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ISLAMIC UNITY— THE IDEAL AND OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF ITS REALIZATION

SEYYED HOSSEIN NASR

Unity is an attribute of Allah who, according to the Qur'ān, is both *al-AÁad* and *al-WāÁid* and *tawÁâd* is conceived in Islam as a spiritual principle which at the highest level pertains solely to God. Division and multiplicity belong to the realm of creation and our human world reflects unity to the extent that it remains faithful to the ideal of unity which comes from God and His revelation. The very fact that the ideal of Islamic unity is present in the heart, soul and mind of Muslims is due to the persistence of the effect of the message of the Noble Qur'ān and the teachings of the Blessed Prophet and the reason why unity is not fully realized on various levels, including the outward, is because there are obstacles and impediments, both inward and outward, which prevent its full realization.

The most profound obstacles to unity lie within the mind and soul of Muslims. The soul of most of us is not integrated into its center and is usually scattered in many directions, pulled by the passions which manifest themselves outwardly as actions that bring about division and discord. Likewise, the mind of many Muslims, and especially those who hold the reign of power in their hands, is dispersed by numerous concepts derived to an ever degree from non-Islamic sources and resulting in a world-view in which there is no center and no integration, resulting consequently in a segmented world which of necessity comes to surround such a human collectivity. There inward causes are the most essential and central reasons for the lack of unity on the more outward plane, a unity which many nevertheless seek because the faith in Islam and hence the thirst for unity on all levels of existence remains strong among Muslims despite the fact that the ideal of unity is not fully realized. There is still an Islamic *ummah* despite the segmentation within it.

Before turning to the more external obstacles in the path of the realization of unity, it is important to make clear that unity in the Islamic context does not mean uniformity. If God had wished to create a single nation or people, He would have done so, whereas the Qur'ān asserts clearly,

"O mankind! Lo! We have created you male and female, and have made you nations and tribes that ye may know one another." (Qur'ān; xlix, 13). Unity on the human level means integration of diverse elements, whether they be the male and the female, various ethnic groups, tribes or social classes into a whole by means of a higher principle in the same way that inwardly unity does not mean the destruction of the various tendencies of the soul or thoughts in the mind, but their integration which bestows wholeness upon the human being.

Historically, Islam has been able to achieve this goal to a large extent inwardly and even outwardly without destroying that diversity which belongs to the richness of God's creation. But today many Muslims feel quite rightly that they have fallen below the norm achieved earlier and hence seek to understand the obstacles which prevent the realization once again of that norm.

Now, putting aside the inward obstacles and turning to the more outward causes, it must be said that Islamic history itself displays a gradual falling away from the unity achieved by the Prophet and the Medinan community. Even the rightly guided caliphs were confronted with divisive forces including tribalism, while the Umayyads, who were the last Muslim rulers to rule over the whole of the Islamic world, nevertheless faced strong forces of division such as the polarization between the Syrian and Khurasani garrisons reflecting Arab-Persian rivalries the Shi'ite protest in Iraq and Arab tribalism against the sedentary centers. After the Umayyads, political rivalries became a feature pitting the Abbasids against the Spanish Umayyads, later Abbasids against the Fātimids, local rulers against the center, and later the Ottomans against the Safavids, etc. Likewise, theological and juridical confrontations and diversions came to the fore ranging from Sunni-Sh'ite interpretations of the various tenets of faith to differences between various schools of law. There were also ethnic rivalries between Arabs and Persians, Turks and Arabs, Turks and Persians and the like.

Despite these historical divisions, however, Islamic civilization preserved its unity to a remarkable degree through the ubiquitous presence of the Noble Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* of the Prophet, the practice of the Divine Law, the use of the Arabic-Persian script, modes of thought and motifs of art which cut across ethnic and political borders and many other factors. The Islamic world was not politically united as in its earliest history, but the ideal

of unity was nevertheless realized to a large extent religiously, culturally, intellectually, artistically and also socially and economically.

The gradual weakening of the Islamic world and the imposition of Western colonialism caused a much greater division and loss of unity within the Islamic world bringing about forms of diversity which persist to this day. Western domination destroyed to a large extent communication between various parts of *dār al-islām* . Even today one has to go through the Paris telephone operator to call from Morocco to some Muslim country in the Middle East, and many Muslim educated people can learn about other parts of the Islamic world only through Western sources whether they be newspapers, journals or the television. An interruption of lines of communication among Muslims was brought about which has never been fully amendd to this day. This can be seen even in language, that supreme means of communication, where foreign influences have even succeeded in separating speakers of a single language from each other not to speak of causing greater separation of various Islamic languages from each other. For example, Persian or *darâ* spoken in Tajikistan has absorbed many Russian word, in Afghanistan English words and in Iran French. The result is that the poetry of Rudaki is perfectly comprehensible to people of all those regions but the current medium of expression poses occasional problems. The same can be seen in the case of Turkish and other Turkic languages.

Colonialism also bequeathed upon the Islamic world Western style nationalism which grew out of the French Revolution and which must not be confused with the earlier identity with one's own land and country which existed in earlier Islamic history and to which the well-known *hadâth* of the Blessed Prophet, "The love of one's country (*waÇan*) comes from faith (*âmān*)" refers. Even in earlier times an Egyptian knew that he was not a Syrian and a Persian that he was not an Arab or a Turk a Persian. But this kind of national or regional identity allowed itself to be integrated into larger wholes as Islamic history bears witness. The new type of nationalism, however, created a notion of the nation-state alien to the Islamic ethos, a reality which remains one of the main impediments to the creation of Islamic unity to this day. This is especially true because many of the Muslim nations now on the map were created by European powers on the basis of their own interests and not on the basis of ethnic, historical or natural regional distinctions. And of course whenever these borders continue to serve the

interests of the world powers, they suddenly become sacrosanct and immutable, while if they their violation poses no great threat to such interests, then few forces on the outside care much about what goes on across such borders.

Not only the very process of modernization but also the manner in which colonial powers modernized various Islamic countries or these countries followed paths of modernization has also had a profound effect upon further loss of unity in the Islamic world and continues to remain a main impediment towards bringing about greater unity. Certain parts of the Islamic world such as Nigeria, Egypt, the Sudan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Malaysia were modernized through British colonial influence; Muslim North Africa, Syria and Lebanon through the French; the Muslim Central Asian and Caucasian republics through the Russians; Indonesia through the Dutch, etc. Furthermore, countries which remained nominally independent also emulated different models of modernization. For example, Turkey followed mostly the Germans, the Iranians, the French at least until a few decades ago and the Saudis the Americans. The differences in Western models is reflected deeply to this day in the modern educational institutions or the institutions of "model" countries to which most of the young from each country who study abroad continue to be sent. It is enough to ponder how deep is the effect of things French upon young Algerians and things English upon young Pakistanis to understand this point. Even the contemporary literature of various Islamic countries reflects the different paths of modernization followed and the reflections within the Islamic world of the diversity and even opposition of many strands of modern Western civilization remain among the major obstacles to unity among Muslims.

When the colonial powers left the Islamic world, at least in name, and Muslims gained their independence, in most regions ruling elites came to power who were highly Westernized and did not rise from the traditional elements in Islamic society for which the ideal of Islamic unity and the *ummah* has always remained strong. Many of these leaders and also rulers of those countries which had preserved some semblance of unity were patriots, but whether patriots or representatives of special interests including their own, they usually sought to modernize their countries on the Western model and therefore upon the foundation of the nation-state imported from 19th century European history. The independence of Islamic countries, therefore, did not

lead automatically to greater Islamic unity. On the contrary, in several instances it made possible more severe conflict between Muslim states, conflicts which were and remain of course opposed to Islamic unity but were and are often of the greatest benefit to the world powers.

The experience of colonialism also destroyed the economic unity of the Islamic world. Main trade routes such as the Silk Route and the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, all of which had been in Muslim hands, were lost over a period of three centuries and gradually the economy of each Muslim region became more tied to that of some Western power than to the economy of other Islamic lands. That pattern has far from disappeared today and the dependence of the economy of the various Islamic countries upon what is usually called the world economy, but which in reality is the economy dominated by the highly industrialized countries, continues unabated. In many ways this dependence has grown and not diminished during this century, creating a formidable obstacle to Islamic unity. It is quite obvious that if this unity were to be realized, it would be of great economic detriment to many powerful countries.

This question of political and economic interest of strong foreign power to preserve disunity in the Islamic world and to prevent the realization of unity is of great importance, although the Muslims cannot ultimately blame anyone but themselves for the fact that there is so much discord in the present-day Islamic world. It is well known that Western powers sought to aggravate and accentuate all the differences they could find and make use of among the Muslims over whom they ruled whether it was Sunnism and Shi'ism, Arab Turkish rivalries, dynastic claims, tribal differences or something else of similar nature.

Nor have they ceased to draw as much benefit as possible from such differences during the past few decades with every effort possible being made to benefit from conflicts which can be of great economic and political importance to them. It is sufficient to think how different the situation would be and how much benefit would have accrued to the Islamic world, if let us say all of the North African countries or the eastern Arab countries were really united in their economic and political policies or if Iran, Turkey and Pakistan had become really closely knit together and been able to include Afghanistan as well within their embrace when they formed R.C. D. And on

an even larger scale how much of the economic resources of the Islamic world would have been saved if the Arabs, Turks and Iranians, not to talk of other Muslim lands were as closely united in their policies as Western Europe has become during the past few decades. Just the amount of arms Muslims would not have had to buy indicates how precious are the differences among Muslims to those who wish not only to buy their natural resources especially oil but also to take back in one way or another most of the money they have paid for those resources. Any talk of obstacles to Islamic unity cannot disregard a realistic appraisal of the very powerful interests which wish to prevent such a unity that is often depicted in the West as the rising danger of a so-called "fundamentalist" Islam at the very moment when Europe, that cradle of modern nationalism, is becoming united into a single economic if not political block.

The great obstacles on the path of Islamic unity must not, however, be interpreted as an excuse for indifference or passivity. First of all steps must be taken to unite the minds and souls of Muslims and integrate them inwardly once again through recourse to the Islamic intellectual, artistic and of course religious tradition and rejection of the totally anti-Islamic alien concepts, motifs ad models which have cluttered the Islamic landscape during the past century. And this must be done most of all through the re-Islamization of education at all levels in the Islamic world. Secondly, while persevering in this process of re-integration and inner unification, attempts must be made to remove these obstacles which it is in the present day power of Muslims to remove, such as creating more mutual respect and understanding between sunnis and Shi'ites, those who accept only the external interpretation of the Divine Law and the people of the Way or the Sufis, Arabs and Turks, Persians and Arabs, Pashtus, Uzbeks and Tajiks, etc. By creating greater understanding and mutual respect through the most universal interpretation of the message of Islam which would embrace all the members of the *ummah*,at least those differences, which are so easily manipulated by the powers that be, will greatly reduced. But the most immediate and the highest goal is to remove the obstacles to unity within ourselves and to live constantly in the awareness of the reality of God who is the source of all unity. In removing these inner obstacles we also make the greatest contribution to the removal of those external obstacles which prevent the world-wide Islamic community from realizing more fully on the

outward plane that unity whose realization at all levels is the very *raison d'tre* of the Islamic revelation.

THE PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTING IQBAL'S IDEAS IN PAKISTAN

DR. JAVID IQBAL

Iqbal had a vision of a new Muslim Society. It was for realizing this objective that he advanced the concept of a separate Muslim state to be carved out from the territories in North West India where the Muslims constituted majorities. The separate Muslim state was created in the shape of Pakistan by Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. But what are the possibilities of implementing some of Iqbal's ideas for bringing into being the new Muslim society in Pakistan.

IQBAL'S PERCEPTION OF ISLAM

Iqbal has not defined Islam as a theologian but as a philosopher. In his view:

> Islam is not a religion in the ancient sense of the word. It is an attitude – an attitude, that is to say, of freedom and even of defiance of universe. It is really a protest against the entire outlook of the ancient world. Briefly, it is the discovery of man. (*Stray Reflections*, p. 139)

From the historical prospective, he argues that religion in the primitive times was national. Judaism affirmed that it was racial. Christianity preached that it was personal. But Islam teaches us that religion is neither national, nor racial, nor personal, but purely human.

Iqbal further points out that as a culture Islam has no specific country, no specific language, no specific script and no specific mode of dress. (*Statements and Speeches* ed. by A.R. Tariq, p.131)

In the light of these observations it is evident that Iqbal's perception of Islam was humanistic and egalitarian. Any interpretation of Islam which approved feudalism and discriminated between man and man, was not acceptable to him.

Iqbal's Concept of Islamic State

Like many other political scientists Iqbal has criticized democracy because of its defects as a political system. But since there was no other acceptable alternative to it, he regarded the establishment of popular legislative assemblies in some Muslim countries as a return to the original purity of Islam. According to him the Caliphate, Imamate or Sultanate were the outmoded Muslim forms of rulership of the past. He believed that the essence of *TauÁâd* (Unity of God) as a working idea, was human equality, human solidarity and human freedom. For him the state, from the Islamic standpoint:

> "is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human organization." (*Reconstruction,* Lectures p.154).

Treatment of Minorities

In his Allahabad Address of 1930 when he presented his concept of a Muslim state, Iqbal categorically proclaimed:

> "I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty according to the teachings of the Qur'ān, to defend their places of worship." (*Statements and Speeches*, Ed. A.R. Tariq p.10)

This assertion of Iqbal respecting the responsibility of a Muslim state for safeguarding the rights of the minorities is based on Surah 20: Verse 40 of the Qur'ān in which God commands:

> "If Allah had not created the group (of Muslims) to ward off the others from aggression, then churches, synagogues, oratories and mosques where Allah is worshipped most, would have been destroyed."

In the early stages of Islamic history this Quranic verse was interpreted as a legal provision for the protection of the places of worship of the "People of the Book" (Jews and Christians). But after the conquest of Iran this protection was extended by the jurists to the Zoroastrians who were considered as "like the people of the Book" (*Ka-mithl-Ahle-Kitab*) The same

protection was made available to the Hindu temples in the times of the Mughal emperors in India after Humayun.

IQBAL'S VIEW ON SEPARATE OR JOINT ELECTORATES

According to Iqbal the provision of separate electorates for the Muslims was necessary for the protection of the rights of the Muslim community before Partition. Otherwise the maintenance of separate electorates was not sacrosanct in the eyes of Iqbal. He stated:

> The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates if provinces are so demarcated as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity. (*Discourses of Iqbal*, ed by S. H. Razzaqi, pp. 65-66).

Therefore Iqbal had no doubt in his mind that the maintenance of separate electorates was not a requirement or a religious obligation of Islam but merely a device for the protection of the Muslims' rights in undivided India. If in Pakistan the non-Muslims do not demand the provision of separate electorates and want joint or mixed electorates, then, according to Iqbal, the Muslims may have no objection to it.

IQBAL'S VIEW ON TERRITORIAL NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM

Despite Iqbal's criticism of territorial nationalism and patriotism in his poems on philosophical grounds, he was of the view that Islam had no quarrel with nationalism in Muslim majority countries. Similarly readiness to lay down one's life for his country was a part of a Muslim's faith. He maintained:

> In Muslim majority countries Islam accommodates nationalism for there Islam and nationalism are practically identical; but in Muslim minority countries (if the community has majority in a viable territory) it is justified in seeking self-determination as a distinct cultural unit. …..Patriotism in the sense of love for one's country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of the Muslim's faith. (*Statements and Speeches*, Ed. A.R. Tariq, p.136)

Thus according to Iqbal the development of Pakistani nationalism must not be considered as something in conflict with Islamic ideology.

Iqbal's View on Secularism

In the contemporary world the Western civilization has developed two types of "Secularism" as an essential part of its political philosophy. Secularism adopted in the capitalist democracies is based on the principle of "indifference towards religion." This thinking is the product of market societies which are mainly interested in the sale of their merchandise. Therefore, the type of secularism evolved by these societies is a means to serve their own materialistic ends.

The other variety of secularism was evolved by the socialist countries which meant the imposition of atheism as a state policy. However after the collapse of the Soviet Union this form of secularism has ceased to exist, and at present the Russian Federation and the other former socialist countries have adopted the capitalist version of this doctrine.

Iqbal, as a deeply religious man, advances the argument that the discoveries of modern physics, particularly respecting matter and nature, are very revealing for the materialists and the secularists. His argument proceeds like this:

> The ultimate reality, according to the Qur'ān, is spiritual and its life consists in its temporal activities. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, material and the secular. All that is secualr is therefore sacred in the roots of its being. The greatest service that modern thought has rendered to Islam and as a matter of fact to all religions, consists in its criticism of what we call material or natural, a criticism which discloses that the merely material has no substance until we discover it rooted in the spirit. There is no such thing as profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of the spirit. All is holy ground. (*Reconstruction*, Lectures, p.155)

In the light of the above analysis and in Iqbalian terms to consider secularism as profane is a Christian way of talking and not Islamic. Therefore, the Muslims are not justified to regard "secularism" as something bad, wicked, profane or anti-God.

Separation of the Department of Religion

Iqbal takes pains in explaining that the division of the religious and the political functions of the state in Islam must not be confounded with the Western idea of the separation of church and state. According to Iqbal in a Muslim state it is only a division of functions whereas in the other case the division is based on the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter or sacred and profane. Since a separate religious organisation (as church organization) cannot be contemplated, Iqbal recommends the establishment of a separate Ministry of Religious Affairs which should, among other things, control the *madāris* (institutions of religious instruction) and mosques. It should appoint qualified Imams and Preachers (*KhaÇâbs*) for them. He also recommends that no one should be permitted to preach in the mosque without holding a licence from the state. When a reform to that effect was implemented in modern Turkey by Kemal Ataturk, Iqbal hailed it in the following words:

> As to licentiate the Ulema, I will certainly introduce it in Muslim India if I had the power to do so. The stupidity of the average Muslim is largely due to the inventions of the myth making Mullah. In excluding him from the religious life of the people, Ataturk has done what would have delighted the heart of an Ibn Taimiyah or Shah Waliullah. There is a tradition of the Holy Prophet reported in the *Mishkāt* to the effect that only the Amir of a Muslim state and the persons appointed by him are entitled to preach to the people. I do not know whether the Ataturk ever knew this tradition, yet it is striking how the light of his Islamic conscience has illuminated the zone of his actions in this important matter. (*Statements and Speeches*, Ed. A.R. Tariq, pp 131-132).

This contention is supported by the history of Islam. Even when the Abbasid Caliphate in Baghdad was at its lowest ebb, the Caliph retained the power of appointing the Qadis (Judges) and the Mosque Imams (preachers). As for the objection that the introduction of this measure in a modern Muslim state would amount to the control of thought, it should be realized that that was a method which the Islamic polity in the past had adopted for curbing those who were inclined to dissiminate sectarian hatred among the Muslims. Therefore, the enforcement of such a provision today cannot violate any fundamental right.

Legislation of Islamic Laws

Iqbal is of the considered view that *Ijtihād* should be adopted as legislative process in modern times in the elected Assemblies. This is the form which *Ijmā'* (Consensus of the Community) can take in a modern democratic Muslim state. It is interesting to note that according to Maulana Shibli Naumānâ,s decision in *Ijmā'* on the majority principle was recognized as correct during the times of Caliph Umar.

Iqbal also held that the claim of the modern Muslim liberals to re-interpret that foundational legal principles of Islam, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern life, was perfectly justified. He was convinced that the world of Islam was confronted and effected by new forces set free by the extraordinary development of human knowledge in all its directions. Therefore, he suggested that each and every generation of Muslims, guided but unhampered, by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems. He maintains:

> The growth of a republican spirit and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitutes a great step forward to transfer the power of *Ijtihād* from individual representatives of Schools to a Muslim legislative assembly. This is the only possible form which *Ijmā'* can take in modern times. It will secure contributions to legal discussion from laymen who happened to possess a keen insight into affairs. In this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in our legal system and give it an evolutionary outlook (*Reconstruction,* Lectures, pp 163, 173-176).

In answer to the question as to how the present legislators, with no knowledge of Islamic law, would interpret and make laws without committing grave mistakes, Iqbal recommended that a Board of Ulema should be nominated to form part of the Muslim legislative assembly, helping and guiding free discussion on questions of law-making, but without any power to vote. This measure can be adopted only temporarily. The effective remedy for the safeguard against erroneous interpretation was to reform the present system of legal instruction, to extend its sphere and to study the conventional Islamic *Fiqh* in the light of modern jurisprudence.

It is unfortunate that the bulk of the so-called Islamic provisions have been enforced in Pakistan arbitrarily by the military dictator and without a

discussion in any legislative assembly. The crux of Iqbal's message on this point is that Islamic law is to be interpreted and legislated by each generation of the Muslims in the light of their own needs and requirements and the changed conditions of modern life. Thus it is evident that the prevalent islamization of laws in Pakistan which the democratic assembly was coerced to adopt is not what Iqbal would have liked to see.

The Ultimate Aim of Iqbal's Islamic State

Iqbal maintains that the real object of Islam is to establish a "spiritual democracy". He talks of "spiritual slavery" and also of "spiritual emancipation". He was the first Muslim in the subcontinent to define the state in Islam as a spiritual democracy. It is a pity that no indepth study has been undertaken on Iqbal in Pakistan and no Iqbal scholar has attempted to explain as to what he meant by these terms. The contention of Iqbal is as follows:

> In view of the basic idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation binding on man, we ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated people on earth. Early Muslims emerging out of the spiritual slavery of pre-Islamic Asia were not in a position to realize the true significance of this basic idea. Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles and evolve out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam." (*Reconstruction,* Lectures, pp. 179-180).

It is a passage of Iqbal which requires careful examination as it is apparently based on an unconventional approach to Islam. An orthodox Muslim may not readily accept this contention of Iqbal. From where did Iqbal pick up this idea? Would it be correct to say that he picked up the idea of "spiritual democracy as the ultimate aim of Islam" from Surah 5 Verse 58 of the Qur'ān? He does not say so. In the said verse Allah addressing mankind commands:

> For each of you We have given a law and a way (of life) and if Allah hath willed He would have made you one religious community. But (He hath willed it otherwise) so that He may put you to the test in what He hath given you. Therefore compete with one another in

good works. To Allah will ye be brought back. And He will inform you about that wherein ye differed.

If this verse of the Qur'ān was in the mind of Iqbal when he advanced the idea of "spiritual democracy" then the question arises as to how should it be established in practical terms? He probably contemplated that state as genuinely Islamic in which all religions were equally free, authentically tolerated, respected and accepted. Such an ideal state would certainly be superior to the two known varieties of secularism.

Fifty years have passed since Pakistan came into being, but owing to the dearth of intellectually imaginative and actively courageous leadership, the ideas of Iqbal have not been implemented. The result is that Iqbal's dream of the creation of a new Muslim society in this country remains unfulfilled and we continue to drift as an "undisciplined mass of believers" (*Hujëm-i-Mominân*).

IQBAL'S DEFENCE OF RELIGION AND POSITIVIST TRADITIONS

Dr. Mohammed Maruf

Iqbal took up defence of religion as a form of experience as early as 1929 when he delivered his famous lectures[1] at Madras and Hyderabad (India) particularly in his first lecture "Knowledge and Religious Experience", and then in his paper "Is Religion Possible?" which he presented to the 5th session of the Aristotelian Society in London in 1932.[2] In this lecture in particular he tried to refute Kant's famous rejection of the possibility of metaphysics because, as he believes, "his argument applies with equal force to the realities in which religion is especially interested"[3]. What interests us in this paper is that Iqbal's defence anticipates the logical positivists position on metaphysics and religion assumed much later and has offered answers which later critics of the movement were to offer subsequently. It is commonly believed that logical positivism emerged in 1930 as a result of interaction between the Cambridge School of Analysis and the Vienna Circle: at least the term appeared for the first time in 1930[4] though with some qualifications; but its application to the fields of morals, metaphysics and religion came as later as 1936 when A.J. Ayer first published his classical work Language, *Truth and Logic* (London)[5] and *The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge* in 1940 (London)[6]. The real threat to religion came through these works of Ayer as they directly attacked the realities with which both religion and metaphysics deal, and such attempts were not rife in the times of Iqbal, at least when he delivered his lectures.

As said before, Iqbal begins his defence of religion with an examination of Kant's famous position on the possibility of metaphysics. Dilating on the

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1 Iqbal Dr. M., *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,* (Lahore Sh. Ashraf, 1978).

2 *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* New Series-Vol.XXXIII, (London: Harrison, 1933), pp.47-64.

3 Op.cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 182

4 F. Waismann first formulated the verifiability principle in 1930. Cf. J. Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy,* (Penguin, 1980), pp. 368-69.

5 Ayer A.J., *Language, Truth & Locic,* (London: victor Golloncz, 1946).

6 *The Foundation of Empirical Knowledge,* (London: Macmillan, 1940)
Logical Positivism, (Illinois: Free Press, 1959).

significance of metaphysics for religion Iqbal says that "Science may ignore a rational metaphysics", but religion cannot in so far as it aims at "the search for a reconciliation of the oppositions of experience and a justification of the environment in which humanity finds itself"[7]. Kant's position as well as of those who followed hin in this rejection of metaphysics, says Iqbal, is based on the following presuppositions:

1. All experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible;[8]
2. There is only one single space-order and time-order which Kant calls the "Forms of Sensibility" which organize data into knowledge of objects and "percepts";
3. The term "fact" has been limited to "empirical facts" only which Iqbal calls "the optically present source of sensation".[9]
4. Discursive thought is the only kind of thought amenable to man.

1. Kant bases his position on metaphysics on the bifurcation between Phenomenon (Thing-as-it-appears) and the Noumenon (the Thing-in-itself), and holds that the latter falls beyond the pale of the manifold of senses" and hence is unknowable". For him, "The thing-in-itself is only a limiting idea. Its function is merely regulative"[10]. Again, Kant made a distinction between what he called the "sensible intuition" and "intellectual intuition", and denied that man possessed the latter[11]. This also contributes to his contention of the impossibility of metaphysics. Here Iqbal urges that "Kant's verdict can be accepted if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible.[12] Iqbal refers to the evidence of religious experts of all ages and countries to prove that "there are potential types of consciousness lying close to our normal consciousness. If these types of consciousness open up possibilities of life-giving and knowledge-

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[7] Op. cit, *Reconstruction*, p.2.
[8] *Ibid*, p. 182.
[9] *Ibid*, p. 188.
[10] *Ibid*, p. 182.
[11] Kant I., *The Critique of Pure Reason,* Eng, tr. Norman K. Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1963), p. 268.
[12] Op. cit, *Reconstruction*, p. 182.

yielding experience the question of the possibility of religion as a form of higher experience is a perfectly legitimate one…"[13] He goes on to add, "These experiences are perfectly natural, like our normal experiences. The evidence is that they possess a cognitive value for the recipient,….[14] Iqbal discusses the position of modern naturalists who allude to the determinants of these experiences and decry them as 'neurotic or mystical"; but he agrees with William James that the quesitons concerning the nature, origin, and historical development of a thing are of quite a different order from the questions regarding their importance, meaning and values[15]. He says, "Psychologically speaking, all states, whether their content is religious or non-religious, are organically determined. The scientific form of mind is as much organically determined as the religious[16]". He concludes, "The truth is that the organic causation of our mental states has nothing to do with the criteria by which we judge them to be superior or inferior in point of value".[17] However, the question how to distinguish between what is really divine and what is counterfeit has always arisen in the mind of the religious people themselves. In such a situation, Iqbal, agreeing with James, recommends the use of the pragmatic test. James quotes Saint Teresa as saying of those who doubted her vision: "I showed them the jewels which the divine hand left with me;.. they were my actual dispositions".[18]

About two centuries after Kant, the logical positivists made an attack on metaphysics and religion on the selfsame grounds, though they approached the problem from a different angle: they were not so much interested in the genuineness of an experience as in the "meaningfulness" (to use their own term) of statements in which an experience expresses itself; thus the main question with them being whether a given 'statement" is varifiable or not. As Iqbal believed in the cognitive aspect of "religious experience", he would agree that they were expressible in the form of "statements" which were no less verifiable.

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[13] *Ibid*., p. 185
[14] *Ibid*., p. 189
[15] Maruf Dr. M., *Iqbal's Philosophy of Religion*, (London: Islamic Book Service 1977), p. 10.
[16] Op. cit., *Reconstruction,* p. 23.
[17] *Ibid*.,
[18] James William, *The Varieties of Religious Experience,* (London: Longmans Green, 1952), p. 22.

He says, "Religious experience…, is essentially a state of feeling with a cognitive aspect, the content of which cannot be communicated to others, except in the form of a judgement".[19] He adds that any judgement placed before anybody entitles him to ask the question, "Are we in possession of a test which would reveal its validity?" This question can legitimately and justifiably be asked about "statements" expressing religious contents also. To those critics who regard religion as a personal and subjective experience only Iqbal replies that "If personal experience had been the only ground for acceptance of a judgement of this kind, religion would have been the possession of a few individuals only".[20] He is of the view that religious "statements" are perfectly verifiable; that we are in possession of tests "which do not differ from those applicable to other forms of knowledge".[21] These he calls the Intellectual and Pragmatic tests. In his Second Lecture "The Philosophical Test of the Revelations of Religions Experience"[22], Iqbal applies the Intellectual Test with a view to proving religious or spiritual realities of the universe.

2. Kant and his followers presume that the ordinary space-time order is the only order which he calls the "Forms of Sensibility"[23], and it organizes data into "percepts". This unilateral approach leads to a physical and meterial reality and has culminated in the famous Einsteinian General Theory of Space-Time Relativity in which Time, losing its identity and significance, is relegated to the fourth dimension of the space. It precludes any possibility of spiritual interpretation of the universe. This approach, according to Iqbal, is un-Islamic as Islam laid exclusive emphasis on the importance of Time: more than once he quotes a well known saying (Hadith) of the Holy Prophet of Islam(PBUH), viz., "Do not vilify time, for time is God".[24] The Holy Quran includes suras named "Ad-dahr" (The Time)[25] and "Al-Asr" (Time through the Ages)[26]

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[19] Op. cit., *Reconstruction,* pp. 26-27.
[20] *Ibid*., p. 27.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid*., p. 28.
[23] Wright W.K. *A History of Modern Philosophy*, (N.Y, Macmillan, 1962) Ch. XII, "Kant", pp. 263 ff.
[24] Op. cit., *Reconstruction,* p.11.
[25] The Holy *Quran*, Sura LVI.
[26] *Ibid*, Sura CIII.

wherein Allah swears by the Time. This convincingly brings home the importance which Islam attaches to Time, thereby opening the way to the mental and spiritual aspects of the universe. Iqbal discusses the possibility of other levels or orders of Space and Time. He refers to Ainal-Qudat al-Hamdani Iraqi (1098-1131 A.D.)[27] who propounded the view of various orders of Space and Time relative to the various levels of being. In his book *Kitab Iama't,* Iraqi conceives infinite varieties of time, relative to the varying grades of being, intervening between materiality and pure spirituality".[28] Right from gross bodies which have a time divisible into past, present and future, he moves on through to the "Divine time—time which is absolutely free from the quality of passage, … It is above eternity; it has neither beginning nor end"[29]. Similarly he holds that there are various levels of space including a kind of space relative to God (the word proximity, contact, and mutual separation which apply to material bedies do not apply to God")[30]. "The existence of space", says Iqbal, "in relation to the life of God,…, cannot be denied; ..".[31] Iraqi holds that there are three kinds of space—the space of material bodies, the space of immaterial beings, and the space of God. He further divides the space of material bodies into three kinds, i.e. "the space of gross bodies', "the space of subtle bodies, e.g., air and sound", and "the space of light".[32] He, then moves on to discuss the space of various classes of immaterial beings, e.g., angels; and finally "the Divine space which is absolutely free from all dimensions and constitutes the meeting point of all infinities".[33] If we go with Iraqi and conceive these various kinds of space and time orders, our whole conception of the nature of the universe would undergo a drastic change; for the admission of other space-orders and time-orders would open the way to non-materialistic, and spiritualistic interpretations of the universe, especially when primacy has been assigned to time in preference to space. How unlike the Einsteinian version where time has been reduced

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[27] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 75.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.*
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 135
[31] *Ibid.*
[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.
[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 136-37.

to one of the dimensions of space which leads to the aforesaid presuppositions: viz., (I) there is only one kind of genuine human experience, and (ii) there is only one single space-time order.

The above presuppositions led to the concept of a physical world-order wherein the law of causation reigns supreme. Iqbal puts the question, "whether the causality bound aspect of nature is the whole truth about it? Is not the ultimate Reality invading our consciousness from some other direction as well? Is the purely intellectual method of overcoming nature the only method? "Iqbal here quotes a full passage from A. Eddington's (1882-1944) book *The Nature of Physical World* [34] in support of his view that there are other directions as well from which the reality is invading the human consciousness. To quote a part of the passage, "… Feelings, purpose, values, make up our consciousness as much as sense-impressions. We follow up the sense impressions and find that they lead into an external world discussed by science; we follow up the other elements of our being and find that they lead not into a world of space and time, but surely somewhere".[35] But what is the nature of that "somewhere" is no less important for the human study and research than the world of science and sense; it leads to the teleogical and spiritual world of metaphysics and religion. Again, Iqbal says that the modern man has exclusively concentrated on the natural aspect of reality and consequently, "His naturalism has given him an unprecedented control over the forces of Nature, but has robbed him of faith in his own future".[36] He regrets that "wholly overshadowed by the results of his intellectual activity, the modern man has ceased to live soulfully, i.e. from within".[37] And as a result in "the domain of thought he is living in open confliect with himself; and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflit with others"[38]. He has failed to control "his ruthless egoism and his infinite gold-hunger" which is "gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-

[34] *Ibid*, quoted From Eddington's *The Nature of Physical World,* (Cambridge University Press, 1929), p. 323.
[35] *Ibid*., p. 186.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid*., p. 187.
[38] *Ibid.*

weariness".[39] Thus, Iqbal regrets that the one-sided approach of the modern man has brought about atrophy of the spiritual side, and has given rise to such movements in philosophy as logical positivism and existentialism. In a beautiful Persian verse in *Gulshane Raze Jadeed (The New Rose Garden of Mystery)*[40], he says:

> *If he should close one eye, it would be sin: It is by seeing with both eyes that he can gain the path..*[41].

Modern empiricists and positivists have, thus, sinned by adopting only one-sided approach to reality – the external approach – which reveals to consciousness only the external or perceptual aspects of reality. This, according to Iqbal, is the chief malady of the modern Western approach. Logical positivists simply reduce the modern empiricist position to "statements" and use the "meaningful" and "meaningless"[42] denominators for them; hence labouring under the same one-sidedness which Iqbal has condemned.

3. This brings us to the third presupposition of modern science and philosophy, viz., the term "fact" is used in the sense of empirical fact only; fact which is, for Iqbal, "the optically present source of sensation". The denomination of the term "fact" again forms the pivot of empirical position. Iqbal, however, denies that empirical facts are the only facts. He says, "The total Reality, which enters our awareness and appears on interpretation as an empirical fact, has other ways of invading our consciousness and offers other opportunities for interpretation. The facts of religious experience are facts among other facts of human experience and, in the capacity of yielding knowledge by interpretation, one fact is as good as another".[43] This fact has been acknowledged decades later by A.C. Ewing in his article "Religious Assertions" thus: 'The position that nothing can exist except the type of subjects we know

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[39] *Ibid.* pp. 187-88.

[40] Iqbal, mathnavi, *Gulshan-e-Raz Jadeed Maa Bandagi Nama/Kulliyat-e-Iqbal* (Persian), (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1990)p.433.

[41] *The New Rose Garden of Mystery,* Eng. tr. Hadi Hussain, (Lahore: Sh. Ashraf, 1969), p.8.

[42] According to the positivists only those statements are "meaningful" which are verifiable by experience: others are called "meaningless" statements. They prefer these terms to "true" and "false" used in logic.

[43] Op. cit., *Reconstruction,* p. 16.

in science and ordinary sense-experience is certainly not true, and if other things do exist there will certainly be facts about them (in a well-recognized sense of "fact")[44]. He rightly adds, "The metaphysician may rightly claim to be giving "factual information", though not about the empirical facts of ordinary life".[45]

However, Iqbal makes an important distinction between, what he calls, "intellectual facts" and "vital facts", adding that the facts with which religion deals are the latter kind.[46] By an intellectual fact" he appears to mean facts which are concerned with cognition and add to our knowledge when interpreted, whereas a "vital fact" is concerned with conation and becomes a part of our faith when understood; of course, not blind faith but faith well-grounded in knowledge.[47] This he calls the stage of "Discovery".[48] This point is obvious from the opening sentence of his preface to his lectures, "The Quran is a book which emphasizes "deed" rather than "idea".[49] While talking of "discovery" Iqbal says that "the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually manageable fact; it is a vital fact, …[50] which "can embody itself only in a world-making or world-shaking act; and in this form alone the content of this timeless experience can make itself effectively visible to the eye of history"[51]. This shows why this experience is more amenable to the pragmatic, rather than to the intellectual, test. Moreover, religious statements are more like the statements of history which have a cognitive as well as an evaluative aspect, and I believe that the positivists will have no objection to admitting statements of history as "meaningful" in the sense in which they are willing to use the word. Again, as Iqbal has emphasized, "there is no such thing as isolated fact; for facts are systematic wholes the elements of which must be

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[44] *Philosophy,* Vol. XXXII, No. 122, July 1957, p. 213.
[45] *Ibid*., p. 213.
[46] *Ibid*., p. 184.
[47] This appears to my mind Iqbal's own implication.
[48] Op. cit., *Reconstruction,* p. 181. Where he recounts three periods of religious life, "Discovery" being the highest and deepest level.
[49] *Ibid*., Preface, p. V.
[50] *Ibid*., p. 184.
[51] *Ibid.*

understood by mutual reference:…".[52] It means that religious facts are, like other facts, systematic wholes with affective, cognitive and conative aspects; but the posititists keep these elements apart, especially in the case of metaphysical and religious facts, in order to disparage them in the light of their Principle of Verifiability, thereby violating their "systematic wholeness".

This brings us to the important question of the "objectivity" of religious experience which has been questioned by its opponents over and again. They hold that the scientific knowledge is objective, while religious knowledge is "subjective' (the positivists condemn them as mere "emotive assertions")[53]. Iqbal refutes the above position and urges that both religion and science aim at "pure objectivity" in their own respective spheres. While talking of the religious man Iqbal says, "His sense of objectivity is as keen as that of the scientist in his own sphere of objectivity He passes from experience to experience,…., as a critical sifter of experience who….; endeavours to eliminate all subjective elements, psychological or physiological… with a view finally to reach what is absolutely objective".[54] "This final experience, he adds, "is the revelation of a new life☙process☙original, essential, spontaneous"[55]. Iqbal quotes a passage from the renowned Indian Sufi Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind[56] as an example of this objectifying process in the field of religion. He also refers to the banning of music as a part of worship in Islam with a view to preclude any subjective element in religious experience. Iqbal goes to the extent of saying that "..it must be said in justice to religion that it insisted on the necessity of concrete experience[57] life long before science learnt to do so".[58] He concludes that "the experience reached is a perfectly natural experience.. It is the human ego rising higher than mere reflection, and mending its

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[52] *Ibid*., pp. 85-86

[53] Positivists like Maritz Schlick, C.L. Stevenson, A.J. Ayer and others relegate religious statements to mere "emotive assertions"—A.J. Ayer, *Logical Positivism,* (Illinois: Free Press, 1959), pp. 247 ff.

[54] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 197.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] *Ibid*, p. 193.

[57] *Ibid*., p. 197.

[58] *Ibid*., p. 25.

transiency by appropriating the eternal[59]. Iqbal furhter stresses the objectivity of this experience when he says, "The final act is.. a vital act which deepens the whole being of the ego, and sharpens his will with the creative assurance that the world is not something to be merely seen or known through concepts, but something to be made and remade by continuous action".[60] This statement brings out two very important things: viz.,

i. religious experience is basically conative rather than cognitive and

ii. the religious facts are vital rather than intellectual facts. Thus, the main mistake of the positivists lies in their confounding them with cognitive facts and trying to judge them accordingly.

4. The last presupposition of the empiricists is that they take "thought" in a discursive sense only. Ever since Aristotle the Western thinkers have been believing in a duality of thought, viz., the Pure Thought (Reason) and the Practical Thought (Reason)[61]. Centuries later Kant named his famous volumes[62] *The Critique of Pure Reason & The Critique of Practical Reason*[63], the former dealing with metaphysical problems of an analysis of human thought, the latter with the practical moral questions. The Westerners take thought in a finite and restricted sense to this day and it is basically analytical, and as a result they assign no important function to it in religious knowledge. Even Antony Flew, who in his *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (ed. 1979)[64], has treated thought in three different senses, has failed to go beyond the superficial movement of thought and its discursive nature which involved dichotomy of the object and subject. Iqbal, however, recommends that we should go beyond this superficial nature of thought when he says in *Baal-I-Jibril* (The Gabriel's Wing)

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[59] *Ibid*., p. 197

[60] *Ibid*., p. 198.

[61] Aristotle's theory of Thought in which he distinguishes between Passive and Creative or Active Reason – F. Thilly, *A History of Philosophy*, (Allahabad, Central Book, 1958) pp. 112-13.

[62] English tr. By Norman Kemp Smith, (London: Macmillan, 1963).

[63] English tr. By T.K. Abbott, (London: Longmans Green, 1959), 6th Revised Edition.

[64] (London: Pan books Paperback, first pb. 1979) see "Reason", pp. 278-79.

Go beyond the pale of reason as this light; Can show the way, not the goal[65].

And Again

Having unravelled the knotty skein of Intellect; O Allah; bestow 'madness' on me[66].

In the above two verses Iqbal has recommended to transcend both the Pure and Practical kinds of thought in order to fully appreciate the nature of thought itself. He says that thought, though finite "is capable of reaching an immanent infinite…[67]. According to him, thought "is a greeting of the finite with the infinite".[68] He says, "The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge".[69] He regrets that even such great thinkers as al-Ghazali and Kant "failed to see that thought, in the very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude…".[70] Again, acknowledging that thought is basically finite, Iqbal holds that the finitudes of nature are mutually and reciprocally exclusive but not "the finitudes of thought which is, in its essential nature, incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned in the narrow circuit of its own individuality".[71] This he calls "the deeper movement of thought"[72] as against its superficial movements discussed above, and in this movement thought comes very close to intuition. He regrets that modern philosophy, despite its so much emphasis on epistemology, has failed to see this fact and to realize "the implicit presence in its finite individuality of the infinite…[73]. Even Imam Ghazali, despite his admitting the importance of thought (intellect) in religion[74], was forced by his own personal mystic experience "to draw a

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[65] Iqbal Dr. M., *Baal-I-Jibril,* (Lahore: Ghulamali, 1976), p. 84. (Eng. tr. My own).
[66] *Ibid*., p. 87.
[67] Op. cit., *Reconstruction*, p. 6.
[68] *Ibid*., p. 7.
[69] *Ibid*., p. 6.
[70] *Ibid*., p. 6, 7.
[71] *Ibid*., p. 7.
[72] *Ibid*., p. 6.
[73] *Ibid.*
[74] *Ibid*., p. 4, 5.

line of cleavage between thought and Intuition…".[75] It was al-Farabi[76] in the Muslim world who could see that "rational knowledge coincides with ecstasy and inspiration,"[77] and Iqbal appears to have taken inspiration from him in understanding a proper relationship between thought and intuition. He says, "They spring up from the same root and complement each other".[78] He further says, "Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation". Both seek the vision of the same Reality which reveals itself to them…[79]. In *Javid Namah* he says more emphatically that

……..Love-led

Can reason claim the Lord and reason-lit

Love strikes firm roots. When integrated,

These two draw the pattern of a different world"[80]

The amalgamation of love and reason, says Iqbal, is necessitated by the fact that the Ultimate Reality "reveals its symbols both within and without"[81], and that the "internal" aspect of the real is not less important than its "external" and "observable" aspects. "Reality lives in its own appearances;…[82] says he.

Again, Iqbal agreeing with Kant, holds that thought cannot be completely divorced from concrete experience in the domain of knowledge, and this is true of both scientific and religious knowledge. He agrees with the Freudians that "there are religions, …, which provide a kind of cowardly escape from the facts of life, …[83] but this is not true of all religion. Similar is the position of the logical positivists who

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[75] Sharif M.M. (ed.), *A History of Muslim Philosophy,* Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), Vol.I, "Al'Farabi", p. 462.
[76] Iqbal, *Rconstruction*, p. 2.
[77] *Ibid*., p. 3.
[78] *Ibid*., p. 2.
[79] *Ibid*., p. 15.
[80] Ahmad S. Mahmood, *The Pilgrimage of Eternity*, Eng. tr. of Iqbal's *Javed Namah*, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1961), vs. 1135-40, p. 54.
[81] Op. cit., *Rconstruction*, p. 25.
[82] *Ibid*., p. 182.
[83] *Ibid*., p. 16

relegate religious statements to mere "emotive assertions", having no grounding in concrete experience, and hence condemning them to be 'meaningless' statements. Against all such positions Iqbal urges, as said before, that religion insisted on the possiblity of concrete experience in religious life long before science learnt to do so. He adds that higher religion is essentially experience and that it is "as critical of its level of experience as Naturalism is of its own level".[84] This experiential nature of religion and its critical approach dispel the position held by the positivists that religious experience was purely subjective. Iqbal, while discussing the nature of intuition, sounds the warning that we must not regard it as a "mysterious special faculty"' and adds that "the vista of experience' opened to us by this faculty" is as real and concrete as any other experience. To describe it as psychic, mystical or supernatural does not detract from its value as experience ".[85] He aptly remarks that to "the primitive man all experience was supernatural"[86] "The total reality, which enters our awareness and appears on interpretation as an empirical fact, has other ways of invading our consciousness and offers further opportunities of interpretation".[87] Once this fact is acknowledged, much of what appears to be mysterious about human life will be converted into hard facts of life requiring study and interpretation, and will enlarge the scope of human knowledge beyond its present limitations.

[84] *Ibid*., p. 182.
[85] *Ibid*., p. 16.
[86] *Ibid.*
[87] *Ibid.*

ISLAM AND THE WEST: A CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Part-I

Dr. Durre S. Ahmad

I

Introduction

In a recent widely disseminated article and interview, Harvard political scientist Sam Huntington suggested that future international conflicts will not be so much geopolitical as geocultural and involve a clash of civilizations featuring the "West versus the rest"[88]. The idea is not an isolated one and is shared by other foreign policy intellectuals in the United States such a Zbigniew Brzezinski who also believes that international issues are now primarily "cultural and philosophical"[89]. A cursory examination of such views indicates that Islam, as religion/culture, is perceived as the foremost protagonist among the "rest":

The Collected Works of C.G. Jung; Translated from the German by R.F.C. Hull. Edited by William McGuire, Herbert Read, Michael Fordham M.D., and Gerhard Adler. Ph.d. Routledge and Kegan Paul 1979 London. Also published in the U.S. by Princeton University Press.

1. Introduction

[88] Huntington, Samuel; 'Clash of Civilizations', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

"The Next Battleground". Time. June 28, 1993. Interview with Samuel Huntington.

- Also the *Los Angeles Times Syndicate*. June 1993'.

[89] According to Brzezinksi, The West urgently needs a "prolonged process of cultural self-examination and philosophical revaluation". Interestingly, in a review of the book, *The Economist's* response to Brzezinski was that "Islamic fundamentalists would cheer him on - but they would, would not they?" (31.7.93)

Brzezinski, Zbigniew; *Out of Control*. Scribners. N.Y. 1993.

> The conflict among civilizations will be increasingly central: The West and Islam, Islam and Hindu civilizations in India. Islam vs the Slavic Orthodox Russian civilization, China and Japan as civilizations. These are going to be the major entities among which international relations will take place...[90]

By now there are extensive scholarly materials which have attempted to break down the monolithic stereotypes regarding Islam, fundamentalism and the geopolitics of the subject after the end of the Cold War.[91] As one scans this material, however, there is a certain sense of *deja vu*, leaving one wondering about the capacity of those who teach, to learn themselves. The intellectual enterprise of 'Soviet Studies' is a case in point.

In an article about the collapse of the Soviet Union titled "Why Were We Surprised?", (The American Scholar, Spring 1991) W.R. Connors asked a crucial question implicating the western approach to knowledge about such issues; and the academic tendency to view phenomena through the "thin slit of social science" which pays attention to only a very narrow range of factors: data on military force, economics, agricultural productivity and the relationships among leaders. Frequently ignored are:

> the passions ... the appeal of ethnic loyalty and nationalism, the demands for freedom of religious practice and cultural expression - these conditions were "soft" or "unscientific" and those who emphasized them could be scorned.

Connors' views were echoed by a spectrum of intellectuals and academics and are summed up by an extensive editorial in the *Wilson Quarterly* on the demise of Soviet Studies.[92] As it points out, Soviet Studies had as much to do with the various intellectual positions within U.S. academe as without, in

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[90] Huntington; *op.cit.*

[91] Hadar, Leon T. 'What Green Peril?' *Foreign Affairs*, Spring '93

- Miller, Judith; "The Challenge of Radical Islam. *Foreign Affairs*, Spring '93

- Salame Ghassam; 'Islam and the West'. *Foreign Policy*, Sprint '93.

- Lewis, Bernard; 'Islam and Liberal Democracy. *The Atlantic Monthly*. February '93.

[92] *The Wilson Quarterly*. Spring 1991.

what was the Soviet Union itself. As a consequence of these different, essentially philosophical perspectives (e.g. liberal versus conservative) and despite "prodigious intellectual labours and the prodigious sums spent to make them possible", proponents of different views could not even vaguely anticipate the events which led to the final collapse.

While one applauds the western inclination for doing such academic postmortems, it must also be said that they are nevertheless, postmortems, conducted in hindsight by specialists whose primary task was to gauge and monitor the future. It is perhaps premature to conclude that the ghost of Soviet Studies has returned to haunt the scholarship on Islam. At the same time, there is as yet scant evidence that the experience of Soviet Studies has been absorbed and adapted to the West's newfound interest in what is now being called "another despotic creed seeking to infiltrate the West".[93]

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[93] 'Another Despotic Creed Seeks to Infiltrate the West'. *New York Times* editorial Sept 9, 1993:

> *Muslim fundamentalism is fast becoming the chief threat to global peace and security... It is akin to the menace posed by Nazism and Fascism in the 1930s and then communism in the 50s. The Soviet Union and China not only wielded great military might after World War II, but also had communist party branches in the universities and towns of the democratic states, which enabled them to acquire political influence at a high level. In Britain alone, more than 20,000 educated middle and upper-class people have converted to Islam (since 1989), including a former head boy of Eden. Many keep their conversions secret for business or family reasons, but assume an Islamic name... The British converts generally join moderate gentle and mystic Sufism... It is not easy to understand why these men and women, brought up in a democracy, should embrace a faith whose laws can be interpreted to require the stoning to death of women who commit adultery and the flogging of men, or chopping off the hand of a thief. (One commonly sees cripples in the town of Saudi Arabia)...*
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> *...There are as yet no know cases of Western converts to Islam serving Allah as spies or informants in the manner of such converts to communism such as Guy Burgbess and Kim Philby... Today national Islamic fervour is not only to be seen in Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia but has dramatically increased in Egypt and across North Africa. A decade ago apart from a show of prayer and fasting at the beginning of the holy month of Ramadan it was unusual for more than a few dozen men to appear at Friday prayers in most mosques. Today rich Muslims are building mosques in the secular states... For the Quran claims that "he who construct a Mosque for Him, the most high, will build a house in paradise". So for there has been scant reaction from the Western world, but it is increasingly important that the members of the Both Atlantic Treaty Organization set up and pay attention to aggressive Islamic trends.*

Once again, economics, and especially politics, dominates the flow of analysis. It remains to be seen also, if this particular endeavour will receive the same degree of academic and research support in universities and think-tanks as did Soviet Studies. With time, the substance of this research effort will become a major indicator of the extent to which any genuine shift has occurred in western intellectual consciousness and its theories and methods of knowledge.

At present, one can say that in the same way that it has taken the social sciences almost 20 years to begin a serious re-examination of 'development', it has yet to come to a substantive understanding of religion *per se* and especially Islam. The current situation cannot be considered anti-Islamic as much as anti-religion, stemming as it does, from the modern academic belief that there is an 'inconsistency' between faith and knowledge and thus 'those who believe cannot think and those who think cannot believe'. As one has discussed elsewhere, this attitude is slowly changing and there is now an openness and even an active return to religion in some western academic circles. However, the direction of this change does not bode well, in one's opinion, for either the West or the rest - and for women on both sides. While it claims to base itself on a rejection of modernity, it goes on to endorse what one understands as basically a return to fundamentalist Christianity and Judaism.[94]

That the focus in the West has been on Islam's militant/fundamentalist aspect, in a sense highlights and puts to question many basic assumptions about religion and the approach of modern knowledge systems to the study of religion. On the one hand, Islam has been historically lumped with Judaism and Christianity as part of a particular moral-partriarchal world view labelled 'monotheism'. Yet, it sticks out like a sore thumb, generating immense passions on both sides of an ever increasing and violent divide the other side of which is precisely those religious systems of which it is supposedly a confused, received, and therefore invented version. The fact is that Islam largely remains to be studied either in postmodern or its own terms, that is, from a framework not only of comparative theology but its

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[94] Chaudhry T. & Ahmed, D. "The Cultural Politics of Paranoia: First World/Third World". *Seminar on 'Decolonizing Knowledge*'. Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland.

specific psychology, as distinct from other religions, each of which infact have also different psychologies.

Some Theoretical Considerations
Paranoia:

In psychological terms, the present relationship between the West and Islam can be considered one of a mutual growing paranoia. Paranoia is a psychological condition *par excellence* about a real or imaginary 'other' and is today one of the few psychopathologies which has not been reduced to a biochemical basis. The dictionary defines paranoia as "a mental disorder characterized by systematized delusions, as of grandeur or especially persecution".[95] Both psychiatry and the dictionary define delusion as a "false belief" Without commenting on the peculiarities of modern psychology, according to the definitions, it can be said that both Islam and the West are entangled in a spectrum of "false beliefs" spanning feelings of grandeur at one end, and what is infect the inevitable and logical counterpart of feelings of persecution at the other end.

In the context of its treatment, paranoia is an exceedingly intransigent condition. Therapy relying on the ideal of insight into oneself rarely works, not least because the majority of paranoids are highly intelligent. Given the initial "false belief", whatever the therapist may say and however rational and factual it may be, the paranoid person interprets information which simply confirms the initial belief. The roots of paranoia are thus deeply related to two currently popular intellectual themes: epistemology and interpretation. Indeed, as one considers the official material on paranoia, it seems to be a peculiarly intellectual(s) disease:

> The Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics of the American Psychology Association grouped paranoia and paranoid states as *psychoses without known brain pathology*. It defined them as cases showing persistent delusions, generally persecutory and grandiose, and ordinarily without hallucinations ... Emotional response and behaviour are consistent with the ideas held ... *Intelligence is well preserved* ... It is characterized by an intricate, complex and slowly developing system, often *logically elaborated after a false interpretation* of

[95] New Websters: Universal Unabridged Dictionary. Second Edition.

> an actual occurrence. The patient frequently considers himself endowed with superior or unique abilities ... older psychiatrists called it *monomania ... essentially a disorder of the intellect ... but without general personality deterioration*.[96] (My emphases)

Applying these criteria to the mutual paranoia of the West and Islam, there seems little cause for an optimistic resolution between the two. However, since this discourse aims to remain within an analytic framework as set down by the West itself, it will continue to rely on the assumptions of western depth psychology/psychiatry regarding insight, knowledge and change. As a psychotherapeutic endeavour then, this paper is part of a series addressed to the academic/intellectual mentality of both sides. For reasons of both structure and space, the present focus is the West and the nature and extent of Islam as the 'other' in Western consciousness which is not to say that the reverse does not hold. Infect it does. But for reasons related to clarity and different psychological concerns, the stance of the protagonists will be discussed individually.

Rapport and Psychotherapy

The necessity of a common language is a pre-requisite for the psychotherapeutic process. The earliest Freudian model was based on the notion that it was the therapist's task to understand and 'make sense' of the patient's condition hence the field of depth psychology. Within the massive enterprise of what constitutes psychotherapy in the West, today it is taken for granted that it is important for the therapist to "speak the language" of the patient, of "entering the patient's world" and so on, as the first and most crucial step towards successful therapy. The degree of rapport then is inextricably related to the therapist's ability to speak the language(s) of the patient.

In trying to establish an intellectual rapport between Islam and the West, it is not enough to be simply writing in English in order to attack the West for being prejudiced, hypocritical etc, or then belligerently insisting on a different 'indigenous' vision, stating it, and leaving it at that. While to a certain extent such an attitude can be justified for asserting a post-colonial

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[96] Freedman, A.(M.D.) and Kaplan H.(M.D.); *Comprehensive Text book of Psychiatry* Baltimore. The Williams and Wilkins Company, 1967.

identity and contrasting vision(s) it presents no solution as to how to bridge the growing polarization between the protagonists. The need for such bridges is becoming imperative in the light of problems which are global in scope such as AIDS and the state of the environment. The pragmatics of human communication are such that simply blaming the other rarely proves to be conducive to dialogue or change.[97] In psychological terms, such an approach is essentially Freudian in which most problems are laid at the door of powerful parental figures which, theoretically, can lead into an infinite regress of blameworthy progenitors. It is also conceptually fruitless since the 'other' is seen only as a protagonist to be either repelled or conquered.

This particular discourse then is based on the assumption that communication is more effective through a common theoretical/analytic language, one belonging to the West. In this instance it is the Jungian method of analytical psychology. Apart from offering a conceptually rich field of ideas, it is suitable since it takes into account widely divergent cultures and religions in its view of collective and individual behaviour. At times, in the course of the analysis, the shortcomings inherent in the theory will be difficult to ignore. Yet, the main purpose is not to do a critique of Jungian theory. Rather, as a first step towards mutual understanding, the aim at this initial stage is to set out the West's understanding of the psychology of Islam. Even in the context of criticism, it is preferable not to launch into a diatribe on behalf of 'the rest'. One of the most distinctive and admirable features of the Western approach to knowledge is a healthy tendency towards self-criticism which is markedly lacking in its opponents.[98] In sum, the effort is to

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[97] Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson; *The pragmatics of Human Communication* N.Y. W.W. Norton 1967.

[98] Politeness aside, the West does has difficulty when an'outsider' criticizes it. For example, the Indian anthropologist's book *Danes Are Like* That ("Saaden er Dansekerne"; Grevas Forlag, Aarhans, D.Kr 244); was met with much protest in Denmark. As *The Economist* reports:

> *Prakash Reddy, a professor of social anthropology chanced to visit the department of anthropology at a Danish University a few years ago. Pins in a wall may marked where the department had sent field workers. "Why are there no pins in Denmark? Professor Reddy asked. "There's nothing to study here", he was told ... His observations probably told Danes little they did not already know or suspect. But not all of them were pleased to hear it from a third-world anthropologist... Among his findings: individual independence was mixed with loneliness ... a marked lack of spirituality ... an almost complete lack of community ... extreme*

be neither acrimonious nor condemnatory but to communicate, on the basis of facts, the West's view of Islam as provided by the West itself.

The Other

The term 'other' is rapidly becoming a cliche in sociology and anthropology but in its source context of psychology, it continues to be an important concept. Uprooted from its original matrix and made into a label, the term has been claimed mostly by the rest to bash the West. At the same time, all sides tend to overlook the psychological fact that such a division between 'self' and 'other', serves a crucial function in the advancement of the evolution of human consciousness. That is, the 'other' is vital to knowledge about oneself, regardless of whether this self belongs to the West or the rest. As Jung pointed out, the ability to differentiate is the *sine qua non* of consciousness and all knowledge (including morality) presupposes such a consciousness.[99]

The necessity of differentiation-as-knowledge can be considered a law, functioning as it does at the most basic levels of human perception. The human sensorium can only function on the basis of contrast and difference. There can be no information/knowledge without contrast.[100] For example, subjects placed in a room painted a uniform white with absolutely no present of contrast start experiencing visual distortion and then 'blindness' until contrast it introduced even as a spot of black thereby restoring perspective and balance. The same holds for all the other senses. Similarly, knowledge of oneself, individual or cultural, is possible only in the context of difference, which is perhaps why, since antiquity, the sages have looked to travel as a source of wisdom. Thus, the current negative viewing of the notion of the 'other' is both fruitless and limiting. And the observation that "to understand himself man needs to be understood by another; to be understood by another, he needs to understand the other",[101] is applicable to the rest and the West.

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individualism ... His Danish studies left him feeling that white people were odd ... he was accused of moralizing not observing". "An Indian in Hvilsager". The Economist (25.1.92)

[99] Jung C;. *Collected Works* Volume 11,p.372.

[100] Bateson, Gregory; *Mind and Nature*. Dutton N.Y. 1980.

[101] Hora, Thomas; "Tao, Zen, and Existential Psychotherapy". *Psychologia* 2: 236-42, 1959.

The issue of the other is also close to the heart of the therapeutic enterprise. More than most disciplines, the structure of psychotherapy insists on the recognition of this other. The therapeutic context becomes a microcosmic arena in which different levels of other-ness and their relationship(s) with both therapist are played out on the assumption that these encounters will lead to further insight - and change. At one level, patient and therapist mutually reflect an other. Similarly, most depth psychology theories assume the existence of another–or others–within each individual. The therapist's training assumes that he/she has developed a knowledge of and therefore a comfortable relationship with the 'other(s) within. Based on this sort of self-knowledge, the therapist can assist the patient to do the same.

Thus, for example, the Freudian 'id' and its counterpart of the 'superego' can be postulated as different 'others' which have to be firstly recognized and subsequently brought under the control of the rational 'ego'. The jungian approach assumes a host of psychological 'others' which need to be 'integrated' in order for a person to feel whole and 'individuated'. To quote Jung:

> No one who does not know himself can know others. And in each of us there is another whom we do not know. He speaks to us in dreams and tells us how differently he sees us from the way we see ourselves. When therefore we find ourselves in a difficult situation to which there is no solution, he can sometimes kindle a light that radically alters our attitude–the very attitude that led us into there difficult situation.[102]

To simply say then, that the West sees Islam as the 'other' is to trivialize and render irrelevant what is obviously becoming a serious situation. After all, if the 'other' is basically a matter of difference, the question arises as to how to distinguish the quality of response between, for example, Hinduism as 'other' and Islam?

Setting aside obvious disparities of numerical scale, the question needs a frame of reference which would permit reasonable comparisons. Within

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[102] Jung C.G; *Collected Works*; Volume 10, p.153.

psychology and psychiatry, such a frame is provided by *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung,* the best of the West/Symbol.

Carl Jung: Biography and Background.

Perhaps even more than Freud, Carl Jung remains a controversial figure in western intellectual history. Numerous biographies and commentaries have been written on Jung's life and work, many of them linking personal events with the formulation of his theories. The wide and intense spectrum of response that he generated can be gauged by a sampling of just the titles of some of these texts. Paul Stern's *C.G.Jung: The Haunted Prophet* [103] is a highly critical biography verging on character assassination. A Freudian analyst, Stern saw Jung as a man of bad conscience, an extortionist, a terrible family man not interested in his children who married his wife primarily for his money. Stern is also convinced of Jung's anti-semitism. At the other extreme is a book by the prolific author, traveller and latter day renaissance man, Laurens van der Post and his *Jung and the Story of Our Times*.[104] It is Post's conviction that sooner rather than later, Jung "will be seen for what he is, one of the great turning points in history, already being recognized by the Old and New Worlds". Insofar as Post is not a psychologist, his undoubtedly adulatory tone can be considered a forerunner to the current absorption of the 'New Age' in the West with Jungian and post-Jungian concepts. As Post notes, Jung enabled the opening of a dialogue and a meeting point between East and West. In this sense, Post's view is perhaps the most widespread and representative for our purpose of a mutually acceptable analytic framework.

A third biography on Jung is by Vincent Brome who like Stern, is a psychiatrist. Academically, however, his approach is far more balanced. Thus in the book *Jung: Man and Myth*,[105] Brome notes the facts regarding Jung's bisexual impulses, his forays into adultery and his remaining "unreconciled to Christianity". Yet, there are other facets which are also highlighted. Brome takes care to establish Jung's academic credentials including the awarding of numerous honorary degrees by prestigious universities across the continents. He confirms what is anyway evident in Jung's *Collected Works* of an erudition

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[103] Stern, P.; *C.G.Jung: The Haunted Prophet* N.Y. Delta Books. 1967.

[104] Laurens van der Post; *Jung and the Story of Our Times*. Penguin U.K. 1978.

[105] Brome, Vincent; Jung: *Man and Myth. London*. Grenada 1980.

on a gigantic scale. Brome's assessment of Jung's influence on other disciplines is similarly comprehensive. He notes the frequently obscured fact that despite the bitter differences with Freud, Jung's ideas were to clearly influence psychoanalysis itself. Similarly, his careful consideration of the anti-semitic accusation, exonerates Jung from the essentially Freudian motivated charge.

Jung's Contemporary Status and Influence

Today, Jung's obscurity is no longer an issue. While he has yet to have the same impact as Freud on academe, the comparison is perhaps misplaced since in many ways academe has itself undergone a transformation since the advent of Freud. As Brome has pointed out, analogies to Jungian concepts are not difficult to find in fields ranging from anthropology to sociology. The feminist movement and its mostly successful insistence on the centrality of gender and interpretation, owes a substantial debt to Jung.

Numerous writers have described how the quarrel between Freud and Jung can be seen as a battle between the Freudian masculine patriarch and Jung's effort to restore the lost elements of the Great Mother Goddess. Many books have documented the story of the separation between Freud and Jung as a battle between father and son. The battle, of course, was over the human Psyche, classically a female, and who among the two men had the more appropriate theory and method to formulate a logos of the psyche: Psychology. Half a century later, while the battle continues, Jung stands if not vindicated then at least in a position where a different feminine voice is now an audible contrast to Freud's masculine one. The dethroning of Freud, with his virulent anti-female bias, has been a major force in the search for alternative explanations of what can be called normal and abnormal. While one has argued that much of what is considered post-Freudian psychology is infect more of the same,[106] the feminist reaction to Freud has at least succeeded in making space for other views, including Jung's. Which is not to say that Jungian theory is a particularly sympathetic and accurate portrait of the psychology of women. That is another story. This one is about Jung and

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[106] Ahmed, D.S; "*Woman, Body, Knowledge*: Notes Towards a Re-search for the Feminine Self in Psychology and Sufism". *Seminar on Development and Repression*, IDS, University of Helsinki, Finland. 1991.

how he can be considered a symbol of a particular type of geopolitical/cultural consciousness.

Brome's review of Jung's influence is important since it reveals long-obscured facts pertaining to a range of contemporary knowledge systems. It illustrates that, unlike Freud whose methods have long been discarded by disciplines other than psychology, Jungian concepts continue to flourish in many fields, albeit unacknowledged. According to Brome, within psychology, Neo-Freudians owe much to Jung whose concept of 'individuation' anticipated the notion of 'self-actualization'. Existential analysts are similarly indebted in their theoretical constructs. Painting as a means of insight is today a common therapeutic method and has its origins in Jung's analytic psychology. Terms such as 'complex', 'introvert' and 'extrovert' inspired even Freud to revise his libido theory. Subsequently, the introversion/extraversion model was employed by Eysenk as one important dimension of personality.

Jung's early work on word association inspired the Rorschach test and other projective techniques leading to the invention of the lie-detector. His preoccupation with myths, fairy tales, symbols and archetypes led to a new understanding of not only schizophrenia but of the psychological significance of these materials for individuals and entire cultures.

In literary criticism, the cross fertilization has been equally rich. For example, Northrop Frye's classic text *The Anatomy of Criticism* is clearly influenced by Jung. Frye's subsequent and highly influential wrestling's reflect a continuing deepening of this influence. Similarly, another critical classic, Archetypal Patterns in Poetry by Maud Bodkin is directly derivative in its very title. Jung's influence is also evident in the writings of Gillbert Murray, J.B. Priestley's *Literature and Western Man*, Gottfried Diener's study of *Faust* and James Kirsch's *Shakespeare's Hamlet.*

In the artistic domain, an entire aesthetic has been worked out by Phipson based on Jungian principles. Eric Neumann's analysis of Henry Moore, Herbert Read's studies of painting and Michael Tippett's musical criticism are all anchored in Jungian concepts. David Reisman's *The Lonely Crowd* developed the introversion-extraversion categories in sociological terms. Jung's views on religions provided lively debates in both Catholic and Protestant theologians and Paul Tillich especially found a reaffirmation of Protestant theology in many Jungian ideas.

As Brome documents, in Europe especially, Jung's ideas were brought to bear on political philosophy, jurisprudence and even economics. The historian Arnold Toynbee classified many world religions in terms of Jung's psychological types. Long before Derrida et al, Jung talked of signs, symbols and Semitics. Similarly, Chomsky's innate structures, Levi-Strauss' structuralism, and Piaget's theories are derived from an essentially Jungian methodology:

> Extrapolate some of the structures underlying Jung's thinking–the principle of opposites, of complementarity of phylogentic structures, of feminine and masculine, conscious and unconscious and it is not difficult to find analogies in many fields (p.293)

While Brome's review attempts to redress the balance of ignorance regarding Jung in the academic world, it does not go into related reasons regarding the reasons for Jung's obscurity and the explanatory detour can be considered marginal to the purpose at hand (the West and Islam), it does provide a context to understanding western consciousness and certain dominant motifs in its intellectual history.

Freud versus Jung

Starting from his initial position as one of Freud's most brilliant and devoted disciples, to his subsequent departure from the inner circle of psychoanalysis, Jung's conception of human behaviour forms the other pillar of the house of psychology which until recently was inhabited primarily be the heirs of the Freudian tradition. Both had the same academic and practical credentials and Jung's opus is possibly more extensive than Freud's. Jung's relative obscurity in academia can be briefly summed up within two broad categories. The first was related to the accusations emerging from the Freudian camp regarding Jung's alleged anti-semitism which for anyone thoroughly familiar with Jung's sprawling *Collected Works* is essentially anti-Freud not anti-semitic. The fact that Jung gave greater importance to factors such as culture, history and religion, coupled with applying certain analytic principles propounded by Freud to Freud himself, were convenient grist for the "anti-semitic" mill.

The second reason for Jung's obscurity is linked to the inner workings of the disciplines/professions of psychiatry and clinical psychology. Unlike Freud, Jung never gave a specific etiology of neurosis or psychosis. Mental

illness for Jung was basically a one-sidedness in the presence of multiplicity. Related to this theoretical frame, the Freudian emphasis on sexuality was for Jung an incomplete and exceedingly narrow view of human behaviour– normal or otherwise. A more comprehensive picture was only possible if the practitioner was aware of numerous cultural and historical factors which also affect psychological consciousness, including the domains of culture, art, religion, and spirituality. The practice of psychotherapy within such broad intellectual parameters without the benefit of a well-structured etiology is not an easy task.

It becomes even more difficult to accomplish when one takes into account the considerable time required to qualify simply as a medical doctor. Thus, it was the Freudian perspective with its singular emphasis on sexuality and the dismissing of religion as "infantile", which was absorbed into the mainstream of the newly emerging discipline of psychiatry. While both Freud and Jung eventually declared that psychotherapy need not be restricted to only medical doctors, the status of psychiatry over all other non-medical forms of therapy, consolidated Freud's position over Jung. In the last fifty years, until recently, this situation has remained basically the same, especially with psychiatry. Even though the method initiated by Freud, psychoanalysis, is today a crumbling fortress, Freud's legacy lives on in numerous schools and theories of psychology.[107] Similarly, it would be no exaggeration to say that worldwide, in the public imagination, people are still more apt to recognize and think in Freudian rather than in Jungian concepts. Id, ego, superego are popularly much more 'accessible' than, for example, the concepts of archetype, anima and enantrodromia. But with the advent of postmodernism, this is slowly changing.

Jung, The 'New Age' Movement and Religion

The New Age movement and its academic counterpart of Alternatives, suggest a significant change in western attitudes regarding self, other and society.[108] Underlying, and in many instances pre-empting this change, is

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[107] *Newsweek*: "Freud's Enduring Legacy: How His Ideas Still Shape Psychotherapy" (4.7.88).

[108] In the following extracts from a recent essay in *Time* titled "The year 2000 - Is It the End or Just the Beginning?", Henry Grunwald, a leading U.S. conservative commentator and former editor of Time discusses the decline of mainstream religion in the U.S. The passages are relevant for two reasons. Firstly, they summarize in accessible language the secular basis

of modern academic knowledge and its present outcome. Secondly, they confirm the strong presence of the religious aspect of the New Age.

> *The Age of Reason exalted humankind but still admitted God as a sort of supreme philosopher-king or chairman of the board who ultimately presided over the glories achieved by reason and science. The humanist 19th century voted him out. It increasingly saw reason and science irreconcilably opposed to religion, which would fade away....*
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> *Secular humanism (a respectable term even though it became a right-wing swearword) stubbornly insisted that morality need not be based on the supernatural. But it gradually became clear that ethics without the sanction of Some higher authority simply were not compelling…*
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> *The ultimate irony or perhaps tragedy, is that secularism has not led to humanism. We have gradually dissolved-reconstructed-the human being into a bundle of reflexes, impulses, neuroses, nerve endings. The great religious heresy used to be making man the measure of all things; but we have come close to making man the measure of nothing.*
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> *... The mainstream churches have tried various ways to adapt themselves to a soecular age. The Roman Catholic Church made its liturgy accessible in the vernacular and turned increasingly from saving souls to saving society. The major Protestant denominations also increasingly emphasized social activism and tried to dilute dogma to accommodated 20th century rationality and diversity. Churches not only permitted the ordination of women - long overdue - but are seriously debating the ordination of homosexuals and sanctioning homosexual marriages. Fin de siecle?*
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> *... But none of these reforms are arresting the sharp decline of the mainstream churches. Why not? The answer seems to be that while orthodox religion can be stifling, liberal religion can be empty. Many people seem to want a faith that is rigorous and demanding, or else more personal and emotional. That explains in part why denominations outside the mainstream are doing well, including Fundamentalists (despite the decline of the scandal-ridden TV ministries)*
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> *... Equally significant is the flood of substitute religions. The most prominent of these is the so-called New Age movement - a vast, amorphous hodgepodge of spiritualism, faith healing, reincarnation, meditation, yoga, macrobiotic diets, mystical environmentalism and anything else that helps transform the self. Its followers sound as if they were born again, but without Christ. A motto often used by them is borrowed from Joseph Campbell "Follow your bliss".*
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> *The New Age bliss has grown to extraordinary proportions, with magazines, books, records, mass merchandising. Large corporations have dabbled in New Age techniques to control stress in their managers. Some New Agers often affirm that all is God, hence all is good. As Chesterton said "when men stop believing in God, they don't in nothing; they believe in anything".*
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> *But the New Age phenomenon points to avoid that our society has left in people's lives. They don't need Sartre to find existence meaningless. In* New Perspectives Quarterly*, author Christopher Lasch laments the loss of institutions of "organic unity" like family, neighborhood and religion, a loss to which "liberalism never had an answer." (30.3.92)*

Jung's vision of complexity and diversity in human nature and the centrality of a mode of consciousness that can be loosely termed the Feminine and the critical need for western civilization to consider the consequences of what Jung termed its loss of soul. Many of the ideas (and practices) of the New Age movement can be traced to Jungian perspectives on physical and mental health. This historical link is evident insofar as Jung was among the first medical scientists who, as early as the 40s and 50s, suggested that modern man's search for mental health would be better served by many of the psychological principles underlying eastern spiritual practices rather than mainstream Protestant Christianity or Freudian analysis.

Presently, Jung's ideas are finding an even larger audience, thanks primarily to outstanding post-Jungian scholars such as James Hillman. The present almost cult like status of the poet Robert Bligh, author of Iron John, and the swirl of debate over masculine and feminine modes of consciousness, are almost entirely due to the writings of post-Jungians such as Hillman. The ubiquitous use of terms such as 'soul', 'meditation', 'visualization', 'holism', 'wholeness', etc, all emerge from a Jungian matrix now dispersed by time and by the sheer volume of concepts it has generated.

It was mainly Jung's writings on religion and psychology which led him to being called a "new Messiah" and "psychiatrist to God". He made no secret of his enthusiasm regarding numerous aspects of these 'alien' philosophies and saw a profound resonance between his own ideas and these traditions. His range and grasp of the psychology of religion is immense, ranging from ancient African beliefs to those of the American Indian, the Chinese, Hindus and other lesser known systems. His personal and cultural milieu assured him of a strong grasp of Christianity and Judaism. The extensive and enormously erudite writings on many aspects of the Jedeo-Christian tradition ensured his being branded anti-semitic on the one hand, and a heretic on the other. Post-Jungians such as James Hillman continue to fight the battle initiated by Jung, especially with mainstream psychology/psychiatry and Protestant Christianity.

All this needed to be set down as part of the attempt to make way for a common ground and language regarding the West versus the rest and

especially Islam. As one has tried to show, this ground/language exists in the West and the effort will be to stay within its boundaries. When it comes to understanding other cultures and religions, Jung is a symbol of the best of the West: Liberal, enlightened, capable of being self-critical, always pursuing knowledge regardless of cultural prejudice, and prevailing academic fashion. The present widespread acceptance of his ideas, directly or indirectly, indicate that such a consciousness (i.e. postmodernism) is well established and growing in the West. It is a consciousness which one both relates to and even admires and to which this paper is addressed.

II

The Collected Works of C.G. Jung:

A Content Analysis

The Collected Works of Carl Jung are scholarly and eloquent testimony to his life-long effort to serve as a mediator between the Christian West and other religions. While this may not have been his primary intention, which he maintained was essentially psychotherapeutic and rooted in scientific psychology, The Collected Works can, nevertheless, be regarded as a mediative corpus especially in its use of two broad methods. The first was Jung's attempt to view religion psychologically. This was based on drawing a distinction between the psychology of a religious person as posed to the "psychology of religion proper, that is of religious contents"[109]. For Jung, the content of a religion, that is, issues of dogma and belief, are not a question of 'facts'. Most religious assertions are impossible to prove in the usual sense of the word. The study of any religion then must take into account the psychology of its symbols, not just the literal dogma. Thus, religious assertions have to do primarily with the reality of the psyche not physics.[110]

For example, in the process of uncovering the forgotten and neglected world of the Divine Feminine as represented by Sophia and Mary in Judaism and Christianity, Jung repeatedly demonstrated the line between the bias against the feminine aspects of the psyche and the Judaeo-Christian contribution towards this bias. James Hillman and other post-Jungians have

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[109] Jung C.G; *Collected Works*, Volume 11,p.464.

[110] *Ibid.*

carryed this view further, showing how modern systems of knowledge - scientific, and secular-human - are in fact still anchored in the religious worldview of what Hillman calls "Cartesian-Christianism".[111]

One aspect of Jung's work then, attempts to de-link knowledge not from the Judaeo-Christian tradition as such but from what he perceived were partriarchical accetions and the extreme masculinization of these traditions. From this perspective, the bulk of The Collected Works is primarily addressed to 'modern man', and thus primarily to the West. Jung's secondary effort was concerned with the religions and philosophies of "the rest". that is, non-western civilizations and cultures. The study of these other modes of religious psychology was done not with the purpose of offering them as a substitute for, what was a Jung, a highly frayed Christianity. Rather, it was to illustrate the correspondence and fundamental harmony between these seemingly alien systems and the sort of Christianity that, according to Jung, had originally existed.

Apart from commenting in depth on a range of western and non-western sacred texts, rituals, art(ifacts) and other religious/spiritual/cultural expressions both public and private, the main source of his sweeping comparative vision was again twofold. The first was mythology and its related areas such as folk tales, legends, etc. The second was his foray into alchemy which had long been dismissed in the West as simply a primitive forerunner to the modern science of chemistry. His work in this area can be considered *tour de force* of academic and scholarly research demonstrating the deep links of this arena with psychological process and transformation. As he has brilliantly shown, much of alchemy was a symbolic representation of certain psycho-spiritual process which form the core of the 'message(s)' of many sacred texts and practices.

It would be no exaggeration to say that in the 20th century, Jung was one of the few western authors who tried to create a vast and challenging conceptual space for a mutual understanding between the West and the rest. And it is this space which offers the best prospect for a continuing dialogue. The parameters then are The Collected Works of C.G. Jung. It consists of

[111] Hillman, James; *The Soul of the World Dallas*, Spring Publications, 1992.

twenty volumes. As stated earlier, it is primarily addressed to the inheritors of the Judaeo-Christian worlview. Simultaneously, it is one of the most comprehensive surveys available on the psychological study of religions.

Methodology

Taking Jung as a symbol representing the best of the West, this paper will examine the precise nature of Jung's understanding of Islam as reflected in The Collected Works. Rather than prematurely imposing one's interpretation of this understanding the first step is to examine the corpus through empirical means.

One relatively standard technique is of a content analysis. This will be done firstly by noting the numerical frequency of references to Islam in comparison to all the major religions examined by Jung. For example, one can note the frequency of reference to certain primary features which constitute the most visible profile of a religion such as the main person (Moses, Lao Tzu, Mohammad), place (Benaras, Jerusalem, Mecca) and scripture (Vedas, Quran, Torah, Bible). These data can then be viewed from a more comprehensive angle in terms of comparison.

The second, deeper level would examine the substantive nature of all the reference to Islam. Using methods of (con) textual analysis one will attempt to delineate more precisely Jung's understanding of the psychology of Islam as distinct from other religions, alongwith his grasp of areas of similarity. Such a cross-referential method or a dual analytic level, which takes into account both quantity and quality of knowledge about Islam, would enable one to gauge the extent and depth of Jung's understanding of the subject. The emergent proportions would indicate the extent to which Islam can be considered the 'other', or in Jungian terms the 'shadow' in western religious and psychological consciousness. The data for the quantitative content analysis have been compiled/identified from the General Index (Vol.20)

Quantitative Analysis of References to Islam.

As the tables indicate, Islam has the least number of references to it in every category. This despite the fact that even during Jung's time it was the second largest religion in the world and is today moving towards having the most adherents. Apart from the massive amount of material on Judaism and Christianity, combined reference to Indo-Chinese traditions exceed one

hundred. Whereas all other religions have entries under related categories, the only related category to 'Islam' is 'Arabs' which consists of 15 references and the names of eight Arab alchemists. Even without a substantive review, the figures indicate a certain lack of interest, indicating that Islam was the least of Jung's priority in his pursuit of understanding the psychology of various religions.

The order of priority suggested by the figures seems to be constant at the most basic levels. For example, within Jungian theory considerable attention is devoted to different religious rituals and their psycho-symbolic significance. The low priority of Islam in these categories is also evident if a comparison is made, for example, among Passover, Christmas, and the Muslim festival of Eid or the rite of the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Haj. There are two detailed references to Passover, 14 to Christmas, 11 to Easter, many of these extensive. There are no references to any Islamic rite or ritual. Again, in the context of symbols, the cross, for example, has almost an entire page of references as does the 'Star' (of both the Messiah and David). The prototypical symbol of Islam, the crescent, is not referred to even once in this context. Even though within the realm of classical symbols it is highly significant and extensively documented. While there are extensive references to the symbolic significance of the 'moon', none of these is specifically discussed in the context of Islam.

This seeming lack of interest in Islam becomes clearer when one move on to the next level of analysis which is an examination of the precise context and extent to which these 19 references to Islam and its allied concepts occur.

Qualitative (Con) Textual Analysis of References to Islam.

The review is based on the following structure: Apart from Islam(is), all major related concepts will also be noted, such as 'Allah', 'Muhammad' and other names, themes etc. specific to the Islamic religious/spiritual universe. Two broad categories of references can be discerned. The first consist of what can be termed block or passing references. That is, while 'Islam' or 'Allah' or 'Muhammad' is certainly mentioned, nothing more specific is said in what is a general statement about, for example, Yahweh, Allah, Brahma or the 'monotheisms' etc. The second category is when more substantive

observations are made. These, in turn, can be examined for positive or negative comments and other insights into the subject.

Before approaching the data, a few points need to be kept in mind. Firstly, while *The Collected Works* were written over a period of a lifetime, they are arranged thematically. Thus, if some volumes contain no references to Islam, it is by itself no indication of Jung's lack of interest in the subject. In this case, any conclusions to be drawn must come from the whole and not any one part. Secondly, while the main discussion will be done after the review, the rather technical and frequently arcane nature of many contexts necessitate some brief comments, if only to retain the reader's interest.

The references can be approached keeping three broad categories in mind: Positive, negative and neutral/indifferent. The last would consist of all those that have been earlier classified as passing, since no conclusion can be drawn from them. It should also be noted that there is one central and repeated reference to Islam. This has to do with an interpretation of the 18th Surah of the Qurān and the figure of *Al-Khidr* (or Khadir). It is an interesting and insightful analysis regarding certain psychological aspects of Islam. Given the relatively large number of repeat references to it, as well as the positivity which characterises them, this aspect of Jung's writings will be examined at length after the overall review of *The Collected Works*.

Vol. 1 ***Psychiatric Studies*.** **No reference.**

Vol.2 ***Experimental Researches*.** **No reference**

Vol.3 ***The Psychogenesis of Mental Disease*.** **No reference**

Vol.4 ***Freud and Psychonalysis*.** **No reference**

Vol.5 ***Smybols of Transformation*:** **Khidr.**

(i) An extensive reference to the 18th Surah of the Qurān about the legend of Moses and Khidr. (See detailed discussion). The context is the essay titled 'The Origins of the Hero' and pertains to a series of dreams of an anonymous "Miss Miller" who was the subject of another extensive Jungian analysis titled "The Miller Fantasies". The

reference occurs in the course of tracing an association given by Miss Miller about 'Ahasuerus' whom Jung links to the archetype of the wandering Jew:

Although the stories about Ahasuerus cannot be traced beyond the thirteenth century, the oral tradition may go much further back, and it is possible that a link with the Orient once existed. There, the parallel figure is Khadir or El-Khadir, the "eternally youthful Chidher" celebrated in song by Friedrick R✓ckert. The legend is purely Islamic. The strange thing is, however, that Khidr is not only regarded as a saint, but in Sufic circles even has the status of a deity. In view of the strict monotheism of Islam, one is inclined to think of him as a pre-Islamic, Arabian deity who, though not officially recognized by the new religion, was tolerated for reasons of expediency. But there is nothing to prove that. The first traces of Khidr are to be found in the commentaries on the Koran by al-Bukhari (d.870) and al-Tabari(d.923), and especially in the commentary on a note-worthy passage in the 18th Surah. This is entitled 'The Cave' after the cave of the seven sleepers who, according to legend, slept in it for 309 years, thus escaping the the persecution, and woke up in a new age. It is interesting to see how the Koran after lengthy moral reflection in the course of this same Surah, comes to the following passage, which is especially important as regards the origin of the Khidr myth. I quote the Koran literally .....(5.194)

There are no other reference to Islam or related categories in a total text of 462 pages.

Vol.6. *Psychological Types.*

In an essay 'The Type Problem in Classical and Medieval Thought', Jung alludes to certain aspects of Islamic mysticism (Sufism) in which certain techniques are geared towards rapid psychological and spiritual transformation:

How easily the primitive reality of the psychic image re-appears is shown by the dreams of normal people and the hallucinations that accompany mental derangement. The mystics even endeavour to recapture primitive reality of the imago (image) by means of an artificial introversion, in order to counterbalance extraversion. There is an excellent example of this in the initiation of the Mohammedan mystic Tewekkul-Beg, by Molla-Shah. Tewekkul-Beg relates: "after these words he called me to seat myself opposite to him, while still my senses were as though bemused, and commanded me to create his own image in

my innerself; and after he had bound my eyes, he made me gather all the forces of the soul into my heart. I obeyed, and in the twinkling of an eye, by divine favour, and with the spiritual succour of the Sheikh, my heart was opened. I beheld there in my innermost self something resembling an overturned bowl; when this vessel was righted, a feeling of boundless joy flooded through my whole being. I said to the Master: "From this cell, in which I am seated before you, I beheld within me a true vision, and it is as though another Tewekkul-Beg were seated before another Molla-Shah". The Master explained this to him as the first phenomenon of his initiation. Other visions soon followed, once the way to the primitive image of the real had been opened ..... (p.31).

Despite the considerably rich psychological material, no connections are drawn between it and Islamic symbols, imagery, theology. Instead, the reference is to "a Mohammedan mystic". Nevertheless, it cannot be considered a negative reference and can be categorized either as positive or neutral. This is the only reference in a total text of 555 pages.

Vol.7 ***Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*****. No reference.**

Vol.8. ***The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche*****.**

There is one reference to Islam, in the essay "Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology". It is difficult to assess the connotations in terms of positive/negative, though from the Muslim point of view it can be considered negative, insofar as it alludes to the absence of 'reason' in Islam which is mentioned alongwith other historical facts of a negative nature. In either case, it remains an essentially passing reference, since it does not substantiate the observation on Islam:

Truth that appeals to the testimony of the senses may satisfy reason, but it offers nothing that stirs our feelings and expresses them by giving meaning to human life. Yet it is most often feeling that is decisive in matters of good and evil, and if feeling does not come to the aid of reason, the latter is usually powerless. Did reason and good intentions save us from the World War, or have they ever saved us from any other catastrophic stupidity? Have any of the great spiritual and social revolution sprung from reason - for instance, the transformation of the Greco-Roman world into the age of feudalism, or the explosive spread of Islam? (p.355)

This is the only reference in a total text of 531 pages.

Vol.9 (Part-1*) The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious.*

(i) This text contains the most substantive reference to the Qur'ān/Islam in *The Collected Works*. It discusses *the 18th Surah ('The Cave')*, as descriptive of a psychological process of transformation in the essay "*A Typical set of Symbols Illustrating The Process of Transformation*". It will be discussed separately, after the main review.

(ii) A footnote citing a German scholar citing the Arab astronomer Abë ManÄër who say symbolic parallels in astronomy with lives of Christ and Mohammad. The text of the footnote: "*The light of Mohammad has the form of a peacock and the angels were made out of the peacock' sweat....*" (331 n)

Vol.9 (Part-II) *Aion:Researches into the Phenomenology of the Self.*

(i) A footnote citing the German scholar Harnack's work on the 'Clementine Homilies', a collection of gnostic-Christian writing of A.D.150. It is an intriguing footnote, unfortunately not carried through:

Harnack ascribes the Clementine Homilies to the beginning of the 4th century and is of the opinion that they contain "no source that could be attributed to the 2nd century". He thinks that Islam is far superior to this theology. Yahweh and Allah are unreflected God-images, whereas in the Clementive Homilies there is a psychological and reflective spirit at work. It is not immediately evident why this should bring about a disintegration of the God-concept, as Harnack thinks. Fear of psychology should not be carried too far (p.54 n)

(ii) A block/passing reference to the advents of "Judaism, Christianity and Islam" as seen through astrology (p.76)

(iii) An interesting series of footnotes about Islam and Mohammad in the essay "*The Prophecies of Nostradamus*". They are significant for their mostly pejorative connotations of Islam, by various western medieval authors/astrologers, and Jung himself. The first footnote:

> (a) ....The quartile aspect between Mercury and Mars "injures" Mercury by "martial" violence. According to Cardan, (some astrological symbols) signify the "law of Mahomet". This aspect could therefore indicate an attack by Islam. Albumasar regards (the symbols) in the same way: "And if Mars shall be in conjunction with him (Jupiter) it signifies the fiery civilization of the pagan

faith" (that is Islam). On the analogy of history the evil events to come are ascribed to the crescent moon, but one never reflects that the opponent of Christianity dwells in the European unconscious. History repeats itself. (p.95 n)

(b) A footnote to Nostradamus' statement "*Then the beginning of that year (1792) shall see a great persecution against the Christian Church than ever was in Africa". Jung's note states that this was "when Roman Christendom succumbed to Islam*" (964n)

(c) **Quoting Nostradamus:**

".... a mighty one will come after Mahomet, who will set up an evil and magical law. Thus we may surmise with credible probability that after the sect of Mahomet none other will come save the law of the Anti-Christ"(9.97)

(d) A passing reference, not followed through "The year 589 foretell Islam, and 1189 the significant reign of Pope Innocent III...."(99).

(e) There is one reference to Mohammad in the essay on the "Prophecies of Nostradamus". "*...it is possible that Nostradamus calls the Antichrist who was to appear after 1792, the "second Antichrist" because the first had already appeared in the guise of the German reformer (Luther) or much earlier with Nero or Mohammad.....*" (p.102)

(vi) Discussing how Europe accepted Christianity only at the point of the sword of Roman legions, thereby abandoning paganism, but which is held back only by a "thin wall":

"...Doubtless the spread of Christianity among barbarian people not only favoured, but actually necessitated, a certain inflexibility of dogma. Much the same thing can be observed in the spread of Islam, which was likewise obliged resort to fanaticism and rigidity...."(p.175).

(v) Footnote mentioning "Qur'ān and 18th Surah" (III n).

None of these references in a text of 269 pages can be considered substantive. At best they are all passing/block and hence neutral though they can be construed as negative, e.g. Mohammad as anti-Christ, and the "fanaticism and rigidity of Islam":

Vol.10 *Civilization in Transition*:

(i) Passing/block reference... "The meaning of and purpose of religion lie in the relationship of the individual to God (Christianity, Judaism, Islam...) (p.257).

(ii) In the famous essay, "Woman", Jung tried to explain Christian psychology and its tendency to self-righteously judged Nazi Germany: "*...The Semitic experience of Allah was for a long time an extremely painful affair for the whole of Christendom...* "(p.298) This is not followed through.

(iii) Two passing references to Khidr as "a human personification of Allah" (0.328). The second is more significant:

...Living in the West, I would have to say Christ instead of "self", in the Near East it would be Khidr, in the Far East Atman or Tao or the Buddha, in the Far West may be a hare or Mondamin and in cabalism it would be Tifereth. Our world has shrunk and it is dawning on us that humanity is one, with one psyche (p.410).

(iv) In a review of a book by Keyserling there is a reference which is not followed through" "....*In order to find the criterion for contemporary events Keyserling harks back to the rise of Islam....*" (p.497)

(v) In the essay "*The Dreamlike World of India*", we get apart from the 18th Surah perhaps the only other psychological statement on Islam albeit in a context of calling a "cult" what was even in Jung's time, a world religion. Given his perception that the "beauty" of the "Islamic Eros" is universally invisible and " all too jealously guarded", the great religious researcher, it seems, was either unable on uninterested in probing the secret. After giving a rich description of Hinduism and his personal reactions to the Indian landscape he states:

In comparison, Islam seems to be a superior, more spiritual and more advanced religion. Its mosques are pure and beautiful, and of course wholly Asiatic. There is not much mind about it, not a great deal of feeling. The cult is one wailing cry for the all-Merciful. It is a desire, an ardent longing and even a greed for God; I would not call it love. But there is love, the most poetic, most exquisite love of beauty in these old Moguls ... I marvel at that love which discovered the genius of Shah Jehan and used it as an instrument of self-realization. This is the one

place in the world where the - alas - all too invisible and all too jealously guarded beauty of the Islamic Eros has been revealed by a well-nigh divine miracle... The Taj Mahal is a revelation. It is thoroughly un-Indian. It is more like a plant that could thrive and flower in the rich Indian earth as it could nowhere else. It is Eros in its purest form; There is nothing mysterious nothing symbolic about it... the Taj Mahal is the secret of Islam...(p.519-20)

(vi) Stretching the framework of categories as far as possible further, there is, finally, one reference to 'mosque' in the context of different experiences of sacred space:

...One breathed a sigh of relief oneself when one emerged from the haze of an orthodox church with its multitude of lamps and entered an honest mosque, where the sublime and invisible omnipresence of God was not crowded out by a superfluity of sacred paraphernalia (p.132)

There is also one reference suggesting that certain features of mosque architecture are derived from Christianity. (p.155) Except for the comments on the Taj Mahal and a mosque, the references can be considered passing ones. The comments on the Taj allude to significant Jungian concepts such as 'Eros' that are not examined upon further here or elsewhere in *The Collected Works*. Similarly, the notion that Islam has "little mind to it" is not elaborated upon. Jung's intrigued and rapturous response is really not explored further either in contrasting traditions or even with Hinduism which, at the outset, he distinguishes from Islam.

Vol.11 *Psychology and Religion: West and East.*

As the title suggests, the book is a sweeping panorama of world religions and deserves careful scrutiny for what it may have to say regarding Islam. The book is devided into nine sections. Part 1 consists of what are known as "The Terry Lectures" given at Yale in 1939, and deal with principles of Jungian psychology and the study of religion. Its only reference to Islam is in a passing/block context, of religions being similar yet different:

(i) ... a definite framework with definite contents which cannot be combined with or supplemented by Buddhist or Islamic ideas or feelings...(p.9).

Part-II is titled "*A Psychological Approach to the Dogma of the Trinity*". In this section there is considerable background material regarding Egypt and Greece. The one reference here is typical of the western tendency to lump Islam with Judaism simply on the basis of some obvious common elements: "*...modern anti-trinitarianism has a conception of God that is more Old Testament or Islamic in character than Christian...*" (p.153). There is also a line referring to "*early Christianity and the rise of Islam*" (151) Neither of these are followed through.

Part-III is an analysis of the "*Transformation Symbolism in the Mass*". Part-IV consists of three prefaces written to books on religion by various authors. Part-V consists of two essays: "*Psychotherapists and the Clergy*" and *Psychoanalysis and the Cure of Souls*". Part-VI consists of the famous and controversial "Answer to Job", which discusses elements of the psychology of Judaism. None of these carry any type of reference to Islam.

The Second half of the book is devoted to "*Eastern Religions*" and consists of three parts. The first consists of essays on "*Yoga and the West*", a forward to Suzuki's "*Introduction to Zen Buddhism,*" and essays on "*The Psychology of Eastern Meditation*" and the "Holy Men of India". The third and final part of this section is an extensive foreword to Richard Willhelm's translation of the "*I Ching*". There is just one reference to Islam in the essay on Yoga and the West. It is a passing one, in the historical context of the Renaissance and the by then well-established split between science and philosophy in the West.:

At the time, there arose a widespread and passionate interest in antiquity stimulated by the fall of the Byzantine Empire under the onslaught of Islam. Then, for the first time, knowledge of the Greek language and Greek literature was carried to every corner of Europe. As a direct result of this invasion of so called pagan philosophy there arose the great schism in the Roman Church—Protestantism which soon covered the whole of northern Europe (p.530-531).

Here again, the connection between 'paganism' and elements of Islam are ignored, despite the fact that medieval authors frequently saw Islam as a 'pagan'belief system. Thus, in a text of a more than 600 pages, suggesting a comprehensive approach to religion—East and West—there are exactly four references to Islam, not a single one of which is remotely substantive.

Drawing on all related categories the situation remains the same, that is, they are passing/block references:

i) "*...Buddha and Mohammad ... Confucius and Zarthustra...*" (p.10)

ii) "*...The importation on a mass scale of exotic religious systems...Abdul Baha, the Sufi sects, Ramakrishna...*"(861).

iii) In a comment on the Nazis: "*...our blight is ideologies&they are the long awaited Anti-Christ.... National Socialism comes as near to being a religious movement as any movement since A.D.622..*". (A footnote informs us that A. D. 622 is the date of the Hejira, Mohammad's flight from Mecca and the beginning of the Moslem era. (p.488 n)

iv) "*... 'God', can just as well mean Yahweh, Allah, Zeus, Shiva...*" (454)

Summing up the review for (Volumes 1 through 11) the emergent picture of Islam contains mostly blank spaces, in the sense of an overwhelming number of passing/block references. The one exception is the analysis of the 18th Surah in Vol.9, which will be discussed separately. The only other substantive reference to the Islamic Eros as epitomized by the Taj is not followed through, nor is the subject referred to in any of the other volumes. Simultaneously, there are a number of passing, negative references such as Islam's "rigidity and fanaticism" and Muhammad in the same conceptual category as Nero, Anti-Christ, Hitler.

III

Jung, Psychology and Alchemy

Taken collectively, Volumes 12,13,14, namely, *Psychology and Alchemy, Mysterious Conjunctions and Alchemical Studies*, can be considered Jung's magnum opus. The three texts form the core of his theories about the psyche as derived from the alchemical traditions. As he recounts in *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, the task of retrieving the alchemical texts was foretold in a dream in which he discovers a library of ancient manuscripts. Fifteen years later, Jung realized that he had unwittingly amassed a similar collection of books on the subject of alchemy.[112]

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[112] Jung C.G. and Aniela Jaffe(ed); *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. N.Y. Vintage Books, 1963. pp.205, 212, 221.

While many Jungians find Jung's alchemical writings an embarrassment, it would be a gross distortion to present him without this aspect of his work. Jung devoted the last 30 years of his research on this subject, published perhaps a quarter of his printed pages on alchemical texts and themes, and said in his autobiography that it was alchemy which provided the true background to his psychology. As Hillman states:

> *Alchemy is thus not merely of scholarly interest and a separate field of research, nor is it Jung's quirk or private passion. It is infect fundamental to his conception of personality structure.*[113]

Most Westerners, including many Jungians, are unaware of the profound and living alchemical tradition in Islam. This ignorance is due to the general decay and decline to the point of extinction, of alchemy in the West. Hence, infect, the significance of Jung's researches into the subject. In any case, there is firstly no doubt that Islam has an ancient and highly developed and active alchemical tradition. Secondly, there is also no doubt as to the historic role played by the Arabs who were of course, Muslims, in the (retransmission of many types of knowledge—including alchemy—going back to the Greeks and Egyptians. As is evident from Jung's own work, significant alchemical text by European authors which he 'decoded' are largely drawn from Arabic writings on the subject. Thus, at one level Jung was well aware of the highly developed alchemical tradition within Islam, as well as its considerable strong links to the West. At least eight Arab authors are cited in this connection. Yet there are absolutely no psychological insights regarding Islam.

The fact that, by and large, Jung's alchemical studies do not go further back than the 12th century still does not explain this neglect. Nor can it be explained on the grounds that his focus was the European/Christian psyche, since one needs to keep in mind the all-important context of a general psychology of religion. Thus, while he was able to skillfully extrapolate connections between western alchemy, Judaic/Christian beliefs and psychology, and even Chinese alchemy and religion, there is a complete absence of similar connections between Islam and alchemy. Certainly, there are numerous nods of acknowledgement to 'Arab' sources in the footnotes, but remarkably no comments as to how these were, as they undoubtedly are,

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[113] Hillman, James; "Archetypal Theory", in *Loose Ends*, Dallas Spring Publication, 1987.

embedded in the symbols of Islam. These points become evident on a closer examination of reference to Islam in the three volumes.

Volumes 12, *Psychology and Alchemy*

(i) A passing/block reference in a sentence on "*...a world religion, such as Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam*" (p.19)

(ii) Two references to Khidr and the 18th Surah. (See detailed discussion in the same context.). "*.. In Islam, the plan of the 'temenos' with the foundation developed under the influence of early Christian architecture into the court of the mosque with the ritual washhouse in the center....*".(p.118).

(iii) *A footnote on the* "Muhammedan legend of the rock in the mosque of Omar, at Jerusalem....." (390n).

(iv) A reference to "mosque/Koran" in the dream of a female patient. Surprisingly, neither is picked up in the subsequent analysis:

> *"....we go in. The interior resembles a mosque, more particularly, the Hagia Sophia: no seats, wonderful effect of space, no images, only framed texts decorating the walls (like the Koran texts in the Hagia Sophia.)...*" (p.138)

Apart from these, there are a good number of references to prominent Arab alchemists such as Kalid, Abdul Qasim, Geber and Senior. Some of them are central to Western alchemy since the 12th century. However, none of them are linked psychologically with Islam. Naturally then, the obvious links between Islamic alchemy and Greek philosophy also remain unmentioned and unexplored. For example, in the essay "*Religious Ideas in Alchemy*":

> *... in the writing of the Church Fathers the south wind is an allegory of the Holy Ghost, presumably because it is not dry. For the same reason the process of sublimation is known in Arabic alchemy as the "great south wind" .....when therefore Abu'l Qasim speaks of the fire as the "great south wind", he is in agreement with the ancient Greek view that Hermes was a wind-god. (p.383).*

There are, thus, numerous references to Arabs/Arabic/Arabian alchemy; mostly in footnotes, but also other extensive quotations from Arab authors in the text. Yet, not a single one is directly or indirectly linked with the symbolic imagery or psychological aspects of Islam and alchemy. Instead, the main focus is Christianity and Judaism. This neglect becomes even more

evident insofar as other religions, apart from Judaism and Christianity, are examined in varying detail for their alchemical symbolism, such as the Chinese and Hindu. Thus, in the entire 483 pages of a text on the psychological aspects of a range of religious and alchemical traditions, there is infect, not a single substantive reference to Islam.

Vol. 13 ***Alchemical Studies***

There are two references to Arabs and Arabian alchemy, illustrating the point made earlier.

(i) The first is the context of four categories of sources used by Jung. Category I is titled "Texts by Ancient Authors', consisting of mainly Greek texts and "*those transmitted by the Arabs...*" *The second group is texts by early Latinists: "The most important of these are translations from the Arabic.. to this group belong certain texts whose Arabic origin is doubtful but which at least show some Arabic influence... of Geber and the Aristotle and Avicenna treatises*". This period extends from the 9th to 13th centry. The third group is by later Latinists from 14th to 17th century. The last group of texts is in modern European languages upto the 18th century. (p.206)

(ii) The second reference to Arabs is a passing one: "*Connections between Greek and Arabic alchemy and India are not unlikely*" (p.231). This is not followed through.

Other than these, there is no mention of Islam in the entire book, except an indirect one regarding Khidr and the 18th Surah(p.321)

Vol. 14 ***Mysterious Conjunctions***

This book is a masterpiece of research and psychological insights. However, the nature of the references to Islam continue to reflect an attitude towards Arabs and Islam in which glimpses of substantive information regarding Arabs are rarely connected in a meaningful manner with psychological insights, racial or religious. The word 'Islam' does not appear once in the entire text of 599 pages. Following are all the references in the spectrum categories:

(i) A footnote refers to the Qur'ān Surah XIX regarding Marry giving birth under a palm tree. (418 n).

(ii) A footnote: '*the stage appears as the emblem of 'Mahomet Philosophus*'. (p.159)

(iii) *"...In Athens the day of the new moon was considered favorable for collaborating marriages, and it is still and Arabian custom to marry on this day; sun and moon are marriage partners who embrace on the twenty eighth day of the month" (p.129).*

(iv) The only reference to the Ka'ba, is not followed through, even though it is complex and profound symbol in Islam:

In Arabian tradition Adam also built the Ka'ba for which purpose the angel Gabriel gave him the ground plan and a precious stone. Later the stone turned black because of the sins of men (p.398).

The following group of references firstly clearly allude to the significant impact of 'Arabic' (i.e. Islamic) alchemy on the Western tradition of not only scientific knowledge, but also gnosticism and most importantly, health and healing rooted in a specific spiritual *Weltanschauung*. Secondly, they also allude to the direct link between the Greeks and Egyptians on the one hand and Gnostic Christianity on the other as mediated by the 'Arabs'. Yet, the line between the transmission of these knowledges is not once connected to their matrix of Islam:

(v) "... The Johanine interpretation of Christ as the pre-wordly Logos is an early attempt of this kind to put into other words the "meaning" of Christs essence. The late mendievlists, and in particular the "natural philosophers" created a new nature myth. In this they were very much influenced by the writings of the Arabs and of the Harrites, the last exponents of Greek philosophy and gnosis, whose chief representative was Tabit ibn Qurra in the tenth centry (p.142).

(iv) "The physicians and natural philosophers of the Middle Ages nevertheless found themselves faced with the problems for which the church had no answer. Confronted with sickness and death, the physicians did hesitate to seek counsel with the Arabs and so resuscitated that bit of the Ancient world which the Church thought she had exterminated for ever, namely the Manteau and Sabean remnants of Hellenistic syncretism. From them (Arabs) they derived a'sal sapientia' that seemed so unlike the doctrine of the Church....(p.243)

(vii) ...In the face of all this one is driven to the conjecture that medieval alchemy, which evolved out of the Arabic tradition sometimes in the 13th century,... was

in the last resort a contamination of the doctrine of the Holy Ghost which never came to very much in the church...(p.318)

Islam and Alchemy

The preceding statements clearly indicate Jung's thorough understanding of the history of western alchemy and its fertilization and "resuscitation" through Arabic texts. The *General Index* contains a separate section on 'Arab Alchemical Writers' cited by Jung, many of whom he called "classical authorities". (p.288). They include Abul Qasim, El-Halib, Geber (Jabir) Kalid, Magus, Nadi, Senior, Rhazes and Al-Iraqi. As Jung states about the most significant roots of Hermetic philosophy in which alchemy is embedded:

In the oldest alchemy known to the West the Hermetic fragments were handed down mostly through Arabic originals. Direct contact with the Corpus Hermeticum was only established in the second half of the fifteenth century, when the Greek manuscript reached Italy from Macedonia and was translated into Latin by Marsilio Ficino. (Volume 12. p.390)

While Jung indeed acknowledges, but mostly indirectly, these historical elements of the Judaeo-Christian alchemical and spiritual universe, he was content to regard the 'Arabs' simply as such. This may have been appropriate (albeit at a stretch) if he had been involved in documenting a sort of secular history of alchemy, which was patently not the case. His principal focus was psycho-spiritual, devoted to illustrating the parallels between alchemical language, a given religion and psychology.

As Hillman points out, Jung saw alchemy as a "pre-scientific psychology of personality disguised as metaphors". Alchemical formulation such as 'lead', 'salt', 'sulphur', 'mercury' correspond with different psychological and archetypal experiences and figures. The processes that go on in the personality are also depicted in alchemy as a series of operations. According to Jung, by 'projecting' what were essentially unconscious contents/ideas onto (or into) various (alchemical materials/elements, the alchemists generated a process which in todays popular parlance could be called 'consciousness raising'. The names of many of these processes have found their way into clinical psychology: Projection, dissolution, sublimation, fixation, condensation were all alchemical terms. The two main ones - solution and coagulation - are another way of stating the main work of

psychotherapy: taking apart and putting together, analyzing and synthesizing. Thus, methods which modern analysis believes it has invented for furthering personality development were already known to alchemy as description of psychological processes, not ideals (such as making gold) to be attained literally.[114]

The main point is that throughout the three texts under review, the connections between religion and alchemy are considerable. This is evident even in the thematic arrangement of Psychology and Alchemy (Volume 12). It is divided into three areas having the following headings:

(i) Introduction to the Religious and Psychological Problems of Alchemy.

(ii) Individual Dream Symbolism in Relation to Alchemy.

(iii) Religious Ideas in Alchemy.

In this overwhelmingly religious context of the study of a system knowledge and its relationship with western psychology, alongwith considerable familiarity of key Arab sources, there is no mention of the religion which informed the heart of this Arab enterprise, that is, Islam. An even more unusual aspect is that the majority of the Arab sources cited by Jung considered themselves, and are considered by scholars of Islamic culture, as being deeply influenced by the spiritual teachings of Islam.

In keeping with the history of this scholarship, Jung also confirmed the connections between Egyptian and Hermetic philosophy on the one hand and its "resuscitation" by the Arabs and subsequent transmission to the West on the other, As Burckhardt has pointed out, the expression 'alchemia' could have been derived from the Greek "chyma" (smelting and casting) or from the Arabic "al-Kimiya" which is said to come from the ancient 'keme' - reference to the 'black earth' which was a designation of Egypt and which may also have been a symbol of the alchemists' '*prima materia*'[115]

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[114] *Ibid.*

[115] Burckhardt, Titus; *Alchemy*. Translated from the German by William Stoddart. Dorset, Element Books 1987.

In the book *Alchemy*, Burckhardt shows how it was possible for alchemy and its mythological background to be incorporated into the three monotheistic religions.[116] The main reason was that the cosmological perspectives of alchemy were in resonance with the cosmologies of these religions. The cosmological background was taken over, alongwith the craft, simply as a science of nature (physics) in the broadest sense of the term. The process is similar to the way Christianity and Islam appropriated the Pythagorean tradition in music and architecture, and assimilated the corresponding spiritual perspective:

> By its assimilation into Christian belief, alchemy was fecundated, while Christianity found in it a way which, through the contemplation of nature, led to a true gnosis. (p.18).

What Jung failed to discern is the deep resonance between Islam and the Hermetic perspective, even though he was aware of the contributions of the Arabs to what he called the "resuscitation" of European thought. As Burckhardt states:

> *Even more easily did the Hermetic art enter into the spiritual world of Islam, the latter was always ready to recognize any pre-Islamic art which appeared under the aspect 'wisdom' ('hikmah') as a heritage of earlier prophets. Thus in the Islamic world Hermes Trismegistos is often identified with Enoch (Idris). It was the doctrine of the "oneness of existence" (Wahdat-al-Wujud) - the esoteric interpretation of the Islamic confession of faith - which gave to Hermitism a new spiritual axis, or in other words re-established its original spiritual horizon in all its fullness ... (p.18, 19).*

Reviewing the history of alchemy, Burckhardt confirms some of Jung's historical observations but more importantly, he articulates what seems obvious but was nevertheless not evident to Jung:

> *....Alchemy made its entry into western Christendom through Byzantium, and later, and even more richly, through Arab dominated Spain. It was in the Islamic world that alchemy reached its fullest flowering. Jabir Ibn Hayyan, a*

[116] Nasr, S.H; *Knowledge and the Sacred*, Edinburgh University Press 1981. See also*: Science and Civilization in Islam*. p.p.244.

pupil of the sixth century Shiite Imam Jafar as-Sadiq, founded in the eighth century A.D. a whole school, from which hundreds of alchemical texts flowed forth. No doubt it was because the name Jabir had become the hallmark of much alchemical lore that the author of the 'Summa Perfectionism', a 13th century Italian or Catalan, also assumed the name in its Latinized form of Jaber. (p.19)

Names such as Jabir (Geber), Al-Iraqi, Avicenna etc, are, in the context of Islamic civilization, prominent not only as spiritual alchemists but also as scientists and philosophers. However, as Nasr has suggested, with the possible exception of Rhazes, these individuals functioned from within a profoundly Islamic *Weltanschauung*. He reiterates: "we must remember that ancient and medieval man did not separate the material from the psychological and spiritual in the categorical manner that has become customary".[117] Jung's rediscovery of alchemy in the 20th century arrived at a similar conclusion, indeed, he was one of the first western scientists to highlight the dangers inherent in the contemporary separation of the material and spiritual. Hence his impassioned appeal for a different type of religious psychology more suited to the emotional and mental condition of modern Westerners.

Writers such as Burckhardt and Nasr confirm the historical aspect of Jung's research but also place the same information in its crucial religious context. Nasr's review of the alchemical tradition can also be considered a 'who's who' of Jung's explorations into the subject:

In Arabic or Islamic alchemy, which arose soon after the rise of Islam in the first/seventh century, and has a continuous tradition until today there is a very large number of texts, written during the past twelve centuries and dealing with all phases of the art. The most important corpus is that of Jabir ibn Hayyan, the alchemist, who become the greatest authority on the subject not only in the Islamic world but also in the West, where as "Geber" he became universally accepted as the leading authority.... By the sixth/twelfth century, following the translation of alchemical texts from Arabic into Latin, interest in alchemy grew in the Latin West, continuing into the seventeenth and even eighteenth centuries. The earlier Latin text however is the "Turban Philosophorum", which was

[117] As quoted in *The Collected Works*. Dawood's translation.

translated from the Arabic; among the earliest students of alchemy who wrote on the subject one may mention Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Arnold of Villanova, Raymond Lully, and somewhat later Nicolas Flamel. (p.244)(My emphasis).[118]

It is on the basis of such well-established historic linkages that Sufism -- the most popular and widespread form of Islam -- claims men such as Lully, Bacon and many other medieval scientists and philosophers as being Sufis (and thereby Muslims) or certainly having been deeply influenced by Islam. While this may not be the right place to enlarge on this little known aspect to the present relationship between Islam and the West, it is nevertheless worth noting that such claims to a mutuality of vision are more frequently forthcoming from Muslim writers rather than the West.

The point here is not to suggest that Jung's forays into alchemy do not give 'credit' to the Islamic/ Arabic contributions in this domain. Strictly speaking, this would be impossible since, by an large, he does reaffirm these seminal connections, albeit mostly through footnotes. The question is not so much credit for the Islamic spiritual perspective but of an absence of meaningful connections *vis a vis* Islam and alchemy, whereas these connections are brought out in contexts of other religions. Given the unavoidable links between religion and alchemy, and given the highly significant contributions of the Arabs (i.e. Muslims), there is virtually no substantive reference to Islam throughout the three volumes on alchemy, religion and psychology.

One raises these points not in order to be churlish or to insist on such academic issues regarding citations/acknowledgement. Regardless of Jung's neglect, other western writers have been more accurate regarding the role of Islam and the history of alchemy. Nor is one implying that this was somehow an intentional omission by Jung in keeping with the perceived western bias against Islam. The issue is not one of credit or prejudice but *knowledge* about Islam in the context of substantive psychological materials (and insights about them) which are inextricably a part of religion - and the stated Jungian endeavour. Basically, the texts communicate nothing about Islam, one way or

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118 "They termed me a "Man of the Book" because of my knowledge of the Quran. To their minds, I was a disguised Mohammedan". *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*. ibid. p.265.

another. But since it is impossible to discount the role of the Arabs in this field, one is left with the impression that their contribution was akin to that of holding the hot potato (of alchemy) until it was cool enough to be lobbed back to the rightful owners in Europe as they emerged from the Dark and Middle Age. This view, of seeing Islam and Muslims as unthinking ("no mind") and therefore simply mechanically holding and 'preserving' alchemy through a certain period in history, is symptomatic of the West's attitude about other branches of knowledge which the Arabs conserved, explored and developed during this period. There is nothing to explain what was present *psychologically* in Islam which encouraged and resonated with this quest for preservation and exploration of different knowledges. Thus, whether alchemy or other disciplines, one is left with the 'role' of the Arabs but not Islam, and the impression is of a passivity, devoid of anything other than a mechanical wait-to-pass-it-on attitude.

Such a neglect takes on added significance when one considers the fact that unlike the Christian West, alchemy as a science of the soul has been an uninterrupted, living tradition in the Islamic world or, as Nasr states, a "continuous tradition up to today". While such facts may be of no significance to a sociologist or political scientist, they are pertinent in the context of Jung's survey of alchemy and its connections with religion and psychology.

To sum up: The preceding review of *The Collected Works* upto Volume 14 reflect the initial level of content analysis regarding Islam. Both levels indicate not so much a prejudiced view but one giving the lowest priority to Islam in terms of scholarly attention. Compared to other religions and especially Judaism and Christianity, Islam remains at best a shadowy impression with many of the references to it primarily in the form of footnotes. Hardly any significant statements are to be found either on Islam *per se* or in the context of comparison with other religions.

The shadowy impression of Islam is especially evident in the three texts on alchemy. Since there is scant Islamic material, one cannot conclude that prejudice dominates Jung's understanding. Naturally then, there is little evidence thus far of any substantive understanding of the religion in terms of its symbols or psychology. In short, there is what can be called a neglect or lack of interest in the subject. Before trying to analyze this lack of interest, one needs to conclude the review of the remaining texts.

Volume 15 ***The Spirit in Man, Art and Literature***

No reference to Islam or related categories.

Volume 16 ***The Practice of Psychotherapy***

(i) *"The Christian doctrine of original sin on the one hand, and of the meaning and value of suffering on the other, is therefore of profound therapeutic significance and is undoubtedly far better suited to western man than Islamic fatalism". (186)*

This is the only reference to Islam and it is not followed through with any illustrative examples. One can note that firstly the notion of Islamic fatalism is a stereotypical one reminiscent of Edward Said's observations in Culture and Imperialism about colonialism in terms of 'action' versus the 'passivity' of the colonized. More significantly, this stereotype of passive/acceptance, 'fatalism' is in direct contrast to the present portrayal of the Islamic fundamentalist as a violent, agitative agent.

Volume 17, ***The Development of Personality***

No reference to Islam or related categories.

Volume 18, ***The Symbolic Life***

This volume consists of miscellaneous writings, notes, lectures, speeches, radio/press interviews. In a sense it is a distillation of many of Jung's views. It consists of 820 pages. The nature of reference to 'Islam', 'Arabs' and 'Mohammed' are as follows:

(i) In the transcript of a seminar to the Guild of Pastoral Psychology, London, just before World War II. Prior to expressing his views on Islam, Jung spoke of the shadow within Christianity and the need for the West to accept, as Christ did, "the least of our brethren". For Jung "Christ..carried through his hypothesis to the bitter end..."

How was Christ hewn? In the greatest misery. Who was his father? He was an illegitimate child - humanly the most miserable situation: a poor girl having a little son. That is our symbol, that is ourselves; we are all that ... that is modern psychology and that is the future...(p.281)

The future which Jung spoke of was a psychological, not necessarily a literal future. Strange for a man who otherwise saw the two as

inextricably linked. But perhaps it is not so strange when the text is considered further:

... Of course the historical future might be quite different, we do not know whether it is not the Catholic Church that will reap the harvest that is now going to be cut down. We do not know that. We do not know whether Hitler is going to found a new Islam. (He is already on the way; he is like Mohammad. The emotion in Germany is Islamic; warlike and Islamic. They are all drunk with wild god). That can be the historic future.....(p.281)

In the discussion following the seminar, there is another exchange which illustrates the point at hand:

The Bishop of Southward:

Would you say the same of the Nazi or the Mohammedan, that they are right to go on their faith?

Jung:

God is terrible. The living God is a living fear. I think it is an instrument, as Mohammad was for that people....(p.281)

We shall return to this observation subsequently. For the moment, one can note that in an overall context of very few substantive statements on Islam, Muhammad and Hitler are closely linked in the European imagination.

(ii) A general/passing reference, reflective of Jung's tolerance towards other religions:

"... Nor should one doubt than the devotees of other faiths, including Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, and so on, have the same living relationship to "God" ...(p.663)

(iii) A passing reference: '*Yahweh and Allah are nomads ... the Christian God a triad...*".(1611)

(iv) The final reference to Islam is in the context of a letter to a Father Bruno, in response to the latter's queries regarding the figure of Elijah who, according to Islamic tradition, and Jung, is a variant of the archetype known in Islam as Khidr. The figure of Khidr infect forms the basis of the only substantive comment by Jung on Islam in the essay "On Psychological Re-birth". (Vol. 9). It is the only

motif in Islam to which Jung did give considerable attention. Khidr is mentioned in five of the 18 texts.

(To be Continued)

THE CONTRIBUTION OF RABI'AH AL-'ADAWIYYAH IN SUFISM

Nusba Parveen

Rabi'ah BaÄriyyah has played a significant role in the development of Sufism. She was a representative of that particular style of Sufism which grew in her time. Separation from her family in her childhood made her live a life of slavery. This in turn enabled her to accomplish her goal, i.e. complete devotion and full submission in the service of Allah. Her contribution was highlighted by later Sufis without any thought of her being a woman and they considered her a prominent Sufi. Particularly her concept of selfless - love with God is noteworthy. Why was she accorded this high position? What was the essence of her experience/teaching and how did she achieve it? We would try to offer some thoughts on these issues in the following.

According to Jāmâ (d. 1492 A.D. who wrote *NafaÁāt al-Uns*) the term 'Sufi' was for the first time applied to Abë Hāshim of Këfa (ob. before 800 A.D.). He founded a monastery for sufis at Ramlah in Palestine. This marked the development of a new trend in Sufism. Commenting on the distinction between earlier ascetic trend and this new sufistic trend, Nicholson says, "They were the *via purgativa* and the *via illuminativa* of Western medieval mysticism."[119] However. this does not mean that Sufism in Islam became devoid of that inner purification with this new trend. But it remained as it always was, as a means to attain the nearness of Allah. Louis Massignon explains the emergence of Sufism as the result of an inner rebellion of the conscience against social injustices, not only those of others but primarily and particularly against one's own faults."[120] Thus early Sufism was a natural expression of a person's contemplation regarding his self and reality.

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[119] Reynold A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs.* (Cambridge University Press, 1962). p. 229.

[120] Louis Massignon, "*Tasawwf*", Encyclopedia of Islam, New Ed.

The problem in Sufism started, as Trimingham observes, that early sufis "were concerned with experiencial than theosophical theorizing and sought to guide rather than to teach."[121]

Development of Ascetic Trend

Asceticism developed as a trend in reaction to the Umayyad misrule. Theoretically everything was same as before but in practice they were lacking in justice, their love for luxury was growing and their *Khilāfah* was becoming individualized. Thus Mu'tazilaism emerged as bearing a moderate attitude in reaction to Khārijites (fanatical and rigid) and Murjites (political conformists) but it changed to extremism later. Asceticism was not a new trend developed at this time but it became popular with the passage of time. Traces of the ascetics (*Zuhhad*) were found in the life of the Prophet (SAW) in the companions whose sense of fear and responsibility was stronger than others. The names of Uways al-Qaranâ, Abu-¿arr al-Ghifārâ, Salman Fārsâ are worthy to be mentioned who had been praised by the Prophet himself for their piety. A companion, Tamâm al-Darâ is said to have passed the whole night repeating a single verse, (xiv, 20).[122]

> "Do those who work evil think that we shall make them even as those who believe and do good so that their life or death shall be equal?"

Abu Darda used to say:[123] "if you knew what you shall see after death you would not eat food nor drink water from appetite." A prophetic tradition goes like this: "If you knew what I know you would laugh little and weep more".

The disgust with the tyrannical and impious rulers strengthened these thoughts and a sense of grave responsibility and fear for what was going on overtook them. Àasan al-BaÄrâ was the first representative of this trend and his fear of God was so strong that Sha'rānâ says,[124] "It seemed as though Hell-fire had been created for him alone."

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[121] J. Spencer Tirmingham, *The Sufi Orders in Islam*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1971). pp. 2-3.
[122] Quoted in Nicholson, op. cit., p. 225.
[123] *Ibid.*
[124] *Ibid.*, p. 226.

'Umar II, the Umayyad ruler was regarded like Àasan in this matter. So the purpose of early Muslim sufis according to Massignon[125] only if they retired or isolated themselves was in order to be better able to meditate on the Qur'ān (*taqarraba* is the old synonym of *tasawwaffa*) by seeking to draw near to God in prayer. Fazlur RaÁmān does not differentiate these ascetics from '*Ulama* as "they were identically the same persons with varying degrees of emphasis on personal piety and abstinence. Thus he says that this trend was purely ethical with a deepening of inwardness of the ethical motivation".[126]

Development of Rabi'ah's Ascetic Ideas

Sibt Ibn al-Jawzâ (d. 1257) relates a story[127] which shows Rabi'ah's feeling towards other Muslims at that time. Once when she went out on a feast day and she was asked about her impression of it, she said, "I saw how you went out (nominally) to make the Sunnah a living force and to put a stop to heresy, but you displayed a love of luxury and soft living and thereby you brought humiliation upon the Muslims".

This does not at all suggest that these Muslims were extremely corrupt, but their lifestyle were changing towards the world compared to the time of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs. In another story quoted by 'AÇÇār, Rabi'ah asked a man to buy her a blanket and gave him four silver *dirhams*. The man left and came back to ask her what colour he should buy. "How did colour come into the business? Rabi'ah answered and demanded her money back and threw it into Tigris. It implies that the fear of too much indulgenoe in the world had stopped her to do what was even necessary.

Another story is quoted by 'AÇÇār[128], which he claims was her first experience in asceticism and she gave up all her worldly desires after that.

Once for seven days and seven nights she had been fasting and had eaten nothing and during the night she had not slept at all, but had spent every night in prayer. When she was in extremity from hunger someone came into

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125 Massignon, "*Tasawwuf*"

126 Fazlur Rahman, Islam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) p. 129.

127 Quoted in Margaret Smith, *Rabi'ah the Mystic and Her Fellow Saints in Islam*. (Lahore, Hijrah International Publishers, 1983) p. 22.

128 Fariduddin 'AÇÇ«r, *Tazkirat al-Awliyah*. Eng. tr. by A.J. Arberry. (From A *Classical Persian Reader* being compiled by A.R. Farhadi).

the house and brought her a cup of food. Rabi'ah took it and went to fetch a lamp. When she returned, a cat had upset the cup. She said, "I will go and fetch a jug and break by fast." When she brought the jug the lamp had gone out. She intended to drink the water in darkness, but the jug fell from her hands and was smashed to pieces. Rabi'ah broke into lamentations and heaved such a sigh that it almost seemed as if the house would catch fire. She then prayed to God that why are you doing it to me? And she heard a voice that if you desire these pleasures I will confer it on you, but I shall take concern for me out of your heart. Since then she says she separated her heart from worldly things.

Biography

Details of Rabi'ah's life have reached us through many different sources, and above all from her biographer Farâd al-Dân 'AÇÇār (ob. A. D. 1230). He wrote *Tazkirat al-Awliyah* in which he mentions Rabi'ah in detail. Rabi'ah was born about (95 or 99 A.H/717 A.D) in BaÄra in a poor but religious and noble family. She was from al-Atik, a tribe of Qays b. 'Adâ, therefore called Qaysiyyah or 'Adawiyyah. She was the fourth daughter thus called Rabi'ah and some miraculous events occurred after she was born. It is said that there was no oil for lamp and cloth to wrap her. Her mother asked her father to go and get some oil from the neighbour. Her father had vowed that he wouldn't ask any human being for help, so he went out but came back and while sitting in that agony he slept. He dreamt Prophet Muhammad (SAW) who said words of comfort and relief and asked him to write a letter to Isa Zadan, Amir of Basra reminding him that he prays one hundred prayers every night and four hundred on Friday night, but this Friday night he has neglected, and as a penance, he must give you four hundred dinars, lawfuly required. (related by 'AÇÇār).

Rabi'ah's father did as he was asked and the Amir himself came to see this noble man with penance money, while also giving two thousands dinars as thanks giving to poor. But after some time her parents passed away and she became an orphan. Then the sisters were also scattered after a famine in Basra. One day while walking Rabi'ah was seized by an evil minded man who sold her for six *dirhams* and was forced to do hard labour by her master. Again she was attacked by a wicked person on the street and in the struggle to run she broke her hand. Then she broke into tears and said,

"Lord God, I am a stranger, orphaned of mother and father, a helpless prisoner fallen into captivity, my hand broken. Yet for all this I do not grieve, all I need is thy good pleasure, to know whether you are well pleased or no." She heard a voice saying, "Tomorrow a station (rank) shall be thine such that those who are nearest to God in Heaven shall envy thee".

Rabi'ah then came back to her master's house and continually fasted in the daytime and carried out her appointed tasks and worshipped all night till the day began.

This throws some light on the condition of that time, which left women insecure, and they held fast their relationship with Allah. There were some other women also who were known for their asceticism at that time. One of them, Rabi'ah binti Ismail of Syria was given a high position by sufis. Sometimes she has been confused with Rabi'ah BaÄrâ but the fact that she was married has cleared the confusion. Another woman of this time was Muadha al-Adawiyya, who was known for her humility. She was an associate of Rabi'ah BaÄrâ and was married. Sha'wana was another sufi whose assembly was attended by men and women sufis. She used to cry a lot for God and followed the way of love like Rabi'ah. Nafisa was great granddaughter of HaÄan (son of Ali), born at Mecca in 145 A.H. She was so well versed in the Qur'an and religious knowledge that Imam Shāfi'â used to come and listened to her discourse. (Ibn Khallikān) etc. etc.

Now, one night while Rabi'ah was praying, her master woke up and saw her worshipping, she was shying, "O my Lord, you know that the desire of my heart is to obey you, and that the light of my eye is in the service of your court. If the master rested with me, I should not cease for one hour from your service, but you have made me subject to a creature".

This reflects the inner state of Rabi'ah which was not taught to her but was developing due to her sincere devotion to God. Her master saw a light on Rabi'ah's head which illumined the whole house. He called her when the day was dawned and set her free. She journeyed into desert first then obtained a cell in which she was engaged in devotional worship. Afterwards she left for pilgrimage which tells a story how her ass died and she was left-alone rejecting offer of men to carry her luggage. She then prayed to God, "O my God, do kings deal thus with a woman, a stranger and weak? Thou art calling me to thine own house (the *Ka'ba*) but in the midst of the way thou

hast suffered mine ass to die and thou hast left me alone in the desert". Her ass stirred and got up before she had finished her prayer and she proceeded.

'Attar quotes another story that once in the desert alone, how she desired to see God, "show thyself in this very place". Then she prayed until God spoke in her heart directly without any medium. Saying, "O Rabi'ah ... When Moses desired to see my face I casted a few particles of my glory upon the mountain (Sinai) and it was rent into forty pieces. Be content here with my name'.[129]

This was the beginning of Rabi'ah's asceticism which developed in her due to strong faith and trust in God.

One aspect of her life which needs to be commented is her choice of *celibacy*. Margaret Smith quotes the following passage from *Tazkira al-Awliyah*, (p. 66) which was Rabi'ah's answer to Hasan Bari's proposal, she said, "The contract of marriage is for those who have a phenomenal existence (i.e. who are concerned with the affairs of this material world). Here (i.e. in my case) existence has ceased, since I have ceased to exist and have passed out of self. My resistance is in Him, and I am altogether His. I am in the shadow of His command the marriage contract must be asked for from Him, not from me".

Commenting on the passage Smith says; [130]

> So, like her Christian sisters in the life of sanctity, Rabi'ah espoused a heavenly Bridegroom and turned her back on earthly marriage even with one of her own intimates and companions on the way.

But Rabi'ah's case cannot be compared to Christian sisters as in Rabi'ah's case it was only her choice not teaching. She did not deny marriage but she was (just) too occupied with her worship and prayers that it had not left any sensual desires in her heart. On another occasion, al-Hurayfish (*al-Rawad al-fariq*; p. 214) writes that when she was asked to choose any man for her, "She said, yes willingly. Who's the most learned of you, that I may marry him? They said Hasan of Basra so she said to him, "If you can give me the answer to four questions I will be your wife". He said, "Ask if God permit, I will answer you".

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[129] M. Smith, p. 13.
[130] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

She then asked (i). "What will be the judge of the world when I die? (means Muslim or *Kafir*?). And (ii) When I am put in the grave and *Munkar* and *Nakir* question me shall I be able to answer them or not? (iii) In the Resurrection, shall I be given my (book) in my right hand or in my left'? (iv) In which two groups (paradise or hell) shall I be on the day of judgement?

Àasan BaÄrâ's answer to all four questions was that it is hidden and only Allah has the knowledge of it. She then concluded that if this is not known and I have to concern myself with these four questions, how should I need a husband with whom to occupy.

Rabi'ah lived a long life alone and died in 185 A.H. (801 A.D.) and was buried at Basra.

Rabi'ah's Teachings

It is interesting to note, that there is no evidence that Rabi'ah learnt or studied from any teacher. As for her anecdotes related to Hasan Basri and other leading sufis of the time, it implies that they had high regard about Rabi'ah as their teacher. They use to come to her for her advice and counselling. But there is only one story quoted by Abu al-Qasim al-Nishaburi (in *Uqala al-Majānân* p. 128) which tells that she attended Hayyuna's company, who practised the greatest austerity and used to pray, "O God I would that the day were night that I might enjoy thy proximity". In the middle of the night sleep overcame Rabi'ah and Hayyuna came to Rabi'ah, kicking her with his foot he said, "Rise up, the Bridegroom of the truly guided ones has come. The adornments of the brides of night are revealed by the light of the night prayers".[131]

Munawi (d. 1622) places Rabi'ah in the second, of the two classes of individuals "one is the class of those who seek a master in the way that leads to the majesty of God, who may act as an intermediary between them and God... (prophet).... the second class are those who, when they seek to follow the right path, do not see before them the footprint of any of God's creature, for they have removed all thought from their hearts and concern themselves solely with God. And he says, "This state is the state of Abd al-Qadir and Abu Said Shibli and Rabi'ah al-"Adawiyya"[132]

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[131] *Ibid*., p. 48.
[132] *Ibid*., p. 37.

Rabi'ah has not written any book but her sayings have been quoted by almost all (great) sufi writers, Rabi'ah was regarded a guide and teacher both in her time, and the following generation of sufis on that path were highly indebted to her teachings. To give an example, of what was her view of teaching we quote this story from 'AÇÇār:

"Once 'Rabi'ah sent Hasan three things - a piece of wax, a needle and a hair.

"Be like wax", she said "Illumine the world, and yourself burn. Be like a needle always be working naked. When you have done these two things, a thousand years will be for you as a hair". It can be understood from this that to her, the existence should be to enlighten the world on a higher level. On a lower level we can say to help and benefit others. By naked she probably meant not to be outwardly but in necessary natural condition and the thinness or fineness of hair imply the feeling shortness of the time which is troublesome on this path.

But it is also very important to clarify that she was not aware of the problem, on her path. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1257, wrote *Mir'at al-zamān* p. 257a) mentions this conversation of Rabi'ah with Zulfa bint Abd. al-Wahid who says,

"I said to Rabi'ah, O my aunt, why do you not allow people to visit you?"' Rabi'ah replied, "I fear lest when I am dead, people will relate of me what I did not say or do, what if I had seen, I should have feared or mistrusted. I am told that they say that I find money under my place of prayer, and that I cook (food) in the pot without a fire". I said to her, "They relate of you that you find food and drink in your house", and she said, O daughter of my brother, if I had found such things in my house I would not have touched them, or laid hands upon them, but I tell you that I buy my things and am blessed in them"[133]

We can derive the following points from this story.

i. Rabi'ah's teaching was limited to only those who were able to understand it. Those who did not stand on the same level of understanding in this path were immune to be misled. It suggest that

[133] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

sufism which is the attainment of higher knowledge that's known as *Ma'rifa* cannot be taught to everyone. It is the knowledge which is given by God to those servants who come nearer to him through their self worship and struggle.

ii. It also suggests that it cannot be taught to common men except in the language that they understand. This means that certain things are not apprehended by everyone. For example, miracles are done by the command of Allah for those whom He wills. They should be the means to strengthen the faith for both, who see and for whom it is done. But they tend to mislead instead and become a source of deviation.

iii. People should not deny the miracles considering the command of Allah, nor should they consider them within the power of sufis.

iv. That Rabi'ah's miracles associated with food and drink were nothing but her trust in Allah, which Allah promises to everyone and provides through strange means.

The aim of the Sufis like Rabi'ah was not to show miracles and teach their practices but as Abë ñālib Makkâ (d. 996) writes in *Qët al-Qulëb*, "Thou shalt worship God as if thou sawest Him". This attainment of *Ihsan* was one of the initial goals of the sufis and they experience it through by worship. First, as to be seen by Him. For He sees us if we cannot see Him. This brought them closer to Allah and finally they arrived at the stage where they were able to see, hear and speak by Him. The Holy tradition speaks of it like this.

"My servant ceases not to draw nigh unto me by supererogatory worship until I love him; and when I love him, I am his ear, so that he hears by me, and his tongue, so that he speaks by me, and his hand, so that he takes by me".

The sufis aimed at achieving this position and there were some like Said Abil Khair as Nicholson[134] points out who stopped their practices, which were the means to that goal. But the sufis like Rabi'ah continued their practices until their very end. Thus to quote Prof. 'Attas, "*tasawwuf* is an integral part of Islam; just as all reality and truth has an outer and inner aspect to it so is *tasawwuf* the inner dimension of Islam; it sincere and correct

[134] Syed M. Naquib al-'Attas, *Islam and Secularism* (Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 1978) p. 115.

practice is none other than the intensification of the *shari'ah* upon one's self; it is the expression of ihsan in the '*abd*.[135]

Different Aspects of Her Teachings

***Tawba* (Repentance)**

Sufis have given great importance to *Tawba* which was derived from various Qur'anic verses Al-Hujwiri says,[136] "There is no right service without repentance. Repentance is the first of the stations in this path" and it includes 3 things (i) remorse for disobedience (ii) determination not to sin again (iii) immediate abandonment of sin. Al-Ghazālâ[137] said that *Tawba* is the conviction of sin which leads to amend it. Rabi'ah's sense of *Tawba* was very grave which caused her to grieve and weep. 'AÇÇār says, it is related that Rabi'ah was always weeping and when it was said to her, 'Why do you weep like this? She said, 'I fear that I may be cut off from Him to whom I accustomed and that at the hour of death a voice may say that, I am not worthy. When she was asked that, Will God accept the *Tawba* of a person who has committed sin? She answered, How can anyone repent unless his Lord gives him repentance and accepts him". So the sense of seeking *Tawba* itself was a gift from God, to Rabi'ah. But her concept of *Tawba* was full of shame which implied to ask for forgiveness for something shameful.

Taqi al-Dân Hisnâ (ob. A.D. 1426 wrote *Siyar al-Salihat*)[138] relates that Ibn ManÄër came to Rabi'ah who was praying and saw her place of worship like a marsh from her tears. And she asked him the reason for coming, he replied, to greet you. She then rose up for *Âalāt* and said "I ask forgiveness of God for my lack of sincerity when 'I say (those words) I ask forgiveness of God".

Tawba free from sincerity may arise the sense of pride in a person and thus may not be effective. Jāmâ[139] (d. 1492 A.D. wrote *Nafhat al-Uns*) relates that Sufyān al-Thawrâ exclaimed in Rabi'ah's presence, "Alas! for my sorrow". Rabi'ah said to him, "Do not lie, if you were really sorrowful, life would not be so pleasant to you". She used to say, "my sorrow is not for the things

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135 Smith, p. 53.
136 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *LÁy« Ulum al-Din*, Vol. 4, p. 29.
137 Smith, p. 56.
138 *Ibid.*
139 *Ibid.*

which make me grieve, but my sorrow is for the things for which I do not grieve".. This is very important because Tawba is a positive aspect for wrong actions. But if the sense of awareness of the sin is not there, the person keeps doing it unconsciously. The concept of sin to Rabi'ah was not sorrowful because of the punishment in hereafter but because it separates the sinner from God. Hurayfish[140] (d. 1398 A.D wrote *Al-Rawdal-Faiq*) says that she used to refer to God as the "One who can cleanse her from her sin".

***Âabr* (Patience)**

Rabi'ah's teaching of *Sabr* was a complete example of her practices. She demonstrated the highest stages of *Sabr* during her early life, when she suffered from all sorts of injuries. Later on her stories related to her sicknesses or her domestic needs all show that her main concern was to seek the pleasure of God and she justified everything as His will. 'AÇÇār refers to her secret of *Sabr* in her coversation with Sufyan. Sufyan tempted her to seek what she desired from God, and she answered, "If I will a thing, and my Lord does not will it, I shall be guilty of unbelief". This is important as not surrendering to the will of Allah makes a person react and say *Këfr*. Therefore to accept everything from Allah makes man submit and patient. Al-Ghazali and al-Qushayri considered patience as an essential part of faith.

***Shukr* (Gratitude)**

Rabi'ah's sense of gratitude was not only for the gifts but rather for the Giver. 'AÇÇār quotes this story that her maid servant asked her to come out to behold the works of God. She replied, "Come you inside that you may behold their Maker. Contemplation of the maker has turned me aside from contemplating what he has made. Smith[141] says that here "Rabi'ah's attitude was different from pantheistic sufis who felt that God was seen (and could be worshipped) in all His creation".

Al-Qushayrâ (*Risālah*, p. 106) regarded gratitude as an important quality on the mystic way. He mentions three elements leading to Shukr, faith, feeling and action. Faith must accept the fact that all benefits come from God. This faith must produce the feeling of joy and the humility before the

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140 *Ibid, p. 62..*
141 *Ibid., p. 60.*

Giver. And consequence of these two leads to action and make an individual grateful, praising and thanking the Giver and avoid its opposite.

'ttar relates this story on her teaching of *Shukr*. "It is related that one time she saw someone who had a bandage bound about his head. She said, "Why is this bandage bound (round your head)? He said, "My head is paining me". Rabi'ah asked him, "how old he was"? "Thirty years old he replied. She asked him "Were you in pain and trouble for the greater part of your life"? 'No' he answered. Then she said, "for thirty years (God) has kept your body fit and you have never bound upon it the bandage of gratitude, but for one night of pain in your head you bind it with the bandage of complaint".

***Raja'* and *Khauf* (Hope and Fear)**

Hope and fear were regarded as the two main pillars of faith by sufis. Al-Sarraj (al-luma; p. 66) says, "Those who fear, serve God through dread of separation from Him, and those who hope, serve in the expectation of union with Him. Al-Sarrāj[142] refers to three kinds of fear, the commonest being fear of punishment. Others fear being cut off from God, or anything that might hinder attainment of gnosis. But there is a higher type of fear even than this, and the holy fear of elect is the fear of God alone.

Al-Qushayrâ says that the terror of the common sort (*rahba*) makes a man run away, but holy dread (*Khashya*) brings him near to God. And so he compares it with the lamp, which makes heart see what is good and what is evil. "He who truly fears a thing flees from it, but he who truly fears God, flees unto Him."

The Sufi doctrine of fear and hope is summarized by al-Sarraj[143] as follows:

"The fear is like a state of darkness, in which the soul wanders, bewildered, seeking always to escape from it, and when hope comes to lighten it, the soul goes out to place of refreshment and grace prevails.

Rabi'ah's fear was caused from the effect of hell fire and it used to express in her weeping (as we have already seen). Her biographer Munawi says that she remained for forty years without raising her head to heaven, out of her

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142 *Ibid., p. 67.*
143 *Ibid.*

reverence towards God. And she used to say, whenever I have heard the call to prayer, I have remembered the trumpet call of the Day of Resurrection, and whenever I have seen the snow I have seen also the pages of the records fluttering. Commenting on Rabi'ah's teaching on hope and fear, Smith[144] says, "Seen in an eschatological setting, it is closely linked with her teaching on the doctrine of disinterested love to God, and since she appears to have been among the first to bring this doctrine into prominence among the sufis and to lay particular stress upon it as the essential element in the saint's relation to God. It is possible that she was also one of the first to teach this exalted ideal of hope and fear and to conceive of paradise as a spiritual state". Al-Ghazālâ also regarded Rabi'ah responsible for this important development in Sufi doctrine.

Al-Munawi relates that Rabi'ah heard a reader reading that "the inhabitants of paradise are occupied in enjoying themselves," and she said, "the inhabitants of paradise are unfortunate in their occupation and their companions". But Rabi'ah was blamed for making this statement by Ibn 'Arabâ, who said that it was she who was unfortunate and that they were occupied only with God and this was His will for them. Smith[145] elaborates Rabi'ah's point by saying, "She probably wished to make it clear that in her view paradise was not a place for sensual delights but rather a state of contemplation of the face of God". There are several occasions when Rabi'ah was asked to say something about paradise, she said, "first the neighbour, then the house". Al-Ghazālâ's opinion on this statement was that, "in her heart was no leaning towards paradise, but to the Lord of paradise.

Tawakkul (dependence), *Zuhd* and Poverty

Tawakkul is related to poverty, and asceticism. Rabi'ah's life was a perfect example of abandoning everything for the sake of God and relying in Him. "AÇÇār relates one story of Rabi'ah when she reached '*Arafāt* while making pilgrimage. She heard the voice of God saying, "O you who invoke me, what request have you to make of me? If it is myself that you desire, then I will show you one flash of My Glory (but in that) you will be absorbed and melt

144 *Kitab al-Luma'*, p. 63.
145 Smith, p. 72.

away." She then said, O Lord of Glory, Rabi'ah has no means of attaining to that degree, but I desire one particle of (spiritual) poverty.[146]

And then the voice explained poverty, that it is as a wrath in the way of men.

Smith says that poverty, here" signifies the state of complete self-loss, exceedingly hard to attain and not leading to union unless it is perfect and even then the mystic may, in the good pleasure of God, be subject to a dark night of the soul before attaining to union. Such a poverty could be attained only by the adept, divested of every attribute of "self". '*Zuhd'* (asceticism) she says is considered side by side with poverty. And the first state of '*Zuhd'* is initiatory and represents the purgative life, through which the *Nafs*, the carnal soul must be purified from its sins which come from the desires of self.[147]

Abë ñāalib Makkâ[148] (pp. 248, 250) says, that piety in the servants leads on to '*zuhd'* and '*zuhd'* to love of God, and these two states are the aim of those who seek to love God and to be intimate with Him and he is not truly a *Zahid* who does not attain to the station of love or the mystic state of intimacy (*Uns*)'.

Al-Hujwiri refers to three kinds of '*zuhd'* by Ahmad b. Àanbal. One, the renunciation of what is unlawful, which is common enough. The renunciation of what is lawful, which is a more special type, and finally, the renunciation of all, whatever it may be, that distracts the servant from God most High and this is the *zuhd* of gnostic.[149]

Rabi'ah's teachings have played a major role in the development of this early school of *Zuhd*. 'Attar says that when she was asked "whence have you come?" She said, from that world" they asked her, "Whithers are you going? She replied, "To that world? and she was asked, "what are you doing in this world"? and she answered, "I am sorrowing". "In what way", they asked and she said, "I am eating the bread of this world and doing the work of that world." Then someone said, "One so persuasive in speech is worthy to keep a rest-house and she responded, "I myself am keeping a rest house, whatever

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146 *Ibid.*
147 *Ibid.*
148 *Ibid.*
149 *Kitab al-Luma'*, p. 46.

is within, I do not allow to go out and whatever is not does out come in. If anyone comes in or goes out, he does not concern me, for I am contemplating my own heart, not mere clay".[150]

On Love and Union

Rabi'ah's teaching on love can be summarized as follows: First, she says this love of the servant to his Lord must shut out all others than the beloved. One must raise above the claims of the sense and allow neither pleasure nor pain to disturb his contemplation of the divine. To her God seemed to be a jealous God, who will suffer none to share with Him that love which is due to Him alone. Secondly, she teaches that this love, which directed to God to the exclusion of all else, must be disinterested, that it must look neither to hope of reward nor to relief from punishment but seek only to the will of God and to accomplish that which is pleasing to Him, that He may be glorified". Schimmel says,[151] "Rabi'ah's love of God was absolute". She was the pioneer of disinterested love and love of jealous God. Smith says that though she was not the first to seek God through love, she was the first to lay stress upon the doctrine and to combine with it the doctrine of *Kashf*, the unveiling at the end of the way, of the Beloved to His lovers."[152]

'AÇÇār speaks of her as "that woman on fire with love and ardent desire... consumed with her passion".[153] Abë ñālib refers to Rabi'ah's comment on Sufyān at-Thawrâ, when he said, "O God mayst thou be satisfied with Him". And Sufyan said, I ask forgiveness of God". Ja'far then said, to her, when is the servant satisfied with God most high"? and she said, when his pleasure in misfortune is equal to his pleasure in prosperity".[154] Al-Ghazālâ says that sincere love causes you to obey and "everyone who obeys seeks intimacy", and he refers to following verses recited by her.[155]

> "I have made thee the companion of my heart, But my body is available for those who desire its company,

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[150] *Kashaf*, pp. 117-118, Quoted in Smith, p. 77.
[151] Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*. (Chappel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1975) p. 39.
[152] Smith, p. 97.
[153] *Ibid.*
[154] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[155] Al-Ghazali, p. 358.

And my body is friendly towards its guest, But the beloved of my heart is the guest of my soul".

There is a famous story attributed by Aflākâ[156] to Rabi'ah, where her disinterested love for God is demonstrated.

One day a number of saints saw that Rabi'ah had taken fire in one hand and water in the other and was running with speed. They said to her, "O lady of the next world, where are you going and wheat is the meaning of this"? She said:

"I am going to light fire in paradise and to pour water on to hell so that both veils (i.e. hindrances to the true vision of God) may completely disappear from the pilgrims ... and the servants of God may see Him without any object of hope or motive of fear".

'Attar mentions one story that Rabi'ah was asked, "Do you love the Lord of glory"? She said, 'I do". Then he asked "do you hold Satan as an enemy". She said, "no". And when astonishingly asked, 'why is that"? She said "my love for God leaves no room for hating Satan". She further said, "I saw the Prophet in a dream" and he asked 'O Rabi'ah, do you love me"? I said, "O Prophet of God! who is there who does not love you, but my love of God has so possessed me that no place remains for loving and hating save Him." Rabi'ah has been blamed to have heresy in her teaching for this saying. But it is clear that she had a completely different picture of God and was indifferent to any other love.

Someone asked her, "what is love"? She replied, "love has come from eternity and passes to eternity and none has been found in seventy thousand worlds who drinks one drop of it until at last he is absorbed in God, and from that comes the saying "He loves them (saints) and they love Him". (al-Qur'ān 5:59).

There have been some confusion about the famous verses on love attributed to Rabi'ah and according to Smith, Abu Talib who is attributed to them, have himself referred them to Rabi'ah's own. (They are reported by all her biographers, except 'AÇÇār):

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[156] Smith, pp. 98-99.

"I have love you with two loves, a selfish love and a love that is worthy (of you),

As for the love which is selfish, I occupy myself therein with remembrance of you to the exclusion of all others. And for that which is worthy of you, therein you raise the veil that I may see you.

Yet is there no praise to me in this or that, but the praise is to you, whether in that or this".

After elaborating these verses, Abë ñālib commented that she had reached the highest truth in regard to love.[157] Al-Ghazali said, "she meant by the selfish love, the love of God for His favour and grace bestowed and for temporary happiness. And by the love worthy of Him. The love of His beauty which was revealed to her and this is the higher of the two loves and finer of them"[158] He further says that she wanted to achieve the union with God and His Beatific vision.

Munājat or Prayers

Rabi'ah's prayers were an important part of her daily practice and an insight into her feelings. Introducing her prayers to God, Schimmel says, "The nightly prayers, one of the early pivots of early ascetic life, become, with her, a sweat and loving conversation between lover and beloved; as she says in one of the prayers;

"O God, the night has passed and the day has dawned. How I long to know if you have accepted my prayers or if you have rejected them ....."[159]

Conclusion

Rabi'ah was one of those few figures in Islamic history, like al-Ghazālâ who have been highly respected by all Muslims. And this is a fact to which Smith points out that any pious woman in Muslim society is given the nickname of Rabi'ah. She has influenced a great deal on general Muslim women but with regard to sufism, her teachings were highly appreciated by all great sufi writers like Abë ñālib Makkâi, al-Qushayrâ, al-Ghazālâ and Sohrawardâ. They all consider her teachings an integral part of sufism. Her

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157 Smith, p. 104.
158 Al-Ghazali, p. 267.
159 Schimmel, p. 40.

main biographer ʻAÇÇār calls her "the second spotless Mary," who was chosen over all the women of the worlds (al-Qur'ān). And it is possible that Rabiʻah was inspired by Maryam's personality. The Qur'an mentions Maryam as the most purified and devout figure. Allah mentions her name with praise, for devoting her life for the service of Allah. This justifies the isolation of sufis like Rabiʻah for which they have been generally criticized.

While commenting on the personality of Rabiʻah Schimmel[160] holds the view that "the attitude of sufism towards fair sex was ambivalent, and it can be said that sufism was more favourable to the development of feminine activities than were other branches of Islam". This is very interesting to note that we certainly do not find any prominent female figure in other disciplines in Islam. And the only reason as the scholars point out could be the technical difficulties faced by women in contributing their intellectual qualities.

Rabiʻah's life was a good mixture of Qur'anic teachings. She demonstrated both hope and fear in her actions an ideal for true belief. This in turn developed to the extent that she desired to see God and this typical love for God found its way for her.

[160] *Ibid.*, p. 426.

THE AESTHETIC SELF IN KIEERKEGAARD:A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

> Iqbal whose philosophical kinship with Kierkegaard is deep, and who along with Kierkegaard recognized the limits of science and reason in understanding the "self" and the apprehension of religious faith. For both humanistic psychology is a victory over the brute facts of science and behaviorism.
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> Sami S. Hawi

Phenomenology as the descriptive study of the episodes of our consciousness with interest in their essential structures has been at odds with modern behavioristic psychology. The latter, whether logical or psychological, suspended or eliminated subjective experience in the interest of making psychology a natural science. The behavioristic perspective stressed that the variables determining behavior lie outside the "self" in its immediate environment and in its environmental history. The human being is considered to be completely at the mercy of previous learning and environmental conditions. *Freedom of choice and self determination* are viewed as illusions. Such an approach to behavior has had a tremendous impact on our modern views of human nature.

On the other hand, inspired by the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and by Kierkegaard's subtle description of various dimensions and modifications of human inwardness and his vehement stress on the uniqueness of the individual, phenomenological psychology or humanistic psychology emerged as a reaction to the depersonalizing effects and to the mechanistic conception of man which modern behaviorism has projected. Husserl considered egology to be the essence of the study of the immanent structures of subjectivity, and that the Ego, in a Kantian sense, is the uniting principle of our conscious modifications or cogitations. Whereas Kierkegaard considered the self to be "The immediate man" whose essential structure is an internal dynamic activity with intensity of feeling and thought. It is passion Kierkegaard maintains that is the final yardstick by which the uniqueness of the self is measured. The self, contra the behaviorists,

organizes its passions or inward life and affirms itself against the environment and personal history. The core of the self is then a vital structure whose essence is freedom which allows man to strive for values and meaning, self-direction and slef-fulfillment. Truth exists, writes Kierkegaard. "only as the self produces it in action." Rollo May states that it was Kierkegaard's description of the multifarious dynamics of the self, though not exclusively, that inspired the rise of humanistic psychology [161]. In describing the aesthetic self, Kierkegaard discerns almost an endless multiplicity of subjective variables whose revolving point is the inward geography of the human emotions and the conditions that are causally connected by which the self *announces* its existence *concretely*. Kierkegaard's writings on the self, consequently, have basic significance for descriptive or humanistic psychology, However, due to the extensiveness and the many-levelled manner in which Kierkegaard expresses himself on the subject, I shall confine myself to describing a) nature of the self, b) reason and existential alternatives, c) the self: actualities and protensions of aesthetic existence, d) the aesthetic self and despair, e) choice and the aesthetic self. I shall also show that James Collins, one of the influential writers on Kierkegaard, in his interpretation of the aesthetic life is at least implausible.

(a) Nature of the Self:

Kierkegaard does not seem to involve himself with the investigation of the epistemological grounds and conditions for the existence of the self. He does not even describe or argue his position, he simply presents it. For him, the proposition "man has a self" is self evident or assumed. In other words, Kierkegaard does not bother to offer either empirical, rational or intuitive proof for the existence of the self. Furthermore. when Kierkegaard writes about the self, he is usually not concerned with the traditional question about personal identity, a question which was of substantial significance for philosophers such as Avicenna, Berkeley and Hume. For the first two, the self in known intuitively as opposed to demonstratively, namely, it is known without inference. Whereas the latter considered the self to be empirically speaking, fictitious or non-existent.

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[161] Rollo May, *Existence A New Dimension in Psychology and Psychiatry*, Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1958, pp.10-15.

Kierkegaard makes extensive use of the term "self", both in his aesthetic and ethico-religious writings. However, he does not seem to be very clear on the issue and his interpreters seem to follow him literally without succeeding in providing us with a distinct and exact meaning that Kierkegaard attaches to the concept. His and their explanations are saturated with Hegelian jargon and woven rhetoric which is neither adequately comprehensible nor is it functional for the goals of the present undertaking. For instance, witness his definition of man:

> Man is spirit, but what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that the relation relates itself to its own self: The self in not the relation but (consists in the fact) that the relation relates itself to its own self." [162]

In this passage, Kierkegaard is declaring that man is spirit which of course means that he does not totally belong to the animal modality nor is man simply a material entity. Then he adds "spirit is the self"; now if this is true what happens to the body in this Kierkegaardian formula? Is the self then a "ghost in a machine" as Ryle had categorized Cartesian dualism? What role does the body play in this conception of the self? It is not really clear whether there is an interaction between the spirit and the body, or the body is just simply inert. If the body is inert, then the self as a relation cannot be to the body but must mean self consciousness or *reflexivity*. However, further analysis of the quoted passage could be of significance in other contexts but not in the context of the present study; it is hardly profitable.

Now, a sensitive reading of Kierkegaard's literature dealing with the aesthetic mode of living can phenomenologically announce two meanings of the self that underlie most of his pronouncements about subjective experiences and psychic states stemming from the individual's concrete choices of being in the world. These I shall call respectively the *dynamic conception* of the self and the *ontological conception* of the self.

Descriptively speaking the first definition of the self presents itself as *character*. When Kierkegaard talks about the self of the aesthete in *Either/or* and the alternatives which he prefers, he is talking about the character of the

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[162] Soren Kierkegaard, *The Sickness unto Death*, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 164.

agent who performs multiplicity of choices. Williams James, in his *Principles of Psychology* states that *character is a transformed will*. This means that what one does makes him what he is. Therefore in this sense, the self of the aesthete is initially a sheer potentiality, which in essence does not exist. The aesthete makes himself, creates himself in the dramatic act of choices and actions which he initiates to enhance his interests. This of course means that actions are necessary conditions for the phenomenological constitution of the self of the aesthete which is his character. Hence, when we ask "what can I do for myself?", "What can I do for others?", "what can I do before God", we are effectively talking about the aesthetic self, the ethical self and the religious self. These three categories describe different selves or characters. However, such selves are different actualities of the same entity which gets transformed essentially by its focus and the activities it performs.

Along with the dynamic concept of the self, if we explore further horizons in Kierkegaard's writings, the self emerges as a *vital* entity in the individual, an entity which is energetic and productive. Therefore, at the heart of Kierkegaard's conception of the self is a definite element of vitalism. Such a *vitalism* renders the self an internal dynamic activity with intensity of volition, feeling and thought.

On the other hand, when one looks with neutral attentiveness, namely, by exercising objective distancing in describing man's dispositions, one can discern the givenness of two elements which ontologically constitute the self, namely the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite [163]. These are two actuated tendencies in the self that cannot be obliterated. They are the basic "residue" which is obtained by a radical *reduction* of the different modifications of human nature. The human self (by the language of description and appearance and not by logical argument) is a synthesis or a composite of two behaviorally (existentially) opposing tendencies in man. Phenomenologically man's nature seems to dynamically gravitate towards the worldly, the finite, and towards the eternal, the infinite. Such a syntheses, according to Kierkegaard, harbours in itself open possibilities for the individual, and hence the possibility of choice. Therefore, at the heart of human nature, freedom appears to be the final seat of man's personality and consequently, this ontological conception of the self construes man as the

163 *Ibid.*

only place where the possibility of the eternal resides. Such conception of the self, along with the dynamic conception, leaves for man the open and varied possibilities of living the metamorphosis of aesthetic life. In his almost endless and multiple ways of describing the aesthetic mode of life and the emotional accompaniment of this life, such as anxiety, dread, despair, Kierkegaard considered himself an experimental psychologist. Again, it is necessary to state here that the two conceptions of the self are actually the same self looked at phenomenologically by what Husserl imaginative variation.

(b) Reason, Passion and Existential Alternatives:

It was remarked earlier that the self or the individual has three possible ways of living, namely the aesthetic, the ethical and the religious. These are usually known as the three spheres of existence or stages. However, when reading Kierkegaard's Either/or [164] and the Stages [165], one cannot help getting the impression that what Kierkegaard was unfolding in this theory of the aesthetic, ethical, and religious spheres were his own experiences and giving them theoretical expression. These spheres are actually modes of existence in one and the same personality. They are independent modalities of consciousness of one's own ontological being which differ qualitatively from each other, and yet can hardly have isolated existence in the individual. Such a theory of the spheres must according to Kierkegaard allow for alternatives.

Again, within the dichotomy of the opposing elements of the self lies the fountainhead of human freedom. The aesthetic self, therefore, can pursue a plurality of qualitatively varied actions to satisfy any whim or desire. However, the one basic formula to bear in mind here, is whatever the actions or choices the self may project, these cannot be obtained or accomplished without two basic components of subjectivity, namely *reason and the passions*. As it is for Nietszche and Bergson, it is for Kierkegaard, reason is an instrument for the motive powers of the self. Reason itself is destitute of the ability to lead to actions or to change the essential structure of the

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[164] Soren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, 2 Vols. Doubleday and Co. New York, 1984. Henceforth referred to as *Either/Or*.

[165] Soren Kierkegaard, *Stages on Life's Way*, Schocken Books, New York, 1975. Henceforth referred to as Stages.

personality. For this change, the passions and the will ought to be creatively involved. Here the passions and the will are not two separate orders of our psychic phenomena. The will is defined and understood in terms of passions, desires and interests. If it were possible for passionateless, desireless, interestless self to exist at all, such a self would necessarily be a *willess* one. Consequently, reason shall always be a "slave" of passion in any mode or form of existence. Both are like hunter and a hunting dog. The latter points out the prey and the former executes the shooting.

While emphasizing the presence of alternatives for his theory of the spheres, Kierkegaard states that his theory does not possess any legitimate claims to conceptual truth than other theories.[166] This is by and large due to the fact that reason and actual existence belong to two different modalities. The theory of the spheres cannot, consequently, be more valid than other theories because: (1) rationally all views, or alternatives, are "logically" defensible. Reason flings these alternatives to the world of possibles; (2) to know, Kierkegaard says, is to translate reals into possibles, this is the direction in which any and all knowlwdge moves; [167] (3) it is only when we come to the exigencies of existence, to the actualities of real life, that opposition and conflicts in the behavioral sense, come into play.

Points (1), (2) and (3) are illustrated by Kierkegaard in presenting two traditional views. The first preaches that the highest good is pleasure (aesthetic), and the other that the highest good is duty (ethical). Here, when one observes the concrete existential implications of these two doctrines, one encounters unresolvable behavioral oppositions. namely, the dilemma of universally pursuing *pleasure*[168] and *duty*[169] at the same time. For it is not infrequent that they behaviorally differ, in fact contradict each other. This existential opposition between the two views, according to Kierkegaard,

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166 In an early entry to his *Journals*, called "The difficulty with our age" Kierkegaard says the following: "And so the whole generation is stuck in the mud banks of reason; and no one grieves over it, there is only self satisfaction and conceit, which always follow on reason and the sins of reason. Oh, the sins of passion and of the heart, how much nearer to salvation than the sins of reason." p. 461. Year 1852, sec. 1249.

167 *Postscript*, p. 285 ff.

168 As in the case of Hedonism, Epicureanism and Utilitarianism.

169 Kant's ethical theory is the best instant of that.

remains unresolved and places the existential ego in an unconquered existential uncertainty.

Now, what does reason do with the two opposing alternatives? Kierkegaard contends that reason abolishes the difficulty by asking which one of the possibilities is valid. But this will conceivably yield no conclusion. For on the basis of points (1) and (2) the opposition is absorbed and transferred from the existential to the rational realm, and consequently it is emptied of all existential importance. Kierkegaard would say ironically, that reason resolves the opposition between the alternatives in very much the same way as a physician's medicine removes the patient's fever by removing the patient's life as well.[170] Furthermore, reason at its best may function in delineating alternatives for a possible choice. But reason lacks the singular character of existence:

> What is reasoning? It is the result of doing away with the vital distinction which separates subjectivity and objectivity. As a form of abstract thought reasoning is not profoundly dialectical enough; as an opinion and a conviction it lacks fullblooded individuality. But where mere scope is concerned, reasoning has all the apparent advantage; for a thinker can encompass his science, a man can have an opinion upon a particular subject and a conviction as a result of a certain view of life, but one can reason about anything.[171]

Therefore, if one can reason about anything, then, according to Kierkegaard, to ask which of the alternatives is true is to ask a question which is irrelevant in connection with existential choices. Choices are neither true nor false, they are either productive in a positive vein or non-instrumental for the needs of the self. Now, if reason as mentioned earlier, "lacks fullblooded individuality", it is then the passions that are most essential for the enhancement of the capabilities and vitality of the individual. Passion is what really determines the quality and the breach between existential alternatives. The spheres as alternative modes of existence are determined and distinguished from one another by a specific passion. The

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[170] *Postscript*, p. 268.

[171] Soren Kierkegaard, *The Present Age*, trans. Alexander Dru, London: Collins Clear-type Press, 1962, p. 87. *Underlining* is mine. Henceforth referred to as The Present Age.

more the self has passion in each sphere the more it belongs to that sphere. Besides, if the spheres differ in their qualitative modes of living, they are necessarily more so in the qualitative difference of their passions.[172]

The aesthetic passion is essentially a zest for pleasure, however, not in strictly hedonistic terms, but in a more general fashion. The ethical passion is a zest to abide by the moral law, and the religious passion is suffering on whose grounds religious faith emerges.

In any stage, therefore, if the "Single one" loses his passion or allows it to recede, then his singularity starts receding too; for what makes the self what it is, is the intensity and kind of passion it possesses. Passion, Kierkegaard holds, is, in the last analysis, what is essential.[173] Whether in one stage or the other, the individual can only realize himself fully by living very intensively, a way which is a vital condition for the personality: "Passion... is the real measure of man's power. And the age in which we live is wretched, because it is without passion".[174] This point is emphasized in order to remark the movement which Kierkiegaard is going to take later on. Humanity is defined by sensibility, and not by reason. The *authentically* human is passion, Kierkegaard says.[175] If humanity is feeling and passion, human perfection is constituted in the greatest possible energy, that is passion, the most perfect expression of existence.

Passion, however, is not like emotion or sentiment. It is more ardent than sentiment, and not as short lived as emotions. *Passion is a tendency which exaggerates itself, which takes hold of us, which makes itself the center of everything.*

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[172] I have discussed part of this section on passion in another forthcoming paper on the concept of the leap.

[173] Soren Kierkegaard, *The journals of Soren Kierkegaard*, London, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 201, year 1847, sec. 652. Henceforth, referred to as Journals. In the same section, Kierkegaard says that "What the age needs is *pathos*... The misfortune of the age is understanding and reflection.... That is why it requires a man who could reflect the renunciation f all reflection..."

[174] *Journals*, pp 102-3, year 1841, sec. 396.

[175] Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, Walter Lowrie, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1974, p.

As a matter of fact, one can deduce from Kierkegaard's *Either/or, Postscript*, and *Fear and Trembling* that passion is a more total phenomenon of our subjective modifications. It is a transformation of the whole personality.

But passion, Kierkegaard maintains, is not just an immediate outbreak of emotions that is not guided or purified by reason. An unguided, uncontrolled passion means the dissolution of the personality. Therefore, in order to be creative, and in order to be conducive to perfection, passion should be purified by reflection (reason). Consequently, passion in every stage of existence does not break away from reason, but it is channelled and more focused by reason to an object. Kierkegaard says: "Let no one misunderstand all my talk about passion and pathos to mean that I am proclaiming any and every uncircumcised immediacy, all manner of unshaven passion.[176] A passion without a definite object is a useless enthusiasm that consumes the energies of the individual, and forsakes him to an existential blunder which spells his own annihilation.

It follows, that the individual in each sphere of existence, whether in the aesthetic, ethical, or religious, shauld very dynamically converge his passions on the *contents* of every stage. But, whether consciously or unconsciously, passion in every stage labours in a double movement. On the one hand, it seeks satisfaction and realization in the sphere it belongs to; on the other hand, it strives to go beyond itself and to become transfigured to another sphere. On this basis, Kierkegaard finds an escape for the individual from being imprisoned and stifled in one of the spheres. Passion in every stage, therefore, implies an "unward" flight to a higher stage, and it is never tranquilized until it reaches *Him* who is the source of its inspiration. In fact, it is *Him* who offers a motivation for the transition from one sphere to the other. But this transition is described by Kierkegaard as always a crisis, as a breach of continuity.

The breach of continuity between the stages means three things for Kierkegaard: (1) The values in each stage are determined by specific passion or enthusiasm, qualitatively different. (2) A person whose life is in the one sphere cannot by a mere process of reflection transport himself into the other; for this a passionate resolution of the will is necessary. (3) The change

[176] Referred to hereafter as *Fear and Trembling*.

from one sphere to the other is never necessary, but always contingent; if it presents itself as possible, it also presents as possible of non-realization. It is this breach, between the stages, and even in the acts of choice in the same sphere that the aesthetic self constitutes its character and personality.

By now, it is amply clear that Kierkegaard considers the passions to be of paramount importance in his phenomenological constitution of the human self. Passion makes up the very life of the individual. The exaggerated role he assigns to the passions is not a common theme in the intellectual history of Western culture. Ever since Socrates, philosophy has sought an answer to man's dynamic problems through the arrogance of reason and in its role to control, subvert and emaciate the passions. It was Plato who strongly insisted that the rational faculties in man must always control, direct and even restrain the passionate faculties. Reason was, and still is considered the gifted spark which directs and enlightens the human self. Such a pervasive intellectualism (rationalism) in Western civilization Kierkegaard forcefully deplores. "Why is reason baptized and the passions considered to be the pagans of the human soul?" he cried. Inspired by Kierkegaard, R. Salomon states that nowadays we should "... return to the passions the central and defining role in our lives that they have so long and persistently being denied, to limit the pretensions of "objectivity" and self-demeaning reason which have exclusively ruled Western philosophy, religion, and science since the days of Socrates. Our passions have too long been relegated to mere footnotes in philosophy and parentheses in psychology, as if they were intrusions and interruptions... but more usually embarrassing if not treacherous subversion of lives...".[177] Amen, Kierkegaard would say.

(c) The Self: Actualities and Protensions of Aesthetic Existence:

Aesthetic existence means for Kierkegaard living in the *immediate*, and the aesthetic self is that by which the self is immediately what it is. The term "aesthetic" is derived from the Greek term "aesthetikos" which means perceptive and appreciative or responsive to the artistic. Such a meaning seems to have a direct relevance to what Kierkegaard means by the "aesthetic". For that which is perceived is usually immediate; also the

[177] Robert Salomon, *The Passions, Doubleday*, New York, 1977, p. xvi.

aesthetic self is an entity which by virtue of living in the immediate, is basically romantic and is appreciative of different kinds of artistic creation.

Kierkegaard investigates the aesthetic view of life with subtlety and wit, yet in *Either/Or* he is endlessly repetitious, viewing over and over the same theme again from different perspectives. This method of "imaginative variation" as Husserl puts it is employed by Kierkegaard in order to *identify* with his characters; such an identification is executed by him in a phenomenological manner to "look into", inspect, discern, record, describe and perhaps even objectify and then subjectify the inward life of the self being scrutinized from the point of view of neutral psychological description. Through *empathy* and *sympathetic penetration* of the field of consciousness of his different characters, Kierkegaard is able to describe the moods and emotional states which the life of the aesthete presents to him in the "first person", non polluted and purified from the fantastic and the illusory. In a Husserlian language, Kierkegaard's ego is "split" to become at once both his ego and the ego of the person whose emotional life he is describing. Hence, using this method, Kierkegaard declares in *Either/Or* that the aesthetic sphere is a possible form of individual existence which advocates *variety of pleasures* as the ultimate goal to which the self is attracted. However, this variety of pleasures, Kierkegaard does not reduce to pure sensualism. Rather it includes any attitude whose sole aim is pleasure, even if it is refined and merely intellectual. In short, the aesthetic life culminates in a general form of Epicureanism which tries to banish meaninglessness and despair by emphasizing the pleasures of the moment. By doing so, it falls back on, or gets arrested by, the same existential state it attempted to escape from, and that is despair. The aesthetic self in a primary sense, is one who determines to live for the luxury of pleasurable moments.

Accordingly, every man, says Kierkegaard, no matter how inferior his talents are, feels by natural tendency the necessity of forming a view of life and a conception of its purpose. The aesthete also forms a view of life, but this view is based on enjoyment. In this view, the self of the aesthete does not differ from other people, for most people thought the ages agree that one must enjoy life. However, the important thing here is that people differ in their conceptions of enjoyment.[178] They differ because enjoyment is not

[178] *Either/Or*, Vol. II, p. 184.

one thing but a multiplicity of things. The aesthetic self then which emphasizes enjoyment in life, is itself ruptured or diffused into a boundless multiplicity[179]; the multiplicity of the pleasures of the moment. But since the aesthete lives in the greed for the moment, then he lives a prey for external events because "... *he who says that he wants to enjoy life always posits a condition which either lies outside the individual or is in the individual in such a way that it is not posited by the individual himself*".[180] And "we encounter views of life which teach that one must enjoy life but which place the condition for it outside the individual. This is the case with every view of life where wealth, glory, high station ... are accounted life's task and its content".[181] Consequently, if man has to seek enjoyment outside himself, he cannot bear existence in the present.[182] Therefore, the aesthete is driven to plunge into violent exciting works and amusements in order to escape from the possibility of boredom. This escape, which is an escape from himself, becomes his cause of bewilderment and despair.

The aesthete, accordingly, is man who does not possess himself; he is engaged with the things outside him and therefore lacks full-blooded individuality, stability, and is diffused in the flux of momentary immediate pleasure. Nothing gives him temporary relief from his boredom except the freshness of immediacy. The aesthetic self, says Kierkegaard, cannot will one thing:

> ... When that one thing which he wills is not in itself one: is in itself a multitude of things, a dispersion, the toy of changeableness, and the prey of corruption! In the time of pleasure see how he longed for one gratification after another. Variety was his watchword. Is variety, then, to will one thing that shall ever remain the same? On the contrary, it is to will one thing that must never be the same. It is to will a multitude of things. And a person who wills in this fashion

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179 *Ibid.*, p. 188.

180 *Ibid.*, p. 184.

181 *Ibid.*, pp. 186-187.

182 *Ibid.*, p. 182. "But what is it to live aesthetically... What is aesthetical in man?... To this I would reply the aesthetical in man is that by which he is immediately what he is... He who lives in and by and of and for the aesthetical in him lives aesthetically."

> is not only double minded but is at odds with himself. For such a man wills first one thing and then immediately wills the opposite, because the oneness of pleasure is a snare and a delusion. It is the diversity of pleasure that he wills. So when the man of whom we are speaking had gratified himself up to the point of disgust, he became weary and sated... his enfeebled soul raged so that no ingenuity was sufficient to discover something new - something new! It was change he cried out for as pleasure served him, change! change!"[183]

This quotation, from Purity of Heart, displays almost exactly what sort of being the aesthetic self becomes in its pursuit of pleasure. Boredom creeps into the very veins of the aesthete and turns his life into a whirpool of dizzying preferences and actions. Boredom becomes the vital impulse behind the "bliss" of enjoyment. But such a bliss is nothing more than a superficial profundity that is void of content. Thus the individual who thrusts himself into different indulgences reaps liveliness, emptiness, self-hate and would be unwilling to change. Such an aesthetic self can love itself in dreams and the interweavings of the imagination. The culmination of all this is unhappiness: "The unhappy person is one who has his ideal, the content of his life, the fullness of his consciousness, the essence of his being in some manner outside himself. He is always absent, never present to himself".[184] The aesthetic self then, is essentially separated from the center of its being and ontologically does not dwell in the security and homeliness of its own consciousness. It evaporates into the torturing jaws of endless multiplicity.

A phenomenological glance at the history of philosophy presents us with Aristotle's view of the highest form of life. For him, the highest form is one of *contemplation*; the contemplation of the prime mover and the separate intelligences. The telos of such a life is not happiness but the fulfillment of one of our natural and higher functions that is contemplation. Happiness, Aristotle states, ensues as an outcome of contemplating the Eternal, who is pure act and devoid of potentiality, and is constantly engaged in intellecting Himself or His essence. The contemplative life is superior to other human activities because its basic attribute is *self-sufficiency* and does not depend on

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[183] Soren Kierkegaard, *Purity of Heart is to Will one Thing*, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956, pp. 56-57.

[184] *Either/Or*, Vol, I, P. 220.

external factors. The two thinkers, bearing basic differences in mind, seem to agree that a life centered on external goals, such as riches, pleasures and other diversions culminate in failure.

Again, when willing enjoyment, the aesthete is not willing one thing but a multiplicity of things. This multiplicity of alternatives is conceived by the aesthete's power of *reasoning*. It is reason that points to the possibilities of aesthetic life, but *reason itself precludes commitment and even action.* Consequently, the contemplative or rational aesthete standes outside life and scrutinizes it as a spectator.

Furthermore, rational speculation and non-committed intellectualism, which Kierkegaard calls skepticism, are employed by the refined aesthete to escape dynamic, ethical or religious decisions. The philosophers or rationalists, who occupy themselves with the luxury of weighing possibilities and analyzing concepts, are all essentially aesthetes in their undertaking. And all of these, says the Danish Socrates, suffer from a lack of self-understanding. Their lack of self-understanding is due to the fact that they are incapable of an inward movement which would involve them in the responsibility of practical connections and decisions. Therefore, it is hard for such speculators to relate themselves to a permanent standard, or to the Divine imperatives. For they are aesthetically absorbed in contemplating their own abstract systems that are far from real life. Thus, from these extravagant intellectuals who are bewitched with their "intellectual landscape", come the greedy Don Juan,[185] the idle doubter, and the egocentric Epicurean. Eventually then, the philosopher's objective detachment and the continuous suspension of judgement until evidence emerges - two qualities closely associated with the Western tradition of philosophy - are rejected by Kierkegaard. In this rejection Kierkegaard presented the primary theme of subsequent existential philosophy, namely, that of the priority of existence over essence.

But what about the faith of the aesthete according to Kieriegaard? When one is engaged in reading Either/Or one does not really dwell on passages where Kierkegaard overtly predicates faith of the aesthete. What permeates the being of the aesthete is a sort of conviction about the value of the

[185] See *Either/Or*, Vol. I, pp. 83-102.

immediate attachment to life and the fleeting mement. In other words, the aesthetic life is devoid of "faith" in the sense of rational and passionate attachment to the Eternal-God. The aesthete who indulges in the moment, i.e., the temporal, is in sin, for the temporal signifies sinfulness[186] according to Kierkegaard. But why does the temporal signify sinfulness? Simply because the aesthete lives merely in the instant abstracted from the eternal, and embraces finitude which is an embracement of a false self-independence. Living in the temporal is an escape on the part of the aesthete from yielding himself to faith and, consequently, he is caught in sin.

This is why the self of the aesthete is engulfed in suffering and despair. For he waives an essential necessary component of his nature, namely, the eternal,[187] which is forsaken and remains hungry, or so to speak, crying for satisfaction. this suffering, or inner torment, is the beacon which prompts the aesthete to choose religious faith via the ethical stage. the aesthetic mode, therefore, is a pint of departure from which man passes and lays anchor in the eternal, and therewith, reeaches the bliss of faith. Yet man is left free to make his own decision, either to choose - existentially - the ethico - religious, or remain suspended in the charm of speculation, loosing touch with existence, paralyzing his will and destroying his personality.

Therefore, the life of the aesthete does not bask in the bliss of religious faith. Kierkegaard does not even attempt to employ the terms "aesthetic faith" or "ethical faith" which some interpreters of Kierkegaard are wont to employ. For instance, James Collins, and influential writer on the subject, in his somewhat dogmatically written essay [188] on the role of reflection in the three stages, although profitable on certain points, construes the whole problem of reason and faith in a manner which, in as much as it is Collin's own innovation, is literally un- Kierkegaardian. He talks about "aesthetic reflection and aesthetic faith", "ethical reflection and ethical faith", "religious

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[186] *Dread*, p. 83.

[187] For Kierkegaard, the human self is a union of the temporal and the eternal; being aware of both is a deepened self knowledge. Cf., *Ibid*., p. 76 and pp. 81-83. Cf. also *Fear and Trembling*, p. 162. "The self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude..."

[188] James Collins "Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard", in *Kierkegaard Critique*, New York, pp. 141-154.

reflection and religious faith".[189] This manner of construing the problem of faith and reason is mistaken and definitely does not belong to the inner compass of Kierkegaard's thought on the subject. True, there are instances where Kierkegaard talks about aesthetic, ethical, and religious reflections,[190] but he never mentions or wanted to mention what Collins calls aesthetic faith or ethical faith.

Kierkegaard uses "faith" to mean only religious faith; this means that Collins, in his writing on the subject, is not fully aware of the shifts of meaning of "faith" in each case. Collins sometimes talks about belief and reflections[191] without making clear to us whether he means by "belief" exactly what he means by "faith", and whether "belief" in the different spheres has different connotations. Therefore he misinterprets Kierkegaard on this issue and is caught by terminological confusion. Let us listen to Kierkegaard:

> For faith is not the first immediacy but a subsequent immediacy. The first immediacy is the aesthetical... But faith is not the aesthetical - or else faith has never existed because it has always existed."[192]

It is amply clear from this passage that Kierkegaard does not speak of "aesthetic faith" in the manner which Collins claims him to do. For as Kierkegaard writes in the passage above faith is not the aesthetical; and most definitely he does not categorize faith as the ethical, for as Kierkegaard indubitably asserts in *Fear and Trembling*, the ethical is teleologically suspended in the dialectical and passionate act of faith.

(d) *The Aesthete and the Moment*:

Based on most of the foregoing interpretations of Kierkegaard, one can comfortably and unreservedly state that the primary principle or proposition for the aesthete, is that the *moment is everything*. But this tantamounts to saying that the moment is nothing; or just as Kierkegaard puts it in the Postscript,

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[189] *Ibid.* pp. 143-145.

[190] *Either/Or*, Vol. II, p. 188. Also *Postscript*, pp. 105-106.

[191] Collins, *op. cit.*, p.143.

[192] *Fear and Trembling*, p. 92.

similar to the sophistic proposition that *everything is true means that nothing is true*.[193] For instance, Don Juan, who belongs everywhere and desires in every woman the whole of womanhood, belongs to no woman, and, consequently belongs nowhere. This means that in the moment, for the aesthete, there is only the moment. However, the moment being transient and continuously disappearing, then the aesthete, in a special sense, lives in nothing. If we look at his actual life, we find it anarchical, disorderly, and resulting in failure. Here the aesthetic self is psychologically impoverished almost beyond repair and is caught by the stormy emptiness of its conscious life. The aesthete "... gasps after pleasure... for only in the instant of pleasure does he find repose, and when that is passed, he gasps with faintness... The spirit is constantly disappointed and... his soul becomes an anguishing dread".[194] The aesthete is told that he is like a dying man and that his life has lost its ontological support and his essence as a human self is dissolving in the restless giddiness of his inner turmoil.

One the other hand, Kierkegaard says that the moment is "a glance touched by eternity", or it is the present that has no past or future.[195] Here it is this eternity in the moment that gives the aesthete stability and self-possession. But this is exactly what the aesthete recklessly neglects and thus, he becomes a vain cry, a speck of dust in the winds of enjoyment. But enjoyment or immediacy is an intoxication that has the taste of death. Consequently, the aesthete is somebody who dies, or who longs for dying by neglecting the eternal and concentrating on the transitory which becomes despair.[196] He then becomes the "epitome of every possibility",[197] and is forced to choose either the temporal, which necessitates nihilism and perdition, or the ethico-religious ensuing in self integration, self perpetuation and general well being. For according to Kierkegaard, the authentic man is

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[193] *Postscript*, p. 265.

[194] *Either/Or*, Vol. II, p. 190.

[195] *Dread*, p. 78.

[196] *Either/Or*, Vol. II, p. 199. Also Ibid., p. 220, where Judge Williams declares to the aesthete "You are like a dying man, you die daily... life has lost its reality..." See also *Ibid.*, p. 198, "... the aesthetic view of life has proved itself to be despair.

[197] *Ibid.*, p. 17, where the aesthete is told that "you are an epitome of every possibility, and so at one time I can see in you the possibility of perdition, and another of salvation".

one who lives in the hope for the eternal via the moment, yet retaining touch with the temporal.

(e) *The Aesthetic Self and Despair*.[198]

In the preceding sections the factors that precipitate despair have been mentioned. It has been noted that the aesthetic stage is a stage in the existential development of the self, in which man does not yet realize his dual nature of the infinite and the finite, the eternal in time. The aesthetic stage precedes despair and nourishes the seeds of despair in it.[199]

But what is despair? Despair is a form of loss of one's self due to the inability on the part of the aesthete to effect balance and stability between the two components of his being. It is a form of bewilderment, confusion, and even estrangement from one of the elements of his composite being. It is the failure to hold fast both elements in a form of homogeneity before Pure Being[200] or God. Considered this way, despair becomes *a double-edged weapon which slays and saves at the same time.* For the self that remains in despair becomes mortally sick, and the self that suffers it is necessarily driven to choose itself in its eternal validity. The aesthete gets to know that his destruction is the temporal: "Then it appears to him that time, that the temporal, is his ruin; he demands a more perfect form of existence, and at this point there comes to evidence a fatigue, an apathy... This apathy may rest so broodingly upon a man that suicide appears to him the only way of escape... He has not chosen himself. Such a situation has certainly ended not infrequently in suicide".[201]

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[198] This section and the subsequent sections can hardly be written without the repetition of certain concepts and themes. For when discussing despair one is led to dwell on choice. And when discussing choice one has to dwell again, to a limited degree, on despair.

[199] An elaborate analysis of Despair and Choice is to be found in *Sickness Unto Death*, pp. 146-200, and *Either/Or,* Vol. II, pp. 198-236. "Choice" is stressed on pages 219-229 of *Either/Or*, Vol. II.

[200] Cf., *Sickness Unto Death*. p. 162. "The self is the conscious synthesis of infinitude and finitude .. whose task is to become itself, a task which can be performed only by means of a relationship to God."

[201] *Either/Or,* Vol. II, p. 236.

Thus far, it is obvious that in his descriptive analysis of the varied emotional and subjective underpinning of the aesthetic self (which is essentially a humanistic self) Kierkegaard does not argue for his position. He simply presents it. This is done with exceeding attentiveness and intuitive empathy for the dimensions of the self under diagnosis. He appears to be like a person who is reading, with effort and penetrating insight from the pages of an open book placed in his consciousness. This brings forth the principle of *identification* which was alluded to earlier. Kierkegaard seems to project himself into the consciousness of the self he is describing by objectifying that self and then appropriating the results within the vitality of his inwardness. This is what he intends when he states that occasionally he feels that he had becomes double-minded, namely his mind and the mind of the person whose consciousness is under scrutiny. In his description of despair and what such description *reveals* or *announces*, he appears to be a first rate psychologist and an outstanding pioneer in the employment of phenomenological description. This phenomenological analysis of despair is found in his *Sickness Unto Death* and in *Either/Or*, vol. II. In both books, he displays a remarkable insight into the interworkings of the psychic life of the human self. The psychoanalytic strain in his phenomenological description is indubitably apparent. He does anticipate a substantial amount of the principles of depth-psychology, or insight-psychology which, as mentioned earlier make him one of the dynamic impulses behind the rise of humanistic psychology. In his analysis of despair, Kierkegaard seems to be advancing a doctrine of human nature which is as profound as it is psychological. However, such a doctrine is woven with a dominant religious intentionality. The troubles and crises in man do not converge on him basically from the outside in as much as from within the immanence of his conscious or subconscious life.

The problem of despair seems to focus primarily upon the self's own relationship with itself, namely the reflexiveness of consciousness upon its dual nature and the disruption or dislocation of this relationship. In order to vanquish despair the aesthetic self has to form an authentic or meaningful relationship with itself whereby the finite element in man is enriched with abundance of meaning by the eternal. A humanistic life for the self where the eternal does not at all exist is not susceptible to despair. "To have a self, to be a self, is the greatest concession made to man, but at the same time, it is

eternity's demand upon him".[202] Therefore, to be in despair, according to Kierkegaard is to having the self being constituted in such a vein that it prefers not to fulfill this demand.

Kierkegaard initiates his phenomenological analysis of despair in the following manner: a) despair viewed under the aspects of finitude or infinitude; the despair of infinitude is due to the lack of finitude and the despair of finitude is due to the lack of infinitude. b) despair which is unconscious that it is despair, and the despair which is conscious of being despair.[203] This is how Kierkegaard schematizes his analysis of despair. Again, despair seems to obtain when the two components of the personality are thrown out of equilibrium, the structure of the self gets warped as it were. On the other hand, unconscious despair takes place because the self does not come into grips with the truth; here the self builds resistance against acknowledging that it is in despair, and hence individuals execute their lives in *self deception and illusions*. Of course, this is reminiscent of Nietzsche's dictum "man is a great self deceiver"; without deception man cannot bear living in the world. We create art, we create what we think is best for us lest we perish in truth, Nietzsche says. However, Kierkegaard urges that when the self that is in unconscious despair is awakened to its pitiful state of affairs the self retaliates at the source with vehement hostility. This is the case of the aesthete who judges his well-being by the amount of pleasurable or agreeable experiences he can achieve. Eliminating such a deception is done by becoming conscious of one's own despair and by facing the reality that without the eternal man cannot afford living in the present. The resulting consciousness must be one which indwells the world concretely, becoming the concrete individual in concrete relationship to God.

Again, despair with its two movements towards the temporal or towards the eternal, is the result of the ontological structure of man. Man has to effect a communion with Pure Being without being himself Pure Being. Both of the foregoing movements lead to despair because they are attempts to escape from the genuine self which is neither the one nor the other but a composite of both. Although man knows that either one, is the cause of

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[202] *Sickness Unto Death*, p. 154.

[203] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-180.

despair, yet he cannot escape from either one especially the eternal; it is hard, it generates despair and nothing can destroy it. Consequently, it drives man to continual self-consumption without dying. "But dying the death means to live to experience death... If one might die of despair as one dies of sickness, then the eternal in him, the self, must be capable of dying in the same sense that the body dies of sickness. But this is an impossibility... The despairing man cannot die; no more than the dagger can slay thoughts can despair consume the eternal thing, the self,... whose worm dieth not, and whose fire is not quenched".[204] The despair that Kierkegaard is delineating in this passage is not like the rational doubt which can be removed easily by rational demonstration.

(f) *Reason, Doubt and Despair*:

But what is the difference between doubt[205] and despair? The difference between reason and *faith*. If the realm of reason is the realm of *ideality*, and the realm of faith is the realm of real existence, then on parallel grounds doubt belongs to the realm of abstractions and despair belongs to the realm of the inward life of the individual.

Doubt belongs to the realm of reason, but the realm of reason is the realm of necessity. Consequently, doubt cannot move, and if it cannot move it cannot embrace the existing ego.[206]

Therefore, only despair can seep into the very depth of the personality. Doubt, on the other hand, can only be predicated of intellectual activity, whereas despair grips the individual in his very core. This despair incites the aesthete to leap toward the eternal and relate himself to Pure Being. As a result, rational attempts to reach objective certainty do not preclude despair. On the contrary, the philosopher might rest in his intellectual certainty and still be captured by despair. This point Kierkegaard launches "against certain philosophers of Germany,[207] who having conquered their doubt and tranquilized their thought, are still in despair and are distracted from it by

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[204] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[205] For the difference between doubt and despair, see *Either/Or*, Vol. II, pp. 215-217.

[206] *Ibid.*, p. 216.

[207] Ibid., p. 216. Here Kierkegaard seems to mean Hegel.

objective thinking. the aesthete hardly needs reason in order to despair. *For one can despair without reason, and can reason and remain in despair*. This means that, for Kierkegaard, the extravagant intellectual does not will despair but thinks it out, and therefore, remains existentially in it.

This last point is not simply significant from a theoretical stance, but is also of exceeding and volatile interest to clinical psychologists and psychoanalysts in the clinical compass of the *concrete* psychotherapeutic situation. Both Freud and Perls, among others, emphatically believe that the client must and should learn to be "in touch" with his/her feelings and with the very intimate plethora of the "deep" subjective amalgam of human emotions. A client is not and cannot be helped by simply getting to *know* his/her problems. Whether in clinical psychoanalytic theory or in the Gestalt theory of Mr. Perls *Knowing* or conceiving of very detail that precipitated the client's symptoms is no guarantee for the elimination of such symptoms. In fact many clients enter therapy with a massive amount of knowledge about their symptoms and their causes. The more they conceptualize or logically analyze these symptoms the more difficult it is to help them out. They, as Kierkegaard "beautifully" puts it, *think out* their symptoms and therefore remain endlessly stuck to them. Witness the following: "Despair is precisely an expression for the whole personality, doubt only an expression of thought".[208]

However, in order to go beyond despair, one must have the will to will despair, And when one wills despair, he simply goes beyond it.[209] But by going beyond it, his personality is tranquilized, not by logical necessity but rather by an insertion of the will. This will is an essential constituent of the personality, and the more will a person has the more self he possesses. This is why, when talking about the importance of choice, Kierkegaard says that" "A man who has no will at all is no self; for the more will he has, the more consciousness of self he has also".[210] Consequently, for Kierkegaard, a richness of personality and its spiritual contents can be achieved by a decisive will which effects choice and vanquishes despair by reaching the Divine.

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[208] Idem.

[209] *Ibid.*, p. 217.

[210] *Sickness Unto Death*, p. 162.

Furthermore, Kierkegaard seems to be leery of academics or professors talking for instance about constructing material objects from sense data, and exalting the systematic doubt of Descartes. The doubt which his phenomenological study reveals is the doubt of Socrates, Pascal, Ghazzali and the searing doubt of adventuring Faust.[211]

The professor carries to class a sorry figure who spouts off theoretical expressions and a bunch of systematic facts which only glide over his concrete ego and never penetrate the intimate structure of this ego, a structure by virtue of which he is human. the Cartesian form of doubt is an ingenious theoretical or rational exercise which maintains the state of affairs of the personality and keeps the inward geography of the self untouched. A Faust, a Ghazzali knows that academic doubt is a ritual, and in sharp contrast experiences despair as a harrowing experience which penetrates the very substratum of the human self.

Another manner of interpreting the relationship between doubt and despair is explained by Kierkegaard's phenomenological analysis of consciousness. Briefly stated the phenomenological structure of consciousness is a *duality*, that is, an opposition of *immediacy and mediacy* or ideality.[212] The very essence of consciousness is a dichotomy of two elements, that of existence (actuality) and *thought*. But consciousness is neither the one or the other, it is a relationship of both. Kierkegaard here seems to anticipate Husserl's and Brentano's concept of intentionality of consciousness, namely consciousness is always a "consciousness of something", that is there is the *noetic* process of experiencing and the appearance of or the *noematic* or the experienced object. However, Kierkegaard maintains that consciousness is neither the noetic nor the noematic but a combination of the two. Now, rational doubt *cannot really arise in either of the two components of consciousness*. For, on the one hand, ideality or conceptional thinking cannot be true or false except when it tries to account for reality (actuality) or existent things. While on the other hand, reality is "present" and it makes no sense to predicate truth or falsity of it. Doubt arises only when there is a relationship between two things, Kierkegaard says. Therefore, when ideality tries to account for

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[211] *Journals*, section 88, p. 33, and *Either/Or*, Vol. II, pp. 178-188.

[212] Soren Kierkegaard, *De Omnibus Dubitantum Est*, London, 1958, pp. 146-149.

reality and is bent on existence, then truth or falsity can be predicated of this relationship and consequently doubt becomes possible. Hence, doubt presupposes both reality and ideality and it cannot be a quality of either one independent of the other. But what determines the possibility of doubt is something dynamic in consciousness, something which involves our interests, *desires* and *passions* (immediacy). But this form of doubt is not really the Cartesian, it is *existential doubt* which the Greek Skeptics were aware of, and Kierkegaard categorizes it genuinely as *despair*. This despair which involves the whole personality can be conquered by a determination of the will. Therefore, the aesthetic self, when it experiences despair will remain in this condition until it mobilizes its motive energies and acts to be transformed into another mode of existence.

One should emphasize at this point that in the distinction which Kierkegaard makes between rational doubt and despair he does not deny the merits of reason when it functions in its own domain. He is simply drawing the limits of reason when it reflects on existential matters. like despair and choice.

(g) *Choice and the Aesthete*:

The discussion of despair and doubt leads us to discuss Kierkegaard's concept of choice. Such a concept impells us to dwell again on the duality of the self. According to Kierkegaard, the consciousness of the self, as a duality of eternity and time, is a form of *deepened self-knowledge* that introduces to the individual the category of choice. In the aesthetic stage, when the aesthete is not yet in despair, he is not yet himself fully. When he suffers despair, only then does he become aware of his real self as it is. The aesthete, as it were, before despair, was incapable of real choice because he was not aware of he alternatives that constitute his nature. Therefore, this self is what it is, and it does not become. But when the self is realized for what it is, then there is open to it the true possibility of choice. This is what Kierkegaard means by saying that one chooses "one's self". The self which is chosen is the dual self, and this new self gives new possibility of choice. The former self, namely, the aesthetic, is necessarily, i.e., the absence of alternatives. Whereas the new self is contingent and hence can exercise freedom.

Apparently, choice seems to be rooted in the structure of the self that is in situation. However, when the category of choice is introduced the self is

alteady in the ethical stage. Consequently, it is the presence of the eternal in the self that brings forth the ethical stage. From this, it follows that what constitutes freedom and makes choice possible is something highly abstract - the eternal - and something highly concrete, namely the temporal. The self is "the most abstract of all things, and yet at the same time it is the most concrete - it is freedom".[213] This is freedom *par excellence* for Kierkegaard. Accordingly, choice is nourished and reaches maturity in a self that is in despair. Here there is cognizance of the unbalanced conflict between eternity and time.[214]

But this conflict, we said, is the means of liberation from the aesthetic life to reach the ethical life by a choice. However, Kierkegaard maintains that there is one form of choice where the individual chooses himself absolutely. This category of absolute choice requires brief attention: "I return to the importance of choosing. So, then in choosing absolutely I choose despair, and in despair I choose the absolute, for I myself, I am the absolute..." [215] What Kierkegaard means by the self as the absolute is obscure. Knowing that he wrote an a age where absolutism was very influential, especially Hegel's, would help us to clarify what he meant by the self as the absolute.[216] One might say that choices have an absolute character in the sense that, having been made, they cannot be retracted; the self becomes the absolute in either bringing together, or, in dissociating the multiplicity of the attachments between itself and the universe.

Furthermore, absolute choices have two dialectical movements or aspects, necessity and freedom. Choices are necessary in the sense that the self or inward history which is chosen, was already available qua the individual; and choices are free in the sense that the newly acquired self was precipitated by

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213 *Either/Or*, Vol. II, p. 218.

214 Freedom could also be related to *Dread* in a similar fashion. The seat of Dread is found in the tension between two open possibilities for the individual: The possibility of drawing nearer to God, or the possibility of self annihilation.

215 *Either/Or*, Vol. II, p. 217.

216 One cannot but agree here with what Lowrie says about his painful difficulty to understand Kierkegaard on certain points: "Much as I love Kierkegaard, I sometimes hate him for keeping me awake at night. Only between sleeping and waking am I able to unravel some of his most complicated sentences." *Fear and Trembling*, p. 81 "n".

the choice.[217] This sounds paradoxical, yet one can find it meaningful. For, if what one chooses did not exist, but completely came into existence with the choice, one would not be choosing, but would be *creating*. But one does not create himself, he chooses himself. Furthermore, if the original self is regarded as the new self, then this new self is not a self of free spirit, because it actually was not chosen but was there form the beginning. The new self is born out of a choice that transforms the original self to a new one.

However, when choice is performed, the self is transformed to a higher sphere than the aesthetic. The self reaches the ethical and religious spheres of consciousness. But when the self reaches these spheres, the aesthetic stage, Kierkegaard observes, is not completely eliminated. The self lives in the happy synthesis of the three modes of existence. The three become united in an alliance, and become mutually interdependent, with the religious sphere as the dominating factor.

Such were the views of Kierkegaard concerning the ontological structure of the aesthetic self. In the vein of a rigorous descriptive phenomenologist, he "allowed" this self to *announce* its field of subjective modifications and reveal the essential dynamics of its psychological life. Furthermore, the value of his multi-varied description lies in the richness and penetrating illuminations of the human experience which is not completely accessible to the procedures of natural science. A substantial amount of the determinations of humanistic psychology nowadays must look back with debt to Kierkegaard.

One cannot read Kierkegaard and understand him relatively well without being impacted or seriously influenced by his diagnosis. Is he a psychologist, a poet, a philosopher or a religious thinker? He is all this. He is Kierkegaard.

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[217] Cf., *Either/Or*, Vol. II, p. 219. Choices perform "... two dialectical movements: that which is chosen does not exist and comes into existence with the choice; that which is chosen exists, otherwise there would not be a choice".

2. ABU NASR FARABI AND MUHAMMAD IQBAL ON IDEAL SOCIETY

S. A. YULDOSHEV (UZBEKISTAN)

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3. MAKHTUMKULI AND IQBAL: TWO POETS AND TWO DREAMS

TARIQ SAEEDI (TURKMENISTAN)

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ABU NAÄR FĀRĀBÂ AND MUHAMMAD IQBAL ON IDEAL SOCIETY

S. A. YULDOSHEV

Utopic ideas were inherent to humanity during the whole history of its social, cultural and scientific development; they expressed the sense of unsatisfaction of the majority with the existing order, social and political ideal of progressive thinkers, dreams and ideas of progressive people on equality and justice, happy life, free labor, intellectual and virtual perfectness, developed personality, ways and tools of achieving of an ideal social order, embodied the highest results of social progress. Even in ancient times Plato dreamt on building of ideal society. This ideal society should be ruled by selected people, as it is done in oligarchy. But, dislike to oligarchy, these selected persons should be those really able to govern well. First, on the ground of their *natural* talents and abilities; secondly, thanks to their beforehand and long-term training. The main principle of this ideal odes was considered justice. Each member of such society is given with special place and special job due to social justice. The supremacy of justice unite different and even heterogenous parts of the state into one body characterized by unity and harmony. This best social system must, according to Plato, be moral one; this morality will enable the state to settle the most important social issues. Such a state must, first of all, provide its own security and defense for protection against its enormous evvironment, secondly, it must provide systematic supply all its members with material goods, then it must promote and protect the spiritual creativity of its members. All it will mean the implementation the idea of the Good, as that governing the world. The source of such ideas was Plato's reflections on social order of Egypt of that time. Plato's ideal society is Athenic idealization of Egyptian social organization. Plato's ideas on perfect society were continued and developed in medieval Orient. The prominent place is occupied among the thinkers developing Plato's heritage, NaÄr Fārābâ, who, in his turn gave impetus for reflections to the thinkers of modern world, and modern East, particularly.

Social Utopic ideas of medeival Middle East and Asia Minor and, of course, Central Asia influenced the dissemination of utopic ideas all over the world. The great thinker of medieval Orient. Abu NaÄr Fārābâ was the first

to establish the science on ideal society as foundation for his social and political ideas.

Fārābâ gave comprehensive theoretic research on the state based on reason. The main idea of such a state was the idea of happiness of all its members.

The ideas on ideal society was, surely, the logical conclusions of Muhammad Iqbal's progressive thoughts on settling the problem of "a human being – a society;" he believed in the creative power of a man, recognised the necessity of prevailing of community interests over individual ones, protest against social inequality and suppression. Iqbal gave his own interpretation of main moral principles of ideal society. Though Iqbal's conception of ideal society was religious, it also had brightly – expressed social and political character, being, as well as his conceptionof Khudi, the synthesis of utopic ideas of common Muslims on social justice, in appeals to revive early Islamic traditions with ideas of Western democracy.

As N. Prigarine truly noted in her work, "it was his philosophic poem "Ramuz e bekhudi", where the main principles of Iqbal's ideal society were explicated. The main obstacles in the way of human liberation, according to Iqbal, was social inequality, religious and social prejudices, conservative traditions, separating people, seeding entrust and enmity among them. In this connection Iqbal criticized social injustice not only his contemporary society, but inhuman, exploitative civilisation of the West. His criticism on social shortcomings of existing reality is undevidingly connected with his ideas on ideal social order, promoting all gently creative abilities of a person. The brightest expression of Iqbal's ideas on ideal society are contained in his wonderful poem "Javid-Nama", called by himself his seven song.

M. Iqbal suggested that for the purpose of building the perfect society, a man should attempt to dominate over nature. He considered it a stimula for development of science, contributing the overcoming of Orient's being behind the West. In his "Javid Nama" the poet- philosopher emphasized that the power of the West is in nothing but development of science, that enabled it to dominate the East.

The West is obliged for his power to knowledge and science.
His lamp was lit by the fire of knowledge only.
Knowledge is not dependent on the form of governance.

Turban on a head is not an obstacle for getting knowledge.[218]

The important place in Iqbal's heritage is occupied by the idea on necessity of experience and knowledge for establishing man's superiority on nature and deliberation of his abilities for reconstruction of the world for social benefit. In his "Javid Nama" M. Iqbal described his journey around celestial planets; the Moon (Falak e Kamar). Mars (Falak e Mirrikh), Venus (Falak e Zuhra), etc.

Iqbal compared his ideal society with a human body ; as human's organs are cennected with each other, fulfilling their vital function, helping and assisting each other, so members of the ideal society must live in close cooperation because, otherwise, it will perish.

Flowrishing and progress of ideal society was considered by Iqbal in spiritual perfecting of people. Justice is established by moral and intellectual education of people by reconstructed and renewed Islam.

Human being was the main engine of social progress in Iqbal's ideas. Iqbal believed, that a man can win the society of endless competition, civilisation lacking its inherent unity because of the conflict of religious and political values.[219] Thus, social development was defined by the character of human activity, as a man can (according to Iqbal) change his living conditions.

In one of his letters Iqbal wrote: "The aim of my Persian poems is not the advocating of Islam. In reality, I am eager to find the best social order and in this search one cannot ignore the existing social system aiming the overcoming of all differences based on race, caste and colour of skin".[220]

In his ryhm "Ahl e Mirrikh" (Inhabitants of Mars), he criticized the bourgeois order on the Earth confronting to it the imaginatony Society of Mars.

Our soul is termanted by bitterness of life,
But they (Marsians – S. A.) spend time happily.

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[218] Iqbal in. *Javid Nama*.

[219] M. Iqbal: *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 85.

[220] M. I. Prigarina.

M. Iqbal called his nation for establishing of such a society, where all people will be equal, will love and pay respect to each other. Only having in mind this real equality, not depending on their religious and race status, one can establish ideal society.

Iqbal's views on social life were two-fold. On one hand, he approved socialistic ideas, but at the same time he criticized socialism for its atheistic ideology. Such his ideas were expressed in his "Javid Nama" (Book of Eternity) describing, as well, his meeting with Jamaluddin Afghani, their conversation on different social and political problems. Iqbal asked Afghani to remember him to Russian peoples, which, to some extent, was realising in practical life the ideals of Islam, for example, liberation of man, neglecting necessity of church:

There are large and high buildings in Margdin.
The life there is like honey
He broke the magic of Czar and Palace
He refused from private property
He turned over reason, feelings and customs

Peoples of the former USSR really believed that they made a miracle that they gained freedom, equality, justice, democracy and national self – determination. Therefore, many progressive thinking people approved the revolution. One of those was Muhammad Iqbal. He appreciated the establishing of equality, democracy and freedom in Russia.

But these ideas were only declared, and could not be put into reality.

Totalitarian political system expressed enmity against any struggle for independence. Turkestan was divided into parts, in this way, new national republics were established.

Isolated from each other brotherly peoples (Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Turkmens) found themselves even more dependent than they were before. Turkestan continued playing role of raw material base of the USSR.

During more than seventy years, the Centre proclaiming independence of Uzbekistan, in reality, governed all spheres of social and economic life of the Republic. But this proclamation illusioned the world community.

Totalitarian system deprived our history from its historical roots. But now we are doing our best to gain them, standing of real way of independence. Every member of a society must do work hard for strengthening the independence of his society.

For example, Fārābâ could not imagine his ideal society without useful labour. Therefore he appealed all strata of a society to work hard to master any socially useful craft. Such views of the thinker was of a high importance for his epoch, when ruling class demonstrated contemptuous attitude toward labor.

Fārābâ's dreams on social reconstruction are connected with his ideal of peaceful coexistence among nations. To his opinion the whole world will become virtuous, if peoples will help each other in achieving of happiness".[221]

"Ideal state, by Fārābâ, is the guarantee for peace and war is considered by it as a crime. Ideal state fights only for the sake of defence and also for the prevention of other states violations".[222]

The most important task of Fārābâ's ideal state is fulfilment of measures aimed for achieving real happiness of all its citizens such as establishing of justice, enlightenment of people, their moral education, etc. Muhammad Iqbal, as Abë NaÄr Fārābâ, considered a man able to build his own happiness by his own power. Iqbal imagined the future society without capitalists and exploitation, without rulers, without clerics. It is governed by justice, equality, friendship, love to each other. Iqbal described the city of Margdin where he found himself during his imaginatory celestial travellings.

Inhabitants of Margdin don't
live in luxury and debauch
at the expense of other people's labor

Inhabitants of Margdin have neither gold, nor silver, they live honestly. They don't know what is religions, races and castes.

People are well-shaped, dressed very simply.

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[221] Al- F«r«bâ

[222] Al- F«r«bâ

The climate there is mild and pleasant.
Nobody suffers from misfortune and evil.
Everbody enjoys all benefits of the world.
They get salt from salty water
Science and technology serve for beneficial purposes.
And they are not exchanged for gold
They know neither dirhem, nor dollar
Working people have light buildings
A machine does not govern nature,
They do not have masters to be afraid of
Without enmity a peasant waters his fields
Nobody deprives his yield
There are neither soldiers, nor wars
Nobody drinks people's blood.

It is remarkable, that it is Mars, embodying active, willing and military nature, was chosen by the poet as a possible place for realisation of his ideal of a harmonious person in a harmonious society, stressing thereby that its achievement is possible only through struggle.

Thus, on one hand, the thinker, defending interests of suppressed people, criticized rich people, hated their luxury, richness, and on other hand, he approved role and importance of labor in development of a human community, its social nature.

But, although the thinker raised this problem in ethic aspect mainly, his ideas on ideal society free from landlords, exploitators and slaves were of progressive character in colonial conditions of peoples of Indian subcontinent of that time.

MAKHTUMKULI AND IQBAL: TWO POETS AND TWO DREAMS

TARIQ SAEEDI

Makhtumkuli is the national poet of Turkmenistan and Iqbal is the national poet of Pakistan.

Astonishing similarity is found between the ideas and concepts of these two poets who lived in different times and at different places, at least 3000 kilometres away from each other.

Great poets like Iqal and Makhtumkuli don't belong to any one nation or any one country. Like sunshine, they belong to all mankind. That, I suppose, is one of the fundumental differences between a great man and a not-so-great man. A great man rises above the geographical boundaries and breaks the barriers of cast and creed. Great men, especially great poets and visionaries, soar above the mundane and manage to get in touch with the eternal truth. Here I remember two couplets; one by Iqbal and one by Makhtumkuli, which say virtually the same thing, although style of expression is different:

Iqbal says:

"Be it Attar, or Rumi or Razi or Ghazali Nothing
is attainable without tears in the twilight of dawn"

He refers to great thinkers, Sufis and philosophers like Fariduddin Attar, Jalaluddin Rumi, Fakhruddin Razi and Imam Ghazali. He says that you cannot attain anything unless you make a habit of rising in the hours of dawn when creative twilight is enveloping the earth. You have cultivate solitude in such hours and only then can you be granted a part of the eternal truth.

Makhtumkuly, in his poem, "This is the Time", says:

"Friends, don't remain asleep at the time of dawn.
This is the time of opening the doors, the time of nearness.
Those who are awake at dawn, find the Benevolence of God.
This is the time when soothing light of Truth pours forth"

He also stresses the importance of this powerful parcel of time, the Dawn. He has found the great truth and wants his followers to benefit from his knowledge. He stresses the very same thing that you have to get up in the early hours if you want to reach the truth sublime.

Similarities of these two great poets don't end with these two couplets; they just begin there.

Iqbal was writing with pain when he looked at the plight of Muslims in India under the colonial rule of the British. His pain was made all the more acute by the fact that the Muslims of Indian subcontinent were slumbering in indifference, unaware of their humiliation and subjugation. Having done his doctorate from Germany, he would have spent his life in ease and comfort in any European country. But he elected to return to his homeland to devote his life to awakening the Muslims of Indian subcontinent. He gave them thundering jolts through his powerful poetry and managed to awaken more than ten million people. Not only did he manage to awaken them, he also bestowed on them his dream. The dream of an independent country, a country where they will be free to pray according to their wishes, a country where all persons will have equal opportunity; above all, a country where yokes of slavery will not be awaiting the generations yet unborn.

It was on 23 March 1940, that representatives of Muslims all over India gathered in Lahore and passed a resolution, demanding an independent country for Muslims. Also Iqbal had died two years before this historical event, his spirit was guiding the people and kept them until Pakistan gained independence on 14 August 1947. Pakistan, in true sense, is legacy of Iqbal.

Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah who put concerted efforts to translate the dream of Iqbal into reality was his contemporary but in historical sense he could be called spiritual son of Iqbal because at spiritual plane, son is the rightful heir of father.

Makhtumkuli was always restless over the plight of Turkmen people who were splintered into tribes and did not have a united homeland of their own. In his poem "About Turkmen", he says:

"Tribes are like brothers, like family, like true friends.
Even destiny doesn't dare antagonize them,
when they are united.

Their unity is the light of God"

Makhtumkuli also said that:

"My best words are dedicated to my people"

He said very clearly:

"Oh, Turkmen, Be one. Teke, Yemut, Sarek, Alili, Arseri, all the tribes who are woven as one into blood relations, unite and create a country for yourself. Lay the foundations of a strong country. You can break the chains of your heart and gain freedom if you are united as one entity."

It took more than two hundred years to become the dream of Makhtumkuli a reality. Turkmenistan, therefore, is the legacy of Makhtumkuli. President Saparmurat Niyazov, rightly titled Turkmen-bashy, can be called spiritual son of Makhtumkuli- although they are separated by more than two hundred years-because he managed to translate the dream of Makhtumkuli into reality.

The similarity does not end there either. It goes on. Both the poets not only dreamed of independent countries for Muslims of their areas, they also gave code of conduct, the way how life should be regulated in the countries of their dreams.

BOOK REVIEWS

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1. *IQBAL'S RECONSTRUCTION OF IJTIHAD*

BY: MUHAMMAD KHALID MASUD
REVIEWED BY: DR. MOHD. ALTAF HUSSAIN AHANGAR

φ φ φ

2. *CALL OF THE MARCHING BELL*

(Bāng-i-Darā)

By: M. A. K. Khalil

Reviewed by: Muhammad Sarwar Rija

φ φ φ

Iqbal's Reconstruction of Ijtihad, Muhammad Kahlid Masud, Iqbal Academy Pakistan and Islamic Research Institute, Islamabad Pakistan, 1995, PP.236.

Growing out of a research project approved by Islamic Research Institute, Pakistan with consequential publication by Iqbal Academy Pakistan, this book by Muhammad Khalid Masud has tried to highlight the vision and mission of Dr. Iqbal with regard to the *Reconstruction of Ijtihad*. Its text contains eight chapters of uneven length spread over 197 pages. An introduction, a conclusion, bibliography and index constitute the remaining portion of the book.

Masud's claim that this book is the product of extensive study and research on Iqbal's approach to *Ijtihad* has prompted us to assess and analyse the contribution of the learned author chapter-wise.

Chapter one is an attempt to inform the readers about the definition of *Ijtihad* and *Mujtahid* and its classification. Focus has been upon the complexity through which *Ijtihad* doctrine had to pass in the Indian sub-continent, i.e. how this term got linked with *Qiyas*, rationalism, *Taqlid* and so on. Apprising us with the fact that modern *Mujtahid* cannot funnction on Fiqh knowledge alone, we are rightly told that presently power of law-making and law-enforcing vests in a modern state and codification is the only recognisable instrument through which we can remove lacuna in Islamic law. According

to Masud, "*Ijtihad"* constitutes and effort to opt for one of two or more possible solutions in a given situation and to provide legal justification for that solution". But the learned author fails to inform us about the material from which legal justification is to be sought. In other words, is it the justification from contemporary legal knowledge or from Quran and *Hadith* alone? Throughout the whole book, Masud has avoided answer to this query. How can one reconstruct Iqbal's doctrine of *Ijtihad* unless this basic question is addressed? Iqbal has stressed upon the *reinterpretation of foundational legal principles deduced from Quran* and deferment of implementation of Quranic laws under certain specified circumstances. *Tauhid*, i.e., equality, solidarity and freedom, constitutes for Iqbal one of the fundamental legal principle. Likewise Iqbal considers undiscoverable the application universality of traditions of legal character and insists against indiscoverable the application universality of tradition of legal character and insists against indiscriminate use of *Hadith* as a source of law. Rather he favours non-consideration of *Hadith* for legislation purpose. In such a situation if Masud is advocating for providence of legal justification for an approved solution, then in view of Iqbal's thinking what are the parameters within which the justification is to be sought? Masud has surely failed to address this problem.

Chapter 2 factually professes to deal with the development of *Ijtihad* in subcontinent but practically it highlights the legal philosophy of Shah Wali-ullah. Perhaps the object is to lend credibility to Iqbal's view on *Hadith* with which Masud has scarcely dealt with in this book. The learned author is absolutely right in contending that "Shah Wali-ullah's views on *Ijtihad*, *Taqlid* and development of Islamic law contributed a great deal to the formation f Iqbal's views on *Ijtihad"*. In this chapter, the critical analysis of views of Shah and Iqbal would have been within the scope of the book, but for some inexplicable reasons it has not been done. Under the title "Semantic Development of the Concpet of *Ijtihad"*, chapter 3 is an attempt to familiarize the readers with views of personalities like Shah Ismail Shahid, Nadhir Hussain Dahlawi, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Jamal al-din Afghani, Renan, Halim Pasha, Abul Kalam Azad, Zia Gokalp and Aghnides relating to *Ijtihad*, *Taqlid, Islam* etc. Convincingly one is acquainted with the manner in which *Ijtihad* was employed by various movements in view of social, economic and political changes in the subcontinent. The focal point of this chapter is the observation of Aghnides that "Ijtihad was in fact a mechanical

principle that led Islamic society to fossilization and prevented it from progress". It is indeed this statement, we are rightly informed, which proved motivational force for Iqbal's writing of his lecture "The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam".

Chapter 4 under the title "Iqbal's lecture on Ijtihad" tries to solve the riddle as to whether the lecture was written in 1920 or it was still under preparation in 1925. Doubts are also cast as to whether the present article is the original article because despite all efforts original manuscript could not be found. Besides, this chapter enlists the names of jurists whose works were consulted by Iqbal during the writing of *Ijtihad* lecture. We are of the opinion that this chapter has no practical utility for a student of Islamic law or even for those from other disciplines. It may have some fanciful relevance to those who attach undue importance to secondary matters while ignoring the primary one.

Chapter 5 clarifies magnificiently the distinctive features of mechanism in relation to dynamism and highlights how Iqbal focused on dynamic character of universe, Islamic mode of prayer, self, Quran and *Ijtihad*. With regard to *Ijtihad*, we are introduced to five dynamic elements in Iqbal's thought i.e., Quran's anti-classical spirit; dynamic concept of universe, society and culture in Islam; the idea of the changeability of the life, the realism of juristic reasoning in Islam and the evolutionary and dynamic concept of intellect and thought in Islam. We are also informed about Iqbal's refutations of Aghnides' observation that "Islamic system of law does not possess evolutionary view of life and the qualifications and limitations for *Ijtihad* illustrate the mechanical nature of law". For Iqbal the conflict between the legists of Hijaz and Iraq, instead of warranting stagnation, became a source of life and movement in the law of Islam. Besides, we are also confronted in these pages with the anti-pathy of Iqbal to rationalism and his advice to leaders of the world today to understand the real meaning of what has happened in Europe and then to move forward with self-control and a clear insight into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social policy. This chapter also provides us an insight why Iqbal preferred *Reconstruction of religious thought in Islam* rather than *Reformation and modernization*. According to Iqbal, *Reconstruction* aims at restoring the original universalism and dynamism of Islam, which object cannot be achieved by adopting the terms "reformation" and "modernisation".

The meaning of *Ijtihad*, from legal viewpoint has also been introduced in this chapter. We are rightly told that Iqbal rejects both school-related and problem-related authority in law-making but stands for complete authority in law-making. As a prelude to Iqbal's thought, the learned author familiarises us with Iqbal's poetic verses some opposing and some supporting *Ijtihad*. One of the conclusions of the author about *taqlid-sanctioning* verses is that "to concluded from these verses that Iqbal supported *taqlid* against *ijtihad* would certainly constitute a grave misunderstanding of Iqbal's thought". We fail to support this argument of the author fully. There is every possibility that Iqbal stood sincerely for *taqlid* in early days of his life and later changing scenario changed his vision and mission. If time factor is ignored in assessing Iqbal's thought, then surely one can read in these verses that Iqbal had reposed his impeccable faith in *taqlid*. Our view is also shared by B.A. Dar's conclusion about Iqbal's *Taqlid* verses quoted by the author himself.

However, the magnificence and the beauty of this chapter has been eroded by Masud by juxtaposition of his views with that of Iqbal and self - contradiction in his conclusions.

Attributing the statement to Iqbal, Masud writes:

"He (Iqbal) explains that so many limitations and qualifications were added to the requirements for the exercise of *Ijtihad* and that these qualifications were made so difficult to attain, that it became well nigh impossible for any individual to exercise *Ijtihad*. This criticism of any qualifications is, however, rather exaggerated. The view that *Ijtihad* was impossible due to impossible qualifications is in fact the idea of many modern writers. The conservatives stress this point to prove the validity of *Taqlid*. The modernists cite it to prove the stubborn conservatism of the traditionalists". (pp 125-126)

The fact is that Iqbal's real statement is only from "He ... to exercise *Ijtihad*". The words this "criticism ... traditionalists" are Masud's own observations. However, the way the statement has been foot-noted, creates an impression that Iqbal suffers from inconsistency and ambiguity with regard to qualifications of *Mujtahid*.

Besides in response to Iqbal's argument that 'qualifications for exercise of *Ijtihad* were made so difficult to attain ...'. The learned author has come out with the observation that five qualifications for exercise of *Ijtihad*, viz,

Knowledge of Book, *Sunnah*, precedents of *Ijma*, *Qiyas* and Arabic are neither impossible to attain nor are they irrelevant or unnecessarily imposed in order to make *Ijtihad* impossible. He refers extensively in this regard to the views of Al-Ghazali and Abu Zahra. After so much of deliberations and justifications, Masud contends that "these qualifications are nevertheless insufficient for *Ijtihad* in modern times. The progress that human knowledge has made these days, the breadth of scope and the depth that it has gained demand revision of these qualifications".

Iqbal is in essence the product of 20th century. He realized the fact that one-man *Ijtihad* is no more possible and earlier qualifications of *Mujtahid* are impracticable in view of broadening human knowledge. If, in above lines Masud also shares the same viewpoint, then what purpose it has served him to defend classical qualifications of *Ijtihad*. Besides, if a person acquires five qualifications outlined by Masud for exercising *Ijtihad*, then how the attainment of these qualifications would help him in comprehending the intricacies of cyberspace, teleconferencing, contemporary economic propositions and other realities of this temporal world. Self-contradiction in Masud's observation is writ large.

Under the title 'Law, State and *Ulama'*, chapter 6 introduces us the definition of *Ijma* and also provides us an insight into debates relating to *khilafat*. We are told that the principle of election is the principle of Quran and the will of whole Muslim community is the further source of law. Consistent with Iqbal's views, it is said that Turkish development is a demonstrative spirit of Islam. For *Ijma*, author contends, one has to be familiar with several sciences and traditional scholars cannot alone exercise *Ijtihad*. The proposed solution lies in an institution where experts on these sciences may sit together with traditional scholars to deliberate on such matters. Masud rightly informs us that Iqbal reviewed two methods of Ulama's participation in politics namely method adopted under 1906 constitution of Iran wherein *ulama* consider themselves entitled to supervise the whole life of community and secondly the formation of assembly of *ulama*, independent of legislature. Masud has in this chapter successfully forged a link of *khilafat* with *Ijtihad* and *Ijam*. Despite the overall relevance of this chapter we find a conflicting entry in this chapter. Masud writes that "Iqbal's reconstruction of *Ijma* places emphasis on the participation of common man in the process of law-making". The fact is that Iqbal never

favoured a common man participation in legislation; he advocated the participation of those laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs. Thus every Tom and Harry cannot have a participatory role in law-making process of a Muslim nation. Later, Masud also reaches the same conclusion when he says that 'Iqbal stresses the significance of layman's contribution due to latter's keen insight in this affairs'.

In order to highlight the practical demonstration of *Ulama's* role in legislative process, chapter 7 under the title 'Justice, Law, and Reform' familiarizes us with the historical background of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. Under the pretension of highlightening the development of public opinion on the need to reform those Islamic laws that caused hardship for Muslim women, the 22 page chapter introduces us Islamic law relating to apostasy, judicial precedents leading to apostasy and the contribution of Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi towards the enactment of the above Act. Iqbal in his lecture did not only deal with apostasy but also talked about polygamy, inheritance and divorce rights of females. It is an open truth that Iqbal considered polygamy as 'religio-legal excuse to the rich for adultery'. Although polygamy has not been banned in Pakistan but legislatively it is controlled under sec.6 of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961. Author to refer to this piece of legislation. Besides, author had an ample opportunity of discussing inheritance rights of female from Iqbal's viewpoint but no such details have been provided.

Besides, in contradiction to Iqbal's stand on Hanafi approach to *Hadith*, Masud claims that 'Hanafis accepted not only *ahadith* that were *marfu* but also the *mursal'*. We are also told that 'Hanafis tended to reject a deduction based on pure *qiyas* in favour of a *mursal hadith* and it was often called *Istihsan'*. We consider all these arguments pure conjectures because no authority has been cited by Masud to reinforce his argument.

Chapter 8 professing to have "an analytical review of the criticism of Iqbal's lecture" contains the maze of criticism against Iqbal's lecture from Muslim and non-Muslim critics. Masud has forcefully neutralized Bahi's criticism regarding the reference of orientalists by Iqbal in his lecture. However, this forcefulness is nowhere visible when Masud tries to counter Gibb's allegation that 'Iqbal bypassed problem of divorce to concentrate on the easier problem of inheritance". In response Masud writes that it were "the Iqbal's remarks and strong pleas that generated the process of legal

reform providing Muslim women the right of dissolution of marriage". Masud's contention is partially irrelevant. Iqbal did not discuss divorce right of females in general but only concentrated on *apostasy* aspect whereby he concluded that 'Hanafi law on apostasy was not protecting the religion but was rather forcing women to abandon the religion". Besides, when Zia Gokalp talked about inequality in divorce, he was mainly concerned with the husband's right of *Talaq* especially *Triple Talaq*. No one can dispute this fact that in most Muslim countries this privilege continues with the husband without any parallel right in the wife.

Likewise, we fail to agree with Masud that absence of details on divorce in *Reconstruction* 'reflects Iqbal's view that legal reform should be in response to a social need'. In reality, Iqbal had no material to counter Gibb's argument and so he avoided full discussion on this issue by contending that "the wife at the time of marriage is at liberty to get the husband's power of divorce delegated to her on stated conditions and thus secure equality of divorce with her hunband". No one can deny that only few husbands would like to compromise with their right of *Talaq*. Additionally, in Indian sub-continent women have actually suffered a lot on account of the way the *Talaq* power is exercised by the husband. Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 has not disturbed the classical law of Triple divorce, although some procedural limitations have been enacted under section 7 of Pakistan Ordinance, 1961. There was surely a social need existing during Iqbal's time to reform Hanafi law relating to *Talaq* in accordance with Quranic injunctions but for cultural ethos in the subcontinent it could not mature at all.

Further the objectionable part of this chapter is the reference to Iqbal's views on Quran and *Hadith*. As contended earlier, Iqbal's views on legal relevance of Quran and *Hadith* should have been the subject of inquiry and discussion in a separate chapter because that would have identified the frontiers within which the right of *Ijtihad* has to be exercised. However Masud does not depict Iqbal's views in true spirit when he says: "Iqbal considered principles in Quran were eternal whereas legality of *Hadith* disturbed him". As contended earlier, all legal verses in Quran were not eternal for Iqbal. He was simply concerned with foundational legal principles. Regarding *Hadith* Iqbal stands for an outright non-consideration of it in legal matters and so the question of the legality of *Hadith* disturbing him does not arise.

In its two page conclusion, Masud has realistically argued that the study of Iqbal's reconstruction of *Ijtihad* in its doctrinal, historical and semantic context was necessarey for proper evaluation of Iqbal's contribution. Masud, *inter alia*, impliedly endorses Iqbal's creation of an institution in the form of Legislative Assembly by the combination of *Ijtihad* and *Ijma* institutions. We are told that constitutional development in Pakistan are reflecting Iqbal's reconstruction of *Ijtihad* particularly the participatory role of *Ulama*. Here we want to make it clear that Iqbal endorses the participatory role of *Ulama* only when they happen to be the members of the legislature. Otherwise their role is merely recommendatory i.e. they are supposed to help and guide free discussions on questions relating to law. In other words, if a conflict emerges regarding a future enactment, then it will be the will of the legislative assembly which would prevail over the reasoning of the *Ulama*. While commenting upon the role of *Ulama* from Iqbal's viewpoint, Pakistan Supreme Court in *Khurshid Jane V. Fazal Dad*, PLD 1964 (W.

P) Lahore 558 observed:

Two distinct thoughts are visible in these observations. One that the legislative assemblies of the modern state may assume the role of Ijma' *and other that the sovereignty of the legislature should not be impaired by subjecting it to the authority of an external organ.*

In conclusion, Masud's book has indeed tried to interweave the loose threads of discussions, informations and explanations regarding Iqbal's views on *Ijtihad*. However, the failure to shed light on the frontiers within which *Ijtihad* has to be exercised coupled with entries of juxtaposition and self-contradiction has not *fully* helped in fulfillment of aims of this book advanced by the author in the introduction, i.e. 'forestalling the shortcomings of the partial and pedestrian studies which are not suitable for the appreciation of thinkers like Iqbal who are themselves perpetually involved in the process of reform'.

***Call of the Marching Bell* & English Translation Notes and Commentary of *Bang-i-Dara* (Allamah Muhammad Iqbal) By. M. A. K. Khalil**, 106 Highland Drive, St. John's, Newfoundland, A1A 3C5, Canada. Pp. 477. ISBN 969-416-023-9 (Distributed by Iqbal Academy Pakistan)

Translating prose of any language into prose of an other is quite a daunting job, as every language has unique characteristics which reflect the

religious, cultural and social backgrounds of the people who speak it. The task of translation becomes far more difficult when one is trying to translate poetry of one language into idiomatic prose of another, simply because, in general, poetry has a 'language of its own' which may be quite different from the everyday idiom of the people.

The work under review is a gallant attempt at translating Urdu poetry of very high caliber into English verse. *Bang-i-Dara* is indubitably the most well-know and arguably the best Urdu work of Allamah Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), who was one of the most prominent and influential thinkers of the twentieth country. His philosophy of *khudi* (self-realization) has been instrumental in awakening the poor and suppressed masses of he East, particularly of the Muslim world. He wrote several books of poetry in Urdu and Persian. His prose writings in English have world-wide appeal, especially because, in these he has explained, elaborated upon and justified the universality of Islam and its relevance to modern times.

His Urdu poems collected in *Bang-i-Dara* deal with a large variety of subjects and ideas, but concentrate mainly on the state of the Muslim in modern times and exhort them to learn from their glorious past, wake from their present slumber and build a worthy future of one united *Ummah* (community), 'from the banks of the Nile to the plains of Kashghar' as God enjoined them to 'promote the good and forbid the evil in the world.

Khalil's attempt to translate these poems which are replete with reference to the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet (PBUH), Islamic history, culture and civilizations, important Personalities as well as events of world history and much more, and, above all, examples of Urdu poetry of incomparable beauty and feeling, is indeed praiseworthy. Even from the quantitative aspects of the original book, to embark on its translation in its entirety was a mammoth task. In addition to translating every couplet in every poem, Khalil has given the gist of every poem before translation, which helps an English reader to better understand and appreciate the poem.

Two early chapters, 'The Life and Times of Allamah Iqbal' (Chapter 2) and 'The Philosophy of Iqbal: Sources and Expressions in *Bang-i-Dara* (Chapter 3), are extremely useful as they contain well-researched material in a concise form and are important addition to the literature on *Iqbaliyaat* in English. A section on the 'Sources of the Philosophy of Allamah Iqbal' lists,

first in order of importance and then chronologically, all the influences on the poet's thinking, starting with the Qur'an and th *Sunnah* (traditions) of th Prophet, through Muslim philosophers and *Sufis* etc., down to modern literature, including Western philosophy.

Again, the last 84 pages of Khalil's book contain five most useful appendices, which appreciably enhance its informational and explanatory value. Appendix I 'Biographical Notes' has 82 entries, each of which refers to one or more verses of *Bang-i-Dara.* The notes are adequately detailed and explain why these persons found a place in Iqbal's poems. A two-page note on Shah Waliullah of Delhi is particularly noteworthy, perhaps because Allamah Iqbal was greatly impressed by shah Waliullah's writings on the subject of and efforts towards reforming the eighteenth-century Muslim society, especially in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

Appendix II, 'Glossary and Explanatory Notes', is also extremely useful; a collection of Qur'anic and other terms which all writers on and about Islam have to use-often without explaining their origin, historical background or even dictionary meaning. Very often these words and terms are simple expressions of everyday use and are commonly understood by Urdu speakers, but in Iqbal's poetry they have special connotations. *Aql* (intellect) is one such word. By defining them, in their proper context, khalil has helped the English reader tremendously.

Appendix III 'Bibliography', which is quite comprehensive and varied is further testimony to Khalil's extensive research which is reflected thought the book.

The translation itself is by far and large accurate. However, at places, it is too literal and does not fully convey the beauty and elegance of the original Urdu-although, as has already been said, in translation it is almost impossible to achieve this anyway! Nevertheless if an Urdu word or phrase is capable of being translated in more than one way Khalil has found the one which approximates most closely to the essence of the original Urdu.

Whether or not we accept Khalil's translation of *Bang-i-Dara* as an example of high class English verse, the fact remains that he has eminently succeeded in making Iqbal's ideas, as displayed in *Bang-i-Dara* accessible to the English speaking world, and this is no mean achievement. English translations of Iqbal's works are few and far between and the few which do

exist have not found their way to a mass readership. The book under review seems to possess some of the qualities which would appeal to an English reader who is interested in the best of other languages' literature. Khalil is to be congratulated on his work. The excellent quality of its paper, printing, binding, etc, have made this a book that every admirer of Iqbal who knows English would be delighted to have on his/her bookshelf.

INFORMATION AND COMMENTS

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Report: Ibrahim Kalin

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IQBAL ACADEMY CANADA— BRIEF INTRODUCTION

Some elements have always acted as a binding agent for Muslims living around the world. With the diversity in dialects, languages, customs, and cultures, it is no short of a miracle that Muslims find icons of unity that bring them together on one platform. Allama Mohammad Iqbal is one such binding agent that has molded the diverse Muslim communities around the globe into one family.

The experiences of Urdu and Persian literate communities living in Canada were no different. They always experienced that pull towards a center that was characterized by the poetry and philosophy of Allama Iqbal.

Since the early seventies, Muslims from subcontinent, who call Canada their home, have joined each other in commemorating the works of Allama Iqbal. Meetings at different level by individuals and organizations are very well alive in the minds of many.

Continuing on that rich tradition, devotees of Allama Iqbal got together to formerly launch an organization that would strive to preserve, promote and propagate Iqbal's philosophy, thought and poetry among Muslims and the intellectual community at large. Thus, with the blessings of Professor Mirza Muhammad Munawwar, renowned authority on Allama Iqbal and kind guidance of Dr. Muhammad Suheyl Umar, Director Iqbal Academy Pakistan, '*Iqbal Academy Canada*' was formed in November 1998 in Toronto. Iqbal Academy Canada is affiliated with Iqbal Academy in Pakistan. The president of Pakistan is the patron-in-Chief of Iqbal Academy Pakistan.

Iqbal Academy Canada is very alive to the fact that Allama Iqbal's message should reach all Muslims. The universality of his message makes it

paramount that it should cross the boundaries of nation‐states and be available to all Muslims alike. Iqbla Academy Canand will ensure that on the Canadian front, his works are available to a wide audience.

Iqbal Academy Canada has identified several projects to achieve its objectives. A permanent platform will be provided to discuss Allama Iqbal's works through national/international seminars. Through these seminars researchers in Iqbal Studies (Iqbaliat) will have an opportunity to share their research with others. Regular "Iqbal Study" meetings are also being planned to bring together *Iqbal Lovers* around one table on regular basis.

Through these seminars/meetings Iqbal Academy Canada will also bring into the fold the younger generation of Muslims who otherwise may not have the occasion to learn about the great contributions of Allama Iqbal. Similarly, efforts are underway to establish links with the universities in Canada, especially in the Greater Toronto Area, to promote research on Iqbaliat. The links with universities would make it possible for the academy to reach young students, who are willing to undertake research on the works of Allama Iqbal.

A library has already been established at the central office in Toronto. The book collection at the library would contain books in Urdu, Persian, and English. Iqbal Academy Canada recognizes the importance of passing the light of Iqbal's message to young Muslims. Since English is predominatly the preferred mode-of-communication for the younger generation of Muslims in Canada, a significant part of library resources would be devoted to books and other materials in English that highlight Iqbal's works.

The academy would also publish recent research on Allama Iqbal as books, brochures, and other media (e.g., audio/video cassettes and internet). The publishing arm of the academy would also undertake publishing previous research on Iqbal, which is no longer in print.

We, are well aware of the fact that setting the goals are easier than achieving them. But we are also confident that loverfor Allama Iqbal is not limited to few individuals at Iqbal Academy. Please come forward and join the hands to achieve these goals together.

TORONTO CONFERENCE REMEMBERS RANGE AND DEPTH OF ALLAMAH IQBAL'S THOUGHT AND UNDERSTANDING

ZAFAR BANGASH

Great men live in people's consciousness long after they have left the physical world. Sayyid Jamaluddin Afghani (Asadabadi), Allamah Muhammad Iqbal, Syed Qutb, Imam Khomeini, Maulana Maudoodi and Dr. Kalim Siddiqui all come into this category. They were men of great ideas which have helped shape the destiny of millions in this century.

The people of Pakistan are rightly proud of Allamah Muhammad Iqbal; he was born in Sialkot, a city that is part of Pakistan today. But Iqbal belongs to the whole *Ummah*: he gave a message that is universally applicable because it was based on the teachings of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* of the noble Messenger of Allah. He gave a message of hope at a time when despair gripped the Muslims of British India.

Iqbal also understood what clicked with the subcontinental Muslim. It is said that Arabs are motivated by rhetoric; the Irani mind best responds to philosophical arguments; Muslims of the subcontinent are inspired by poetry. So Iqbal chose poetry as a vehicle to convey his ideas. His poetry, however, was not for the sake of poetry itself. Even though he wrote stirring lyrics, his poetry had a higher purpose. In 1911, for instance, Iqbal moved his audience at the Badshahi Mosque in Lahore to tears when he recited his poem about the Italian attack and occupation of Tripoli, Libya.

Iqbal's admirers reside in all parts of the world. He is, of course, best known in his native Pakistan, but it would be a mistake to assume that his reputation is confined to that land. In Iran, there is perhaps even greater admiration for him because more than half his poetry is in Farsi (Persian). Indeed, according to most authorities on Iqbal; his best poetry is in this language. No less a person than the Rahbar of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatullah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, has on numerous occasions, expressed great admiration for Iqbal's work in his speeches. Imam Khomeini also did the same.

To find Iqbal's admirers in Canada reflects the universal validity of his message. There is in fact an organization–the Iqbal Academy Canada, affiliated with its name–sake in Pakistan–that aims to promote Iqbal's thought, particularly among the younger generation of Muslims. On June 11, an Iqbal Academy Canada programme in Toronto was attended by more

than 300 people from all walks of life. In typical Toronto tradition, the event was organized round a dinner.

The Academy had invited Professor Sheila McDonough, a specialist on Iqbal who currently teaches at Concordia University in Montreal, Professor Mustansir Mir, author of numerous books on Qur'anic themes as well as a scholar on Iqbal, Dr. Muhammad Suheyl Umar, Director Iqbal Academy Pakistan, and Aslam Kamal, a well–known Pakistani artist who has produced some masterpieces on Iqbal's poetic works as well as Qur'anic calligraphy. Aslam Kamal, however, was unable to attend because the Canadian High Commission in Islamabad refused him a visa saying the visa officer was 'not convinced' that he would leave Canada after the programme!

Despite his absence, however, there were some excellent speeches. There was no rhetoric, nor was there the resort to reading Iqbal's poetry without context or explanation. Similarly, the organizers, to their credit, excluded the itinerant poets who tend to gather on such occasions to recite their own works. The seriousness of the program can also be gauged from the fact that messages were sent by Rafiq Tarar, the president of Pakistan, and the ambassadors of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Turkey. Extracts from a speech delivered by Ayatullah Seyyed Ali Khamenei on an Iqbal Day Program were also read out.

Events of this nature are invariably organized by a small group of dedicated individuals; this was no exception. Syed Sajjad Hyder, the chief organizer, virtually single-handedly put various parts of the entire program together. The audience, too, was serious and willing to be inspired. They were not disappointed. One could almost feel the presence of Iqbal in the Hall.

Professor McDonough pointed to Iqbal's wide range of reading interests, which were not confined to philosophy or poetry alone. She drew parallels with the writings of such people as Adam Smith, who she said was as much a philosopher as he was economist; Ibn Khaldun and Maulana Shibli Naumani. Other writers have also drawn attention to Iqbal's admiration for Shibli's works, especially his writings on the Seerah and the lives of the Sahaba.

Professor Mustansir Mir, of Ohio State University, held the audience spell-bound with his talk on five separate poems of Iqbal in which he highlighted the poet's original thinking. These are to form part of a book that he is compiling on Iqbal. He referred to Iqbal's great respect for the martyrdom-

seeking Fatima bint Abdullah of Libya, who, by giving her life in the struggle against Italian occupation, inspired millions of others—both men and women—to emulate her example. Professor Mir also reflected on Iqbal's thought about Man's lonely journey through this world before finally coming face to face with Allah. Upon Man's inquiry, Allah merely smiles, indicating that He, too, is in the same position. According to Professor Mir, Iqbal was saying that Man's true friend is only Allah and that he is lonely in this world because this is not his permanent abode.

Although the program was organized by the Iqbal Academy Canada, a brief introduction about the activities of the Iqbal Academy Pakistan was also given by Dr. Muhammad Suheyl Umar . He gave an interesting account of how successive governments in Pakistan had treated the Academy, based on their political preferences rather than any particular interest in the message or thought of Iqbal. Dr. Suheyl Umar's doctoral thesis was on Ibn Arabi. He himself is philosophically inclined with a quiet disposition, preferring to speak shortly and to the point.

Allamah Iqbal's personality is a great unifying force. This is so because he gives a message of hope, universal brotherhood and selfhood (*khudi*) which are the hallmarks of a true believer, qualities that Allah emphasizes repeatedly in the Qur'an, Iqbal has admirers in Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and through out the Arab world. This constitutes the heartland of Islam, where much can be achieved by creating bonds of unity against the forces of *kufr* and *dhulm* that currently reign supreme in the world.

SHORT REPORT ON A TWO-DAY SEMINAR HELD ON ALLAMA IQBAL AND POET KAZI NAZRUL ISLAM HELD ON 6TH & 7TH NOVEMBER, 1998

PROF. SIRAJUL HOQUE

The cultivation of poetry of Allama Muhammad Iqbal and poet Kazi Nazrul Islam is essential for our national existence. These two noble and renowned poets of the sub-continent clearly brought forward the sorrows and sufferings of human being in their poetry irrespective of cast and creed. On the one side the heritage and greatness of Islam was embodied and personalized in their poems and on the other hand they devoted themselves to emancipate the nation from the imperialistic designs and clutches. They cultivated the ideal of humanity in their poetry. In the nourishment of our

arts and literature their role is undeniable. So we should cultivate the works of poet Allama Iqbal and poet Nazrul Islam all the ages to come.

The speakers viewed their opinion in the Seminar held on the occasion of 121st birth anniversary of poet Allama Iqbal and the birth centennial of poet Kazi Nazrul Islam. A two-day seminar was organized jointly by Allama Iqbal Research Academy and Anannya Shahittya Sanskriti Sangsad (unique literary and cultural society), where the reputed intellectuals, poets and litterateur of the country have joined. The topics of discussion of the first and second day of seminar were respectively "**The poet of humanity Kazi Nazrul Islam**" and "**The influence of poetry of Allama Iqbal in our thought, consciousness and literature**".

The seminar was held on 6th and 7th November, 1998 (Friday and Saturday) at 4 pm. in the Auditorium of the Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran, House no. 54, Road no. 8/A, Dhanmondi, Dhaka.

The seminar of he first day was held under the chairmanship of poet Mohammad Nurul Huda, Executive Director of Nazrul Institute while Syed Anwer Hossain, Director General of Bangla Academy attended as chief guest. Mr. Ali Avarseji, Cultural Counsellor of the Islamic Republic of Iran joined as special guest. Among other speakers who discussed in the seminar were Mr. M. Abdur Rashid Chawdhury, formerly editor of the Dhaka Digest, Mr. Zakir Hossain, editor The Daily Hizbullah, Prof. Sirajul Haque, President Allama Iqbal Research Academy and Anannya Shahittya Sanskriti Sangsad, Mr. Samir Ahmed Joint Secy. Anannya Shahittya Sanskriti Sangsad.

Mr. Iqbal Babu, Mr. Zahir Bishwas, poet Amin al Asad, poet Tahmidul Islam recited from the poems of Nazrul Islam.

The Seminar of the second day was presided over by commodore M. Ataur Rahman, Chairman Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd., while Syed Ali Ahsan, National Professor and Vice Chancellor of the Darul Ihsan University (formerly Head of the Deptt. of Bengali of Karachi university) was chief guest. Mrs. Kulsoom Abul Basher, Chairperson of the Urdu and Persian Department of Dhaka University, Dr. Ahmed Tamindari, Iranian Visiting Professor of the above Department of Dhaka University, poet al Mojahidi literary editor of the Daily Ettefaq spoke as special guest. Among others who spoke in the seminar were Prof. Sirajul Haque, President of Both of the above organizations, Mr. M. Abdur Rashid Chawdhry, formerly editor

of the Dhaka Digest, Prof. Abdul Awal, Secy. Of the Allama Iqbal Research Academy.

Mr. Morashed Ali Al Quadery, Mr. Zahir Biswas, Mr. Raihanul Amin, Mrs. Tahmina Manjo Mazid recited from the poems of Allama Iqbal. The seminar was begun by recitation from the holy Quran and Mr. Abul Kalam Sarkar and Mr. Mohammed Nasir Uddin Khan recited some verses of the holy Quran. The seminar was concluded with light refreshment.

ACTIVITIES IQBAL SOCIETY, DUSHANBE, TAJIKISTAN

MINUTES NO 1
Of the Meeting of Iqbal Society
12.12.98

Participants: H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan, Polatov P.A.,

Qurban Vose, Sattorzoda A., Jorabek Nazriev,

Mohammadiev A., Abdushukurova T.M., Alimardonov A,

Ayni K., Bekzoda, Mirzohodiev M., Polatova Sh., Rajabov Kh.

Agenda: New membership of Iqbal Society

New composition of Executive Committee

Current problems

Speaking on the first issue H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan dwelled upon services of Iqbal Society and its Chairman Hodizoda. Then the new staff of Iqbal Society, consisting of 25 members was proposed for discussion. Each nominee was discussed separately by participants. Polatov A.P. supplementing what was said by the previous speaker – Ambassador of Pakistan said that for successful activity the Society had to do its worthy bit – close study and dissemination of Iqbal's life and ideas which are of extreme importance.

Then Sattorzoda A. suggested Mirzohomidov Mirzomuhammad for membership instead of Niyazov J.

So Iqbal Society consisting of 25 members was approved.

Suggesting Qurban Vose, Sattorzoda A., Abdushukurova T.M. and Salimzoda O. for membership of the Executive Committee H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan, Ambassador of Pakistan, underlined the necessity of two co-chairmen – a representative of Pakistan and Tajikistan. Jorabek Nazriev proposed Alimardonov A. for membership as well.

The Executive Committee was elected in the following composition:

1. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan – co- chairman
2. Qurban Vose – co–chairman
3. Polatov P.A.
4. Sattorzoda A.
5. Abdushukurova T.M.
6. Salimzoda O.
7. Alimardonov A.

Khojayorov N.F. was elected secretary of Iqbal's Committee.

MINUTES NO 2

OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF IQBAL SOCIETY

9.12.98

Participants: H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan, Polatov P.A.,

Qurban Vose, Abdushukurova T.M., Khojaerov N. F.,

Agenda: a) Organization of Iqbal Day

b) Approval of Iqbal Day estimate

c) Approval of the letter dedicated to the Day

d) Current issues

Speaking on the first issue Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan drew attention of the participants to the fact that two guests – Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javed Iqbal – son of Allama Iqbal and Director of Iqbal Academy (Lahore) accepted the invitation of the Committee. The guests have to be met at an appropriate level. Polatov backing up H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan said that for arrangement of such and important event it

was necessary to envisage expenditure. Qurban Bose noted that Iqbal was a man of great honour for the people of eastern countries and friendship between Pakistan and Tajikistan gets strengthened thanks to his ideas.

The following resolutions were passed:

a) To send letters to concerning offices about Commemoration arrangements

b) To approve the expenditure of the arrangement and present its copy to the Embassy of Pakistan

MINUTES NO 3

OF THE IQBAL SOCIETY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

16.12.98

Participants: Qurban Vose, Abdushukurova T.M.,

Sattorzoda A., Alimardonov A.

Agenda: a) Regulations about arranging of a contest – reciting Iqbal's verses

b) Approval of composition of judges

c) Current issues

Speaking on the first issue chairman of Iqbal Society underlined the necessity of regulations for the use by the heads of Dushanbe universities. On the other hand it would be of certain help in carrying out the stage by stage contest. Regulations may safeguard from some errors as winners have to be three in number from each educational establishment (schools and universities). Then the second stage have to be started.

Sattorzoda A. and Abdushukurova T.M. backed this proposal as well.

The following resolution was passed:

To approve the regulations of "Contest – 99"

Abdushukurova, speaking on the second issue, proposed to include the following people in the composition of referees:

1. Golnazar Keldi

2. Qurban Vose
3. Nizam Nurjanov
4. Saloh Soleh
5. A Pakistani representative
6. Ali Muhammadi
7. Abdushukurova T. M.
8. The above mentioned nominees were approved.

MINUTES

OF THE MEETING OF IQBAL COMMITTEE

27.01.1999

Participants: H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan, Missers Qurban Vose, Jurabek Nazriev, Polatov P.A.,

Mohammadiev A., Polatova Sh., Rajabov Kh., Shamsiddin Vuritdinov – City council representiative, Niyazov, Alimardonov A., Afsahzod A.

Agenda: Discussion and adoption of the following issues dedicated to Iqbal Day commemoration:

1. Adoption of Proposed Agenda
2. Proposing the concept of having Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javid Iqbal as the Patron of Iqbal Society
3. Decoration of an award by the President of Republic on Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javid Iqbal.
4. Naming a Park/Road/Avenue after the name of Iqbal. Inauguration to be made by Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javid Iqbal.
5. Plantation of a tree by Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javid Iqbal and Ambassador of Pakistan.
6. Getting the premises of Opera Ballet for the main function in Dushanbe
7. Details of the Programme in Opera Ballet

8. Coverage of Iqbal week on the media contact to be made with Ministry of Culture, Committee on Radio and Television and Print Media
9. Arrangement of Programs in Khojand Kurganteppa and Khorog
10. Letters to all the concern authorities to inform about the Programme and responsibility to follow up
11. Arrangement of organising the tableau as performed at Iqbal Day Nov. 1997
12. Arrangement of organising the performance of Jazirbod in the State Youth Theatre
13. Publication of articles dedicated to Iqbal by Tajik Scholars to be presented to guests in the Seminar in April 1999
14. Conducting the Contest of recitation of Iqbal's poems;

Venue and the timing of the Contest

Composition of Committee of judges

15. Organising meetings of the guests from Pakistan, with state leadership, public figures, poets, writers.
16. Arrangements for the guests from Pakistan visiting places of interest.
17. Arrangement of transportation and venues for different events.
18. Other matters.

The proposed agenda was unanimously adopted by the participants.

Speaking on the second issue H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan, co-chairman of the Committee, proposed the concept of having Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javid Iqbal as the Patron of Iqbal Society.

Nomination of Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javid Iqbal as the Patron of Iqbal Society was warmly approved. Simultaneously the Society members – representatives of government and public organisations passed a resolution to apply to the President for naming a park/road/avenue after the name of Iqbal and decoration of an award on Justice (retired) Senator Dr. Javid Iqbal. A tree will be planted by Dr. Javid Iqbal and H.E. Ambassador of Pakistan.

Iqbal Society members decided to get the premises of Opera an ballet theatre for the main function in Dushanbe.

Working out the details of the programme in Opera and bllet theatre was entrusted to Nazriev J., Afsahzod A., Vosiev K., Shamsiddinov.

Participants decided to enlist the co-operation of the Ministry of Culture, TV and Radio Committee and print media for coverage of Iqbal week. Vosiev K. was appointed responsible for this arrangement.

As for arrangements of programmes in Khojand, Kurgantepa and Khorog co-chairman Vosiev K. informed that special messages were already sent to the heads of the local hukumats about the celebration and they were requested to favour the arrangements of the celebration. It was suggested to send Iqbal Committee members to the said cities for participation in the local arrangements.

In the state youth theatre "Jazirbod" performance will be shown. Abdushukurova T. and Afsahzod A. were appointed responsible for it.

Ali Muhammadi informed the Committee members about articles of scholars dedicated to Allama Iqbal. It will be presented to guests of the seminar in April, 1999. Ali Mohammadi was appointed responsible for the publication.

The contest of recitation of Iqbal's poems, venue, timing of the contest, composition of Committee judges were under consideration as well.

It was decided that a meeting of the Executive Committee of Iqbal Society would be held on 15 February 1999 at 1500 hours at the Pakistan (Chancery) Embassy premises located at 37A Rudaki Avenue, Dushanbe.

MINUTES

OF THE MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING OF IQBAL SOCIETY AT THE PAKISTAN EMBASSY CHAMBER

27.01.1999

PRESIDENT: H.E. Mr. Khalid Amir Kahan, Mr. Vosiev Qurban, Mr. Himmatzoda Mahmadsharif (Acting Chairman CNT) Mr. Jurabek

Nazriev, Mr. Sattorzoda A. (recently appointed Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdushukurova T. M.

1.1 The Co-Chairman H. E. Ambassador Khalid Amir Khan welcomed the members of the executive committee to the meeting.

1.2 The Agenda of the meeting was adopted unanimously.

1.3 The minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee of Iqbal Society dated February 15, 1999, were approved.

3.1 Report of Mr. Vosiev Qurban – Co-Chairman, about the discussion with Mr. Fattoev Saidmorad President's Adviser, concerning the Iqbal Day commemoration "The idea of celebration of Iqbal Day commemoration is fully backed by President but he wished the visit of Javid Iqbal to take place on a higher level. He is the son of a prominent poet, philosopher and his presence gives solemnity to celebration of 1100th anniversary of Samani State.

For this reason President considers more appropriate to invite Mr. Javid Iqbal, his wife and Mr. Suheyl Umar, Director Iqbal Academy Pakistan as State Guests in September, 1999, during the celebration of 110oth anniversary of Samani State-National Holiday of Tajikistan.

I have to inform Mr. Fattoev Saidmorad about the decision of the Executive Committee concerning the issue.

3.2 H. Ambassador Mr. Khalid Amir Khan. "I appreciate the decision taken by the President. What are the view of the members of the Executive"?

3.3 Abdushukirova T. M. "It would be advisable if Mr. Javid Iqbal visit our country a week ahead of Samani State celebration. We'd be able to organize all the arrangements of the programme".

3.4 Nazriev Jurabek. "It will be quite possible to implement all the arrangements within Samani State celebration. We would organize the meeting of Javid Iqbal with scholars of the Tajik Academy of Sciences and students. As far his visit to different regions of the country it will be organized by the government". Himmatzoda M. "It would be better if the visit took place in the birthday of Allama Iqbal but if the idea of the President differs we have to manage the implementation of the programme during Samani State celebration".

3.5 Sattorzoda. "If we could keep our guest, Mr. Javid Iqbal and his companions for some days after the celebration would be able to organize the arrangements included into the programme.

3.6 H. E. Mr. Khalid Amir Khan. "I think the ideas suggested by the Executive Committee members may be accepted".

ABOUT THE QUR'AN & RESPONSE OF DR. S. H. NASR TO THE *ATLANTIC MONTHLY* MAGAZINE

PREPARED BY: IBRAHIM KALIN

This text was prepared by Ibrahim Kalin on the basis of the statement by Dr. Seyyed Hossein Nasr of George Washington University about the article published in the *Atlantic Monthly Magazine*.

"The article published in the *Atlantic Monthly* about the Qur'an does not say anything new nor does it add anything to the cnturies-old misunderstanding of the Qur'an by the West. The main issue is not how one looks at the Qur'an as a so-called historical text and analyzes it according to the principles of textual or Biblical criticism but it is rather how one conceives the very notion of revelation. It has to be well noted that what corresponds to Christ as the word of God in Christianity is not the Prophet Muhammad but the Qur'an in Islam. Although this fundamental point is quoted very briefly in the article, the author apparently has not understood its meaning. The acceptance of the Qur'an as the word of God, as logos suggests that the so-called historical and textual study of the Qur'an is tantamount to questioning the historical existence of Jesus Christ as some people in the West have claimed. The rules of biblical criticism do not apply to the Qur'an as God's revelation because what corresponds to the Bible is the *hadith* collection which comprises the words and deeds of the Prophet of Islam as the Bible comprises the words and deeds of Jesus Christ who is the word of God. It is obvious that both the *hadith* books and the Bible were compiled after the revelation whereas the Qur'an has existed in its present form from the very beginning of Islamic revelation. To claim that the so-called history of the Qur'an undermines or casts doubt on its being a Divine revelation is not only to misunderstand the nature of the Qur'an but also to go against the historical evidence. This is a plain fact that any person with a sound mind accepts unless one already has a premeditated idea about the Qur'an not as God's revelation but as a text written by a human being.

Besides these fundamental points, the author confuses many issues. First of all, the so-called textual and historical study of the Qur'an dies not entail the rejection of the Qur'an as God's word as it has not entail the rejection of the Qur'an as God's word as it has not entailed for generations of Muslim scholars from the Mu'tazilites to the Sufi. Anybody who knows at least the basics of Islam and Islamic history cannot deny the fact that the classical scholarship, especially the sciences of Arabic grammar, lexicography, and Quranic exegesis, not to mention the other sciences devoted to the study of the Qur'an, is peerless in studying and analyzing the Qur'an in its minutest details. To claim that Muslims have not studied the historical and textual dimensions of the Qur'an is to admit a total ignorance of Islam and Muslims unless one has a preconceived agenda to blame Muslims for taking their sacred book seriously. At this point, the author's mentioning of some modern Muslim thinkers as a proof for his claim that the Qur'an is not the word of God is totally flawed and misleading. Although the historicist and modernist reading of the Qur'an represents only a small minority in the Islamic world, even this perspective does not abrogate the Divine origin of the Qur'an as the author seems to imply. To claim to read the Qur'an from a certain historical or rather historical point of view without denying its sacred character is one thing; but to see the Qur'an as a text devoid of any Divine substance and written by human beings in the way many modern Westerners claim the Bible was written is another.

It is unfortunate that such aberrant views of Islam, Muslims and their sacred book can still find a voice in the American public. The centuries-old misconceptions about Islam, its Prophet and its sacred book cannot be accepted as 'objective facts' under the pretext of scholarly or historical evidence. We all know too well the history of Orientalism as many of its hostile claims and allegations about Islam habe been now rejected by the serious scholars of Islam as simply spurious and biased. It is also unfortunate that the Western world takes a few minority voices in the Islamic world as representative of 'true' Islam and blames the rest of the Islamic world and history as subjective and limited in understanding themselves, their religion and their sacred book. It is obvious that the type of people aggrandized by Western academia and media as the 'Martin Luthers of Islam' is primarily the type of people who would give credit, in one way or another, to the doubts and baseless allegations cast upon Islam and Muslims by some Western

writers. The so-called 'true' and modern Islam of such Western writers is the type of Islam that will be accepted as valid only when it meets the current dictated standards of Western notions of religion, revelation and prophethood. Needless to say, this is another case of Euro-centrism that has plagued the Western as well as non-Western world for so long in all domains of knowledge from literature and philosophy to political science and comparative religion.

We live at a time when all of us need dialogue and mutual understanding between the members of world religions, especially between Muslims, Christians and Jews. Such a dialogue has to be based on sound principles and carried out with sincerity and in earnest with mutual respect. Insulting the sacred book of Muslims and blaming them for taking the word of God seriously is certainly not the best way to participate in such a dialogue and to gain understanding.

Philosophy Extension Lectures
Ways to God

By Professor Dr. George F. McLean

The Inaugural Lecture will be presided over by Professor Dr. Khalid Hamid Sheikh Vice-Chancellor, University of the Punjab, Lahore On 22 February 1999 at 11.00 a.m. at the Auditorium Centre for South Asian Studies, New Campus, Lahroe

Chief Guest: Professor M. Saeed Sheikh

Pfrofessor Dr. George F. McLean is Secretary of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington D. C. He delivered Iqbal Memorial Lecture at the University of the Punjab in 1997. Since then he has worked on some themes of Allam Iqbal's *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* and developed them into a series of lectures entitled "ways to God", the main points of which he will present in this series of lectures from 22 to 24 February 1999. The venue of the last two lectures will be the Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

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THE HERITAGE OF IBN 'ARABI
AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM HELD AT LADY MARGARET HALL, OXFORD 9TH – 11TH APRIL 1999

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ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND EPISTEMOLOGY

In the Light of Mahdi Hai'ri Yazdi's

The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy

Dr. Mahdi Aminrazavi
Mary Washington College
Dr. Nasr Arif
School of Islamic and Social Sciences
Dr. Ali Raza Mir
Monmouth University
Ibrahim Kalin
George Washington University
M. A. Muqtedar Khan
Georgetown University

Venue: International Institute of Islamic Thought

Date: February 27th, 1999

Time: 10-3.00

Email: Muqtedar@yahoo.com

Contemporary Islamic Philosophers held their Second Annual Conference. This year the conference focused on a landmark book in the contemporary history of Islamic Philosophy. Mahdi Hai'ri Yezdi's *The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy* is not only a major work in the tradition of Islamic philosophical thought but is also among the first to be written in English. It marks a new chapter in the rich tradition of *Falasifah*; indeed it is an outstanding manifestation of the contemporary renewal in Islamic Thought. The five speakers presented their critiques of the book and then there was an open forum which will explore topics such as Islamic Epistemology, Islamic Science and Islamic Philosophy.

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