subjective" truth. Not to do so is to ignore the *haqq* of both the thing and the human subject, *haqq*s that are rooted in the Absolute *haqq*. It is, in other words, to ignore *tawhid*, which is God's first claim upon us. To ignore *tawhid* is to fall into *shirk*, or "associating" other principles with God, that is, other *haqq*s with the Absolute *haqq*. As the Qur'an Koran makes explicit, *shirk* is the one sin that God will not forgive. This teaching alone should be more than enough to give pause to modern-day Muslim scientists, given that their science neither begins nor ends with God.

Modern thought has no access to the *haqq*s of things, so talk of ethics and morality typically goes on in terms of self-interest and social stability. But what is this "self" whose interest we are trying to discern, and what is the *haqq* of society? If we do not know the *haqq* of the human self, we are left with a discussion of ethics in terms of a definition of self-interest based on a misunderstanding of human reality and human becoming. And without knowledge of the *haqq*s of the human selves who make up the society, the *haqq* of society can never be known. Yet, the modern disciplines constantly split reality into fragments, insisting that true knowledge comes from fragmentation and partition (i.e., "specialization"), from separating things out of their overall cosmic and human context – not to mention the divine context, which is rejected out of hand.

It goes without saying that the modern discussions of human nature and of ethics never give the slightest thought to the fact that human beings are made in the image of the Absolute *haqq*, or the fact that their innate, created disposition (*fitrah*) embraces a knowledge of all the names taught by God to Adam, that is, the realities of all things. Nor do the modern

discussions ever take into account the sure criterion of the ultimate significance of all human reality and all human becoming, that is, *ma'ad*, the "return" to God after death, which is the third principle of Islamic faith. *Ma'ad* is a topic that was discussed constantly by the Muslim "scientists", the great representatives of the Islamic intellectual tradition. *Tahqiq* demands that we understand that God gave each thing its creation *and* its guidance. Without understanding the final goal of becoming, there is no possible way to understand the significance of the created realm.

The fact that ethics cannot possibly be integrated into modern science would be sufficient proof for Ibn al-'Arabi that science is fundamentally flawed and ultimately *batil*. *Batil* is the Qur'anic opposite of *haqq*. It can be translated as "unreal, vain, null, void". Modern science is *batil* not only because it ignores the *haqq*s of things, but also because it cannot possibly not ignore the *haqq*s of things. If it did not ignore them, it would betray its own methodology and cease being worthy of the name "science". By definition, scientific research is cut off from anything beyond the realm of "being and corruption", or the realm of time and space. This is why scientists and cosmologists in modern times have so often talked about time and space not as if they were insubstantial relationships, but rather as if they were real things or absolute principles.

In short, modern science specifically and modern learning in general cannot allow for the objectivity of ethical and moral standards. Today's critical methodologies can never acknowledge that people – much less animals, plants, and inanimate objects – have *haqq*s that belong to the actual stuff of reality. It follows that such modern learning is incompatible with *tahqiq*, that is, with giving things their *haqq*s.

This incompatibility is one of the keys to the disastrous policies of many Muslim countries in the twentieth century. A good number of the Muslim intellectuals who have played influential roles in recent times have taken the position that science and technology are value-free, that is, neutral in relation to ethics and morality, even though this position is patently absurd. Its absurdity is proved not only by the viewpoint of the Islamic intellectual tradition, but also by numerous contemporary critics of science and technology in the modern West.

Nonetheless, many Muslim thinkers continue to maintain that when the Prophet made the search for knowledge incumbent upon Muslims, he meant that they have the moral duty to ignore anything but the superficialities of the transmitted learning of Islam, to pretend that there has never been an intellectual tradition, and then to go out and devote their intellectual energies to "real knowledge", by which they mean science, medicine, and engineering. We frequently hear from the modern ideologues that Muslims will keep their morality, but they will have science and technological progress as well. It is thought that the way people think about scientific issues is unrelated to how they understand *tawhid*. As long as Muslims say, "God is one", everything will be fine.

Nonetheless, the idea that knowledge of objects can be disengaged from knowledge of the knowing subject, not to mention knowledge of God, goes against every principle of Islamic thought, beginning with *tawhid*. Only ignorance of the Islamic worldview could lead Muslims to think this way. This, of course, helps explain why the Islamist movements of today are largely opposed to the intellectual tradition, which is precisely the form of Islamic learning that explains the Islamic worldview in holistic, rational, and logical terms. If people were begin to think logically instead of ideologically and emotionally, they would no longer fall prey to the utopianism of modern politics.

Let me conclude by summarizing the relevance of Ibn al-'Arabi's perspective to contemporary concerns: Modern thought is the study of the ocean's waves and the simultaneous rejection of the reality of the ocean. By self-imposed methodological constraints, modern thinking deals only with the surface of reality, which is the realm of "time and space", known traditionally as the domain of "being and corruption". Today, scientists and scholars of all stripes think – or at least they practice their professional disciplines as if – there is no such thing as the ocean. The very methodology of scientific and critical inquiry demands the rejection of the *haqq*s of things. By rejecting the *haqq* of individual things, scholars and scientists reject the Absolute *haqq*, the Absolute Existence, the eternal, fixed reality of God. Just as studying the waves will never allow us to know the depths of the ocean, so also studying things without regard to their *haqq*s will never allow us to know the depths of the universe and ourselves.

THE IDEA OF CREATION IN IQBAL'S PHLOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Dr. Veli Urhan

In this paper, I will first try to depict Iqbal's thoughts about the "creation" of the universe in the context of process theology and then second show its effect upon considerations of ourselves as intelligent beings pursuing the creativity in our finite lives and of the universe as an appearance of God's creative proceeding. The paper also has a third practical aim which be conceived the reason why I focus on such a matter. It is my belief that Iqbal has, together with his thoughts on the nature of the creation, advised us taking a new and stable approach to science which seeks to study and attempts to understand the universe and human beings within it.

Before proceeding to disclose Iqbal's views on the creation, however, I think it might be helpful to look into how various meanings of the term "creation" appeared through the history of thought. Considering its different usages of the term, we generally see it has three basic meanings. Its first meaning is that something might take on a new shape by means of the elements already existing. In that sense, we talk about making of a work of art, the invention of a method, and the revealing of innovative thinking itself [18]. Second it means the formation of something from nothing. That's the sense they alluded when classical theologians spoken of the creation of the universe by God (creation ex nihilo) and said that the universe is not eternal with God and came into being in a certain time by the will of God [19]. These two senses of the term include a notion of beginning in themselves.

Whereas, as André Lalande suggests in his Vocabularie the term creation does not necessarily have a notion of beginning in itself. According to Lalande, the notion of beginning in time is just some part of only a certain form of creation from nothing (ex nihilo) [20]. And the term also has a third

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[18] André Lalande, *Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie* (*VTCP*), PUF, 16. édition, Paris 1988, P. 194.

[19] A. Lalande, *VTCP*, p. 195; Paul Robert, *Le Nouveau Petit Robert*, Dictionnaires le robert, Paris 1994, P. 505.

[20] See A. Lalande, *VTCP*, P. 94.

meaning other than the one mentioned here which doesn't hold the notion of beginning. It means God's keeping every moment of the universe within the process of existence and is commonly known as "continuous creation" [21]. We first see it in scholasticism and cartesianism [22] and afterwards panentheists like Whitehead and Hartshorne in Western philosophical tradition. For Hartshorne, who is one of the modern proclaimers of continuous creation, to create is to determine what is already undetermined, specify what is unspecified and add a new thing into the richness of the reality [23]. Whitehead makes it more clear when he emphasises that it is likely to be out of the question to talk of something like the exhaustibility of creativeness, since the whole process passing through the time has been realized within the creativeness.[24] It is to say that he does not regard the creativity as the cause of actual beings but the actual beings as the moments of creativity.

That's very likely the notion of creation which Iqbal admitted. But, he reinterprets it in the light of Qur'an. Needless to say, there is no doubt about the decision of whether or not the universe has actually been created by God, a personal creator, is ultimately, a matter of faith, not a scientific proof which has been grounded on only pure analytical thinking and hard empirical verification. Considering the disputes about the creation of the universe in the history of thought, we can clearly see that the questions regarding the initial phase of the universe are vehemently unsolvable. Both Kant and Gazzali point out the impossibility of it. Kant had argued that pure theoretical reason can not help falling into antinomies in the matter of "cosmological ideas". Also, Gazzali, even before Kant, had stated that a conception of creation pertaining and peculiar to al Farabi (Abunaser) and Ibn Sina (Avicenna), who made philosophy under the influence of the Greek tradition accepted the claim that 'nothing comes into being from nothing (ex nihilo nihil)' as its fundamental principal, the notion of creation that was

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[21] A. N. Whitehead, *Procès et Réalité* (Traduit de l'anglais par Daniel Charles,), Gallimard, 1995, Pp. 92-94.

[22] A. Lalande, *VTCP*, P. 95; M. S. Aydın, *Alemden Allah'a* (*From the Universe to God*), Ufuk Publications, Istanbul 2000, P. 91.

[23] Ch. Hartshorne, "Philosophy After Fifty Years", *Mid-Twentieth Century American Philosophy*, Ed. P. A. Bertocci, New York, 1974, P. 143.

[24] M. S. Aydın, *AA*, P. 89.

essentially affected by both Plotinus' theory of emanation and Aristotle's First Mover, and therefore ascribed the eternity to the universe along with God has no value of knowledge in the face of insolubility of the same cosmological problem.[25]

As for Iqbal, he does not exactly agree with Kant or Falasifah (Abunaser and Avicenna) or Gazzali. According to him, since the Qur'an has a spirit incompatible with the Greek philosophical thought in its essence, Falasifah had made a mistake by striving to understand and interpret the Qur'an in the light of Greek Philosophy. For that reason, Iqbal considers Gazzali and Ash'arian apologists, who were against such an attempt, as the intellectual revolutionists in their period. In a very similar way Kant declared in accordance with his principles in the XVIII Century, Gazzali realized the impossibility of a knowledge of God in analytical thought as well. He, however, found a way towards the knowledge of God in mystic experience unlike Kant. In spite of that, says Iqbal,[26] Gazzali failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related to each other and the former is destined to inadequacy and to be unsatisfactory because of its connection with time in continuous movement.

Whereas, according to Iqbal, in its deeper movement, thought is undoubtedly capable of reaching an immanent infinite including the various finite concepts in the infinite diversity as moments of self unfolding evolution.[27] He believes that the true infinite does not exclude the finite and embraces the finite without effacing its finitude.[28] Just as Whitehead and Hartshorne, he firmly believes that all beings are, if even partly, capable of self-determinating in their activities for the reason of that ultimate Ego has

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[25] See Al-Ghazali, *Al-Munqid min adalal* (Traduction française avec introduction et notes par Farid Jabre), Deuxième édition, Beyrouth, 1969, Pp. 78-79; Gazzali, *Tehafüt el-felasife* (Incoherence of the Philosophers), Turkish translation by Bekir Karlığa, Çagrý Publications, Istanbul 1981, P. 17-46; Mubahat Türker, *Üç Tehafüt Bakýmýndan Felsefe ve Din Münasebeti*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basýmevi (*Relationship Between Philosophy and Religion in Three Incoherences,* Turkish History Institution Pres), Ankara 1956, P. 210-215; Ahmet Arslan, *Ýbn Haldun'un Ýlim ve Fikir Dünyasý*, Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlýðý Yayýnlarý, (*Ibn Khaldun's World of Science and Thought,* Culture and Tourism Ministry Publications) 1. bsk, Ankara 1987, Pp. 349-352.

[26] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 5

[27] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 6.

[28] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 29 ; Cf. M. S. Aydýn, *AA*, P. 99.

limited the freedom of his own free will by permitting the emergence of the finite and temporary egos endowed with the power to take actions spontaneously and unforeseeably and thus capable of private initiative.

Such a claim has two important implications in its effects. First it indicates that Ultimate Ego shares in freedom and creativity with these finite and temporary egos,[29] and second it points out that only the human ego of all the creations of God is capable of consciously participating in the creative life of God.[30] For, Creative energy pertaining to Ultimate Ego in whom deed and thought are identical and from whom egos proceed functions as ego-unities The world, in its all detail, from the mechanical movement of material atoms to the free movement of thought in the human ego, is nothing other than the self-revelation, in Whitehead and Hartshorne's words, the self concretion of Ultimate Ego.[31] That is why we live and move and have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life like pearls.[32] It is to say that the universe is, in Iqbal's mind, not a block one, a finished product, immobile and incapable of change.[33] Moreover, he notices that the Qur'an opens our eyes to the great fact of change and only through the appreciation and control of change it will be possible to build a durable civilization[34].

It is clearly obvious that Whitehead's ideas, that universe not being a static fact situated in an a-dynamic void, on the contrary being a series of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow and what cuts it up into immobilities is just thought, expressed a strong influence on Iqbal.[35] It seems, if thought would be considered as dynamism and change, that Bergson, who argues that movement is fundamental reality, influenced on Iqbal as well.[36] After having argued that the world of matter is not a stuff upon which is operated by God from a distance and is broken up by thought into a plurality of mutually exclusive things, he strengthened his views in question with a long quotation from Space, Time and Gravitation, written by

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[29] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 79-80,108.
[30] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 72.
[31] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 71-72.
[32] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 72.
[33] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 10; "He (God) adds to His creation what He wills" (Al- Qur'an: 35/1).
[34] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 14.
[35] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 34.
[36] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 36.

Eddington, the well-known physicist, according to whom the world is that of points and moments.[37]

Undoubtedly, Iqbal notably finds Eddington's ideas very close to Ash'arite atomism.[38] Because, Ash'arite atomism, which he called an intellectual revolt against the Aristotelian idea of static and fixed universe in the history of Islam, had conceived the world as a thing which is compounded of what they call "jawahir" in the sense of atoms which can no longer be divided and do not involve space in themselves just like Leibniz's monads [39] but become extended and generate space only by their aggregation. Ash'arite atomism accepted the number of the atoms couldn't be finite since the creative activity of God is ceaseless and the universe is constantly growing because those fresh atoms are coming into being every moment.[40]

In accordance with all these ideas, Iqbal claims that the atom whose essence is independent of its existence lies dormant potentially in the creative energy of God unless the quality of existence is imposed upon the essence by Him, but as soon as the essence may receive this quality it has its position in space; therefore, its existence means nothing more than Divine Energy becomes visible.[41] Following that claim, Iqbal called attention to the fact that a "thing" is, in its very nature, an aggregation of "atomic acts" which are, from his standpoint, hardly possible to be conceptualized in our minds, and that modern physics too consider the actual atom of a certain physical quantity as a action.[42] At that point, he believes Ash'arite atomism that depends the continuity of existent of atom on the perpetual creation of accidents is right in its one assertion: "Nothing has a stable nature". But, he persist that there is no element of truth in its other assertion: "There is a single order of atoms". Only in terms of its first assertion, it is suitable for a

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[37] See M. Iqbal, *R*, Pp. 65-66.

[38] See M. Iqbal, *R*, Pp. 66-67.

[39] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 68.

[40] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 158; See *Al-Qur'an*, Zariyat: 47; H. Aydýn, *Yaradýlýþ ve Gayelilik* (*YG*), Diyanet Ýþleri Baþkanlýðý Yayýnlarý, (*Creation and Purposefullness*, Religious Affairs Presidency Publications) Ankara 1987, Pp. 68-69.

[41] M. Iqbal, *R*. Pp. 68,71.

[42] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 68.

genuine attempt to improve the idea of "continuous creation" based on Absolute power and will.[43]

If we look at the movement embodied in creation from the outside, that is to say, if we apprehend it intellectually, Iqbal says, we can see that it is a process lasting through thousands of years.[44] Having been taken into account the statement that one Divine year in the terminology of the Qur'an and of Old Testament-, is equal to 1000 years and that Universe "was created in six days",[45] it will be understandable that the process of creation lasting through thousands of years from our point of view, is really a single indivisible act, "swift as the twinkling of an eye".[46] Since Iqbal is conscious of the fact that language shaped on the serial time of our daily efficient-self is not able to express this inner experience of pure duration in words, he gives an illustration to elucidate the point: According to physical science, for instance, the reason of our sensation of red is the rapidity of wave motion, the frequency of which is 400 billions per second. If we could observe this tremendous frequency from the outside, and count it at the rate of 2000 per second, which is supposed to be the limit of perceptibility of light, it will take us more than 6000 years to finish the enumeration.[47]

Iqbal, however, inclined to think that "real time" that is not serial one to which the distinction of past, present and future is essential but so-called "pure duration" (change) changing without succession is an essential element in Ultimate Reality.[48] From this point of view, Iqbal suggests that change, certainly not in the sense of a movement from an imperfect to a relatively perfect state, but that of changing within perfection, takes place in Divine life, and consequently believes that since Ultimate Ego exists in pure duration, change in Divine life does not mean a succession of varying states and attitudes.[49]

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[43] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 70.
[44] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 48.
[45] See *Al-Qur'an*, (25/59) See also, *Kur'an-ý Kerim ve Türkçe Meali,* Diyanet Isleri Baskanlýgý Yayýnlarý, Ankara 1985, P. 364
[46] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 48
[47] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 49.
[48] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 58.
[49] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 59; Cf. M. S. Aydýn, *AA*, P. 100.

Pure time, as revealed by a deeper analysis of our conscious experience, according to Iqbal, is not a string of separate and reversible instants, it is, on the contrary, an organic whole in which the past is not left behind and the future is not a line to be traversed, but is moving along with, and operating in, the present.[50] In short, while past and future operate in the present state of consciousness, the future is not wholly undetermined as Bergson's analysis of our conscious experience shows.[51] Iqbal states that organic whole in question is described as "Taqdir" by the Qur'an.[52] Having dealt with "taqdir" in the sense of the future being wholly undetermined, however, he suggests that every moment in the life of Reality is an original, real, absolutely novel and unforeseeable state on the base of that Qur'anic verse: "Every day doth some new work employ Him".[53]

If it was not the case, namely if history was regarded merely as a gradually revealed photo of a predetermined order of events, then there would have no possibility of novelty and initiation for us in it.[54] For Iqbal, to exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation.[55] Because every single thing is the event in the continuity of nature, the universe which seems to us to be a collection of things is not a solid stuff occupying a void and standing in opposition to God as "other", but the collection of creative and free activities.[56] Iqbal, who obviously depended on Bergson in regards to his views above, recognizes with certainty that Ultimate Reality, in terms of either act or knowledge, is a rationally directed creative life, and emphasizes upon that interpreting this life as an Ego does not mean to image God anthropomorphically as well.[57]

All these show that Iqbal is very careful in referring teleology to God. He seems to mention two different concepts of teleology. In other words, it can be said that he differentiates between a teleology in the sense of

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[50] M. Iqbal, *R*, Pp. 49,79.
[51] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 52.
[52] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 49.
[53] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 50.
[54] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 79.
[55] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 50.
[56] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 51.
[57] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 50.

predetermined end or goal from a teleology which indicates, on one hand, to shape and change some ends and purposes in the life process, on the other hand, to be governed by them.

Iqbal shares the same opinion with Bergson on the first sense of teleology making time unreal. Just as Bergson who denies such a teleological character of Reality puts forward that the portals of the future must remain wide open to Reality, otherwise it will not be free and creative,[58] Iqbal suggest the same as well. If teleology is conceived as a having predetermined end or goal, Iqbal says, such a view will reduce the universe to a mere temporal reproduction of a pre-existing eternal scheme or structure in which individual events have already found their proper places, waiting, as it were, for their respective turns to enter into the temporal sweep of history.[59] Such a world like that, for Iqbal, can not be a world of free, responsible moral agents. In fact it is only a state on which puppets are made to move by a kind of pull from behind.[60]

The way to escape from being a puppet is to make second sense of teleology centralized. It is, however, a fact not to be overlooked that there is a system in the continuity of the passage and its various stages are organically related to one another, while life is a passage through a series of deaths [61] The ends and goals in second sense of teleology does not need to be necessarily predetermined. For that reason, time-process too does not need to be unavoidably conceived as a line already drawn. It is actually a line in drawing, in other words, an actualization of open possibilities of Divine life.[62] The infinity of Ultimate Ego consists in infinite inner possibilities of his creative activity of which the universe, as known to us, is only a partial expression.[63] Beneath all his views concerning the fact of what Whitehead and Hartshorne call "process of concretion", it seems, there lies the term "habit of Allah" used for the universe by Qur'an. The Universe is, as we have just been noticing, not a dead mass of matter occupying a void, but the collection of events organically related to Infinite Ego. Iqbal says that the relationship

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[58] M. Iqbal, *R*, Pp. 53-54; Cf. M. S. Aydýn, *AA*, P. 91.
[59] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 54.
[60] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 54.
[61] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 54.
[62] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 55.
[63] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 64; Cf. M. S. Aydýn, *AA*, P. 100.

between human self and human character is just the same with the relationship between Divine Self and his character.[64] It is very clear, therefore, that creation of the universe by God means God's continuous behaviour.

Seeing that finite human minds regarding the universe as a confronting "other" existing per se, something which they know but can not create, Iqbal says, we are apt to regard the act of creation as a specific past event. Thus, for Iqbal, all the meaningless theological controversies about the idea of creation arise from this narrow vision of finite human mind.[65] He rightly indicates that there can not, from the Divine point of view, be talk about a creation in the sense of a specific event having a "beginning" and "ending" as it is as such indicated with the terms "before" and "after" mentioned, because the universe is not an "other" standing in opposition to God and detachable from God with space.[66]

As a matter of fact, Iqbal overtly takes a great care not to utter "creation from nothingness" and he, thus, reviews the meanings of such terms as "khalq", "ibda" and "kun" used for the creation in Qur'an in terms of, to a large extend, "habit of Allah" in places where he expressed his views on creation in his chief work, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, consisting of collected lectures given in several universities such as Madras, Hyderabad and Aligarh of India in 1928-1929. Now, a view considering the creation of God as His behaviour, if it is to be logically coherent, does not and should not make room for the idea of "creation from nothingness".

You can't think of God's behaviour separate from God himself, just as you can't see your own behaviour as independent from yourself. Now there is no time having been passed without behaviour in Divine life -for such a view will render God static and make Him impersonal- God has been acting since He, eternally, existed and will act as long as He exists. Although God's behaviours at a particular moment in his future movement are finite ones, Iqbal maintains that they are liable to boundlessly increase since Ultimate

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[64] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 56.
[65] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 65.
[66] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 65.

Ego perpetually creates some things.[67] Here the boundlessness is potential, not actual. The Universe which is understood as a living, ever-growing organism has no final external limits in its developmental process.[68]

What such a conception of creation demands from us is that we, as Muslims living in a scientific age, should have a very special and respectful approach to science. Because, its subject is nothing other than God's behaviour. Hence, Iqbal who has a very deep consciousness as to that knowing the universe is knowing of God's behaviour, strongly expresses his belief that it is another form of worship to search scientifically into the universe.[69] Clearly speaking, we sometimes succeed in knowing the universe, and sometimes can not. But, should we get out of the road towards God when we confront some trouble on the road and can not reach a satisfying understanding on it? Of course, no! Instead, we should keep in touch with science as well as religion, philosophy and higher poetry.

It should be noted at this point that process philosophy and the science in his own time as well as Islamic thought tradition helps him in understanding the relationship between universe and God. As a result of this, I believe, Iqbal has offered us a new conceptualization of the Islamic theology by showing the difference between understanding and explication of the universe. He has firmly expected that future theologians of Islam be inspired by the best traditions of Muslim thought and new ideas in the modern world of science and philosophy will tend, as he did in his own period, to turn the Ash'arite scheme of atomism into a "spiritual pluralism" [70] allowed us seeing the scientific study as a very real worship. I hope his ideal will be kept alive now and here.

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[67] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 56.
[68] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 56.
[69] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 57.
[70] M. Iqbal, *R*, P. 72.

FREEDOM AND LAW

Sheila McDonough

Muhammad Iqbal's "*Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*" is concerned directly with the question of how it is possible for a rational person to be religious in the twentieth century. As a highly educated man, Iqbal knew that much twentieth century knowledge in the social and physical sciences tended to undercut earlier forms of confidence in religious authority. He had attended lectures by Alfred North Whitehead while he was a student at Cambridge early in the century, and he had learned from that famous mathematician that skepticism was advisable in terms of any claims to certain knowledge form any discipline. Iqbal says Professor Whitehead when he is referring to this intellectual mentor in his *Reconstruction* lectures, thus indicating that he continued to think of himself as a student to the professor.

Whitehead as a young man had endured the shock of discovering that everything he had been taught in physics was wrong. He was convinced by the experience that not only were most human claims to authoritative knowledge in the past wrong, but that present and future claims to certain knowledge would be equally problematic. As Whitehead's subsequent career as one of the most significant mathematicians and philosophers of this century indicates, he became a leading thinker because he was not inhibited in his thinking by pre–existing fixed ideas. Whitehead's position is that we can learn to think better when we give up being emotionally attached to our notions and theories. We need to become ready to abandon old ideas if the evidence suggests we should do so. We should learn to let the data from the outside world impinge directly on us, instead of trying to force it to fit with our assumptions. Thus requires the development of a mental stance wherein ideas are held tentatively, ready to be challenged by experience.

Iqbal thought that this new skepticism would be good for the development of new ways for Muslims to think about past, present and future. His preface to these lectures reads:[71]

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[71] *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: Ashraf, 1960, p. vi.

> I have tried to meet, even though partially, this urgent demand…And the present moment is quite favorable for such an undertaking. Classical Physics has learned to criticize its own foundations.

The reference to physics is directly related to Iqbal's experience of listening to Whitehead's lectures at Cambridge. The Muslim Philosopher-poet felt that his community needed to begin rethinking Islamic religious thought by insisting on skepticism towards past theories. He argues that the present moment is favorable precisely because the intellectual enterprise of physics has gone beyond the more simplistic mechanical theories of the universe which had developed in the 18th century following Newton. The skepticism Iqbal had learned from whitehead included skepticism about the external world as measurable and readily intelligible.

Eighteenth century science had tended to give western man the illusion that he could understand, control and manipulate the eternal world by his thinking processes. The newer physics destroyed that illusion by demonstrating that external reality was much more complex than had been imagined by earlier scientists. Iqbal thought that this loss of a mechanistic theory of the universe meant that it became easier to understand religious experience and practice ads meaningful for a modern person. Thus, Iqbal believed that it was now possible to be skeptical about science as the final source of truth about existence. Throughout his writings, he constantly urges Muslims to be way of matter the only source of knowledge as a reliable basis for clear thinking. He wanted to create a new method of Muslim thinking that would go forward beyond the materialism of those who held a mechanistic theory of nature.

Iqbal's critique of materialism, however, did not mean that he thought Muslims could ignore modern science, and retreat to the emotional certainties of their past. A good understanding of the methods of science was very much needed for all forms of modern thought. These methods included careful observation, reasoned deductions, and readiness to be challenged by new data and new insights. One could be religious as a modern person, he thought, but only if that religiousness would have a different basis than the religiousness of past ages. In chapter seven of the lectures, which is entitled,

Is Religion Possible?[72] He argues that earlier forms of religious trust and certainty are no longer possible. Modern knowledge in the physical and social sciences means that people have to be aware that no simple picture of the cosmos is possible. The social sciences have made us aware of how much of traditional thinking has been shaped by the political and social contexts of past eras. For example: medieval Muslim political thought was shaped by the possibilities and limitations of feudal societies. The past cannot be taken as finally authoritative because new and different contexts require new thinking. It is necessary to reflect upon how to relate basic values to new problems.

This need for a new way of thinking applies to all the religious traditions. Iqbal usually thinks about the history of human religious life as a whole, somewhat in the manner of the academic discipline of History of Religion. Questions as to the psychology of religious experience can be asked of persons in all religious traditions. The list of books in Iqbal's library indicates that much of his reading was concerned with the topic of psychology of religion. All his life he wanted to keep up with the latest thinking about the nature of the human mind and human claims to religious experience and knowledge. However, he had also a particular concern to reconstruct Muslim thinking about this particular topic.

In the first Islamic centuries, he says, trust in the foundational religious experience of the Prophet and the first Muslims was enough to engender a form of discipline by which the whole community accepted orders, an unconditional command, without seeking for rational basis for their faith. They did work out what they thought to be a rational basis for their metaphysics which was logically consistent. This metaphysics served as a rational foundation for religious faith for several centuries. However, modern knowledge makes such a foundation to longer possible. The difficulty for the twentieth century Muslim, as Iqbal sees it, is that neither the unquestioning trust of the first centuries, nor the logical metaphysics of the Middle Ages is any longer adequate as a basis for faith. Contemporary knowledge as to the vastness and complexity of the cosmos makes medieval cosmological thinking outdated. Something new is requested.

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[72] *Reconstruction*, p. 181.

In a way, Iqbal is using himself as a guinea pig to experiment with in order to discover how a modern Muslim person could justify being a serious religious person. He finds the key to the direction of his thought in the experience of freedom and spontaneity. He hated servility and self-contempt, the kind of degradation of spirit which the experience of imperialist domination had imposed on his people, the Indian Muslims. Iqbal was born just twenty years after revolt failed.

Revolt against the British in 1857 which had led to much greater British domination over India, and the final collapse of the Mughal Empire. He went to a school run by missionaries, in a town which contained the presence of the British Army camp. The British were there to defend North West India against the possibility of invasion from Afghanistan. It was necessary to conform to British rules in order to get education, and to get jogs. Iqbal was convinced that the kind of servility caused by this condition of eternal control led to the collapse of self respect and moral responsibility. Subservience led to the development of meanness of spirit among his people. Repression tended to make spontaneity difficult. Servility made for self-hate, and self-hate led to moral corruption.

Iqbal was clear in his insistence that most medieval theology and philosophy would not help with this problem. In his words:

> Nor can the concepts of theological systems, draped in the terminology of a practically dead metaphysics, be of any help to those who happen to possess a different intellectual background. The task before the Modern Muslim is therefore, immense. He has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past.[73]

His way of rethinking the problem of how to be religious in the modern world is to concentrate on personal experience. It is his knowledge of the complexity of his inner life that convinces him that materialism is not adequate as an explanation for existence. He thinks he has a soul, and he wants to understand how that soul functions. Iqbal says that the more we consider the soul, the more we recognize that the forces of our inner life are

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[73] *Reconstruction*, p. 97.

not capable of being conceptualized. We cannot have a simple theory of what the soul is and how it works. What can be understood is that the soul is directive. Iqbal uses the terms soul and ago interchangeably. He writes:

> The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment and environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as directive energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience.[74]

The distinctive character of Iqbal's understanding of human consciousness is precisely this aspect of 'directive energy' he insists that our inner lives are formed through interaction with all that impinges on us from outside.

> Thus my real personality is not a thing. It is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, and held together by the unity a of a directive purpose. My whole reality lies in my directive attitude. You cannot perceive me like a thing in space, or set of experience in temporal order; you must interpret, understand, and appreciate me in my judgments, in my will-attitude, aims and aspirations…. It is the mind's consent which eventually decides the fate of an emotion or a stimulus…. Thus system of experience we call soul or ego is also a system of acts…. The characteristic of the ego is spontaneity".[75]

A significant recent book by Thomas Moore *The Care of the Soul* makes a similar point about the link between spiritual authenticity and spontaneity. Moore has been reviving the ideas of the Italian Renaissance thinker, Ficino, about the link between creativeness and the soul. Each soul is unique, and potentially creative. The soul is nourished by a particular environment: all that is seen, heard, smelled, touched, and experienced enter into the making of a unique consciousness is that which consciousness is most effective when it is spontaneous. The crippled consciousness is that which consciousness is that which is so subservient to control by others than it no longer feels and expresses it self spontaneously. Spontaneity can be effectively creative. The

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[74] *Reconstruction*, p. 102.

[75] *Reconstruction*, p. 102.

servile obey orders but they do not make the world a better place. Freedom of spirit is necessary for gaining insight into what changes might be possible in order to transform the conditions of existence, individual and corporate. We need to be able to feel freely and to express our feelings in constructive action. Feeling enables to us judge the bad and he good.

Iqbal stresses the link between spontaneity and purpose.

> Careful study of intelligent behaviour discloses the fat of 'insight' over and above the mere succession of sensations. This 'insight' is the ego's appreciation of temporal, spatial and causal relations of things-the choice, that is to say of data in a complex that's in view of the goal or purpose which the ego has set before itself for the time being. It is this sense of striving in the experience of purposive ends and the success which I actually achieve in reaching my 'ends' that convince of my efficiency as a personal cause. The essential feature of a purposive act is its vision of a future situation which does riot appears to admit any explanation in terms of physiology.[76] ….
>
> Indeed in interpreting Nature in this way the ego understands and masters its environment, and thereby acquires and amplifies its freedom.[77]

Iqbal knows that free persons can change the world because he has done so. As an artist, he has brought into being forms of expression which did not exist before, and which have changed other lives. We know that we are free when we have created something significant. One past Muslim culture which Iqbal admired was that of Ummayad Spain in which intellectual and artistic creativeness had flourished. His poem "the Mosque of Cordoba" is one of his masterpieces. Iqbal saw the Mosque on a visit to Spain in 1931. It represents to him an awe-inspiring statement of the intentions of the builders to create an effective witness to their love for, and gratitude to, their Creator.

Yet, in this frame of things, gleams of immortal life

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[76] *Reconstruction*, pp. 103-106.

[77] *Reconstruction*, p. 108.

Show where some servants of God wrought into some high shape

Work whose perfection is still bright with the splendor of Love

Love, the well-spring of life; love, on which death has no claim.

Swiftly its tyrannous flood time's long current may roll:

Love itself is a tide, stemming all opposite waves.

Shrine of Cordoba! From Love all your existence is sprung….

Yours the soul-quickening pile, mine the soul-kindling verse,

Yours to knock at men's hearts, mine to open their gates,

Not less exalted than high Heaven is the human breast…

Fervently sounds my voice, ardently sounds my lute,

God is God, like a song, thinking through every vein!

Outward and inward grace, witness in you for him,

Prove your builder like you fair of shape and of soul….

Light such as Moses beheld gleams on those walls, that roof,

High on that minaret's top Gabriel sits enthroned...

Warmed by no blood from the heart, all man's creations are botched.

Warmed by no blood from the heart, poetry's raptures grow faint." [78]

This poem encapsulates much of Iqbal's basic thought. Time is relentless. The glories of the Muslim past, such as the culture of Mughal India, are gone forever. Yet time and eternity are linked in a paradoxical manner. To say that Gabriel sits on the top of the minaret is to suggest that the harmonious

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[78] V. Kiernan, *Poems from Iqbal*, London: John Murray, 1952, Rept. Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 2002, pp. 37-42.

beauty of the mosque transcends time, because it can speak to a person of the twentieth century. The artists who built the mosque did their work so well that then creation awakes response all another human mind, centuries later.

Authentic freedom means authentic emotion, emotion riot shaped by a twisted desire to please exploiters and tyrants. Liberated emotion responds freely to beauty. In this sense, the more free a person its, the more able he or she should be to bear witness to the goodness of creation, and thus to the goodness of the Creator. Iqbal plays with the paradox that we know that God is good because the servants of God, the creators of the mosque, have created a work of beauty. This beauty has a liberating effect on a man of another age who sees the perfection of the mosque. Time is transcended by the response of human persons separated by time and space who can recognize the witnessing power of their creations.

Iqbal also says in this poem that the life is a test. We saw that he understood the soul as the capacity to have and to fulfill purposes. If he were an ideological thinker, this would mean that the ideology was a blueprint, and that the purpose of the individual would be to shape the world according to that blueprint. However, he does not think that individuals fulfill themselves in this way. He writes:

> Life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose, conscious or unconscious…The element of purpose discloses a kind of forward look in consciousness…A state of attentive consciousness involves both memory and imagination as operating factors….No doubt, if teleology means the working out of a plan in view of a predetermined end or goal, it does make time unreal. It reduces the universe to a mere temporal reproduction of a pre-existing eternal scheme of structure in which individual events have already found their proper places, waiting, as it were, for their respective turns to enter into the temporal sweep of history. All is already given somewhere in eternity, the temporal order of events is nothing more than a mere imitation of the eternal mould. Such a view is hardly distinguishable from mechanism which we have already rejected. In fact, it is a kind of veiled materialism in which fate or destiny takes the place of rigid determinism, leaving no scope for human or even

divine freedom. The world regarded as a process realizing a pre-ordained goal is not the world of free, responsible moral agents; it is only a stage on which puppets are made to move by a kind of pull from behind. There is, however, another sense of technology. From our conscious experience we have seen that to live is to shape and change ends and purposes and to be governed by them. Mental life is teleological in the sense that, while there is no far-off distant goal towards which we are moving, there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands. We become by ceasing to be what we are".[79]

Iqbal is thus lucid about the test Muslims face in the present and future is not to just reproduce some pre-existing social and political order. They should rather learn to work within time to create something new. This creation of the new must happen not just once, but regularly. To have awareness of the directive soul within is to strive to realize one purpose and then to go on to other purposes. We should always be directed by purpose, yet the purposes also must change and develop as we mature, individually and corporately. The test is to respond in the present in order to make the world positively better for the future. This process never ceases, because once one goal is achieved, other goal are born. Once we solve one problem, another problem arises. But the purposes should always involve efforts to make goodness tangible in concrete situations.

A year after his visit to Cordoba, Iqbal gives a speech to the Muslims in Lahore in 1932. He says that he is a visionary idealist. He quotes the warning, from the Bible that where there is no vision, the people perish. The actual verse in the King James translation goes on to read "*but he that keepeth the law, happy is he.*" [Proverbs: 29:18] The Chapter is entitled observations on public and private government. This is a Biblical statement about the link between freedom and law. Iqbal is using the Biblical quotation in order to explain what he sees as his vocation.

In this speech, Iqbal is giving the reasons why he thinks Muslims need to retain control over their own cultural development once the British get out

[79] *Reconstruction*, pp. 52, 51.

off India. He says that the servility engendered by imperialism in the spirits of the colonized tends to make the repressed morally irresponsible. He wants the Muslims to be free to develop their own culture, and to become morally responsible for designing the laws, taxation and so forth, which will make their common life good, Iqbal does not intend to recreate the past, since he knows that is not possible. But he wants to rekindle vision and imagination.

> To reveal an ideal freed from its temporal limitation is one function, to know the how ideals can be transformed into living actualities is quite another. If a man is temperamentally fit for the former function his task is comparatively easy, for it involves a dean jump over temporal limitations which waylay the practical politicians at every step Politics have their roofs in the spiritual life of man. It is my belief that Islam is not a matter of private opinion. It is a society, or if you like, a civic church….We must have a clear perception of the forces which are silently molding the future, and place a relatively permanent programme of work before the community."[80]

At this time, Iqbal was advocating a federal state for India in which the Muslim would have control over their cultural autonomy. However, he says that this problem of federalism is less important than the threat of materialism as a foundation of culture. He Says:

> These phenomena, however, are merely premonitions of a coming storm, which is likely to sweep over the whole of India and the rest of Asia. This is the inevitable outcome of a wholly political civilization which has looked upon man as thing to be exploited and not as personality to be developed and enlarged by purely cultural forces… The faith which you represent recognizes the worth of the individual, and disciplines him to give away his all to the service of God and man. Its possibilities are not yet exhausted. It can still create a new world where the social rank of man is riot determined by his caste of color, or the amount of divided he earns, but by the kind of life he lives, where the poor tax the rich, where human society is founded not on the quality of stomachs but on the equality of spirits, where private own ship is a trust and where capital cannot be

[80] S. A. Vahid, *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, Lahore: Ashraf, 1964, p. 211.

allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the real producer of wealth. The superb idealism of your faith, however, needs emancipation from the medieval fancies of theologians and legists. Spiritually we are living in a prison house of thoughts and emotions which during the course of centuries we have woven round ourselves. And be it further said to the shame of us-men of older generation-which we have failed to equip the young generation for the economic, political, and even religious crises that the present age is likely to bring. The whole community needs a complete overhauling of its present mentality in order that it may again become capable of feeling the urge of fresh desires and ideals. He who desires to change an unfavorable environment must undergo a complete transformation of his inner being…. Nothing can be achieved without a firm faith in the independence of one's own inner life.[81]

The relation between law and freedom in Iqbal's thought is thus that persons must begin with faith in the independence of their inner life. This means no subservience to political, military, economic or religious control. Iqbal often writes of the first generation of Muslims as those who effectively struggled against control by kings, and priests. He sees his own struggle as the need to reaffirm freedom of spirit.

Lovely, oh Lord, this fleeting world; but why

Must the frank heart, the quick brain, droop and sigh,

Though usury mingle somewhat with his god ship,

The white man is the world's arch-deity;…

Your laws are just, but their expositors

Bedevil the Koran, twist it awry;….

God-filled, I roam, speaking what truth I see-

No fool for priests, nor yet of this age's fry.

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[81] Vahid, p. 213.

My folk berate me, the stranger does riot love me:….

In Nimrod's fire faith's silent witness, not

Like mustard-seed in the grate, burned spluttering,-

Blood warm, gaze keen, right-following, wrong-forswearing,

In fetters free, prosperous in penury,

In fan or foul untamed and light of heart-

Who can steal laughter from a flower's bright eye?

-Will no-one hush this too proud thing Iqbal

Whose tongue God's presence-chamber could not tie!" [82]

The image of the silent witness in the fire is a reference to the Qu'anic portrayal of Abraham cast into the fire for his faith, and transcending the flames. Iqbal shows himself trying to opt out of western materialism, and also out of the twisted understanding of the Qur'an characteristic of the traditional Islamic scholars of his time.

He is critical of the traditional scholars because lie thinks they still have the medieval tendency to study verses of the Qur'an out of context, rather than in focusing on ht message of the Qur'an as a whole. He thinks these traditional scholars have acquired the bad intellectual habits of just repeating stereotyped ideas, rather than in exercising their minds to apply the Qu'anic perspective to the real problems of the modern world. By refusing to think about new problems in Qur'an interpretation, the traditional ulema were still thinking about the needs of feudal society. For this reason, their thinking was largely irrelevant to the new problems of industrializing societies. The Qu'anic perspective is just, as Iqbal says in this poem. But justice only makes sense in concrete situations. Iqbal thinks that the free religious awareness lie advocates will enable persons to understand the basic principals of the Qur'an, human equality, and social justice. A person who understands

[82] Kiernan, pp. 27, 28.

spiritual freedom in the depths of his or her own personality, must also understand that all persons have the same inner qualities. For this reason, no kind of rectal, social, or genders contempt for other persons is acceptable. If one is valuable, all are valuable.

If the freedom of the soul of one is rooted in the Absolute, so also are the souls of all human persons. This is the basis of equality, and the reason why social justice is essential. In Iqbal's words:

> The individual achieves a free personality, not he releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of his own consciousness. As in the words of a Muslim Sufi 'no understanding of the Holy Book is possible until it is actually revealed to the believer just as it was revealed to the Prophet'.[83]

The Sufi in question was Iqbal's father who taught him to read the Qur'an every day, a duty which he carried on faithfully all his life. The poet tried constantly to appropriate the Qur'an as a message for his own age just as the Prophet had done for his age.[84]

We noted earlier that Iqbal said that we would know him, or any person by judging what he had done, that the actions reveal the quality of a person. This is his approach to the Prophet Muhammad. He believed that the prophet could be understood by his actions, namely that what Muhammad had done with his life revealed the quality and nature of his religious experience. Iqbal thought that the Prophet's religious experience had compelled him to work for human equality and social justice, to free humanity form tyrants and priests, and to try to eliminate all forms of dominance and oppression. Iqbal considered the coming of Islam into human history as the source of the vision of the possibility of the creation of a just and good society. The challenge he offered to the Muslims of the present and the future was that they should pick up this challenge.

Freedom is thus prior to law since only the free can feel adequately the need to express their insights into the need for equality and justice. On the

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[83] *Reconstruction*, p. 181.

[84] S. A. Vahid, pp. 54, 55.

other hand, those who are oppressed cannot easily experience the goodness of Creation which could lead them to appreciate the reality of their spiritual depths. Those who experience freedom need to design social, political and economic structures of common life so that all persons will be able to discover the freedom latent in their consciousness.

As indicated in his 1932 speech, quoted above, Iqbal was well aware that there is a different between talking about the ideals of equality and justice, and working out such ideals in practice. He was himself a lawyer who practiced regularly in the courts in Lahore. He also took part to some degree in the legislative assembly of his area. He knew that actual legislative assembly of his area. He knew that actual legislative activity involved complex processes of compromise and adjustment. He was not an ideological thinker who dreamed that one need only imagine the perfect system and then implement it.

His view of Muslim history was that the ideals of freedom, equality and justice had been appropriated by the Prophet through the Revelation of the Qur'an, and implemented by the first community of believers in the contexts of the possibilities and limitation of their time. Iqbal wanted the Muslims of his time to recover this critical spirit, and vision, and then to go forth into the world of their own time to realize then ideals. The Muslims of the past had worked through judges making decisions to create the system of justice, the Shariah, which had served as a guide to community life in past centuries. In Iqbal's words:

> Now, this principle of the equality of all believers made early Musulmans the greatest political power in the world Islam worked as a leveling force; it gave the individual a sense of his inward power, it elevated those who were socially low… The work of freeing humanity from superstition is the ultimate ideal of Islam as a community… it is their mission to set others free'.[85]

Iqbal constantly emphasizes that the purpose of Islam is for the Muslims to create among themselves a community with a vocation to bear witness to the

[85] S. A. Vahid, p. 51.

spiritual freedom of all individuals. No one should be the victim of control by political or religious authorities. This is why democracy is a necessary political expression of the purpose of the Qur'an. In this connection, in a modern Muslim democratic state as envisaged by Iqbal, the legislature should work to make laws that would increase human freedom. In the poet's words: [86]

> The whole system of Islamic ethics is based on the idea of individuality; anything which tends to repress the healthy development of individual is quite inconsistent with the spirit of Islamic law and ethics. A Muslim is free doing anything he likes, provided he does not violate the law. The general principles of this law are believed to have been revealed: the details, in order to cover the relatively secular cases, are left to the interpretation of professional lawyers. It is, therefore, true to that the entire fabric of Islamic law, actually administered is really judge made law, so that the lawyer performs the legislative function in the Muslim constitution. If, however, an absolutely new case arises which riot is provided for in the law of Islam, the will of the whole Muslim community becomes a further source of law.

The Muslim is free unless he violates the basic principles of the law. These basic principles are equality and justice, Individual freedom must be realized in a way that does not impede or harm the freedom of others. The process of creating the new which must be part of the on-going procedures and decisions by which a democratic society works at solving its problems is entirely in accord with Iqbal's understanding of basic Islamic values. He insists however that the well-being of all human beings must be the end kept, in view as societies struggle to make their economic arid political systems more just. He hated materialism because he thought that societies motivated exclusively by material values were bound to oppress others, and eventually to destroy themselves.

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[86] S. A. Vahid, pp. 61, 62

THE UNIVERSAL APPEAL OF IQBAL'S VERSE

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Throughout the greater part of this century more honour and respect has been given to Iqbal than to any other Urdu poet. The praise which he receives frequently amounts to adulation. In Pakistan, where he is popularly regarded as being the intellectual founder of the nation, his name along with that of Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah, is always mentioned with reverence and affection; in India and many other parts of he world where Urdu is spoken and understood, Iqbal has a special place in the hearts not only of his fellow-Muslims but of people belonging to all faiths and persuasions. Although, to be perfectly honest, his verse is little known in the world at large outside the comparatively narrow confines of the Urdu speaking community, the modern history of the subcontinent can hardly be written without some mention of his contribution. Almost anyone who knows Urdu will be able to recite at least a few lines of Iqbal from memory, and his poetry still possesses the charm and fascination which it first when it was first recited. Indeed, Iqbal is one of the very few Urdu poets whose works have been scrupulously edited and beautifully produced, books, commentaries and scholarly articles on every aspect of his life, art and philosophy number thousands. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the name of Iqbal will survive into the next millennium, and that his work will always form one of the most important chapters in the history of Urdu literature.

Among Urdu speakers poetry, still usually written in its classical form, is an important part of everyday life, and the *musha'ira* the gathering of poets who recite their verse before an eager and discerning audience, maintains its popularity even in communities which have established themselves in parts of the world far from Pakistan. It was, therefore, natural that Iqbal should have chosen verse as the principal medium for the expression of his thought. This gave him direct access to a vast audience which would certainly have been much less influenced or inspired if he had formulated his ideas in dry, academic prose.

Critics, who are often at pains to point out the inconsistencies and vagueness which they detect in Iqbal's philosophical system, lose sight of the fact that he was first and foremost a poet, appealing to the emotions as well as to the mind. For Iqbal, *'ishq*, which embodies the concepts of innate intuition and even recklessness, takes precedence over *'aql*, calculating intellect: profligacy and piety both earned his respect:

مجموعۂ اضداد ہے اقبال نہیں ہے
دل دفتر حکمت ہے، طبیعت خفقانی
رندی سے بھی آگاہ، شریعت سے بھی واقف
پوچھو جو تصوّف کی، تو منصور کا ثانی

Is it not so? Iqbal is a host of contradictions:

His heart a scroll of wisdom: his spirit constant palpitation.

Iqbal's natural gift for poetry enabled him to communicate subtle and sometimes complex ideas to ordinary people in a form and idiom which they could readily understand. This was the greatest secret of the success he enjoyed in his own lifetime, and one of the main reasons why his work and thought will last.

Iqbal was born in 1877 in a small town of the Punjab, Sialkot. His father was a simple tailor who brought up his family in a strict Muslim atmosphere. From his early childhood Iqbal was taught to read the Qur'an and to accept without question the firm Sunni beliefs from which he never waved. Like all his contemporaries he was well grounded in the standard Persian classics which had a great influence on his later writing.

Twenty years before his birth, India and especially the Muslim of India had been shaken by the events of the so-called Mutiny (now widely termed 'the First War of Independence'), the outcome of which was the fail of the already tottering Mughal kingdom of Delhi and the firm establishment of British rule over India. Among the Indian Muslims the realization that, with the removal of Bahadur Shah War from the throne of Delhi, their power, in as much as it ever existed, was finally at an end led to a number of reformist and reactionary movements. One of the greatest reformers who arose at the

time was Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan. Sir Sayyid quickly understood that under the new order the Muslims (whom he began to term his qaum 'nation') would be greatly disadvantaged, and the pathway to any future success lay only in a modern approach to education. His crowning achievement was the foundation of the (Muslim) University of Aligarh, the Alma Mater of many prominent Muslim leaders and thinkers. Around him he gathered a number of like-minded followers, one of the most notable being the writer and poet. Altaf Husain Hali. His long poem, entitled "The Flow and Ebb of Islam", which is usually referred to after the name of its metrical form the Musaddas was written in 1877. The poem, the language and style of which were traditional but at the same time beautifully clear, traced the glorious achievements of the Muslims, their early religious zeal, their rapid conquests and their fostering of learning and science down to present-day India where Hali saw nothing but decline and degradation. So effective was the verse and so poignant the message that even now many people will shed tears when they hear its last stanzas being recited:

وہ ملت کہ گردوں پہ جس کا قدم تھا
ہر ایک کھونٹ میں جس کا برپا علم تھا
وہ فرقہ جو آفاق میں محترم تھا
وہ امت لقب جس کا خیر الامم تھا
نشاں اس کا باقی ہے صرف اس قدر یاں
کہ گنتے ہیں اپنے کو ہم بھی مسلماں

This nation which once roamed above, the sky,

In every clime its standard raised on high,

Respected by the world's discerning eye,

Once called the best of nations. Hear the cry!

And what is left? Where is that valiant call?

We think that we are Muslims, but that's all!

This would have been the kind of Urdu verse that Iqbal heard during his formative years. At the same time he fell under the spell of the great classical Persian masters-Sa'di, Hafiz and especially Rumi. It was in their language that he later chose to compose the bulk of his poetic work. Iqbal imagined that Persian was the medium which was best adapted to his thought and temperament, and may even have believed that by composing in Persian he would be able to reach a far wider Muslim audience. One might, however, wonder whether he was right. Native Persian speakers found his language too archaic and stilted for their taste, and only comparatively recently has Iqbal been 'discovered' in Iran. To most of his contemporaries it was fairly inaccessible, and in the present day when the study of Persian has greatly declined in India and Pakistan, it can only be fully understood by very few. It was always with his Urdu verse that he scored his greatest success, and poems like the ode to the Himalaya, which stands as an exordium to his first collection of Urdu verse always succeeded in rousing the emotions of an eager audience:

اے ہمالہ! اے فیصل کشور ہندوستاں!
چومتا ہے تیری پیشانی کو جھک کر آسماں
تجھ میں کچھ پیدا نہیں دیرینہ روزی کے نشاں
تو جواں ہے گردش شام و سحر کے درمیاں
ایک جلوہ تھا کلیم طور سینا کے لیے
تو تجلّی ہے سراپا چشم بینا کے لیے

Oh Himalaya, bulwark of our Indian ramparts high!

Your forehead, raised to heaven, meets the kisses of the sky,

Your age untold, your years unmarked, you stand before our sight.

Ever fresh and ever young between the dawn and night.

Once Moses saw the face of God upon Mount Sinai;

You are that self-same vision for the true discerning eye

This poem, written when Iqbal was still a student, contains many of the elements which later characterize his Urdu and Persian verse as a whole. The rhetorical exclamations in the first line, the Heavens standing in awe of creation, the eternal vigour of youth, the revelation to Moses on the peak of Sinai are devices and themes to which Iqbal returns time and time again.

Patriotic sentiments, extolling the antiquity, eternity and glory of India, are naturally found in much of his early verse, written before his departure to England in 1905. One such poem which impressed Gandhi enough to make him suggest that it might be adopted as a kind of national anthem is the famous National Song of my Indian Children:

سارے جہاں سے اچھا ہندوستان ہمارا
ہم بلبلیں ہیں اس کی یہ گلستان ہمارا
غربت میں ہوں اگر ہم، رہتا ہے دل وطن میں
سمجھو وہیں ہمیں بھی دل ہو جہاں ہمارا
مذہب نہیں سکھاتا آپس میں بیر رکھنا
ہندی ہیں ہم، وطن ہے ہندوستاں ہمارا
یونان و مصر و روما سب مٹ گئے جہاں سے
اب تک مگر ہے باقی نام و نشاں ہمارا

In all the world our India is the best;

We are is songbirds, there we build our nest.

We may be poor, in exile torn apart,

But in our Indian homeland lives our heart,

Religion does not counsel enmity;

As Indians we strive for unity.

Such (dare one say naive?) nationalistic sentiments written in the simplest language with the well-lived image of the nightingale in the garden, may not be very much to modern taste, but at the time when they were written they could not fail to appeal. Present day Indian commentators accord this and

similar poems great importance when they wish to emphasize Iqbal's beliefs in Hindu-Muslim unity, which he undoubtedly held. Indeed, even now, many Indians, who cannot read a word of Urdu know this poem of Iqbal, if no other, off by heart.

Having done well at college, where he was given a through grounding in English. Iqbal went to Europe and in England and Germany he had three years to study and reflect. On his return to India in 1908, the themes, if not his already established style and diction of his poetry began to change.

At a meeting of the *Anjuman-e Himayat-e Islam* (the Society for the Promotion of Islam) in Lahore in 1911 he recited what has become one of his most celebrated poems "Shikwa" (A Complaint). The majestic first lines of the poem with their dark-vowelled Persian adjectives were calculated to capture the attention of an unsuspecting audience which was about to hear a complaint addressed to God Himself:

کیوں زیاں کار بنوں سود فراموش رہوں؟
فکر فردا نہ کروں، محو غم دوش رہوں
نالے بلبل کے سنوں، اور ہمہ تن گوش رہوں
ہمنوا! میں بھی کوئی گل ہوں کہ خاموش رہوں؟
جرات آموز مری تاب سخن ہے مجھ کو
شکوہ اللہ سے، خاکم بدہن، ہے مجھ کو

Why should plot own loss, unmindful of all I might gain?

Better to think of tomorrow than dwell on yesterday's pain.

Shall I hear the lament of the bulbul, submissively lending my ear?

Am I the rose to suffer its cry in silence year after year?

The fire of my verse gives me courage, and bids me no more to be faint.

With dust in my mouth I am abject, but to God I make my complaint

The Complaint closely follows the pattern which Hali had used for his *Musaddas*. It begins with a list of the Muslims' past achievements and traces

their decline in the present age. But Iqbal goes farther than Hali by suggesting in emotional words taken straight from the tradition of the Persian love-lyric that man is not entirely to blame for his miserable fortune. God, like the coquettish beloved of the ghazal, must bear some of the guilt for the misery of his lovers:

عشق کی خیر، وہ پہلی سی ادا بھی نہ سہی
جادہ پیمائی تسلیم و رضا بھی نہ سہی
مضطرب دل صفت قبلہ نما بھی نہ سہی
اور پابندی آئین وفا بھی نہ سہی
کبھی ہم سے کبھی غیروں سے شناسائی ہے
بات کہنے کی نہیں تو بھی ہرجائی ہے!

In a traditional orthodox society such words could not have been uttered in prose; in verse they were just permissible and as is often the case the poet finds the power he seeks in his art.

Not from a wealthy background, which could have afforded him easy influential connections, Iqbal was unlike many of the Urdu poets who had preceded him in that he was obliged to work for his living and the law, always a lucrative profession in India, was a natural choice. The outcome of the First World War and the re-alignment of the empires which had seemed indestructible began to suggest to certain Indian politicians that Indian independence was more than just a dream. At this time, it must be said that Iqbal showed little active interest in Indian politics, but certainly felt obliged to voice his opinion on the world situation as he saw it. This provided him with the theme of some of his finest Urdu verse which dates from the beginning of the 20's.

In one important poem entitled "Khizr Rah" (Khizr of the Way), he made a number of statements, which, when put together, hardly constitute a coherent political doctrine or philosophy, but do form the basis for the thought which is crystallized in his later work.

Typically the poem begins with a soft natural setting. One night on the bank of a river, the poet reclines fretting about the troubles which are

besetting the world. The waves, sleeping on the surface of the water like a baby in its cradle were restless in their depths. Suddenly he catches sight of Khizr, the Muslim Prophet, who according to legend journeyed with Alexander to the fountain of the water of life, and now wanders for all eternity guiding travelers on their way. The choice of Khizr, a fairly obscure Islamic figure, is deliberate, and for Iqbal he embodies the concept of restless determination, which features so prominently in his work. The poet asks Khizr about his passion or wandering about the very meaning of life, about kingship, capital, labour and empire. The prophet's answer is a fair summary of what Iqbal thought at the time.

According to Khizr, man must remain continually active, tireless in his research and endeavors to find new pastures. The desert caravan proceeds relentlessly from stage to stage; the stars perpetually traverse the firmament; 'the cup of life grows more mature by constantly being passed around':

پختہ تر ہے گردش پیہم سے جام زندگی
ہے یہی اے بیخبر راز دوام زندگی!

Kings and sovereigns are deceivers, who drug their subjects and send them to oblivious sleep. Only one deserves the title of Lord, the 'Ineffable Being'. Who alone is worthy of worship. Democracy preached by the West is a sham, and the grand words used by politicians constitution, reform, concessions, rights and assemblies'- (such words were commonplace in the reports of self-important commissions and enquiries which the British frequently set up in India) are nothing more than same soporific potions dispensed by kings.

Capitalism, the tool of Imperialism, eagerly supported by the Church, patronizes the labourer with its miserable hand-outs and the poor naively believe that they have something to gain from a game which they cannot win.

For Iqbal the only answer could be provided by Islam-not the Islam which has separated Arab from Turk, not the Islam which has made Persia capitulate to its western 'friends', but the Islam, born in Hijaz, the real heritage of Abraham.

ربط و ضبط ملت بیضا ہے مشرقی کی نجات
ایشیا والے ہیں اس نکتے سے اب تک بیخبر
پھر سیاست چھوڑ کر داخل حصار دیں میں ہو
ملک و دولت ہے فقط حفظ حرم کا ایک ثمر

Unity of the Muslim Ummah alone can save the East

But Asia's people still refuse to recognize the sign.

Abandon politics once more: come to the walls of faith!

Dominion will be yours, but only if you save the Sacred Precinct.

The Persian couple which concludes the poem, itself containing the oft-repeated phrase from the Qur'an, is a final clarion call directed at the heart of the true Muslim:

مسلم استی سینہ را از آرزو آباد دار
ہر زماں پیش نظر لا یخلف المیعاد دار

You are a Muslim. Fill your breast with ardour and desire,

Keep these words before your eyes: 'My promise never fails'

This of course, was the uncompromising stance always taken by Iqbal, who never saw any alternative to the faith into which he had been born.

What immediately stakes one about the poems from this period is their great optimism, which is notably absent from Hali's *Musaddas* or Iqbal's *Complaint*. It is as if he believes that there really is something in store for the downtrodden, outnumbered Muslims of India: as if there will be another Abraham or a new effulgence on Sinai. Could it really be that the Muslims might look forward to freedom from the domination of alien thoughts and systems which formed no part of their faith?

In the stirring words of poems like Khzir-e-Rah, many Pakistani might see clear references to the thinking that was later to bring their land into existence. We must, however, always be wary of reading too much into what

at this time were rousing but often unconnected utterances in verse. As with any revered text, it is always possible to find in the verse of Iqbal a line that will prove your point of view. What can certainly be said at this point is that he was succeeding in instilling into his own Muslim 'nation' the pride and courage which was needed when it finally addressed itself to the question of a separate homeland, wherever it might be or in whatever form it might take.

The same positive tone is found in a longer and in many ways gentler poem, entitled "Tulu'-e Islam" (The Rise of Islam) which was written in 1923 against the background of Mustafa Kernel's rise to power in Turkey. Here Iqbal sees the Turks, that brave nation of which he always speaks with admiration and affection, as the most likely to lead Islam into the modern world. The memorable first lines set the tone of the whole poem:

دلیل صبح روشن ہے ستاروں کی تنک تابی
افق سے آفتاب ابھرا، گیا دورگراں خوابی!
عروق مردۂ مشرق میں خون زندگی دوڑا
سمجھ سکتے نہیں اس راز کو سینا و فارابی!

The dimness of the stars reveals the brightness of the dawn;

The sun mounts the horizon and the time of sleep has passed.

The blood of life runs in the veins of the East which once lay dead;

Avicenna and Farabi by this secret are surpassed.

We have referred earlier to the language and style of Iqbal which is so distinctive, and which form the very beginning he made his own. Perhaps we might pause to consider what there is in his language which gave his verse such power and which never ceased to fascinate his audience.

The first thing to note is that Iqbal made no concession to modernism, and from beginning to end the language and the prosody are of a purely traditional kind. In other words, the poet with a modern message saw no reason to experiment with innovative forms. In this, of course, he was quite right, and to this day Urdu-speaking audiences are perfectly happy with and even welcome the well-established verse tradition with which they are totally

familiar. Indeed experimentation belongs more to the modern literary journal than to the ever popular poetic-gathering.

As we have already pointed out. Iqbal claims to have felt more comfortable with Persian than with Urdu verse is replete with Persian vocabulary and Persian idiom transferred to Urdu, which some purists have severely criticized. This again was no problem for his audience, which after all had been brought up in the mosque where the elegant sermon of the *khatib* far outweighed anything written in the humble newspaper. The sheer beauty of the images, familiar from childhood, the Persian rhythms that could vary from the stately to the staccato, the abundance of references to the Qur'an all these were well calculated to appeal directly to the Muslim heart. We must also remember that that by and large the average Urdu-speaker is far better acquainted with the poetry of his language then the average westerner would be with his.

It is possible to bring out many subtle philosophical and mystical points from Iqbal's text, but in general the message which receives constant repetition is unambiguous. One might sum it up as follows: constant endeavor coupled with a firm belief in God and the word of His Prophet will bring man to the realization of his full potential. When he discovers his true Self (the Persian term *khudi* probably features more in Iqbal's writing than any other), he will become 'a man of faith'- the literal rendering of Iqbal's *mard-e-mu'min* which has often annoyingly been translated as 'Superman', as if it should be equated with Nietzsche's *Ubermensch*. Only then will he reach the heights of Gabriel and stand ready to conquer the earth.

It may be noted that the last stanza of "Tulu'-e Islam" is entirely composed in Persian, but the simple syntax, the short phrases and choice of vocabulary, most of which also exists in Urdu anyway, are no real barrier to the comprehension of some of his most beautiful lines.

"بیا تا گل بیفشانیم و مے در ساغر اندازیم
فلک را سقف بشگافیم و طرح دیگر اندازیم"

I scatter the petals of tulips upon the dust of martyrs

For their blood profits the sapling of the community;

Come so that we may strew roses and pour wine into the cup;

Let us tear open the roof of Heaven and think upon new ways.

It was not until 1926 that Iqbal became actively involved in politics by contesting, rather reluctantly, the election to the Punjab Legislative Council. He was elected by an overwhelming majority, but soon became disillusioned by its impotency. His support for the Simon Commission in the following year caused a split with Jinnah, who never rated Iqbal's political acumen very highly, and on many occasions deliberately ignored him. In 1930, Iqbal was elected president of the Allahabad session of the Muslim League, which gave him the kind of political stature he had never before enjoyed and it was here that he made his frequently quoted statement: 'I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Balochistan amalgamated into a single state- a Muslim India within India'.

In fairness it must be admitted that his speech received little attention at the time, and that his words implied the creation of a political unit within an all-Indian federation. Now, however, they are frequently interpreted to support the widely held opinion that Iqbal was outlining the concept of a future Pakistan. Indeed, later statements made on this question by Iqbal may lend credence to the belief. For example, in a letter written to Jinnah in 1937, less than a year before his death, he said: 'To my mind the new Constitution with its idea of a single federation is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims'.

Iqbal almost ten years before the creation of Pakistan, and what his views would have been if he had lived longer must for ever remain a matter of speculation. In his verse, he never made them clear.

One of the clearest statements which Iqbal made of his ideas on a wide range of political, religious and philosophical matters can be found in the celebrated poem, Saqinama 'Address to the Saqi, the last lengthy composition in his second anthology of Urdu verse, which was published in 1936. Like Tulu'-e Islam, the poem is one of great optimism in which the shaken world of Islam is pictured on the brink of a new, more glorious age.

Typically the poem begins with a vibrant description of nature. The 'hero' is a mountain stream beginning as a trickle from the melting snow of the summit and finally emerging as a gushing torrent, smashing all that blocks its path. Its progress is described with a string of clipped verbs:

وہ جوئے کہستاں اچکتی ہوئی
اٹکتی، لچکتی، سرکتی ہوئی
اچھلتی، پھسلتی، سنبھلتی ہوئی
بڑے پیچ کھا کر نکلتی ہوئی
رکے جب تو سل چیر دیتی ہے یہ!
پہاڑوں کے دل چیر دیتی ہے یہ!

The mountain stream coinies leaping down the slope,

Twisting, winding, stopping, in a rush;

It bounds, it slides, Its path is always sure,

And then at last emerges with a gush.

It cleaves the rocks that stand upon its way;

It cuts the mountain sharper than a knife.

A new age is dawning, Iqbal proclaims; the world has rid itself of sultans and Emperors; the time-honoured emblems of Islam, its religious code, its theology are proved to be outmoded. Even the mystic, once the champion of the faith, has lost his way:

وہ صوفی کہ تھا خدمت حق میں مرد
محبت میں یکتا، حمیّت میں فرد
عجم کے خیالات میں کھو گیا
یہ سالک مقامات میں کھو گیا
بجھی عشق کی آگ اندھیر ہے
مسلماں نہیں راکھ کا ڈھیر ہے

The Sufi, once the seeker after truth,

Unrivalled in his zeal to join the fray,

Has lost himself In Persia's arcane thought.

A traveler who has somehow missed the way,

The flames are quenched that fired his love so deep.

He's not a Muslim-just a burnt-out heap!

The one to point the direction is not the politician, but the poet, inspired by Heaven. His intellect freed from the shackles of slavery, he is the one who understands the true essence of life, before which Death can have no meaning:

سمجھتے ہیں ناداں اسے بے ثبات
ابھرتا ہے مٹ مٹ کے نقش حیات
بڑی تیز جولاں، بڑی زود رس!
ازل سے ابد تک رم یک نفس!
زمانہ کہ زنجیر ایّام ہے
دموں کے الٹ پھیر کا نام ہے!

Fools think of its instability,

But life erased arises once again,

Eternally in flight, a single breath;

The days and nights which form a flowing chain

Are nothing but those breaths which come and go.

If life is the sword, then the Self is the blade of that sword. The self is without limit, on a journey which has no end or beginning, continually changing its paths of investigation. The guardian of the Self must never bow in humility before others. He must never become part of the world of master and slave, for the world is but one stage in the Self's existence, after which

there are others, as yet invisible, which await the onslaught of the man of faith.

ہر اک منتظر تیری یلغار کا
تری شوخی فکر و کرادر کا
یہ ہے مقصد گردش روزگار
کہ تیری خودی تجھ پہ ہو آشکار

Each world awaits the quickness of your mind:

Each one the blow of him who would be true,

The purpose of the turning round of time

Is that your Self be manifest to you.

The "Saqinama" is undoubtedly a complex poem, which has lent itself to much scholarly analysis. There can, however, be few Urdu poems which have had so much appeal or served so well to inspire a people who, at the time it was written, were in fact standing at the start of an unknown journey into the future.

It should be said finally that not all of Iqbal's verse is so involved, and in many ways his shorter ghazals, usually containing no more than a few verses, form the best loved and most popular part of his poetic work.

The following poem given in full is one of the best examples of the way in which Iqbal was able to sum up his complex and often contradictory thoughts, readily making available to the common man things which scholars might spend a lifetime unraveling:

پھر چراغ لالہ سے روشن ہوئے کوہ و دمن
مجھ کو پھر نغموں پہ اکسانے لگا مرغ چمن
پھول ہیں صحرا میں یا پریاں قطار اندر قطار
اودے اودے، نیلے نیلے، پیلے پیلے پیرہن

من کی دولت ہاتھ آتی ہے تو پھر جاتی نہیں
تن کی دولت چھاؤں ہے! آتا ہے دھن، جاتا ہے دھن!
من کی دنیا میں نہ پایا میں نے افرنگی کا راج
من کی دنیا میں نہ دیکھے میں نے شیخ و برہمن
پانی پانی کر گئی مجھ کو قلندر کی یہ بات
تو جھکا جب غیر کے آگے نہ من تیرا، نہ تن!

Once more ablaze the mountain-sides glowing with the tulip's fire

The meadow birds arouse my song; once more they waken my desire.

Does the desert bloom with flowers, or are they beauties I behold,

Clothed in yellow, decked in blue, draped in veils of red and gold?

If in the forest careless beauty sheds its veil. Then think again;

Seek the forest, leave the town; the city's loss will be your gain.

Trace life's secret in your soul; the quest is yours and yours alone.

If you will not be mine, who cares? Decide at least to be your own.

The world of spirit burns with feeling, passion, love and ecstasy.

The world of body deals with loss and profit, guile, hypocrisy.

Once acquired, the wealth of spirit keeps its value, feeds and grows.

The body's wealth is but a shadow. Money comes and money goes.

The world of spirit will not brook ideas of foreign domination.

Muslim, Hindu, sheikh and Brahmin-the spirit sees them as one nation.

I heard the dervish call these words, and I was overcome by shame.

If you bow before another, lost are your body, soul and name.

In a recent debate on the future of education in England a serious proposal was made to withdraw the works of Byron, Shelley and Tennyson from the secondary school syllabus. These poets were unkindly branded by the protagonists as 'dead white males' whose values had little relevance to contemporary society. A counter argument was put by Tennyson's great grandson who simply pointed out that the verse of these poets has been recognized as great by all generations, and whatever their values might's have been, they will always remain great. The same argument surely holds true for Iqbal. The greatness of his poetry will always endure, and his essential message will remain as relevant for future generations as it is for our own today.

ISLAMIC MODERNITY AND THE DESIRING SELF: MUHAMMAD IQBAL AND THE POETICS OF NARCISSISM*

Yaseen Noorani

The Indian Muslim poet and religious thinker Muhammad Iqbal (c. 1877-1938) provides the most extensive and fully realised vision of an alternative, Islamic version of modernity that has yet appeared. His critique of Enlightenment rationality, and particularly his cogent linkage of it with Imperialism, anticipates an important line of post-War thinking. Above all, his apparent success in casting modern European civilisation as a dead-end offshoot of the authentic modernity engendered by Islam has earned him great admiration throughout the Muslim world, leaving aside the Indian subcontinent, where he has become an institution of Muslim culture. Iqbal's achievement goes beyond the mere dressing of a pre-existing conception of modernity in Islamic garb. In the manner of European Romantic and Modernist writers, he was able to generate a critique of Europe's rationalist and capitalist social order out of a distinctive figuration of the human condition. Like his European counterparts, from whom he learned a great deal, Iqbal founded his alternative version of modernity on the poetic representation of an ideal modern self characterised by its fundamentally aesthetic or creative mode of being rather than by any capacity for "ratiocination." He derived this representation, however, not from the Romantic artist or hero of European literary traditions, but from the desiring self of the classical Persian *ghazal*. In order to do this, Iqbal had to turn what I will characterise as the "Dionysian" self of the classical *ghazal* into a modern form of subjectivity radically distinguished from nature and inscribed with a historical trajectory. By changing the polarity of the classical representation of the desiring subject, Iqbal produced a "narcissistic" self which served as the basis of the doctrine of selfhood (*khudi*) that he propounded in his *masnavi* poems and his book, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.[87]

* I am grateful for valuable comments on versions of this paper to Salah Hassan, Rachana Kamtekar, Heshmat Moayyad, Michael Murrin and Jaroslav Stetkevych

The transformation that Iqbal worked to create in the narrow compass of the *ghazal* is therefore the key to his hegemonic vision of an authentic, Islamic modernity destined to transform the world.

In recasting the *ghazal* for political purposes, Iqbal's challenge was to turn a lyrical genre centred on passionate love and the subversion of social norms into a blueprint for communal self-realisation, a tool for the moral reform of the Muslim nation. The political potential of the classical *ghazal*, however, comes not out of any vision of a communal ideal, but out of a fundamental alienation from the world of everyday time that governs social existence. We can see this impulse in the way that the *ghazal* represents the escape from everyday existence.[88]

biya ta gul bar-afshanim o may dar saghar andazim

falak-ra saqf bishkafim o tarhi naw dar-andazim

(*Come, let us scatter roses and throw wine in the glass*

Let us pierce the heavenly ceiling and throw down a new law.)

(Hafiz, no. 367)

biya ki qa'ida -yi asiman bigardanim

qaza bi -gardish-i ratl-i giran bigardanim

(*Come, let us overturn the rule of the heavens;*

Let us turn back fate's decree by sending round a

heavy draught.)

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[87] An inordinate amount has been written on Iqbal in Urdu and English. For a short biography as well as a general exposition of Iqbal's thought, and an exhaustive bibliography, see Schimmel 1989. For an exposition of Iqbal's philosophical ideas, see Dar 1944. For a sharp philosophical critique of Iqbal's *Reconstruction*, see Raschid 1986.

[88] For transcribing Persian verses I have used a standard transliteration scheme which does not reflect the actual pronunciation of nineteenth-twentieth century India or fourteenth century Shiraz.

(Ghalib, no. 265)

The drinking-song motif expresses the poet's wish to reorder the universe according to his own desire in the feeling of intoxicated euphoria. Freedom from the tyranny of fate takes the form of a condition condemned by society and religious law. The association of freedom with a position outside society is characteristic of the *ghazal*, enabling the poet to denounce those with moral or political authority and their institutions. For moral and political reform, however, the *ghazal* is a problematic genre. Unlike the *qasida*, to which it is closely related, the *ghazal* depicts fulfilment primarily in individual and temporary images. Instead of tracing a linear progress from personal desire to communal fulfilment, the *ghazal* takes the fixed existential condition of the desiring self and explores its modulations. In other words, the *ghazal* rejects what I have previously called the mechanism of poetic sublimation constitutive of the *qasida*.[89] The movement of the *qasida*, diverts desire from the language of love to the language of social virtue, from the erotic to the heroic. The *ghazal*, however, absolutises the language of love, turning it into a symbolic language capable of representing the human condition in its entirety. The erotic and individual subsume the heroic and communal. The language of the *ghazal* lends itself to "sublimated" interpretation, but remains the language of love. This results not only in moral ambiguity but in the absence of any representation of a communal ideal.

In the context of colonial domination and the rationalist order which it ostensibly inaugurated, the *ghazal* came to be viewed increasingly as a national liability. It appeared more as a manifestation of national decadence than as a potential means of national rehabilitation. The *ghazal's* moral and political deficiencies were of particular importance in India, where it remained the dominant genre of Persian and Urdu poetry through the nineteenth century. The most influential statement of the case was made by Altaf Husayn Hali (1837-1914), the founder of modern Urdu literary criticism, in his *Muqaddima -yi shi'r o Sha'iri* ("Introduction to Poetry"). Half, a close associate of the celebrated Muslim reformer Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khin, extends Khan's conception of "Nature" (*nechar*), adopted from British Enlightenment thought, to the examination of the nature and purpose of poetry. Taking up the psychological doctrine of the influence of poetry on the moral

[89] For an analysis of this mechanism, see Noorani 1997 b.

sensibilities through the emotions, he elaborates the view that the function of poetry is the moral refinement and political inspiration of nations.[90] Natural poetry elevates nations, while artificial poetry corrupts them. He attaches this argument to the narrative of Muslim greatness and decline, seeking to show that the present degenerate state of the Indian Muslim community finds both cause and symptom in the sort of literature that Indian Muslims presently value. Half takes issue with the *ghazal* for its artificiality and preoccupation with lust. It is artificial because it is imitative and detached from reality, both external and emotional. Its preoccupation with lust is the morally damaging consequence of this artificiality. Since the *ghazal* is so popular, it cannot be eliminated, but it can perhaps be morally improved or at least rendered innocuous. Hali calls upon poets to desexualise the *ghazal* by taking up non-sexual forms of love for their theme. He is concerned that they make the beloved as abstract as possible by eliminating all reference to the beloved's sex and body. Wine imagery should be given up unless obviously metaphorical. Denigration of religious authority should also be cast aside. In general, the *ghazal* should give up erotic motifs *('ishqiyya mazamin*) and turn to moral (*akhlaqi*) ones, because this is what the present day requires. In the past, Muslims may have had the luxury to find their entertainment in voluptuous images and precious language. In the present they are struggling for their communal existence.[91]

Hali's attempt to clean up the *ghazal* by trading eros for agape and erotic images for moralistic *sententiae* merely sidesteps the problem of sublimation by obscuring the animating impulse of the desiring self without altering or eliminating it. His programme, if followed through, results in a poetic form that is to the *ghazal* what muzak is to the symphony. Iqbal, who took up the mantle of literary reformer from Hali and that of Islamic reformer from Ahmad Khan, rejected the Enlightenment solution of repression in favour of the more Romantic solution of narcissism. Iqbal does not seek to desex the *ghazal* because it is precisely in the tropes of the *ghazal's* language of desire that he conducts his attack upon Enlightenment Reason. Nor does he wish to leave it in the traditional form found by Hali to be so politically devastating. Instead, Iqbal attempts to harness the full heat of the *ghazal's*

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[90] Hali 1993, pp. 94-105, 158-67, 178-226.

[91] For a much fuller discussion of Hali's critical views see Pritchett 1994.

passion for the sake of an ideal community by making its symbols signify the self, the individual ego. Rather than give up the primacy of eros, he seeks to inscribe sublimation into its essence. Political orientation, which is to say, an unseverable bond with communal identity, is to lie at the core of the desiring self. Iqbal's *ghazal* works to over determine the meaning of eros so that it signifies love of this ideal communal self intrinsically. As in the traditional *ghazal*, the language of love and the condition of the lover are absolute. Iqbal's *ghazal*, however, seeks to eliminate the problem of sublimation by changing the object of the lover's desire and thus the nature of desire itself. Iqbal took as his criterion for the value of poetry not its conformity to Nature but its enhancement of "Life," which is to say, its strengthening and consolidation of the ego. This is precisely what he found lacking in the classical *ghazal*. We can clarify Iqbal's project by first considering his objections to the classical *ghazal* and then examining his attempt to refashion it.

In the first edition of his first Persian *mathnavi*, *Asrar-i khudi* ("Secrets of the Self"),[92] published in 1915, Iqbal boldly attacked the doyen of Indo Persian *ghazal* poetry, Hafiz:

hushyar az hafiz-i sahba gusar

jamash az zahr-i ajal sar-maya-dar

rahn-i saqi khirqayi parhiz-i u

may 'ilaj-i hawl-i rastakhiz-i u...

an faqih-i millat-i may-khwaragan

an imam-i millat-i bi-charagan

naghma-yi changash dalil-i inhitat

hatif-i u jibrayil-i inhitat

mar-i gulzari ki darad zahr-i nab

[92] For R. A. Nicholson's translation of this work into English, see Iqbal, 1978.

sayd-ra avval hami arad bi-khwab[93]

Beware of Hafiz the wine-drinker,

For his cup's supply is the poison of death;

He pawned his hair shirt to the cup-bearer—

Wine is the cure for the heat of his fervour...

He is the cleric of the wine-drinkers' nation;

He is the priest of the religion of the hapless.

His harp's melody is the proof of decadence;

His muse is the Gabriel of decadence.

A rose-bed snake endowed with pure poison,

Proceeds by first lulling its prey to sleep...

The passage continues to find in the sixteenth century poet 'Urfi a life-affirming antithesis to the decadent Hafiz:[94]

in su-yi mulk-i khudi markab jihand

an kinar-i ab-i ruknabad mand

in qatil-i himmat-i mardana-yi

an zi ramz-i zindagi bi-gana-yi

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[93] These lines are quoted in Khan 1976, pp. 12-13. This book, devoted to the relationship between Hafiz and Iqbal, quotes the verses from the first edition of *Asrar-i khudi* concerning Hafiz, which Iqbal dropped from the work for later editions due to the controversy they aroused. The book also quotes passages from letters in which Iqbal discusses these verses and attempts to justify them to his friends. The author argues that Iqbal was unable to maintain the dichotomy he set up between the beauty of poetry (exemplified by Hafiz) and its service of "life." He attempts both to show the influence of Hafiz's style on Iqbal and to defend Hafiz's poetry from Iqbal's charge that it is an opiate.

[94] Khan 1976, p. 14.

This one prodded his mount toward the realm of selfhood;

That one stayed behind by the stream of Ruknabad;

This one is immersed in manly ambition;

That one is a stranger to the secret of life.

Here Iqbal reveals an important "secret of the self." "Manly ambition" (*himmat*) is the direct product of the sublimation of eros. In the traditional *qasida* the poet transforms his desire for his beloved into desire for martial glory. This is what Iqbal claims here to find in 'Urfi and find lacking in Hafiz. Though both poets are from Shiraz, 'Urfi aspires toward higher states of being, while Hafiz is content to remain in (and sing of) the gardens of his hometown. 'Urfi is a poet of the aspiring self, while Hafiz is a poet calling for self-extinction.

These verses were so controversial that even Iqbal's close friends demanded explanations from him. For this reason, Iqbal retracted them, and they do not appear in any subsequent edition of *Asrar-i khudi*; he replaced them with a general indictment of decadent poetry for its role in the downfall of the Muslim community. These deleted passages, as well as Iqbal's epistolary defences of them, are important because they reveal explicitly what the general indictments interspersed throughout Iqbal's works only intimate that the sort of *ghazal* held in the highest esteem by Iqbal's contemporaries is precisely the sort responsible for their present moral degeneracy.

Iqbal explains in one of his letters that his criticism of Hafiz is "purely literary" and has nothing to do with Hafiz's "private personality" or "beliefs."[95] The point of the criticism is merely to elaborate the literary principle that beauty alone cannot be the purpose of art. "If the basis of literature is that beauty is beauty, be its consequences beneficial or injurious, then Khwaja [Hafiz] is of the world's greatest poets."[96] Iqbal then expresses

[95] The letter is to Mawlana Aslam Jirajpuri and is quoted in Khan 1976, p. 14.

[96] Iqbal had written of Hafiz in 1910, perhaps before his objections to Hafiz had reached maturity, "In words like cut jewels Hafiz put the sweet unconscious spirituality of the nightingale." See his published journal entitled *Stray Reflections* (Iqbal 1961a), no. 77.

his dissatisfaction concerning the comparison between 'Urfi and Hafiz, all but admitting that it is based upon a single verse of 'Urfi's:

giriftam an ki bihishtam dahand bi ta'at

qabul kardan-i sadqa na shart-i insaf ast

It seems that I shall be given paradise without having been righteous—

Acceptance of charity is not of the conditions of fairness.

In another letter, written to the poet Akbar Ilahabadi, Iqbal comments upon the nature of the objectionable wine of Hafiz's poetry: "The wine intended in those verses [of *Asrar-i khudi*] is not what people drink in restaurants, but that state of intoxication which suffuses Hafiz's poetry."[97]

The "state of intoxication" that Iqbal finds so objectionable is precisely the Dionysian character of the classical *ghazal*, its tendency to represent eros through the dissolution of the ego rather than in its enhancement. We saw in the drinking-song verses of Hafiz and Ghalib quoted above the manner in which intoxication signifies the state of euphoria to which the lover aspires. It is immediately obvious to any reader of Hafiz, or of any post Hafiz *ghazal* poet, that drunkenness is the exemplary condition of the lover, whether it is produced by wine or by eros. Indeed, it is produced by both in the verses quoted, for the command "come" is addressed to the beloved-union with the beloved (*wasl*) and intoxication are more or less equated. Otherwise, the latter serves as the best substitute for the former, as we learn in the very first verse of Hafiz's *Divan*:

a la ya ayyuha 'l-saqi adir ka'san wa nawil ha

ki 'ishq asan namud avval vali uftad mushkilha

Send the chalice on its round, O cupbearer, and hand it over:

For love seemed easy at first, and then the problems came. (Hafiz 1, 1)

In *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche introduces what he calls the "Dionysian" principle of art, "which is brought home to us most intimately by the analogy

[97] Khan 1976, p. 15.

of intoxication."[98] This principle arises from the experience of "an intoxicated reality, which ... does not heed the single unit, but even seeks to destroy the individual and redeem him by a mystic feeling of oneness."[99] Nietzsche describes this experience as one of complete absorption in the "ground of being," the life-force of nature underlying all that lives and dies while itself remaining constant. According to Nietzsche, this is the basis for the art of music, the most Dionysian of arts, for it is the art which imitates the primordial life-force most directly. In any case, the Dionysian impulse produces the only sort of art which can truthfully present the horror of life-suffering, destruction, and death-and at the same time redeem it with the more profound truth that "life is at the bottom of things, despite all the changes of appearances, indestructibly powerful and pleasurable."[100] Nietzsche describes the process in the following manner:

> [The] rapture of the Dionysian state with its annihilation of the ordinary bounds and limits of existence contains, while it lasts, a hypnotic element in which all personal experiences of the past become immersed. This chasm of oblivion separates the worlds of everyday reality and of Dionysian reality. But as soon as this everyday reality re-enters consciousness, it is experienced as such, with nausea: an ascetic, will-negating mood is the fruit of these states.[101]

It is this nausea, this negation of the will, which is cured by the magic of Dionysian art, which "...alone knows how to turn these nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live..."[102]

In calling the *ghazal* Dionysian, my claim is not that it arises from the Dionysian experience of self-abnegation in the underlying unity of being that Nietzsche holds to be the basis of this sort of art, but that it depicts the

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[98] Nietzsche 1968, p. 36.
[99] Ibid, p. 38.
[100] Ibid, p. 59.
[101] Ibid. pp. 59-60. I have altered the translation of the word that Nietzsche emphasises, "lethargisches," from Kaufmann's "lethargic" to "hypnotic." The sense here is clearly the narcotic, oblivion-inducing effect associated with the river Lethe, as in Keats's "Lethe wards." See Nietzsche 1967, vol. 1. p. 5617
[102] Nietzsche 1968, p. 60.

Dionysian situation that Nietzsche describes. It depicts the quest to extinguish self-consciousness in eros (*'ishq*), figured in union with the beloved, and laments the inability to consistently achieve this condition, which it calls "fate" (*dahr*, *ruzgar*, *qaza*, etc.). As we saw in the verses of Hafiz and Ghalib cited above, the feeling of intoxication is one which allows the poet to climb on top of the heavens, as it were, and alter the world to suit his own liking. For this intoxication is above and beyond the fate which makes of everyday life a cycle of suffering and death; it is of eternity and not of this world:

bi-hich dawr nakhwahand yaft hushyarash

chunin ki hafiz-i and mast-i bada-yi azal ast

At no time shall they find him conscious,

For our Hafiz is drunk of the wine of eternity. (Hafiz 46)

The word used for "time," *dawr*, means literally "turn," and intimates the fatal turn of the wheel of time. The opposite of this is the stationary *azal*, "eternity." The pun on time points up the contrast between the quotidian nature of consciousness and the timeless, universal condition experienced in its extinction. What is the "wine of eternity" if not some cosmic principle underlying all that exists? This principle is eros (*'ishq*), or at least that is what it is called in the *ghazals*.

The *ghazal*, however, speaks much more of sorrow (*ghamm*) than of euphoria. This is because the usual lot of man is not the euphoric, intoxicated state of union with the beloved but rather the misery of everyday life, the realm of fate, the wheel of heaven which grinds us all to dust:

zi dawr-i bada bi -jan rdhatt rasan sdqi

ki ranj-i khatiram az jawr-i dawr-i gardun ast

Give me some comfort by sending the wine around, O cupbearer,

For my mind is vexed by the oppressive revolving of heaven. (Hafiz 55)

As we saw in the quotation of the first verse of Hafiz's *Divan* above, the poet calls this condition separation from the beloved. It is the state of consciousness of the self, which consists in powerful sensations of pain, weakness, and mortality. The whole world cannot redeem even an instant of this condition:

dami ba gham bi-sar burdan jahan yak-sar namiarzad

bi-may bifrush dalq-i ma k-az-in bihtar namiarzad

The whole world is not worth a moment spent in pain—

Trade for wine our cloak of abstinence, for it will fetch no better than this. (Hafiz 147)

This condition can be redeemed only by the intoxication of love, which annihilates it. Since, however, the suffering of this world is our normal fate, it is necessary to evoke the feeling of intoxication by means of the beautiful objects of this world. In other words, it is necessary to transform the world into a landscape of beautiful forms, a garden or a house of idols, by means of the impulse of eros:

ruzgarist ki sawda-yi butan din-i man ast

ghamm-i in kar nishat-i dil-i ghamgin-i man ast

For an age infatuation with idols has been my religion;

Preoccupation with this task is the joy of my sorrowful heart. (Hafiz 53)

This verse, though it speaks of joy, is suffused with melancholy. The word *ruzgarist*, which here means "an age," evokes fate (*ruzgar*). The word for "infatuation" (*sawda*), meant originally "melancholy." The expression translated as "preoccupation" is an idiom which rendered literally, would be "sorrow (*ghamm*) for something," i.e. "care." The upshot of this is that it is only sorrow for "idols" which can transform existential sorrow into joy through preoccupation with beauty, just as sorrow (*ghamm*) is linguistically turned into preoccupation by its attachment to an object. Preoccupation with beauty becomes joy because it arises from the desire for the primordial state of love-intoxication, and is indeed a version of that state.

The *ghazal*, which is the most exemplary preoccupation with beauty, arises from this desire as well, and for this reason, is able to "turn those nauseous thoughts about the horror or absurdity of existence into notions with which one can live"— or perhaps it is better to say into *symbols* with which one can live. In other words, the *ghazal* can break the spell of time:

hadis az mutrib o may gu o raz-i dahr kamtar ju

ki kas naqshud o naqshayad bi-hikmat in mu'amma-ra

Speak of the singer and wine, and leave aside the secret of time

For no one has solved or shall ever solve this riddle with wisdom. (Hafiz 3)

The verse reads literally, "make talk of the singer and wine" (*hadis... gu*), and this "talk" is of course *ghazal* poetry, which has made of these topics its vocation. The wise Oedipus did not solve the riddle of time; he merely recognised it, thus initiating his own destruction. Only the "talk of singer and wine," the *ghazal*, can escape it, not through wisdom, but by evoking the state of mystical union and freedom from the self. The *ghazal* springs from that divine music which governs all of being, including the heavens to which we are subject:

dar asiman chi 'ajab gar zi gufta-yi hafiz

sama'-i zuhra bi-raqs avarad masiha-ra

What wonder if in the heavens, because of the lyrics of Hafiz,

The song of Venus makes the Messiah dance. (Hafiz 4)

The *ghazal* makes everyone dance, because through the luminous symbols of its language which transfigure the world of everyday life it evokes the primordial state of selflessness to which all aspire.

Now we may move from selflessness to selfhood and the problem of political action. We have seen that Iqbal objected to the "state of intoxication which suffuses Hafiz's poetry." This is precisely the Dionysian situation that this poetry depicts, the evocation of selflessness. Yet Iqbal did not propose to abandon the *ghazal*; he was in fact an accomplished practitioner of the

genre. This is because Iqbal did not want to give up the desiring self as it expresses itself in the *ghazal*. In reality, the only objection that Iqbal has to the speaker of the *ghazal* is the manner in which this speaker expresses his desire, his propensity to find its adequation in the world of appearance:

zawq-i huzur dar jahan rasm-i sanamgari nihad

'ishq farib midahad jan-i umidvar-ra

Pleasure in presence set in the world the practice of idolatry;

Love deceives the desirous soul.[103]

Pleasure in presence, self-immersion in the beautiful forms of the world of appearance, is the idolatry that Iqbal would banish from the *ghazal*, for this is the opium that in his view leads to inaction and negation of the will. In other words, the *ghazal* poet's desire to evoke the experience of unity and selflessness by means of preoccupation with beautiful forms is seen as a dangerous enterprise which has succeeding in enticing the *ghazals* admirers from the true, absent (*gha'ib*) object of desire. The warning against ephemeral beauty has its place in the *ghazal* tradition. Yet in the classical *ghazal*, the poet is able to see the divine beauty in ephemeral appearance, because he looks with the eye of selflessness; his vision issues not from the self-serving exterior eye, but from an internal eye which is one with the life-force of eros:

didan-i ru -yi turd dida-yi jan mibayad

v-in kujd martabayi chashm-i jahan-bin-i man ast

Seeing your face requires the eye of the soul

How could my world-seeing eye attain this rank? (Hafiz 53)

For Iqbal, however, this mixing of sacred and profane problematises sublimation, thereby making social action irrelevant to those who are so bewitched by the *ghazal* that they try to live it by making preoccupation with the beauty of the world of appearances their personal vocation. He included

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[103] Iqbal 1985, part 1, *ghazal* no. 48. Henceforth cited as ZA. This work has been rendered into English verse by A. J. Arberry (Iqbal 1961b).

in this class all educated Indian Muslims. Therefore, he inserts an intermediary between the present world of appearance and the absent beloved. This intermediary is selfhood, which has two dimensions—individual, and communal. For Iqbal, the divine beloved, the goal of every mortal being, cannot be reached without traversing this intermediary.

The result is that Iqbal creates a subjective structure similar to that of the traditional *qasida*, in that, in order to attain a state of ultimate fulfilment, the self must pass in a dialectical movement through an intermediate stage of opposition to the external world resulting in social virtue and action. This is not, however, a progressive movement from an initial state to a final all-inclusive one but a perpetual state of self-love expressing itself in the world. The paradigm of the classical *ghazal*, as we have seen, does not work in this fashion at all. The *ghazal* deals with the existential situation of human beings in this world. There is no exit from this situation. In it the self, experiences two extremes, similar to those of the *qasida*; these are the sense of selfhood, which consists in sensations of pain and mortality, and the euphoric sense of self-immersion in the universal force from which all of existence arises. The self is caught in a liminal state between these two extremes, which unlike the liminality of the *qasida*, is not a passage from one to the other, but a simultaneous or alternating experience of each one. In the terms of the *ghazal*, the same beloved is responsible for both. The *ghazal* is liminal because the sensations of both extremes are extremely powerful. It is always on the threshold, never settled into a stable mode of being. Unlike the *qasida*, the *ghazal* can be no *Bildungsroman*; it is a tale that has no beginning or end, and therefore no provision for integration into a stable, social existence.

Therefore Iqbal composed his own versions of the *Bildungsroman*, his *masnavi* works, and made his ghazals the expression of the desiring self that is elaborated in them:

zi shi'r-i dil-kash-i iqbal mitavan daryaft

ki dars-i falsafa midad o 'ashiqi varzid

It may be understood from the alluring poetry of Iqbal

That he taught philosophy and practiced love.[104]

The principle of selfhood that is taught in these works is a principle of individuation, which is to say an Apollonian principle in opposition to the Dionysian states evoked in the classical *ghazal*. It is in fact from the "selflessness" (*bikhudi*) of the classical *ghazal* that Iqbal's "selfhood" (*khudi*) is derived, for the term *khudi* in its normal sense means "selfishness" or "egotism." Iqbal's term, however, means the opposite of *bikhudi*, which is a lack of consciousness of the self, resulting in senselessness. It is precisely the mind-numbed narcotic state that Nietzsche speaks of as the effect of Dionysian experience:

mastam kun an chunan ki nadanam zi bikhudi

dar 'arsa-yi khayal ki amad kudam raft

Make me so drunk that from senselessness I know not

Who came into the mind's realm and who left. (Hafiz 84)

The opposite of this is awareness of the self, the preservation of its proper boundaries, even in the extreme states of desire:

ba chunan zur-i junun pas-i ginban dashtam

dar junun az khud naraftan kar-i har divana nist

Despite such overpowering madness, I did not rend my shirt

It is not every madman's practice not to be beside himself in his madness. (ZA 1, 20)

The madman is the lover, whose habit is to rend his clothes in ecstasy, signifying the destruction of the boundaries of self, both social and psychological; Iqbal shows here how his own practice of love is to be different from that of his precursors. "To be beside one's self," i.e. to lose one's senses, is a common expression which Iqbal has simply negated, drawing attention to the new duty of "remaining within the self." This

[104] Iqbal 1923, p. 154.

corresponds to his negation of the word *bikhudi*. The new lover shall experience the same madness, but he shall vigilantly "guard his collar," which means that he will not allow his boundary of self to be violated.

This does not mean, however, that Iqbal will entirely renounce the language of "selflessness;" it means that this language will have to be kept in its correct perspective. The state that the *ghazal* poets speak of can only be an end that is constantly striven towards through the self, through individuation. The effect of this is that the polarity of the classical *ghazal* is changed from emphasis on the power of the beloved to an emphasis on the agency of the lover. We see this in the following two verses, the first from Hafiz and the second from Iqbal:

bulbul az fayz-i gul amukht sukhan var-na nabud

in hama qawl o ghazal ta'biya dar minqarash

The nightingale learned to speak from the rose's over-abundance,

Else all of this poetry were not laden in his beak. (Hafiz 272)

ghamin mashaw ki jahan raz-i khud birun nadahad

ki anchi gul natavanast murgh-i nalan guft

Grieve not that the world does not give forth its secret,

For what the rose could not tell the lamenting bird told. (ZA 2, 6)

In both verses, the rose is the beloved and the bird the poet. In the verse of Hafiz, the emphasis is on the fact that the poet learned to speak from the beloved, that it is the overflow or grace of the beloved that fills the poet with speech. In Iqbal's verse, the idea is that the beloved cannot speak, and it is the task of the poet to speak for him. It makes the poet's own ability to speak a purposive vocation, the telling of secrets of the universe that the universe itself cannot tell. In other words, one can seek these secrets only in the self; attention to the external world will not yield them. In this there is simply a

change in polarity, yet its result is that Iqbal introduces an essentially modern conception of the relationship between man and nature into the *ghazal*.[105]

The effect of this change in polarity is that the self becomes a narcissistic lover who can love the world only by transforming it into his own image. Whereas the lover of the classical *ghazal* immerses himself in worldly beauty by seeing the divine beauty in it, the new lover immerses the world in himself by transforming it. The principle of individuation that Iqbal introduces to mediate between the world of appearance and the divine force behind it requires that the self love only itself so profoundly that it should become itself the divine force. For the self is a model of the universe-its interior is divine force and its exterior worldly appearance. The divine force can only be reached, therefore, through the self:

dar khakdan-i ma guhar-i zindagi gum ast

in gawhari ki gum shuda ma-im ya ki u-st

In our dust-pit the pearl of life is lost;

This pearl that is lost-is it we or He? (ZA 2, 29)

The dust-pit, normally the appellation of the world, names here the body. To reach this pearl of life requires a narcissistic love of self, so that all we perceive as outside of the self becomes comprised in it. In order to see the divine in the world, we must make the world divine by remaking it according to our own divine desire:

bi-khud nigar gilah-ha-yi jahan chi miguyi

agar nigah-i tu digar shavad jahan digar ast

Look to yourself and complain not of the world

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[105] In *Stray Reflections* we find no. 77 entitled, "The poet and the world spirit." It reads. "The world-spirit conceals the various phases of her inner life in symbols. The universe is nothing but a great symbol. But she never takes the trouble to interpret these symbols for us. It is the duty of the poet to interpret them and to reveal their meaning to humanity. It would, therefore, appear that the poet and the world-spirit are *opposed* to each other, since the former reveals what the latter conceals." (Emphasis added).

When your glance changes the world has changed. (ZA 2, 28)

The principle of individuation requires that we change our glance, and thereby change the world, by working through our "self." Instead of the oscillation between states of union (*wasl*) and separation (*firaq*) of the traditional *ghazal*, Iqbal calls in this way for a perpetual, or well-nigh perpetual, state of separation. This separation, however, is to be a passage, a creative journey of transforming the world into a mirror of the self. The journey of separation is in fact the means by which Iqbal attempts to bring about the sublimation that is so elusive in the classical *ghazal*.

The sublimation of Iqbal's *ghazal* may be understood as a poetic inversion of Freud's theory of narcissism in the ego. For Freud, there is a primary narcissism, in which the ego begins desiring only itself ("an original libidinal cathexes of the ego,"[106]), and a secondary one, of which he says the following:[107]

> At the very beginning, all the libido is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in the process of formation, or is still feeble. The id sends part of this libido out into erotic object-cathexes, whereupon the ego, now grown stronger, tries to get hold of this object-libido and to force itself on the id as a love object. The narcissism of the ego is thus a secondary one, which has been withdrawn from objects.

In other words, the ego tries to divert its desire from objects which are unattainable or forbidden back to itself as self-love. The ego accomplishes this by making itself resemble the loved object so that in attaching its desire to this resemblance it compensates for the lost object. By taking on the attributes of the desired object, the ego is able to give up that object and obtain some satisfaction from self-love:

> ...the ego deals with the first object-cathexes of the id (and certainly with later ones too) by taking over the libido from them into itself and binding it to the alteration of the ego produced by means of identification. This

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[106] Freud 1914, p. 75.
[107] Freud 1923, p. 36.

> transformation [of erotic libido] into ego libido of course involves an abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualisation.[108]

This "absorption" of the desired object into the ego, resulting in abandonment of the object and transference of desire to the self, is thus seen by Freud as a primary means of the sublimation of sexual energy for the sake of non-sexual ends. Furthermore, it is precisely out of this accumulation of traits from beloved objects that "personality" arises, or as Freud puts it, "...this kind of substitution has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and ... makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its 'charac-ter'".[109] In Freud's view then, sublimation and ego building are both results of the process which he calls "secondary narcissism."

The process of narcissism that Iqbal elaborates has these results as well, bringing them about as an inversion of Freud's account. In both accounts, the problem is the same: how can we cope with the fact that we cannot obtain full satisfaction from the people and objects that we love in the world? For Freud, the gap between desire and reality can be bridged only by means of a self-deception which allows us to love ourselves instead of what we originally loved. For Iqbal, however, such an attachment to external objects of desire in the first place is precisely the error. By loving the forms of the world of appearance, we fall into the fatal trap of everyday time, the cycle of frustration, repression, and anguish. The escape from this trap is self-love, a love for which there is no "external" world because it transforms all into the self. Instead of altering itself so as to resemble beloved objects, the self remakes the world in its own image. In other words, self-love produces creative action upon the world. This is the basis for the sublimation of the *ghazal's* language of love which shall redirect its desire to social and political activity.[110]

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[108] Ibid pp. 35-36; my emphasis, bracketed phrase from the editor.

[109] Ibid, p. 18.

[110] Herbert Marcuse, in his analysis of Freud, takes the theory of narcissism in a utopian direction similar to Iqbal's by venturing that "narcissism may contain the germ of a different reality principle: the libidinal cathexis of the ego (one's own body) may become the source and reservoir for a new libidinal cathexis of the objective world-transforming this world into a new mode of being" (Marcuse 1955 pp. 153-54).

Therefore, Iqbal and Freud agree that the most satisfying love that the ego can enjoy is self-love, which is a mental and not a physical love. Iqbal's conception of the relationship between man and nature, however, which is radically different from both Freud's and the classical *ghazal's*, determines the difference in the consequences of self-love. For Freud, nature is opposed to the unlimited desire of its creatures and imposes on them the fate of the "Reality Principle," by which they repress, controvert, and deceive their desire in order to get along in this world. For Iqbal, however, man's desire is the truth of nature:

'ishq andaz-i tapidan az dil-i ma amukht

sharar--i ma-st ki bar jast bi-parvana rasid

Love learned how to throb from our heart:

It is our spark which leaped forth into the moth. (ZA 2, 26)

The moth which immolates itself in the candle is usually the lover's model, but Iqbal makes it act in this way because of the existence of man. Again, the emphasis of the classical *ghazal* is changed; eros is no longer simply the divine force which underlies all of nature, including man. Now man is responsible for the presence of this divine force in nature; without man, nature would be little more than dead matter. In the classical *ghazal* as well as in Freud, the human ego does not affect the working of the universe. For the former, the ego lends moral significance to the human condition by creating the tragic/heroic struggle of desire and consciousness, thus lifting man above other beings. In Freud's view, the ego increases misery by creating the capacity for knowledge without providing anything more than delusory means of changing the universe to fit desire. For Iqbal, however, the universe can only be what it is, and can only become what it must become, because of the activity of the human ego:

guft yazdan ki chunin ast o digar hich magu

guft adam ki chunin ast o chunan mibayast

God said, "It is thus, say no more about it."

Man said, "It is thus, but it must be otherwise." (ZA 2, 69)

Therefore, man comes in control of fate, not by attaining a euphoric state of selflessness but by means of the development of his self. We saw above that in the state of madness, the new lover shall yet refrain from rending his clothes. This preservation of the boundaries of the self causes the madness to be directed outwards, onto the world, creatively transforming it so that it fits into the boundaries of the self. This is a new euphoria, not of seeing divine beauty by throwing off the veil of the self, but of creating the divine in the world by means of creative action, which is the only measure of virtue:

zi jawhari ki nihan ast dar tabi'at-i ma

mapurs sayrafiyan ra ki ma 'iyar-i khudim

Of the jewel that is concealed in our nature

Ask not the jewellers, for we are the standard of our selves. (ZA 2, 53)

The result is that our relation to the potential objects of desire in the world is an automatic sublimation; instead of desiring the world as it is, letting it determine us, we transform the world into our self, as the means of expression of our own narcissistic desire. Freud theorises that the organism's aggressive impulse may be tied to its erotic impulse for the sake of enacting the latter. Here, an aggressive impulse is employed for the sake of enacting the sublimation of an erotic impulse.

Iqbal's attitude towards nature (*fitrat, tabi'at*) is an aggressive one, and this is the true consequence of the difference between his verse about the bird and the flower and the verse of Hafiz. In the verse of Hafiz, man is a part of nature, but for his ego which alienates him by making him less privy to the "rose's overabundance" than the nightingale is. For Iqbal, man's ego is the meaning of nature. Nature can only participate in the divine force, or more accurately, become an expression of the divine force, by being subdued by the divine agent, man. Therefore the relation between the self and the outside world is confrontational.

jahan-i rang o bu payda to miguyi ki raz ast in

yaki khud-ra bi-tarash zan ki to mizrab o saz ast in

You perceive only the world of fragrance and colour, and you say that this is a riddle—

Just strike yourself against its strings, for you are the plectrum and this is the guitar. (ZA 2, 63)

The exploration of the rich possibilities contained in the relation between the eternal life-force of being and the ephemeral, kaleidoscopic world of appearance, which had been the "riddle" with which the *ghazal* had occupied itself for a few centuries, is here consigned by Iqbal to the forgotten shelves of scholasticism. Disgusted by the pale cast of thought engendered by the contemplation of this riddle, Iqbal eliminates it by separating subject from object, resulting in a demand for the "conquest of nature" (*taskhir-i fitrat*). The fact that this separation of the human ego from nature is destined for reconciliation does not diminish the violence of its immediate consequences:

du dasta tigham o gardun birihna sakht mara

fisan kashid o bi-ru-yi zamana akht mara

man an jahan-i khayalam ki fitrat-i azali

jahan-i bulbul o gul-ra shikast o sakht mara

I am a two-edged sword and heaven unsheathed me;

It sharpened me and drew me upon the face of time. I am that world of imagination, which eternal nature,

Having shattered the world of nightingale and rose, made me. (ZA 2, 54)

Here, eternal nature is opposed to the nature that we see, which belongs to time and mutability, and to which the classical *ghazal*, in Iqbal's view, too much directs its attention. "The world of nightingale and rose" is in fact the classical *ghazal* itself, which is the natural world that the self, in league with "eternal nature," must shatter in order to make from the shards its own world beyond the contingencies of space and time. Narcissistic love finds in the world an obstacle to its autotelic quest. It can pursue this quest only by transforming the world into the object of its desire, namely, itself. This aggressive transformation of the world is the form that sublimation takes for the self of the new lover.

The realm of separation (*firaq*) from the beloved becomes therefore the true realm of human activity and freedom, instead of the realm of fate as it was in the classical *ghazal*. For Iqbal the beloved only comes into existence as the outcome of this activity of self-love:

gushay parda zi taqdir-i adam-i khaki

ki ma bi-rahguzar-i to dar intizar-i khudim

Lift the veil from the destiny of earthen man,

For we are, in the path to you, awaiting ourselves. (ZA 1, 53)

Earthen man is the divine in nature. Self-love is the process of the divine working itself out of the naturalness (the "clay body") of nature by making the whole of it divine. In other words, man is actually the divine beloved separated from itself, yearning to achieve self-realisation:

ma az khuda gum shuda-yim u bi -justujust

chun ma niyazmand o giriftar-i arzust

We have become lost from God, He is in search;

Like us He is in need and prisoner to desire. (ZA 2, 29)

Only man can free the Divine Prisoner. God comes truly into being through man's traversal of the gulf of separation. This is the meaning of the creative transformation of the world, and it is for this reason that by doing so the self escapes natural time, or fate, becoming the "sword that is drawn upon the face of time:"

bi-har nafas ki bar ari jahan digar gun kun

darn ribat-i kuhan surat-i zamana guzar

Every breath you draw in, transform the world.

Pass like time through this old hospice. (ZA 2, 32)

Respiration is the clock of fate that comes with the body, but by transforming the world every moment the divine self in us takes over the work of everyday time. Everyday time alters the world every moment

according to the senseless law of fate. By taking over this activity ourselves, we impose divine law on all of existence, including ourselves in so far as we are part of nature:

tu az shumar-i nafas zinda -yi namidani

ki zindagi bi-shikast-i tilasm-i ayyam ast

You live by counting breaths: do you not know

That life requires breaking the spell of everyday time? (ZA 2, 5)

The word *ayyam* ("days") signifies fate, the inexorable succession of one day after another, leading to death. Only by breaking its spell can we achieve true life. Not only do we escape nature in this fashion, but all of nature escapes itself. The mission of man is to free the god that is trapped in himself and in the world.

To transcend the narrow bounds of the natural world in this fashion, therefore, is the primary directive of Iqbal's poetry of the new self.

birun qadam nih az dawr-i afaq

tu pish az ini to bish az ini

Set your foot outside the horizons' circle:

You are prior to this, you are higher than this. (ZA 2, 48)

This is the high station of man spoken of in the Qur'an, where the angels are made to bow to him. It is realised by means of the narcissistic process of sublimation that we have examined. The Dionysian intoxicated state of union celebrated in the classical ghazal short-circuits this process. It turns the self over to nature instead of making nature come into the self. It surrenders the "divine trust" (*amana*) that God granted only to man so as to make him His "vicegerent" (*khalifa*) on earth. It views the day on which this happened (*ruz-i alast*), the day on which God said to all the creatures, "Am I not your lord?" as a day of calamity (*bala*), for it was the day that sealed the fate of separation. For Iqbal, this was a blessed day, for it was the first day of the life of the universe. Therefore Iqbal lays the blame for arresting this process on the Dionysian wine of the poets and Sufis:

tu an nayi ki musalla zi kahkashan mikard

sharab-i sufi o sha'ir tura zi khwish rubud

You are no longer the one who made of the galaxies his prayer mat:

The wine of the Sufi and the poet has stolen you from yourself. (ZA 2, 50)

The man in possession of himself makes of the Milky Way (*kahkashan*: "straw-puller") his straw prayer mat, for prayer is the authentic self-preserving frenzy of love in which no shirts are rent. The poet and Sufi, whom Iqbal usually equates so as to demean the former, encourage the exchange of one's prayer mat for a flask of wine.[111] This exchange is precisely the self-surrender that Iqbal so despises. By following the advice of the poet and Sufi, we have allowed them to steal us from ourselves, thus forfeiting our divine command of the universe.

The ideal poet has quite another role in the vision of Iqbal. He is to be at the vanguard of the self-aware, revealing the secrets of selfhood to the uninitiated:

payam-i shawq ki man bi-hijab miguyam

bi-lala qatra-i shabnam rasid o pinhan guft

The message of desire that I speak unveiled,

The dew drop, having reached the tulip, tells secretly. (ZA 2, 6)

Earlier we saw that the poet is the "lamenting bird" that reveals the secret which the rose is unable to utter. In this verse, however, the sense is taken in a somewhat different direction. Iqbal is fond of the image of the "fertilising drop," often using the phrase, "the April rain drop" (*qatra-yi nisan*). He is also fond of the tulip, which in his poetry usually signifies the self, as opposed to

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[111] For example, in his retracted verses about Hafiz in *Asrar*, Iqbal denigrates Hafiz by troping on verses in which Hafiz ridicules the hypocritical Sufi, thus identifying Hafiz with this character. See Khan 1976, p. 13. By exchanging the prayer mat (or mendicant's habit) for a flask of wine, a poet like Hafiz means that mindless, hypocritical orthodoxy should be given up so that true divine love may be adopted.

the rose which signifies the beloved of the classical *ghazal* and of which Iqbal is not as fond. The dew drop fertilises the tulip, enabling it to grow and "realise itself." The poet performs this action upon his audience. His message of selfhood stirs those who listen to become self-aware and to transform the world as he does in his poetry:

Pas az man shi'r-i man khwanand o dar Yaband o miguyand

jahani-ra digar gun kard yak mard-i khud-agahi

Once I am gone my poetry shall be read and understood and it shall be said

That a self-aware man transformed a whole world. (ZA 2, 34)

This fertilising action of the poet links him to prophethood. Of a piece with this is the emphasis upon the poet's message (*payam*), reducing his melody to a mere expedient. In the verse of Hafiz quoted above, the poet's music comes from the celestial music underlying existence, so that it can cause Venus to sing and the Messiah to dance. It is a Dionysian music which enables freedom from the self. Iqbal, rejecting this form of intoxication, demands of the poet that he be a Pied Piper whose music leads to the self. The danger of a poetic beauty which distracts from the self is too great to allow the poet's music to transgress the limits imposed on it by this task:

naghma kuja o man kuja saz-i sukhan bihana-yist

su-yi qitar mikasham naqa-yi ba-zimam-ra

What have melodies to do with me, the music of my words is a means:

Toward the caravan I lure the unbridled camel. (ZA 1, 52)

The capacity of camels to be led by means of a type of singing (an ancient Arab practice termed *huda'*), and the effect that music has on animals in general, has traditionally been understood in at least two ways. Some have attributed it to the celestial harmony underlying all of being. Others have seen it as affecting animal nature specifically, i.e. the lower soul of human beings, for which a camel serves as a good token. Iqbal gestures toward the second view in this verse in order to emphasise the secondary, lower function of artistic beauty in poetry. Once the camel is re-bridled, it is no

longer necessary. For the new poet of life and selfhood, the message is to be primary.

Despite Iqbal's sustained attack upon the classical *ghazal*, his own version effects an idiosyncratic redefinition of its symbols which depends on the preservation of the form. The changes in polarity and emphasis are often so subtly effected that they are easily missed or pinned down only with difficulty. It is often the case that verses of classical poetry are entirely "Iqbalian" in the sense that they seem to advocate Iqbal's conception of selfhood. It is on this basis that Iqbal initially sought in the poet 'Urfi a polemical antithesis of Hafiz. Yet in the poetry of Hafiz himself there are perhaps thousands of verses, including whole ghazals, to which Iqbal could have no objection. This is not because these verses actually conform to Iqbal's representation of the self, but because his representation is an attempt to rewrite the *ghazal* form, retroactively imposing itself upon the entire tradition. It is clear therefore that Hafiz is merely an icon to clash with in Iqbal's neoclassical strategy of reform. The authority of classicism is crucial to Iqbal's project. For what he demands is a retrenchment within the self, not simply the individual self, but the communal self.

It is this authentic, communal self that keeps Iqbal's version of narcissism from having radical, ultra-romantic implications. A world-absorbing ego that loves only itself to the point of self-deification would not assimilate well into society. Iqbal, however, does not leave it to each individual to determine or discover his true self. The paradigm of fully realised "selfhood" has found human form in the person of the Prophet of Islam, who has provided the means of replicating his achievement in the religion that he founded. The Islamic past, therefore, contains the ideal to which we all aspire, whether we know it or not, and which thereby animates our otherwise lifeless forms.

halqa gird-i man zanid ay paykaran-i ab o gil

atishi dar sina daram az niyakan-i shuma

Form a circle around me, O forms of water and clay

I bear a flame in my breast from your grandfathers. (ZA 2, 57)

In Freud's theory, the pursuit of cultural ideals, be they spiritual, moral or communal, is narcississtic; the ego forms an attachment to these ideals because it has identified with them and sees in them itself. In this way narcissism functions as the primary mechanism for the sublimation of sexuality. It does not matter what the content of these ideals is so long as they have been internalised by the ego in some early stage of development. Iqbal's *ghazal*, however, represents the ideal community as the truth of the self. In the verse quoted above, the "forms of water and clay" are the members of the poet's community, and they are to form a circle around him, thus reconstituting the community, because he has inherited and preserved the fire of the illustrious forebears which originally animated the community. For Iqbal, the primary identification of the (Muslim) self, its "ego ideal," is the Muslim community itself, embodied in the person of its prophet. This ideal is internal to the self, there from the beginning. It is to this ideal, therefore, that all of the self's narcissistic love is directed, and in which the entirety of the self s transformation of the world finds its end.

In other words, Iqbal uses the logic of selfhood worked out in his remodelled version of the *ghazal* to depict Islam, its Prophet as well as its civilisation, as the historical instantiation of fully realised self-love. In this scenario, fully elaborated in Iqbal's *masnavi* works, modernity is nothing more than the authentic selfhood embodied by Islam, the means for transforming the earth into heaven and humanity into divinity. The modernity of the West is a historical wrong turn, an inauthentic form of relating to the world akin to the decadence of the classical *ghazal*. The empiricist, calculative approach of Enlightenment rationality is an attempt to possess and accumulate the objects of the world rather than to transform them into the self. It is therefore yet another form of enslavement to the world of everyday time. It leads not to the utopian political order promised by Islam but to the exploitation and tyranny of capitalism and colonialism. Similarly, the political legacy of the classical *ghazal* and its absorption in the beauty of the external world is the voluntary enslavement to the false and transient pleasures of Western domination. Just as the *ghazal* poet gleefully succumbs to the tyranny of the beloved, so do modern Muslims happily deliver themselves to European rule. Both are embodiments of fate. On this basis Iqbal depicts the colonial situation not simply as a struggle between Islam and Western Imperialism but as a moral and historical drama of the self. The outcome

must be with Islam, however, if History is to have its expected culmination in man's ultimate control over fate.[112]

Iqbal lays the basis for all of this by rejecting the desiring self of the classical *ghazal*, which is trapped in an oscillation between heaven and hell, euphoria and misery, and replacing it with the narcissistic self, which occupies itself with the heavenly task of transforming hell into heaven. In the final analysis, the transformation of the world is nothing more than good old-fashioned bourgeois work. This is precisely the work that, according to the classical *ghazal*, we were doomed to on the fateful "Day of 'am I not'," the day on which man separated himself from the divinity of God. As Hafiz tells us,

maqam-i 'aysh muyassar namishavad bi ranj

bali bi-hukm-i bala basta-and 'ahd-i alast

The post of good living cannot be attained without hardship:

Indeed, the pact of "am I not" was sealed with misfortune. (Hafiz 20)

The pun here, a favourite one, is on the word *bala* which means both "yes," the answer that only man made to God's question, "Am I not your Lord," and "misfortune," which was the result of that answer. This misfortune is the bondage to the world of everyday necessity, the world in which we must suffer everyday to satisfy the needs of our bodies. Iqbal, of course, does not look at things this way, and is not tolerant of those who do:

zarbat-i ruzgar agar nala chu nay dahad tura

bada-yi man zi kaf binih chara zi mumiya talab

If the blows of daily necessity make you cry like a reed,

Put away my wine and seek aid from embalming wax. (ZA 2, 47)

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[112] For a much fuller discussion of the political vision elaborated in Iqbal's *masnavi* poems, see Noorani 1997a, pp. 216-48.

Iqbal's wine is not for drowning sorrow, but is rather for those who are impervious to the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. For Iqbal, work that is directed by self-love, which is to say, undertaken for the sake of the community, is outside of fate. It is not at all the work of toil and misery that Hafiz and other pre-modern poets find to be the intolerable fact of existence. This is but the attitude of effeminacy and decadence. "Manly ambition" (*himmat*), the sublimated form of erotic desire, finds fulfillment in the daily labour required by the community in its quest for glory. This creative labour of self-love is the euphoria that Iqbal's wine induces.

Does Iqbal succeed then in making the *ghazal* useful? At what cost does he turn it into the exemplary expression of an aestheticised work ethic, a non-alienated, utopian form of labour? In order to change the polarity of the classical desiring self, Iqbal must impose a personal conception of authenticity upon the entire *ghazal* tradition. By casting the true form of *'ishq* as self-love, Iqbal's *ghazal* presents itself as recapturing the primordial impulse underlying the language of love of past poets. Iqbal's *ghazal* projects its own narcissistic interpretation of the euphoric experience of intoxication upon the tradition, which becomes a criterion by which to validate or reject different modes of representing this experience. In fact, the Dionysian depiction of self-dissolution is indistinguishable from the narcissistic portrayal of the self absorbing the world around it. Both are characterised by sensations of control over fate. and unity with the underlying force that drives existence. The difference is that Iqbal's *ghazal* confines its representations of this sought-after euphoria to images which conform to a theory of its true nature, while the traditional *ghazal* plays with the aesthetically productive ambiguity of outward appearances and potential inner meanings. In order to assert the opposition of the self to nature, to portray the self in search of itself, rather than anything external to it, Iqbal's *ghazal* avoids the interpretive dangers of beauty and concentrates on images of power. His songs celebrate the human ego's inexhaustible reservoir of desire, from which proceeds its capacity to control and transform its surroundings. Its sorrow and yearning arise not from a sense of weakness and confinement, but from its insatiable desire for more power. Iqbal seems to have regarded this emphasis in representation as therapeutic in an age of decadence and voluntary enslavement to the other. Despite the ever-present danger of pathological "self"-aggrandisement, Iqbal's *ghazal* generates

excitement and wonder in its sense of rediscovery of the self and its confrontational engagement of the *ghazal* tradition, not to mention its unique way of turning *ghazal* vocabulary into a philosophical terminology. One man, however, cannot take ultimate control over a poetic genre. Iqbal seeks to make a pre-modern form of poetry into the basis of a modern vision by confining it to a specific regime of representation. His project is constituted by a creative repression, which produces a personal poetic idiom rather than a more authentic version of the *ghazal*. Perhaps what he teaches us, then, has to do not so much with the true nature of the self as with the nature of modern representations of the self.

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…ÁIKMAT I MARA BA MADRASAH KEH BURD?: THE INFLUENCE OF SHIRAZ SCHOOL ON THE INDIAN SCHOLARS

Muhammad Suheyl Umar

Shâr«z has been a land of extraordinary richness, erudition and wisdom throughout the ages. It should be said at the outset that no correct idea of the extent of the tremendous formative influences that Shâr«z— this homeland of numerous sages, poets, mystics, philosophers, scholars of distinction and men of learning and letters— has exerted on the intellectual, literary and religious life of almost all parts of the Persianate world[113] could be formed without taking into account all the various aspects of the Islamic civilisation to which the men of letters originating from Shâr«z have contributed through out the ages. The Indian subcontinent, which now comprises India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, was the area that, for well-known historical and cultural reasons, came under the direct influence of the Persianate worldview and was dominated by its scholarship and intellectual developments.

But that is an enormous task. Lengthy volumes need to be written to elucidate the outstanding contribution of the Shâr«zâ scholars to different fields of learning, to the flowering of the Islamic civilisation in all its glory and greatness. The more pervasive the influence the more it becomes difficult to study it in a comprehensive and appropriate manner. Obviously it is an impossibility with in the scope of a paper. Even to touch upon the points that require a detailed investigation in this regard would take us too far afield. No mention, therefore, shall be made of the geniuses of Shâr«z like Sa'dâ and À«fiï who have exerted perhaps the greatest influence on the Persianate world in the fields of literature and beyond. This is still one aspect of the issue. Even if we limit our attention to the field of religious sciences there is a host of Shâr«zâ scholars who have made significant contributions to various principal and auxiliary sciences (*'ulëm al- '«liyah wa 'ulëm al- «liyah*) in

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[113] I have adopted the term that S. H. Nasr uses to designate those areas of the eastern lands of Islam that used to be a part of the cultural and intellectual worldview of the Persian language. See S. H. Nasr, *A Journey through Persian History and Culture*, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 2000, pp. 10-13.

the field of religious studies that have been of enduring importance and which, as far as the Indian subcontinent is concerned, have been immensely influential in shaping the curricula, formulating issues, providing insights about important questions, generating debates and, above all, in creating the mindset, and informing the intellectual environment which generations of religious scholars and students of India imbibed and transmitted to the Muslim masses. When I say that I do not make a generalised statement. What I have in mind is the specific works of Shâr«zâ scholars that have proved influential in their respective branches of religious sciences to an extraordinary degree.[114] Again one can not attempt to treat such a long list within the confines of a single paper even in a cursory manner.

Leaving the religious sciences beyond the pale of the present study, if we proceed to limit our focus further to the intellectual sciences (*'ulëm 'aqliyyah*) only, it still leaves us with too vast an area of study. Therefore, for the purposes of the present paper I have decided to focus my attention to a particular aspect of our intellectual history that pertains to the influence of the Shâr«zâ Scholars on the Indian subcontinent before the advent and rise of the specific School of Shâr«z that goes by the name of transcendent theosophy as well as after that. The former shall be called the Shâr«z School in a general sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i '«m*) and the latter shall be designated as the Shâr«z School in a particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*).

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[114] A salient example was Mâr Sayyid Sharâf Jurj«nâ (1340-1413) who, though born in the small town of ñ«ghë, Jurj«n (in present day Iran) spent almost all his life (except when he accompanied Tâmër to Samarqand) in Shâr«z. His *Âarf Mâr*, *NaÁw Mâr*, *Âughr« Kubr«*, *Mâr QuÇbâ* (a commentary on the QuÇb al-Dân R«zâ's *SharÁ Ris«lah al-Shamsiyyah* on the *Ris«lah al-Shamsiyyah* of Najm al-Dân K«tibâ Qazwânâ [d. 1275/76]) and *SharÁ al-Maw«qif* have been the most widely used and formative texts in India for the last six hundred years, in the fields of grammar, morphology, logic and *kal«m* respectively. Another example is of 'Abd Allah bin 'Umar Bayî«wâ (d.1285-6) who hailed from Bayî«' a small country town of Shâr«z and whose commentary on the Qur'«n, *Anw«r al-Tanzâl wa Asr«r al-Ta'wâl* has always been the standard text of Qur'«n studies in the Indian subcontinent and generations of scholars have devoted their attention to writing super-commentaries, glosses and super-glosses and explanatory notes on it down to the twentieth century. Scores of these secondary works have been recorded in the books documenting the biographical and bibliographical details of these scholars. See Akhtar Rahâ, *Tazkarah i MuÄ«nnifân i Dars i Nië«mâ*, Lahore 1978, pp. 161; M Àanâf Gangohi, *À«l«t i MuÄ«nnifân i Dars i Nië«mâ*, Karachi, 2000, pp. 27-31.

The school of Islamic philosophy/theosophy that is the focus of our present conference has been called by many names in history as well as in more recent times. Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr termed it "the School of IÄfah«n" in his earlier writings while the organisers of our present conference have preferred to call it "the Shâr«z School."[115] I have followed their nomenclature.

Having defined the parameters of our investigation we can ask ourselves the question how were the 'ulama produced in India and what was the system of education that provided channels of transmission and influence for the prevailing ideas/sciences to the Indian scholars?

Before the arrival of the British in the Indian subcontinent with their civilising mission and the 'white man's burden" there was only one monolithic educational system in India, the traditional madrsah system with Dars i Nië«mâ (the curriculum institutionalised by Nië«m al-Dân Sih«liyawâ[116]) at the core of its curricula, and it continues till this date in India and Pakistan in a more or less similar form.[117] The alternative educational system offered by the British through modern colleges and universities has never been able to replace it. Fortunately we have a detailed record of Dars i Nië«mâ and the subjects/books used therein for the last three hundred years down to the present day madrasahs. Information on the earlier educational system and curricula of India, in the times when Dars i Nië«mâ was not yet institutionalised i.e. till the end of the 17th/ turn of the 18th century, is not lacking either. Dars i Nië«mâ comprised the following seventeen sciences with several of their auxiliary and secondary sciences:

Grammar (*'ilm al-Äarf*), Morphology (*'ilm al-naÁw*), logic (*manÇiq*), philosophy and theosophy (*falsafah wa Áikmat*), Geometry (*'ilm al-hindasah*),

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[115] In his later writings S. H. Nasr has also remarked that it may now be called the School of Shâr«z. See Leonard Lewisohn and David Morgan (Editors), *The Heritage of Sufism*, Vol. III, Oneworld, Oxford, 1999, pp. 15.

[116] Nië«m al-Dân Sih«liyawâ (d. 1748), the founder of Dars i Nië«mâ in India, was directly influenced by the Shâr«z School and trained by the teachers famous for their erudition in the intellectual sciences and their knowledge of the Shâr«z School in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*). He wrote glosses on *SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah* by Mulla Âadr«, on *Shams B«zigah,* on *'Aq«'id al-'Aîudiyyah* and *H«shiyah 'al« 'SharÁ al-'Tajrâd* of Jal«l al-Dân Daww«nâ. In his glosses he frequently refers to Mulla Âadr« and Mâr B«qir D«m«d and pays them very high tribute.

[117] Along with it there always existed centres of excellence that specialised in specific sciences like *fiqh* or *'ulëm 'aqliyyah* or literary sciences.

astronomy (*'ilm al-hayat*), rhetoric and science of letters (*'ilm al-balaghah wa ma'«nâ*), law or jurisprudence (*fiqh*), principles of jurisprudence (*uÄël al- fiqh*), kal«m and theology (*'ilm al-kal«m wa 'aq«'id*), exegesis or Qur'«n commentary (*'ilm al-tafsâr*), principles of exegesis or Qur'«n commentary (*uÄël al- tafsâr*), Àadâth, principles of the science of Àadâth (*uÄël al-Áadâth*), principles of dialogue/argumentation (*'ilm al-mun«ïarah*), Arabic language and literature) and prosody (*'ilm al-'arëî*). The number of standard textbooks used for studying these sciences, with certain variations, ran into eighty-three. It is interesting to note that a large number of these texts were produced by the Shâr«z Scholars[118] or by their students but we can not enter into its details here. Suffice to say that it is an authentic indicator of the influence of Shâr«z scholars that we mentioned earlier in the field of religious sciences in general apart from its specific influence in the field of philosophy. Even in those areas of the Muslim world where Dars i Nï«mâ was not institutionalised, like in Iran, a survey of standard textbooks used in the traditional madrsah system reveals very similar results. The studies made by Mirza ñ«hir Tunikabënâ and later on by S. Hossein Nasr and others clearly testify to the importance of the Shâr«z School in this regard.[119]

Even in the times when the Dars i Nï«mâ was not yet institutionalised i.e. till the end of the 17th/ turn of the 18th century, the Indian milieu is no less permeated by the works and ideas of the geniuses of Shâr«z because the subjects and overall curriculum were almost the same though arranged in a less systematic manner.

A search for the contribution/influence of the Shâr«z School in both these periods could, therefore, yield positive results if we take a closer look at the subjects that were taught, the works that were used, the commentaries and super-commentaries, glosses and super-glosses and explanatory notes that were written on these works of Dars i Nï«mâ, with specific reference to the intellectual sciences cultivated by the Shâr«z School. It is so because if the Indian scholars were trained through these works generation after generation for hundreds of years and their whole world view was informed by these ideas and they were engaged with these works at different levels, ranging from passive acceptance and imbibing to creative tensions and dialogues resulting in more sophisticated positions and refined thoughts, then there

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[118] See Akhtar Rahâ, *Tazkarah i MuÄ«nnifân i Dars i Nï«mâ*, Lahore 1978, pp. 18-23.

[119] See S. H. Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*, KPI, London, 1987, pp. 165-183.

could be no better example of an intellectual influence. Such an investigation would not only be illuminating with regard to the overall significance and importance of the Shâr«z School but may also be helpful to find answers to certain unresolved questions about some more specific aspects of its reception in India.

Since we are only dealing with the intellectual sciences for the present I have singled out three subjects that fall under this category, namely, logic (*manÇiq*), philosophy and theosophy (*falsafah wa Áikmat*), kal«m and theology (*'ilm al-kal«m wa al-'aq«'id*). The books (taking into consideration the major works only) that were used and are still in use for the study of these sciences are the following:

ManÇiq

¥sagojâ by Athâr al-Dân Abharâ (d. 1263)

SharÁ Ris«lah al-Shamsiyyah (known as *QuÇbâ*) by QuÇb al-Dân R«zâ (d. 1364)

Tehdhâb al-ManÇiq by Sa'd al-Dân Taftaz«nâ (d. 1389)

Mâr QuÇbâ by Mâr Sayyid Sharâf Jurj«nâ (a commentary on the QuÇb al-Dân R«zâ's *SharÁ Ris«lah al-Shamsiyyah*) (d. 1413)

Âughr« Kubr« by Mâr Sayyid Sharâf Jurj«nâ (d. 1413)

SharÁ al- Tehdhâb al-ManÇiq by 'Abd Allah Yazdâ (d. 1573)

Ris«lah Mâr Z«hid [120] by Mâr MuÁammad Z«hid Hirawâ (d. 1689)

Sullam al-'Ulëm by MuÁibbullah Bih«râ (d. 1707)

SharÁ Sullam al-'Ulëm by Àamd Allah Sandâlawâ (d. 1747)

SharÁ Sullam al-'Ulëm by Q«îi Mub«rak (d. 1749)

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[120] A collection of three glosses, written on the *SharÁ al-Maw«qif* of Taftaz«ni, on *SharÁ al-Tehdhâb* of Daww«ni, on *Ris«lah TaÄawwur wa TaÄdâq* of QuÇb al-Dân al-R«zâ, known as Ris«lah Mâr Z«hid.

SharÁ Sullam al-ʻUlëm by Mulla Àasan Lakhnawâ (d. 1784)

Mirq«t by Faîl i Im«m Khayr ÿb«dâ (d. 1829)

Falsafah wa Àikmat

SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah (popularly known as *Âadr«*)[121] by Mulla Âadr« (d. 1640)
SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah by Mâr Àusain Mâbudhâ Yazdâ (d. 1684)
Shams al-B«zigha by Mulla MaÁmëd Jënpërâ (d. 1652)

Àadya i Sa'âdiyyah by Faîl i Àaq Khayr ÿb«dâ (d. 1861)

'Ilm al-Kal«m wa al-'Aq«'id

SharÁ 'Aq«'id al-Nasafiyyah by Sa'd al-Dân Taftaz«nâ (d. 1389)

SharÁ al-Maw«qif by Mâr Sayyid Sharâf Jurj«nâ (d. 1413)

Khay«lâ by AÁmad bin Mësa Khay«lâ (d. 1465)

SharÁ 'Aq«'id al-'Aîudiyyah by Jal«l al-Dân Daww«nâ (d. 1502)

Two points need to be registered here. The relationship and influence of the Shâr«z Scholars with India is not confined to the Shâr«z School of transcendent theosophy (*Áikmah al-mut'«liyyah*) i. e. the Shâr«z School in a particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Á*) though it was the predominant influence as shall be clear from our further elucidation. Secondly it should be noticed that the relationship predates the Shâr«z School of transcendent theosophy by many centuries.

Some of the names that appear in the list of twenty works given above are very well known to the present audience and their works are included among the classics of the respective fields of study. They, therefore, need no introduction though a few remarks on their relevance to the theme of our investigation would be in place here. The others less known figures shall be

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[121] *SharÁ al-hid«yah* ("Commentary upon the '*Guide to Wisdom*'" of Athâr al-Dân Abharâ) came to be known as *Âadr«*; people received distinction by saying that they had studied *Âadr«*.

introduced shortly. But let us first point out an interesting fact here that immediately transpires from the list that is under consideration. All the authors of this list could be divided into two groups. What may come as a surprise to the uninitiated reader here is the fact that the first group directly belongs to the Shâr«z School or even if they are not Shâr«zâs they belong to it in a way that for all practical purposes they should be included in the same school either in its period prior to the rise of transcendent theosophy (*Áikmah al-mut'«liyyah*) i. e. the Shâr«z School in a particular sense or after it. The second group consists of eleven Indian scholars and thinkers, out of a total number of seventeen authors, who are, without a single exception, followers of the Shâr«z School (in a particular sense) and their works are immersed in the world view of the Shâr«z School. Let us have a closer look at these authors before we proceed further.

The First Group — Non Indian Scholars

Athâr al-Dân Abharâ (d. 1263) needs no introduction. What needs to be mentioned here is that his works *¥sagojâ* and *Hid«yah al-Àikmah* (*Guide to Wisdom*) have always been among the books that were taught in Dars i Niï«mâ and the latter has been the subject of hundreds of commentaries and glosses. Two of these commentaries, those of Mulla Âadr« and by Mâr Àusain Mâbudhâ Yazdâ have been the mainstay of the curriculum of philosophy/theology in India.

'Aîud al-Dân ¥jâ (d. 1355), himself one of the outstanding scholar of Shâr«z, likewise should be mentioned because two of his classical works* Al-Maw«qif *and* 'Aq«'id al-'Aîudiyyah *form the core of the curriculum of* 'Ilm al-Kal«m wa al-'Aq«'id *through the commentaries of* SharÁ al-Maw«qif *of Mâr Sayyid Sharâf Jurj«nâ and* SharÁ 'Aq«'id al-'Aîudiyyah *of Jal«l al-Dân Daww«nâ.

Jal«l al-Dân Daww«nâ (d. 1502) must also be included in this category of thinkers who are well known in their own right but need mentioning here with reference to our investigation of the influence of the Shâr«z School. He, like 'Aîud al-Dân ¥jâ, belonged to the Shâr«z School and his *SharÁ 'Aq«'id al-'Aîudiyyah* is one of the basic works for the study of Kal«m in Dars i Niï«mâ.

Mâr Sayyid Sharâf Jurj«nâ (1340-1413) who, though born in the small town of ñ«ghë, Jurj«n (in present day Iran) spent almost all his life (except

when he accompanied Tâmër to Samarqand) in Shâr«z. He was perhaps the most prolific of all these authors of the Shâr«z School who influenced India and his *Âarf Mâr*, *NaÁw Mâr*, *Âughr« Kubr«*, *Mâr QuÇbâ* (a commentary on the QuÇb al-Dân R«zâ's *SharÁ Ris«lah al-Shamsiyyah* on the *Ris«lah al-Shamsiyyah* of Najm al-Dân K«tibâ Qazwânâ [d. 1275/76]) and *SharÁ al-Maw«qif* have been the most widely used and formative texts in Dars i Niï«mâ in India for the last six hundred years, in the fields of grammar, morphology, logic and *kal«m* respectively.

Sa'd al-Dân Taftaz«nâ (d. 1389) was equally prolific like his contemporary Jurj«nâ and though he did not belong to the Shâr«z School, five of his works were included in Dars i Niï«mâ in India and the scholars of the Shâr«z School often wrote commentaries on his works.

'Abd Allah Yazdâ (d. 1573) also belonged to the Shâr«z School because though coming from Yazd he was trained and educated by the scholars of the Shâr«z School in Shâr«z and through his class fellow Mirza J«n Shâr«zâ, he is connected to Mâr Z«hid Hirawâ who exerted a great influence on the Indian scholars especially the family of Sh«h Walâ Ullah of Delhi. Yazdâ's *SharÁ al- Tehdhâb al-ManÇiq* is an important work in Dars i Niï«mâ in India for the study of logic.

Mulla Âadr« (d. 1640)

Mâr Àusain Mâbudhâ Yazdâ (d. 1684) was the student of Jal«l al-Dân Daww«nâ and trained by the teachers famous for their erudition in the intellectual sciences and their knowledge of the Shâr«z School. His *SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah* is the second commentary, along with that of Mulla Âadr«, that is used in Dars i Niï«mâ in India.

The Second Group — Indian Followers of the Shâr«z School

Mâr MuÁammad Z«hid Hirawâ (d. 1689) was called Hirawâ after his father who had migrated from Hirat during Jah«ngârs reign and died in Lahore where Mâr Z«hid was born. Trained by Mirza J«n Shâr«zâ Mâr Z«hid belonged to the Shâr«z School and was extremely influential in the field of

the intellectual sciences. *Ris«lah Mâr Z«hid* [122] is one of the basic works for the study of logic in Dars i Nii«mâ.

MuÁibbullah Bih«râ (d. 1707) was perhaps the most outstanding logician and scholar of philosophy of his times with a literary bent of mind and a very powerful pen. He was not only deeply influenced by the Shâr«z School, in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*), in philosophy and logic but his works show a conscious mirroring of their style of writing as well.[123] His *Sullam al-'Ulëm* has been the basic book taught in Dars i Nii«mâ for logic and has been the subject of many commentaries and glosses. Three of these commentaries, those of Àamd Allah Sandâlawâ, Mulla Àasan Lakhnawâ and Q«âi Mub«rak have been extensively used in the curriculum for logic in Dars i Nii«mâ in India.

Àamd Allah Sandâlawâ (d. 1747) was also directly influenced by the Shâr«z School in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*). His *SharÁ TaÄdâq«t Sullam al-'Ulëm* is among the three commentaries that are used in Dars i Nii«mâ to study *Sullam al-'Ulëm*. Àamd Allah also wrote glosses on *SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah* (popularly known as *Âadr«*) by Mulla Âadr« and *Shams B«zigah* where references to Mulla Âadr« and Mâr B«qir D«m«d could be frequently seen.[124]

Q«âi Mub«rak (d. 1749) was also directly influenced by the Shâr«z School in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*).[125] His *SharÁ Sullam al-'Ulëm* is among the three commentaries that are used in Dars i Nii«mâ to study *Sullam al-'Ulëm*. It is often said that his glosses on *Sullam al-'Ulëm* were composed under a direct influence of Mâr B«qir D«m«d's *Al-Ufuq al-Mubân*.

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[122] See note 8.

[123] For a brief introduction in Persian see Akbar Subët, *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind*, Tehran, Hermes, 1380, p. 10.

[124] For a brief introduction in Persian see Akbar Subët, *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind*, Tehran, Hermes, 1380, pp. 57-61.

[125] For a brief introduction in Persian see Akbar Subët, *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind*, Tehran, Hermes, 1380, pp. 49-56.

Mulla Àasan Lakhnawâ (d. 1784) was also directly influenced by the Shâr«z School and trained by the teachers famous for their erudition in the intellectual sciences and their knowledge of the Shâr«z School in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*). His *SharÁ Sullam al-'Ulëm* is among the three commentaries that are used in Dars i Nii«mâ to study *Sullam al-'Ulëm*. Mulla Àasan also wrote glosses on *SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah* by Mulla Âadr«, on *Shams B«zigah* and on *Ris«lah Mâr Z«hid*. In his glosses he not only frequently refers to Mulla Âadr« and Mâr B«qir D«m«d but often engages in a creative interaction with them on certain issues.[126]

Faîl i Im«m Khayr ÿb«dâ (d. 1829) was known as *Im«m i Ma'qël«t* (the leader in intellectual sciences) in India. Well versed in the teachings of the Shâr«z School, in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*), he wrote many works which exist in manuscripts (e.g. his commentary on B«qir D«m«d's *Al-Ufuq al-Mubân*). His *Mirq«t* is used in the curriculum for logic in Dars i Nii«mâ in India.

Mulla MaÁmëd Jënpërâ (d. 1652) belonged to Jënpër, the city founded in the mid eighth century of Hijrah and famous for its excellence in many sciences along with the intellectual sciences. The Mughal emperor Sh«h Jah«n used to say that "*Përab Shâraz i m« hast*"[127] and it was said about Mulla MaÁmëd Jënpërâ that it would be admissible if the land of Jënpër would claim the pride of place vis a vis Shâr«z because of Mulla MaÁmëd Jënpërâ. He was directly influenced by the Shâr«z School and trained by the teachers famous for their erudition in the intellectual sciences and their knowledge of the Shâr«z School in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*). His work *Shams al-B«zigha* is the summit of the intellectual sciences in India and perhaps the nearest to the works of the masters of transcendent theosophy as well as the mainstay of the curriculum of philosophy/theology in India.

Faîl i Àaq Khayr ÿb«dâ (d. 1861) was, like his father Faîl i Im«m Khayr ÿb«dâ, known for his high standing in the intellectual sciences in India. Well versed in the teachings of the Shâr«z School, in the particular sense (*maktab i*

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[126] For a brief introduction in Persian see Akbar Subët, *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind*, Tehran, Hermes, 1380, pp. 62-75.

[127] The west (Jënpër) is our Shâr«z.

Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä), he wrote many works in the line of the Shâr«z School (e.g. his commentary on B«qir D«m«d's *Al-Ufuq al-Mubân*), *Ris«lah Tashkâk, Ris«lah 'Ilm o Ma'lëm* etc. His *Àadya i Sa'âdiyyah* is used in the curriculum for philosophy/theology in Dars i Nië«mâ in India.

There are many other Indian scholars who were well versed in the teachings of the Shâr«z School, in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*) but our present scope of investigation would not allow to go into details here.[128] However it may be added about Nië«m al-Dân Sih«liyawâ (d. 1748), the founder of Dars i Nië«mâ in India, that he himself was also directly influenced by the Shâr«z School and trained by the teachers famous for their erudition in the intellectual sciences and their knowledge of the Shâr«z School in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*). He wrote glosses on *SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah* by Mulla Âadr«, on *Shams B«zigah,* on *'Aq«'id al-'Aîudiyyah* and *H«shiyah 'al« 'SharÁ al-'Tajrâd* of Jal«l al-Dân Daww«nâ. In his glosses he frequently refers to Mulla Âadr« and Mâr B«qir D«m«d and pays them very high tribute.[129]

What does all this tell us about the question that we are presently investigating? The curriculum, text books, secondary texts, debates, trends in *ma'qël«t*, in short the entire gamut of the intellectual sciences was permeated by the influence of the Shâr«z School!

Turning now to the Shâr«z School in the particular sense (*maktab i Shâraz ba ma'na i kh«Ä*), two more questions need to be addressed. The first is specifically related to the reception of the transcendent theosophy (*al-Áikmat al-muta'«liyah*) itself in India. Apart from the curricula and academia mentioned earlier do we find transcendent theosophy (*al-Áikmat al-muta'«liyah*) influencing the Indian Scholars beyond the pale of madrasah texts and their commentaries and glosses in the field of logic and philosophy?

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[128] One can for example mention Mulla 'Abd al-Àakâm Siy«lkotâ, 'Abd al-Rashâd Dâwan, 'Abd al-'Alâ BaÁr al-'Ulëm, 'Abd al-Azâz Purh«rawâ and many others. For deatails see Akhtar Rahâ, *Tazkarah i MuÄ«nnifân i Dars i Nië«mâ*, op. cit. ; M Àanâf Gangohi, *À«l«t i MuÄ«nnifân i Dars i Nië«mâ*, Karachi, op. cit.; Akbar Subët, *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind,* op. cit..

[129] For a brief introduction in Persian see Akbar Subët, *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind*, Tehran, Hermes, 1380, pp. 40-49.

Secondly the transcendent theosophy (*al-Áikmat al-muta'«liyah*) is distinguished for its unique synthesis of *al-Qur'«n*, *al-burh«n* and *al-'irf«n*.[130] Do we find a continuation of this synthetic approach[131] among the Indian scholars? Or else instead of synthesis there was still emphasis on a certain aspect and subsequently a strand/aspect dominated?

For the purposes of this investigation I have not distinguished between the various philosophers and sages of the Shâr«z School though it is obvious that the most influential figure of the School is Âadr al-Dân Shi«rzâ, known as Mulla Âadr«, who is not only one of the greatest intellectual figures of Islamic history, but his thought is very mush a part of the contemporary Islamic world and continues to exercise great influence upon many aspects of current Islamic thought, especially the philosophical, theological and the theosophical.

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[130] Mull« Âadr« synthesized not only various schools of Islamic thought but also the paths of human knowledge. His own life, based upon great piety, deep philosophical introspection and reasoning and purification of his inner being until his "eye of the heart" opened and he was able to have a direct vision of the spiritual world, attests to the unity of the three major paths of knowledge in his own person. These three paths are according to him revelation (*al-waÁy*), demonstration or intellection (*al-'burh«n*, *al-ta'aqqul*) and spiritual or "mystical" vision (*al-muk«shafah, al-mush«hadah*). Or, to use another terminology prevalent among his school, he followed a way which synthesized *al-Qur'«n*, *al-burh«n* and *al-'irf«n*, which correspond to the terms above.

The grand synthesis of Islamic thought created by Mull« Âadr« is based on the synthesis of these three ways of knowing through which he was able to integrate the earlier schools of Islamic thought into a unified world view and create a new intellectual perspective known as *al-Áikmat al-muta'«liyah* which a number of leading scholars of Islamic philosophy who have written on him in European languages, such as Henry Corbin and Toshihiko Izutsu, have translated as the "transcendent theosophy" while a number of scholars have protested against using such a term. In analyzing the various aspects of Mull« Âadr«'s thought we are in reality studying the *Àikmat al-muta'«liyah* which became a distinct school of Islamic thought much like the Peripatetic (*mashsh«'â*) and Illuminationist (*ishr«qâ*) schools. Mull« Âadr« was in fact so devoted to this term that he used it as part of the title of his major opus which is *al-Asf«r al-arba'ah fi'l-Áikmat al-muta'«liyah* ("The Four Journeys Concerning Theosophy)".

[131] Some termed as "the inter-disciplinary approach of Mulla Âadr«" by the preset day Iranian scholars.

Let me begin by noting that every author of fame who has written, both in English and Persian, on the Shâr«z School has noticed the extent of its influence on the Indian subcontinent. Let us look at a few representative statements to form an idea of the issue at stake.

S. Hossein Nasr visited India in 1961 for the celebrations of the 400th year of the birth of Mulla Âadr« (Calcutta 14th November). While reporting on his visit,[132] he made a very pertinent remark which raised exactly the same question that we are trying to explore. After giving a brief survey of the curricula of various schools of the old madrasah system he turned his attention to the presence of Mulla Âadr« in the present day academia in India:

> "Most of the Indian scholars and historians recognize the importance of Mulla Âadr« only in the science of logic and often mention that he has exerted a profound influence on th earlier generation in the field of logic. A lot of research needs to be done in earnest to reveal the real contours of reception and influence of the teachings of Mulla Âadr« and his followers in India in order to clarify the issue as to why did Mulla Âadr« is known as a logician in this land whereas his influence and significance is related to the transcendent theosophy."[133]

Dr. Fazlur Rehman, in his philosophic study of Mulla Âadr« made in 1975, observed:[134]

> "A somewhat older Indian contemporary of Âadr«– a sworn critic of Ibn e 'Arabâ– AÁmad Sirhindâ, when faced with the same problem of contingency had refused to accept Ibn e 'Arabâ's doctrine that God's attributes were the materials from which the contingent world was created and endowed with existence. Sirhindâ held that while God's attributes are real and are identical with His Existence, the essences of the contingents are the very opposites or negations of these attributes: God has being, life, knowledge, power; the essence of contingent is characterized by non-being, non-life, ignorance, and impotence. But God then redeems the contingent through His positive attributes by casting their shadows upon the former. It is obvious, however, that Âadr« would never accept the

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[132] His article that he presented at the occasion was printed separately and now forms a part of his *Islamic Life and Thought*. See note 23 below.

[133] S. H. Nasr, "Mulla Âadr« dar Hindëst«n", *Rahnum«I Kitab*, Vol. IV, Dâ, 1340; reprinted, *J«vid«n i Khirad*, Saroosh, Tehran, Iran, 1382, pp. 142.

[134] Dr. Fazlur Rehman, *The Philosophy of Mulla Âadra*, Albany, 1975, pp. 90-91.

principal of moral dualism introduced by Sirhindâ…….. "According to Âadr«, the higher does not "abstract from" or negate the lower forms of existence but absorbs, includes, and transcends them: They exist in it in a simple manner. That is why, while characterizing God he annunciates the principles, "a simple being is (i.e. includes) all things (*basiâÇ-ul-Áaqâqah kull al-ashy«*)". There is, therefore no question but that God includes and transcends all things– mundane and supra-mundane. The tension that arises here is between his pronouncements on the utter inanity of essences and his investing God's mind with them. It is not without interest to note that in this respect, Âadr«'s doctrine, in effect, amounts to the same as Sirhindâ's."

More than two decades after making his initial observations, S. Hossein Nasr, again remarked:

"In India his writings, especially the *SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah*, have been studied and taught in Muslim schools up to the present day, and many glosses have been written by well known Indian Muslim thinkers of the past few centuries."……. "Among Mullah Âadra's spiritual and intellectual offspring in India, one must include all those like Nïï«muddân Sih«liyawâ, Àassan ibn Q«zâ Al-Lakhnawâ, MuÁammad Amjad Al-Âiddiqui and others who have written glosses and commentaries upon his works and specially on the *SharÁ Hid«yah al-Àikmah*. Numerous copies of these glosses are to be found in the various libraries of India…. They merit close study as a means of determining the extent of penetration and influence of Mullah Âadra's teachings in India. His influence on Shiekh AÁmad Sirhindâ is also quite obvious."[135]

The same views surfaced in his *History of Islamic Philosophy*:[136]

"The vast synthesis created by Mull« Âadr« was to have a profound influence upon later Persian thought as well as in India and Iraq…. In India the influence of Mull« Âadr« began to manifest itself from the middle of the eleventh/seventeenth century almost from the time of his

[135] S. H. Nasr, *Islamic Life and Thought*, G. Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, Reprint, Suhail Academy, Lahore, 2000, pp. 164, 167-8.

[136] S. H. Nasr, *History of Islamic Philosophy,* Routledge, London, 1996, Part I, pp. 657-8.

death…..[137] This tradition affected many later figures and has survived to this day."[138]

In one of his more recent works S. Hossein Nasr remarked: [139]

"As for India and Turkey, it is nearly impossible to study the development of Islamic philosophy in those lands in recent centuries without taking into account the role of the School of IÄfah«n, although its role is much more manifest in the Indian world than in the Ottoman Empire."

But how to take into account the role of transcendent theosophy? One way of doing it that which Akbar Subët has adopted in his recent work *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind.*[140] He has given us an inventory of 90 scholars, mostly by the help of secondary sources, who refer to Mulla Sadr« or Mâr D«m«d in their works. But this approach only skims the surface and stops short at deriving unwarranted superficial conclusions. When we go through all the 90 entries the result that emerges is that, barring a few outstanding exceptions, most of these scholars were concentrating on one aspect of Mulla Âadr« which, consequently, spawned into that vast literature of commentaries and glosses that is documented and detailed in Akbar Subët's work. In none of these 90 entries do we ever find any reference to his Qur'an commentary, his *Al- Àikmah al-'Arshiyyah* or *Shaw«hid al-Rabëbiyyah.* That is revealing of the manner Mulla Âadr« was received in the Indian subcontinent. It is evident from the survey of this record that the influence of Mulla Âadr« was most pervasive in his capacity of a *ma'qëlâ*, commentator of *Hid«yah*, a kal«m

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[137] His writings, especially the *SharÁ al-hid«yah* ("Commentary upon the '*Guide'to Wisdom*" of Athâr al-Dân Abharâ) became widespread, and the latter book even came to be known as Âadr«; people received distinction by saying that they had studied Âadr«.

[138] It is interesting to recall that Mawl«n« Mawdëdâ, the founder of the Jam«'at-i isl«mâ of Pakistan and India, that is, the founder of one of the most important politico-religious movements in the Islamic world in the fourteenth/twentieth century, translated parts of the *Asf«r* into Urdu in his youth. In a private letter addressed to Akhtar Rahi, Mawl«n« Mawdëdâ wrote, "I translated two middle books of the *Asf«r*, in about 3500 pages, but it could not be published." See 'ÿÄim Nu'm«nâ, *Mak«tâb I Abul A'l«*, Lahore, 1973, Vol. II, p. 104. Also see Akhtar Rahâ, *Tazkarah i MuÄ«nnifân i Dars i Nü«mâ*, Lahore, 1978, pp. 217.

Other translators included Man«ïr AÁsan Gâl«nâ and Mârak Sh«h K«shmârâ. Part of this translation apppeared in print from the D«r al-Tarjumah 'Uthm«nia, Hyderabad Deccan.

[139] Leonard Lewisohn and David Morgan (Editors), *The Heritage of Sufism*, Vol. III, Oneworld, Oxford, 1999, pp. 15. The fact that is in itself significant here is that this remark comes from an article that S. H. Nasr wrote as an introduction to the volume discussing the influence of the School of Shâr«z on subsequent unfolding of Sufism.

[140] See Akbar Subët, *Fâlsëf i Shâr«zâ dar Hind*, Tehran, Hermes, 1380.

scholar. This is how he was transmitted through the curriculum and this is how he was studied. Synthesis was lost in most of the cases. Most of our authors merely paraphrase and repeat the issues discussed by the Shâr«z School though some assimilated the doctrines propounded by the Shâr«z School and offered fresh insights on these topics. Shah Waliullah of Delhi is an outstanding example of this process in that he carried forward the synthetic approach.

That was precisely the reason that unlike the Ishr«qâ school, the influence of the Shâr«z School on India was limited to specific domains. While the Ishr«qâ school became the *quasi* thinking self of the Indian milieu, the influence of the Shâr«z School manifested itself in the intellectual sciences where ever these were cultivated in India. The Ishr«qâ school provided the shared civilizational ground while the Shâr«z School was more secluded.

However, even in that sphere the influence of the Shâr«z School on the Indian Scholars, both in the specific field of the curricula and teaching of the intellectual sciences, especially of *falsfah* and *kal«m* in the traditional *madrasas* as well as in the Islamic philosophic-mystic thought of the Subcontinent, is much more pervasive than what it is imagined in the current scholarship. The spheres of influence of the doctrines of the Shâr«z School and their far-reaching effects have as yet not received sufficient attention. A correct assessment of the pervasiveness and extant of this influence can only be made if a wide and varied range of religious, philosophic literature is taken into consideration — from highly sophisticated philosophic works down to common theological and mystical treatises. One has to take into account a vast body of literature, a large part of which is still in the form of manuscript, before one can form a more or less accurate idea of the breadth and expanse of this influence. Much research would be required in philosophic and *kal«m* texts and in that category of Sufi treatises which is rightly termed as theoretic Sufism, to bring to light the connections and moulding influences that existed between the Shâr«z School and the Indian Scholars.

It may also be remembered that before the influence of the Shâr«z School, formulations of *waÁdat al-wujëd* were sufficient for the intellectual and literary ethos of the Indian mind while the Shâr«z School tried to find a philosophic foundation for it that was characteristic of the universe of discourse that developed under the influence of the Shâr«z School and should be considered as an addition to the intellectual life of India. An other characteristic feature of the Shâr«z School is that which pertains to the

attempt of finding a basis and justification of philosophy that was extra philosophical.

It is as if Mulla Âadr« had a face turned toward the world of the Spirit, to theosophy and the other turned toward the intellectual sciences. The Indian subcontinent, by and large, recognized and was, in turn, influenced, by the latter face of the Shâr«z School. The perception and subsequent reception, of the ideas of the Shâr«z School in India therefore was shaped by this particular aspect of the School and it was largely responsible for the fact that the Shâr«z School became predominantly identified with discursive thought, logic and dry ratiocination. According to this perspective, philosophy/theosophy was then the expression of the subjective intellectual operations/experiences of the separated ego of the thinker/philosopher/sage, and not a fruit of a vision of a reality, which transcends the being of the sage, and for which the sage must have become the expositor and guide.[141] This implied that within the perspective through which the transcendent theosophy was studied in India a very essential and cardinal element of whole episteme of the Shâr«z School was lost sight of or, atleast, relegated to the background. The Shâr«z School, like the School of Illumination, strongly adhered to the view that consciousness should not be reduced to rationality alone i.e. discursive thought[142] or reason severed from its transcendent noetic roots.[143] The Indian perspective suffered from it through and through, redeemed in the teachings of a small number of thinkers.

The poet had complained, according to the famous anecdote, "*shi'r i mara ba madrasah keh burd*"? (who is responsible for it that my poetry falls into the hands of the scholastics?) Mulla Âadr« would also be justified if he complained "***Áikmat i mara ba madrasah keh burd***"? (who is responsible for it that my wisdom falls into the hands of the scholastics?)

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141 See S. H. Nasr, *Islamic Art and Spirituality,* Islamic Text Society, Cambridge, 1987, p. 93.

142 Which is, as if, a reflection of the Intellect on the mental plane.

143 In the words of Rëmâ, " *'aql i juz'â 'aql r« badn«m kard", Mathnawâ*, (ed. Nicholson) Vol. III, p. 31, line, 8. Also see Vol. II, p. 352, line, 11, Vol. I, p. 130, line, 4.

IQBAL STUDIES IN BENGALI LITERATURE

Advocate Mujibur Rahman

Former Minister, Information (East Pakistan)

President, Allama Iqbal Sangsad, Bangladesh.

The revolutionary and bold interpretation of the message of Islam by Allama Iqbal through his extraordinary and unprecedented poems was readily received and welcomed by the suffering and confused Muslims of Bengal. The eminent poets, litterateurs and other intellectuals started translation of his works in to Bengali which highly enriched Bengali literature**:**

Shikwah and Jawab-e-Shikwah was translated during pre-partition days by Amin Uddin Ahmed, Md. Sultan, Farrukh Ahmed[144] and others. Abul Kalam Mustfa translated it in 1952 and poet Gholam Mustafa[145] in 1960 who also translated Kalam-e-Iqbal (several poems of Iqbal). Mizanur Rahman, the founder of Iqbal Academy in 1960, Ashraf Ali Khan, the editor of the Daily Sultan, Prof. Amin Uddin and Doctor Mohammed Shahidullah, the linguist also translated Shikwah and Jawab-e-Shikwah in to Bengali. Mr. Altaf Hossain who subsequently was the chief editor, Dawn And Prof. A. J. Arberry translated it in to English.

Farrukh Ahmed was a highly talented poet with strong ideological mooring. He was a great admirer of Allama Iqbal to whose memory he (Farrukh) dedicated his famous work "Sat Sagarer Majhi" (The Mariner of the Seven Seas).

Asrar-e-Khudi (Secret of the Self) Syed Abdul Mannan translated it which was published in 1945 followed by another translation by Abdul Majid and Mirza Sultan Ahmed. Syed Abdul Mannan also translated the book "Iqbal's Educational Philosophy" which had been translated in to English by

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[144] Farrukh Ahmed was a highly talented poet with strong ideological mooring. He was a great admirer of Allama Iqbal to whose memory he (Farrrukh) dedicated his famous work "Sat Sagarer Majhi" (The Mariner of the Seven Seas).

[145] Poet Gholam Mostafa also had an ideological stand not to be misguided by opportunists.

K.G. Saiyyidain. Another book "Iqbaler Kabita" was jointly written by Farrukh Ahmed, Abdul Hossain and Syed Ali Ahsan which includes parts of Asrar-e-Khudi.

Ramuz-e-Bekhudi is translated by A.F.M. Abdul Huq and Manir Uddin Yusuf. Yusuf also wrote a book "Iqbaler Kavya Sanchayan" which includes *Bang-e-Dara*, *Bal-e-Jibirl*, *Zerb-e-Kaleem* and *Armughan-e-Hijaz*. Mirza Sultan Ahmed and Prof. Adam Uddin translated *Ramuz-e-Bekhudi* in to Bengali. Ahdul Haque Faridi also translated *Ramuz-e- Bekhudi*.

***Bang-e-Dara*:** Prof. Kazi Akram Hossain translated some portions of *Bang-e-Dara* and other poems.

Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam is the collection of highly distinguished philosophical lectures of Allama Iqbal. The first translation by Abdul Haqq which appeared in *Mohammadi* of Moulana Akram Khan. Mr. Mujibur Rahman Khan also translated it in part. This was edited by Ibrahim Khan and Sayeedur Rahman under the heading: *Islame Dharmiya Chintar Punargathan*.

Iqbal's Thesis for Doctorate was on *Development of Metaphysics in Persia* which was translated under the auspices of Islamic foundation, Dhaka.

Some prose writers: Md. Wazed Ali, Syed Wazed Ali, Dewan Mohammad Azraf, Hasan Zaman and others presented Iqbal's works to the Bengali readers. Habibullah Bahar wrote a book, *Kavi Iqbal* (Poet Iqbal), Monowar Uddin Chowdhury, former Provincial Minister, Assam wrote a book *Jalwa* wherein he projected the political philosophy of Iqbal.

Dr. Mohammad Abdullah, Professor of Dhaka University, Advocate A.M.M. A. Jalil, Dr. Abeda Hafiz, Kanize Butool and others are the admirers of Iqbal who also contributed erudite articles which were published in Journal of Iqbal Sangsad, Bangladesh.

Female writers: Begum Shamsun Nahar Mahmud, Begum Habibullah Bahar, Rokeya Anowar, Begum Fazlur Rahman, Begum Sufia Kamal, Dr. Umme Salma and Prof. Tahmina Begum had been conspicuous as the admirers of Iqbal who also wrote rich articles on him which were published in Journal of Iqbal Sangsad, Bangladesh.

DR. ABU SAYED NURUDDIN was the only Ph.D on Dr. Mohammad Allama Iqbal in Bangladesh who contributed articles in *Iqbal Journal*, Bangladesh:

1. Iqbal's Philosophy in the Light of AL-Qur'an.
2. Allama Iqbal's Message on Action.

3. Biography of Sufism on Iqbal's Life and Poems.
4. Poet Iqbal and Syed Mir Hasan
5. Influence of Sufism on Iqbal's Life and Poems.
6. Allama Iqbal and Sufism.
7. Iqbal's Views on Insan-e-Kamil.
8. Allama Iqbal's Philosophy of Life.

DEWAN MOHAMMAD AZRAF, the ex-president of Iqbal Sangsad, Bangladesh contributed the following articles in the *Journal of Allama Iqbal Society:*

1. Necessity of Study of Iqbal's Philosophy.
2. Contribution of Iqbal in World Civilization.
3. Iqbal and Humanism
4. The Great Poet Iqbal.
5. Zabur-e-Azam in Iqbal's Poems.
6. The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts of Allama Iqbal.
7. On the Best Poems of Iqbal.
8. Iqbal's Philosophy on History.
9. Iqbal's Contribution in the field of Philosophy.
10. Iqbal and Sufism.
11. Iqbal and Western Philosophy.
12. Iqbal's Concept of Evolution.

PROF. DR. SAYED SAJJAD HOSSAIN, Vice-Chancellor, Rajshahi and Dhaka Universities contributed articles in the *Journal of Iqbal Society*, Dhaka:

1. Some Aspects of Iqbal's Works.
2. Iqbal in Muslim Bengal.
3. Why Iqbal is Necessary.
4. Remembering Iqbal.
5. Iqbal Aur Alami Adab.
6. Abstract of Iqbal's Articles in Bengali.
7. The Great Poet Iqbal and We.

I myself (**ADVOCATE MUJIBUR RAHMAN**), the present President of Iqbal Snagsad (Society), Bangladesh have made a thorough study of Iqbal's works for years, from different perspectives contributed the following articles among others, to the *Journal of Iqbal Society*, Bangladesh:.

1. Why the Fundamental Teachings of Al-Qur'an Constitute the Foundation of Iqbal's Philosophy?

2. Unity of the Muslim World in the Concept of Iqbal.
3. Relevance of Allama Iqbal in the Modern World.
4. Cultural Philosophy of Iqbal.
5. Role of Iqbal in the Partition of the Subcontinent.
6. Iqbal and Two-Nation Theory.
7. The Twain Statesmen: Allama Iqbal and Quid-e-Azam.
8. Dynamism in Iqbal's Philosophy.
9. Iqbal's Concept of Pan-Islamism.
10. The concept of Sovereignty in the West and in Iqbal's Philosophy.
11. Iqbal's Critique of Democracy.
12. Renaissance Movement of the Muslim World and Allama Iqbal.
13. Iqbal's Concept of Insan-e-Kamil.
14. Iqbal's Concept of Man and Humanism.
15. Iqbal's Concept of Khudi.
16. Iqbal Studies in Bengali Literature.

ABUL HOSSAIN a distinguished poet delivered three speeches at Hotel Metropole, Karachi on Death Anniversary of Allama Iqbal, sponsored by Iqbal Academy, Karachi in 1960, 1961 and 1962 on the subjects:

(1) Impact of Iqbal on Bengali Muslim Thought

(2) Iqbal as an Artist

(3) Translation of Iqbal in Bengali respectably. He translated good number of Iqbal's poems in to Bengali on the request of Habibullah Bahar, Editor *Bulbul* he wrote 2 poems in the light of the ideas of Shikwa and Jawab-e- Shikwa which were included in Bahar's book, *Kavi Iqbal* (Poet Iqbal).

TALIM HUSSAIN in another distinguished poet cum prose writer as well as a Journalist who was an outstanding personality among the youth of Muslim Bengal during the Renaissance Movement which turned into Pakistan Movement. He was the editor in charge of monthly *Mohammadi* in Calcutta and Assistant editor *Mahammadi*, Dhaka. These two periodicals were very much conspicuous on Iqbal studies. He translated significant portions of *Bang-e-Dara*, Khijr-e-Rah, *Bal-e-Jibril* and *Javid Nama* etc.

Poet, Al Mahmud, renowned Jounalists Akhtarul Alam, Syed Tosharaf Ali, Masud Majumder and poet Al-Mujahedi, Moulana Julfiqar Ahmed Kismati, Prof. Abdul Gafur have been contributing rich articles in our *Iqbal Journal*.

Sekandar Abu Zafar
Habibur Rahman
Abdur Rashid Khan
Mohiuddin Khan
Azharul Islam
Fazlur Rahman
Benzir Ahmed.
Prof. Golam Azam.
Ata Sarker.
Prof. Abul Fazal
Moulana Mostafizur Rahman.
Akhber Uddin
Mufakkharul Islam.
Justice A.B. Baker.
Manjur-e- Elahi
Azad Chowdhury
Bulbul Sarwar.
Mahbubul Haque.
Abu Zaher Mahmud
Syed Nasrul Ahsan.
A.F.M Hossain Ahmed.
Prof. S. Kalim Sahsarami.
Sheik Darbar-e- Alam.
Abu Khalid.
Kamrul Islam Humayun
Md. Abu Talib.
Rakib Al Hafiz.
Md. Mahfuzur Rahman.
Hasan Shahriar.
Musud Sahid
Md. Abdur Sattar
Moulana Aminul Islam.
Abdul Haque.
Shahabuddin Ahamad
Lutfur Rahman Faruki.
Mansur Ahmed
Mahabub Hossain.

Ahsan Habib
A.N.M. Bazlur Rashid
Ashraf Siddique.
Md. Moinuddin.
Ashraf Ali Khan.
Abdur Rashid Waseqpuri.
Moulana Abdur Rahim.
Mir Kasem ALi.
Dr. Enamul Haque.
Md. Abdul Hai.
Rawshan Ijdani.
Abul Kalam Shamsuddin
Md. Mamun.
Mr. Anowar Kamal
Eshraf Hossian
Mokul Chowdury.
Abdul Hai Sikhder.
Fazal Shahbuddin
Md. Mobarak Hossain Khan.
Prof. Shamsul Haque Shaidai.
Dr. A.N.M. Raisuddin
K.A. Rahman.
Md. Morshed Ali.
Mahmud Bayat.
Sadia Chowdhury Parag.
Dr. Kazi Nurul Islam.
Faruk Mahmud .
Dr. Anisuz Zaman.
Md. Asad
Sultan Mahmud Badal.
Dr. M. Abdul Kader
Moulana Mohiuddin Khan.
Abdul Hai Mashriki.
Md. Isa Shahedi
Gazi Azizur Rahman.
Enamul Karim
Md. Musa.

Bakhtiar.
Nahid Saleh.
Md. Maksudur Rahman.
Shariful Muzahid.
Nurzzaman.
Md. Saqi Miah
Md. Mohibbullah.
Principal K.A. Rahman.
Dr. Md. Baker
Mozammel Haque.
Ala Uddin Ahmed.
Mhamudul Hasan.
Mazharul Islam
Hossain Mahamud.
Al-Beruni.
Zakir Abu Zafar.
Mesbah Uddin Ahmed.
Prof. Shahed Ali,
Abdul Mokit Chowdhury
Nur-e-Awal
Amin -Al- Asad.
Abu Taher Md Manzur.
Galib Hasan.
Faruk Ahmed Khan.
Matiur Rahman Mallik.
Prof. A.F.M. Hossain Ahmed.
Md. Mahfuzullha.
Dr. Wahid Ishrat.
Ahmed Selim Reza .
Mahzufa Haque.
Md. Keramat Ali.(Minister for Religion.)
Md. Hossain Malik.
Prof. H. Kalim Sahsarami.
Zafar Alam.
Md. Hafizur Rahman.
Kamrul Islam Humayun.
Amir Khasru.
A.F.M. Hossain Ahmed.
Dr. Wali Ullah Zafri
Md. Ruhul Amin
Aziz Ullah
Syed Nuzrul Ahsan.
A.B. M. Saleh Uddin
Md. Nurul Islam.
Md. Mahfuz Ullah.
Shriful Muzahid.
Faruk Ahmed Khan
Dr. Abu Baker Rafique.
Yaqub Goali.
Nasir Ahmed.
Md. Hanif.
Khurshid Anwar
Jahangir Alam prodhan.
Ibn Golam Samad.
Abdul Mannan Talib.
Golam Nabi Panna.
Dr. Jamal Badabi.
Mr. Ali Avarseji.
Mozammelul Haque Khan.
Abu Naim
Ahmed Nadeem Kasemi
Fahamidur Rahman.
Md. Ganjidost.
Nazeer Siddeqi
Prof. Abdul Gafur.
SK. Golam Maksud Helali.
A.K.M. Mahbubur Rahman.

Shikder Abdur Rab.
Md. Badrul Amin Khan.
Md. Mostafa Saki.
Md. Morshed Ali.
Dr. Md. Tasir.

Dr. Khalifa Abdul Hakim.
Md. Minhazur Rahman.
S. Amzad Ali
Syed Anwar Hossin.
Prof. Dr. Osman Ghani.
Syeda Kaniz Mustafa
Md. Naymul Haque.
Md. Tutiur Rahman.
Enamul Karim.
Ahmed Mazhar.
Abdul Wazed Salafi.
Lt. Col. A. Rashid.
Mumtaz Hasan.
Md. Ismail Hossain.
Abu Musa Md Arif Billah.
Nasir Ahmed
Ayar Danish
Prof. Zia Rahman.
Prof. Raihan Sharif.
Prof. Abdul Bari Abbasi.
Khandker Hasnat Karim.

ESTABLISHMENT OF IQBAL SANGSAD (SOCIETY) IN BANGLADESH

With the Indian influence since 1971, the then Awami League Government introduced Secularism in the Constitutionof 1972 in place of ideological guide line of the previous Constitutions which were identified with the spirit of Islamic Republic, hostile atmosphere started to prevail, the monogram '*Rabbi zidni Ilma*' was removed. Even the names of Iqbal and Quaid-e-Azam were dropped from two students' Hall. The term 'Muslim' was deleted from the name of pre-partition Halls including Internationally famous SALIMULLA MUSLIM HALL. But some students of Dhaka University came forward in March, 1986 under dynamic leadership of one talented student: Abdul Wahid, the founder Secretary of Allama Iqbal Sangsad who subsequently did his Ph.D. from the said University on *Tafsir Literature in Indo-Pak Subcontinent*. Dr. Abdul Wahid is not only the Founder Secretary but also has been the Life-Vein of Iqbal Society, Bangladesh.

ACHIEVEMENTS

The Sangsad since 19th March, 1986 has been enthusiastically functioning in Iqbal studies in various ways:

(1) It organized 50 Seminars and Symposiums with intellectual participants and experts on Iqbal till today.
(2) It has already published 48 quarterly Journals covering 15000 pages by now.
(3) Iqbal poems on one Audio Cassette (Electronic Media).

(4) It has been regularly observing the Birth and the Death anniversaries which are not only attended by the local elites but also by foreign Ambassadors and High Commissioners.
(5) There are 3000 books in Iqbal Memorial Library.

The activities of Sangsad have earned a great reputation within and without the country which is increasing by leaps and bounds.

PUBLICATION OF BOOKS ON IQBAL

1. *Maha Kavi Iqbal* (Great Poet Iqbal) (Biography)
   By Dr. Abu Sayeed Nuruddin, Ph.D. on Iqbal
2. *Iqbaler Srestha Kabita* (Great Poems of Iqbal, Edited by Dr. Abdul Wahid)
3. *Zarb-e-Kaleem*, Translated by Abdul Mannan Talib
4. *Shikwah and Jawab-e-Shikwah*, Translated by Muhammad Sultan,
   Golam Mostafa and A. J. Arberry.
5. *Iqbal Manane Anneshane*, Fahmidur Rahman
6. *Iqbal Deshe Bideshe* (Iqbal both within and outside the country) Edited by Mizanur Rahman.
7. *Biswa Shabhatai Allama Iqbaler* Abodan(Iqbal's Contribution to World Civilization), By Dewan Mohammad Azraf.
8. *Shaheen: Iqbaler Kabita Sharak* Edited by Dr. Abdul Wahid
9. Allama Iqbal 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Volumes Series, Edited by Dr. Abdul Wahid.

In different Universities of Bangladesh: Dhaka, Chittagong and Rajshahi, half a dozen brilliant students have been doing M.Phils and Ph.D on Iqbal.

OUR APPEALS

1. Establishment of Iqbal Academy at Dhaka is indispensable
2. A house is urgently required to accommodate the Academy and the Library.
3. We could not as yet translate and publish all the works of Iqbal because of shortage of fund.
4. Plenty of books are required for Iqbal Library.
5. To conduct the activities of the Institution, regular economic assistance is to be ensured.
6. Regular publication of quarterly Journals is to be ensured.

7. This organization has to translate Urdu books in to Bengali and vice versa.

THE BUYID DOMINATION AS THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE FLOURISHING OF MUSLIM SCHOLARSHIP DURING THE FOURTH / TENTH CENTURY

Dr. M. Ismail Marcinkowski

> *Let the one who is seeking to preserve the health of his soul realize that, by so doing, he is indeed preserving noble blessings which are bestowed upon it, great pleasures which are laid in it and splendid garments which are cast on it.*
>
> *(Ibn Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), Tahdhib al-Akhlaq)*

The Buyid period constituted the background for the revival of Muslim scholarship during the 4th/10th centuries. However, the coming of the Buyids did not simply signify the establishment of just another dynasty more. More significantly, their rule had even been referred to (although somewhat misleadingly) as the "Renaissance of Islam". As a matter of fact, Iranian civilization, too, saw a revival under them since they themselves were Iranians and sought deliberately to reconnect to Iran's glorious past after centuries of foreign domination. Moreover, the Buyids, who ruled over what is now Iran and Iraq, had been Twelver Shi'ites, and several aspects of Shi'ite culture and ceremonial can be traced back to their days, e.g. the official celebration of Shi'ite holidays. This paper addresses their rise to power and their coexistence with the 'Abbasid caliphs.

In the following I shall present an outline of the major political developments of the era of the Buyids, as well as their contribution to the world of scholarship as patrons of learning.

The rule of the Buyids[146] marked one of the crucial periods of early Islamic history as it signifies the turning point from predominant Arab rule to the political domination of non-Arabs in the Islamic heartlands. This process can be already be traced back to early 'Abbasid times. It was the Buyid domination over the 'Arab Iraq' *(al-'Iraq al-'Arabi)*[147] and most of Iran (320-447/932-1055, in Fars until 454/1062) which heralded a period of tolerance and scholarly excellence in a variety of fields. Shi'ites, too, came to enjoy a comparatively tolerant atmosphere which sets that historical period apart from the situation that had been prevailing under previous rulers.

At the beginning of the second half of the 4th/10th century the general political circumstances prevailing in the lands ruled by the 'Abbasid caliphs were not very encouraging: during the previous decades province after province of their once powerful empire had gained the status of factual independence, although some of those provinces might still have acknowledged the caliph in Baghdad as their nominal suzerain. Spain, for example, went under the Umayyads her own way: in the course of time the Spanish Umayyads even assumed the titles of *khalifah,* 'caliph' and *amir al-mu'minin*, 'commander of the faithful'.[148] Similar developments occurred in North Africa: in 358/969 the Isma'ili Fatimids had conquered Egypt, established a 'counter-caliphate' in Cairo and threatened Syria. Once they were entrenched firmly in Egypt, they sent propagandists of their beliefs even to the Muslim lands of the East.[149] The Fatimids constituted thus the

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[146] A comprehensive introduction to the Buyid period is provided by the insightful book by 'Ali Asghar Faqihi, *Al-i Buvayh* (n. pl.: Chapkhanah-yi Diba, 1366 solar/1987).

[147] Mesopotamia, or 'Iraq proper', whereas the connotation *al-'Iraq al-'Ajami*, 'Persian Iraq', was applied to the Western and Central Iranian lands. Refer on this distinction to Wilhelm Barthold [Vasilii Vladimirovich Bartol'd], *A Historical Geography of Iran,* trans. Svat Soucek, ed. with an introduction by Clifford Edmund Bosworth (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 124, and Guy Le Strange, *The Land of the Eastern Caliphate. Mesopotamia, Persia, and Central Asia from the Muslim Conquest to the Time of Timur* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1905), pp. 185-86.

[148] W. M. Watt and Pierre Cachia, *A History of Islamic Spain* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1977, paperback edition, Islamic Surveys 4), p. 46.

[149] Claude Cahen, *Der Islam I. Vom Ursprung bis zu den Anfängen des Osmanenreiche*s. (Fischer Weltgeschichte Band 14) (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Bücherei GmbH, 1968), pp. 226-30. The today most comprehensive study on the Isma'ili phenomenon is Farhad Daftary, *The Isma'ilis. Their History and Doctrines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, first

most serious danger for Baghdad. Furthermore, several local dynasties sprang up in the East which paid often only lip-service to to their allegiance to the central authority in Baghdad: Tahirids, Saffarids and Samanids established, one after the other, their respective power-bases, especially in the vast areas of Khurasan and beyond.[150] At the same time the pressure on the borders of the Muslim territories was increasing: the Byzantine Emperors made all possible efforts to regain their previously lost provinces in Anatolia, Armenia and Northern Syria.[151] The Byzantines were even able to regain control over vast parts of eastern Anatolia under the rulers of their energetic Macedonian Dynasty (867-1056 CE).[152] The central government in Baghdad seemed to be unable to stop their advance. It had thus become obvious that the 'Abbasids had become unable to exercise control over the remote territories of their empire. Local military leaders had to confront the Byzantines on their own, with the counterproductive result that those leaders themselves became almost independent. In Iraq itself the situation was not much better for the 'Abbasids: since they had surrounded themselves by Turkish slave soldiers whose leaders controlled the political life in the capital, their status was

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paperback edition). Further comprehensive studies have been provided by Wilferd Madelung, "Isma'iliyyah," in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, vol. 4 (1978), pp. 198-206, and M. Canard, "Fatimids," in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, vol. 2 (1983), pp. 850-62. For specicific issues refer to Wilferd Madelung, "Fatimiden und Bahrainqarmaten," *Der Islam* 34 (1959), pp. 34-88, W. Ivanow, "Ismailis and Qarmatians," *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Sosiety* 16 (1940), pp. 43-85, idem, "The Organization of the Fatimid Propaganda," *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 15 (1939), pp. 1-35, S. M. Stern, "The Early Isma'ili Missionaries in North-West Persia and in Khurasan and Transoxania," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23 (1960), pp. 56-90, idem, "Heterodox Isma'ilism at the Time of al-Mu'izz," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 17 (1955), pp. 10-33, idem, "Isma'ili Propaganda and Fatimid Rule in Sind," *Islamic Culture* 23 (1949), pp. 298-307.

[150] Refer to Clifford Edmund Bosworth, "The Tahirids and Saffarids," in: *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 4, ed. R. N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 90-135, and R. N. Frye, "The Samanids," in: ibid., pp. 136-61.

[151] Refer to A. A. Vasilev, *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, reprint), pp. 300-74.

[152] Refer to A. A. Vasilev, *History of the Byzantine Empire, 324-1453*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984, reprint), pp. 300-74.

subsequently reduced to that of 'puppets' in the hands of one or the other of the dominating groups.[153]

During the first half of the 4th/10th century, however, the Buyids appeared on the scene. The Buyids, descendants of a certain Buwayh, were an Iranian clan originating from the region of Daylam. Daylam was at that time the inclusive and rather vague term for the northern regions of Iran, especially the present-day provinces of Gilan and the utmost western part of Mazandaran.[154] A particular region towards the east of Daylam, Tabaristan,[155] had in the past provided the 'Abbasid armies, as well as the guards of the caliphs, with formidable soldiers. The majority of the population of this mountainous area had just recently embraced Islam, mostly following one of the Shi'ite denominations, and there was still existing a considerable number of non-Muslims, usually Zoroastrians, among them. The geographical isolation and inaccessibility of those northern areas of Iran might have been one of the reasons for the comparatively high number of non-Muslims there. This proved advantageous to those who were adhering to various Shi'ites denominations and who took refuge in those easily defendable mountains in order to avoid persecution at the hands of their Sunnite opponents.

The Buyids, too, originated from those northern regions. In particular Western scholars have in the past differed on the question of whether they were followers of the Zaydi or Twelver Shi'ite denominations. However, today there seems to prevail consensus that they were Twelvers, since in legal questions they are said to have followed the *ja'fari* rite, the legal school of the Twelvers, instead one of the Sunnite ones.[156] This they would certainly not have done if they would have been Zaydis since the Zaydis used to follow the Sunnite interpretation of Islamic law.

The above mentioned Buwayh, the ancestor of the Buyids, was the father of three sons: 'Ali, al-Hasan and Ahmad, the youngest. Towards the

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153 Joel L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam. The Cultural Revival during the Buyid Age* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), pp. 33-34.

154 See Heribert Busse,"Iran under the Buyids," in: *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 4, ed. R. N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 253-262.

155 Barthold, *A Historical Geography of Iran,* pp. 230-35, and Le Strange, *The Land of the Eastern Caliphate,* p. 173.

156 Faqihi, *Al-i Buwayh*, pp. 479-482, Cahen, *Der Islam I. Vom Ursprung bis zu den Anfängen des Osmanenreiche*s, pp. 247-48.

beginning of their carreers, the three brothers earned their livelihood as a kind of *condottieri* in the services of numerous central Iranian rulers and became thus known as experienced warriors. The reasons which had made these three to leave their native regions, accompanied by a large number of relatives and followers from among their countrymen, are not entirely clear.[157] However, 'Ali's takeover of Fars, as well as that of al-Jibal, the mountainous region in north-western Iran,[158] by al-Hasan, after the defeat of its local rolers, enabled the Buyids to establish their power overthere firmly after 324/935. Soon after this, Ahmad added to this Kirman and Khuzistan which had previously been under the authority of caliphal envoys. This brought the Buyids into the close neighbourhood of the 'Abbasid capital.

Even in Baghdad itself effective 'Abbasid rule was practically not extant any more by that time: Turkish army commanders and certain factions of the court struggled for power. But in the year 334/945 Ahmad entered with his troops Baghdad. It appears to be probable that the Buyids were acting on request of one of the political factions in the 'Abbasid capital.[159] In this way it would become apprehensible why they had been able to establish a foothold there in such a short period of time. The caliph granted to the three brothers upon their demand the honourific titles (*alqab*) *Mu'izz al-Dawlah* (to Ahmad, 'Pillar of the Empire'), *'Imad al-Dawlah* (to 'Ali, 'Strengthener of the Empire') and *Rukn al-Dawlah* (to al-Hasan, 'Support of the Empire'), respectively.[160] Ahmad took his residence in Baghdad, whereas the other members of his family received the provinces al-Jibal, Kirman and Fars.

The Buyids did not touch upon the very existence of the caliphate. They were, however, to change its practical function,: they merely 'permitted' the caliphs to place their signature under documents which were prior to that drafted by their Buyid 'protectors'. The political power of the caliph was thus

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157 For further information on Daylam and the emergence of Buyid power see Busse, "Iran under the Buyids," pp. 253-262, and Mafizullah Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad (333/946-447/1055)* (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1964), pp. 1-6.

158 Approximately the area between the cities of Kashan, Isfahan and Qumm. On the term *al-Jibal* see Barthold, *A Historical Geography of Iran,* p. 199, and pp. 207-208, and Le Strange, *The Land of the Eastern Caliphate*, pp. 185-231.

159 Faqihi, *Al-i Buwayh*, p. 120.

160 For further *alqab* that had bestowed upon them them by the caliphs consult Faqihi, *Al-i Buwayh*, pp. 150-151.

reduced to that of an observer. As Shi'ites, the Buyids, were not conceding to the caliph the right of assuming the effective leadership of the Muslim community, neither in the political nor in the spiritual sense. The special relationship that was to prevail between the Sunnite caliph and his Shi'ite 'protectors', the Buyids, can appropriately be described as a mere *modus vivendi*, a symbiosis, rather than as a liaison of tender affection: the caliph for his part was eager to preserve his remaining last bit of influence whereas the Buyids were in need of the caliphs in order to receive a quasi-legitimation for their political domination over the Sunnite majority.

But there were probably other considerations more that were determining the Buyids to pursue this kind of *Realpolitik*, i.e their decision not to abolish the institution of the caliphate altogether, considerations that seem to be particularly momentous in the context of the circumstance of their adhering to the Twelver Shi'ite denomination: about the year 329/939 the Twelfth Imam is said to have left for his Major Occultation (*al-Ghaybat al-Kubra*). The actual assumption of the political power in Iraq by the Buyids was to take place only six years after that event. We may well assume that by that time there did not exist yet any elaborated theory for a Shi'ite government during the time of the Hidden Imam's absence.[161] We should furthermore keep in

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[161] The literature in Western languages on the significance of *Imamah* in Twelver Shi'ite thought, especially during the formative period, has increased enormously, in particular in the course of the past two decades, a development which had perhaps been stimulated by the political events in Iran, the main stronghold of the Twelvers today. The following selection, although already extensive, reflects only a fraction of the material but gives nevertheless evidence to the today prevailing and at times sharply differing, views on the subject: Wilferd Madelung, "Authority in Twelver Shi'ism in the Absence of the Imam", in: *La notion d'autorité au Moyen Age: Islam, Byzance, Occident. Colloques internationaux de la Napoule 1978*, ed. George Makdisi (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982), pp. 163-73, idem, "Shi'ism: The Imamiyyah and the Zaydiyyah", in: *Religious Trends in Early Islamic Iran* (Albany, NY: The Persian Heritage Foundation, 1988, Columbia Lectures on Iranian Studies no. 4, "Bibliotheca Persica"), pp. 77-92, Etan Kohlberg, "From Imamiyya to Ithna'ashariyya", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 39 (1976), pp. 521-34, Joseph Eliash, "The Ithna'ashari-Shi'i Juristic Theory of Political and Legal Authority," *Studia Islamica* 29 (1969), pp. 17-30, W. M. Watt, "Sidelights on Early Imamite Doctrine," *Studia Islamica* 31 (1971), pp. 286-98, Norman Calder, "Judicial Authority in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence," *Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies* 6, no. 2 (1979), pp. 104-108, Ann K. S. Lambton, "The Shi'ah: The Imamiyya", *State and Government in Medieval Islam. An Introduction to the study Of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1985), pp. 219-41,

mind that the already referred to establishment of an Isma'ili state in Egypt during the second half of the 4th/10th century was perceived as a threat by both, the Buyids *and* the caliph.

For the Shi'ite community, in turn, the Buyid domination must have meant a great relieve: the former were now in the position to participate in larger numbers and openly in public affairs. Furthermore, the Buyids, their new 'protectors', introduced several traditionally Shi'ite ceremonies as public holidays, such as the commemoration of the nomination of 'Ali b. Abi Talib by the Prophet as his successor in the leadership of the Muslim

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Norman Calder, "Doubt and Prerogative: The Emergence of an Imami Shi'i Theology of *Ijtihad*," *Studia Islamica* 70 (1989), pp. 57-78, Jasim M. Husain, "The Role of the Imamite *Wikala* with Special Reference to the first *Safir*," in: *Hamdard Islamicus* 5, no. 4 (Dec. 1982), pp. 25-52, idem, *The Occultation of the Twelfth Imam. A Historical Background* (London: The Muhammadi Trust, 1982), Verena Klemm, "Die vier *sufara'* des Zwölften *Imam*. Zur formativen Periode der Zwölfer·si'a," *Die Welt des Orients* 15 (1984), pp. 126-43, A. Sachedina, "A Treatise on the Occultation of the Twelfth Imamite Imam," *Studia Islamica* 48 (1978), pp. 108-24, Said Amir Arjomand. "Imam *Absconditus* and the Beginning of a Theology of Occultation. Imami Shi'ism *circa* 280-90 A.H./900 A.D.," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 117, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1997), pp. 1-12, idem, "The Crisis of the Im®mate and the Institution of Occultation in Twelver Shi'ism: A Sociocultural Perspective," in: *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 28, no, 4 (Nov. 1996), pp. 491-515, idem, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam. Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), especially pp. 1-23, 32-45. See also 'Abbas Iqbal, *Khandan-i Naubakhti* (Tehran: Kitabkhaneh-yi Tahuri, 1357solar/1977, 3rd edition), Hossein Modarressi, *Crisis and Consolidation in the Formative Period of Shi'ite Islam. Ab, Ja'far ibn Qiba al-Razi and His Contribution to Imamite Shi'ite Thought* (Princeton, NJ: The Darwin Press, 1993), especially pp. 1-105, Sayyid Ahmad Kazemi-Moussavi, *Religious Authority in Shi'ite Islam. From the Office of Mufti to the Institution of Marja'* (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1996), especially pp. 107 ff., Mohammad Ali Amir-Moezzi, *The Divine Guide in Early Shi'ism. The Sources of Esoterism in Islam*, trans. David Streight (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), Heinz Halm, *Shiism*, trans. Janet Watson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1991), pp. 29-58, Abdoljavad Falaturi, "Die Zwölfer-Schia aus der Sicht eines Schiiten: Probleme ihrer Untersuchung," in: *Festschrift W. Caskel, zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (5. März 1966) gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern*, ed. Ed. Erwin Graf (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), pp. 62-95. For the point of view of two eminent 20th-century Twelver Shi'ite theologians on the issue of *Imamah* refer to al-Shaykh Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar, *The Faith of Shi'a Islam* (Dubai: Ahl al-Bayt Foundation, n. d.), pp. 31-46, and al-'Allamah al-Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Al-i Kashif al-Ghita', *The Origin of Shi'ite Islam and its Principles (asl al-shi'ah wa-usuluha)* (Qumm: Ansariyan Publications, 1402 lunar/1982), pp. 42-45 and 48-55.

community,[162] or the public mourning of the martyrdom of al-Husayn b. 'Ali b. Abi Talib at the plain of Karbala' during Muharram, the first month of the Islamic year.[163] We shall return to this point later.

In their attitude towards the non- Shi'ites, the Buyids pursued a rather pragmatic policy: their actual control of the political power did certainly not result in a persecution of the Sunnite population, which, after all, constitued the vast majority of the Muslims. The Sunnites were thus not hindered to follow their various legal rites. Moreover, as we have already seen, the very existence of the caliphate was not altered by the new rulers, although they 'modified' it somewhat. A policy different from that would also not have been in the Buyids' political interest as the majority of their subjects were Sunnites. Unfortunately, although this should only alluded to here briefly because it was only to affect the post-Buyid, Saljuq period - this tolerant policy was not to bear fruits: toward the end of their rule the mob of Baghdad destroyed at several occasions the living areas of the Shi'ites in the city's district of Karkh, whereby many people perished and thousands of valuable works of scholarship burnt to ashes.[164]

Although initially of rather humble origin and intellectual backgorund, the Buyids paid subsequently prime attention towards the Twelver Shi'ite scholars. Their patronage of Ibn Babawayh (between 305 or 307-381/917 or 919-991),[165] for instance, will be referred to again below. Alongside with Ibn

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[162] See Faqihi, *Al-i Buwayh*, p. 469, and Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad (333/946-447/1055)*, p. 205.

[163] Faqihi, *Al-i Buwayh*, p. 466, and Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad (333/946-447/1055)*, p. 205. Confer Yitzhak Nakash, "An Attempt to Trace the Origin of the Rituals of 'Ashura'," *Die Welt des Islams* 33, no. 2 (1993), pp. 161-81. On the significance of the aforesaid mourning-ceremonies for the contemporary Twelver Shi'ite community see Eckard Neubauer, "*Muharram*-Bräuche im heutigen Persien," *Der Islam* 49, no. 2 (1972), pp. 249-72, Werner Ende, "The Flagellations of *Muharram* and the Shi'ite 'Ulama'," *Der Islam* 55, no. 1 (1978), pp. 19-36, and Peter J. Chelkowski (ed.), *Ta'ziyeh. Ritual and Drama in Iran* (New York: New York University Press and Soroush Press, 1979).

[164] Waheed Akhtar, *The Early Imamiyyah Shi'ite Thinkers* (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House, 1988), p. 211, decribes such incidents and gives several dates for them, most of them at the end of the Buyid rule.

[165] See on him M. Ismail Marcinkowski, "Twelver Shi'ite Scholarship and Buyid Domination. A Glance on the Life and Times of Ibn Babawayh al-Shaykh al-Saduq," *Islamic Culture* 76, no. 1 (Jan. 2002), pp. 69-99.

Babawayh, we notice a galaxy of outstanding Twelver scholars, some of which have been dealt with elsewhere by me in a more detailed fashion than it would be possible here.[166] It should be noted here only in brief that just before the takeover of the political power by the Buyids the celebrated Abu Ja'far Muhammad b. Ya'qub al-Kulayni (d. 329/941) had compiled his *Al-Kafi,* a collection of Traditions which is counted among the 'canonical' Four Books of the Twelvers.[167] Although Ibn Babawayh was not one of his direct disciples he seemed to have benefitted to a high degree from al-Kulayni as a transmitter of Traditions. Ibn Babawayh himself was among the teachers of the celebrated Twelver scholar Muhammad b. Muhammad b. al-Nu'man, known as al-Shaykh al-Mufid (336-413/948-1022), who is famous for his *usuli*-rationalist approach in legal theory. Interesting in this context is al-Mufid's controversy with his teacher in theological questions and in matters of procedure Al-Mufid gave Twelver Shi'ite theological studies a new impetus and direction: he is said to have emphasized the role of discursive theology *before* or better *side-by-side* with that of the science of Traditions.

Although initially of a somewhat lower cultural level, it is remarkable that the Buyids were in the course of time to become patrons of classical Arab-Islamic scholarship and culture.[168] Some distinguished authors of Arabic poetry, among them al-Mutanabbi (303-54/915-55),[169] lived at and from their court. Under their patronage worked also the famous anthologist Abu al-Faraj al-Isfahani (284-356/897-967) as well as Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Sabi' (313-84/925-94)[170] and the historian and philosopher Ibn al-Miskawayh (320-

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166 Refer to idem, ""Rapprochement and Fealty during the Buyids and Early Saljuqs: The Life and Times of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tusi," *Islamic Studies* (Islamabad, Pakistan), vol. 40, no. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 273-96, and idem, "Selected Aspects of the Life and Work of al-Shaykh al-Mufid (336-413/948-1022)," *Hamdard Islamicus* 23, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 2000), pp. 41-54.

167 See on him M. Ismail Marcinkowski, "Al-Kulayni and his Early Twelver-Shi'ite *Hadith*-Compendium *Al-Kafi*: Selected Aspects of the Part *Al-Usul min al-Kafi*," *Islamic Culture* 74, no. 1 (Jan. 2000), pp. 89-126.

168 Claude Cahen, "Buwayhids or Buyids," in: *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new edition, vol. 1 (1986), p. 1354.

169 Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam*, p. 276.

170 [Abu 'l-Hasan] Hilal [b. al-Muhassin b. Ab, Ishaq b. Ibrahim b. Zahrun b. Hayyun] al-Sabi, *Rusum Dar al-Khilafah (The Rules and Regulations of the 'Abbasid Court)*, trans. and intro. Elie A. Salem (UNESCO Collection of Representative Works, Arabic Series) (Beirut: Lebanese Commisssion for the Translation of Great Works, 1997), p. 1 n. 5 (translator's intro.).

421/932-1030). Abu 'Ali Ibn Sina (370-428/980-1037), the great Iranian philosopher and scientist, whom we commemorate today, served most probably as vizier at the court of Shams al-Dawlah (r. 387-412/997-1021 in al-Jibal). The same ruler had also ordered the construction of an observatory at Baghdad.[171] The libraries that were donated by the Buyids at Isfahan, Shiraz and Rayy (the last mentioned was at that time probably the largest city in Iran) were known for their excellence. Beside all this, they ordered the erection of two hospitals[172] in the two first above-mentioned cities. At least from the cultural point of view, the rule of the Buyids may thus be considered as a 'Golden Age'.[173] From the perspective of history of civilization, the arrest of the last Buyid in Baghdad, al-Malik al-Rahim (sic!) Khusraw Firuz (r. 440-47/1048-55, in Iraq), in 447/1055 by the Sunnite Saljuq Turks, marked the end of that fascinating period, although subsequenly the Saljuqs, too, were to establish themselves as new 'protectors the caliphs'.[174] The remaining ruling members of the Buyid family in Kirman, Fars/Khuzistan and al-Jibal met a similar fate.[175]

However, if we consider the Buyids from the political angle, we have to consider the fact that there were already at the early stages of their rule some indications for a steady decline of their power. Paradoxically, the signs of this decline were already detectible as early as during the first fourty years of their rule,[176] among them being the periodically recurring clashes and street-fightings between groups of the Shi'ite and Sunnite mob. Those clashes reached usually their climax in the course of the above-mentioned Shi'ite commemoration-ceremonies and left behind each time many people dead or

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171 On the role of the Buyids as patrons of astronomy refer to Aydın Sayılı, *The Observatory in Islam and its Place in the General History of the Observatory* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1960, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 7. seri, no. 38), pp. 103-58.

172 Persian: *bimaristan*. See Heribert Busse, *Chalif und Großkönig. Die Buyiden im Iraq (945-1055)* (Beirut: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1969, Beiruter Texte und Studien 6), pp. 529-532.

173 Refer to Cahen, "Buwayhids or Buyids," p. 1354, for further information.

174 Ibid., p. 1356.

175 Cahen, "Buwayhids or Buyids," p. 1356, and Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad (333/946-447/1055)*, p. 115. It should be noted that Buyid rule lasted in Fars under a another member of the family until 454/1062.

176 After the death of the capable 'Adud al-Dawlah Fana Khusraw in 372/983. For a concised desription of that period refer to Cahen, *Der Islam I. Vom Ursprung bis zu den Anfängen des Osmanenreiche*s, pp. 246-52.

wounded. It is significant for the degree of their weakness that the Buyids were unable to prevent such bloody incidents, which was a further factor for their declining prestige in the eyes of their subjects. Another factor was the circumstance that the Buyids, too, used to surround themselves with Turkish slave soldiers rather than relying on their own Daylamite countrymen. The continuation of this 'Abbasid practice was to contribute further to the final collapse of their rule, as could be observed when the Buyids had to defend themselves first against the invading Turkish Ghaznavids[177] and then the Saljuqs. A further circumstance that contributed to the increasing instability of Buyid rule was the prevailing disunity among the members of their own family, especially at times when discontent concerning the questions of seniority, power-sharing and distribution of territory arose.

Serious was also the prevailing economic situation,[178] exemplified by the steady decline of the value of the silver coinage. Moreover, because of their internal political difficulties the Buyids were in most cases unable to control piracy in the Persian Gulf, as well as highway-robbery on the main land-routes: rebels in the southern parts of Iraq threatened at times even Baghdad. Among the disastrous results of this development was that the overseas trade began to shift its route from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea which was at that time under the control of the Isma'ili state in Egypt.[179] The Buyids were in this way prevented from securing a lasting and stabile economic foundation for their rule, which resulted in a chronic lack of money, which led, in turn, to a steady increase of taxes.[180]

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[177] On the rise of the Ghaznavids and specic aspects of their rule to Clifford Edmund Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids. Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 994-1040* (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1973, 2d ed.), idem, "The Early Ghaznavids," in: *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 4, pp. 162-97, idem, "The Development of Persian Culture under the Early Ghaznavids," *Iran* 6 (1968), pp. 33-44, idem, "The Titulature of the Early Ghaznavids," *Oriens* 15 (1962), pp. 210-33, idem, "The Imperial Policy of the Early Ghaznavids," *Islamic Studies* 1, no. 3 (1962), pp. 49-82.

[178] Faqihi, *Al-i Buwayh*, pp. 389-436.

[179] Cahen, "Buwayhids or Buyids," p. 1355. Refer on the economic decline also to Busse, *Chalif und Großkönig*, pp. 353-401, and Kabir, *The Buwayhid Dynasty of Baghdad (333/946-447/1055)*, pp. 145-66.

[180] Cahen, "Buwayhids or Buyids," p. 1355.

Significant within the context of the formation of present-day Shi'ite as well as Iranian culture is introduction of certain public holidays or festivals with an explicitely Shi'ite character by the Buyids, as already mentioned earlier. Among them is the celebration of 'Ghadir al-Khumm'[181] on the eighteenth of the lunar month of Dhu 'l-Hijjah, which marks in the understanding of the Shi'ites the commemoration of the Prophet's nomination of 'Ali b. Abi Talib as his successor in the political and spiritual leadership of the Muslims. The second and perhaps even more expressive ceremony introduced by the Buyids is the *public* mourning during the first ten days of the lunar month of Muharram in remembrance of the martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson al-Husayn b. 'Ali b. Abi Talib at Karbala' in 61/680. The ceremonies reached their climax on the ninth *(tasu'a)* and tenth *('ashura')* day of that month.[182] Although this particularly awful event, which is usually also deplored by Sunnites, had been commemorated in the one or other way during pre-Buyid times, its *institutionalization* helped to strengthen the solidarity among the members of the Twelver community. Both ceremonies, i.e. the remembrance of 'al-Ghadir' and the Muharram-mourning, constitute nowadays integral parts of Shi'ite social life, in particular in Iran.

The Buyid rule was furthermore vital for the later historical development of the Twelver Shi'ah and the further elaboration of its thought. Although the Buyids observed usually tolerance towards the other Muslim creeds, they became particularly known as patrons of the Twelver scholars. Under their protection flourished high-caliber scholars, among them the traditionist Ibn Babawayh, the compiler of one of the four 'canonical' *hadith*-collections of the Twelvers *(al-Kutub al-Arba'ah)*, and the jurist and theologian Shaykh al-Ta'ifah al-Tusi (385-460/995-1067), who contributed two more collections of Traditions to those 'Four Books'. Furthermore, the two brothers Abu'l-Hasan Muhammad b. al-Husayn, known as al-Sharif al-Radi (359-406/970-1015),[183] and 'Ali b. al-Husayn al-Sharif al-Murtada (355-436/967-1044),[184]

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[181] Faqihi, *Al-i Buwayh*, p. 469.

[182] Ibid., p. 466.

[183] Refer to Akhtar, *The Early Imamiyyah Shi'ite Thinkers*, pp. 123-175. Valuable material on him is to be found in Al-Mirza al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al- Musawi al-Isfahani al-Khwansari, *Rawdat al-Jannat*, 8 vols. (Tehran: Maktabah Isma'iliyan, 1390 AH lunar), vol. 6, pp. 190-209, al-'Allamah Muhammad Muhsin al-Tihrani Agha Buzurg, *Tabaqat A'lam al-Shi'ah*, 4 vols. (Qumm Mu'assasah-yi Isma'iliyan, n.d.), vol. 2, pp. 164-65 and Al-Imam al-

descendents of the Prophet and Twelvers, had been acclaimed for their expertise and eloquence in the Arabic language. Al-Sharif al-Radi, in particular, is well-known for his *Nahj al-Balaghah*, a collection of the sermons and speeches which are usually ascribed to ʻAli b. Abi Talib, whereas al-Sharif al-Murtada is renowned for his contributions towards the principles of jurisprudence *(usul al-fiqh)*. Both of them were furthermore celebrated poets. They were also politically influential, a fact which was symbolized by the bestowment upon them of a variety of high ranking offices by the Buyid rulers, such as that of the *naqib* of the descendents of ʻAli b. Abi Talib (a.s.). Al-Mufid's relations with the Buyid authorities too can be concidered as cordial. When in 402/1011-12 the eminent Sunnite and Twelver Shiʻite scholars of that time were asked by the ʻAbbasid caliph al-Qadir (r. 381-422/991-1031) and the Buyids to sign a document, which was to refute the claim of the Isma'ili rulers of Egypt of being descendents of the Prophet, al-Mufid did not hold back with his cooperation.[185]

The achievements of the Buyids with regard to what is usually termed as a 'revival of national feeling' within the context of Iranian history is usual being underestimated, in comparison with the role played by the much later Safavids.[186] If we were to continue considering the significance of the Buyid period within the framework of Iranian history and the Iranian nation we could even state that the Buyids - although Muslims - re-established 'traditional' Iranian kingship by consciously referring back to the days of the by-gone pre-Islamic Sasanid period. As a matter of fact, the Buyids ruled

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Sayyid Abu ʻl-Qasim al-Musawi al-Khu'i, *Muʻjam Rijal al-Hadith*, 23 vols. (Qumm: Markaz-i Nashr-i Athar-i Shiʻah, 1410 AH lunar), vol. 16, no. 10589, pp. 19-23.

184 Refer to Carl Brockelmann, "Al-Murtada", *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new editon, vol. 7 (1986), p. 634, Akhtar, *The Early Imamiyyah Shiʻite Thinkers*, pp. 177-204, Faqihi, *Al-i Buvayh*, pp. 324-25, Al-Khwansari, *Rawdat al-Jannat*, vol. 4, pp. 294-314, Agha Buzurg, *Tabaqat Aʻlam al-Shiʻah*, vol. 2, pp. 120-21, Al-Sayyid Muhammad b. Mahdi al-Tabataba'i Bahr al-ʻUlum, *Fawa'id al-Rijaliyyah*, 4 vols. (Tehran. Maktabah al-Sadiq, 1363 AH solar), vol. 3, pp. 87-155, Al-Khu'i, *Muʻjam Rijal al-Hadith*, vol. 11, no. 8063, pp. 370-374.

185 Martin J. McDermott, *The Theology of Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid* (d. 413/1022) (Beirut: dar el-Machreq, 1986), pp. 20-21, Akhtar, *The Early Imamiyyah Shiʻite Thinkers*, p. 81.

186 See M. Ismail Marcinkowski, "The Reputed Issue of the 'Ethnic Origin' of Iran's Safavid Dynasty (907-1145/1501-1722): Reflections on Selected Prevailing Views," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* 49, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 2001), pp. 5-19, and idem, *Mirza Rafi'a's Dastur al-Muluk: A Manual of Later Safavid Administration* (introduction).

over much as the same territories as the Sasanids. Their revival of the ancient pre-Islamic Iranian title *Shahanshah,* 'King of the Kings', seems even to point into the same direction. In addition, the re-application of this title seems also to display certain 'secular' tendencies from their part. During the Buyid period, a certain tendency towards political quietism could be ascribed to Shi'ite scholars, such as Ibn Babawayh, since the latter's friendship with Rukn al-Dawlah seems to indicate an approval from his part for the Buyids' role as *factual* rulers of the Muslims. The Buyids *administered* the affairs of the state in accordance with the demands of the respective prevailing political situation, without claiming the power in the name of the Hidden Imam.

In conclusion, it is beyond any doubt that the course of Iran's history in general, as well as the development Muslim scholarship and learning might have taken another direction without Buyid political support, patronage and encouragement to scholarship in the background.

THE REVIVAL OF AL-QADARIYA IN MODERN ISLAMIC THOUGHT

Muhammad Kamal

To commence a discussion of human freedom in Islamic thought it is necessary to outline an understanding of the meaning of the two counter conceptions of fatalism and determinism, otherwise the Arabic term 'al-Qadariya', which is used for the doctrine of free will, is misleading. Fatalism, as interpreted by Muslim theologians, is understood as theistic determinism (al-Jabariya), and is quite distinct from scientific determinism developed by some Western thinkers under the sway of a scientific understanding of nature and human action, are subject to inevitable predestination, that is to say all things happen according to fate; (*al-qadar*) the way it is pre-ordained and foreknown by God. This analysis of the meaning of the term fatalism accepts the idea of causation; that God causes human beings to act and decide upon them in a certain way and that God knows in advance all relationship between the events in terms of cause and effect and reduces the role of God in the world by patting emphasis on natural forces and conditions surrounding human life.

Before we begin a discussion of the doctrine of free will in detail and analyze its theo-political and ethical implications, it is noteworthy to mention that the term 'fatalism' (al-Qadariya) was used by the Arabs before the rise of Islam in the *Jahilliyya* period. Heiner Ringgren, in his work on Arabian fatalism, explains that the term (*qadar*) was widely used in Arabia to describe the powerlessness and passivity of human existence in the face of life events in three distinct ways;

- To express generally the notion of predestination,
- To describe the ides of allotment, particularly associated with the event of death,
- And finally the term was used in reference to time or destiny.[187]

Abu Aqil Labid, an Arab poet of the pre-Islamic period who embraced Islam in 630 A.D., expresses the ideas above thus;

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[187]. Ringgren, Helmer. *Studies in Arabian Fatalism*. Uppsala. 1955. pp. 6-11.

Yet do not grieve, if Time has parted us for ever;

The day must come when Fate falls upon every man.

Men are as desert encampments, whose brief inhabitants

One day quit with the dawn, and they remain desolate;

Like the palm of a hand, fingers clutching at emptiness.[188]

There are other verses ascribed to Labid where the term 'fate' is used in a more, general meaning which is thought that Labid used it under the influence of Islam:

What was given to you, Allah sent,

What you were denied the decree (qadar) did not bring.'[189]

But the term *al-qadar* is used in the converse sense by Muslim theologians of medieval time when describing a doctrine of free will or al-*Ikhtiyar*. Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (260/873-324/937), the founder of the Ash'arite school, has come with an explanation saying that; 'The *qadari* is that who affirms that the *qadar* is his own and not his own and not his Lord's, and that he himself determines his Creator.'[190] Al-Ash'ari's, in his analysis, has not given the etymological meaning of the term but rather he has tried to define it in Islamic-theological context which was commonly used during his time. The original meaning of the term *al-qadar* in Arabic language and its usage by the Arabs of *jahilliya* still stand for something quite opposite to the concept of free will, and the title '*Qadariya*', in the history of Islamic thought is associated with a cluster of theologians who advocate a doctrine whose meaning is distinct from the literal meaning of *al-qadar*.

The problem of free will, however, become a central theological issue in medieval Islam, particularly with the rise of the Mu'tazila school, but the Mu'tazilites were not the first to raise this issue. The problem as to whether human beings were free to determine their own destiny, whether their being

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188. Arberry, A. J. *The Seven Odes*. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1957. p. 126.
189. Ringgren, Helmer. *op. cit*., p.10
190. Watt, M. *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*. London: Luzac Co., 1948.pp.32-33.

was determined by the will of God, is one of the central disputes in a rift within the Kharijite movement. For the first time the Ajarrad-Kharijites split into two sub-groups, the Maimunites and the Shu'aib ites.[191] The reason for this division originated in an argument between Maimun and Shu'aib (the leaders of thegroups). Shu'aib had some money belonging to Maimun, and when Maimun demanded repayment Shu'aib said to him: "I shall give it to you, if God wills. Maimun replied: God has willed it, I could not have done otherwise than give it to you." Maimun continued by saying: "Verily, God has willed what he commanded; what He did not command, He did not will; and what He did not will, He did not command." Then they wrote about their dispute to Abdul Karim bin Ajarrad, their leader, who was in prison. Abdul Karim responded by saying that: "what God willed came about, and what He did not will did not come about; and we do not fix evil upon Him."[192] Maimun and Shu'aib both believed that their leader had approved their views and were therefore separated, forming two different groups. The followers of Maimunm the Maimunites, were know for their belief in free will and claimed that although God was omnipotent, no evil should be attributed to Him. Therefore, the Shu'aib ites, followers of Shu'aib, became the forerunners of the adherents to fatalism in Islamic theology. There were also some thinkers who advocated *Qadariya* before the Mu'tazilites and influenced them, thinkers such as Umar al-Maqsus, Ma'bad al-Jahani and Ghailan al-Damashqi, who were executed by the Umayyad rulers for advocating the doctrine of free will. Umar al-Maqsus was a teacher of Mu'awiya bin Yazid, accused of corrupting the mind of young Mu'awiya and was executed in 699 A.D. Ghailan al-Damsahqi, was crucified in Damascus and Ma'bad was executed by Hajaj, the ruler of Iraq.[193]

The Mu'tazilites are thought to be advocates of the al-Qadariya doctrine without dispute, who believed that the validity of values and human actions were grounded on the decisions arrived at thought reason. Accordingly, they argued for human freedom on the basis of rationality rather than on faith and tried to avoid all contradictions that existed between the notions of Divine Justice and fatalism. The idea of the existence of an omnipotent Creator and human freedom, which was thought incompatible by some Western thinkers

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191. *ibid*., p.49.
192. *Ibid.*
193. Al-Dainuri, Ibn Qutaiba. *Al-Imama we al-Siysa*. Cairo. 1966.

such as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Jean Paul Sartre, (1905-1981) seemed to co-exist for the Mu'tazilites as they believed that God assigned human beings to Hell or Paradise on the basis of their freedom of actions. The Mu'tazilites, however, were accused of been influenced by non-Islamic theology,[194] and this accusation may not be from the truth as the Middle East was the centre for intellectual interaction between the theologians of Islam and other religions in the area. It is clear that St. Augustine (354-430 A.D) discussed this before the Mu'tazilites in The City of God, and his idea of the compatibility between the freedom of the will and God's foreknowledge has been transmitted to Islamic theology. Augustine's idea was developed in response to Civero (106-43 B.C.) who rejected God's foreknowledge of future so that there would be no prediction of events, and human actions would be free. Cicero's argument is quite simple to understand, as it asserts that if fatalism prevails, then there could be no free will. Against Cicero, Augustine argues that God, as the Creator of all beings, has bestowed power in them to will, but all wills, i.e., wicked wills, are human products because wickedness cannot be ascribed to God. And it is not then the case to say that since God foreknows what will happen to an individual, there is therefore nothing in the power of our wills, "Prayers, also, are of avail to procure those things which he foreknew that He would grant to those who offered them; and with justice have rewards been appointed for good deeds, and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore sin because God for knew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be doubted but that it is the man himself who sins, because, He, whose of foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew not that fate, or fortune, or something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who, if he wills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this did God foreknow."[195] The Mu'tazilites argue along much the same lines as St. Augustine by suggesting that God's for knowledge does not signify human beings have no innate power or that their power is pre-ordained to perform their duties, because this interpretation is in contradiction with the notion of Divine Justice. As a consequence of this, they become fully responsible for their sins and no evil can be attributed to God.[196] Accordingly, the existence of God is not perceived as a limitation on

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194. Jarallah, Zuhdi Hassa. *Al-Mutazilah*. Cairo: Matbah Misr. 1947. p.

195. Augustine, Saint. *The City of God*. Trs Marcus Dods. London: Edingburgh House. 1892. Book V. p.169.

196. Al-Shahristani. *Al-Milal wa al-Nihal*. Beirut: Dar al-Ma'arif. 1975. Vol.1, p. 47.

human actions as human beings are left to themselves, free to perform their duties. When we think about the doctrine of Qadariya and its application in a political context, it means that the ruler shall be held responsible for his unjust deeds on the grounds that human actions are the result of choice, rather than the result of decree by God. This understanding of human freedom paves the road to critical thinking thereby holding people morally responsible; and due to this some rulers, in order to cover their own absolute despotism, patronized the traditionalist thought to fight the views of the advocates of free will on the basis of a challenge to the authority of the Caliph. The advocates of free will were also branded as heretics and subsequently punished. Ibn Batta, a Hanbelite scholar (d. 997 A.D.) openly condemned the revolt against the rules, identifying obedience to authority with religious obligation.[197] It should be noted that al-Qadariya was preached for the first time by the Kharijite Muslims who opposed the Umayyad rulers, and this could be counted as another reason for the Umayyads to be hostile towards the adherents of *Qadariya.*

Further ti this, the *Qadariya* promulgated a forceful attitude towards novelty and renewal, by interpreting matters relating to morel and legal problems. This view that human beings are free provides grounds for there being no place for any finality in understanding and interpreting of legal and moral issues. As a consequence of this the gates of *ijtihad* (interpretation of the text and jurisdiction) will remain open and there will be a constant need demand for reform in religious thoughts.

Muslim modernist thinkers were inspired by the rationalist theology of the Mu'tazilites and review their ideas for understanding Islamic thought, attempting to redefine the doctrine of *Qadariya* without which reform was unthinkable. But before we move on to discuss their views of human freedom we should say a few words about modernism in Islam. Islamic modernism is a religious reform movement came into existence under the sway of scientific development of Western societies and Protestantism in the second half of the 19th century by some Muslim scholars from Indian sub-continent and the Middle East. These scholars were seeking a rationalist theology along the line of the Mu'tazila and compatibility between Islam and science. They called for a return to the essentials of Islam or the Qur'an as

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[197]. Lapidus, Ira, *M. A History, of Islamic Societies.* Cambrigde University Press. 1988. p. 183.

the only authentic source and divine document for Muslims, rejecting the *Sunnah* and *taqlid,* opposing the idea of relying on the teaching and methodology of other jurists without exercising one's own reasoning in dealing with novel legal cases. Ahmad Khan, the founder of Islamic modernism in India, stressed the necessity of independent reasoning and concluded the *ulema* were free to reinterpret Islamic jurisdiction as they thought fit and they should be allowed to exercise their right to *ijtihad.* He also insisted on secularization of politics in the Muslim world and came very close to the notion of a distinction between what is sacred and what is profane in social life, considering the former to be private or rather personal and the latter public. Muslim modernist thinkers believed Islamic theology suffered stagnation and turned into a dogma in the hands of the traditionalist Muslims, who they believed were in need of new reflections on the old values in order to assess new conditions prevalent in their current society. These new reflections should be able to apprehend the problems and requirements of their current circumstances and therefore provide solutions to the problems and hopefully answers to immediate questions. The need for a new interpretation of Islam, however, should capture the spirit of its own time simply by reflections upon and recognizing of change.

However, an attempt at any kind of reform presupposes recognition of human freedom. Unless human freedom is recognized it will be unlikely to get away with the dogmatic tenets of institutionalized and formalistic interpretations of religious decrees. Now we attempt the spirit of the modern Islamic thought which has come up with the idea of reform and argue that reform is possible only when human freedom is fully realized to exercise its power to bring about changes. This implies that no reform movement can deliver its message without first recognizing the significance of the *al-Qadariya* doctrine and its message without first recognizing the significance of the *al-Qadariya* doctrine and its struggle against the dogmas of orthodoxy and the obstruction rigid view erect in the path of cultural progress. Generally speaking, Muslim modernist thinkers can be divided into three groups;

1. The adherents to scientific determinism.
2. The adherents to soft determinism.
3. The adherents to free will.

As I understand the views of the first group outlined above; including such thinkers such as Ahmed Khan (1817-1898), Shibli Nu'mani (1857-1914), Maulana Hali (1837-1924), and Amir Ali (1849-1928), are close to an Aristotelian interpretation of causation; in the sense that these thinkers consider God to be the First Cause of the universe and that God has no direct influence on human life, as there is a chain of cause and effect sequence between what happens in individual's life and the First Cause. It is not wrong to say that God is the original cause of everything, but that does not mean God is a direct cause and interferes in human life. On their view the events in life occur in accordance with the laws of nature, or they are determined by natural causes and these natural laws are given by God. This picture of the world dominated by natural laws and the sequence of cause and effect is a further emphasis on the point that God does not interfere arbitrarily and whatever happens is not due to fate. Maulana Hali, for examples, remarks that, "Even those who hold this belief (fatalism) do not desist from making appropriate efforts in everyday life. They will repair their houses, put their valuables under lock and key and will not leave their house open, if there is no inmate in it. But when they are faced with a difficult situation whose causes are a little bit complicated, they begin to talk of destiny and trust in God".[198] Maulana Hali's thought stands against fatalism but paradoxically it accommodates scientific determinism, for he interprets the events in human history scientifically and considers the acceptance of the sequence of cause and effect among natural phenomena and the role of natural order and its governance by universal law to be fundamental for religious belief.[199] Looking at the Qur'an, Ahmad Khan believes that certain verses can be understood as stressing the fact that the Creator is the prime cause, and that therefore, all other causes exist only through the prime cause which clearly describes the events in human life in terms of causal relationships or determinism. But the Qur'an is asking to investigate into human life and only thought this investigation the problem of predestination and free will can be analyzed and be solved. Under the influence of western scientific knowledge and be solved. Under the influence of western scientific knowledge and rationalism, this Muslim tinker goes further stating that

198. Siddiqi, Mazheruddin. "General Characteristics of Muslim Modernism", *Islamic Studies.* Vol. IX, No.1, March 1970. Islamabad. p.40.

199. Abduh, Muhammad. *Al-Islamic Wal-Nasraniya Ma'a al-IIm wal Madaniya.* Cairo.1935. p. 182

human beings are born with a 'nature' which is pre-given and precedes their existence on this planet.[200] This concept of human nature which is a common belief of religious thought and modern philosophy, particularly the Cartesian school, presupposes the idea that human reality is a self-substance or a knowing subject and conceives it as a pure, 'worldless entity'. Although human beings are strikingly different form that of other entities in the world, but are still determined by their pre-given nature which involves 'what' or 'properties' of their beings created by God. It is true that human beings are free in the sense that they can always respond to a situation in various ways; but whatever response they perform is in accordance with their 'nature'. Human freedom, therefore, is possible only in terms of limited responses to circumstances and Ahmad khan believes that all Quranic verses which are dealing with predestination must be interpreted in light of this limited freedom of human nature. As we see, Ahmed khan's argument against fatalism does not tackle the problem of free will. His determinism, as it is directed against fatalism, plays down the morel issue, that is how a human nature'.

The notion of punishment in Ahmed khan's moral philosophy is distinct from what generally understood by Muslims. It is not based on the idea of resurrection of earthly bodies on the Day of Judgment, but on the idea of the resurrection of human life in a non-corporeal form. He described a bodily resurrection.[201] And therefore, Judgment, Paradise, and Hell should be understood metaphorically, and all Quranic verses dealing with moral evil and goodness are aiming at awakening human beings to obey commands of God and respect divine prohibitions.[202] Maulana Shibli Nu'mani, based on the law of causation, is not in contradiction with Islam, stating that if everything in nature is dominated by God's direct interference, then why Muslims do enjoy victory at one time and suffer defeat at another? One way to understand this is through an analysis of the natural causes which contribute to the victory or the defect of Muslims at various times.

These thinkers, as we see, have rejected fatalism or the view that God determines all outcomes independently of human efforts of wishes, so that

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200. Panipati, Isamil (ed.). *Maqalat-e-Sir Sayyid*. Vol 13.Lahore.1962. p. 199.
201. Ibid., p.332.
202. Ibid., p.336.

evil should not be attributed to God or as Plato says, 'God should not be bland',[203] but then they have accepted scientific understanding of human society is a total negation of fatalism, scientific determinism has something of human society is a total negation of fatalism, scientific determinism has something of human society is a total negation of fatalism, scientific determinism has something in common with fatalism, the denial of human freedom, "Human conduct is by no means fortuitous, one act is the result of another; and life, destiny and character means the connected series of incidents which are related to each other, as cause and effect by an ordained law, the assignment of God."[204] The second group of Muslim modernist thinkers does not agree with the views of the first group completely, because as we know scientific determinism leaves with no room for freedom of choice. This second group includes Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Fazlur Rahman (d. 1988) who advocated the doctrine of Acquisition developed by Al-Ash'ari in the 9th century. According to this doctrine, human will is not original, but rather is derived from the will of God; for this reason one cannot say he/she is absolutely free. Therefore, since human beings are not the creators of their own power and will, they have a limited freedom which can be defined as freedom to choose between virtue and vice. Al-Baqilani, one of the Ash'arite thinkers, explains that all intentional activities in human life are created by God but their modes are produced by human beings. The ability to speak, for example, is given by God, and from this whatever we speak and whenever we want to speak, is our choice. Perhaps with the development of such type of arguments of free choice there would be less chance to be in conflict with the dominant traditionalist view of the doctrine of Acquisition which ascribes Creation for everything to God only, and at the same time does not claim every event in human life to be caused by some other event. Since human beings are endowed with power and a free will then all events or states of affairs are not produced by a transcendent causation. The will, which causes the events in life, although it is not original, is immanent, and only in this sense can one make a distinction between the movements of physical entities and events in human life. Unwilling to accept scientific determinism and abandon free will, these Muslim thinkers have tried to

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203. Plato, *The Republic*. Book X, 617e

204. Ali, Amir. *Spirit of Islam*. London: Christophers. 1955. p.635

endorse *compatibilism* and take the middle position. They speak of freedom as the power of doing according to what one wills, but that power is not original.

The third group of Muslim modernist thinkers, advocating *al-qadariya,* is mainly position. They speak of freedom as the power of doing to what one wills, but that power is not original.

The third group of Muslim modernist thinkers, advocating *al-qadariya*, is mainly represented by Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938). Iqbal is the most outstanding poet philosopher of the Indian subcontinent and was the inspiration for the creation of Pakistan. He admitted that claim of the present generation of Muslim liberals to re-interpret the foundational legal principles, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of social life, is, in my opinion, perfectly justified'.[205] Iqbal studied philosophy in Cambridge and Munich and was fully cognizant of the philosophic debates being pursued in Europe. Initially a disciple of Nietzsche, Bergson, Bradley and Mc Taggart he was familiar with the ideas of *übermensch*, dynamics of consciousness, vitalism and creative evolution. Under the influence of these thinkers, particularly Nietzsche and Bergson, he made a distinction between rational knowledge and knowledge by religious experience outside the domain of reason, further he interpreted consciousness as something which is not space-bound and is in constant change, and believing that Nietzsche's idea of the *übermensch* should be given special attention as Muslim society was in need of these types of individuals (*Mard-e-Momin*) for reconstructing higher morality reflecting the linkage between Divinity and temporally.[206] Continuing this idea and searching for the highest potentiality of human existence, he insisted that super-human beings should be armed with passion or love "*ishq*", rather than with reason, the vital way of the Dionysusian motif being strong an adventurous, as natural passion is fearless and bold. In this manner, Iqbal's thought thus expands upon the idea of connection between religious morality, human freedom and art which is one of the strongest creative flavors of his poetry;

Reason is ruthless; love is even more,

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[205].Iqbal, Muhammad. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Lahore. 1962. p. 180.
[206]. Ibid., p.115

Purer, nimbler and more unafraid.

Lost in the maize of cause and effect is reason;

Love strikes boldly in the field of action.[207]

His relation to Nietzsche was also critical as he accused him for bein a nihilist and negated the profession of faith or the acknowledgement of God's sovereignty. Iqbal has tried to understand Nietzsch's *übermensch* in religious terms and his advocacy of human freedom is presupposed by the way human consciousness is understood by him as something substantially distinct from material reality, and cannot be studied in the light of the laws of nature. According to him, the laws of nature are developed by consciousness to understand material reality and hence they are not applied to consciousness to understand material reality and hence they are not applied to consciousness. There is no way to think that consciousness would be bound by its own laws and can be studied scientifically. His interpretation of the Fall and of Satan's seduction of Adam is the best example for him to prove that human beings are in constant struggle to achieve perfection as that event gave the father of mankind the possibility of enjoying labour and strife to cultivate all possibilities in life, and this can be understood only if human freedom is taken into a consideration. Against fatalism, Iqbal argues that future events are not foreknown by God, because they are mere possibilities that might come into existence with human initiation.[208] Further Iqbal states that although the *Qur'an,* still there are verses which clearly deal with freedom of consciousness; for example where it is written that human beings are free to choose their religion, it is up to them whether they choose to do good or evil.[209] In this way, Islam does not negate the freedom of the human ego, but rather restores it, by bringing it closer to God through a sense of their moral responsibilities.

In the conclusion, Muslim modernist thinkers have rejected fatalism in order to defend *ijtihad* and their reform movement. But most of them, with the exception of Iqbal, have accepted scientific determinism whilst being

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207. Iqbal, Muhammad. *The Secrets of Selflessness.* Translated by A. J. Arberry. London. 1953. p. 26.
208. Iqbal, Muhammad. *Op.cit.,*.p. 80.
209. The Qur'an 18:28, 17:7.

aware of the potential for this doctrine negating human freedom and responsibility. The only common point between scientific determinism and the doctrine of free will is that both of these doctrines have one enemy, namely, fatalism, and Muslim modernist thinkers from Ahmad Khan to Abduh, with the exception of Iqbal, have failed, in their attempt to a advocate scientific determinism, to liberate the Muslim mind from the doom of fatalism. It is true that scientific determinism stands against fatalism but it does not endorse free will.

THE TRADITION OF IQBAL'S POETRY ON CANVAS

Ambreen Salahuddin

Abdur Rehman Chughtai illustrated poetry from *Diwan-e-Ghalib* and he named the pictorial collection *Muraqqa-e-Chughtai*. Allama Iqbal wrote its foreword in English. He concisely narrated the salient features of Fine Arts. He also wrote that all the forms of Art are yet to take their best form as far as Islamic Arts are concerned, with the exception of the art of architecture. He appreciated Chughtai's creations and hoped that the final acceptance of Chughtai's abilities will emerge in the times to come.

Javid Iqbal has written in his book *Zinda Rood* that he himself became interested in drawing during the early years of his school-life, Iqbal was happy at this and, to further refine the artistic taste of his son, he brought some books and perhaps also some other material of drawing for him. But Javid Iqbal's interest was just transitory.

Iqbal was happy when *Javid Namah* got published. He was satisfied with this creation. It was his heart's desire to get *Javid Namah* painted as he was much inspired by the illustrated editions of the works of Dante and Goethe. He predicted that the person, who will paint *Javid Namah* would get honour and eminence.

It is said that Ustaad Allah Bukhsh illustrated some creations of Iqbal in his life but no proof of this claim could be gathered. The creator of *Muraqqa-e-Chughtai* could have attempted to illustrate some theme of *Javid Namah*. Chughtai's elder brother, Dr. Abdullah Chughtai had close ties with Iqbal. Seeing all these reason, it is quite possible that when Iqbal was asked to write the preface of *Muraqqa-e-Chughtai*, Chughtai had in his heart the desire to paint Iqbal's poetry as well. So, in the preface to the *Aml-e-Chughtai*, what he had written seems quite correct. He writes under the title, "Fard aur Jama'at":

> Iqbal had the desire to publish a comprehensive pictorial edition of his works. Iqbal used to say that when his health will allow, he will translate *Javid Namah* into English, will arrange it, include Chughtai's

paintings in it and will present it for Noble Prize. I also made Iqbal's desire, my wish.

In the second preface of *Aml-e-Chughtai*, he has written under the title, "Deedan digar Amoz":

> Today Iqbal's desire is being fulfilled. He was much inspired by the pictorial editions of Goethe and Dante and he always made it felt that his poetry should also be transferred into lines and colours.

Abdur Rehman Chughtai's *Aml-e-Chughtai* came into public view in the 60's. General Ayyub Khan was in power and being the President of Pakistan, he awarded hundred thousand rupees to the late Mr. Chughtai on his great artistic achievement. Lahore Arts Council (Alhamra) held an exhibition of Chughtai's works. The paintings were put on display in the tin-made art gallery and the white tents in the lawns of the Lahore Arts Council. People passing by the Mall Road watched this graceful and fascinating view for days together. The details presented here are the beginning of the tradition of Iqbal's poetry presented on canvas.

It was probably the summer of 1969, when National Book Council of Pakistan, Lahore, organized the launching ceremony of a booklet containing some black and white drawings of Iqbal's poetry. These were the creations of the famous leader of Muslim league Ch. Muhammad Ahsan Aleague (late), father of the Pakistan People's Party's leader Ch. Aitezaz Ahsan Dr. Javid Iqbal presided over the ceremony. Renowned Iqbal scholar Prof. Muhammad Munawwar Mirza and famous artist Aslam Kamal spoke on the occasion. In 1970's, Azir Zoobi made number of Illustrations from "Shikwa" and "Jawab-e-Shikwa". This famous sculptor and calligrapher belonged to Lahore and resided in Karachi. The illustrations were made in Black and White. An exhibition was held at the Pakistan National Center in Alfalah Building. Iqbal was portrayed as a pure Punjabi youth in these works.

During the same times, famous painter, calligrapher and book cover designer, Aslam Kamal's art was blooming. When the late Sajjad Haider (Executive Director, Punjab Arts Council) heard that Aslam Kamal was painting Iqbal, he contacted him immediately and planned to hold an exhibition of his works. The year 1977 was already announced to be

celebrated in the name of Iqbal, as "Iqbal Year". It was the hundredth birthday of the great poet-philosopher. Near the end of this year, a group exhibition was held displaying the creations of Sadequain, Chughtai, Aslam Kamal and Abbasi Abidi (Principal, National College of Arts). The then Governor of Punjab inaugurated the exhibition. The works of Chughtai and Abbasi Abidi were displayed at the miniature gallery. The paintings of Sadequain were exhibited at the gallery of contemporary painting. The precious "Ghandhara Art Gallary" of Lahore Museum was evacuated for displaying the paintings of Aslam Kamal. This was probably the first exhibition of its kind in Lahore, which generated a lot of interest in the cultural life of Lahore and entailed for quite a period of time. Pakistan Television showed the exhibition several times and the newspapers published features and reviews for so many weeks. The Pakistanis generally and the residents of Lahore in particular have a deep sense of closeness with Iqbal, his poetry and his message. So, the exhibition was a great success.

Aslam Kamal's paintings were appreciated a lot, especially his black and white drawings, being excellent in skill and expertise. The students from the Dept. of Fine Arts (University of the Punjab) and National College of Arts, situated in the same vicinity, were seen all the time gathered around the paintings of Aslam Kamal. The close association between the paintings and the poetry was mostly discussed. Sadequain was known for the colossal size of his paintings but the paintings of Aslam Kamal, shown in this exhibition, outsized those of Sadequain. This aspect really amazed everyone.

The People kept on comparing the works of Aslam Kamal and Sadaquain. Aslam Kamal's paintings showed grandeur and majesty. The freshness and the abundance of colors truly reflected Iqbal's optimism. Famous thinker, writer and critique, Feteh Muhammad Malik expressed his appreciation in a single sentence of only seven words where in every word contains a world of meanings. He said: "Today the first Pakistani Painter is born".

In the year 1982, Artist Jimmy Engineer was asked by Justice (Retd.) Javid Iqbal to illustrate verses from *Javid Namah*. Under his guidance, Jimmy Engineer painted a wall of his home's drawing room, situated at the main Boulevard, Gulberg. Iqbal Academy published a pictorial edition of *Javid Namah* containing these paintings. But this pictorial edition did not get any appraisals. The portrayal of Iqbal and Rumi and other characters was not

effective and it was devoid of any thought as well. The reason was probably that the artist did not know Urdu, Persian languages and was unaware of the grandeur of Iqbal's thought and message.

In 1938, the Punjab Council of the Arts again held an exhibition at the Free Mason Hall, Mall Road, Lahore. It was the same exhibition that was arranged in 1977 displaying the works of the same four artists (Sadequanin, Chughtai, Aslam Kamal and Abbasi Abidi).

The Punjab Arts Council organized the above-mentioned exhibition once again in 1984 and a large number of people watched it.

In the directorship of late Muhammad Munawwar Mirza, in 1985, Iqbal Academy Pakistan, arranged exclusive exhibitions of Aslam Kamal's painting in Quetta and Hyderabad. The turn out of visitors was exceptionally good and Aslam Kamal's paintings were much appreciated.

In 1986, Aslam Kamal went to many European countries. Exhibitions of his paintings were held there and he propagated Iqbal's thought in the foreign countries through his paintings. This step introduced the tradition of illustrating Iqbal's poetry out of the national boundaries to the international Art scenario.

In 1992, Faisalabad Arts Council arranged a grand exhibition of Aslam Kamal's works at a local hotel. Held on the 9th of November, this exhibition got much approval from the magazines and new papers.

Iqbal Academy, Europe, arranged an International Seminar on "Iqbal and Fine Arts" in Birmingham (England). It was presided over by the Princess of Jordan, Prince Talal and his Pakistani wife Sarwat's daughter. Aslam Kamal was sent to represent Pakistan by the Pakistan National Council of the Arts, Islamabad. Daily *The Nation* wrote that in the history of Fine Arts, it happened for the first time that two separate exhibitions of an artist are being held on the same topic, at the same time, in two different continents. One was organized at the Fine Arts Dept of Birmingham University and the other at the Shakir Ali Museum in Lahore.

In 1997, an international conference was held in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia on "Iqbal and the Asian Renaissance". Aslam Kamal's paintings

played key role in the propagation of Iqbal's poetry at this seminar. It was an international seminar in the real sense of the word. The scholars who addressed the seminar belonged to different nationalities, countries and languages. Each one of the eminent scholars was truly impressed by Aslam Kamal's creations. So, his works at this seminar proved that painting is a real universal language.

The Director of Iqbal Academy Pakistan reports:

"The exhibition of Paintings and Drawings was given the title 'Muhammad Iqbal – An Artist's Perspective'. In a large hall, adjacent to the exhibition of the Iqbal Memorabilia. 36 paintings and 14 drawings of Aslam Kamal depicting various selected themes of Iqbal's poetry through a variety of mediums were mounted and displayed were among his best. The spell binding impact of the beauty of his art combined with the force and grandeur of Iqbalian themes captivated the visitors and they stayed on. The Acting Prime Minister, when he inaugurated the exhibition, became was visited by crowds art lovers and admirers of Iqbal. Aslam Kamal was all the time busy in his exhibition in accepting congratulations, signing autograph books and imparting the exciting experience of mysteries of painting the poetry of Allama Iqbal. Everyone of the delegates from 13 countries was keen to see him personally and to pay homage to his mastery. It was even amazing for Aslam Kamal himself that by virtue of his creative commitment to Allama Iqbal his name has been spread to these distant parts of the world along with the name and thoughts of the great poet philosopher. The appreciation and admiration it received is reflected the following comments of Dr. Natalia Prigarina from USSR which is but one of the many comments made during the exhibition".

I am deeply impressed by the work of the well-know artist Aslam Kamal. I was always fond of his paintings of Muhammad Iqbal, which I met in the books, illustrated by this painter. One may say that he created an image of Iqbal's spirituality by laconic and elegant means. His vision of Iqbal and his poetry is of high artistic merit, it combines the precise interpretation of Iqbal's poetic world and the free imagination of the master of art. His black and white graphics and full of energy and expression".

The case of the Fine Arts has always been really a delicate issue. Its evolution makes it further delicate because some events take place so speedily that historian's eyes fail to pick them up. A real work of Art springs from intuitive level, beyond the realms of observation. The Fine Arts shift from one era to another age, traveling on the ship of values and they pave the path for a creative future, being the warp and woof of tradition.

The tradition of painting Iqbal's poetry that started with the magic of Chughtai's waving lines and profound colours, continued its journey in the works of Ch. Muhammad Ahsan Aleague, Azir Zoori, Aslam Kamal, Sadquain, Abbasi Abidi, and Jimmy Engineer, who depicted Iqbal's poetry on canvas, using all the abilities of their mind and spirit.

In the afternoon of 2nd December 2000, the President of Pakistan inaugurated the permanent exhibition of paintings and drawings on Iqbal by Aslam Kamal, at Aiwan-e-Iqbal. Justice (Retd.) Dr. Naseem Hassan Shah (the then Chairman, Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority) gave the welcome address. He said:

> Allama Iqbal is the perpetual song of exaltation for the Muslims of the whole world and he is the symbol of hope and optimism for the whole mankind. Aiwan-e-Iqbal is the embodiment of nobility of his great message. It is to become the center of the dignity and grandeur of the Muslim Ummah, Insha Allah.
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> The inauguration of Aslam Kamal's paintings on Iqbal's thought is to actually make 2nd December 2000 a most jubilant day. Aslam Kamal is internationally known as Musawwir-e-Iqbal. His painting illustrations, calligraphy and book jacked designing requires no introduction. He is no doubt a versatile genius who is now a school of thought in his person and a criterion of professional excellence in his own right. He is painting Iqbal for the past 25 years. It is quite true that any other painter has not enjoyed the popularity his works have acquired. He is a living legend and his creations have gained the status of classic. A book "Kasb-e-Kamal" containing his paintings has already been published. Abdur Rehman Chughtai, "The Painter of the East" (Musawwir-i-Msahriq) has done an unforgettable job in the form of "Aml-e-Chughta" and the paintings of some other artists are also worth

mentioning. But the work done by Aslam Kamal has surpassed the collective performance of all other artists. Mr. President! Aslam Kamal has spent the best part of his life in serving Iqbal. The Aiwan-e-Iqbal Authority, in recognition of his services, has specified a permanent gallery displaying his creations".

From Iqbal year 1977 to Iqbal year 2002, Aslam Kamal has stood consistently in front of his canvases one by one on easel, with painting pallet and brush in hand and Iqbalian themes in mind. In this span of 25years, Aslam Kamal has achieved to his credit so many exhibitions of his drawings and paintings of the poetry of Allama Iqbal at home and 25 exhibitions abroad. An art book of Aslam Kamal's drawings and paintings of the poetry of Allama Iqbal has been published and widely admired in the art and literary circles. In recognition of Aslam Kamal's creative services a permanent Art Gallery of his works has been established in Aiwan-e-Iqbal which was inaugurated by President of Pakistan on December 2, 2000. And finally Aslam Kamal's works appeared on postage stamps commemorating 2002 the year of Allama Iqbal. Under these postage stamps Aslam Kamal from his studios now dispatches Iqbal's message to the east, to the west, to the north and to the south of the globe.

In the mid of 20th century, the tradition of painting Iqbal's poetry which was shaped by late Abdur Rehman Chughtai has been taken over befittingly by the wings of the lines and colours of Aslam Kamal into the expanse of the 21st century.

BOOK REVIEW

JEAN-LOUIS, *Lights of Islam—Institutions, Cultures, Arts and Spirituality in the Islamic City, Lok Virsa, Islamabad, 2000.*

REVIEWED BY KAMIL KHAN MUMTAZ.

The arts of Islam are amongst its greatest legacies. Yet the legitimacy of the arts is today a matter of controversy in contemporary Muslim societies. The modernist rejects the religious basis of any art, and therefore the very notion of "Islamic" art, while the Islamic zealot brackets "art" with all that he sees as corrupting and satanic about "modernity" and therefore as "un-Islamic".

Both need to be reminded that the modern definition and criteria of art, which they presume to be universal and timeless, are of relatively recent origin, a product of the Euro-centric modernity project; that there is indeed an intimate relationship between art and the traditional perspective of Islam; and that this traditional perspective is not related to time, space or material form, but represents a world-view that is more than ever relevant to "our time";

Traditionally the term "art" includes all the arts and crafts. In fact it is applied to making or doing anything that meets the dual criteria of utility and beauty. Now utility relates to quantity and the practical and physical aspects of material and form. But beauty relates to quality, and is traditionally understood as a quality of the Divine. In the traditional cosmology, everything in the created universe, is a manifestation of the Divine. In the creative process, the attributes and qualities of the Divine are reflected first as archetypes on the plane of the Spirit or the ideal plane, then as pure forms on the imaginal plane, and finally as objects and acts on the earthly plane. But while everything in the universe reflects some divine attribute or quality, only Man, the archetypal Man, reflects all the divine qualities. To realize his potential man must recover his primordial nature made in the image of God but which he lost at the fall. He must undertake an inward journey from the body, through the soul to the heart. Only when the "eye of the heart" is opened can it contemplate "the Real" and attain enlightenment. The role of

art, in traditional societies, has been to act as support in this spiritual quest or journey, by reminding us of our role and function in this life, by pointing to our true goal and by illuminating the way to that goal.

The renaissance in Europe marked the start of the transition from tradition to modernity. The modernity package— Humanism; rationalism; empirical science - represented a paradigm shift, a radical change in man's conception of reality, and his own place in the macrocosm. Part of this package was a new category of activity called Art or the "fine arts", and Art History and Art Criticism became new fields of study which relegated the traditional arts - the "useful", "applied", or "industrial" arts - to the lesser category of "minor arts" or simply "crafts". These Euro-centered criteria were used by the imperialist powers to justify their subjugation of "primitive" nations as a benign act of civilization.

E. B. Havel, in the later half of the nineteenth century, had raised a lonely though somewhat hysterical voice against the European attitudes towards the "native" arts. But it was A. K. Coomeraswamy, in the first half of the twentieth century, who first argued the case for the traditional arts from within the traditional perspective. While Stella Kramrisch applied this approach to Hindu art and architecture, Titus Burckhardt, Henry Corbin and Sayyed Hossein Nasr did the same for the arts of Islam. But while these luminaries take the reader into the subtleties and intricacies of metaphysics and philosophy, Michon presents the basic concepts in a manner that is direct and simple for the less academic layman or professional artist. His presentation is enriched by his own deep involvement and extensive experience of the Muslim world.

Michon locates his discussion of the arts, literally and metaphorically, between the *shariat* and *tariqat,* the legal and spiritual dimensions of Islam. The opening section or the book lays out the fundamental tenets of Islam, and shows how these inform every aspect of the daily lives of Muslims and Islamic society. The middle two parts of the book cover the whole range of the arts. He shows how art is an integral part of Muslim life, and covers the formal languages of Psalmody, calligraphy and geometry, and the question of figurative representation. He demonstrates how the message of Divine Unity becomes imprinted in the Muslim living environment through its art, architecture, landscape and hand crafted objects of daily use.

The centerpiece and the jewel in the crown is the chapter on music. As usual, Michon confronts the most controversial issues head-on, presenting the whole range of viewpoints. He shows the intimate relationship between music and spirituality, but draws a clear line between the kinds of music that can and cannot be included in this category. He then takes us on a guided tour of the wide range of musical genres to be found across the length and breadth of Muslim world with its rich diversity of ethnicity and cultures.

The closing section of the book is devoted to *tariqat*, the way of the sufi: its scriptural and historical roots; its methods; and its goals. In fact a proper understanding of the arts in Islam is not possible without an understanding of the spiritual dimension or *tassawwuf*. Those not familiar with this "esoteric" or "mystical" aspect will therefore be grateful to find all its essentials laid out in a clear and uncomplicated manner.

Although the color separation and printing of illustrations leaves much to be desired, the publishers, Lok Virsa, are to be congratulated on this excellent and timely book, which is well-produced, with a clear text, good quality of paper and binding.

SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR, *The Philosophy of Seyyed Hossein Nasr*, Edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, Randall E. Auxier and Lucian W. Stone Jr., Open Court Publishing Company, 315 Fifth Street, Peru, Illinois 61354-0300 (U.S.A.), 2001, pp. 1001, ISBN-0-8126-7.

REVIEWED BY MARYAM JAMEELAH.

Foreign critics of the contemporary scene of *Dar ul Islam* since long have customarily divided modern Muslims into two bread categories: the religious classes determined to preserve the Islamic order and the *statuesque* absolutely unchanged, remaining entirely aloof from the modern West and its innovations as if it did not exist, and the western-educated intelligentsia seeking drastic re-interpretation of Islam in conformity to the demands of modern life. Contrary to this commonly-held assumption, Seyyed Hossein Nasr belongs to a very small, yet growing, group choosing a third alternative; deeply immersed in traditional Islamic civilization on the one hand while intimately and profoundly knowledgeable about the history, religions, philosophies and sciences of the West through firsthand experience —

severely critical of modernize and determined to preserve and propagate the integrity of Islamic orthodoxy and tradition intact.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr is supremely well-qualified for this task as his detailed intellectual autobiography in this book illustrates. Born in 1933 in Tehran, into a distinguished family of illustrious fore bearers, in Nasr's description of his early years, the reader is simply amazed by the high intellectual, cultural and educational attainments of his parents and all their relatives, friends and acquaintances. His first seven year were spent in a traditional "medieval" quarter of Tehran, innocent even of electricity after which he with his parents and younger brother moved to a new house into a more modern district of the city for his primary schooling.

After the traumatic Allied invasion of Iran during World Was II, the deaths of his grandfather and an aunt who lived with them and the impending demise of his father, his family decided to send him to America for his subsequent education. A precocious child extremely advanced for his age, he entered the preparatory school where he was almost entirely isolated from his follow countrymen or any other Muslims, merely forget his motive Persian language and was compelled by the school authorities to attend regular church services, even though a Muslim. After graduation with highest academic honours in 1950, he was admitted to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and for his M.A. and Ph.D he received his advanced training at Harvard. When the reader considers the tender age during which, almost alone and entirely on his own, Nasr was thrust unprepared into such alien environment, he/she is astonished to note how superbly well he succeeded in assimilating the very best that American higher education had to offer him – in contrast to so many other foreign students in their teems and twenties from Asia and Africa who sink into the slimy depths of sex, drug-addiction and alcoholism, utterly lost to their country, culture and society of origin. After reading Nasr's story in America, the reviewer is convinced that only Divine protection saved his from that fate.

The turning point in Nasr's life came at the age of 19 at MIT when one of his professors introduced him to the Traditional school of writers representing the ***Sophia perennis*** – Ananda Kemtiah Coomarswamy, Rene Guenon Frithjof Schuon, Titus Burkhardt and Martin Lings who vigorously defended orthodoxy in all the major historic world religious and sewerely

criticized the modern world accordingly. ***Sophia perennis*** miraculously resolved his spiritual and intellectual crisis, bringing him not only complete mental poise but a firm commitment and single-minded purpose to which he was to dedicate the remainder of his life.

In 1958 he thus resolved to return to Iran and devote himself to the learning and propagation of traditional Islamic philosophy under the greatest living masters of the subject who never demanded any payment but only his exclusive undivided attention. Some of his teachers had been close friends of his late father. Once again, the reader is astounded by the noble standards of traditional Islamic learning which still flourished in Pahlevi Iran despite the steadily increased in reads of modernization.

Meantime Nasr served as Professor in the Faculty of Letters of Tehran University, then as Tehran University's Vice-Chancellor after which he was founder and head of the Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy and later head of The Aryamehr Institute of Technology. By the time of the Revolution in 1979, the Shah had appointed him to one of the most influential positions in charge of the educational and cultural affairs of the entire country. The Shah and Empress Farah have often been demonized as imitations of Ataturk yet it must be admitted that in their drive for Westernization and industrialism (which Nasr opposed), they did not go too far because traditional religious education and the *ulema* still survived in Pahlevi Iran while Ataturk had all but eliminated them in Turkey. If the Shah had chosen such an eminent figure as Nasr for these influential posts in national education and culture, that much must be conceded in his favour.

While in Iran, Nasr played a vital role on the Islamic Educational Conference held in Mecca in 1977 and The World of Islam Festival held in London (April-June 1976). He also played host to numerous eminent scholars in Iran and abroad and wrote and lectured tirelessly on religion, art, science, ecology and philosophy, both at home and all over the world. Again, the reader is struck by the high level of educational and culture in Iran at that time.

During the political turmoil of the 1979 revolution, Nasr was forced into exile, never able to return to Iran again. Nasr returned to America with the daunting task of rebuilding his shattered life at mid-stream all over again. He

served as University Professor of Islamic Studies at Temple University, Philadelphia until 1984 and at George Washington University, Washington D.C. until the present date all the while, teaching, carefully training new generations of students, lecturing all over the world and writing and publishing dozens of books, articles and essays.

Nasr is above all a Traditionalist, staunchly upholding the absolute, transcendental values of Islam and severely condemning all modernist attempts to alter the form and content of the Faith to suit the transient fashions of the "times." He is especially critical of scientism, evolutionism, progressivism, historicism, relativism, subjectivism and individualism prevailing in current philosophy and art. He never doubts the objective, absolute, timeless and eternal Divinely-revealed Truth of Islam by which all else must be judged. He upholds Sufism as the heart and soul of Islam. He never ceases to emphasize the importance of beauty as indispensable expression of Truth.

Nasr insists that he has never been anti-West but rather anti-modern. He points out that "contemporary" is not necessarily synonymous with "modern." Nasr is more sympathetic to the Middle-Ages than any other historic period of the West, never failing to declare that the so-called "Dark Ages" in Europe was not as black as previously supposed. This Age of Faith had much in a common with Islam as well as the other traditions of mankind. The so-called "renaissance" marked a complete break with the past after which the triumph of atheism, materialism and neo-paganism resulted in an abnormal monstrosity unique in the history of civilization which during succeeding centuries became global. The only way Muslims can combat these evils is to acquire thorough mastery over modern knowledge, afterwards subjecting it to resource Islamic criteria. Only an education in Islamic theology or mastery of the *'aqa'id* is not sufficient. Islamic intellectual sciences, as expressed in the rich tradition of Islamic philosophies, can provide the student with an adequate response to present-day challenges. What is needed is not new discoveries but re-discovery and re-assertion of merely lost truths in contemporary language.

From the start, Nasr knew all too well that in the modern academic world he was waging an uphill battle. He is literally swimming against the opposite tidal waves. Judging from his critics in this book, it would appear that he is

fighting a lost cause. At first, few even in Muslim countries, took him seriously. Yet despite all those odds, he has enjoyed academic and literary success. He was the first Muslim from a Muslim country selected to deliver the prestigious Gifford Lectures (*Knowledge and the Sacred*) in 1981 and the very first Muslim scholar to be included in the present volume of this series.

For more than four decades Seyyed Hussein Nasr has striven single-handed for nothing less than a full-scale revival of traditional Islamic civilization—of all the sciences and arts in their pristine intellectual, aesthetic and spiritual dimensions— a most vital matter for Islamic survival today and tomorrow, yet very much neglected by current political/activist movements.

This volume in indispensable for full knowledge, understanding, clarification and appreciation of all the achievements of his life and thought.

ZAILAN MORIS, *Revelation, Intellectual Intuition and Reason in the Philosophy of Mulla Sadra: An Analysis of the al-'Arshiyyah,* London: Routledge Curzon, 2003, pp. 229

REVIEWED BY NASRIN NASIR.

There's been a rapid increase in the study of Mulla Sadra Shirazi in the West in the past 20 years or so after the publication of books by renowned scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Henry Corbin, Fazlur Rahman and James W. Morris to name a few.

There has also been an increase of interest towards this seminal thinker of the 17th century Safavid Iran who is noted for his *al-Asfar al-Arba'ah* which is considered by Nasr as presenting Islamic theosophy. Nasr has always been credited with reviving the interest towards this theosophical school within Islam and rightfully so as he has supervised many Ph.D. students in the field of Sadrian studies.

This latest book, a revised version of a Ph.D. dissertation of one of his closest students, contributes towards our understanding of the ideas of Mulla Sadra. As the title suggests, it discusses a specific issue which has always been debated in the history of Islamic thought. The issue of revelation and reason or revelation and intellectual intuition has always been one of the core issues which have been discussed at length by the various schools of thought

amongst the Muslim scholars. Beginning with the Mu'tazilite movement which propagated the idea that reason supersedes revelation and their counterparts, the Ash'arites who shun reason but advocate a more controlled reason to the anti-reason Hanbalite theologians to the philosophers, such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi and Ibn Sina.

This book however concerns itself with how Mulla Sadra deals with the issue of revelation, intellectual intuition and reason in his philosophy.

The author uses the *al- Hikmah al-'Arshiyyah* as her main text in analysing Mulla Sadra's view and techniques in dealing with this particular issue. As the reader would notice, *al-Hikmah al-'Arshiyyah* had been treated before by James Morris in his book, *The Wisdom of the Throne* (Princeton University Press, 1981). Where James's book consists mainly of a translation of the text into English with an introduction and numerous annotations, this work here is a step forward in the sense of analysing the text in line with the proposed line of enquiry which is the synthesis of revelation, reason and intellectual intuition.

This study here is concerned with three primary questions which forms the line of enquiry of the writer. Does there exist a synthesis of the truth claims of revelation, intellectual intuition and reason in the philosophy of Mulla Sadra? How does Mulla Sadra synthesise the truth claims of revelation, intellectual intuition and reason? Is Mulla Sadra successful in his synthesising effort?

This book is divided into 6 chapters with an introduction and an after word. Before going into these three central themes, the writer lays the foundation for an understanding of Mulla Sadra's thought as well as the issue of revelation, reason and intellectual intuition as it is seen from the two primary sources of Islam, and by Muslim philosophers and mystics. These necessary discussions take up 2 preliminary chapters of the book.

The first chapter deals with the aims of philosophy within the knowledge structure of Islam. The writer emphasises on the concept of *al-tawhid* as the heart of Islamic revelation (pg. 16) and its focus point of unity as well as man's dependence on God. She then continues to discuss the conception of the perfect man; which is normally associated with Ibn Arabi and which

identifies man as a theomorphic being (*tajalli*) or the bearer or locus of manifestation of the divine Names and Qualities. Thus by qualification the individual who has realised within himself the perfections of a servant of God as well as His vicegerent, is the Universal or Perfect Man (*al-insan al-kamil*). The doctrine of *al-tawhid* then finds its complement in the doctrine of the Perfect man. As the world and its creations are the multiplicity from the One source, similarly the Perfect Man is the perfect embodiment of the One in creation, and is the "being in whom multiplicity returns to Unity" (pg.17).

The pursuit of the philosophers or *hukama'* then is mainly to achieve certain knowledge of God or *al-tawhid* and to attain the station of the Universal Man or Perfect Man. After laying this foundation she situates Mulla Sadra as being one of the *hukama'* who had in various works discussed such a realisation. One of the works being the *al-Hikmah al-Arshiyyah* which she has chosen as the main text for analysis here.

The rest of the chapter then deals with a hierarchical conception of reality based on Ibn Arabi's cosmological doctrine where there are 5 levels of beings in the five levels of Divine Presences (*al-hadarat Ilahiyyat al-khams*). This in turn leads to the discussion of the microcosm and the macrocosm. This foundational principle that there exists a hierarchical structure of reality is important when understanding man's intellectual faculties within Mulla Sadra's writings. Towards the end of the chapter she moves to discuss the two distinctive types of knowledge which exist in the traditional madrasahs of which Mulla Sadra was a product i.e. the acquired knowledge *al-'ilm al-husuli* and presential knowledge *al-'ilm al-huduri*. It is the second type of knowledge which is of interest to the Sufis e.g. Ibn Arabi and Philosophers or *Hukama'* e.g. Mulla Sadra.

Gnosis is the highest form of presential knowledge as it deals with the immediate knowledge of God and the spiritual world (pg. 28-29). To Mulla Sadra everyone has the potential provided the eye of their hearts are properly awakened to received such witnessing. In esoteric Shi'ism of which Mulla Sadra is an exponent, the figure of the *Imam* is central to enable the eye of the heart to be awakened as the *Imam* is the direct descendant of the Holy Prophet of Islam who can make the *al-barakah al-muhammadiyyah* available to the individual for the transformation of his soul as well as for the attainment of the immediate knowledge (*ma'rifah*) of God.

After the first introductory chapter which serves as a foundation for the discussion in the book, she then goes into more specific details of what each of the technical-terms in the title mean, and this forms the bulk of the second chapter. Interestingly *al-'aql* is translated as human intelligence denoting both intellect and reason. To her these two functions of *al-'aql* as viably demonstrated in the Qur'an are a unity.

The first thing that God created according to certain prophetic hadiths is the Spirit (*al-ruh*) or in the discourse of the philosophers the Universal Intellect (*al-'aql al-kulli*). This Spirit is the Pen as referred to in the Qur'an and explicated by the hadith. Therefore in relation to God *al-'aql* is the Universal Intellect and in relation to man, it is the human intellect which binds man to God.

The third chapter deals mainly with the life and works of Mulla Sadra. The fourth, fifth and sixth chapter are the most central chapters in the book. It is within these chapters that the 3 questions outlined at the beginning of the study takes centre stage.

One of the book's many strengths is its ability to explain Sadra's views in the backdrop of the historical development of Islamic philosophy. In chapter 4 which discuses the question "Does there exists a synthesis of the truth claims…" the writer amply provides the Sadrian view in contrast to the philosophers preceding him. This is clearly seen in many of Sadra's works especially the *Asfar* and ably demonstrated here.

The book's other interesting point that makes it an invaluable reference-tool for the students is its explication of Sadra's philosophy in an easy language for the beginners. It identifies correctly Sadra's main principles in philosophy to four main principles i.e. the unity, ontological primacy (*asalah*) and gradation (*tashkik*) of Being (*wujud*); transubstantial motion (*al-harakah al-jawhariyyah*); the union of the knower (*al-'aqil*) and the known (*al-ma'qul*); and the catharsis (*tajrid*) and independence of the imaginal faculty (*al-mutakhayyilah*) from the body. These four main principles are each explained in an easy language and in a lucid manner thus making the understanding of these principles clearer and straightforward. This is a valuable access tool for anyone who wishes to have a quick reference to these principles which are central in Mulla Sadra's philosophy. The quotations from the text of the

Asfar as well as the *al-'Arshiyyah* would also prove useful for the researcher in furthering the studies of the said principles. I would have wished that a glossary of the technical terms used by Sadra to have appeared at the end of the work. Nevertheless this work deserves to be considered as a valuable contribution to Sadrian studies. The fact that it is written by a scholar who comes from Southeast-Asia proves that Sadrian studies has influenced almost all regions of the world. Written in a cogent manner this book should be counted as one of the best introductions to Mulla Sadra's philosophy.