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THE INDIVIDUAL AND ACTION IN THE THOUGHT OF IQBAL

Richard S. Wheeler

The though of Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) is a product of the blending of the philosophic traditions of East and West, a blending in which the concepts and categories used by Western thinkers are employed to re-evaluate and restate the philosophic systems of earlier Muslim thinkers and of Islam itself. Iqbal's preparation for his eventual role as philosopher par excellence of the Muslim revival in India involved a thorough grounding in both Muslim and Western philosophy. As a boy he attended a Scottish missionary school and simultaneously studied under a leading Muslim scholar and theologian. At college in Lahore he earned his Master's degree in Western philosophy and subsequently went to Europe to obtain his doctoral degree in philosophy and to gain admission to the bar.

In Europe, although he continued his studies of modern Western philosophy, Iqbal wrote his doctoral dissertation (at Munich) on "The Development of Metaphysics in Persia." He spent the greater part of the years 1905-1908 in Cambridge where he came under the influence of the English neo-Hegeliam school. His particular mentors were Professors McTaggart and James Ward of whom the latter made the more lasting impression. During this period Iqbal also became further acquainted with the writings of Kant, Fichte, Nietzsche, and Bergson, all of whom contributed to the development of his thought. Nevertheless, lqbal regarded himself as a disciple not of James Ward but of Jalal al-Din Rumi, the thirteenth-century Persian mystic and poet philosopher. From Rumi he drew much of his inspiration, in matters of literary form as well as philosophic content, and in Rumi he found anticipated some of the ideas of modern thinkers such as Nietzsche and Bergson.

In addition to his study of the Qura'an and of Eastern and Western philosophy, a further factor influencing the character of Iqbal's thought was the nature of the world in which he, as a Muslim and an Indian, lived. Iqbal grew to manhood during the years when, simultaneously with the appearance of Muslim reformers in other countries, the liberal teachings of the Aligarh

movement were initiating a revolution in Indian Muslim social attitudes. Thus the future of the Muslim community, in India and the world generally, was a matter of keen concern to him. The critically formative years 1900 to 1915, spanning the period from Iqbal's completion of his M.A. studies in India to the publication of his first major philosophic poem, and including his European years, were years of crisis for the Muslim world and indeed of the West as well.

At this time the political and cultural attacks of the West on Islam were met with a new sensitivity among the awakening minority of Muslims, who suffered the more through realization o' their helplessness. Politically, repeated reverses for Islam ii Morocco, Tripoli, and the Balkans were matched in India by the disestablishment of the Muslim Provinces of Eastern Bengal aria Assam (1905-11) in the wake of Hindu terrorist agitation. Culturally, the Islamic world seemed on the verge of disintegration under the dual pressures of Western material civilization and nationalism Although Iqbal appreciated the accomplishments of European civilization, as a non-European he was struck by its shortcomings and injustices; like other intellectuals of the time he felt the need for a new ethical and moral reintegration, to enable modern man to control the forces which science -had released. Among those forces was nationalism, a -divisive and destructive tribal morality which was rapidly moving Europe and the entire world toward war. Thus Iqbal was stimulated to formulate a philosophy which would give man control over himself and his destiny, would erase the narrow loyalties of nationalism, and in particular.

> **would awaken the world of Islam... from the torpor of a despondent fatalism and stir them to activity in the name of the heritage of dynamic ideals which were (*sic*) that of Islam**[1]

Although echoes of European thinkers are evident in Iqbal, he regarded his philosophy as derived in all important points from the, Qur'an; the Europeans merely provided conceptual insights useful for explaining ideas inherent in Islam. As a consequence of he Islamic milieu within which he

[1] Iqbal Singh, The Ardent Pilgrim, (London, Green & Co., 1951), 9.53.

wrote, Iqbal's philosophy is framed as an exhortation to the Muslim community. However, in the poet's own words:

> **My real purpose is to look for a better social order and to present a universally acceptable ideal (of life and action) before the world, but it is impossible for me, in this effort to outline this ideal, to ignore the social system and values of Islam whose most important objective is to demolish all the artificial and pernicious distinctions of caste, creed, colour and economic status ... No doubt I am intensely devoted to Islam but I have selected the Islamic community as my starting point not because of any national or religious prejudice but because it is the most practicable line of approach to the problem.**[2]

I. The Nature of Reality

The point of departure of Iqbal's philosophy is his conviction that the "inexplicable finite centre of experience is the fundamental fact of the universe."[3] Differing from Bradley, he emphasizes that Reality is a system of finite individuals, of whom the Absolute Self is the most unique. From the conscious experience of the individual Self all else is posited:

> **The form of existence is an effect of the Self,**
>
> **Whatsoever thous seest is a secret of the Self…**[4]

The consciousness of the Self has two aspects, says Iqbal, efficient (active) and appreciative, which correspond to the two modes of acquiring knowledge, Intellect and Intuition. The efficient Self has ' its being in spatial, serial Time, and acquires knowledge through the analytic, ordering functions

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[2] M. Raziuddin Siddiqi, et al., Iqbal as a Thinker (Essays by Eminent Scholars) (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1952), pp. 78-79.

[3] Iqbal, The Secrets of the Self (Asrar-i-Khudi), trans. by R.A. Nicholson, (Lodon: MacMillan, 1920), p. xvii.

[4] Ibid., II. 1-2

of the Intellect. The appreciative Self is he Self seen as unified, non-serial, a synthesizing of experience; it is Ego, existing in pure Time.[5] The appreciative consciousness of the Ego knows itself as timeless and boundless; it gives us therefore by Intuition, direct apprehension, an sight into the ultimate nature of Reality itself, also timeless and boundless.

The concept of Time as pure duration, an organic whole in which the past exists within the present, is adopted by Iqbal from Bergson, as illustrative of Qur'anic ideas. Time as Pure duration Iqbal describes as the Qur'anic idea of destiny, "time regraded as prior to the disclosure of its possibilities."[6] This destiny is not a fate imposed from without, but the realizable possibilities of a thing. "To exist in real time is not to be bound by the fetters of serial time, but to create it from moment to moment and to be absolutely free and original in creation."[7] Thus, life is the free creative activity of the Self; the time-process is a line "in the drawing," not a temporal working cut of a preconceived plan.

On the analogy of the conscious experience of life, therefore, Iqbal sees the Universe as a free creative movement, not a thing but an act. He departs from Bergson, however, in

attributing a purposive character to the Universe. The consciousness of life incorporates the experience of the past in the present, as a unity; the unity of consciousness implies a forward look as well, a look toward future purpose. The Universe is teleological in the sense that creative intelligence is constantly reformulating goals in conformity with the experience of the past. This is the only alternative to the chaotic freedom of Bergson's view, and to the view of the Universe as "an already completed product which left the

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[5] Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (O.U.P.,

1934). p. 46.

[6] Ibid., p. 47.

[7] Ibid., p. 48.

hand of its maker ages ago, and is now lying stretched in space as a dead mass of matter to which Time does nothing, and consequently is nothing."[8]

The concept of Time as pure duration, revealed by examination of the Self to be a unity interpenetrated by thought, life, and purpose, leads Iqbal to the notion of Reality as an all-embracing Self.[9] This Absolute Ego is infinitely creative, existing in our duration; His infinity is intensive, not extensive, as no space or time exists apart form His creative activity.

> **To the Absolute Self, then, the Universe is not a reality confronting him as his 'other,' it is only a passing phase of His consciousness, a fleeting moment of His infinite life. Einstein is quite right in saying that the Universe is finite, but boundless. It is finite because it is a passing phase of God's extensively infinite consciousness and boundless because the creative power of God is intensively infinite.[10]**

Time, space and matter are interpretations which thought puts on His free creative energy. The infinite creativity of the Absolute precludes any notion of predetermination; the future remains an open possibility, not- a latent reality.

This brief review of Iqbal's view of reality indicates the importance in his thought of the concept of the Self, and of the free, dynamic nature of the Universe. the stage is therefore set for the individual to strive, within the limits of his own creative powers, to give purpose to the Universe.

The Ego

Reality, the Ultimate Ego, is manifested according to Iqbal in a hierarchy of ego-unities, a rising scale of egohood culminating in man[11] the reality of

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[8] Ibid., p. 52.

[9] Ibid., p. 53.

[10] B.A. Dar, A Study in Iqbal's Philosophy (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 398.

these ego-unities is relative to their consciousness; man is the most real for he alone consciously participates in the creative life of his Maker. By creating the human Ego, God has limited His own creativity, to the extent that individual finite Egos participate in creative action. All life is individual, and the Ego is the highest form of that individuality thus far achieved. The efforts of the Ego to perfect this individuality by approaching God, the Ultimate Individual, require him to master nature, to absorb God into himself. The nature of the Self, then, demands affirmation:

> **By the Self the seed of opposition is sown in the world**
>
> **It imagines itself to be other than itself.**
>
> **It makes from itself the forms of others**
>
> **In order to multiply the pleasure of strife.**[12]

Desire to conquer nature gives purpose to life, and leads the Self into new fields of creativity in order to achieve its objective of approach to God.

> **In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity, and transcends the limits of ° space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation.**[13]

To Iqbal, the perfection of he individuality of man means the achievement of personality, which distinguishes the human Ego from other forms of life. "Personality is a state of tension and can continue only if that state is maintained".[14] "The life of the Ego is a kind of tension caused by the Ego invading the environment and the environment invading the Ego".[15]

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[11] Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 68.

[12] Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, II, 193-6.

[13] Dar, op., cit., p. 401.

[14] Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, p. xxi.

[15] Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 97.

Thus personality is developed through action which maintains the state of tension; that which increases tension is good, that which relaxes it is evil all things must be judged from the standpoint of their effect on personality. Consequently, all philosophies of withdrawal or self-negation are condemned by Iqbal as tending to betray the processes which have produced man; in other words, by causing a relation of the state of tension and struggle, philosophies of negation prevent man from achieving that mastery over nature which will carry him toward perfect individuality.

The evil implied in a philosophy of self- negation may be appreciated when Iqbal's doctrine of he evolution of the Ego is understood. Matter, says Iqbal, is "a colony of egos of a low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their association and interaction reach a certain degree of coordination".[16] The Ego is the product of millions of years of evolution, from plant through animal to human existence; life is the condition of ego-activity, and as action caused the Ego to grow in consciousness, it advanced from stage to stage. By continued ego-sustaining action, man may advance his consciousness towards the next stage of evolution. As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the trend of life is toward the perfection of individuality and personality; "it is highly improbable that a being whose evolution has taken millions of years should be thrown away [at death] as a thing of no use".[17] Man therefore any be considered a candidate for immortality; in Iqbal's words: "Personal immortality is an aspiration; you can have it if you make an effort to achieve it".[18]

The concept of immortality as an evolutionary stage to he achieved by the creative action of the individual Ego throws additional light on Iqbal's view of he Universe. The free creative Universe is given purpose by the strivings of individual Egos seeking to fulfil their Destiny, that is, to achieve that appropriation of the Universe by the Ego which is immortality. The climax of the long evolutionary development of the Ego toward uniqueness

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[16] Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 100.

[17] Ibid., p. 112

[18] Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, p. xxiii.

"is reached when the Ego is able to retain full self-possession, even in the case of a direct contact with the all-embracing Ego".[19] Thu creative action by the individual is not merely the means toward the development of the human personality, but can also be a step cowards the eventual creative direction of the Universe itself.

The Ego-sustaining activity which carries the individual toward the perfection of individuality and personality is the acquisition of knowledge of the self and of the Universe. According to Iqbal there are, as was noted earlier, two modes of acquiring knowledge, by Intellect and by Intuition. The Intellect, by ordering the evidence of sense experience, acquires scientific knowledge of fragments of Reality. In the words of Iqbal, "the various natural sciences are like so many vultures falling on the dead body of Nature, and each running away with a piece of its flesh".[20] This is not to deprecate the significance of he Intellect or of science, but to indicate that the totality of scientific knowledge does not equal the totality of Reality. Sole reliance on empirical knowledge, therefore, cannot bring the Ego to its fullest consciousness and intensity—the most obvious reason being that empirical, scientific knowledge cannot explain the relation o the Self to Reality. The explanation of this relationship can be discovered only through the intuitional consciousness of the Self.

To Iqbal, Intuition, which he calls Love, is the key to the perfection of the Ego. Love is the absorptive consciousness of the Self, and in "its highest form is the creation of values and ideals and the endeavour to realize them".[21] By Love the Self approaches comprehension of all the implication of Reality, and thus is strengthened. Conversely, by inaction or "asking," which includes all that is achieved without personal effort—such as thinking the thoughts of others the Ego is weakened. Hence, Love can be said to be an approach to knowledge through intense personal effort, in a sense a mystical experience.

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[19] Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. III.

[20] Ibid., p. 40.

[21] Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, p. xxv.

In its approach to perfection the human Ego passes through stages in which the elements of Intellect and Love as means of acquiring knowledge play ferrying roles. The first stage, of Obedience to the Law, is one in which the individual is taught to limit his actions in accordance with the traditions and historical experience of the community of which he is a member. From the self-consciousness of the community the individual acquires his being and personality.

The Individual a Mirror holds

To the Community, and they to him.[22]

The simple sense-experiences of the community are given meaning, during the "minority of mankind," by occasional bursts of intuitional, prophetic knowledge from exceptional individual Egos.

... Slack and lifeless hangs the warp and woof of the Group's

labour...[23]

until a prophet appears, who

Weaves all together life's dissevered parts.[24]

and

... unto one goal

Drawing each on, he circumscribes the feet

Of all within the circle of one Law.[25]

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[22] Iqbal, The Mysteries of Selflessness (Rumuz-i- Bekhudi), trans. by A.J. Arberry, (London: John Murray, 1953), p. 5.

[23] Ibid., p. 8.

[24] Ibid., p. 9.

In the second stage, that of Self control, the individual Ego, having developed through adherence to the rules laid down by the community in accordance with the intuitional knowledge of occasional prophets, is freed from mere obedience to command and is enabled to understand for himself the roles of Intellect and Intuition in achieving knowledge of Reality. In this stage, says Iqbal, the need for prophecy, as action by an individual Ego to lead the community toward knowledge, is outmoded. Man is thrown on his own resources, to achieve complete self-consciousness through a combination of Intellect and Love, as an individual perception of Reality, the transition from the first to this second stage is achieved by means of a final prophetic revelation, in which the road to individual action is made clear. Such, says Iqbal, is the meaning of Islam.

The third stage of the development of he Ego is called by Iqbal Divine Vicegerency, the last stage of human development on earth. Divine vicegerency is achieved when the Ego, through personal experience integrating Intellect and Love, "achieves a free personality, not by releasing himself from the fetters of the law, but by discovering the ultimate source of the law within the depths of this own consciousness".[26] At this stage the Ego reaches what is practically that condition of "the Infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite"[27] which is the Destiny of Egohood: the absorption of God, the Ultimate Ego, into the Self.

In the concept of Divine Vicegerency critics have seen the Nietzschean Superman under a thin disguise. Iqbal, however, himself made the distinction that all men potentially were divine vicegerents, while Nietzshe thought in terms of an aristocratic few. For Iqbal the political ideal on this earth, towards which the evolution of the Ego to new levels of consciousness moves, is the "democracy of more or less unique individuals. presided over by the most unique individual possible".[28] This ideal is "based on the

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[25] Ibid., p. 10.

[26] Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 171.

[27] Ibid., p. 104

[28] Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, p. xxvii-ix.

assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character".[29] The aim of individual action, therefore, is the cultivation of this character, which takes as its fundamental principle the conviction that "the life of the Universe comes from the power of the Self".[30]

All stars and planets dwelling in the sky,

Those lords to whom the ancient peoples prayed,

All those, my master, wait upon thy word

And are obedient servants to thy will.[31]

Recognition of the Oneness of the Absolute Ego, and of the potentialities of man as in some sense a manifestation of Him, enables the individual to keep a proper proportion between the eternal values and the changing demands of material existence. the concept of Tauhid (the unity of God) implies, says Iqbal, the unity of human origin and hence the equality of men, their freedom as subject only to God, and their solidarity as having common interests.

Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle [Tauhid] a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, [which] virtually amounts to man's loyalty to his own ideal nature. …[32]

The State, from the Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite human

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[29] Ibid., p. xxix.

[30] Ibid., p. I, 233.

[31] Iqbal, The Mysteries of Selflessness, p. 58.

[32] Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 140.

organization. ... The ultimate Reality... is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity.[33]

It is because the state (or community) is conceived as a means of realizing the fundamental principles of reality in a human organization that knowledge of the nature of Reality is essential for individual political action. It will be recalled that the community and its laws mold the immature Ego in its development toward self-consciousness. Appreciation of the Ultimate nature of Reality is basic for the whole career of the Ego as an assimilative personal center of life and experience.

Conduct, which involves a decision of the ultimate fate of the agent cannot be based on illusion. A wrong concept misleads the understanding; a wrong deed degrades the whole man, and may eventually demolish the structure of the human ego. The mere concept affects life only partially; the deed is dynamically related to reality and issues from a generally constant attitude of the whole man toward reality.[34]

In Iqbal's formulation, the appreciation of Reality which is necessary for "reintegrating the force of the average man's inner life, and thus preparing him for participation in the march of history"[35] is a religious one. It is religious, however, in the sense of not being rational, and lacks any implication of otherworldliness or supernatural manipulation of mankind; as indicated before, it "amounts to man's loyalty to this own ideal nature." This ideal of the infinite creative possibilities of the Ego reaching potentially to immortality and absorption of the Absolute restores man's faith in his future and prepares him ethically for the responsibilities involved in the advancement of modern science.

Iqbal's ultimate message to political man, then is an exhilarating, at times almost ruthless, call to the individual to create his own world. Lite. said Iqbal, is power made manifest.

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[33] Ibid., p. 147

[34] Ibid., p. 147

[35] Ibid., p. 177

The man of strong character who is master of himself

will find fortune complaisant.

.....

He will dig up the foundations of the universe

and cast its atoms into a new mould.

He will subvert the course of Time

And wreck the azure firmament.

By his own strength he will produce

A new world which will do his pleasure.[36]

Man, as a creative Ego, was entrusted by God with a free personality which he accepted at the peril of wrong action. The exercise of his free creativity may lead to immortality or to the dissolution of the Ego; this latter is the sanction which limits the action of those who, mastering themselves, are mastering Reality.

A more immediate political limitation is Iqbal's emphasis on the community and the values of its traditional practices. The past makes the personal identity of the people and of the individual; "life moves with the weight of its own past on its back".[37] Social rules—as exemplified in the communal prayer in Islam—unite the individual with his fellows, and give him a sense of that emotional oneness which is Reality. However, while emphasizing the complexity of society and the inter-dependence of institutions as a caveat for the reformer, Iqbal warns against a "false reverence of he past".[38] Each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors,"[39]

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[36] Iqbal, Secrets of the Self, p. II, 1025-34.

[37] Iqbal, Reconstruction, p. 158.

[38] Ibid., p. 144.

should solve its own problems in its own way While social organization and adherence to the law serve, to a degree, to minimize wrong action by the community in periods of decline, "the ultimate fate of a people does not depend so much on organization as on the worth and power of individual men. In an over organized society the individual is altogether crushed out of existence".[40]

Iqbal's message was meant to shock man into constructive action, especially the man of the Muslim East. In the Secrets of the Selflessness he emphasized the community as the matrix from which the individual sprang; in his Lectures he gave a comprehensive analysis of the individual Ego as related to Reality. But, however qualified, the basis of his philosophy remained individual action:

The ultimate aim of the ego is not to see something, but to be something. It is in the ego's effort to be something that he discovers his final opportunity to sharpen his objectivity and acquire a more fundamental "I am" which finds evidence of its reality not in the Cartesian "I think" but in the Kantian "I can".[41]

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[39] Ibid., p. 160.

[40] Ibid., p. 144.

[41] Ibid., p. 187.

IQBAL' S THEROY OF IJMA: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS

Muhammad Altaf Hussein Ahangar

I

Ours is an age of evolution ad revolution. The advances made in all disciplines of knowledge especially in the fields of scientific and technological know-how have dazzled and dazed not only the common man but the inventors and researchers themselves. Consequently many challenges have been thrown upon the different religio-social communities of the world particularly Muslims. One of the confronting problems for the Muslims is regarding the institution which can provide an answer to the Ummah regarding the attending consequences of all these developments. In other words, should we follow the West for providing solution to these problems or Islam provides us the institutions for meeting out the demands resulting form these intellectual and scientific excursions. And in case Islam provides several institutions which one is most viable and relevant during contemporary times. These queries are not made by the Muslims now but were attended by the Muslim intellectuals and philosophers even during the last few centuries. Appreciating the onslaught of these trends, Allama Muhammad Iqbal suggested the following Islamic alternative for dealing with,such contingencies:

> **The pressure of new world-forces and the political experience of European nations are impressing on the mind of modern Islam the value and possibilities of the idea of *Ijma'*. The growth of republican spirit and the gradual formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constitute a great step in advance.**[42]

With these introductory remarks, 'an endeavour is being made in this paper to deal with the views of Dr. Iqbal regarding Ijma'; what form Ijma'

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[42] Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 138 (Iqbal Academy Pakistan, 2nd Edition, 1989). Hereinafter referred as Reconstruction.

can assume according to him in contemporary times; how far his views are acceptable to Pakistan judiciary and how far his views can be defended in the light of views expressed by contemporary *Ulama* and jurists.

II

Ijma', in broader terms, means the consensus of the jurists of a certain period of the Muslim community over a certain legal matter. A contemporary attempt defines it as a legal concept comprising the consensus of the competent scholars of the *Ummah* with regard to legal questions that are not commented upon in the written sources.[43] While avoiding the discussion pertaining to definition, Iqbal like the generality of Muslim jurists declares *Ijma'* as the third source of Islamic law but considers it the *most important legal notion in Islam.*[44] He regrets that this important notion remained practically a mere idea and rarely assumed the form of a permanent institution in any Muslim country.[45] He attributes the non-transformation of this institution into a permanent legislative institution possibly to the political interests of absolute monarchy especially to that of the Umayyad and the Abbaside Caliphs.[46] Besides, refuting the theory of some orientalists that *Ijma'* can repeal Qur'an, he contends that *Ijma'* of companions could only extend or limit the application. of a Qur'anic rule provided the companions were in possession of a Shariah value *(Hukm)* entitling them to such a limitation or extention.[47]

Generally *Ijma'* of the companions is considered valid and binding with regard to all affairs whether religious or legal. We have even jurists on record who did not accept any other *Ijma'* except the *Ijma'* of the companions. But

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[43] Abdul Hamid A. Abu Sulayman, "Islamization of Knowledge: A New Approach Toward Reform of Contemporary Knowledge" in the book Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge, 93-118 at 104 (U.S.A, 1988)

[44] Reconstruction, 137

[45] Ibid.

[46] Id. at 138.

[47] Id. at 138-139.

Iqbal has unique a opinion about this type of *Ijma* In *Reconstruction*, he informs us:

> But supposing the companions have unanimously decided a certain point, the further question is whether later generations are bound by their decision... I think it is necessary in this connection to discriminate between a decision relating to a question of fact and the one relating to a question of law. In the former case as, for instance, when the question arose whether the two small *Surahs* known as *Mu'awwidhatan* formed part of the Qur'an or not, and the Companions unanimously decided that they did, we are bound by their decision, obviously because the companions alone were in a position to know the factor. In the latter case the question is one of interpretation only, and I venture to think, on the authority of Karkhi, that later generations are not bound by the decision of the Companions. Says Karkhi: The *Sunnah* of the Companions is binding in matters which cannot be cleared up by *Qiyas*, but .it is not so in matters which can be established by *Qiyas* .[48]

In these lines Iqbal gives his opinion that where there is a consensus of the Companions on a question of act, then such a consensus is unquestionably binding in its entirety on the succeeding generations on the ground that the Companions alone possess the knowledge of those questions and such questions cannot be answered by analogy and individual interpretation. However, where the problem pertains to a question of law, then the *Ijma'* of the Companions is not binding upon future generations for the reason that such questions relate to interpretation which is a right of every competent person[49] in every age.

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[48] Id. at 139

[49] Ahmad Hassan. The Doctrine of Ijma' in Islam. 241 (Islamabad, 1978)

Before we embark upon analysing the prospects of the above views, we deem it relevant to quote the way Professor Mohammad Hashim Kamali. reproduces the above passage:

> Iqbal draws a distinction between the two functions of *Ijma'*
>
> namely:
>
> Discovering the law and implementing the law. The former function related to the question of facts and the latter relates to - the question of law. "In the former case as, for instance, when the question arose, whether the two small suras known as *'mu'awwazatain'* formed part of the Qur'an or not, and the Companions unanimously decided that they did, we are bound by their decision, obviously because the Companions alone were in a position to know the fact. In the latter case, the question is one of interpretation only, and I venture to think, on the authority of Karkhi, that later generations are not bound by the decision of the companions"[50]

With due respect it is submitted that we fail to locate these two-fold functions of *Ijma'* in Iqbal's Reconstruction. Iqbal nowhere talks about 'discovery' and 'implementation' functions of *Ijma'*. He is simply concerned with the binding relevance of *Ijma'* of the Companions and to this self-posed question he answers that an *Ijma'* of Companions relating to question of law is not binding on future generations. By way of analysis, it is pointed out that if the function of *Ijma* is to 'discover' the law, then this object can be served not only *vis* a *vis* question of fact but also question of law. Secondly we fail to accept the view that the function of *Ijma'* is to implement law which can be fulfilled regarding question of law only. *Ijma'* is mainly concerned with the interpretation of existing law according to changed circumstances and also with the formulation of new laws in the light of guidance from the Qur'an and the Sunnah according to the exigencies of time. Implementation of laws does not fall within the ambit of Ijma'; it has always been the concern of the executive branch of the state. Perhaps the learned professor has relied for the

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[50] Mohamamd Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. 240 (Selangor, 1989).

above passage upon some secondary source in which the author might have put his own construction upon Iqbal's views.

Regarding the prospects of Iqbal's thesis that *Ijma'* of the Companions relating to question of laws is not binding on the future generations, it is worth mentioning that the observations of 1 contemporary Muslim jurists and writers seem to be implicitly endorsing Iqbal's approach. For example, Taha Jabir al 'Alwani in one of his papers *"Ijtihad"* contends:

Muslim scholars should realize that time constantly travels forward, making it impossible for situations or events to recur in exactly the same way. It just is not possible today to impose proposals and ideas put forward in Madinah by Imam Malik and his contemporaries fourteen hundred years ago. Similarly, it is not possible to ignore or discount the developments and achievements made during all the intervening generations in the field of human sciences. In economics, for instance, how would it be possible to follow the Madman market mentality in reference to contemporary economic issues. To apply the Madman market model to contemporary financial and economic situations would result in poverty and prevent the *Ummah* from meeting the people's basic requirements. It will neither be possible to have any dealings with today's complex world economic systems nor for any Muslim state to build a -strong economy capable of meeting the challenges of the present time. ***Muslims can, no doubt, learn from their predecessors by incorporating the latter's ideas into their own***.[51]

Likewise, while justifying on merits the present price control system, Dato Abdul Hamid A. Abu Sulayman states:

> While instituting reform, the factors of time and place have to be given adequate consideration with regard to the influence they might have on the interpretation or amendment of each text within the frame work of the principles of Divine guidance.[52]

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[51] Taha Jabir al 'Alwani, Ijtihad, 24-25 (IIIT, USA, 1993). [Emphasis Laid].

[52] Supra note 2 at 105.

From the above details it is apparent that in order to prove that Islam as a living ideology is susceptible to evolution and growth[53] we would have to resort to re-interpretation of the corpus of Islamic legacy and eliminate from its components the inconsistency and irrelevancy which might have crept in its legal and other fabrics.[54] We are not to forget that the current concept of Usul was formulated in an earlier period and in that capacity it responded to the needs of that age. But the developments, changes and the trends in the realities of Muslim life require a reforming in order to determine the amendments that have to be introduced[55] with regard to the individual and collective life of the Muslims.

III

We have already come to know that Iqbal treats *Ijma'* as a most important legal notion. But that contention does not solve the problem. The question is how Iqbal intends the *Ummah* to take benefit of this institution contemporarily. In other words how *Ijma'* can be constituted at present and who can participate in the discharge of this divinely - ordained obligation. As a realist Iqbal does not allow himself to be hamstrung by the notions and conceptions of past jurists and theologians. Rather he is ahead of his time when he writes:

> **The transfer of the power of Ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly, which in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only form Ijma' can take in modern times, will secure contributions to legal discussions from laymen who happen to possess a keen sight into affairs. In this way alone we can stir into activity the dormant spirit of**

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[53] Ismail Raji al Faruqi, "Islamization of Knowledge: Problems, Principles and Prospective" in the Book Islam: Source and Purpose of Knowledge, 56 (U.S.A, 1988).

[54] Id., at 30.

[55] Supra note 2 at 105.

> **life in our legal system, and give it an evolutionary outlook.**[56]

These lines suggest that legislation in an Islamic country is no more a job which can be entrusted exclusively to an individual jurist representing a particular school of thought. Such an approach, according to Iqbal, would simply lead to the growth of opposing sects thereby dividing *Ummah* further. In order to add unifying element in *Ijma'* institution, Iqbal considers the legislation through the agency of the legislative assembly as the only possible way-out. He is of the opinion that through the agency of legislative assembly *we can stir into activity the dormant spirit in our legal system and give it an evolutionary outlook*. It implies that the collective deliberations on an issue can result in best formulations and prescriptions for *Ummah*.

The second issue involved in the above observation relates to the membership of the legislative assembly. Should it be represented by the *Ulama* only or even a common man should have some say in the legislative deliberations. In this regard Iqbal expects contributions to legal discussions from *laymen who happen to possess a keen insight* into affairs. Who are these laymen whom Iqbal points out? Do they include illiterate common men? The answer is 'no'. By laymen', we contend that Iqbal means those Muslims who may not be conversant with the intricacies of *Fiqh* but do possess in-depth and profound understanding of other disciplines of life. In order to clarify Iqbal's approach, we venture to reproduce extensively the views expressed by Dato Abdul Hamid A. Abu Sulayman in one of his papers. If not mistaken, we find the close proximity in Dato's views with that of Dr. Iqbal. Dato reiterates:[57]

> **we must realize, however, that modern knowledge has expanded immensely and has become so complex that** *it is impossible for a single person to acquire a command of the multiple aspects of even one branch of knowledge.* **This means that the ability necessary for** *Ijtihad* **in any one of the various**

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[56] Reconstruction, 138

[57] Supra note 2 at 102. [Emphasis Laid].

> **branches of knowledge requires specialization in and absolute mastery of that branch. In view of this multifariousness of knowledge, and the multifariousness of the fields of specialization, it is clear that *Ijtihad*, insights, solutions and alternatives, in the domain of social and scientific knowledge cannot be provided by the specialists in legal studies alone. [Both][58] the task and the expectation are impossible.**
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> **This is most noticeable in the case of legislators who formulate and categorize the laws and regulations covering economics, politics, information, industry and scientific research or transformation. It cannot be assumed that they are the masterminds of the knowledge from which the laws and regulation have been derived. In view of the achievements and progress made in the modern fields of knowledge, we need to bring to bear the expertise of economists, politicians, administrators and others who are well-versed in the various affairs of social life. Such specialists should at the same time have first hand knowledge of the Qur'an and-the *Sunnah*, which give them proper insight into the morals, values and purpose of existence as understood in Islam and validate their activities and contributions.**

Even the Pakistani judiciary could not shun away from endorsing Iqbal's "Legislative Assembly" theory as the best form of *Ijma'*. In *Khurshid Jan*,[59] Justice Muhammad Yaqub Ali of Lahore High Court did make the following observation:

> **With due respect to them, the members of our Legislative Assemblies, at present, are not sufficiently**

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[58] The original word is "But". We think it should be "both" because that conveys the intended meaning.

[59] Khurshid Jan v. Fazal Dad, PLD 1964 (W.P) Lahore 558.

> **learned so as to be considered fit for *Ijtihad* or *Qiyas*, the two essential conditions for participating in an *Ijma*. This, however, is not a counsel of despair. A remedy against it has been suggested by Dr. Iqbal and we may add that the pre-requisite for every member of a Legislative Assembly in Pakistan should be _a fair amount of knowledge of law-making in Islam.** *We do not mean that each one of them should be Faqih or a Mujtahid. But at the same time he should not be wholly unfamiliar with the primary duty of a legislator in an Islamic country.*[60]

IV

Does it mean that *Ulama* have no role within the framework of Iqbal's theory of *Ijma'* and it is only the legislative assembly which may have the ultimate say in judging the Islamicity or otherwise of any proposed legislation? As usual, the answer is not in the affirmative. Iqbal has a definite role for *Ulama* and he does not envisage any legislation to their exclusion. In *Reconstruction* he writes:

> **One more question may be asked as to the legislative activity of a modern Muslim assembly which must consist,[61] at least for the present, mostly of men possessing no knowledge of the subtleties of Muhammadan Law. Such an assembly may make grave mistakes in their interpretation of law. How can we exclude or at least reduce the possibilities of erroneous interpretations?. The Persian Constitution of 1906 provided a separate ecclesiastical committee of Ulama - 'conversant with the affairs of the world' - having power to supervise the legislative activity of the Mejliss... But whatever may be the Persian constitutional theory, the arrangement is not free from danger, and may be tried, if**

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[60] Id. at 578-579. [Emphasis Laid].

[61] Id. at 579.

at all, only as a temporary measure in Sunni countries. *The Ulama should form a vital part of a Muslim legislative assembly helping and guiding free discussion on questions relating to law.*[62]

What one can deduce from the above observation is that the legislative assembly should enact a law in consultation of the Ulama. Dr Iqbal has his own reasons for such a contention. He thinks that most of the members of the legislative assembly *must* [63] consist of men possessing no knowledge of the subtleties of Islamic Law. Resultantly such assembly is likely to commit grave mistakes in the interpretation of law. Such an assumption is absolutely right. Even today we see such persons elected to the legislative assembly who are bereft of academic and moral excellence and it is purely their personal influence on the electorates of this constituency which enables them to reach to the corridors of highest law-making institution. So, in order to reduce possibilities of erroneous interpretation Iqbal advocates the temporary adoption in Sunni countries of a device envisaged in Persian Constitution of 1906 whereby *Ulama* should form the *vital part of a Muslim legislative assembly helping and guiding free discussions on questions relating to law.* It means that the role which Iqbal intends to be ass1igned to the *Ulama* is confined simply to helping and guiding free discussions on questions relating to law. In other words, if a conflict emerges regarding a future enactment, then it will be the will of the legislative assembly which would prevail over the reasoning of *Ulama.* It seems that Iqbal does not favour dominating role of *Ulama* in *Shia* Jurisprudence whereby *Ulama* consider themselves entitled to supervise the whole life of the community. Actually he does not want sovereignty of legislative assembly to be impaired by any other institution. Further, he expects those persons to dominate Muslim legislative assembly in future who happen to possess the) knowledge of the subtleties of Islamic law. We find favour for our argument in Khurshid Jan where the learned judge observed:

> **Two distinct thoughts are visible in these observations. One that the legislative assemblies of the modern state may assume the role of Ijma' and the other that the**

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[62] Reconstruction, 139-140. [Emphasis Laud.

[63] Emphasis Laid.

sovereignty of the legislature should not be impaired by subjecting it to the authority of an external organ.[64]

Secondly, what meaning Iqbal gives to the word ' *Ulama'*. Does, he mean a person who is well versed in the teachings of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* and relies unfailingly on the interpretation of early jurists while dealing with a problem. In other words is he the person who is mostly engrossed in the past and does not acquaint himself with the realities of the contemporary multi-dimensional world. In this regard, Iqbal insists on those *Ulama who are conversant with the affairs of the world*. A vivid depiction of qualifications of such *Ulama* can be found in one of the works of Maulana Abul A' la Maududi in which he provides that our law-makers should, *inter alia*, have acquaintance with the problems and conditions of our times – the new problems of life to which an answer is sought and the new conditions in which the principles and injunctions of the *Shari' ah* are to be applied.[65]

From the above views one can arrive at a conclusion that for the time being the Muslim specialists in different disciplines and Ulama have, to some extent, role of equivalence in a Muslim legislative assembly. Dato Abdul Hamid A. Abu Sulayman does not seem departing from this approach when he writes:

Such well-equipped specialists can develop the legislative source materials on which legislators can draw to meet the day-to-day requirements of the *Ummah* and vitalize its existence. By so doing we can define the place of *'lfta'* and of the legislature in the field of knowledge, as well as realistically assess their potential social performance in order to avoid overburden or misguiding either the experts or the solons. *This means that we will continue to call*

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[64] Supra note 18 at 577.

[65] Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, 77 (Lahore, 7th edition, 1980). Other qualifications according to learned author, are (i) faith in Sharaah, (ii) proper knowledge of Arabic language,

(iii) Knowledge and insight in the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunnah,

(iv) acquaintance with contributions of earlier jurists and commendable character and conduct. (Ibid)

upon orthodox jurists and legislators to provide the insights, originality and answers to new, intricate problems, but only in conjunction with an unflinching determination to keep them abreast of knowledge by preparing cadres of specialists capable of living to the-expectations and requirements of the age.[66]

The responsibility of these inter-disciplinary specialist cadres should not remain confined to a particular legislative think-tank or authority but should be shared by the academic community, by representatives of interest groups, and by legislative bodi responsible for pronouncements arising from the need and demands of the ' *Ummah's* social structure. This approach is necessary to enhance the intellectual vitality of the *Ummah* and to reduce any ambiguities or anxieties in its daily practices.[67]

V

Is the literature and law inherited by Ummah from Islamic heritage sufficient to guide us for having *Ijma*' pertaining to unending contemporary problems? Many of the contemporary *Ummah* would answer this query affirmatively but Iqbal addresses the problem with the observation:

> The only effective remedy for the possibilities of erroneous interpretations is to reform the present system of legal education in Muhammadan countries, to extend its sphere and to combine it with an intelligent study of modern jurisprudence.[68]

From this dictum Iqbal seems to suggest that with the present system of legal education in Muslim countries we cannot face the contemporary world, i.e., we cannot provide solutions to the multi-dimensional complex problems of contemporary items. Accordingly he suggests three-fold steps for proving Shariah as a living institution through the agency of Ijma'. Legislators and Ulama are supposed to work for (i) the reformation of

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[66] Emphasis Laid.

[67] Supra note 2 at 102-103.

[68] Reconstruction, 140.

present system of legal education, (ii) the extension of the sphere of legal education and (iii) the) combination of Islamic legal education with an intelligent study of modern jurisprudence.

A look in these three steps suggests that there should have been some reason with Iqbal for pleading for the reformation of present system of legal education. Personally we are of the view that it is the rigidness and conservativeness in our legal system towards the solution of our day to day problems that prompted Iqbal to plead for its reformation. When Iqbal talks about the extension of the sphere of legal education, he wants us to come out of the myopic sphere of Islamic family law, penal law and commercial law. His intentions are to make us face the realities of the real world. And this is possible only when we study and teach subjects of contemporary legal relevance, such as, shipping laws, aviation laws, industrial laws, economic laws and so on. Still not satisfied, he impresses upon us the need of combination of Islamic legal education with intelligent study of modern jurisprudence, implying thereby that a comprehensive study of modern legal disciplines and Islamic legal heritage is sine qua non for the purpose of finding solutions to the present-day problems. Here, it would not be a matter of irrelevance to suggest that in Iqbal's approach to legal education we can identify coincidentally the policy adopted by International Institute of Islamic Thought, U.S.A. towards the Islamization of knowledge. The workplan designed by this Institute for knowledge Islamization process lays emphasis, inter alia, on (i) mastery of modern disciplines, (ii) discipline survey, (iii) mastery of Islamic legacy, (iv) establishment of specific relevance of Islam to the disciplines, and (v) critical assessment of modern discipline and Islamic legacy.[69] One can at case find in this workplan the materialization of Iqbal's visionary outlook about the future educational pattern of Ummah. There is, however, a differentiating factor; Iqbal's three-step formula relates to the discipline of law whereas the blue-print designed by the IIIT concerns with every discipline of human life. But what can be true of discipline of law is equally applicable to other disciplines and there is a real need to Islamize our knowledge with regard to every discipline of life and talk simply about the discipline of law would not be productive fur the Ummah.

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[69] Supra note 12 at 54-63. See also supra note 2 at 103-106.

VI

One more question which attends our mind pertains to location and analysis of the practical significance of Iqbal's theory regarding Ijma'. We mean whether lqbal's views simply reflect the philosophical dimension and relevance of the Ijma' institution or practically it has impressed the legal institutions of Muslim nations. An approach of Pakistani judiciary to Iqbal's thinking can provide best answer to this self-posed query. In Khurshid Jan,[70] justice Muhammad Yaqub Ali found Iqbal's views about Ijma' constitutionally incorporated in the provisions of Article 198(3) of he 1956 Constitution and Articles 199-203 of 1962 Constitutions of Pakistan. Article 198(3) of 1956 Constitution authorised the President of Pakistan to appoint a commission:

a) to make recommendations:-

i) as to the measures for bringing the existing law into conformity with the injunctions of Islam, and

ii) as to the stages by which such measures should be brought into effect; and

b) to compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of the

National and Provincial Assemblies such injunctions of

Islam as can be given legislative effect.

Likewise the enumerated articles of 1962- Constitution empowered the President or the Governor of Province to refer to the Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology for advice on any question that arises as to whether a proposed law disregards or violates, or is otherwise not in accordance with, the above principles. In selecting a person for appointment to the Council, the President was to have regard to the person's understanding and appreciation of Islam and of the economic, political, legal and administrative problems of Pakistan. The functions of the Council were:

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[70] Supra note 18.

(a) to make recommendations to the Central Government and the Provinclal Governments as to means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives inall respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam, as set out in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah; and

(b) to advise the National Assembly, a Provincial Assembly, the President or a Governor on any question referred to the Council under Article 6, that is to say, a question as to whether a proposed law disregards or violates, or is otherwise not in accordance with the principles of law-making.

Besides, the Constitution required the President to establish an Islamic Research Institute which shall undertake Islamic research and instruction in Islam for the purpose of assisting in the t reconstruction of Muslim society on the truly Islamic basis.[71]

The Post-Kburshid Jan era, however, witnessed more strides towards the realization of Iqbal's thinking about Ijma'. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 provides for the establishment of Federal Shariah Court[72] entrusted with the task of examining and deciding the question whether or not any law or provision of law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (SAAS). Once it finds any law or provision of law repugnant to the injunctions of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, such law or provision shall cease to have effect on the day on which the decision of he court takes effect.[73] The role and approach of Federal Shariat Court was discussed in Muhammad Riaz.[74] Aftab Hussain J., observed:

> **The principle under which the repugnance of a particular law to the injunctions of Islam has to be**

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[71] Id. at 577-578.

[72] Art. 203 C.

[73] Art. 203 D.

[74] Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Govt. PLD 1980 F.S.C.I. (Federal Shariat Court).

judged is limited to the consideration of the question whether the laws sought to be challenged before this court are in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of Prophet (peace be upon Him). It would, therefore, be clear that the language of the Constitution does not warrant any attempts at harmonizing the laws with any particular Jurisprudence (Fiqh) or Jurisprudence of any particular school of thought or sect. On the other hand it appears that reference to any particular doctrinal approach (Fiqh) has been ellminated deliberately so as to enable the Courts to test the validity of a law only on the criteria of commandments laid down in the Holy Qur'an or the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon Him)[75]

Continuing his observation, the learned judge further contends:

Looked in this context it would be clear that though doctrinal approach (Fiqh) of different schools of thought may have a persuasive value which it undoubtedly has and in many cases full assistance may be obtained from it in the interpretation of the texts of the Holy Qur'an or traditions, yet this Court cannot blindly follow the doctrines (fiqh) of a particular sect. If the intention of the Constitution had been to apply a sectarian doctrine to matters of public law (as distinguished from personal law) all the difficulty would have been obviated by replacing the present public law by Fatawa Alamgiri. But clearly this is not the object of the Constitution to which it appears abhorrent to demolish the existing legal structure in order to raise a new structure of public law. The constitutional intent is only to repair the existing structure by eliminating from it what is repugnant to the divine law comprised in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon

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[75] Id. at 14.

Him) and amending the law to make it conform to the said divine law.[76]

Zakaullah Lodi, the other Judge of the Federal Shariat Court, held:

We are required to construe the injunction of the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah in the light of such conditions as were prevalent at particular juncture of time in the society in which Islam was practised first in its true spirlt and not to try to apply -it by rigidly adhering to the grammatical meanings of a particular verse and by divorcing the impact and bearing of the general scheme and spirit of the Qur'an as well as the goal in view of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon Him). The greatest of exponents of Islamic laws always adopted this course in their own times and provided a guideline for us. Such other questions as the examination of the historical background of our people, their temperament and the, place and position that they occupy in the present day civilization are other considerations which shall have to be kept in mind.[77]

Late President Zia, after putting 1973 Constitution in abeyance, allowed many of its articles to operate without any amendment and got some articles amended vide Chief Martial Law Administrator's order No. 1 of 1981. Article 228 provided for the Constitution of Council of Islamic Ideology within ninety days of commencing of the Order consisting of not less than eight and more than twenty members amongst persons having knowledge of the principles and philosophy of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah, or understanding of thee economic, political, legal or administrative problems of Pakistan.[78] Allowing a member the tenure of three years[79] and Council having at least a woman member,[80] the function of the Council

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[76] Ibid.

[77] Id. at 46.

[78] Art. 228 (2).

[79] Art. 228 (5).

include (i) making of recommendations to Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling to encourage the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Qur'an and the Suunnah; (ii) to advise a House, a Provincial Assembly, the President or a Governor on any question referred to the Council as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam; (iii) to make recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws into conformity with the injunctions of Islam and the stages by which such measures should be brought into effect; and (iv) to compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of the Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies, such injunctions of Islam as can be given legislative, effect.[81]

All these details have been given with the object of familiarising the readers that Pakistan has theoretically (and to some extent practically) gone ahead of Iqbals' conception of Ijma Iqbal had envisioned uni-tier device for framing of laws by Ijma', i.e., Ulama constituting a vital part of Muslim legislative assembly helping and guiding free discussion on questions relating to law.[82]

But the Pakistani Judiciary has come out with four-tier device for legal formulutions by Ijma'. These are: (1) Legislative Assemblies; (2) Federal Shariat Court; (3) Council of Islamic Ideology and (4) Islamic Research Institute. Treating the establishment of Islamic Council and Islamic Research Institute conforming with Ijma' institutiou, Muhammad Yaqub Ali, J., observed in Khurshid Jan:[83]

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[80] Art. 228 (3) (d). The inclusion of a woman member in the Council of Islamic Ideology bears witness to the fact that only Muslim males cannot have understanding of the principles and philosophy of Islam enunciated in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. It implies that Muslim women can equally participate in the legislative process of a Muslim nation.

[81] Art. 230 (1) (a-d).

[82] Reconstruction, 139-140.

[83] Supra note 18.

... The masses are to follow the learned in exposition of laws on the basis of Qur'anic verse "obey God and obey the Prophet and those amongst you who are in authority". According to the four Sunni Schools, the words "man is authority" referred to men, who are learned in the laws so as to be considered fit for Ijtihad or Qiyas and not to Rulers or Governors since they themselves are required to conform to the rules of Shariat and to act upon the advice of the learned according to the Qur'anic Text: "that if you yourself do not know them question those who do". The Constitutional provisions for the establishment of . Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology and Islamic Research Institute, in our opinion, seek to conform to this rule.[84]

As is evident, the judicial approach in Pakistan highlights several devices for resorting to the law-making through Ijma' but this in no way affects the utility and relevance of Iqbal's device of 'legislative assembly' as constituting the only possible form of Ijma'. Any rule and finding put forward by Council of Islamic ideology and Islamic Research Institute cannot become law unless given recognition by a legislative assembly. Likewise, where the legislative assembly is convinced that the Federal Shariat Court has departed from the true spirit of an Islamic principle while construing a law, it can nullify that very interpretation by a legislative provision to that effect. So we can safely arrive at a conclusion that contemporarily the legislative assembly of Pakistan is the supreme body of law-making and the role of the Council of Islamic Ideology, Islamic Research Institute and even Federal Shariat Court is to help and guide this legislative assembly in the formulations of rules, regulations and laws for the governance of the contemporary Pakistani Muslim society in accordance with the urgencies and demands of the time.[85]

VII

From the preceding discussion we have come to know that Iqbal considered lima' as the most important legal notion in Islam. And in order to provide legal solutions to the multi-dimensional confronting problems, he

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[84] Id. at 578.

[85] For further details, see M. Altai. Hussain Ahangar, "Classical Sources of Islamic Law: Judicial Responses in Pakistan", Xll Islamic Comparative Law Review, 101-113 (New Delhi, 1992).

held the opinion that the legislative assembly of a Muslim state is the possible form the Ijma' can assume in contemporary times. He expects the guidance and help of Ulama to the members of legislative assembly during the law enactment process. The 'legislative assembly 'device for law formulations has already received endorsement from Pakistan Judiciary. However, the Pakistani Judiciary has recognised (1) Federal Sha'riat Court; (2) Council of Islamic Ideology, and (3) Islamic Research Institute as other institutions through which laws can be enacted in a Muslim County. Personally we are of the opinion that the four-fold devices recognised by Pakistan Judiciary for enactment of Laws through the process of Ijma' does not in any way affect Iqbal's 'legislative assembly' theory whereby the legislative assembly is the only possible form of Ijma. The fact remains that deliberations, findings and formulations by any institution does not become law automatically unless and until legislative assembly approves and ratifies these in the form of' legislation. The emergence of International Institute of Islamic thought on the world-scene does make us realize that Iqbal's theory of lima' holds positive and bright future. A comparison of Iqbal's thesis with that of policy and objects of IIIT makes one realize! about the closeness and at some places the similarity between the, Iqbal's philosophical adventure and HIT'S practical workplan. An indirect concise account of IIIT's mission outlined by Taha Jabir al 'Alwani in one of his papers mentions:

... It advocates the revival of Muslim Thought along the Prophet's original methodology and calls for a fresh look at Islam's basic sources in the light of modern changes and for adjustment in Islamic thought accordingly. The exponents of this school consider Ijtihad a reflection of the contemporary intellectual and, psychological state of the Ummah. For then whatever the right pre reguisites for Ijtihad exist, then it becomes incumbent upon the Ulama to practise Ijtihad and respond to the needs of the time. They, also contend that fiqh is but one area in need for Ijtihad in order to deals with the affairs of the Ummah. The school propounds what could be called macro-fiqh which deals with the totality of the concerns of the Ummah - as opposed to micro-fiqh which deal with specific issues - and is therefore subject to local conditions and' influences.[86]

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[86] Supra note 10 at 21-22.

LANDSCAPE IN IQBAL'S POETRY

Aalila Sohail Khan

Ideology consists of "those modes of feeling, valuing, perceiving and believing which have some kind of relation to the maintenance and reproduction of social power."[87] Colonialism, nationalism and ideology they work much less by explicit concepts or formulated doctrines than by images, symbols, rituals, myths and folklore. A successful ideology entwines itself with the deepest unconscious roots of human psyche and engages deep-seated and arational human fears and needs. Ideas embodied in images making a direct appeal to human passions and feelings, enable an ideology to operate at every social level; intellectual elite, enlightened middle-class, religious section and the labouring class.

"Literature is an ideology"[88], because though it has an autonomous existence of its own, it cannot be chopped off from history and society, and it maps its affiliations. English literature has been used, as is proved by Edward Said in his book Culture and Imperialism, Terry Eagleton in Literary Theory and Gauri Viswanathan in Masks of Conquest to shape and buttress images of English authority and nobility. Colonialism is also not simply an act of acquisition and domination. It is supported and perhaps even impelled by ideological formulations, which project images of its racial, moral, political, economic and military superiority in manufacturing grand rituals and ceremonies. Similarly, Dr, Parveen Shaukat in her book The Political Philosophy of Iqbal quotes from different political philosophers to bring out the ideological aspects of nationalism, which is more of a feeling than a fully logically structured system. Nationalism expresses itself in images and symbols - flags, military parades, totem animals, folk songs - "Representing a sense of belonging to one collective body of individuals essentially different

[87] Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), pp. 22.
[88] 2. Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), pp. 8.

from individuals of any other collective body which is rationally inexpressible."[89]

These nationalist ideas and images are as significant as the number of people in an army. To sustain and consolidate social power, or to harness patriotic feelings, both the colonial ruling elite and the insurgent natives generate a set of expressive and interpretative images of a common history of a sacred land with its own perspective, historical sense, traditions, values and structure of feelings. This strategy is at work in what many nationalist poets write during freedom movements.

Literature of awareness sparking resistance against colonialism develops quite consciously out of a desire to create and develop a sense of self-respect, national self-consciousness and freedom. Before this can be done, however, there is a pressing need for the repossession of the colonized territory which, because of the presence of the colonizing intruder, is recoverable at first only in literature through the imagination. Man is rooted in earth. The struggle to recapture the lost land involves a battle of images and ideas. One element which is radically distinguishable in the imagination of anti-imperialism is "the primacy of the geographical"[90] in it. Colonialism after all is an act of geographical violence through which distant lands are coveted, explored, charted and finally usurped. "For the native the history of his/her colonial servitude is inaugurated by the loss to an outsider of the local place, whose concrete geographical identity must thereafter be searched for and some-how restored."[91] In his Poem "Mosque of Cordoba", Iqbal feels himself dispossessed of his land like the founder of the mosque, Abd-al-Rahman who had been exiled from Arabia, his birth place. In one of his letters to Quaid-e-Azam, Iqbal wrote that they were both exiles in India. A colonized person is homeless, an exile, because he has been dispossessed of his rightful land:

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[89] Parveen Shaukat Ali, The Political Philosophy of Iqbal (Lahore: Publishers United Limited, 1978), pp. 184.

[90] Edward W. Said, "Yeats and Decolonization," in Literature in the

Modern World: Critical Essays and Documents, ed., Dennis Walder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). pp. 36.

[91] Ibid., p. 36.

My exile from this land so dear,

Is full of anguish, pain and shocks

(Rod of Meses).

From 1900 till his departure for Europe in 1905. Iqbal's poetry is full of love for his native land. He thought that India was incomparably superior to the rest of the world. He praised enthusiastically Indian civilization's achievements and longevity. In the beginning Iqbal was an ardent lover of his native land, and sang the beauty of the Indian landscape: "Each speck of dust of my native land is as holy as a country's idol" (Bang-e-Dara). At this time Iqbal took the counfry, a territorial unit, as the basis of national consciousness and believed that religion could be separate from politics. Iqbal's political thought was geographically oriented before he left for Europe in 1905. His idea of nationalism was soil-based and the identity of the people derived its meaning from the idea of a common homeland, a concrete geographical entity.

On his return from Europe in 1908, Iqbal rejected the Western concept of territorial nationalism. He believed that on a secular level, territorial nationalism narrows the sphere of human loyalties, breeds hostility and war among nations, and undermines prospects of international peace. On the religious level, nationalism separates religion from politics. On the political level, nationalism promotes colonialism and imperialism.

Iqbal said "Western nations are based on territory and race. Whereas the strength of your -community rests on the might of your religion". (Bang-e-Dara). Taking religion as the determining factor of his national identity, Iqbal looks across stretches of land to Arabia and claims its spirit to be the fountain head of his inspiration and strength in thought and poetry:

If my jar is Persian, does not matter, my wine is Arabian,

If my song is Indian, does not matter, may melody is Arabian

(Bang-e-Dara).

The majority of the Muslim territories and Asian countries were under the English colonial domination. For colonialism all the Muslim lands were an image of an antagonistic culture which had to be controlled and subjugated. Therefore, Iqbal's reply to Western aggression is continental in its breadth. He proclaims spokesmanship for the whole of the East, and sends a message to the West: "In this our ancient dust I find the pure gold of the soul:

Each atom of it is a star's eye with the power to see.

In every grain of sand lodged in the womb of mother earth

I see the promise of-a many-branched fruit-laden tree

(Message from the East).

His concept of Pan-Islamism, like the concept of Negritude aiming at the freedom of the entire African continent, aims at freeing all the Muslim lands from colonial possession. He thus takes up arms to restore all the lost Muslim possessions, and this widens the framework of his geographical references.

The shift from the Indian landscape to the Arabian desert is a marked change in his poetry after his return from Europe in 1908. the landscape becomes a mental inscape. Arabic influence starts increasing from the third section his first collection of poems Bang-i-Dara, and it persists till the last of Iqbal's books, Armaghan-i-Hijaz. The contours of his landscape change and expand and a new inconography emerges, the Arabian desert, the abode of camelherds. His poetry becomes preoccupied with references to rivers, mountains and places in the Middle East to the exclusion of references to rivers and mountains in India. The native peasant never makes his appearance in Iqbal's poetry. He populates his landscape with an idealised version of camel - drivers. The Arabic spirit pervades his work through "Similes, metaphors, proverbs, figures of speech and images which carry the reader unconsciously to the Arabian surroundings.[92] The images of "carefree loiterings of deer on sand-dunes" (Bang-i-Dara), caravans stopping at pools

[92] Prof. Muhammad Munawwar, Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Islam (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1992), pp. 16.

of water surrounded by palm trees, journeys without milestones, remains of burnt-out fire and pieces of tent robe on the soft velvet-like desert sand become frequent. The poem entitled 'Mosque of Cordoba' was composed in Spain about a Spanish mosque, and yet it is suffused with the Arabian spirit. the columns of the mosque are compared to a thick grove of Syrian desert date-palms.

The names of the nations used in the words - Irish, English, Arabian, Japanese, Pakistani, Indian - are only geographic terms and in this sense do not come into conflict with any ideology. But in the political literature of the present day, the word "country" has not only a geographical connotation but also an idea, a principle governing the form of human society that has a history and tradition of thought, inconography and vocabulary that give reality, and is, from this point of view, a political concept. One of the methods that Iqbal uses to identify national concern is to stud his poetry with the names of Muslim places. This use of precise geographical locations is a manifestion of his allegiance to Islam.

Iqbal could at times complain of the blind bitter undisciplined country he was living in. He denounced ignorant crowds, and lamented lack of leadership among his people but he never flinched from an unstinted commitment to his ideology, and land becomes an emblem of his ideology: separate identity, pride, an ideal of life and civilization, a dignified image counter to the insult hurled at him by colonialism. This imaginatively projected base helps him to free his people from foreign political and cultural control.

A study of colonial writer's landscape descriptions strikes one by the entirely foreign terms of reference.[93] They aimed to create an empathy between them and the colonial milieu. Their focus was on their individual experience and their home- sickness. The scenic details that they depicted emphasized the exotic element and bore little relationship to the actual landscape. Landscape was observed to study its material influence on the indigenous traits of the natives, who were either condescended to, or made fun of. Colonial eyes could not see any beauty in the native scenery. Kipling

[93] Hugh Ridley, Images of Imperial Rule (New York: St. Martins Press, 1983), pp. 63-72.

asserted that in "India there are no half tints worth noticing[94] Frequently there was a negative account of colonial scenery. Indo-Pak Subcontinent's vast stretches of land and Arabia's desert were shown as without scruple or sympathy for the English settlers who were the heroes in colonial literature. Colonized forests, deserts and mountains became nightmarish, merciless and harsh. This emphasis on the extraordinarily cruel aspect of the native land and weather helped to preserve the strongly idealistic belief in colonialism. The native country itself was held responsible for the crimes of the settlers. The suggestion was that the colonists had succumbed to the barbarism of the native land rather than to the inherent cruelty of colonialism. Colonial writers harsh scene - setting aimed at suspending normal moral judgement in their readers. Their argument was that nobody could be a saint in such hellish scenes.

Iqbal looked around with loving eyes, and found the landscape of his country beautiful and soul-refreshing. Iqbal does not feel himself scorched by the implacable sun of the Arabian desert. It is a pleasure for him to see the sun rising and setting in the silence of the desert. In his poem "Khizr-e-Rah" Iqbal compares the morning star in the desert to Gabriel's brow, and the caravaneers around the pool of water are like the faithful around the fountain Salsabil in paradise. The desert air is clean, there are no dust particles in it. Leaves of date palms are washed, and the sand is soft like velvet. Iqbal's camel-drivers are silhouetted as dignified, brave, freedom-loving figures against Arabian landscape.

Colonial literature in its description of the occupied country's landscape used language suggestive of "a fantasy of dominance and appropriation".[95] The captive country uncontestingly presents itself to the colonial eye. However, native land as it spreads before the eyes of Iqbal cahllenges foreign presence. Awesome peaks of mountains, turbulent rivers and majestic deserts defy invasion. the "winds of the wilderness" which sweep through Iqbal's landscape "temper the sword/that soldiers of righteousness draw in the field" (Gabriel's Wing). Iqbal calls the majestic Himalaya "rampart of Hindustan's

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[94] Ibid., p. 65.

[95] Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 60.

domain" (Bang-i-Dara). The snow-capped mountains have awesome grandeur. It is the guardian which blocked the

onslaught of many invaders in the past. He inhabits his landscape with an idealised version of crusaders, who are ever on the alert, and bid defiance to the enemies. These "sentinels of nature" (Bang-i-Dara) live dangerously, hurl a challenge to the infidels and face the danger fearlessly with laughing lips. They are like an eagle which scorns ease, and is ever ready to swoop upon the enemy.

In colonial literature, the crossing of a river, or climbing mountain was mentioned without any reference to their political or cultural significance. To Iqbal, the appearance of native landscape did not convey only delight, but was bound up, with the idea of a glorious past. This secondary and derived interest in place supersedes the primary and simple physical delight in the scene. He establishes a connection between place, history and native traditions.

In his address to Himalaah, Iqbal uses the antiquity and the scenic beauty of the Himalayas as background to project his love for his country. In his patriotic fervour, Iqbal increases its stature more than mount Sinai. These mountains rank so high in his esteem that Iqbal lands the boat of Noah on its heights rather than on any other mountain in the Mediterranean ocean.

The values of the old history of India are imprinted on the majestic peaks of. Himalayas. The poem 'Himalaya' is an investigation into origins, roots and native authenticity. Iqbal extols the ancient Indian culture which like a beacon glowed and illumined the rest of the world. He wants the passage of time to take a reverse course so that he could see with his own eyes the past grandeur of India.

Fancy, bring back to life the same old morn and eve,

changing time, more swiftly back to ancient past"

(Bang-e-Dara).

The scenic beauty of the landscape in Iqbal is not simply an idyllic description of appreciation of the purely aesthetic charm of nature. the

movement that Iqbal makes from the landscape to the past reassures him that he belongs to a culture which can boast of a grand ancient heritage, second to none. Iqbal recalls the days when the Muslims landed on the banks of Ganges!

The waters of the ganges! Do you still remember

The days when our caravan halted by your banks

(Bang-i-Dara)

Sicily, Spain, Samarkand and Bokhara evoke memories of the throne-shaking power of the Muslims in the past. Sight and memory are interwoven. He feels that the breeze of Cordova is still fragrant with the perfume of Hejaz and Yemen.

It is natural that in the construction of national consciousness, different components would be stressed by different people in different times at different places-Iqbal philosophizes the concept of country; Igbal's concept is that country is neither a material object to be deified nor an inert fact of nature. Men make their own history and what they make, they extend it to geography. As both geographical and cultural entities, regions are man-made. Geographical rootedness can deter individual and national progress This dynamic concept of territorial unit helps Iqbal to transcend an adherence to a petrified constricting past. Moreover, it facilitates a move away from parochial ties to cosmopolitanism:

Now Brotherhood has been so cut to shreds

That instead of the Community

The Country has been given pride of place

(Mysteries of Selflessness).

According to Iqbal's belief, "Islam is not earthbound. It aims at shaping a human society by the commingling of races and nationalities".[96] Iqbal

[96] Quoted by Professor Muhammad Munawwar in Iqbal: Poet Philosopher of Islam (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1992), pp. 97.*)*

ultimately transcends space and soars high to roam in the ethereal regions (Javid Nama) transcending all the animosities and hostilities, eliminating all the racial, religious and territorial distinctions:

I have seen, the contrivings of West and East-

Prevent the destinies of West and East ...

Abandon the East, be not spellbound by the West

(Javid Nama).

AESTHETICS IN IQBAL' S POETRY

Professor Jagan Nath Azad

Iqbal was not only a great poet and, by virtue of his being a great poet, a great artist, but also a great art critic. His aesthetic taste compled with his expression has no parallel in Urdu or Persian poetry. In almost all his poetical works in Urdu and Persian he examines the ideas of beauty, which have prevailed in all ages to find out, as far as possible, the fundamental principles on which such ideas rest. As a philosopher Iqbal has a realm of concrete knowledge in his possession but through poetry he communicates all his concrete knowledge in a sensory form. In his poetry we discover philosophised study of all the arts manifested through natural beauty. A pleasant blend indeed!

Before I move on further with this subject I would like to point out that according to some art critics aestheticism is generally not limited with classicism. Most of the classical theories have been considered by Benedetto Croce, a great modern aesthetic philosopher, to be less than "aesthetic", defective either through simple hedonism or through hedonism joined with didacticism. But as Iqbal was a poet who could not be labeled as only classical or only didactic or only a philosopher poet or only a modern poet or only a mystic poet, he was something more than "aesthetic", a mystical access or ascent into the boundless beyond criticism. He was an amalgam of a seer, a philosopher and a poet.

Iqbal presents his world beautifully and delightfully and the delight comes from the passionate vitality of his expression, for this gives him a criterion which, if necessary, he can abstract altogether from his total view of poetry as the most effective way of moving to virtue and apply to a work of literary art, whatsoever its subject matter and whether it has a moral purpose or not. Iqbal's poetry both teaches and delights and in case the reader has separate criteria for what is good doctrine and what constitutes delight in the way of expression, he or she has thus prepared the way for the emergence of the purely aesthetic point of view.

The world created by Iqbal is not an "imitation", in any sense, of the real world we live in, but an improvement on it, presented so purposively that the reader will wish to imitate that improvement. This aspect of Iqbal's poetry is also due to his perception of the beautiful in nature and art.

Aesthetics, although a branch of philosophy, deals with the appreciation of the beautiful in accordance with the principles of good taste for the main reason that it belongs to the appreciation of the Beautiful. The bliss that it provides to its reader is not a product of philosophical reasoning but of emotion, imagination and fancy. However, it is not far away from fact that sometimes philosophical reasoning also tries to provide pleasure and derive pleasure from this process in a clandestine manner. This process is not a taboo for philosophical reasoning, the only condition for the philosophical reasoning is that it has to surrender before imagination. Here I am reminded of Samuel Taylor Coleridge's quotations: "No man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher". So it is because emotion or the felt thought and that too when the poet is able to give it the language of poetry, that genuine great poetry comes into existence.

Iqbal's aesthetic taste is a remarkable God-given gift not only to poetry but also to entire humanity. In so far as his aesthetic sense becoming a part and parcel of his self and his poetic expression is concerned, he is unique in the entire galaxy of great Urdu and Persian poets.

According to Iqbal the entire universe is an endless river of beauty, elegance and sublimity; its every drop is surging with charm and positive pleasure only if the eye is able to see it; only if the eye is able to discern it. How beautifully, he in his poem "Sada-i-Dard" (Voice of Affliction) expresses it in a charming couplet:

Mehfil-i-qudrat hai ik darya-i-be-payan-i-husn,

ankh agar dekhe to har qatre men hai toofan-i-husm

For him life is all beautiful and real and earnest. On this issue Iqbal is most vocal in his disagreement with Plato, according to whom "there is the world, an appearance, and there is the reality which is yonder". Both in his Urdu and Persian poetry Iqbal transforms beauty into the soul of life with

the result that the human'soul derives aesthetic pleasure and delight out of the process.

However, this should not lead us to misconstrue that Iqbal disagrees with Plato on every issue touching on aesthetics. For instance, take Plato's following assertion to which Iqbal is in agreement to a great extent.

> Still the arts are not to be slighted on the ground that they create by imitation of natural objects; for, to begin with, these natural objects are themselves imitations; then, we must recognise that they (the arts) give no bare reproduction of the thing seen but go back to the Ideas from which nature derives,-and, furthermore, that much of their work is all their own; they are moulders of beauty and add where nature is lacking.

One of Iqbal's couplets touching on this issue is

Wuhi jahan hai tira jis ko tu kare paida

Yeh sang-o-khisht naheen jo tiree nigah men hai

Your world is (only) the one which you create yourself,

Not these stones and bricks, which are in sight

And again

Shair-i-dilnawaz bhi bat agar kahe kharee

Hoti hai us ke faiz se kisht-i-sukhanwari haree

If a heart-soothing poet utters something genuine

Through his grace and blessings plantation of poetry grows lush green

Mentioning Iqbal's disagreement and agreement with Plato on the issues mentioned above, it would perhaps be a bit unfair to bypass of two of the most respected criteria of beauty symmetry and brightness of colour—known to later

antiquity and emphasized by stoic philosophers and litterateurs. According to Cicero "the essential characters composing beauty are order, symmetry and definition". And according to Coleridge" a poem is a species of composition which proposes to itself such delight from the whole as is compatible with a distinct gratification from each component part (Biographia Literaria). Here two modern writers, William K. Winsatt, Jr. and Cleanth Brooks of Yale University have raised a question saying, "how could symmetry be part of the definition of beauty?" and then they quote Plotinus who says.

> **Only compound can be beautiful, never anything devoid of parts; and only a whole; the several parts will have beauty, not in themselves, but only as working together to give a comely total. Yet beauty in an aggregate demands beauty in details; it cannot be constructed out of ugliness its laws must run throughout Ennead I. vi, !.**
>
> **All the loveliness of colour and even the light of the sun, being devoid of parts and so not beautiful by symmetry, must be ruled out of the realm of beauty. And how comes gold to he a beautiful thing? And lightning by night and the stars, why are these so fair?**
>
> *Ennead* I, vi 1.

It appears a bit strange but an in-depth study of Iqbal's poetry and prose reveals this fact that such questions have been tackled with in Iqbal's poetry in relation to the study of aesthetics.

According to him it is not essential for symmetry to be part of the definition of beauty but at the same time symmetry is not opposed in nature of tendency to definition of beauty. Similarly like a whole component parts can also be beautiful and thus be a source of delight for the reader or the viewer. Here are a few instances:-

Yeh sahar jo kabhi farda hai kabhi hai imroz

Nab een maloom ki hoti hai kahan se paida

Wuh sahar jis se larazta hai shabistan-i-wujood

Hoti hai banda-i-momin ki Azan se paida

This down which is sometimes tomorrow and sometimes today, It is not known to me as to where it appears from;

(But I know) the morning which causes tremulousness in the night-seraglio of existence

Takes its birth from the Azan of Momin

Taseer hai yeh mere nafas kee hi khazan men

Murghan-i-Saharhkhwan miree suhbat men hain khursand

It is due to my refreshing breath (poetry) that even in autumn singing brids of morning are satisfied and happy in my company

Sarood-o-sher-o-siasat, kitab-o-Been-o-hunar

Guhar hain in kee grab men tamam yakdana

Music, poetry, politics, book, religion and art & craft Each one of these has a unique pearl within it.

(Religion and Art & Craft)

Tahan-i-Taza hi afhar-i-taza se hat namood

ki sang-o-khisht se hote naheen jahan paida

A new world order can come into being only through fresh and novel ideas

Stones and bricks cannot create a new universe (Creativity)

Mujhe Khabar naheen yeh shairi hai ya kuchh aur

ata hua hat mujhe zikr-o fikr-o-soz-o-sarood

I am not aware whether it is poetry or something else

(But I know) I have been granted invocation, a questioning mind, fervour and passionate zeal and music

Touching on this question, William K. Wimsatt Jr. and Cleanth Brooks provide an answer in their own way saying:

> **"How many lines of a poem, we might ask ourselves, do we read before we begin to form some opinion of its merit? How many scenes of a play before knowing whether we enjoy it? Certain short phrases have, or seem to have, poetic power the sudden flashes of the sublime about which Longinus spoke the sure "touchstones" or sovereign fragments by which Matthew Arnold in a distant post-Platonic age would propose the ordering of criticism" "Our choice between a holistic view of art and a connoisseurship of the disjecta membra may not be able altogether to escape the fact that in one of its most natural, primitive and perennial uses, the term beautiful does apply to simple and bright and smooth objects—gold rather than rusty iron, a polished topaz rather than a lump of mud. The stoic doctrine of charming color may seem, when confronted with such examples, not very profoundly integrated with that of symmetry. If nowadays we refuse to entertain any such**
>
> **conception as that earlier Greek one of "Kosmos theword "purple" or the word "topaz" as a valuable ornament in a poem_or to adopt the thought of the sophist Hippies in the Platonic dialogue, "Gold is what is beautiful".- nevertheless we do. to some extent, inevitably recognise the affinity between the beautiful and the brilliant. We do so, for instance, in the very metaphors we choose for commending works of art—bright or brilliant or clean or clear, we are likely to say, not muddy, or dirty or drab"**

Iqbal is one of those poets who know what they are composing, what they have to say and what they have to delete. Repetition in poetry, more often than not, does not serve any aesthetical purpose, as for an intelligent and thoughtful reader it proves to be boring. Quite a large portion of Josh Melehabadi's poetry is a specimen of that.

Let us take sublimity. There is first, a certain emotion to be identified and analysed. This Iqbal calls "astonishment" (hairat)

Kabhi hairat, kabhi masti, kabhi aah-i-sahargah-i

Badalta hai hazaron rang mera dard-i-mahjoori

At times astonishment, at times intoxication and at times morning sighs

My forlorn condition appears in varied hues and colours

This astonishment is a state of the soul in which all motions are suspended, a sense of the mind's filled with what it contemplates, held and transfixed. The lower grade of this feeling of sublimity are admiration, reverence and respect expressed with a pinch of salt.

Iqbal's poem on Mussolini in "Bal-i Jibreel"(not to be confused with another poem under the same title in "Zarb-i-Kaleem"), which outwardly appears to be in praise of Mussolini reflects the above mentioned lower grade of Iqbal's feeling of admiration and reverence. Actually during his meeting with Mussolini in 1931 Iqbal was "impressed" by his sense of patriotism and what he had done for his country, Italy. That is why Iqbal praising him says:-

Nudrat-i-fikr-o-amal se mucjzat-i-zindgi

Nudrat-i-fikr-o-amal se sang-i-khara lal-i-nab

Chashm-i-Peeran-i-kuhan men zindagani ka farogh

Naujawan tere hain soz-i-arzoo se seen a tab

Faiz yeh kis ki nazar lea hai karamat kis ki hai

Woh ki hai jis ki nazar misl-i-shua-i-aftab

Miracles of life are always the product of innovation in thought and action,

Innovation of thought and action can transform granite into a real ruby,

Life is now glittering in the eyes of aged Romans,

0' Italy, thy youth are now youth with glowing chests through their ardent desire

Whose mind has bestowed these blessings on thee? Who has performed these miraculous acts?

The one whose looks are like the rays of the sun.

In this poem Iqbal describes Mussolini as an embodiment of thought and action, a harbinger of warmth of love, a combination of beauty and grandeur and elegance and majesty.

It was only three years later, in November 1934, that Mussolini's intentions about Abyassina became plainer. At that time Iqbal's attitude towards Massolini has undergone a sea-change which one can see in Iqbal's poem on Mussolini included in "Zarb-i-Kaleem", but that is not the subject of the present writer's discussion here.

In so far as appreciation of beauty and elegance is concerned, Iqbal stands unique in India and Iran among his contemporary poets or even those who have gone before him. He sees beauty in all aspects of nature, even in the appalling and dreaded silence of mountains.

Husn kohistan ki huibatanak khamoshi men hai

Mehr ki zaugustari, shab ki siah poshi men hai

Asman-e-subh kee aaeana poshee men hai yeh

Sham ki zulmat, shafaq ki gulfiroshi men hai yeh,

Azamt-i-dereena ka mitte hue aasar men

Tifliki na ashna ki koshish-i-guftar men,

Sakinan-i-sehn-i-gulshan ki ham--awazi men hai

Nanneh nanneh tairon ki aashian sazi me hai

Chashma-i-kuhsar men, darya ki azadi men husn

Shehr men, sehra men, veerane me, aabadi men husn

Beauty is there in mirror-clad morning sky, tis in the darkness of evening; in the twilights, florist business

In the decaying relics of ancient glory,

In the symphony of the chirping birds in the garden

In small birds' nest making process;

Beauty is there in the mountain spring, and in the freedom of the flowing river;

Beauty is there in the city, in the desert, in the waste-land and also in the flourishings

However Iqbal is not content with this and says

Ruh ko lekin kisi gum-gashta shai ki hai hawas

Warna is sehra men yeh nalam hai hun misl-e jaras

Husn ke is aam jalwe men bhi yeh betab hai

Zindagi is ke misal-e- mahi-e- be ab hai

But the soul is longing for some lost object,

Otherwise why is it vailing like a bell in this desert?

It is restless in this boundless manifestation and splendour of

Beauty,

Its life is like a fish thrown out of water.

Iqbal wants to see the beautiful world more beautiful. That is why he says:-

Haveda aaj apne zakhm-i pinhan karke chhoroon ga

Lahoo ro ro ke mehfil ko gulistan kar ke chhoroon ga

Jalana hai mujhe her sham-i-dil ko soz-i-pinhan se

Tin tareek raton men chiraghan kar ke Chhoroon ga

Mujhe ai hamnasheen rehne de shaqhl-e-seena kavi men

Kih main dagh-i-mahabbat ko numayan kar ke chhornga

Today I shall manifest all my hidden wounds

I shall go on weeping blood till the entire assembly is transformed into a garden

I have to light the candle of every heart with my inner warmth,

I am bent upon transforming your dark nights into illumination.

0'my companion, please let me remain busy with my heart rending process,

As I am determined to make my scar of love palpable.

In one of his lectures entitled "the Conception of God and Meaning of Prayer" Iqbal says: "The teaching of the Our'an, which believes in the possibility of improvement in the behaviour of man and his control over natural forces is neither optimism nor pessimism. It is meliorism, which recognises a growing Universe and is animated by the hope of man's eventual

victory over evil". How beautifully he expresses the same idea in "Bal-i Jibreel" when he says

Yeh kainat abhi natamam hai shayad

ki aa rahi hai damadam sada-i-kun fayakoon

This universe is perhaps incomplete so far,

As every moment the voice-call of "kun fayakoon" (Be and it is) is coming

Aesthetics is theory of philosophy of taste, or of the perception of the beautiful in nature or art. Most authorities agree with Plato, the first great exponent of this theory or philosophy, that behind the changes due to the progress of time and differences of race, there is in the mind of man an idea of beauty that is absolute and exists quite apart from all consideration of time and space. One of its essentials is harmony; another is truth; fidelity to an ideal; and one of its tastes is giving of pleasure. It would not be overstresing a point to say that this pleasure is the creation of sentiment, emotion and imagination and not of reasoning or of philosophy in the strict sense of the terms. However, great thought transformed into felt-thought and given the language of poetry by a great poet like Iqbal lends to the ear as also to the mind of the reader the same pleasureful taste, which perception of the beautiful in nature and art is supposed to give. Iqbal, when addressing the sun says:-

Arzoo noor-i-Hagigi ki hamare dil men hat

Laili-e-zauq-i-talab lea ghar isi rnanzil men hai

Kis qadar lazzat kushood-t-uqda-e-mushkil men hai

Lutf i-sad basil hamari say-i-la basil men hai

Dard-i-istafham se wafiq tira pehlu naheen

Justju-e-raz-i-qudrat ka shanasa too naheen

A desire to behold the light of Reality is in our hearts,

The house of Laila of taste for search, quest, and seeking is in

this very camel-litter

(How can I describe) as to how much pleasure lies in opening a

difficult knot?

(Actually) pleasure of a hundred gains is there in this "fruitless" effort.

Thou art not aware of the pangs of the questioning mind,

Thou art not acquainted with the quest of nature's secrets

He is actually in search of he sublimest forms of beauty, elegance, truthfulness, harmony, fidelity to an ideal all giving pleasure and all this he finds in his religion, life of the Holy Prophet of Islam (may peace be upon him) and his concept of God.

Like Ghalib, for Iqbal also Paradise is a place meant for recreation, rest, pleasure and luxury. It is, therefore, not worth giving any attention to. From his point of view, Paradise or Jannat is a place where one's all desires would be fulfilled and contrary to worldly life one would have there eternal repose and tranquility. But as he has always been preferring action and movement to rest and recreation and tranquility he has described Jannat in the following words.

> The Old Testament curses the earth for Adam's act of disobedience; the Qur'an declares the earth to be the 'dwelling place' of man and a 'source of profit' to him for the possession of which he ought to be grateful to God. 'And we have established you on the earth and given you therein the supports of life. How little do ye give thanks', (7:10) Nor is there any reason to suppose that the word 'Jannat' (Garden) as used here means he supersensual paradise from which man is supposed to have fallen on this earth. According_ to the Qur'an man is not a stranger on this earth. 'And we have caused you to grow from the earth, says the Qur'an. The 'Jannat', mentioned in the legend, cannot mean the eternal

abode of the righteous. In the sense of the eternal abode of the righteous, 'Jannat' is described by the Qur'an to be the place 'wherein the righteous will pass to one another the cup which shall engender no light discourse, no motive to sin', It is further described to be the place 'wherein no weariness shall reach the righteous, nor forth from it shall they be cast.' In the 'Jannat' mentioned in the legend, however, the very first event that took place was man's sin of disobedience followed by his expulsion. In fact, the Qur'an itself explains the meaning of the word as used in its own narration. In the second episode of the legend the garden is described as a place 'where there is neither hunger, no thirst, neither heat nor nakedness'. I am, therefore, inclined to think that the 'Jannat' in the Qur' anic narration is the conception of a primitive state in which man is practically unrelated to his environment and consequently does not feel the sting of human wants the birth of which alone marks the beginning of human culture.

Although a number of Iqbal's complets and other writings can be referred to for giving instances of Iqbal's above-mentioned approach to Jannat, but the most glaring example is "Masjid-i-Qurtuba" which is generally regarded not only as Iqbal's best poem but a magnum opus in the entire world of Urdu poetry. The main point of similarity between the mazquita de-Qordoba in Spain and Masjidi-i-Qurtuba in "Bal-i Jibreel" is that the former is a feat of architecture and the latter a literary or, in more_ appropriate words a poetic masterpiece.

This poem comprising eight stanzas which opens with a poetic description of the nature and essence of the Real Time touches on a variety of subjects, mundane as will as celestial, including fine arts, love with all its sweep, philosophy, history, politics, religion mortality and immortality, grandeur, charm, .elegance and beauty the mosque possesses. In one of its eight stanzas Iqbal addresses the mosque making references to French revolution, catholicism, Reformation and finally says:

Ruh-i-Muslimmn men hai aaj wuhi iztirab

Raz-i-khudai hai yeh keh naheen sakti zaban

Dekhiye is behr bitch se uchhalta hai kya

Gunhad-i-neelufari rang badalta hai kya

Now that commotion has seized even the soul of the Muslim

Strangely, divinely its meaning cannot be told by the tongue

Watch from this ocean-floor what new protents shall burst

Watch within azur vault what new cluours hall spring.

The charm of the poem lies in the most exquisite use of pleasant blend of thought and emotion embellished with simile, mataphor, myth, symbol, metaphysical approach and imagery. Iqbal is a perfect master in using metaphor as a device for expanding meaning, for saving several things at once, for producing ambivalence and demonstration of how metaphysical expression can help to achieve richness and subtlety of implication. In "Masjid-i-Qurtuba" recurring images of a certain kind give a characteristic tone and, a whole set of echoing meaning to the poem as well to the back-drop of the poem, La Mazquita de Cordoba, a feat of architecture. The marvellous city of Cordoba was founded in the 18th century a few years after the invasion and the rapid conquest of the Peninsula by the great Muslim General Tariq. The city attained the highest splendour under two great sovereigns, the caliphs Abdur-Rehman III (912-961) and his son Al-Kakim II (976-1009) and the de facto government of Ahangar until the first year of the 11th century.

The twin focal points of this city were the La Mazquta de Qordoba and the Madinat-uz-Zohra, one reflective of the grandeur and strength of the Mooish rulers, the other representative of spiritual faith. The city had an aesthetic appeal as well as it was planned to house the monarch, his court and the nobility.

The Spanish poet Gorgora says addressing this city

Oh lofty wall Oh towere crowned

With honour, majesty and valor!

Oh you great river, king of Andalusia,

Of noble, if no golden sands!

To see your wall, your towers and your river,

Your plains and mountains—oh my native country! Flower of Spain.

One can, therefore, say that the back drop for Bal-iJibreeli'poem, "Masjid-i-Qurtuba" had already been set by political and social circumstances as well as nature itself about ten centuries before Iqbal set his foot on the soil of Spain, particular Andlusiana to see L Mazquita- de Cordoba and have spiritual communion with ' it.

Iqbal is fully aware that social progress is inconceivable without the development of spiritual culture, which boosts the peoples' creative energy. He is also conscious of the fact that we need today, as never before in history including the history of aesthetic thought, the solid basis of progressive traditions and a correct ideologic approach to past development. In other words, analysis of our aesthetic heritage, however instructive it may be, must be based on feeling for history, its knowledge and understanding without unnecessary modernisation and with due consideration for historic disance, so to speak.

What Karl Marx said of John Milton that "Milton produced 'paradise Lost' for the same reason that a silk worm produces silk. It was an activity of his nature", aptly applies to Iqbal in so far as his poetry including "Masjid-i-Qurtuba" is concerned.

In one or two paragraphs in the foregoing pages of this paper it has been stated that aesthetic expression as distinct from the philosophy of art pertains to the perceptual level of human experience, but I hope my readers would pardon me if 1 say that in so far as Iqbal's poetry, which is all philosophical from beginning to end, is concerned, gives an insight into moral; aesthetic and religious values and helps men and women to discriminate. Philosophy does not give sensuous pleasure, but great philosophical poetry does give and Iqbal's poetry can be quoted as a

specimen of that genere. Generally speaking the goals of art are not knowledge and understanding as in philosophy, nor description and controls as in science, but creativity, perception, form, beauty, communication and expression and above all the esthetic response. But Iqbal's poetry transcends all such barriers and so in addition to creativity, perfection, form, beauty, sensuous pleasure, also provides its reader with knowledge and understanding and also modernness and progressive outlook which science provides.

In his book "Living issues in Philosophy "Herald H. Titus, explaining what the aesthetic experience can do for us, says:- "The aesthetic experience, in addition to bringing immediate pleasure and satisfaction by revealing certain experimental elements of reality can also fortify us in various ways to meet the practical demand of life". keeping in view what Herald says one can feel that aesthetic response to Iqbal's poetry in general and the long poem "Masjid-i-Qurtuba" in particular may help renew our spirits, exciting us and giving us courage and enthusiasm for some strenuous task. The power of the aesthetic experiences in its different forms to create various moods from patience to a spirit of sacrifice is what we have in Iqbal's poetry with full vigour and charm and "Masjid-i-Qurtuba" is a remarkable example of this. The aesthetic experience and response that we have from Iqbal's poetry helps create a social bond between diverse individuals and groups by arousing sympathy, furnishing understanding and producing a desire for harmonious relationship. The presence of beauty whether in nature or art-objects like Iqbal's poetry tends to make our lives qualitatively. richer.

"Masjid-i-Qurtuba", an embodiment of beauty and grace, flows into the eye and ear and a reader or a listener of this master-piece in Urdu literature invites a taste for beauty and decency.

In "Masjid-i-Qurtuba", which is a work of art, aesthetic experience is related to a number of elements including medium, the technique form and the content or subject--matter. As for the medium the material used in the poem varies from subject to subject, from spiritual to mundane, from philosophy to politics to history

As for the technique, the aesthetically experience is enriched by awareness of the skill which in execution is quite perfect and prominent only

to the extent which is essential for attainment of,them sense of qualitative whole so essential to aesthetic appreciation.

According to some art-critics "how" Is everything and the "what" is not important. Iqbal poetry, however, presents -a happy, blend of both and provides aesthetic pleasure which is a very special type of pleasure related to the aesthetic experience.

One noticeable element of Iqbal's poetry is its revealing power. It opens our eyes to sensuous beauties and spiritual meanings in the world of human experience and of nature to which otherwise we should remain blind. In addition another special power has been granted to Iqbal the power of so expressing and interpreting what lie sees and feels as to' quicken our old imagination and sympathies, and to make us see and feel with him. Thus the one great service that Iqbal renders to us is what Coleridge has described as "awakening the mind's attention to the lethargy of custom, and directing it to the loveliness and wonders of the world before us; an inexhaustible treasure, but for which, in consequence of the whim of familiarity and selfish solicitude, we have eyes, yet see not, ears that hear not, and hearts that neither feel nor understand".

Iqbal was the man, who of all modern and perhaps ancient Urdu and Persian poets had d the largest and most comprehensive soul. All the images of nature were ever present to him and he drew them, not laboriously, but luckily. When he describes any thing, we more than see it, we feel it too. The beauty which we see in Iqbal's "Masjid-i-Qurtuba" is not the beauty we see in individual things like statues, buildings and people or men or even in animals or birds. It is the essential form of beauty, Absolute Beauty not seen with the eyes but grasped conceptually by the "mind alone".

No doubt, the beauty of this world reminds us of the true beauty, but here the question arises as to what the role of Iqbal is in this process of recollection in respect of his poem "Masjid-i-Qurtuba". Here we may refer to a few couplets of this poem wherein Iqbal says:-

Ai haram-i-Qurtuba ishq se tera wujood

Ishq sarapa dawan jis men naheen raft-o-bood,

Rang ho ya khisht-o-sang chang ho ya harf o-saut

Mojza-i-fan ki hai khoon-i jigar se namood

Qatra-i-khoon-i jigar sil ko banata hai dil

Khun-i jigar se sada soz-o-suroor-o-sarood

Teri faza dilfaroz, meri nawa seena soz

Tujh se delon ka hazoor, mujh se dilon ki kushood

Arsh-i-mualla se barn seena-i-Aadam naheen

Garchi kaf e-khak ki had hai sipihr-e-kubooc/

Tera jalal-o jamal mard-i-khuda ki daleel

woh bhi jaleel-o jameel too bhi jaleel-o jameel

Thou, oh Shrine of Cordoba owest existence to love,

Deathless in all its being, Stranger to Then and Now

Colour or brick or stone, speech or music and song

Only the heart's warm blood feeds, the craftsman's design,

One drop of heart's blood lends marble .a beating heart;

Out of the heart's blood gush warmth and music and mirth.

Thine the soul-quickening pile, mine the soul-kindling verse,

Thou to the guidance of God callest, I open men's hearts,

Strong is the human breast, great as the Heaven of Heavens,

Handful of dust though it be hemmed in the azure sky.

Thou with outward and inward beauty, thy builders witness,

Provest him like thyself, fair of shape and of soul.

And now the answer to the question as to what Iqbal's roll is in this process of recollection. His roll is that he has progressed from bodily beauty to beauty of mind, to beauty of institutions and laws of civilised society and tenets of Islam and to essential beauty entirely pure and unallayed".

It was in July, 1928 that Iqbal wrote in the Forword to "Muragga-i-Chughtai", Illustrated edition of Ghalib's Urdu Poetry) by M. A. Rahman Chughtai:-

I look upon art as subservient to life and personality. I picture the soul-movement of the ideal artist (as one) in whom love reveals itself as a unity of Beauty and Power.

The spiritual health of a people largely depends on the kinds of inspiration which their poets and artists receive. But inspiration is not a matter of choice. It is a gift, the character of which cannot he critically judged by the recipient before accepting it. It comes to the individual unsolicited, and only to socialise itself. For this reason the personality that receives, and the life-quality of that which is received, are matters which are of the utmost importance for mankind. The inspiration of a single decadent, if his art can lure his fellows to his song or picture, may prove more ruinous to a people than whole battalions of an Attila or a Changez....

To permit the visible to shape the invisible, to seek what is scientifically called adjustment with nature is to recognise her mastery over the spirit of man. Power comes from resisting her stimulie and not from exposing ourselves to their action. Resistance of what is, with a view to create what ought to be, is health and life. All else is decay and death. Both God and man live by perpetual creation. The artist who is a blessing to mankind defies life. He is an associate of God and feels the contact of Time and Eternity in his soul....

And in so far as the cultural history of Islam is concerned, it is my belief that, with the single exception of Architecture, the art of Islam (Music, Painting and even Poetry) is yet to be born the art, that is to say, which aims at

the human assimilation of Divine attributes, gives man infinite inspiration, and finally wins for him the status of God's Representative on earth.

This poem "Masjid-i-Qurtuba", the greatest piece of poetry in Urdu, dealing with essence of Time, the difference between pure duration and serial time, mortality of the universe, permanence of a piece of art, love with all its sweep in which Masjid-i-Qurtuba is based, grandeur of the mosque, heritage of Islamic creativity, emergence of reformation, French Revolution, renaissance and confidence in- life future of Islam goes on producing in the reader not mere pleasure or intellectual conviction, but "transport" the sense of being carried away as though by magic. Carrying fu blooded ideas and vehement emotion the poem says in the last three couplets (out of which I have already quoted two) of the last but one stanza.

Millat-i-Roomi nayad kuhna parasti se peer,

Lazzat-i-tajdeed se woh bhi bui phir jawan

Ruh-i-musalman men hai aaj wuhi iztirab

Raz-i-Khudai hai yeh, keh naheen sakti zaban

Dekhyey is behr ki teh se uchhalta hai kya

Gunbad-i-neelupari rang badalta hai kya

The Roman nation grown old by worshipping ancient things,

Led by the lure of rebirth found once again her youth;

Now that commotion has seized even the soul of the Muslim,

Strangely, divinely its meaning cant be told by the tongue.

Let us see what new portents burst from the bed of this ocean

And watch within azurevault what new colour shall spring

To identify such a quality as the necessary and sufficient condition of literary greatness is not without interest. It is the genuine emotion in the right place. And also, a great style is the natural outcome of weighty thoughts.

The last two couplets reflect a highly progressive rather a prophetic outlook about the present day agitation, commotion, excitement, anxiety and restlessness in modern Muslim mind. These two couplets make this great poem a greater piece of art which is not only beautiful, elegant and charming but also pulsating with vigour.

The present august house would kindly forgive me if I present an exposition in prose of these couplets in Allama Iqbal's own words. In his first lecture entitled "Knowledge and Religious experience" contained in "The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam" he says:-

During the last five hundred years religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary. There was a time when European thought received inspiration from the world of Islam. The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam. Our only fear is that the dazzling exterior of European Culture may arrest our movement and we may fail to reach the true inwardness of that culture.

And in the fourth lecture entitled "The Human Ego: His Freedom and Immortality" in the same book:-

> The task before the modern Muslim is, therefore, immense. He has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past
>
> The only course open to us is o approach modern knowledge with a respectful but independent attitude and to appreciate the teachings of Islam in the light of that knowledge; even though we may be led to differ from those who have gone before us.

Iqbal's views on the subject referred to in the above quoted two couplets in his prose reveal the fact that lqbal through his prose as well as poetry wants

to make the world more beautiful and more elegant than the one he is seeing around. He is a great philosopher poet, who has in so far as Urdu and Persian poetry is concerned revolutionised aestheticism i.e. the cult of the beautiful in nature and in art.

A RAY OF LIGHT: FOR GENERATIONS YOUNG OR FOR THE YOUNG UMMAH

Suleman Zubair

Whatever now than art,

While these sterling qualities

Of thine

Are only because

Our love tingled in thee.

It was she who infused in thee

That immortal spirit,

Sonny dear, And through her ye

Grieve not over words nor Understood the meaning

vows Real of La illah (The

For they too can alluring be, Almightly)

What ever the depth of heart

contains Now come hither and gather

Out of reach of words can it ye

be. The wisdom and elation

Of enjoying through me

Remember ye that I did express So much so easily, Though I have for thee What could still perplex ye. When ye often do recall Inexplicable Could my ideas be, So catch their spirit Oh! ye of generations new One and all of ye! Further gather ye from this warmth of mine, As also from these looks And brows of mine.

The joy of vision, While glowing In the halo of Almighly. Now La illah Do so from the depth of thy heart, So that thy body too Could feel the warmth of thy soul! Even the sun and the moon Do glow, Seen have I this blaze Or' the mountains And the grass too by it does glow.

Although thy first lessons Learnt did thee Atop thy mothers lap, Which did enable thee

La and Illah?

To open the window of thy Are not words alone,

mind! They are infact a sword

Whose cut ye cannot escape.

Her breath made out of thee

The stroke of La illah

Is lasting; No longer

Through its radiance Is there evidence,

Strength, energy and power Of any divinity

all do flow. In their universe.

Ah! believers Their source of strength

And pay homage? Once was Almighty alone.

And at that too

To the un-believers too? Now hath they fallen

Into the depths of loving

Believers and disloyal be? Naught, but wealth alone,

Believers and hypocrites be? And in their hearts

My! My! Now they fear

Naught, but death alone. What! Such believers?

Who their religion sell! Gone is their love

And their people too Ardour and zest,

For a trifle do thay sell!That once steeled

The love,

persons such not only torch That they had

All that their nations hold In their faith.

dear

But also set aflame Their enthusiasm has faded

Their very country dear! That rapture of their's has

evaporated,

The muslims' prayers That joy too in them has

Once inspired were By La faded

illah, Their energy go and gusto

But no more hath they Has all but evaporated.

The spirit -

Nor the soul of Lah illah. The Muslims' religion real

Now only in the book

Their submissions remains

To the Almighty, While his body in the grave

Had attractions. Remains.

Once their very own.

Influenced are some

Now their prayings Inversely by the so called

Have lost all their frevour,
While their fastings
All their spirtuality.
From "Prophets"
Not one but two,
The first one from Iran did
come
Who Haj did'nt approve,
While the other from India
did come
Who Jihad did disapprove !
Ye ought to know.
But deleate,
And Jihad
Too ye forfiet,
From religious duties thine,
Then prayers and fastings too
Loose their meaning and their
'soul.

When prayers and fasts

modernity,
Who unlearnt their religions
did
At whose behest
The heavens too did swirl.
And casts its imprint
On the mountains too,
Who would evaporate
As ordained in the Quran
Like smoke
When thou doth Haj
Prostration ours is nothing
now
But the bending of the head,
Or call it
The weakness of the aged.
No longer hath our faith
In it the grandeur
Of God is Great !

Loose their philosophy, spirit Is it our fault?

and soul, Or our inherent defect?

The individual

Is upturned and unbalanced, Nay ! Now instead

While the Society too All of us

Is disconnected and uprooted. Move on our way

Own.

When no longer

Hearts The muslim now moves

Are warmed by the Quran, Like a camel bridleless

What good Aimless and goalless.

Can ye expect

From such hearts and minds? The once

Standard bearers of

Quran

The muslims Have lost their urge

Have their For research!

Self respect lost, Astonishing and astounding

O! Khizar please do help ls'nt if?

Before all is lost.

If the Almighty doth

grant

Once our Saida (bowing), thee

To the Almightly Insight and vision,

Caused the earth to quake, Scan the times

Through which ye move. The world may moveth

Or may not moveth Yell feel But the Muslman now

That reason has been Does not moveth.

swallowed

By brutal beasts, Infact have they now

And hearts no longer Fallen a prey

By love are warmed. To the talismans

Of the priests and the kings.

The muslims no longer

Are modest or discreet, Ahove' crippled their

Influenced alone by glitter thoughts

Now are they ! And movements too;

That has further clipped

The knowledge that they Their urge to soar

gather now Higher and higher

Negates Towards the unattainable.

Their arts and sciences

Economics and politics, Is'nt it shameful

And more so their religion That our reason, faith and

too thought

They v' plunged in to the in Are now tied alone

mire To the western school of

Of power, wealth and muck! thought.

Asia that massive land However, invaded have I

Of the rising sun The castles of their thoughts.

Has sunk so low

That it is hidden -from itself. That's led my heart

To bleed from within,

Asians now borrow But enabled has it me

Ideas ov othersTo revolutionize

And have stopped Her world from without.

Thinking for themselves.

While their ideas own In so few a words

Now ar'nt worth a pun ! Has this sage

Conveyed his thoughts

The Asians life To the people of this age.

In this world called old

Is caught All the knowledge

By the syndorme of the old. Contained in oceans two,

Have been condensed

Can you imagine Are far more diverse,

By me! That hath enabled me

Only in cups two! To lay the foundation,

Of a phenomenon

Expressed have I ideas mine Far more different.

In paralance such

That I could win Although the youth

The applause of people mine Of today thirsty remain,

For its excellence. Yet that goblet of theirs

empty remains,

Which ye shall see Otherwise charming all of

As ye go along. them remain.

But ye might yet Yet some of them

Not grasp its meaning, Possess

For here have I used A soul that's dark.

The metaphor of the west.

Foresight have they

none

The exotic songs that fleet Future theirs they can't

From the strings of my heart perceive,

Merge for thee all that is the best
Both of the east and the west.
Know do ye
The songs of the East
Out of contemplation spring,
While the songs of the West
Out of thoughts do sprout.
I want ye to grasp
And inherit them both
For I am a stream
Whose thoughts flow from
both.
My divergence includes both
Individual disconnection
As well as ecclesiastical
connection.

In conviction do they lack
Nothing in this world can
they discern.
When independence ye do
loose
Ego and spirit ye also loose
To top it all faith too do ye
loose.
Although the builders of
temples of learning ours
Use bricks and mortars of
mother earth,
Even then these scholars of ours
Know not what
Aspirations and objectives are
really ours.

Then how can ye expect

The demands of the age
Our scholar's instructions and appeals
For clarifies it, the cobwebs
That befogs the judgement of

To flow deep into our hearts a being.

To build a society

With roots deep and strong. Burn ye thy self

While passing through the fire

See ye thus, how this Of thoughts pure and chaste,

Has stolen our lives and souls If ye really want to

Of our inner most light, discriminate

Including the goodness of Betwixt right and wrong.

nature ours,

And of what is wrong and That could lead thee

what is right. Towards grasping the truth,

And attaining a vision

So much so that even That is even beyond

Roses worth name ours The reach of reason.

Have stopped growing

On these boughs of ours! Ample knowledge gathered have ye

And builders ours From literary compositions

Haven't laid foundations Books and tutors a many,

propel- Yet real insight can thou

Of mosques that are ours. Acquire through the

disposition

Although thine fathers fore
Were far more daring
Than even the eagles,
Now youth ours
Are far more timid
Than even the ducklings.

If thy education gathers not
The warmth from the flame
of life. Whifs of thoughts a fresh
How can thy heart recieve the
fervour Filing the inverted cup
And the absorbtion of
knowledge new.
Thus see ye
How learning is a process.
Of the exposure of thy being,
And be very much brief in
thy speech
Which will cause thee
To be agile and alert,

Of the-natures eye!
The wine of preception that
flowth
From these eyes of mine
Can exhilarate and invigorate
Thy Vision and
foresight.

While each dawn bringth
And blowth away ideas old,
On shoulders thine with ideas
new.
Another advice sonny dear
Is eat as little as is possible
Sleep as less as ve can
And circumvent it never.
In matters such
Let none else but logic

Enabling thee Rule thy heart.

To amass and encompass

Far more knowledge and Food for the human soul,

insight. Is reminiscence infinite

Of ideas, logic and opinions;

The clergy denounces While therapy for the cage

gainsayers Of mortals

Of Almighty as unbelievers, Is sans excesses carnal and

Where as I consider those physical.

who disown

Them selves .as greater If thy body and soul arn't

unbelievers. sound and pure,

Ye can't attain sway

Of them one is dubbed Neither in this life

impietous Nor in the hereafter.

For denying existence

While the other one is labeled Goals of movements

Rash, baised and oblivious. Be they of ideas or of journies

Should in the direction

Truthfulness should thy Forward move

resolve be Other wise why at all bother

So break the chains of fear to move.

And free thyself from the

phobia Now look, the cruise of the

Of the feudals and the lords. moon

Is limited to its orbit

own,

Leave not the hands of justice It shall tarry

Even if thou be And one day shall it stop;

In a state While the voyage of the

Of rage or tranquility. humans

Is unbounded and

infinite.

And hold on to this principle

Whether ye be drenched Existence is non-existent

In poverty or prosperity, If the delight of the flight is

Even though amiss,

The law of Almighty And retreat discordant

May not to thy liking be; With the nature of t he

Do this remember humankind.

Crums and scums of the earth My! My! what a horse

Sustain vultures and crows, Steadfast and flawless

While eagles draw With a lineage that surpassed

norushiment Excellence all.

Their's from regions

Nearest the sun and the O! Men of reason

moon. Do ye remember

That once upon a time,

Religion pure and simple is to Nothing dearer was

Be honest in life To a soldier's heart

Upright and true in speech Than his holy book

Graceful in seclusion His sword and his horse.

Generous in assembly

And above all to be This giant of a horse

benevolent and upright. With the agility of a tiger

Sprang or' hills, and dales,

Be firm in devotion thine to While in combat his speed

the Almightly Eclipsed the lightining

And in matters such always an Of the skies.

angle be Hemmed he in his stride

Exist always to be with the Rocks and boulders

Almighty Like a gusty blizzard would.

If ye want to live in real

tranquility Many an uproar and

excitement

I shall now unravel for thee Did he embed in his rapid

Religion in its heart, spirit and Sprints, twists and turns,

soul Bedecked with his astounding

By telling thee the tale of the Appearances and

life disappearncess

And times of Sultan Muzzafar Every now and then.

Who peerless ever was

In his earnestness. Stone and rock and all

Would shudder and

shatter

This Sultan loved his -stallion Under his powerful hoofs.

did

As he his own sonny would, But alas one sad day,

In times of war this Arab This mighty and noble

Horse creature

Of his was as hardy That Alimghty did create,

As his Lord. Like a mortal had to endure

A sharp agony in abdomen That the insolent and the

his. rude,

Command neither respect

So the medic royal was called, Nor honour due !

Who to the stable regal came

To remove the horse's When behold I ! the youth

distress,

Displaying conduct

But perforce had to administer unbecoming

That forbidden drink My life turns dark, dismal and

To remove the horse's blue.

torment.

Resultantly,

That saintly prince thereafter Grief and torment intensifies,

Never bridled that beauty ever In this heart of mine. again,

Thus see ye how the approach And then the teachings of

of the godly Mustafa

Happens to be very much Come vivdly to life.

Unlike that of ours.

The truth of all truths

My prayer to the Almighty Is and remains,

Is, that ye too be bestowed That a woman's security

With a vision veracious
And a kindly heart.
These are the possessions
Of a muslim sincere
And a believer right earnest.

To pursue a religion true
Yell have to glow in its flame
Right from head to toe.

Initiation in a religion true
With a conduct becoming
Begins, To utter words evil and
And with love does it end.
About human kind. As in, hue and fragrance,
Is cast, the beauty of a rose.

By now ye ought to know,

So live up and mindful be

With her consort lies
In this world of men
So wild and primative,
While in the hereafter
Tranqulity is all but hers!

The security of a man
Inversely lies in his 'will own
To guard his self
From immorality and depravation.

Tis sinful and vile
immoral
Forget not for both
The faithful and those devoid
Are Almighty's creation too!
Ti's a fact that heart too
Is bound by water and clay

Of the high pedestal As our globe too

Of the human being Is bound by these elements

In this universetwo.

That's both thine and mine!

Though thou
aristocratic be

Do remember Or bathe ye in affluence,

That the strength of a human Leave not the apron string of

being education.

Is in proportion direct

To their reverence for Remember the essence

mankind; Of this frair's frevour for

To 'attain destination such learning

Bind thy self firmly Lies in thy spirit and thy

In the bond of love and frame,

brotherhood. Further this accord

Also is embeded

Men and women of love In thee by thy fathersfore

Who hold dear to their hearts Through their blood, sweat

The commandments of the and intellect.

Almighty;

Who emulate and hold near Look not for

To their hearts and souls
The role of Almighty Allah
their Lord;
Are kind and compassionate
Very much like their Lord
Both to the believers
And unbelievers alike.
Pray, permit both
Faith and doubt
A limitless place

For the spasms of thy soul
In this mortal and earth!
abode.
Nor beg for honour or f
glory
From princes and the di rich
Instead look ye up
Almighty Allah
For his blessings and rewards

In thy heart.

Time and again it happens so

However if thy heart too
Experiences infirmity
Then pray to the Almighty
To help thee
In this calamity.

That persons of preception
Who are godfearing too
Can turn inconsiderate an
Injudicious too

Through the smell of power wealth and fame.

Hold the cup of intellect.

Affluence much to much

Arrogance does incubate,
It erases intellect,
And sparks of goodness.

In travels of mine or' the
world
Around the globe and or' the
years,
Seen have 1 pity none
In the eyes of the moneyed.

They heedless of Almighty's
Commandments remain
So unfortunatly
Calamity is their claim.

Much do I adore those
Who like hermits do abide.

Now when the muslims have

While muslims brains best
Are brain washed by the west,
Who effortless solutions seek
To problems intricate
And in the analysis final,
They only but lament.
Dispossessed are persons
Who easily are
ride,
For unenlightened are
they,
the nature and essence of
divinity.

Scarcely would ye find
Honesty and integrity
In
and
amongst
the
aristocracy,
While whole hearted
truism
Originates

lost In the masses by and large.

All their vigour trust and

belief, Discriminate ye thoughtfully

Evaporated too has their Betwixt the satanic and the

Frevour, elation and joy. godly,

Search out a person
godly,

The learned ones too heed And in his association

The Quran no more! Do associate.

And are enlightened

By it no more. Societies have their Vultures

too

The sufi hermits Who grab, seize and suck,

Do longer holy come, The walth, labour and ideas o'

But plunderous and ravenous others,

Now they v' become. And that's become

Their etiquette,
culture, code

Despite activties hectic and conduct;

In religious schools of ours, While who like eagles soar

The scholars of therein, Incubate and grow

seldom do

On resources and ideas their very own.

Men of destiny who saintly are

Like heavenly light they descend on us, pitiless

Stimulus theirs is derived From civilizations both of East and West.

In ignorance while we languish

In this world of ours,

They administer, rule and command

Both or' our lives and times.

Who is the one who is akin?

To Abraham?

To Moses?

To Jesus?

To Gabriel?

For being elevated as Almightys' vicegerent.

By his frevour and warmth Did he convert us,

From a souless, spiritless, And a disorganized mass Into a nation with a throbbing heart!

Horrified am I of the age When thou were cast Into this mortal world, That's sunk so deep in carnal sensuality;

And insensible is it Both to the soul and spirituality.

When spirit is lost so are souls Resulting in soulless bodies a many,

And to the Quran? Then neither honesty nor
He is Muhammad (SAS)! justice

These elements two
Akin is Mohammad (SAS) to Can find a person nor a place
the radiant sun,Wherein to lodge themselves,
Universe is he for the masses, Finally as they find a place no
Who adore him better
From the core of their hearts. So seek they shelter in their

shells own.

His shining brilliance and
wisdom The situation is so very
Emits warmth, compassion serious
and love. Yell not be able to seek out

Persons who are
honest to a
Initially did he brandish us fault,
Through the flame of his Even though they be
radiance, Around thee all the while.
Guiding us to the august
pedstal So sonny dear abondon not
Nor disheartened be, The physical dance causes
And cease not thy quest This mortal world to swirl,

For finding a person such
Even if ye have to brave
Hardships far too many!

If in thy endevours ye do fail
To attract the fellowship of a
sage, Ye too can capture
Then please do care to accept
blessings mine
With all the wisdom that 1
carry
Of thy fathersfore both thine
and mine.

Cause Rumi thy mentor to be
Who'll set ye on a course
That'll amplify thee,
And may Almighty bless thee
With warmth, enthusiasm,
love and mercy.

While the intellectual dance
causes,
The heavens to bouy
Up with joy.

With these tools two
Both the heavens and the
earth,
Thereby ye too could rule
Over both the worlds
Spiritual and temporal.

Singly a person
By painstaking labour such
Can by means all
Moses's elation achieve
While
Collectively a nation can
develop
And preside over a realm

Know ye? that Rumi stands
out
In discriminating
The shallow form the deep,
And unwavering Rumi is ever
In his mode of adoration of
the Alimghty.

Rumi's inspiration true
Our minds did fail to sieze,
Which slipped from our
hands
As a fish or a deer could.

Rumi's physical prance
Did we adopt
While his spiritual dance
We forgot.

To understand the difference
Betwixt the Goldy and the

That's glorious, great and
noble.

Soul's dance is the disciplining
of the self
Ti's an exercise of the
Intellect,
That can be achieved
By burning elements
That are ungodly.

The sustained glowing
Of the spirit in the flame of
love,
Plus trails and tribulations a
many
Prompt the dance of the soul.

Further sonny dear
learn ye
So if ye

satanic, Master the dance

Know what is temporal Of the spirit and the soul.

Know what is spiritual,

And above all, I shall tutor thee

What is service above self! In the religion of Mustpha

For the salvation

And further when Of thy spirit

Ye detach thy self And thy soul

From the selfish, And shall pray

Then and only then thy soul For the forgivness

Shall have the ability Of they soul

To dance by itself. Even when I lie

In that grave of mine

Oh! ye thou

Young friends of mine **THE END**

Do this counsel of mine but

heed, **A LITTLE PRAYER**,

That worring much

Leads to beliefs feeble and frail

Anxiety and adversity too it Now dear children of Islam

incubates,

Which becomes the cause Named mostly after Mustpha

main Though this be the end of this

Of senility in the youth. poem

Can ye comprehend that It should be the begining

Even the hermits of today Of thine lives anew.

Have greedy become,

And that's what's made me a (Sulman Zubair)

And an ally

Of the unselfish and of

Those who govern and live

Thier lives own.

By now you can see

How ye can a cause

Of solace be,

For my restless

Spirit and soul.

SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS INSTRUMENTALISM: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON SCIENCE-RELIGION CONTROVERSY

Ibrahim Kalin

Abstract

In what follows in presented a descriptive account of the basic premises of scientific and religious instrumentalism. Since focus of the essay will mainly be the relation between science and religion, technicalities and implications of both instrumentalism for philosophy of science and philosophy of religion will be omitted. Scientific instrumentalism, as introduced here, is presented as one of the contemporary philosophies of science among other. Therefore the stance of scientific instrumentalism towards science and its implication for the philosophy of religion should not be taken as the last world about the matter. the main premises of scientific instrumentalism simply indicate the fact that science-religion controversy is a philosophical problem and should be treated like any other philosophical issue. The same holds true for religious instrumentalism. This particular view of religious belief has many points to be dealt with. For brevity's sake one can make such a generalisation at the outset that instrumentalist construal of religion and religious belief has a long story in Western intellectual tradition and it will be treated here as one of the main characteristics of the modern Western conception of religion. Reduction of religious/metaphysical truth to mere set of moral principles (Kant's 'regulative principle', so to speak) is one of the conspicuous consequences of this approach. Besides religious instrumentalism points to the notion of truth and meaning in religious belief which is one of the most crucial and controversial issues in contemporary philosophy of religion. taking into consideration the different and competing approaches, one can speak of different schools appearing in the scheme of philosophy of religion as different attempts to account for the justification of religious belief Within the limits of our study, however, we will confine ourselves to a particular version of instrumentalist construal of religious belief, that is to what Braithwaite calls 'an empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief. Due to the close relation between religious instrumentalism and postmodernist understanding of religion, at the end some conclusions will be drawn about the so-called postmodern theology and the concept of religion in postmodernist discourse.

It is perplexing most of the time to see supposedly two different things as being juxtaposed upon the same plane. Religion and science should be one of the best examples of this sort. In modern times they have always been set against each other to the extent that a choice between one of them has become necessary for those who belong to religious or scientific side. the main reason in this exclusive discrimination was the assumption that there could be no disciplinary or methodological relation and correlation between the two. To use Wittgenstein's analogy, they represent 'different language-games[97] whose rules for their own games are totally different from each other. Only difference in this schema, however, is the controlling and monopolising power of science. In language-games, every discourse has to follow its rule for its game. None of them can be substituted for any other ontologically or epistemologically. Neither of them can have preponderance over the other methodologically. This means that science, as any language-game among. others, cannot claim any ontological or methodological superiority over, say, philosophy or theology or more generally religion. Until recently the dominant understanding of science kept on holding exactly the opposite position and claimed an absolute supremacy in every respect over other disciplines and sciences.[98] The underlying view going parallel to this assumption was that ontologically and methodologically there could be no intersection at any level between science and religion. Classical positivist conception of science construed itself as the only valid and reliable language-game prescribing the rules of the others. Besides a lot of philosophical points which can be adduced to .prove the interrelation between religion and science, instrumentalism and its reflections in religious and scientific issues offer a somewhat new perspective to the notorious clash between religion

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[97] For the concept of language-games, see L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, (Basil Blackwell, 1988) 1-8.

[98] It was this scientist position that induced Husserl to develop a phenomenology which would be conducive to the elimination of the 'wrong rationalism of the Enlightenment'. At this point Husserl's phenomenology was a bold attempt to overcome the European crisis which 'has its roots in a misguided rationalism'. See his masterpiece The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (North Western University Press, Evanson, 1970) p. 290. Apart from Husserl, the other significant trend of that period to rebut the positivistic-universalistic understanding of science was Hermeneutics which was initially put forward to give back to social sciences their lost reliability against natural sciences.

and science and provide some novel strategies to solve out the cited problem. Now let us see the major arguments of the two instrumentalisms.

SCIENTIFIC INSTURMENTALISM

Instrumentalist view in science asserts that scientific theories are mere instruments in scientific inquiries. Theories are important and necessary as long as they perform a function in scientific descriptions of the universe. Every theory put forward in physics or in chemistry or in astronomy has a role which renders scientific explanations more adequate and -systematic. In that sense theories are indispensable for any scientific investigation. The main point in scientific instrumentalism, however, is that besides their guiding role, they have no value and function such as to reflect the phenomena as they are or to be the summary of some complicated and extensive experimental data. In instrumentalist view theories are not to be considered as summaries of experimental data derived from the factual world because this idea presupposes a relation of correspondence[99] between theory and the factual phenomena. The instrumentalist simply rejects the relation of identification between theories and physical realities. In line with these premises the idea that theories are supposed to be translatable into the language of experiment and observation is rejected and replaced with the view that the relation between theories and physical entities are not ontological or existential but instrumental, that is to say, not substantial but accidental. It is with this stance that scientific instrumentalism goes beyond the notorious distinction between observational and theoretical terms. The idea that observation is theory-dependent and theory-laden does refer in a sense to an epistemic condition... Instrumentalist position towards theoretical entities aims to undermine their ontological basis.

What underlies these assumptions of instrumentalism is the repudiation of the idea of truth and falsity in theories and science. The proponents of

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[99] Correspondence theory of truth is still one of the main precepts of realism despite the fact that one can hold a realist position without adhering to the correspondence theory of truth. (For a defence of the distinction between realism and the correspondence theory, see M. Devitt, Realism and Truth, (Blackwell, 1991) pp. 27-30). In this context the most ambitious attempt at the beginning of this century was Wittgenstein's project to develop a 'logically perfect language' in Tractatus.

scientific instrumentalism like van ' Fraassen[100] argue that theories bear no ontological basis and reality. In contradistinction to the claims of realists, theories do not correspond to objective entities existing independently of theoretical constructions of the scientist. Since theories do not correspond to any objective ontological ground or reality, they cannot be assessed as true or false. At this point the instrumentalist is in opposition to the realist view that science (or here theory) aims at 'truth'. To the instrumentalist, the notion of truth in science either as truth in realist sense or as verisimilitude in Popperian sense should be taken out of consideration. In this respect instrumentalism appears as an extension of antirealism in that both schools deny the ontological reality and basis of science in general and scientific theories in particular. Likewise theoretical entities such as electrons, protons, etc., cannot be said to be really existing. As the name itself suggests, they are 'theoretical' entities and once the term 'theoretical' is defined in the instrumentalist sense, ontological basis and validity of theories and theoretical entities cannot be proved and justified.[101]

Although instrumentalism poses no ontological and even epistemological status and importance to theories, "some theories still can be regarded and preferred as better over others. And it is here that

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[100] Van Fraassen's reading of scientific realism is as follows: 'Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true'. (The Scientific Image, p. 8). The word 'belief' in the above statement renders the issue quite problematic for the realist. Instead, van Fraassen comes up with a new theory which he calls 'constructive empiricism': 'Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate' and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate'. (Ibid., p. 12); quoted in Michael Devitt, ibid., p. 137. Smith, The Rationality of Science, (Routledge & Kaegan Paul, 1981), pp. 28-34; lan Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge University Press, 1983) pp. 50-52.

[101] With regard to the existence of theoretical entities, Quinton says that 'since sentences containing the manes of theoretical entities do not so refer, they are not really statements at all but are linguistic devices of calculation or prediction'. The Nature of Things (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973) p. 288; quoted in Newton-Smith, p. 32. It is here that positivist element in scientific instrumentalism which we omit due to the context of our discussion displays itself withour further ado. Since the instrumentalist denies the existence of theoretical entities by relying on the assumption that only the observable phenomena can be the subject matter of science, this results in a position similar to positivism.

instrumentalism differs form antirealism in its attitude towards the superiority of some theories. The lack of ontological basis does not diminish the functional validity and supremacy of some theories. They can still be considered as better not because they are approximately closer to truth but because they perform a better function just as the daily instruments and tools we use do. In a word some theories are superior to some others as long as they are 'useful' and have an instrumental function in scientific inquiries. To make an analogy, theories in science can be compared with signs and utterances in every day language. 'Every sign by itself seems dead.' says Wittgenstein. ' What gives it life?- In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?- Or is the rise its life?[102] Theories shorn of their function and use in scientific inquiry are dead, as it were; they are meaningful and alive when taken as our linguistic devices.

The embarrassment which the realist view of theories faces is that there may be two or more different theories which cover and explain the same domain of phenomena equally well. (Fig.l)



Fig. 1

[102] Philosophical Investigations, (Basil Blackwell, 1988), 432. For the account of the 'flippant' philosopher of science on the instrumentalist theory of language derived from the later Wittgenstein see P. Feyerabend, 'Wittegenstein's Philosophical Investigation' in Problems of Empiricism Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, (Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 99-131.

History of science has many examples of this sort within different paradigms, to deploy Kuhn's term. At this juncture the instrumentalist argues that if theories are to be taken mere instruments for our calculations and predictions, there would be no trouble for the scientist to choose one of the opposing theories. Moreover, when taken as tools, different theories about the same' phenomenon would not be incompatible with each other because neither of them have any ontological status regarding the factual world. Second advantage of the instrumentalist view is that no theory is to be considered as 'the last word' about any theoretical - or non-theoretical entity. History of science displays many cases such as the Newtonian and Einsteinian pictures of the universe in which a theory was taken as absolutely true, but with, later developments, replaced by another theory. Instrumentalist stance will prevent the scientist from facing such paradoxical and inconsistent choices.

To sum up the instrumentalist position, science in general and theories in particular are our intellectual devices for certain purposes such as calculation, classification and prediction. Theories are employed in scientific quest and in this sense they are indispensable equipment of the scientist. They are not, however, the exact projections of entities for which they are devised. their sole significance and function is to help us understand and explain the universe better. To use Nagel's phrase, in the instrumentalist view, theories are not the projected maps of some domain of nature but the principles of *mapping*.[103] Therefore one cannot assign to science in general and to scientific theories in particular such paradoxical and odd tasks as to be a counter-argument against any philosophical, theological or moral assertion.[104]

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[103] Nagel, E.-The Structure of Science, Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, (Heackett Pub., 1979) p..139.

[104] Before proceeding to religious instrumentalism some points should be made very briefly about the connection of insturmentalism to the postmodernist discourse. Denial of the ontological basis of reality and the construal of any discourse as a distinct language-game are among the basic premises of postmodernism. At this juncture 'postmodern science' is, like any other discipline and discourse, a language-game without posing any ontological claim about its function and place in human society. It is here that postmodernist discourse and scientific instrumentalism get closer to each other in their stance towards science and

RELIGIOUS **I**NSTRUMENTALISM

The basic postulation of religious instrumentalism is the same as that of scientific instrumentalism: Since the truth in religious assertions cannot be verified according to the principle of verification, any account pertaining to truth or falsity in religious belief has to be discarded. The verification principle of the logical positivists stipulates that no statement is meaningful unless it is verified empirically. Empirical verification of any religious statement or proposition is exactly of the same character as any physical or chemical experiment in that such empirical elements of verification as observation, testing, seeing, etc. are of primary importance. Once this principle of verification is accepted as the sole criterion of truth and meaning, it is obvious that no religious or moral or metaphysical statement can have meaning or 'truth-value' and therefore these statements, as the logical positivists declared, would be meaningless. It is not so easy, however, to deny the operational function of religious belief and moral imperatives in the conduct and regulation of the social life. This point refers to an empirical aspect. Therefore the only way open to an empiricist is, as R. B. Braithwaite attempts, to interpret and explain the religious truth and moral principles according to the role and function they have in the regulation and management of society.

According to the principle of verification, religious dogmas, beliefs and claims should be taken as propositions and statements with a certain empirical content if they are to be proved to be true or false. Braithwaite considers three main classes of statement which is valid for truth-value

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scientific theories. To leave aside the implications of the term 'postmodern science' and the interrelation between postmoderism and such ideas in contemporary philosophy of science as those of Kuhn and Feyerablend, the following description of Leotard is worth quoting': Postmodern science by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterised by incomplete information, "Fracta", catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes— is theorising its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model legitimation that has nothing to do with maximised performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy'. The Postmodern Condition: A report on Knowledge, tr. by G. Bennington and B. Msaaumi, (University of Minnesta Press, 1989), p. 60

testing: statements about empiric facts, scientific hypotheses and other empirical statements, an finally the logically necessary statements of logic and mathematics.[105] The crucial question here is whether the religious statements f into the category of any of these kinds. Religious assertions cannot, be regarded as empirical statements because their objects (such God, angel, hereafter, etc.) are not observable and testable phenomena. Being beyond the seen and the testable renders the impervious to empirical test unlike a chemical or biological entity If these statements are to be taken as scientific hypotheses o empirical statements about the factual world, they must falsifiable and refutable when the experience proves them to be false. Such a consequence obviously contradicts and undermines the very nature of religious belief which is by its nature transcendent an' everlasting. The last option is to consider the religious assertions necessary like the logically necessary propositions of logic an' mathematics. In this case religious belief faces a more serious problem, which is the ontological status of the propositions of logic and mathematics. According to this account following Hume an, Kant, logical and mathematical, propositions are hypothetic entities which, although indispensable for our understanding an' regulation of the world of phenomena, do not correspond to an objective existence in the -factual world. Of religious statements are taken to be necessary premises like the propositions of logic an mathematics, then one has to accept them as hypothetical an, instrumental entities having no claim of existence.

Within this framework religious claims have to be abandoned unverifiable and hence meaningless metaphysical statements. But we mentioned above, religious beliefs cannot be easily descarded., because of their regulative role and power in society. At this point Braithwaite comes up with a new definition of meaning derived from the later Wittgenstein in order to save the phenomena: 'the meaning of any statement is given by the way in which it is used.[106] Since 'usage' of any religious or theological statement has

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[105] R. B. Braithwaite, 'An Empiricist's View of the Nature of the Nature of Religious Belief', in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. by B. Mitchell, p. 73.

[106] Ibid., p. 77. Meaning-use equation is one of the main characteristics of the later Wittgenstein: 'For a large class of cases—though not for all in which we employ the

empiric content, it can be observed, tested, heard, etc. Intention of the asserter of any religious belief to subscribe to a religious or moral policy, for instance, is open to empirical testing. Intention and will of the asserter can be tested by observing what he does and what attitudes he follows. In the same way, empirical answers can obtained form him. Hence according to this criterion which fact a reminiscent of the pragmatist approach, what makes religion and religious claims 'meaningful' is the intention of the believer regardless of the truth or falsity of these intentions and beliefs.[107]

Since the meaning of religious statements is provided by the intention of the asserter, religious propositions are devoid of meaning unless they are associated with the object of the asserter's intention. ...the meaning of a religious assertion is given by its use in expressing the asserter's intention t follow a specified policy of behaviour'.[108] What is meant by the specified policy of behaviour is moral principles because the intention of the asserter to pursue a certain pattern of attitude cannot be any arbitrary and subjective behaviour. More importantly, religious beliefs and claims can have an 'empirical' content (conductive role in society) only when they are associated with a set of moral principles. Since religious statements have no truth-content and value in themselves as in the case of stories narrated by the sacred books, they are meaningful only when they are reduced to moral commands. '...the primary use of religious assertion is to announce allegiance to a set of moral principles: without such allegiance there is no 'true religion''.[109]

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word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language'. Philosophical Investigations,

43; see also 30, 41, 120 138, 197, 532, 556.

[107] Reduction of the epistemological basis of religion and religious belief to the intention of the believer can be seen as an extension of the emotionist view of religion which seeks the source and justification of religious belief in the 'emotions' and 'feelings' (or to speak more metaphysically, in the 'experiences') of the believer.

[108] Ibid, 80.

[109] Ibid, 82.

As is seen so far, empirical basis and content of religious belief which is necessary for verification is provided by two elements, namely the intention of the asserter to pursue a specified policy of behaviour and the moral principles which have an empirical content such as the asserter's intention. On the other hand it goes without saying that these two conditions are observed in and shared by all religions. If this is the case for the basic religious statements, then how can the differences between religions be explained? If intention of the asserter and the moral principles which he is supposed to follow are not arbitrary and subjective, how can there be religions like Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, etc.? Now can the religious ramifications be accounted for despite the fact that all great religions share a lot in common as far as the overall moral principle and prescriptions are concerned? The answer Braithwaite gives is different 'stories' of religions. '...The intentions to pursue the behaviour policies, which may be the same for different religions, are associated with thinking of different stories (or set of stories).'Hence the difference between stories which every religion maintains for its credo causes the varieties of religions. What is meant by 'story' is 'a proposition or set of propositions which are starightforwardly empirical propositions capable of empirical test and which are thought of by the religious man in connection with his resolution to follow the ways of life advocated by his religion.[110]

Although stories have empirical content because they refer to certain events, figures, places, etc., they need not necessarily to be true. The significance of these stories which vary from one religion to another is not to account for the religious belief itself but to be instrumental and functional for the believer in his religious life.[111]

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[110] Ibid., p. 84.

[111] J. H. Randall takes a similar position regarding the meaning and significance of religious belief and symbols. 'What is important to recognise is that religious symbols belong with social and artistic symbols, in the group of symbols that are both nonrepresentative and nonnegative. Such noncognitive symbols can be said to symbolise not some external thing that can be indicated apart from their operation, but rather what they themselves do, their peculiar functions'. The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion (Boston, 1958), p. 114 quoted in J. Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, (Macmillan Press, 1988),p. 4. According

To sum up, the religious instrumentalism denies any kind of truth or falsity account in religious belief.[112] What is essential for religious conviction, belief and practice is not to have a ' truth-content', but to be instrumental and functional in the life of a person and society. Because of this 'use' element (at this point the 'use' can be safely substituted by 'utility' and 'pragmatics') religious statements have necessarily to be associated with a set of moral principles. Corollary of this postulation is the relegation of religion in general and religious belief in particular to a morality which has no account or claim of truth and falsity. This metaphysicsless religion and morality, as it were, is functional in the conduct and regulation of the social life. No account of metaphysics or theology should be searched for and aimed at besides this regulative function of moral principles.

The picture given above is an outcome of accepting the verificationsim as the only reliable and valid criterion of knowledge. To leave aside the logical positivism which is the source of this verificationism, formation of religion and religious belief as a regulating element in individual and in

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to Randall religion is 'a distinctive human enterprise with a socially indispensable function'. Similarly theology amounts to 'an imaginative and symbolic rendering of men's moral experience and ideas: all religious beliefs are symbolic'. Ibid., pp. 24-25. Likewise God, for Randall, is 'our ideals, our controlling values, our ultimate concern'. He is 'an intellectual symbol for he religious dimension of the world, for the Divine'. Quoted in J. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, (Prentice Hall, 1990), p. 90.

[112] J. Hick classifies Braithwaite's position under the rubric of 'non-cognitive' theories of religion. (See Philosophy of Religion, (Prentice Hall, 1990); pp. 89-99). What is meant by non-congnitive here is to take religious beliefs and assertions as neither true nor false. Therefore religious principles possess no truth in themselves as such. Apart from Braithwaite, J.H. Randall, D.Z. Phillips and Don Cupitt hold more or less the same outlook with regard to the religious truth. For an appraisal of their views see J. Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, (Macmillan Press, 1989), pp. 193-209. The same noncognitive position can be followed from the following literature which I quote from J. Hick for the sake of record: P. Munz, Problems of Religious Knowledge (London, 1959); P. Schmidt, Religious Knowledge (New York, 1961); T. R. Miles Religion and the Scientific Outlook (London, 1959); Paul van Buren,The Secular Meaning of the Gospel

(New York, 1963); Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (London, 1980), The World to Come (London, 1982) and Only Human (London, 1985).

society can be traced back to Kant's categorical imperative. Kant's distinction between pure and practical reason and his declaration of metaphysical basis of religion and morality as belonging to the sphere of noumena, of which we can have no knowledge and in fact -no interest,[113] necessitates the reduction of religion and religious belief to moral conduct. It is obvious that this deontological stance undermines the metaphysical• basis of religious belief and moral principles despite the very fact that Kant aimed at a completely morality-based system. Just as the 'Ideas' in the Kantian terminology refer to necessary tools for our mental conception of the world,[114] religious belief and moral assertions -too point to an essential function in the life of the individual and society with no claim of metaphysical existence. Therefore the religious belief is replaced by moral principles as a stereotype of the modern conception of religion. Furthermore moral values and commands fall within the scope of practical reason and the term 'practical' itself implies the, conductive and functional element. Regulative moral principles which find their justification not in a supra-subjective basis but in subject's feelings of perfection and responsibility lead to a moral system having no religious/metaphysical basis as such. In a nutshell, moral principles derive

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[113] Contrary to the common opinion Kant's exclusion of the realm of noumena was not a mere attempt to determine the limits of reason but rather to determine the Being and beings in the Heideggerian sense according to the precepts of reason. As Grunebaum states, 'the limitations of reason which at the end of the eighteenth century Kant compels his contemporaries to realise exclude man if indeed they do exclude him only from areas into which, in the last analysis, he no longer cares to penetrate'. G.E. von Grunebaum, 'Concept and Function of Reason in Islamic Ethics', Orients, Vol. 15, 1962, p. 16.

[114] As L. W. Beck states 'Kant takes the word 'Idea' from Plato, though he does not ascribe metaphysical reality and power to ideas, as Plato often did. An Idea for Kant is like Plato's Idea, however, in being a conception for which no experience can give us an exemplar, yet a conception which is not arbitrarily constructed by the imagination. But whereas Plato thought the Ideas were objects of pure reason in a noumenal world in which the world of sense participates by imitating the ideas. Kant thought of them as necessary creations of the human mind with no known metaphysical existence. Necessary, though for what? Kant believed that they were necessary for the guidance of our theoretical knowledge and practical or moral experience, holding before us an unrealised systematic goal for our piecemeal dealings with particular problems'. On History Immanuel Kant, edited with an introduction by L.W. Beck, (Macmillan pub. Corn. 1963), pp. XIX-XX. For Kant's evaluation of Plato's 'Ideas' sec Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by N. K. Smith (St. Martin's Press, 1965), pp. 310-311.

their primary significance and justification from the conductive and operational role in the management of society.[115] Religion is meaningful and useful as long as it is a mere set of moral principles.

It is an another application of the denial of the truth-falsity account which leads to the construal of religion as a distinct language-game. D.Z. Phillips. One of the proponents of this view, argues that the criteria of meaning in religion-should be intrinsic to religion itself.[116] This can be carried out only when religion is taken as a language-game in the sense Wittgenstein has used the term. But here one can observe that, although the ways are different, consequence of Braithwaite's empiricism and Phillips' language-game strategy is almost the same: Any account relating to truth or falsity in religion should be relying on ontological relativism which is a corollary of the notion of language-game. Since every language-game has its rules peculiar to it, one cannot talk about a general and universal criterion of truth and falsity to verify or justify any religious or non-religious statement. As Wittgeinstein' says, each language-game can be a complete language in itself.[117] This

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[115] Regulative function is a necessary constituent and consequence of ethical values and principles. What is problematic in instrumentalist position, however, is the justification of these principles by their use and utility in social life. This is in fact is to reverse the process and make the reference point not the ethical values and principles but the management of society. It is obvious that this causes another problem of justification.

[116] The problem of criterion is one of he distinctive features of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. For an account of this notion in Wittgenstein see P. M. S. Hacker Wittgenstein Meaning and Mind (Blackwell, 1993) pp. 243-266. The same issue is often taken up in the philosophy of religion. Daniel Guerriere, for example, attempts to develop a truth criterion proper to religion by defining religion as a 'remedy and salvational Power'. Account to this phenomenological approach, truth is defined as alethia (manifestation) in the Heideggerian sense. See D. Guerriere The Truth, The nontrth, and the Untruth Proper to Religion' in Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion, ed. by D. Guerriere (State University of New York Press, 1990) pp. 75-101.

[117] This point in fact explains the core of Wittgenstein's 'fideism' with regard to the justification of (religious) belief. For a critical account of fideistic mode of justification which we have to neglect here due to the context of our discussion, see N. Frankenberry, Religion and Radical Empiricism (State University of New York Press, 1987) pp.8-13; also M. C.

amounts to construing religion as a distinct world putting no claim of supremacy over other language-games. And at this point one can easily talk of 'language games as having criteria of intelligibility within them, and of impossibility rendering one language-game unintelligible in terms of criteria of intelligibility taken from another.[118] It is obvious that this ontological relativism whose details and implications should be taken up in an another study is destructive as far as the metaphysical basis and structure of religion is concerned.

SOME **C**ONCLUDING **R**EMARKS

As the above considerations show, scientific and religious instrumentalism have some common points. Both discard any account of truth and falsity as redundant for the operation of science or religion. Both consider their subject, science and religion respectively, as instruments for some other purposes. And finally both are anti-realist. Leaving aside at the moment the criticism of both instrumentalism, one can conclude that scientific instrumentalism may have some useful applications especially when there is a clash between science and religion. In such a situation of clash and conflict between religion and any scientific theory, one of the stategies would be to relatives, so to speak, the science according to the perspective of instrumentalism and to consider the clashing theory in question as instrumental and provisional. Pierre Duhem (1861-1961) assumes such a position with regard to the scientific theories which clash with religion. When a theory is put against religion, he says, the best way is not to revise or change the religious belief but against religion, he says, the best way is not to revise or, change the religious belief but to take and evaluate this theory as instrumental. As far as the history of science and the demise of old theories and paradigms are concerned, this instrumettalist stance with regard to the scientific theories is quite justified. This harms nither religious belief nor scientific theory. Duhem who is famous with his distinction between physics

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banner The Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief, (Clarendon Paperbacks, 1992) pp. 67-95.

[118] D. Z. Phillips, 'Religious Beliefs and Language Games' in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. by B. Mitchell, p. 131. See also his Faith After Fundationalims, (Routledge, 1988), especially part one. For a critical evaluation of Phillips' ideas see J. Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, pp. 25-36.

and metaphysics describes his interpretation of physics as 'positivist in its conclusions as well as in its origins' although he himself again expresses his belief in religion by saying that 'I believe with all my soul in the truths which God has revealed to us.[119] Within this context the supposed controversy between religion and science necessarily becomes accidental and provisional rather than substantial and mutually exclusive as it is thought to be.

As for religious instrumentalism, we argued that instrumetalist construal of religion and the subordination of religion and religious belief to moral conduct represent one of the parameters of the Western conception of religion. This position implies that religion as defined by the Divine revelation does not refer to an ultimate transcendent truth which encapsulates in itself all the moral principles and values but rather to a morally defined institution.

Since the consolidation of the Enlightenment as the dominant discourse of the Western- civilization the self-perception of the Western man has tended to see the religious truth as something operational and instrumental. the 'religious element' in the Enlightenment thinkers. if any, in fact points to such a religious imagination rather than to a religious truth as such. As Heidegger would say of the Nietzschean slogan 'God is dead', this refers to the oblivion and subordination of God rather than to the formulation of a mere atheism.[120]

At this juncture modernism and postmodernism share a common point with regard to the statue of religion in spite of the somewhat misleading opinion that no school of thought has been as harsh and catastrophic in its critical approach to modernism as postmodernism. Postmodernist discourse places religion among the 'socially responsible institutions.' Postmodern religion devoid of any transcendental ground must be responsive to the

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[119] The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, p. 275, quoted in F. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, (Image Books, 1985), vol IX, p. 277-278.

[120] For an overall survey of the idea of 'God is dead' in the West from Luther to Heidegger, see Eric von der Luft, 'Sources of Nietzsche's "God is dead" and Its Meaning for Heidegger' Journal of the History of Ideas April-June 1984, vol. XLV no. 2, pp. 263-276.

existing human conditions and problems.[121] Otherwise any theological and metaphysical reality such as God or the hereafter will have to be abandoned like any other 'metanarrative'. It is to be noted that here religion is defined by and allowed for something other than the ultimate transcendental reality itself. Religion is given meaning and justification by the role it plays in the salvation of human society. To leave aside the details and implications of the concept of 'postmodern religion', the other vital problem that comes into the picture is the ontological relativism which both instrumentalism and postmodernism share. It is true that postmodernist discourse provides a certain place for religion and it is this factor in fact that makes postmodernism attractive for many people. But it should be indicated that postmodernist approval of religion is not an ethical but an ontologically relativistic position. This means that religion is given as much meaning and justification as any other justified discourse. Within this postmodernist framework religion would be as justified and meaningful as any other language-game provided that it is responsive to the existing human condition. To be more specific, Islam is as justified and meaningful as any other religious or ideological trend such as, say, Buddhism or feminism. But again it should be borne in mind that in this framework and religion is justified and admitted not as a transcendental truth as defined by the Divine revelation but as a 'socially responsible institution'. Therefore the pluralism to which postmodernism gives rise does not designate an ethical attitude or tolerance but rather an ontological relativism. At this point one has to concede the fact that postmodernist conception of religion, just like the religious instrumentalism, is as detrimental and perncious as modernism in its stance towards religion notwithstanding its seemingly sympathetic disguise.

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[121] See J.W. Murphy, Postmodern Social Analysis and' Criticism, (Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 30; also pp. 95-98. As Murphy says 'deprived of God as an absolute point of reference, salvation must come through a transformation of society that enhances the human condition. This is what Nietzsche had in mind when he stated that the question of ethics goes 'beyond good and evil. "Ibid., p.31.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NAQSHBANDIYYA-MUJADDIDIYYA IN INDIA

How THE **P**ANJAB **B**ECAME THE **C**ENTRE
OF **N**INETEENTH-**C**ENTURY
INTERNATIONAL **N**AQSHBANDI **A**CTIVITY

Arthur F. Buehler

Introduction

It is not obvious how the Naqshbandi Sufi lineage of Central Asian origin, named after Baha'uddin Naqshband (d. 791/1389 Bukhara), developed an influential centre in the Indian Punjab four-hundred years later.[122] Even less clear is how an Indian form of the Naqshbandiyya, the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya quickly replaced the original Central Asian lineage. This essay explores the historical processes of this development.

Naqshbandi shaykhs came into India with the Timurid conquests in the tenth/sixteenth century. In the following century, the Indian shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1034/1624), began an new chapter in the history of the Naqshbandiyya. More than any other Naqshbandi after Baha'uddin, Sirhindi was the pivotal figure who redefined Sufism's role in society and who elaborated Naqshbandi mystical exercises. His title, "the renewer of the second millennium" (mujaddid-i alf-i thani), made him a co-founder figure for the later Naqshbandiyya and reflected the significance of his influence. He was so convincing in his stress on following the Prophetic example and on Islamic law as the basis for mystical experience that almost all Naqshbandis world-wide now call themselves Mujaddidis (hencefoth Naqshbandis).

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[122] When two dates are juxtaposed, the first is the Islamic lunar hijri date followed by a slash and the Common Era date. All date conversions were calculated with Professor John Woods's "Taqwim" software, using Julian equivalents for the hijri era up to October 4, 1582 and Gregorian equivalents thereafter.

The far-reaching impact of the Naqshbandiyya in India relates directly to their comprehensive vision of religious leadership. The Naqshbandiyya, to a greater degree than any other Indian Sufi group, attempted to influence the arenas of both politics and mystical practice at the same time. After counselling a ruler about his own individual Islamic practices, the Naqshbandis expected to guide the development of Islamic social institutions for the Indian Muslim community. It has been in such a holistic and interconnected fashion that the Naqshbandis dedicated themselves to the re-forming of the mystical and the political, the inward and the outward, and the personal and the impersonal. One effect of this reform was an. acceleration of a religious crystallisation process beginning in the eleventh/seventeenth century. This development, in addition to other currents in the Islamic community, resulted in the eventual creation of Pakistan.

Naqshbandi leadership hastened the process of integrating the authority of jurists and Sufis in the Subcontinent---precipitating a similar concentration of religious authority among Naqshbandi groups worldwide. Based upon Central Asian and Indian precedents, Naqshbandis are still prominent in the national political arenas of several Islamic countries.

1. **T**HE **I**NTRODUCTION OF THE **N**AQSHBANDIYYA IN **I**NDIA.

Historically, the spiritual path now known as the Naqshbandiyya can be divided into three stages, each of which is distinguished by a pivotal charismatic figure who developed new spiritual practices and even redefined the identity of the Sufi group. The first stage, called "the way of the masters" (tariqa-yi khw ajagan), since the time of Khwaja 'Abdulkhaliq Ghujduvani (d. 575/1179)[123] is the "prehistorical" stage originating with the Prophet Muhammad. Baha'uddin Naqshband, the founder-figure, imitates the second

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[123] Indo-Muslim sources give Ghujduvani's death date as 575/1179 while Western scholars use 617/1220. For a thorough analysis of the dating difficulties see Fritz Meier, Zwei Abhandlungen uber die Naqshbandiyya (Istanbul: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1994), p.25. At least a few Sufis before Khwaja Ghujduvani were named Khwaja, e.g., Khwaja Yusuf Hamadan (d. 535/1140) who was Khwaja Ghujduvani's spiritual guide (murshid), in addition to Khwaja Ahmad Yasawi (d. 562/1166-67) and Khwaja Abu Muhammad al-Hasan b. al-Husayn al- Andaqi(d.522/1157) who were Khwaja Ghujduvani's fellow disciples.

historical stage, when the spiritual path (tariqa) was called the Naqshbandiyya.[124] This section will discuss this second stage of the Naqshbandiyya as its teachings spread into the Indian Subcontinent along with Timurid rule. The third historical stage of the Naqshbandiyya begins with Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d.1034/1624) and includes those applying Ahmad Sirhindi's teachings and spiritual techniques.[125] It is with Sirhindi that the movement becomes the Naqshbandyya-Mujaddidiyya or simply Mujaddidiyya. In the following two sections I will detail this third stage, when the Mujaddidiyya spread throughout India to predominate over all other Naqshbandi lineages.

Most significant in the Naqshbandiyya's spread to India is Khwaja Nasiruddin 'Ubaydullah Ahrar (d. 895/1490), whose lineal and spiritual descendants absolutely dominate the Indian Naqshbandiyys. Ahrar's remarkably powerful spiritual personality attracted large numbers of influential disciples who not only went to India, but also to Turkey, Iran and Arabia. As one of the largest landowners in Transoxiana and the-de facto ruler over much of the eastern Timurid kingdom, Ahrar set the precedent for Naqshbandis to cultivate close relationship with ruling dynasties.[126] The

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[124] Dina Le gall states, on the basis of hagiographical sources, that the tariqa was not named after Baha'uddinh Naqshband until roughly one hundred years after his death. See Dina Le Gall, "The Ottoman Naqshbandiyya in the Pre-Mujaddidi Phase: A Study in Islamic Religious Culture and its transmission") Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1992), pp. 12-13.

[125] A fourth stage, the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya named after Maulana Khalid Baghdadi (d. 1282/1827), may also be included. The spread of this branch has been largely limited to the Arab world and Indonesia. See Mahindokht Mu'tamadi, Maulana Khalid Naqshband (Teheran: Pazhang Publishing, 1990). Some modern Naqshbandi writers include two additional stages, from Abu Bakr Siddiq (d. 13/634) to Tayfur ibn ' Isa Abu Yzaid Bistami (d. 261/874) called the Siddiqiyya and form Abu Yazid Bistami to Khwaja 'Abdulkhaliq Ghujduvani (d. 575/1179) called the Tayfuriyya. See Muhammad Nur Bakhsh Tawakkuli, Ta,lhkiralyi' masha'ikb-i naqshband with additions by Muhammad Sadiq Qusuri (Gujarat: Fadl Nur Academy, n. d.), p. 488. This typology has bee duplicated by various later Arab Naqshbandi authors. See Muhammad Parsa, Qudsiyya: Kalimat-i Baba'uddin Naqshband, ed. Ahmad Tahiri (Teheran: Kitabkhana-yi Tahuri, 1975), p. 28 (introduction). There is n historical evidence that any Sufis identified themselves as members of the "Siddiqiyya" or "Tayfuriyya."

Naqshbandi political agenda, among their other goals, was to influence political leaders to establish and enforce Islamic practices.

In Ahrar's case, he attempted to rid Transoxiana of Turco-Mongol customs and laws contrary to Islamic practice.[127]

Things did not always go smoothly for the Naqshbanis, especially at first when Timurid rule ended in Transoxiania in 905/1500. the founder of the succeeding Shaybanid dynasty in Transociana, Muhammad Shaybani, confiscated considerable property of the Ahrar family and was implicated in the massacre of one of Ahrar's sons, Khuwaja Yahya and two of Yahya's three sons in 906/1500-1.[128] Fortunately for the Naqshbandis, this kind of treatment was shortlived. The Shaybanids (905/1500-1007/1598), ruling after Muhammad Shaybani, and the succeeding dynasties ruling from Samarqand continued to respect Naqshbandi shaykhs, as did the succeeding Uzbek dynasties ruling from Bukhara, e.g., the Janids (1007/1599/1785).

The Tumurid dynasty, under the aegis of Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur (d. 937/1530), continued to have close ties with the Naqshbandis.[129] Khwaja

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[126] See Hamid Algar, "A Brief History of the Naqshbandi Order," in Marc Gaborieau, Alexander Popovic, and Thierry Zarcone, eds., Naqshbandis: Historical Development and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order (Istanbul: Editions Isis, 1990), pp. 13-15.

[127] Hamid Algar, "Political Aspects of Naqshbandi History," in Gaborieau et. al., in Naqshbandis, p. 126.

[128] Muhammad Hashimi Kishmi, Nasamat al-quds, Urdu translation by Mahbub Hasan Wasiti (Sialkot? Maktaba-yi Nu' maniyya, 1990), p. 153 and Babur, Babur nama, 2 vols., English translation by Annette S. Beveridge, The Memoirs of Babur(Delhi: Low Price Publications [1922], 1989), p. 128.

[129] Babur's father, his paternal uncle Sultan Ahmad Mirza, as well as Babur himself respected Khwaja Ahrar but were not formally Ahrar's disciples. Naqshbandi sources sometimes exaggerate Tumurid connections to the Naqshbandiyya, e.g., Khurshid Hasan Bukhari, "Mughal siyasat par awliya'-i naqshband ka athar," Nur al- Islam, awliya'-i naqshband narnber, part 1, vol. 24 (March-April 1979), p. 138. In his memoirs, Babur recounts a dream where Ahrar predicted his successful victory taking Samarqand. See Babur, Babur nama, p. 132. In addition, he relates having especially honoured a visiting grandson of Ahrar, Khwaja 'Abdushshahid (d. 983/1575) (ibid, p. 631). Khwaja 'Abdusshshahid later spent fifteen years in India (966/1558-59 to 982/1574-75) where he reportedly had a

Ahrar's descendants were already established in Kabul before Babur captured the city in 909-10/1504.[130] As Babur moved on to conquer portions of northern' India in 932-33/1526, the Naqshbandis continued to find a receptive climate to spread their teaching. Ahrar's third son, Muhammad Amin, accompanied Babur when he conquered Kabul and India.[131] Babur, in battle against the forces of the Lodhi King Sultan Ibrahim in Delhi, is said to have

> [first] visualised Ahar and [soon after] a man came dressed in white on a white horse who fought fiercely. After the Gurganis [Babur's forces] won the battle, this man was later identified as Khwajagi Ahmad and was rewarded by Mir Qadi.[132]

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following of twelve thousand people before returning to Samarqand in 983/1575. Kishmi, Nasamat, pp. 168-169.

[130] Stephen Dale describes Ahrar's extensive waqf holdings probably obtained in cooperation with Babur's uncle Ulugh Beg Kabuli. One holding was a madrasa, maktab, and a mospue, a base for education and patronage and that could have been one of Baqi Billah's (d. 1012/1603) institutional affiliations when he was in Kabul before migrating to Delhi in 1007-8/1599. Dale, revising earlier studies by S. Athar Abbas Rizvi, Muslim Revival Movements in the 16th and 17th Centuries (Agra: Agra University, 1965), pp. 179-183, has shown the close interrelationship of the Naqshbandiyya and Timurid dynasty in India, particularly in marriage ties between the Ahraris and the Timurids ruling India. Stephen Dale, "The Legacy of the TImurids," in David Morgan and Francis Robinson, eds., The Legacy of the Timurids(Delhi: Oxford University Press for the Royual Asiatic Society, forthcoming). I am particularly grateful for Stephen Dale making this unpaginated pre-publication available and giving me permission to cite. See also Bukhari, "Mughal siyasat," pp. 140-141.

[131] Kishmi, Nasamat, pp. 153-154.

[132] Khwajagi Ahmad, known as Maulana Khwajagi Ahmad b. Jalaluddin (d. 950/1543-44), was a disciple of Muhammad Qadi (d. 911 or 912/1505-7), a famous successor of Ahrar. See Muhammad Ghawthi Mandawi, Adhkar-i abrar, Urdu tar juma-yi gulzar-i abrar, 2nd ed., Urdu translation by Fadl Ahmad Jewari (Lahore: Islamic Book Foundation [1908], 1975), p. 259. It was a common practice of the time to have holy men accompany armies as a kind of "spiritual artillery" to assist in gaining victory. Baba Palangposh (d. 1110-11/1699), originally from Ghujduvan, was a Naqshbandi military pir, who accompanied Ghazi'uddin Khan, an immigrant Mughal general fighting in India. See Simon Digby, "The Naqshbandis in the

When Babur's cousin, Haydar Mirza Muhammad, described the unrespectful treatment accorded to Khwaja Khawand Mahmud by the Mughal Emperor Humayun (r. 937/1530-947/1539, 962/1555-963/1556) and his entourage, he noted, "Khawja Nura [Khawand Mahmud].... had an hereditary claim to their veneration."0[133] Just as his grandfather, Ahrar, had foreseen Babur's previous victory over Samarqand, Khawand Mahmud is said to have predicted that Babur's son, Mirza Kamran, would take the city of Qandahar.[134] Conversely, after being treated brusquely by Humayun, who was a devotee of Shaykh Bahlul, the elder brother of Shattari Muhammad Ghauth Gwaliori (d. 970/1562(, Khawand Mahmud is said to have predicted Humayun's defeat by Sher Shah.[135] Sufi anecdotes such as these reflected and perpetuated the prevailing world view of the time that there was a causal relationship between Naqshbandi. Ahrari spiritual intercession and Timurid military success. A shaykh's authority, in addition to genealogical factors, was thought to be based on his ability to affect mundane affairs through intercession on the supramundane plane.

The Naqshbandi-Timurid partnership involved many dimensions of cooperation of interrelationships. There were formal master• disciple ties, e.g., Khwaja Mu'inuddin Abdulhaqq (d. 956/1549.50 or 962/1554-55), the brother of Khawand Mahmud, acted as Mirza Kamiran's spiritual mentor.[136] Bairam Khan, Akbar's tutor, was the disciple of Iranian Naqshbandi Maulana Zaynuddin Kamankar.[137] Other Naqshbandis, particularly descendants of

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Deccan in the Late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Century A.D.: Baba Palangposh, Baba Musafir and Their Adherents," in Gaborieau et. al., Naqshbandis, pp. 167-207.

[133] N. Elias, ed., English translation by E. Denison Ross, A History of the Mughals in Central Asia Being the Tarikh-i Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar Dughlat, 2nd ed. (London: Curzon Press, 1972) p. 399 cited by Dale, "The Legacy of the Timurids." Mirza Muhammad was a disciple of Khwawand Mahmud.

[134] Kishmi, Nasamat, p. 161. Both of these forecasts were inerpreted as divine assistance mediated by the Naqshbandis.

[135] Ibid., p. 156.

[136] Ibid., p. 163. ' Abdulhaqq parted ways with Humayun due to some unspecified animosity between them.

Ahrar, held governmental posts during Humayun's reign, e.g., Ahrar's great grandsons Khwaja 'Abdulkafi and Khwaja Qasim. Sultan Khwaja Naqshbandi, a disciple of Khwaja 'Abdushshahid, was appointed the sadr in charge of religious endowments and land grants from 985-86/1578-992/1584 during Akbar's reign.[138] Muhammad Yahya (d. 999/1590-91 in Agra), the principal successor to his father, Abu Fayd, a grandson of Ahrar, was appointed Mir-i Hajj for the year 986/1578 by Akbar following the previous hajj which was led by a lineal descendant of Ahrar, Sultan Khwaja.[139] Timurid respect and veneration of Naqshbandis could be expected to have been reflected in a more widespread public recognition of Naqshbandis. It was a reciprocal relationship; the Timurids- acquired religious legitimacy from the Maqshbandis and the Naqshbandis secured an elevated socio-political status in their association with the Timurids.

Ahraris also intermarried within the top echelons of Timurid ruling families. Babur's daughter was married to Nuruddin Muhammad Naqshbandi; a daughter of this marriage married Akbar's tutor, Bairam Khan, and later became one of Akbar's wives after her first husband's death. Humayun's daughter was given in marriage to Khwaja Hasan Naqshbandi by Akbar's half brother, Mirza Muhammad Hakim (d. 993/1585), the governor of Kabul.[140] The intermarriage of Timurid families with Ahraris, combined with a hereditary discipleship and government patronage of the Ahraris,) made northern India fertile ground for the spread of the Naqshbandiyya.

In addition, Stephen Dale notes that Naqshbandi-Timurid associations continued to exist between Naqshbandis and both Turco-Mongol and

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[137] Dale, "The Legacy of the Timurids."

[138] Ibid., Khwaja 'Abdushshahid (d. 983/1575-76) was one of Ahrar's grandsons.

[139] Bada'ni, 'Abdulqadir Muntakhab al-tawarikh,, vol. 2, English translation by W.H. Lowe (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Deli [1884-1925], 1973), pp. 246, 275. According to Bada'uni, Sultan Khwaja was the son of Khwaja Khawand Mahmud. Ibid., p. 246. Others say he was disciple of Khwaja Dost whose shaykh was a disciple of Khwaja 'Abdushshahid. See Abu Fadl ' Allami, Akbar nama: History of the reign of Akbar inculuding an account of his predecessors, 3 vols., English translation by H. Beveridge (Delhi: Ess Ess Publications [1897-1921], 1977), 3. 192, 271.

[140] Dale, "The Legacy of the Timurids."

Afghan nobles in the former Mughal territories of South Asia until the nineteenth century.[141] These liaisons were most numerous during Tumurid rule when Naqshbandis emigrating from Afghanistan or Central Asia were more likely to receive some kind of government patronage. In later times the descendants of Sirhindi had strong ties with Afghani notables in Afghanistan in the eighteenth century which facilitated their migration to Afghanistan after the Sikhs razed Sirhind in 1177/1764, the home and base of Sirhindi and his descendants.[142] Naqshbani Abu'l-Khayr d.1341/1923) of Delhi had many important links with top-ranking figures in the Afghani government including the king, Amanullah Khan.[143]

Not Naqshbandis in early Timurid India were Ahrar's lineal descendants, nor did every Naqshbandi have government affiliations. Non-Ahrari Naqshbandis, like other Muslims travelling from Transoxiana, -sometimes became residents in one of the major centres on the pilgrimage route to the Hijaz: Balkh, Kabul, Lahore, Agra, or Surat. Often they would stay in the port of Surat upon completion of the pilgrimage, For example. Khwaja Jamaluddin b. Badshah Pardah Push Khwarzmi (d. 1015-16/1606-7), commonly known as Khwaja Dana in later hagiographies, became the disciple of Khwaja Muhammad Islam Juybari (d. 971/1563-64 Bukhara) in Balkh and then travelled to Thatta and Agra before his residence in Surat.[144]

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[141] Ibid.,

[142] Sirhindi's name is derived form his birthplace, Sirhind. the ties between Sirhindi's descendants and Afghani affairs is an intriguing subject that requires further research. See 'Azizuddin Wakil Fufalza'i Timur Shah Durrani, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Kabul: n.p., n.d.), 2.677-688.

[143] Abu'l Hasan Zayd Faruqi, Maqamat-i khayr (Delhi: Dr. Abu'l-Fadl Muhammad Faruqi, 1975), p.344. Members of teh Mujaddidi family, e.g., Sibghatullah Mujaddidi, are still prominent in the contemporary Afghani political scene. For further examples of Afghan-Naqshbandi affinities see Juan Cole, Roots of North Indian Shi 'ism in Iran and Iraq: Religion and State in Awadh, 1722-1859 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 230-239.

[144] SHah Zuhur al-Hasan Sharib, Tarikh-i sufiya'-i Gujarat (Ahmadabad: Jamil Academy, 1981), pp. 97-113. His sobriquet is also Khwaja Divana, see 'Abdulhayy b.

Some Naqshbandis, such as Khwaja 'Ubaydullah Kabuli, a disciple of Lutfullah (d. 979/1571-72 in Samarqand), went to India is Kabul, ostensibly to seek employment. Upon ' Ubaydullah's arrival in India, Akbar appointed him to:each religious sciences in he district of Turbat.

Baqi Billah (d. 1012/ 1603) is, in retrospect, the other key figure if the second stage of Naqshbani history.[145] As Ahmad Sirhindi's spiritual mentor, Baqi Billah is the most significant Naqshbandi in India during the tenth/sixteenth century.[146] Baqi Billah was probably)(posed to the Naqshbandiyya from an early age; his grandfather ad received spiritual guidance from Khwaja Muhammad Zakariya, one of Ahrar's grandsons, and the two families began intermarrying.[147] It is likely that Baqi 'Billah associated with Naqshbandis in Kabul, e.g., Khwaja Ubayd Kabuli, before embarking on a trip to India in search of the perfect pir. After pending time with a

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Fakhruddin al Hasani, Nuzhat al-khawatir wa bahjat al-masami' wa'l-nawazir, 9. vols., 3rd ed. (Hyderabad, Deccan: Osmania Oriental Publications Bureau, 1989), 5.115. The shift in sobriquet reflects a preference of sobriety over intoxication in Sufi identity (dana = = wise and diviana==ecstatic). His son, Abu'l-Hasan b. al-Jamal (d. 1054/1644-45) and Abu'l-Hasan's son Muhammad (d. 1078/1667-68) continued his teaching in Surat. Ibid., pp. 15, 337.

[145] The other is Khwaja Ahrar.

[146] A common misperception among historians of Indian Sufism has been that Baqi Billah was the first Naqshbandi in India, e.g., Abdul Haqq Ansari, Sufism and Shari'ah: A Study of Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi's Effort to Reform Sufism (Leicester: Foundation, 1986), p. 13. Baqi Billah was not the first spiritual descendant of Ahrar outside of Ahrar's blood line to arrive in India (contrary to Algar, cf. Algar, "A Brief History," p. 19). Non-Ahrari Naqshbandis, i.e., those not of Ahrari lineal descent, had been arriving and initiating disciples long before Baqi Billah arrived in India. The biographical sources mention many spiritual descendants of Muhammad Qadi (d. 903/1497-98 Samarqand), one of Ahrar's important successors, who came to India spreading the Naqshbandiyya, e.g., Maulana Tarsun Qadi (d. 1013/1604-5 Mecca) with disciples in Lahore and Fathpur; Himiduddin Harwi, son of Muhammad Qadi, who died in Surat; and Khawand Mahmud (d. 1052/1642 Lahore) who came to India the same year as Baqi Billah. See Kishmi, Nasamat, pp. 226, 265-266, 242. For more specific information on Khawand Mahmud, see David Mamrel, "Forgotten Grace: Khwaja Khawand Mahmud Naqshbandi in Central Asia and Mughal India," (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1991).

[147] Kishmi, Nasamat, pp. 153-154.

Kubrawi shaykh residing in Kashmir, Baba Uali (d. 1011/1602-3), he went to Samarqand, reaching intimacy with God (wilaya) under the tutelage of Muhammad Khwajagi Amkanaki (d. 1008/1600 Bukhara).[148] After Amkanaki's death, Baqi Billah stayed about a year in Lahore, later setting up his Sufi. hospice near Delhi in the Firuzi fort where all expenses were paid by one of Akbar's viziers, Shaykh Farid Bukhari.[149]

During the few years Baqi Billah resided in Delhi he attracted a remarkable number of disciples before dying at the age of forty.[150] Tajuddin Sanbhali (d. 1050/1640-41 Mecca), one of Baqi Billah's senior disciples, transferred his residence to the Hijaz after his spiritual mentor's death. Tajuddin's disciples spread the Naqshbandiyya in Egypt and Yemen. Khwaja Husamuddin Ahmad (d. 1043/1633 Agra), another senior disciple, maintained the Sufi hospice in Firuzabd and raised Baqi Billah's two children after his death. Husamuddin had married Abu Fadl's sister and had advanced to a high-ranking post (mansabdar of 1000) in Akbar's government before renouncing government service and becoming a devout follower of Baqi Billah.

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[148] Wilaya, meaning "proximity" and walaya, meaning "protection and authority," are both derived from the same Arabic root "w 1 y." The meanings have been conflated to a large extent because 1) Both words, when applied to holy persons, usually share both meanings; and 2) Short vowels are not mormally written in Arabic to distinguish between the two words. The convention has been for scholars to use wilaya which I have chosen to translate as "intimacy," a suitable type of proximity for shaykhs not involiving physical distance. The most detailed discussion on these two terms and the notion of wali is Michel Chodkiewicz, Le sceau des saints: Prophetic et saintete dans la doctirne d'Ibn Arabi (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), pp. 35-39.

[149] Mandawi, Gulzar-i abrar, p. 477. He is also known as Mir Murtada Khan.

[150] For more information on Baqi Billah see Muhammad Hashmi,Kishmi Badakhshani, Zubdat al-maqamat (Isbanbul: Isik Kitabevi, 1977) and Muhammad Sadiq Dihlawi Kashmiri Hamadani, Kalimat al-sadiqin, ed. Muhammad Saleem Akhtar (Lahore: Maktaba 'Ilmiyya Press, 1988), pp. 161-196. ALl of Baqi Billah's writing has been collected in Baqi Billah, Kulliyat-i Baqi Billah, eds, Abu'l-Hasan Faruqi and Burhan AHmad Faruqi (Lahore: Din Muhammadi Press, n.d.). In one of the few biographical compendiums detailing Muslim religious personages of the eleventh/seventeenth entury, Nuzhat al-khawatir, there are 32 prominent ' Naqshbandis from Baqi Billah's lineage mentioned, 26 " Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis, and five with Central Asian shaykhs. See ' Abdulhayy, Nuzhat al-khawatir, vol. 3.

By the time Baqi Billah arrived in Delhi, Akbar, the Mughal ruler, had visited Mu'inuddin Chishti's tomb many times, having performed his first pilgrimage on foot to the mausoleum in 972/1564. Like his father, Humayun, Akbar did not give apecial patronage to the Naqshbandiyya. Akbar visited another Chishti, Salim Chishti (d. 979/1571) whose holy intercession and prayer Akbar believed had expedited the birth of his first surviving son. Akbar's Chishti affiliation especially aggravated the Naqshbandis. Not only were the Naqshbandis politically marginalised, but the Chishtis at court engaged in practices which the Naqshbandis considered forbidden by Islamic law, e.g., Sufi concerts (sama'). The subsequent support of Ahmad Sirhindi by influential Muslim groups after Akbar's death is related to these political circumstances.

Observing the precedent set by Khwaja Ahrar, the Naqshbandi-Timurid partnership- in India bolstered the Islamic identity of the Timurid regime while facilitating the spread of Naqshbandi teachings among the Indian Muslim community. Continuing beyond the Mughal empire into the fourteenth/twentieth century, the Naqshbandi-Timurid alliance created its own precedents in India by developing social and religious ties between Naqshbandis and Afghans. In addition, the political role of the Naqshbandi pir as a shaykh-intimate to the ruler was established. Not only did Naqshbandi shaykhs advise and mediate Mughal administrative affairs, but were also expected to focus divine favour to the ruler's advantage. this Central-Asian legacy was to make a lasting impression on Indian Islam

2. THE SPREAD OF THE NAQSHBANDIYYA-MUJADDIDIYYA IN INDIA UP TO 1857.

Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1034/1624) initiates the third stage of Naqshbandi history. Also called the renewer of the second millennium (mujaddid-i alf-i thani), he was the most famous of Baqi Billah's disciples. More than any other Naqshbandi after Baha'uddin, Sirhindi is the pivotal figure who redefined Sufism's role in society and who elaborated Naqshbandi mystical exercises. The renaming of the path from Naqshbandiyya to Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya (or simply Mujaddidiyya) reflects the significance of Sirhindi's influence. making him a co-founder figure for the later Naqshbandiyya. With the goal of following in the footsteps of the Prophet, his ideas ran counter to conventional perspectives of the time.

Sirhindi's emphasis on defining Indian Muslims according to a strict interpretation of Sunni credal dogma was in direct conflict with Akbar's official policy which, among other things, did not emphasise the pivotal role of Muhammad as the exemplar for Muslims, accelerating a process, that blurred distinctions between religious communities. Within a short period of time, Mujaddidi political influence and alliances contributed to the demise of universalist tendencies in Mughal government, permanently inluencing Muslim self-identity in the Subcontinent. Indian Naqshbandis continued to advise rulers until the decline of the Mughal empire after Aurangzeb's death in 1119/1707. Sirhindi's impact was not only political; by the eighteenth century the Mujaddidis dominated all other Indian Naqshbandi lineages. He was so convincing in his stress on following the sunna and sharia (shari'ah, Islamic law) as the basis for mystical experience that almost all Naqshbandis world now call themselves Mujaddidis.

Sirhindi, whose father 'Abdulahad was a well-known Chishti-Qadiri and religious scholar, exhibited his extraordinary spiritual aptitude by becoming a successor to Baqi Billah in less than three months. His spiritual attainments attracted a large numbers of disciples, including members of Akbar's court. Shortly before his death, Sirhindi was imprisoned for a year by the Emperor Jahangir for his controversial claim to have reached a higher spiritual rank than Abu Bakr, the first Caliph.[151]

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[151] Naqshbandis claim that Sirhindi was imprisoned because of the Shi'i intrigues initiated by Nurjahan, Jahangir's Sh'i wife. Supposedly this measure was precipitated by Sirhindi's failing to perform the necessary court obeisance mandted by court protocol, This controversy was one of many which has involved Sirhindi from his lifetime to the present. Yohanan Friedmann, in his lucid but brief monograph, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi: An outline of His Thought and a Study of His Image in the Eyes of Posterity (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971), discusses Sirhindi's self-image, the perceptions of his contemporaries, and how critics and supporters up to the present have interpreted Sirhindi. From a pro. Sirhindi perspective, Muhammad Iqbal Mujaddidi in his Ahwal wa-athar-i 'Abdullah Khushagi Qusuri. (Lahore: Ashraf Press, 1972) analyses critically many of the eleventh/seveteenth-century sources used by Friedmann in addition to adding data from sources not available to Friedmann. The most complete scholarly treatments of Sirhindi are Zawwar Husayn, Hadrat Mujaddid-i Alfi Thani (Karachi: Idara-yi Mujaddidiyya, 1983) and Muhammad Mas' ud Ahmad, Sirat-i Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thani(Karachi: Medina Publishing

Successors to Sirhindi

In 1032-33/1623 Sirhindi declared his middle son, Khwaja Muhammad Ma'sum (d. 1079/1668), to be his principal successor and next qayyum.[152] Like his father who had written to the Emperor Jahangir,[153] Ma'sum wrote letters to the royal family encouraging them to promote and implement Islamic policies throughout India.[154] It is said that the prince Aurangzeb, Dara Shikoh's younger brother, visited Khwaja Ma' sum's residence in Sirhind after Shah Jahan's death in 1076/1666 and became his formal disciple there.[155] Further evidence in the maktuhat of Ma'sum and his son, Hujjatullah

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Company, 1974), pp. 164-214, where he discusses Sirhindi's detention and parole in considerable detail.

[152] Qayyum or qutb al-aqtab is a living person considered to have the highest spiritual rank of all Sufis on earth. After Muhammad Ma'sum, the next two qayyums were Hujjatullah Naqshband (d. 1114/1702) and Muhammad Zubayr (d. 1152/1740), both lineal descendants of Muhammad Ma' sum.

[153] Sirhindi wrote many letters to persons holding a governmental post during the reigns of Akbar and Jahangir. For an analysis of these letters, most of which were written requesting help on hehalf of a third person; see J. G. J. ter Haar, Follower and Heir of the Prophet: Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi (1564-1624) as Mystic (Leiden" Het Oosters Instituut, 1992), p. 16-17.

[154] Five letters to Auragnzeb are collected in Muhammad Ma'sum, Maktubat-i ma'sumiyya, ed. Ghulam Mustafa Khan, 3 vols. (Karachi, Walend Military Press, n.d.), Letter 64 in volume one [henceforth written 1.64] was written before Aurangzeb became Emperor and 2.5, 3.6, 3.122, 3.221, 3.227, were all written after Aurangzeb became Emperor. A discussion of letters written by Ahmad Sirhindi's descendants to Aurangzeb, his family members, and members of the Mughal Court are collected in S. Athar Abbas Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India: From Sixteenth Century to Modern Century, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1983), 2.482-491. Due to the Emperor Shahjahan's and Crown Prince Dara Shikoh's (d. 1069-70/1659) devotion to Mulla Shah, a Qadiri shaykh in Srinagar, Ma' sum has no reason to write any letters to them.

[155] Khwaja Sayfuddin, Maktubat-i sayfiyya, compiled by Muhammad A'zam, ed. Ghulam Mustafa Khan (Hyderabad, Slnd: Sa'id Art Press, n.d.), letter 83, pp. 123-124, dited in Mujaddidi, Hasanat, p. 112. Aurangzeb was in Ma' sum's spiritual presence three times according to Ma' sum's son and successor, Sayfuddin. See Sayfuddin, Maktubat, letter 84, p. 123 cited in Mujaddidi, Hasanat, p. 112. Aurangzeb allegedly went to Sirhind and became Ma'sum's formal disciple in 1048/1638. See Kamaluddin Muhammad Ihsan Sirhindi, Rawdat

Naqshbandi (d. 1114/1702)[156]; indicate that Aurangzeb was a practising Naqshbandi at one time.

When the war for succession between the two princes took place, Aurangzeb is said to have looked to the Naqshbandis for support. Sufis were the specialists to mediate and focus divine Effulgence on the ruler's behalf. Muhammad Ma'sum ordered his nephew Shaykh Sa'duddin, the son of Muhammad Sa'id, and his own son Muhammad Ashraf, both of whom were preparing to go on pilgrimage, to go immediately to Aurangzeb; the latter supposedly also had orders to stay by Aurangzeb's side.[157] Ma'sum and his eldest son, Sibghatullah, went to Mecca. The former went to mobilise spiritual support of ulama)' ulama') and Sufis in the holy city to pray for Aurangzeb's victory, while the latter was dispatched to Baghdad to appeal to the spirit of 'Abdulqadir al-Jilani (d. 561/1166), the forunder-figure of the Qadiriyya. The intent was for ' Abdulqadir to abandon spiritual tawajjuh for Dara Shikoh, since the Naqshbandis considered Dara no longer worthy of being in the Qadiriyya, after he even abandoned the writing of Hanafi and Qadiri after his name.[158] The loss of 'Abdulqadir's assistance would have

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al-qayyumiyya, 2 vols. (Lahore, n.e.), 2.38-39, an unreliable hagiographical source for Naqshbandi history, cited in Mujaddidi, Hasanat, p. 111. Aurangzeb's Naqshbandi connection should not be exaggerated; he visited Burhanuddin Shattari Burhanpuri a few times for spiritual blessing. His request to be buried near the Naynuddin Shirazi Chishti's tomb indicates no particular Naqshbandi affinity toward the latter part of his reign. Carl Ernst perceptively details the biases of Sufi istoriography in his Eternal Garden: Mysticism, History, and Politics at a South Asian Sufi Centre (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 38-61.

[156] Ma'sum, Maktubat, letters 6, 122, 194, 220, 221, 227. Hujjatullah Naqshband, Wasilat al-qabul ila Allah wa'l-rasul (Hyderabad, Sind: Sa' id Art Press, 1963), p. 139 cited in Khaliq Ahznad Nizami, "Naqshbandi Influence on Mughal Rulers and Politics," in Islamic Culture, January, 1965, pp. 49-50.

[157] Ihsan Sirhindi, Rawdat al-qayyumiyya 2.91, cited in Mujaddidi, Hasanat, p. 126. Muhammad Ashraf, by performing supplications (sing. du' a') for Divine intervention on the battlefield, was supposed to help Aurangzeh emerge victorious. Dara Shikoh took Tantrics and Hindu holy men in addition to Sufis on his Qandahar campaign in 1063/1653 [he lost the battle]. See S.A.A. Rizvi, A History of Sufism in India, 2.414.

isolated Dara from the flow of divine Effulgence, rendering Dara powerless. Whether or- not the Naqshbandis actually performed this barrage of prayer and spiritual lobbying is not the issue. These actions reflect the popular assumption at the time that Shah Jahan's succession would be decided in the heavenly sphere first; the Sufis were considered to have the most power to influence this causal plane and thereby effect changes in this world.

Post-Sirhindi Relations with Mughal Rulers

With the victory of Aurangzeb, Mughal support of a universalist approach to religion, i.e., the belief that all religions have equal, validity, came to an end. The Mujaddidi definition of Islam, stressing stricter definitions of Muslim identity, became official and predominated into the twentieth century. Sirhindi's spiritual and physical descendants continued to advise Aurangzeb, as many Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi family members and disciples continued to find employment in the Mughal administration.[159] Although it is debatable how much unfluence the Naqshbandis actually had over Aurangzeb's subsequent policies, Naqshbandis believed they could encourage what they considered the Islam of the ahl al-sunna wa,'ljama'a by influencing the leaders of the community in the manner of Ahrar and his descendants. At the same time these shaykhs and their senior successors had thousands of disciples who were being taught to adhere assiduously to Islamic law (sharia) and sunna as they progressed along the Sufi path. From the Emperor's viewpoint, political expedience dictated a religiously legitimate government supported by religious tables. The Tumurids' retention of mediators to channel spiritual power and to wield influence in the higher spheres proved equally consequential. There were some cases where the Mughals made land grants to shrines merely on condition that the sajjadanishin pray "for the prosperity of the government."[160]

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[158] Mujaddidi, Hasanat, pp. 126-127. Professor Mujaddidi lists the numerous contemporary sources (without page references) that mention this'all-important intervention by Sibghatullah.

[159] See Mujaddidi, Hasanat, pp. 126-159 for an analysis of the maktubat leterature between Aurangzeh and the Naqshbandis of the time.

From these government land grants the worldly fortunes of many Naqshbandis were enhanced. Even Mughal emperors like Humayun and Shah Jahan, who did not utilise the services and protection of the Naqshbandis, supported their own Sufis to perform these all-inportant tasks of intercession. Overall, political considerations reigned supreme in Mughal-Sufi relationships. An emperor's survival depended on his highly sophisticated political acumen. Jahangir did not hesitate to take action against Ahmad Sirhindi soon after the second volume of Sirhindi's Maktubat went into circulation in 1028/1619. Sirhindi's subsequent imprisonment reflected Jahangir's need to minimise discord in his realm. Emperor Shah Jahan immediately banished Sayyid Adam Banuri (1053-1644), an influential successor of Ahmad Sirhindi, to the Hijaz in 1052/1642-43 when the emperor's messengers in Lahore reported ten thousand threatening Afghhans in Banuri's entourage.[161] Likewise, Aurangzed's proscription of Sirhindi's Maktubat does not contradict his previous association with the Naqshbandis. Political issues required political responses and spiritual issues spiritual responses. Sufis were useful to the Mughals but were not considered invincible; when the boundaries of political acceptability were transgressed, the emperor quickly reminded the Sufis that they were still his subjects.

After Aurangzeb: Shah Waliullah and Mir Dard

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[160] A statement noted in a late-Mughal land grant to the shrine of Bahawal Haq at Multan and part of a translated abstract of a copy of a Chaknama dated 25th Rabi' II, 1141 A.H. (Board of Revenue, file 131/1575). Cited in David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989),p. 45. Lest "praying for prosperity" be considered simply a literary courtesy (which it might well have been) another alternative is a shaykh praying for ruin. In modern Pakistani politics, legal proceedings were brought aginst the pir of Manki Sharif after he had "tried to restrain the Members of the Electoral College from the free exercise of their right to vote by invoking divine wrath against those who do not support President Ayub." See Pakistan Times 12/21/64 cited by Adrian C. Mayer, "Pir and Murshid: An Aspect of Religious Leadership in West Pakistan," Middle Eastern Studies 3 (January, 1967), p. 166. Later, Presidential Election Rules were revised with the inclusion of a clause prohibiting the threatening of electors with divine displeasure. See Pakistan Times 1/12/65. Ibid., p. 169 n. 15.

[161] Although not explicitly stated, many of these Afghans were probably armed. Ghulam- Sarvar Lahuri, Khazinat al-asfiya', 2 vols. (Lucknow: Nawal Kishor Press. 1864), 1.630-631.

The twelfth/eighteenth century begins another era in Indian Muslim history, as the Indian Mughal empire disintegrated after

Aurangzeb's death in 1118/1707. Spiritual descendants of Ahmad Sirhindi became the most prominent Naqshbandis, overshadowing other lineages. A member of this spiritual family, Shah Waliullah Dihlawi (d. 1176/1762) continued the reform tradition of Ahmad Sirhindi and is known as the most famous Indian Muslim of the period. Shah Waliullah became known internationally on the basis of his erudite and versatile scholarship in tafsir, hadith, fiqh, and tasawwuf. His most well-known work, Hujjat Allah al-baligha, has been used in the course of study at Al-Azhar University in Cairo.[162] Through original syntheses of Islamic religious subjects, Shah Waliullah demonstrated his intellectual genius, whether formulating unpredented legal decisions on the basis of original hadith

__ship or showing that the so-called shuhudi and wujudi positions did not conflict but had complementary functions in Sufism. His own talents harmonised the best of Sufi experience and scholarly attainment, making Shah Waliullah an ideal religious leader who, by reconciliation of opposing trends, endeavoured to revive Islam. While striving to eliminate practices of Indian Muslims not conforming to the Prophetic sunna, he not only followed the reform tradition of Ahmad Sirhindi, but formulated an example for nineteenth-and twentieth-century Sufis.

Shah Waliullah's Naqshbandi contemporary, Mir Dard (d. 1199/1785), also lived in Delhi. Mir Dard's father, Muhammad Nasir ' Andalib (d.1172/1759), a Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi shaykh and a Khalifa of Shah Sa' dullah Gulshan (d. 1140/1728), was the first Indian to call his Sufi path, the Muhammadan path (tariqa Muhanarradiyya), a designation also used by the thirteenth/nineteenth-century North African Idrisiya and Sanusiyya Sufis and the Indian Ahmad Shahid (d. 1246-7/1831) of Rai Bareilly (there is no historical evidence that they influenced each other). When Mir Dard asked his father how to name this new path, he replied:

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[162] For further information on this subject see J.M.S. Baljon, Religion and Thought of Shah Walt Allah Dihlawi, 1703-1762, (Leiden" E.J. Brill, 1986).

> if my intention has been such, I would name the tariqa after my own name, as the others do. But all of us are children, lost in the sea of identity and drowned in one ocean. *Our name is the name of Muhammad, and our sign is the sign of Muhammad. Our love is the love of Muhammad and our claim is the claim of Muhammad. One must call this order the tariqa Muhammadiyya, the Muhammadan path. It is exactly the path of Muhammad, and we have not added anything to it. Our conduct is the conduct of the prophet, and our way the Muhammadan way.[163]

Both Mir Dard and Shah Waliullah distinguished two ways to God: the higher path of the prophethood (tariq-i nubuwat) and the lower path of intimates of God (tariq-i Wilayat). Like Shah Waliullah Mir Dard's emphsis on' the Prophet influenced concepts of Muslim identity in thirteenth/nineteenth-century India. The Muhammadan path also inspired Indian Muslim freedom fighters in their struggle against the Sikhs and the British during the 1820's.

Mujaddidiyya dn Other Naqshbandi Tendencies

Shah Waliullah exemplified a uniqure genealogical confluence of all the major suborders of the Indian Naqshbandiyya.[164] Of all these eight

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[163] Annemarie Schmmel, Pain and Grace: A Study of Two Mystical Writers of Eighteenth-Century Muslim India (Leiden: E.J. Brill: 1976), p. 42.

[164] He was first initiated into the Naqshbandiyya by his father, Shaykh 'Abdurrahim (d. 1131-32/1719) who had received instruction from four different Naqshbandi shaykhs: 1) Sayyid Abdullah ' Akbarabadi, a spiritual great-grandson of Ahmad Sirhindi through Adam Banuri (d. 1053/1644), 2) Amir Abu Qasim Akbarabadi, the spiritual grandson of Abu'! Ula Akbarabadi (d. 1061/1651), a lineal descendant of 'Ubaydullah Ahrar, 3) Khwaja Khurd, the -son of Bali Billah, and 4) Amir Nurul-' ula (d. 1081/1671), the son of Abu'l-'Ula Akbarabadi. See Shah Waliullah, Intibah fa salasil awliya' Allah, (Lyallpur: Panjab Electric Press, n.d.), p. 31. Shah Waliullah wrote a book about his father, and his other teachers, Anfas al-'arifin (Multan: Islami Kutubkhana, n.d.). For more information on the non-Mujaddidi branch of an Ahrari, Abu'l-'Ula, see Abu'l-'Ula'i Ahrari, Israr-i Abul Ula (Agra: Shamsi Machine Press, n.d.), pp. 5-8. This non-Mujaddidi branch still has functioning Sufi hospices in Gaya, Bihar and Agra. At least through the nineteenth century, descendants of

Naqshbanid affiliations, Shah Waliullah preferred the Naqshbaniyya-Mujaddidiyya, describing it as "the most illustrious and pure and the least heretical tariqa."[165] It was the reformist Sufi path, i.e., living according to a strict interpretation of Islamic law and modelling one's actions after those of the Pronhet, that was to make Naqshbandi affiliation almost synonymous with that of the Naqshbaniyya-Mujaddidiyya worldwide. Other Naqshbandi sub-branches, e.g., those following Abu'l-'Ula's and Baqi Billah's teachings, listened to concerts (sama') accompanied by dancing to produce spiritual ecstasy, an activity not considered permissible by sharia-minded Naqshbandi-Mujaddidis. Abu '1-' Ula's sub-branch uniquely combined Chishti practices of singing and sama' with Ahrari dhikr but this sub-branch never became widespread within South Asia.[166] Even before the early part of the twelfth/eighteenth century, Baqi Billah's non-Mujaddidi sub-branch had apparently withered away in India, subsumed by the vigorous Mujaddidis.[167]

Khwaja Ahrar were sajiadanishins at the Sufi hospice in Agra (contrary to Algar's assertion that the physical descendants of Ahrar in India "died out in the eleventh/seventeenth century," Algar, "A Brief History," p. 19) Initiation from his father involved no Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi spiritual practices; Shah Waliullah mentions that he learned these practices from Mulla Balil Kakyani, a spiritual grandson of Muhammad Ma' sum. The scholar/mystic Abu Tahir Muhammad (d. 1145-46/1733) initiated Shah Waliullah into the Naqshbandiyya in Medina. See Baljon, Religion and Thought, pp. 5-6. he also initiated him into the Shadhiliyya, Shattariyya, Suhrawardiyya, and Kubrawiyya. Abu Tahir had three Naqshbandi affiliations:. 1) His father, Ibrahim al-Kurani (d. 1101-2/1690), who was a non-Ahrari spiritual descendant in 'Abdurrahman Jami's (d. 898/1492) chain, 2) Ahmad Nakhli (d. 1130/1717-18 Mecca) of Ahrari lineage, and 3) 'Abdullah Basri, the spiritual grandson of Tajuddin Sanbhali, s senior khalifa of Baqi Billah.

165 Ibid., p. 85. Later he makes favourable, inclusive comments about other Indian Sufi groups, Chishtiyya, Suhrawardiyya, and Qadiriyya.

166 'Abdulhayy, Nuzhat, vol. 5. p. 22, Shah Amir Abu'l-'Ula'i AHrari, Israr, p. 21. There are presently hospices of Abu'l-' Ula's lineage in gaya, Bihar, and Agra. Ji Hli Abu ' Ula' i (d. 1250/1834-35) had many didciples in Hyderabad, Deccan. See 'Ata' Husayn, Kayfiyat al-'arifin, (Gaya: n.p., 932), pp. 105-106. Successors of 'Ata' Husayn (d. 1311/1893-94 in gaya), e.g., Mir Ashraf 'Ali, transmitted the teachings to Dacca, Bombay, and Hyderabad. There have been hospices in these last two locations.

167 Khwaja Khurd, Baqi Billah's younger son studied with Ahmad Sirhindi, see Shah Waliullah, Intibah, p.31. 'Abdulhaqq Muhaddith Dihlawi's son, Nurulhaqq Mashraqi (d. 1073/1662), instead of following Baqi Billah's senior disciples, became a- disciple of

In addition, other non-Mujadidi Naqshbandi sub-braches, e.g., represented by Khwaja Khawand Mahmud (d. 1052/1642 Lahore) and by a Central Asian sub-branch of Baba Shah Muhammad Musafir (d. 1126/1714 Aurangabad), failed to attract disciples and perpetuate their teachings.[168] Within a century of Ahmad Sirhindi's death, the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya reigned supreme among the Naqshbandis in India.

To analyse the supremacy of the Mujaddidiyya among the Naqshbandiyya it is significant that a posthumous Naqshbani-Mujaddidi hagiographical tradition did bestow a limited degree of literary immortality upon Sirhindi. After Sirhindi's death Muhammad Hashim Kishmi Badakhshani composed Zubdat al-maqamat, soon followed by Badruddin Sirhindi's Hadarat al-quds, finished in 1057/1647-48. Considerable anecdotal material, bolstered with exaggerated accounts of Sirhindi's miracles and political importance, has accumulated by the time Abu'l-Fayd Ihsan began compiling Rawdat al-qayyumiyya after 1152-53/1740. The most lasting literary monument to Sirhindi, however, is a compendium of his 536 collected letters, Maktubat-i Imam-i Rabbani.

No other Naqshbandi group had either a hagiographical tradition or massive volumes of collected letters (maktubat) to perpetuate a literary legacy for tuture generations. In terms of lasting fame, Sirhindi's compiled letters in the genre of maktubat in India Sufi literature compare with Amir Hasan Sijzi's notable contribution, Fawa'id al-fu'ad in the genre of malfuzat.[169] Yet

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Muhammad Ma'sum. Rahman 'Ali, Tadhkira-yi 'ulama'-i Hind,(Lucknow: Nawal Kishor Press, 1 1894), p. 246.

[168] For further information on Khawand Mahmud, see David Damrel, "Forgotten Grace." For additional information on the Deccan Naqshbandi, Baba Musafir, see Gigby, "The Naqshbandis in the Deccan," pp. 167-207.

[169] The comparison of Amir Hasan Sijzi's Fawa'id al fu'ad and Sirhindi's Maktubat is on the basis of subsequent popularity. Sijzi pioneered the genre of malfiazat in India while Sirhindi continued the maktubat tradition, following the precedents of Sharafuddin Yahya Maneri (d. 782/1381) and Ashraf Jahangir Simnani (d. 829/1425). See Bruce Lawrence, Notes from a Distant Flute: The Extant Literature of pre-Mughal Indian Sufism (Teheran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1978), pp. 53-55; 72-76. For a discussion of malfuzat literature in India, see K.A. Nizami's introduction to Nizamuddin Awliya', Fawa 'id al-fu 'ad, compiled by Amir Hasam Sijzi, English translation by Bruce Lawrence, Morals of

these two types of Sufi writing are very different. Although Sirhindi's letters have been translated into Arabic, Turkish, and Urdu in addition to having been reprinted in Persian many times, to understand this correspondence requires a background in Islamic religious sciences and an advanced knowledge of Naqshbanid-Mujaddidi technical terms.[170] Unlike Fawa'id alfu ad, a written oral history comprehensible to a general audience, Sirhindi's letters are addressed to almost two hundred disparate persons, most of whom cannot be properly identified, a situation which creates contextual difficulties in explaining contradictions between similar topics in different letters. In short, Maktubat-i Imam-i Rabbani is not a popular, accessible work that would influence common people's perception of the Naqshbandiyya.

Sirhindi's collected letters concentrate interpretive authority on the spiritual mentor. Instead of appealing to a wide audience, it has been more commonly used as a teaching manual by shaykhs commenting on various topics of Sufi practice and interpreting correct Hanafi ritual practice. For the common uneducated Muslim, Sirhindi's Maktubat represent the continuity and teaching authority from the founder-figure, who in turn legitimises his teaching by continually citing precedents of his Naqshbandi predecessors and the Prophet. Other branches of the Indian Naqshbandiyya lacked both hagiographical and maktubat literature to perpetuate their memory. A Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi literary legacy, unmatched by Baqi Billah, Khawand Mahmud, Baba Palangposh, Abu'l'Ula, and their descendants, relegated non-Mujaddidis to the background of Indian Sufism.[171]

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the Heart (New York: Paulist Press, 1992), pp. 43-49. The letters of Sirhindi's son, Muhammad Ma'sum, have also been collected in a three-volume work, Maktubat-i ma'sumiyya. Numerous Naqshbandis and other Indian Sufis have had their letters published, although scholars of Indian Sufism have rarely consulted this invaluable source material.

[170] For translations see Friedmann, Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi, p. 1, notes 3, 4, 5, and Ansari, "A Select Bibliography," The latest publication of Nur Ahmad's edition of Maktubat-i Imam-i Rabbani is by University Book Depot in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1991.

[171] This is Damrel's argument for Khawand Mahmud's Naqshbandi lineage failing to prosper. See David Damrel, "The Naqshbandi Order in Transition: A Central Asian Shaykh in Mughal India," (unpublished paper given at MESA meeting, San Antonio, Texas, 11/11/90). Digby notes that Baba Shah's Naqshbandi lineage did not survive pat the twelfth/eighteenth century because Baba Shah's hospice appealed to Turkish immigrants and

3. THE SPREAD OF THE NAQSHBANDIYYA-MUJADDIDIYYA IN INDIA

1857-1947: CONSEQUENCES OF THE INDIAN REBELLION

Naqshbandis stopped advising rulers when the actual government of northern India came under British rule. In 1217-18/1803 the British had ousted the Marathas from Delhi to be the new protectors of the titular Muslim king in Delhi; by 1265/1849 the Panjab was under British control. After the Indian rebellion of 1273/1849, no longer pretending to honour Mughal law, the British abruptly exiled the last Mughal ruler, Bahadur Shah, to Rangoon. The Indian Muslim community, treated as a scapegoat for the 1857 uprising, was forced to endure British punishment, which especially affected high-profile Muslim institutions in Delhi. The British closed the grand mosque of Delhi for five years after the revolt; even as late as 1316-17/1899 Europeans still considered their entering the Delhi mosque with shoes on as a "right of conquest."[172]

Naqshbandi activity in Delhi was similarly disrupted. Ahmad Sa'id's Naqshbandi hospice in Chatli Qabr, housing the graves of Mirza Janjanan (d. 1195/1781) and Ghulam 'Ali Shah (d. 1240/1824), was entrusted to a Panjabi disciple of Dost Muhammad (d. 1284/1868) when Ahmad Said (d. 1277/1860) surreptitiously emigrated with his family to the Hijaz in 1274/1858. It was not until thirty years later, when his grandson, Abu'l-Khayr (d. 1341/1924), reorganized the hospice as an institution that the Naqshbandis renewed their activity in the capital.[173] Naqshbandi political activity became a memory as conditions for Muslims in India went from bad

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did not adapt to Indian conditions, See Digby, "The Naqshbandis in the Deccan," pp. 204-205.

[172] Home political proceedings cited by Warren Fusfeld, "The Shaping of Sufi Leadership in Delhi: The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya, 1750-1920" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1981), p. 53.

[173] Fusfeld, "The Shaping of Sufi Leadership," pp. 243-248. In addition, Fakhruddin Jahan Chisti Dihlawi's (d. 1199/1785) khanaqah also was forced to close. Ghulam Muhyiuddin Qusuri, •Malfuzat-i sharif with introduction and footnotes by Muhammad Iqbal Mujaddidi, Urdu translation by Iqbal Ahmad Faruqi (Lahore: Al-Ma' arif press, 1978), p. 12.

to worse. In twelfth/eighteenth-century India, rulers generally ignored sell-intentioned Naqshbandi advice. By the later part of the thirteenth/nineteenth century, the British Government in urban centres had become hostile to any hint of potential Muslim political involvement, Naqshbandi or otherwise. This change initiated a new chapter in Indian Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi history.

The Panjab as the Naqshbandi Centre

Demographically, in the ninety-year period after the 1857 rebellion, the highest concentration of Naqshbandi centres was found in the Panjab. While certain distracts in the Panjab could be ranked among the regions with the highest concentration of Naqshbandi Sufi activity anywhere in the Islamic world in this period,[174] other districts in southwest Panjab, e.g., Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Kahn, Montgomery, and Multan, noticeably lacked Naqshbandi centres. These districts, linked together by thirty shrines, encompassed the spiritual territory of the Suhrawardiyya, the domain of the descendants of Sayyid Jalaluddin Bukhari (d. 692/1292).[175] Deceased Suhrawardi pirs were believed to manifest themselves through these strategically-locatede tombs, legitimising political and economic power of the shrine's custodians.

In the context of rural Panjab Islam, the smaller shrines served as local symbols of access to religious power and intercession as did the larger pan-

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[174] This speculative statement can only be based on extant hagiographic literature of the period, facilitated in part by the flourishing Urdu publication boon of the latter nineteenth— and early twentieth-century India. See Barbara Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (Princeton Princeton.Univerity Press, 1982), pp. 198-200. In Indonesia the. Naqshbandiyya were also the most popular Sufi group during the same period. Perhaps there were more Naqshbandi centres and disciples in Indonesia than in the Panjab, but since Sufisrn in Indonesia does not have as extensive a hagiographical tradition as the Subcontinent., precise comparison is impossible.

[175] Jhang District Gazetteer, 1908, p. 58, cited in Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, p. 43. There were at least thirty such shrines by the turn of the twentieth century. the question of a pir's spiritual power being exercised in a specific geographical area (walayat) began in fifth/eleventh-century Khorasan and became a recurring phenomenon in later Indian Sufi literature. Not only was walayat impossible to share with non-Muslim holy persons, but it was difficult for two powerful shaykhs to co-exist in the same vicinity. See Simon Digby, "Encounters with Jogis in Indian Sufi Hagiography," (unpublished paper, given at University of London, 1/27/79).

Panjab shrines of Data Ganj Bakhsh in Lahore, Baba Farid in Pakpattan, and Ruknuddin in Multan. The descendants of the deceased shaykh buried at each shrine functioned as religious specialists who provided cures and a modicum of religious identity for the devotees participating in shrine activities. Typically Naqshbandis did not establish centres in rural areas where local Sufi shrines already existed, although individual Naqshbandi pirs with their circle of disciples could be found anywhere.

In British India economic considerations often reinforced the - distribution of rural shrines. Even though the British had no justification to extend governmental support to urban Sufis and ulama, they reluctantly found it politically expedient to give land assignments (jagirs) to rural Sufis. As landed gentry, the religious leaders collected the taxes for the central government. Thus, the British ended up outwardly imitating the Mughal practice of supporting religious dignitaries and shrines.[176] Naqshbandis were not ascetics isolated from the community or political affairs; to work effectively within Indian society it was difficult for Naqshbandis to be totally detached from the British colonial presence.

Among Naqshbandis, the British had given Imam 'Ali Shah (1282/1865) 900 ghuma 'o of land near the area of Kotal Sharif in the Panjab.[177] Jama' at 'Ali Shah (d. 1370/1951), arguably the most well-known Naqshbanid in the struggle for Pakistan, was inextricably associated with the rural Panjabi social structure and thus could not avoid close ties to the British administration. In

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[176] The former Sikh government of the Panjab also conformed to this practice. See B.N. Goswany and J.S. Grewal, The Mughal and Sikh Rulers and the Vaishnavas of Pindori (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1969). For examples of British colonial policy using Sufis' local political authority, see Gilmarin, Empire and Islam, pp. 46-52. The British supported Sufis solely for political purposes and did not share the paradigm of divine intervention.

[177] This land, however, was not under Naqshbandi control until Amiruddin (d.1331/1913) came and courageously asserted his authority. It is said one of Amiruddin's belligeraent adversaries among the villagers paid for this opposition to the shaykh by contracting a serious illness. See Muhammad Ibrahim Qusuri, Khazina-yi Ma'rifat (Lahore: Naqush Press, n.d.), p. 97 One ghuma'o is between .2 and .75 of a acre, see John T. Platts, A Dictionary of Urdu and Classical Hindi and English, (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1977), p. 935.

1353-54/1935, the Ittihad-i Millat elected Jama' at 'Ali Shah as leader of the Muslim community (amir-i millat) to agitate on behalf of the Shahidganj Mosque. In response, Maulana Habiburrahman, a member of an urban Muslim group, Majhis-i Ahrar and a politically active Deobandi religious scholar asked, "How can a man [Jama' at ' ALi Shah] who calls the government 'mai-bap' (mother and father) be entrusted with leading the Muslims?"[178]

Dispersion of Naqshbandis in Rural Panjab

Sufi notables of British India took to building their hospices (khanaqahs) outside urban areas, where they could avoid confrontations with the central government and rely on rural or tribal sources of income. In the neighbouring region of Qandahar, political turbulence forced Dost Muhammad Qandahari in 1266/1850 to relocate his hospice near the village of Musa Zai, forty-one miles from Dera Ismail Khan.[179] His shaykh, Ahmad Said advised him to establish the new Sufi hospice in palace where both Panjabi and Pashto were spoken,[180] Although there were some initial difficulties with the neighbouring Pashto-Speaking tribes, the remote Khanaqah attracted disciples form Afghanistan, the Peshawar area, and the Panjab.

Muhammad 'Uthman (d.. 1314/1896), Dost Muhammad's successor, continued the Naqshbandi tradition at Musa Zai and in 1311/1893-94 had a new hospice built near Mianwali in the village of Khundian, Punjab, to take advantage of the relatively moderate climate there. Situated on the frontier between Pashto-and Panjab-i-speaking groups, the new, more accessible location continued to fulfil the mandate of his grandfather pir.[181] His son and

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[178] Ihsan, 9/23/35 Press Branch file #8331, vol. 7a, cited in Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, pp. 104-105. Gilmartin's book discusses rural pirs in pre-independence Panjab.

[179] Muhammad Isma'il, Tajalliyat al-dostiyya, pp. 65-66.

[180] Mahbubullahi, Tuhfa-yi sa 'diyya, (Lahore: Al-Hamra Art Printers, 1979), pp. 40-42.

successor, Sirajuddin (d. 1333/1915), spent his summers at the Khundian hospice and, through his teaching, the Naqshbandiyya spread to Hyderabad, Sind.[182] These two hospices, like those of the other prominent Naqshibandis of this period, were located in villages.[183]

Another important factor in distribution Naqshbandi shaykhs the Panjab was educational. Almost all of the prominent Panjabi shaykhs purposely sent their khalifas into rural areas to encourage nominal Muslims to adopt more Islamic practices in their daily lives. In the environs of Lahore, Muhyiuddin Qusuri (d. 1270/1854), carried on the teachings of the Naqshbandiyy. Ghulam Nabi Lilahi (d.1306/1888) set up his khanaqah in the hinterlands of Jhelam. Other disciples of Muhyuddin Qusuri went on to establish their hospices in Dera Ismail khan, Bhera, and Namak Miyani.[184] Sher Muhammad Sharqpuri (d. 1347/1928), a reformist pir of the Arain biradari,[185] attracted large numbers of disciples to his hospice in Sharqpur, located roughly forty miles from Lahore, His most renowned disciples were: Muhammad ' Umar Birbali (d. 1387/1967), the editor of Sher Muhammad's malfuzat, inqilab al-haqiqat, who later became the sajjadanishin at his father's Sufi hospice in the village of Birbal in the Sargodha district;[186] Sayyid Muhammad Ismail Kirmanwali (d. 1385/1966 Lahore), who received permission to teach disciples upon his first meeting with Sher Muhammad; and Sayyid Nurul-

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[181] The train station at Khundian is about a mile from the second Khanaqah. In comparison, the original khanaqah at Musa Zai even today is a bumpy thirteen-hour bus ride form Peshawar.

[182] Zawwar Husayn (d. 1400/1980) and his disciple, Dr. Ghulam Mustafa Khan, two prolific Naqshbandi scholars form the Sind, are siritual descendants fo Sirajuddin.

[183] One exception is 'Abdulkarim (d. 1355/1936), whose hospice was in Rawalpindi.

[184] Muhammad Ibrahim Qusuri, Khazina-yi ma'rifat, p. 61. These hospices were still functioning in 1977.

[185] A biradari is a Panjabi clan grouping within which most Panjabis marry. the Arains were one of these clans who the British classified as an "agricultural tribe." See Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, pp. 89-95.

[186] Tawakkuli, Tadhkira-yi masha'ikh-i naqshband, p. 550. Muhammad 'Umar's father was Ghulam Murtada Birbali (d. 1321/1903), the spiritual grandson of Muhyiuddin Qusuri.

Hasan Bukhari Kiliyanwali (d. 1373/1953), an ex-Shi'i of the Gujranwala district.[187] Innumerable other Naqshbandis were scattered throughout the Panjab, many of whose spiritual pedigree could be traced back to a handful of shaykhs in pre-1857 Delhi.

It is not immediately obvious why the northern Panjab became the major centre of Naqshbandi activity in British India. In spite of the Naqshbandiyya's rapid adaptation to the Indian environment after Sirhindi's death, it has never had masss appeal in the Subcontinent. the atmosphere in a Naqshbandi hospice, reflected in the strict Islamic behaviour of the disciples, is in sharp contrast with the festive atmosphere of rural Panjabi shrine cults that demanded little from the visitor except material contribution for services rendered. Yet Naqshbandis shared a similar mediatory parading and would visit shrines themselves, e.g., those of Baha'uddin Naqshband, Mu' inuddin Chishti, or Ahmad Sirhindi. One factor influencing Naqshbandi success in the religious environment of rural Panjab was the Naqshbandi's ability to bridge the gap between the ulama and the Panjabi shrine cults.

The Naqshbandiyya and the Ulama Base

The ulama can be seen as religious specialists who function as jurisprudents (sing. faqih), judges (sib. mufti or (qadi), or prayer leaders (sing. imam) Historically, throughout the Islamic world, ulama have served as government officials. It has been a symbiotic relationship: the government support the religious infrastructure managed by ulama and, in turn, the ulama validate the government. In the Mughal empire the perceived Islamic nature of government, legitimised by both Suifs and ulama, underpinned Indian Muslim identity and compensated somewhat for Muslims' perceiving themselves as a minority in India. When the Mughal state began to disintegrate in the twelfth/eighteenth century, the ulama were among the first to experience the consequences. In the aftermath of the 1857 revolt,

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[187] Muhammad 'Umar Birbali, Inqilab al-haqiqat (Lahore: Aftab-i 'Alam Press, n.d.) For information concerning Muhammad Ismail see Nur Ahmad Maqbul, Khazina-yi karam, (Karachi: Kirmanwala Publishers, 1978), and for Nurul-Hasan see Munir Husayn Shah, Inshirah al-sadur bi-tadhkirat al-nur (Gujarat: Small State Industries, 1983).

when the British eliminated the last outward symbolic traces of the Mughal empire, the effect on the Delhi ulama was devastating.

> Though many sajjadanishins kept their political influence in the localities even after the Mughal collapse, the decline of the Mughals seemed for the 'ulama at Delhi nothing less than a catastrophe. It signalled the disappearance of the cultural exis around which the entire Indian Islamic system had developed.[188]

Many Delhi ulama dispersed to small towns throughout the Panjab. Others, leaders of reformist ulams, organised a new type of teaching institution to propagate a sharia-minded Islam, e.g., the Dar al Ulum founded at Deoband in 1283-84/1867, which recognised Sufism but rejected excesses of the shrine cult and exaggerated dependence on the pir.[189]

The Naqshbandi sharia-minded reform orientation, a central aspect of Indian Naqshbandi identity, has attracted many ulama into the ranks of the Indian Naqshbandiyya.[190] As the ulama left Delhi bereft of government support, those with a reformist agenda often affiliated with their counterparts in revivalist Sufi groups who frequently were, like themselves, educated Muslims. By the late thirteenth/nineteenth century, Naqshbandis were among the leading participants in the Sufi revival movement that emphasised the sharia and the active propagation of Islam (tabligh) within the institutional structure of the Sufi khanaqah.

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[188] Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, p. 53.

[189] See Metcalf, Islamic Revival.

[190] Pakistani scholars have informed me that in the Panjab. the Naqshbandiyya and Qadiriyya have tended to attract more ulama than other tariqas. The Chishtiyya -and Suhrawardiyya resolutely followed Hanafi fiqh but as a rule did not interpret Islamic behaviour as strictly as the Naqshbandis who forbid the practices fo sama' . According to a two-volume biographical work of non-Barelwi ulama in nineteenth and twentieth-century Panjab, Safir Akhtar, Tadhkira-yi 'ulama '-i Panjab, 2 vols. (Lahore: Za'id Bashir Printers, 1980), out of 173 ulama with a specified Sufi-affiliation, 42% were Naqshbandis, 35% Chishtis, 20% Qadiris, and 2% Suhrawardis. The Naqshbandi ulama were much more prominent among Lahori Barelwi ulama.

Often the Deobandis gravitated toward the reformist Chishtiyya just as the Naqshbandiyya attracted many ulama of the Nadwat al-'Ulama' in Lucknow. Many ulama in the Panjab, however, shared neither the reformist Deobandi position nor the perspective of Nadwat al-'Ulama'. These rural ulama, emphasising a mediational style stressing love of the Prophet and obedience to the pir, came to be known as Barelwis, on the basis of the erudite scholarly work of Ahmad Rida Khan Barelwi (d. 1339-40/1921) of Bareilly. Ahmad Rida, sharing an ethos more popular with the religious sensibilities of the average Panjabi Muslim than the Deobandis, formulated another perspective (mashrab) to justify the religious authority of Sufism and particularly to legitimise Sufi revivalist pirs.[191]

For Barelwi religious education, the Dar al Ulum Nu' maniyya, was founded in 1304-4/1887 and the Dar al Ulum Hizb al-Ahnaf in 1342-43/1924, both in Lahore, Naqshbandi Barelwi pirs of the area, e.g., lama' at ' Ali Shah, provided teachers in addition to supporting these schools financially.[192] As ulama became affiliated with the Naqshbandis, whether from a Deobandi reformist stance or a Barelwi Dufi revivalist perspective, other educated Muslims would be inclined to participate in these Sufi groups. The consequent legitimacy and status could only draw additional aspirants into the outer circle of the Sufi group. The long-term effect resulted in Naqshbandi. ideas influencing the Muslim elite, which in turn defined Indian notions of what proper Islam should be.

Conclusion

Until the political decline of the Mughal empire after Aurangzeb, Naqshbandis developed close relations with the ruling Turco. Mongol elite. Numerous letters addressed to Mughal Indian rulers exhibit Naqshbandi concern for both the ruler's performance of religious duties and for the implementation of Islamic policies in the empire. To a greater degree than

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[191] See Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp. 296-314.

[192] Iqbal Ahmad Faruqi, Tadhkira-yi abl-i sunnat wa-jama at Lahur-(Lahore: Maktaba-yi Nabawiyya, 1987), p: 272, and Gilmartin, Empire and Islam, pp. 60-61. Of twenty-three prominent Sufi-affiliated Barelwi ulama in British colonial Lahore, there were fourteen Naqshbandis, six Chishtis, and three Qadiris. See Faruqi, Tadhkira-yi ahl-i sunnat.

other Sufi groups, the Naqshbandiyya explicitly concerned itself with correct performance of Islamic ritual according to the Hanfi school of jurisprudence and with moderlling one's every behaviour on that of the Prophet. Like many other Muslims the Naqshbandis have assumed that a correctly ordered society, that is, one organised according to the sharia, establishes the necessary foundation for individuals to perform their ritual obligations and to live harmoniously both in this world and in the next. Naqshbandi emphasis on the importance of laws governing Muslims or on enforcing certain social norms led to political involvement. In this regard, the Naqshbandiyya are not unique among Sufis. Most Indian Sufi groups have nurtured political interests and acted with political motives at one time or another. Naqshbandis have simply done so more frequently than other Sufi groups.[193] Naqshbandi emphasis on sharia and jurisprudence (fiqh) in the mystical path has attracted many ulama to the movement, thus compounding political relationship's profoundly deepening their level of political involvement, and ultimately influencing the nature of normative Indian Islam

As the Mughal empire declined in the twelfth/eighteenth and thirteenth/nineteenth centuries, the socio-political modus operandi of the Naqshbandiyya underwent many transitions. Shah Waliullah's futile attempts to sway ineffectual Mughal rulers and his naive trust in Ahmad Shah Durrani, who wantonly sacked numerous cities in northern India, demonstrate that the days of counseling the ruling elite a had passed.[194] Armed struggle was equally useless as Sayyid Ahmad Barelwi (d.1246/1831), a disciple of Shah Waliullah's son, ' Abdul' aziz was killed fighting to restore Muslim rule in

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[193] See Algar, "Political aspects," pp. 123-152, which discusses this question in detail.

[194] Shah Faqirullah (d. 1195/1781) and Shah Waliullah were anong the last Nqashbandis in northern India to continue the Naqshbandi practice of advising rulers. For additional information concerning Shah - Waliullah's letters, see Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, ed., Shah Waliullah Diblawi ke siyasi maktubat(Delhi: Nadqat al-Musannifin, 1969). For letters by Faqirullah to Shah Abdali, see Faqirullah Shikarpuri, Maktubat-i Faqirullah, ed. Maulwi Karam Bakhsh (Lahore: Islamiyya Steam Press, n.d.), letters: 18, 29, 57, 66; for communications with the Shah Abdali's chief minister, Shall Wali Khan, letters 56, 69; for letters to Qadi Idris, a grandson of Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Abdali's chief mufti, letter 19. As far as Indian Muslims were conerned, these letters were of little avail in preventing the pillaging by Shah Abdali's armies.

northern India..With the advent of British rule, Indian Naqshbandis, refrained from explicit political action until the Pakistan movement began in the 1930's.

Without an Islamic polity to support Islamic institutions financially and to provide an identity so necessary for a minority Muslim community, Naqshbandi pirs stressed the personal nature of Muslim identity. From their rural hospices, Panjabi Naqshbandis proclaimed the essentials of correct Islamic credal dogma (' aqida) and of suitable individual Muslim behaviour modelled on the Prophet as prerequisites to the performance of mystical practices.[195] Religious authority became more focused on the religious leader, or shaykh, who was now expected to provide guidance in ordinary Islamic religious duties, to mediate between earthly concerns and a higher spiritual reality, and to direct mystical practices. For thousands of Indian Muslims an intimate personal relationship with a spiritual mentor established and confirmed one's identity as a Muslim.[196] Personal adherence was essential, especially without the overarching presence of an Islamic polity.[197]

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[195] Credal affirmation ('aqa'id) are often written in dogmatic lists that Muslims are expected to accept as true. These lists vary from time to time, between Sunni and Shi'i, and between the various Shi'i groups. For the early Sunni formulations of credal dogma see A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis and Historical Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932). the goal of these affirmations is to make one's inner faith (irnan), the quality of religiousness, outwardly tangible.

[196] Muslims chose other avenues to individualise Islamic identity which also allowed them to participate in the larger geographical and historical Islamic community. One alternative was to identify Islam totally on the basis of Islamic scriptural norms, i.e., the Qur'an and Hadith. Although considerably less popular in Muslim India, these scripturalist groups, pejoratively termed "Wahhabis" by Sufis, have had an influence on the religious life of Indian Muslims. Their definition of Sunni orthodoxy based on scripture and a totally transcendent God is diametrically opposed to Sufis who espouse a mediatory paradign involving the personal guidance of pirs with or without the practice of a contemplative discipline. For a description of such a group, the Ahl-i hadith, a scripturalist-minded organisation in northern India, See Metcalf, Islamic Revival, pp. 264-296.

[197] Speaking in cotemporary times, the late Fazlur Rahman noted that many people nearly equate a person without a pir *(be pira)* to a "godless person." See his *Islam*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1979), p. 154. In Urdu the adjective *"be pur"* (lit. without pir) commonly assumes a meaning of pitiless, cruel, or vicious.

Compatible with the ethos of Panjabi Islam, religious authority and communal identity were transferred from socio-political symbols to the personal and approachable figure embodied in the living perfect and perfection-bestowing Sufi shaykh. By the thirteenth/nineteenth century, this development .of a charismatic shykh was not unique either historically or geographically but there was an extraordinary concentration of internationally influential Naqshbandi shaykhs in the Panjab during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Why this ceased to be the case in the twentieth century is yet a further topic of research.

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20. Ibid.

ARTHUR F. BUEHLER: The Development of we Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in India

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THE MUHAMMADAN INHERITANCE

William C. Chittick

One of the great merits of the writings of Michel Chodkiewicz is that he has placed the Muhammadan dimension of Ibn 'Arabi's spirituality at the center of his concerns. Too often in earlier studies of al-Shaykh al-Akbar, scholars pretended that he had appeared in Islam almost in spite of the Koranic revelation and that his chief contribution was to formulate a philosophical system that had certain advantages over Western philosophy because it focused primarily on the spiritual and esoteric dimension of things. Before the writings of Chodkiewicz, those familiar with the Shaykh al-Akbar's own writings were always surprised at how much these writings were skewed in Western-language presentations. What was missing form these studies was the Shaykh's own focus on the Koran, the Sunnah, and the Shariah. What was forgotten was that Ibn 'Arabi was first and foremost an inheritor of the explicit teachings of Muhammad, not a great champion of esoteric or initiatic teachings. This is not to deny that Ibn 'Arabi is one of the greatest expositors of mystical wisdom that the world has ever known. It is simply to say that his exposition needs to be placed squarely in the actual texts and traditions from which it grew. Michel Chodkiewicz's work has the great merit of never letting us forget this fact.

As Professor Chodkiewicz has explained in detail in his masterly Seal of the Saints, Ibn 'Arabi laid claim to being the "Seal of Muhammadan Sanctity" or, as I prefer to translate this expression, the "Seal of the Muhammadan Friends of God." The terms is derived from a title that the Koran gives to Muhammad, "The Seal of the Prophets". This is typically understood to mean that Muhammad was the last of the 124,000 prophets that God sent to the world from the time of Adam. The title is also understood to mean that Muhammad in his own person achieved all the human perfections possessed by all previous prophets, while the revelation he received — the Koran gathers together all prophetic knowledge in a - single synthetic whole, while at the same time clearly differentiating; these sciences from each other. For lbn ' Arabi, this explains the two primary names or the Koran, qua'an and furqan. One of the literal meanings of qur'an is "that which brings together", while the term furqan means "that which differentiates".

Like "seal", the term "friend of God" is Koranic, and by the time of Ibn 'Arabi it had become one of the standard expressions that was used to describe those Muslims who came close to embodying the model of human perfection established by Muhammad. As Chodkiewcz has illustrated, the idea of divine friendship is a major theme of Ibn 'Arabi writings. In brief, he follows the mainstream of the Islamic tradition by asserting that god chooses as His friends those people who embody the best qualities of the human race. God's friends are first and foremost the prophets. Then God's revelations to the prophets make it possible for others to become His friends as well. Each prophet is a source of guidance and a model of human perfection. Those who follow in the footsteps of any prophet may be given an "inheritance" from that prophet, and this inheritance has three basic dimensions: works, or activities that manifest noble character traits; states, or inner experiences of unseen realities; and knowledge, or direct perception of various modalities of reality.

Ibn 'Arabi considered that goal of religion to be the achievement of human perfection in the three modalities of works, states, and knowledge. The prophets are the models who establish the diverse paradigms of perfection. Knowledge is one dimension of perfection, and in many ways the most important and fundamental dimension. It demands discernment and putting things in their proper places. Ibn 'Arabi writes, "*As a person moves closer to perfection, God gives him discernment among affairs and verifies for him the realities*" (II 525.2)[198] "realities" are the thing of the universe as known by God Himself.

Each modality of human perfection, as established by the prophets, brings along with it knowledge of a certain configuration of the realities. The realities are infinite, so they can be known in their simultaneity by God alone. Nevertheless, it is possible for human beings to know the principles of all the manifest and nonmanifest realities. In many passages, Ibn 'Arabi connects the modes of knowing the realities with the names of God. Thus the great prophets have special insight into the manner in which the primary divine names exercise their effects in the universe. In the Bezels of Wisdom, Ibn 'Arabi associates each of twenty-seven prophets with a specific divine attribute.

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[198] All quotations are from Ibn Arabi's, al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Cairo, 1911.

Each prophet has left an inheritance, and Ibn 'Arabi tells us that in every age there must be at least 124,000 friends of God, that is, one inheritor for each prophet of history (III 208.14). The prophetic inheritances define the various modes of authentic experience and knowledge of God. In other words, to attain to true knowledge, one must know God according to a certain paradigm of human perfection defined by a specific prophet.

The question of how people can gain the knowledge bestowed upon a prophet is central to Ibn 'Arabi writings. The simplest answer is that, to the extent human initiative plays a role, people must follow a given prophet's guidance. However, the guidance of most prophets. has not come down to us. In the case of these prophets, the only way to receive an inheritance is to receive it by means of one of the later prophets. And since Muhammad's message comprises everything given to all previous prophets, the best way to receive a prophetic inheritance is to follow Muhammad. In any case, in the last analysis, it is God Himself who chooses to bestow a particular prophetic inheritance on any given individual.

Ibn 'Arabi often says that human effort can take seekers only as far as the door. Having reached the door, they can knock as often as they like. But God must decide when and if He will open the door. Only after the door has been opened does full inheritance take place. This explains the meaning of the title of Ibn 'Arabi's magnum opus, al-Futuhat al-makkiyya, "The Meccan Openings". The sciences contained in this work were not gained by study or discursive reasoning. They were simply given to Ibn ' Arabi when God opened the door to him.

In a typical passage, Ibn 'Arabi describes the process whereby one attains to opening as follows:

> *When the aspiring traveler clings to retreat and invocation of God's name, when he empties his heart of reflective thoughts, sitting in poverty, having nothing, at the door of his Lord, then God will bestow upon him and give him something of knowledge of Hann, of the divine mysteries, and of the lordly sciences.... That is why Abu Yazid has said, "You*

take your knowledge dead from the dead, but I take my knowledge from the living One who does not die." (I 31.4)

When the door was opened to him, Ibn, Arabi found that he had inherited all the sciences of Muhammad. Among these sciences was the knowledge that no one after him -- except Jesus, at the end of time would inherit all these sciences. Hence Ibn 'Arabi saw himself as the Seal of Muhammadan Friendship, that is, the last person to actualize fully the specific mode of friendship that results from embodying the paradigm established by Muhammad.

Clearly, Ibn 'Arabi's claim to be the Seal of God's Muhammadan Friends does not imply that there will be no friends of God after him. Rather, it means that no one after him, except Jesus, will inherit the totality of the prophetic works, states, and sciences, a totality realized by Muhammad alone among the prophets. Thus, Ibn 'Arabi maintained that friends of God would continue to inherit from Muhammad, but from his time onward they would inherit works, states, and sciences connected to specific prophets of previous eras. For example, he writes:

Just as God sealed the prophecy of the revealed religions through Muhammad, so also God sealed, through the Muhammadan .Seal, the friendship that is acquired through the Muhammadan inheritance, but not that which is acquired through the other prophets. For among God's friends are those 'who inherit from Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. These will continue to he found after this Muhammadan Seal. But after him, no friend will be found "upon the heart of Muhammad" (Il 49.24).

If the Muhammadan friends of God alone inherit all the sciences (of Muhammad which are equivalent to the science of all the prophets the seal of these friends will be the person in his own time with the most knowledge of God. Thus Ibn 'Arabi writes about the Seal, "*There is no one who has more knowledge of God.... He,Ind the Koran are siblings" (111 329.27). In other words, like the Koran, the Muhammad Seal embraces the sciences of all previous revelations.*

With these brief remarks about Ibn 'Arabi understanding of the significance of the knowledge contained in his own works, I turn to an even

briefer account of the contents of these works. I want to suggest one or two of the answers that he would give to two closely related questions: "What can we know about God?" And, "Who are we to ask?"

IBN ' ARABI'S CONCEPT OF GOD

Ibn ' Arabi basic givens about God are provided by the Koran, Cod's linguistic self-expression. When he attempts to summarize the contents of the Koran, he sometimes says that it address two primary modes of human understanding reason (or intelligence) and imagination. In order to understand the Koran in its totality, both of these faculties must be employed. Each Koranic verse yields up an appropriate meaning according to the mode in which the reader addresses it. Ibn 'Arabi often brings this home by discussing certain verses as expressions of a rational truth, and then offering a different interpretation of the same verse on the basis of an imaginal understanding.

This is not to say that Ibn 'Arabi thinks each Koranic verse has two meanings_one rational and the other imaginal. In his view, each word and each letter of the Koran_not to speak of its chapters and verses_ has an indefinite number of meanings, each of which is intended by God. If someone recites a Koranic verse and finds there the same meaning that he has found in a previous recitation, this simply shows his ignorance. As Ibn 'Arabi writes, "*When meaning repeats itself for someone who is reciting the Koran, he has not recited it as it should be recited. This is proof of his ignorance. But when someone's knowledge is increased through his recitation, and when he acquires a new judgement with each reading, he is the reciter who, in his own existence, follows God*" (IV 367.3).

One of the constant themes of Ibn 'Arabi works is the prophetic saying that reaffirms an important Judeo-Christian principle: "God created the human being in His own image". One of the corollaries of this principle is that human conceptualization of God is rooted in the very image of God that people embody. It is true that in one respect, God is infinitely beyond the human image, and the image has no means whatsoever of relating to God. But the only response to God from this point of view is silence, since nothing can express the utterly inexpressible. Hence we turn to a second point of view.

In a second respect, god discloses Himself to human beings through the divine images that are their own selves, and He does this in two basic modes. First, He discloses His indisclosability. Hence people come to know that they do not and cannot know God. This type of divine self-- disclosure is discussed by those who take the route of negative theology, as Ibn 'Arabi often does. But God also discloses Himself to human beings to let them know that they can and do know Him inasmuch as and to the extent that He discloses Himself. This is the route of positive theology.

In terms of the human receptacle, the mode of understanding that reaches the conclusion that God cannot be known is called "reason", whereas the modes of understanding that knows for certain that God does indeed show Himself is called "imagination". In Ibn 'Arabi's view, rational thought pushes God far away, while imaginal thought brings Him close. Reason sees god as absent, while imagination finds Him present.

In the technical terminology of Islamic theology, the understanding that God is inaccessible to human thought is called tanzih, or the "assertion of God's incomparability". This perspective is normative for all schools of rational theology in Islam. In contrast, the understanding that God is accessible to human understanding that God is accessible to human understanding is called tashbih, "the assertion of God's similarity", and it is normative for many Sufi expressions of Islamic teachings, especially those found in poetry, by far the most popular form of literature in Islamic civilization. For Ibn 'Arabi, reason, which sees God as incomparable, and imagination, which sees Him as similar, are the "two eyes" that human beings must employ in order to see the nature of things.

To be human, then, is to be a divine image, and to be a divine image is to be a self-expression of God within which every divine attribute_that is to say, every real attribute found in the cosmos_can be known. Understanding the divine image, which is both different from God and identical with Him, demands that all God's attributes be seen as both incomparable and similar, both inaccessible and present. One of the basic differences between ordinary human beings and the friends of God is that ordinary human beings have not succeeded in actualizing the full possibilities of their own selves. As a result, they fail to see with both eyes, or their two eyes do not focus correctly and in harmony. By contrast, perfect human beings have actualized the image in

which they were created, which is to say that they see the realities in proper proportion and respond to every situation as God Himself would respond were He to take human form. They are, in effect the human forms of God, each of them unique and endless.

KNOWING SELF AND GOD

All expressions of knowledge go back to the experience of the human self, which is to use a common Sufi expression that Professor Chodkiewicz has chosen as the title of his recent study of Ibn 'Arabi's hermeneutics_ "an ocean without shore". To the extent that the human self comes to be known, God's incomparability and similarity come to be known. But for Ibn 'Arabi, it is an axiom that God's self-disclosure never repeats itself, because God is unique and infinite. At each moment God shows Himself in a unique manner to each individual in the universe. Hence the gnostic's knowledge of self is endlessly changing and forever new, since each moment of self-knowledge represents a new moment of knowing the divine self-disclosure.

For Ibn 'Arabi, the goal of the seeker's quest is to live in a constantly overflowing fountain of divine self-expression, a never-ending outpour of knowledge and bliss. At each instant the gnostic — the .one who knows things as they truly are experiences a renewed self-disclosure of God and hence comes to a new understanding of what it means to be God's image. God is infinite and His image is also infinite. However, as Ibn 'Arabi often remarks, the infinite cannot fit into existence, because existence would negate its infinity. Hence the infinite divine image can only be experienced by successive self-disclosures, and these extend ad infinitum. This explains the bliss of the people of paradise. They are never bored, because they experience constant renewal. So also, the life of the gnostic never becomes stale, because he sees each moment as a new creation. In discussing the nature of self-knowledge and its connection to God-knowledge, Ibn 'Arabi typically cites the famous saying of the Prophet, "He who knows himself knows his Lord". In explaining the meaning of this saying, he takes the two basic routes of asserting God's incomparability and declaring His similarity. Through rational analysis of ourselves, we come to know that we are not God. But through perceiving the images of the divine slef-disclosures within ourselves, we come to understand

that we are indeed God. Ibn 'Arabi sometimes refers to the mystic vision of self as the direct experience of "He/not He", or "God/not God". This is the reality of the divine image, a reality that demands never-ending transformation and joy.[199]

Knowledge, of course, demands escape from ignorance. The Prophet said, "The search for knowledge is incumbent upon every Muslim". One Koranic meaning of the term muslim is simply a thing that is submitted to its Creator. In this sense, everything in the universe is a Muslim. It follows that the search for knowledge is incumbent upon everything in the universe, and this incumbency pertains to its very mode of existence. All things search for knowledge, whether they know it or not. As Ibn 'Arabi remarks.

In reality, the teacher is God, and the whole universe is a learner, a seeker, poor, and in need. This in fact is the perfection of each thing, Anyone who does not have these qualities is ignorant of himself, and he who is ignorant of himself is ignorant of his Lord. He who is ignorant of something has not given it its rightful due, and he who does not give something its rightful due has wronged that thing through his own properties and has stripped himself of the clothing of knowledge. Thus it has been made clear to you that all nobility lies in knowledge alone, and that the knowers of God are ranked in keeping with their knowledge (III 399.12).

In one respect, knowledge of the shoreless ocean of the self is impossible, and coming to know the impossibility of knowing oneself provides the basis for knowing God in terms of incomparability. In one of his many explanations of this principle, Ibn 'Arabi writes, "*The Prophet said, "Ha who knows himself knows his Lord ". In the same way, he who sees himself sees his Lord, or, he who sees his Lord sees himself In the view of the gnostics, with this statement the Shariah has locked the door to knowledge of God. For .... no one can reach the door to knowledge of God. For... no one.can reach knowledge of himself, since the self cannot be known disengaged from its connection to a body that it governs, whether this body be luminous or dark.... In that same way, God cannot be known except as a god [that is, He cannot be known in His inaccessible Essence]. Other than a God cannot be known,*

[199] For a detailed explanation of the concept of He/not He (huwa/la huwa), see W. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn 'Arabi 's Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989).

because it is not possible in knowing Him to disengage Him from the cosmos that is His vassal (IV 423.16).

Although knowledge of God's.Essence is inaccessible to any but God Himself, knowledge of God as He discloses Himself to the soul is available to every seeker. In fact, there is no other knowledge. Everyone knows God in themselves, but most people do not know that He is what they know.

There are none but knowers of God. However, some of the knowers know that they know God, and some of them do not know that they know God. The latter have knowledge of what they witness and examine, but they do not know that it is God. (II 510.32).

At the supreme level of spiritual experience, knowledge of self yields the understanding that there is nothing else in existence but the self, since nothing can be found but God's image, His self disclosure. In a long account that Ibn ' Arabi provides of how he ascended to God in the footsteps of Muhammad, he summarizes his experience as follows:

Through this ascent I actualized the meanings of all the divine names. I saw how they all go back to a single Named Object and a single Entity. That Named Object was the object of my witnessing, and that Entity was my own existence. So my journey had been only in myself (III 350.30).

This is why Ibn 'Arabi advises the seeker, "*Do not hope to know yourself through other than yourself, for there is no other*" (III 319.23.).

At the highest stage of self-knowledge, the gnostics actualize their own self-hoods as infinite and never-ending self-disclosures of God. Ibn 'Arabi writes, "*He who is not accompanied by the vision of God constantly, with every breath, is not one of these men*" (III 227.26). Or again:

The gnostics witness God in the forms of the possible things, those things whose existence has originated in time. Those who are veiled the exoteric scholars deny Him. Hence God is called the Manifest in respect of the gnostics, but He is called the Nonmanifest in respect of those who are veiled. But He is none other than He. The Folk of God, those who are worthy of Him, never cease to dwell, in this world and the next, in constant visual witnessing. Though the forms [of self-disclosure] are diverse, this does not detract from their witnessing (III 541.9).

The true gnostics witness the self-disclosures of God, who is the Real. They see nothing other than God, for every "other" is unreal. They dwell, along with Ibn 'Arabi, in what he sometimes calls the "wide earth of God". He tells us that he entered this earth in he' year 590/1195, when he was thirty years old, and he never left it. It is the station of true and utter servanthood of God.

When someone comes to dwell in the wide earth of God, he fully realizes the worship of God, and God ascribes that person to Himself God says, "0 My servants,... truly My earth is wide, so worship Me" [Koran 29:56], that is, "Worship Me in that earth ". I have worshipped God in that earth since the year 590, and today I am in the year 635 [1237-38].

This earth has permanent subsistence. It is not the earth that accepts change. That is why God made it the dwelling place of His servant and the locus of His worship. The servant remains forever a servant, so he remains in this earth forever. It is a supra-sensory, intelligible earth, not a sensory earth (III 224. 7).

The full Muhammadan inheritance demands the actualization of the Koranic vision through the concrete experience of life. Those who live with Muhammad dwell in God's wide earth, never departing from witnessing. His face in everything that appears to them. Like Muhammad, they have faith in the "Unseen "— which, in the Koran, is typically identified with God, the angels, and the Last Day. But also like Muhammad, they witness these unseen realities interwoven with their daily experience. Muhammad lived in the presence of God, the angels, and the Last Day, for these were the determining realities of his existence. So also the Muhammadan inheritors live in the witnessing of these realities, so much so that the "unseen " for them is in fact the present world. They accept on faith that there is a world and that the people who dwell within it do not see God, but their own situation is different.

They witness nothing but God in the engendered universe. They do not know what the world is, since they do not witness it as a world. They witness God with the eye, and they witness the world through faith, for God has reported to them that there is a world. Hence they have faith in it, but they do not see it. (IV 74.13).

BOOK REVIEWS

1 THE VISION OF ISLAM

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3 FUNDAMENTAL SYMBOLS:
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5 PROPHET MUHAMMAD AND HIS WESTERN CRITICS, (A CRITIQUE OF WE. MONTGONERY WATT AND OTHERS)

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6 EPISTEMOLOGY - THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

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7 MAWDUDI AND THE MAKING OF ISLAMIC RVIVALISM

Reviewed by Dr. Sohail Mahmud

The Vision of Islam, Sachiko Murata and William C. Chittick, Paragon House, 370 Lexington Avenue, New York City, N.Y. 10017, 1994, pp. 368, Pbk. $ 17.9.5.

This book is the ripe fruit of more than a decade of teaching a basic course in Islam as part of the program of Religious Studies at the State University of New York, Stony Brook, Long Island. It is first and foremost directed to their American students coming from diverce backgrounds. Although primarily intended for young undergraduate students with little or no prior knowledge of Islam, this work throughout maintains its mature sophisticated intellectual standards.

It refutes once and for all the general idea widely held in the West that Islam consists of harsh legalism and outward formalism with little or no inward spirituality or beauty. This erroneous conception has been much enhanced these days by the militant activities of certain political groups loosely labeled as "fundamentalists" with whom the authors of this book share no sympathies. On the contrary, they show why indiscriminate violence for political ends is forbidden by the Shar'iat.

In contrast to so many other western publications preoccupied with current political events of this or that Muslim country. This work concentrates its exposition exclusively on the inner spiritual life of the practicing Muslim from within its own ethos - a perspective very sorely needed in the West.

The first part of this work discusses the exterior dimensions of the Five Pillars of Islam, emphasizing Salat or the obligatory five times daily ritual prayers, the Shar'iat, Holy Qur'an and the Islamic concept of revealed scriptures, the Sunnah or practice of the Holy Prophet upon whom be peace, the Madhhahs or schools of Islamic jurisprudence. The second part takes up the subject of Diniyat on all its aspects the Islamic creed or Shahadah, Tawhid and Shirk, the Divine Names or attributes of God, why Divine mercy takes precedence over Divine warth and the necessity for a delicate balance between tanzih or Divine Majesty and Tashbih or Divine beauty, the Angels and their necessary role, Satan and the jinn, predestination verses free-will and the uniqueness of the human state and the purpose of human life. Also included are the relation of Islam to other major world religions followed by the Islamic concept of death and Hereafter. Part II ends with a brief commentary of Islamic theology, philosophy and sufism. The third and last part of this book describes Ihsan or the interior dimensions of Islam, including sincerity in attitudes, motivations and intentions, character-building, manners and the necessity in Islam for doing everything beautifully. Eloquent explanations are given why authentic - Muslim arts and crafts exemplified in correct Qur'anic recitation, calligraphy and mosque architecture are essential and exalted expressions of Islam.

The viewpoint throughout this book is traditional and orthodox, from beginning to end hostile to modernity and above all "progress" and "development" expressed in ever-intensifying mechanization and

indoctrination, their rampant growth spreading the most degrading ugliness all over the Muslim world. Although classical Islamic civilization included the natural sciences, perfection of human character and Din not technical progress - was its ultimate goal.

The value of this book lies in its emphasis on the necessity of beauty in Islam. Current political, economic and social activities in Muslim countries today have little if any concern with beauty. Activism in the Muslim world today expresses the very negation of beauty, With irrefutable evidence, Murata and Chittick convincingly argue why unless and until the Muslims give beauty its full expression in their everyday lives, the regeneration of Islamic civilization cannot possibly take place.

Maryam Jameelah

Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-' Arabi and the Problem of Religious Diversity. William C. Chittick, Published by the State University of New York (SUNY) Press, Albany, New York, 1994. 208 pages.

William Chittick and his publishers have rendered a significant service for reflective Akbarians who wish to understand the greatest Shaykh more deeply. Under three interconnected themes -- human perfection, worlds of imagination, and religious diversity — Imaginal Worlds brings together ten essays written over the last decade and published in a variety of places, including symposia proceedings of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society. Not content merely to make these thoughtful essays readily accessible, Chittick has substantially rewritten and revised than to eliminate unnecessary repetition and to exhibit an architectonic unity in their contents. He has been admirably successful in doing both. For those who have found his monumental The Sufi Path of Knowledge (SUNY Press, 1989) daunting, the volume under review could serve as an introduction and guidebook for the longer work. Yet it stands on its own as a survey of major Akbarian themes.

Throughout his essays, Chittick is concerned to draw together and interweave metaphysical, ethical and psychological dimensions of the Shaykh's thought and to show that they are rooted in his profound spiritual

experience, including his remarkable grasp of, and devotion to, Islam. Beginning with a detailed discussion of wahdat al-wujud -- term, Chittick notes, not used by Ibn al-' Arabi but suitably applied to his ontology -- Chittick shows how the Shaykh would have understood it. This opening allows Chittick to inaugurate a discussion of the Divine Names and their relevance to the macrocosm, the microcosm (the human being) and the perfect human being. He returns to the Most Beautiful Names again and again, because they are essential to all three. Every time Chittick discusses the Names, he broadens our perspective and adds subtlety to it. They are the unifying theme of these essays.

In a fascinating chapter, 'Ethics and Antinomianism', Chittick clearly and convincingly demonstrates that human character traits are tooted in the Divine Names, showing that character traits are rooted in he Divine Names, showing that Akbarian ethics derive from ontology. All Names, including those generally associated with blameworthy character traits, are disclosures of Deity. No trait can therefore be blameworthy in itself. Rather, human misunderstanding or misuse of the creative power of a Name as it manifests in a person results in he judgment of blameworthiness. But existence (wujud) is one, which implies that all things are properties and effects of the Divine Names. 'This means', Chittick explains, 'that in the last analysis nothing can be found but various modalities of wujud, or various relationships and attributions' (p. 47). Being is one, but relationships are many. Outside being, there are no things in themselves, only relationships, each of which is a bridge (barzakh) between other changing relationships and between the world of plurality and the Names, themselves self-disclosures of, and bridges to, Reality. Only the prophetic tradition as embodied in eh Shari' ah provides accurate guidance in ethics and spiritual development by situating actions in their proper contexts.

In his concern to elucidate how Ibn al-' Arabi's ethics are wedded both to his ontology and to the prescriptions of the Shari' ah, Chittick regrettably addresses only crude antinomianism, which declares that spiritual knowledge places one above normative ethics. The cliche that the line between genius and insanity is thin has become so threadbare that one might miss the truth behind it: both the genius and the deranged move beyond conventional reality. The genius, however, may attempt to translate his insight into

language and forms of understanding which can elevate ours; the insane demands that we acknowledge their 'reality' without connecting it to ours. Anyone whose consciousness is spiritually transformed, that is, whose very structure of thinking, feeling and perceiving is changed, does move beyond conventional views of normative ethics. he or she neither rejects nor mocks moral principles which are held to limit others, but his or her understanding of them is necessarily vastly expanded. Normative ethics become soul ethics, an integral part of the spiritual pilgrim and not just a set of rules to be followed. Were such not a result of spiritual insight, the illumination itself would be suspect. Thus, the line between crude antinomianism and the illuminated soul will also appear thin to those of lesser vision. Chittick modestly avoids this admittedly treacherous'territory; but Ibn al-' Arabi did not.

Chittick provides a clear account of the Shaykh's explanation of religious diversity, which is resonant with his account of blameworthy character traits. Being is one and therefore the source of all beliefs, and every belief must have some connection with existence to exist itself. Nonetheless, ever belief is limited; none can encompass the whole of wujud. To the degree that a belief is misguided, it is because of the less than perfect development of the believer. Our preparedness for understanding determines the beliefs we have. (Here a comparison with the Hindu view of absolute and relative truth and preparedness for insight would be enlightening. But Chittick, wary of superficial similarities and of ideas taken out of context, does not indulge in such considerations.) Those who follow the Qur'an do not follow the only path to God, but they follow the straightest path, which is 'the road of felicity' (p. 146).

On the basis of the Shaykh's view of religious diversity and the necessity for it, Chittick attempts a generous and inclusive perspective on all religious traditions. Yet his refusal to note comparable standpoints in other religions, notably Hinduism, Buddhism, mystical. Christianity of the later Middle Ages, and even Taoism, gives his account a cold edge not found in the Shaykh. The tension between Ibn al-' Arabi's boldness -- it caused trouble in his lifetime and after - and Chittick's caution (noticed earlier in the discussion of antinomianism) here shadows the exhilarating conclusion of the volume. In the end, the Shaykh's own words win through: 'Be in yourself a matter for

the forms of all beliefs, for God is wider and more tremendous than that He should be constricted by one knotting (belief, world view) rather than another'. (p. 176). For Ibn al-' Arabi, there is no problem of religious diversity.

In dealing with these themes, Chittick broaches many subjects not touched on here, as essay titles indicate: 'Revelation and Poetic Imagery'; 'Meetings with Imaginal Men'; Death and the Afterlife'; and 'A Myth of Origins'. The entire volume merits close reading and sustained reflection. Thought not always luminous, Chittick's essays are invariably illuminating, and the careful reader will discern a certain beauty and integrity of thought in Chittick's consistently sober prose. Useful indices are included, along with a select bibliography. Unfortunately, Mystical Languages of Unsaying by Michael Sells containing two exquisite essays on Ibn al-'Arabi, apparently appeared in print too late to be included.

Elton A. Hall

Fundamental Symbols: The Universal Language of Sacred Science

By Rene Guenon. Translated by Alvin Moore, Jr., Compiled by M Valsan, and edited by Martin Lings. Cambridge, England: Quinta Essentia, 1995. Pp. 369.20 diagrams. $ 35.95, cloth; $ 22.95, paper.

Even among those who have become interested in mythology and symbolism, it is too often forgotten that "myth," itself form the Greek mythos, is related etymologically to mystery and has to do precisely with the "Divine Mysteries," while "symbol" comes form the Greek verb symballein meaning to put together or bind, that is, to unite a thing with its origin. The French metaphysician and mathematician Rene Guenon stands as a beacon of light in guiding us to the understanding of symbols and in asserting with certitude the root of symbols in the immutable archetypes which are reflected on different levels of cosmic existence.

Despite the significance of so many of his works such as The Crisis of the Modern World, The Reign of Quantity and the Signs of the Time, and The Symbolism of the Cross (all published in English but now out of print),

Fundamental Symbols is perhaps the most important after Man and His Becoming According to the Vedanta (which appeared in English in 1945 and is also no longer in print). As Martin Lings, himself the author of a major work on symbolism entitled Symbol and Archetype, states in his preface,

> The universal language of symbolism is as old as humanity; and the light which Guenon throws on the intelligence and the intellectual unanimity of the ancient world is enough to dispel forever any lingering illusions about primitive man that we have subconsciously retained from our education.

In this work, Guenon not only speaks about various symbols which concern religion, art, the traditional sciences, and life itself, and in fact provide the language of both sacred art and sacred science, but also discusses the meaning of symbol in general. He demonstrates why symbols are rooted in the ontological reality of things, having their source in the noumenal and archetypal levels of reality rather than in the merely human or psychological.

In seventy-six chapters grouped into eight sections, Guenon deals with the metaphysical and cosmological meaning of symbols drawn from traditions as far apart as the Greek and the Buddhist, the Druid and the Islamic. The titles of the eight sections reveal the vast expanse of this seminal work: "Traditional Symbolism and Some of Its General Applications"; "Symbols of the Center and of the World"; "Symbols of Cyclic Manifestation"; "Some Symbolic Weapons"; "The Symbolism of the Forms of the Cosmos"; "The Symbolism of Building"; "Axial Symbolism and Symbolism of Passage"; and "The Symbolism of the Heart." This collection, assembled by M. Valsan after Guenon's death from his scattered essays, was published in the original French as Symboles fondamentaux de la science sacree (Paris: Galliinard, 1962). It is presented here for the first time in English, with the addition of two essays and the deletion of one from the French text. The English edition opens with a preface by Martin Lings,_ long-time friend and colleague of Guenon, on the, significance of this book, and an introduction by another close associate of Guenon, W. N. Perry, on' his life. It concludes with a list of the original sources of the essays, the bibliography of the books of Guenon, and a useful index.

Guenon's exposition of symbolism is a critique in depth of all those modernist writers who would reduce the symbol to an allegory, an agreed-upon image of a socially defined significance, or a reality of psychological origin emanating from the common historic experiences or collective unconscious of an ethnic or linguistic group. And, like other writings of Guenon, Fundamental Symbols is an exposition of metaphysical truths and a criticism of errors in the light of those truths.

The translation of this extensive work has been a real labor of love for. both the translator, who has spent a lifetime in the study of Guenon's works, and the editor, himself one of the foremost traditional authors. The result is an English text reflecting the lucidity and clarity of the original French, qualities which characterize Guenon's writings in general. It is a major addition to the English corpus of his work, one that it is hoped will kindle enough interest to bring back into print many of Guenon's books rendered earlier into English but now unavailable.

In any case the translator and editor as well as the publishers are to be congratulated for making this work available in English. The hardcover edition of the book is well-printed with a handsome cover characteristic of the Quinta Essentia imprint. One only wishes that Dr. Lings could have dealt in greater length with Guenon's significance. Perhaps he will do so in a future work, in response to the need in the English-speaking world for the reassertion of the call of tradition in general and the teachings of Guenon in particular.

S. Hossein Nasr

Undlus Ki Islami Mirath Ed. (Urdu) Dr. Sahibzadah Sajidul Rahman, (Islamic Heritage of Spain), Publisher Islamic Research Institute, International Islamic University, Islamabad, 1996, pp. 790; Paperback; Price Rs. 300/-

The book is an attempt to understand the Islamic heritage of Spain. The topic is interesting not only for lay readers, but experts on history and politics as well as those who want to peep into the present Islamic revivalism

Granada where the Islamic culture flourished during the reign of Umayyads was a citadel of learning at the time of its fall (1492). The excellence of Spanish Muslims encompassed philosophy, history, poetry, literature, physics, chemistry, geography, medicine, mathematics and many other fields of knowledge. The greatness of Granada attracts, not only the curious Muslim, but even those enemies who brought about its collapse. This enlightenment travelled upto Italy, Germany, France and other countries of Europe and in sixteenth century matured into renaissance in Europe. Muslim Spain was a fraternal home not only for the rulers Muslims, but also the Christians and Jews who lived there in accordance with the dictates of their religions. A substantial compartment of Muslim scholarship in Qur'an, tafsir, hadith, fiqah, philosophy, kalam, mysticism, culture and civilisation owes authorship to Muslim luminaries from Spain.

The idea behind this book-was to refresh the Muslim Spain's memory. With this objective in mind, the Islamic Research Institute of the International Islamic University, Islamabad brought out a special number of its three quarterly journals - Urdu Fikr-o-Nazar, Arabic al-Dirasatul Islami and English Islamic Studies. The present compilation consists of the articles published in Fikr-o-Nazar in its April, December 1991 issue.

In introduction entitiled 'Islam in Spain through the history', Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud has given a brief account of the pre-Muslim and post-Muslim era of Spain. He traces the history of Spain before Christ, its geographical boundaries, the dynastic rule of Qutiah kings and the dawn of Muslim era in 711 AD. Spain's Muslim identity lasted till January 3, 1492 when Sultan Abu Abdullah of Granada surrendered before Ferdinand. In Ferdinand's reign Morisco Muslims suffered immense torture and economic exploitation at the hands of Christian rulers. They were also forced to adopt Christianity. Morisco Yielded to this intimidation, but never compromised on their Islamic beliefs. In December 1568 Morisco organised a rebellion under the leadership of an 'alim Abdullah Muhammad bin Umayya (whose declared name was Farnando Walor). The uprising was crushed and some of the Moriscos migrated to Tunis, Rabat and Turkey. However, a small number of them continued presence in Spain. They were Christians outwardly, but Muslims from the core of their hearts. In his concluding remarks the author makes the following exposure of the contemporary scene in Spain:

> Recently in Spain Islamic regeneration has dawned after restoration of religious and political freedoms, and contacts with the Muslim world. The local Muslim societies have managed to regain the control of some of the mosques. They have also attained political influence on various political parties. In Undlusia, Spain's southern province, this Islamic movement is specifically active. In that - province, the people tag Islamic posterity with their distinct cultural entity. (p. 20)

The book has articles analysing the contributions of Spanish Muslims in tafsir (Dr. Muhammad Tufail), hadith (Suhail Hasan), siyrah (Dr. Nisar Ahmad), fiqh (Muhammad Miyan Siddiqui), history (Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Azhar, Dr. Aminullah Vithar and Dr. Tufail Hashmi), literature (Dr. Ihsanul Haq, Dr. Khurshid Rizvi, Muhammad Shard Sialvi, Habibul Rahman Asim, Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Azhar and Dr. Rahim Bakhsh Shaheen), Iqbaliat (Dr. Muhammad Riaz, Dr. Mahmoodul Rahman), medicine (Hakim Naeemul din Zubairy), philosophy and kalam (Ubaidullah Qudsi), personalities (Dr. Muhammad Khalid Masud, Syed Ali Asghar Chishti Sabri, Dr. Sayyid Ali Raza Naqvi and Professor Muhammad Saleem Shah), culture and civilisation (Dr. Ihtisham bin Hasan, Dr. Tufail Hashmi, Dr. Abdul Rahim Ashraf Baloch, Dr. Muhammad Akran and Muhammad Sajid Khan), and bibliography (Akhtar Rahi). It has preamble by Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari and preface by Dr. Sahibazadah Sajidual Rahman.

Broad theme of the contributions by scholars is the Islamic heritage of Spain. There is no single consistently pursued thesis. All articles are independent units and follow their distinct theses relevant to the area of their study.

The contributors have largely based their analysis on the original books mostly in Arabic, Translations and scholarly works in Urdu follow the Arabic sources in number, and last come the books in Persian and English.

The authors have successfully depicted their particular themes within the overall gambit of Islamic heritage of Spain. However, looked at from the critical angle the book suffers from a few handicaps, one of which is very serious. The focus of all the scholars is on the source material and analysis available in Arabic, Urdu and Persian works. There is almost complete black

out of the Western primary sources on the Islamic heritage of Spain. A big volume of books is available on the Muslim Spain in English and other European languages. George Muqaddasi and many other Western scholars are of the view that to understand the Muslim Spain is essential to understand the contemporary Europe, and the world at large. (pp. 27-8) The Western appreciation of this important development in the world history cannot be ignored. Secondly, without a comparative study, the real nature of he Islamic heritage of Spain cannot be visualised. In the present form the book's theme more appropriately conforms to the "Muslim version" only. It minimises the universality of the Muslim rule in Spain. Thirdly the source material cited from English sources is of very insignificant and secondary nature published in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (Dr. Nisar Ahamd pp. 158-162; Dr Khurshid Rizvi pp. 334-338; Dr. Muhammad Riaz p. 498; Dr. Ihtisham bin Hasan pp. 660-661; Dr. Tufail Hashmi pp. 677-679 and Dr. Abdul Rahim Ashraf Baloch pp. 726-728). This modus-operandi is generally not encouraged in scholarly and research oriented works. The approach dominates not only the entire contributions, but even the article exclusively dealing with bibliographic information in the end (pp. 745-790). Apart from this, there is no index.

Besides above few shortcomings, the book is definitely a good • addition to the historical literature on the Muslim civilisation and culture. It reminds the reader of the greatness of the Muslims, when they ruled Spain. In his introduction Dr. Ansari writes that in Spain Christians are once agains attracted to Islam. Muslim societies are being formed. Mosques are being built. With a small mosque in Granada near the historic Masjid-e-Qurtaba (now a Church), once again the call for prayer is being disseminated in the space of Spain. Dr. Khalid Masud points out the eagerness of the Western scholars to understand the Muslim Spain. An article dealing with this contemporary thinking added with the theme that why Muslims could not continue with that rich heritage, could have universalised this book.

Dr. Sayyid A.S. Pirzada

Prophet Muhammad and His Western Critics, (A Critique of We. Montgomery Watt and Others), Zafar Ali Qureshi, Idara Ma'arif Islami, Mansoora, Lahore, 1992, 2 Vols., pp. 1, 103.

For centuries orientalists in Europe and America have been engaged in the study of Islamic history and civilization in accordance with their own needs and aims. Since Islam is the only serious rival to its world supremacy the West has ever confronted, consequently, negative image of Islam has become an integral part of the cultural heritage of the West. Hence it is hardly surprising that Muhammad (peace be upon him) has been more maligned and denigrated than any other great man in history.

Montgomery Watt is prominent among these well-known orientalists. His two-volume biography: Muhammad at Mecca and Muhammad in Madian, both written and published during the 1950's, has become a veritable orientalist classic upheld as an uncontested "authority" on the subject even at Pakistani colleges and universities.

Zafar Ali Qureshi, ex-Assistant Professor of Islamic Studies, Islamia College, Lahore, has arisen with a powerful pen and vast erudition to contest this "authority." Qureshi has evidently studied nearly every book in English about the Holy Prophet published during the last two centuries and effectively demolishes Watt's errors with copious quotations from western sources.

Typical of contemporary western scholars who refuse to acknowledge Muhammad (Upon whom be peace) as an authentic prophet of God and the Holy Qur'an as Divine revelation, Watt attributes the spectacular success of Islam to purely political, social and economic factors. He alleges that the majority of its followers were attracted to Islam due to worldly and materialistic motives: Although Watt is a clergyman as well as Professor, he does not write as a Christian but rather as a fervent adherent of Marxism.

In his Muhammad at Mecca, Watt plays down the persecution by the Quraish that, lasting for thirteen long years, it was so extraordinarily severe that during the three-year boycott, the Muslims nearly starved to death and at last the Holy Prophet was forced to flee from Mecca to Madina for his life. Watt says that the Holy Prophet, having stopped intertribal raiding, was

giving much "thought" to the economic basis of his system, thus the expansion of Islam into adjacent lands and the conquests of the Persian and Byzantine empires was done "to maintain the standard of living" and quest for loot and booty; Qureshi shows that the Arabs of the Prophet's time lived on camels and dates and that their lives were simple to the utmost austerity. Qureshi shows Watt's concern with their "standard of living" to be a ludicrous retrospection of present-day thinking to the distant past and a negation despite all evidence of Qur'an and Hadiths to the contrary of the spiritual role of the Holy Prophet's mission in history. Qureshi shows that the earliest Muslims were no "wild" bedu tribes driven by hunger and overpopulation to seek elbow room in the adjacent lands to the North but that Jihad was above all, spiritual, seeking the pleasure of Almighty Allah and eternal reward in Hereafter. Had Islam been only motivated by material factors, it could not have left a permanent religious or cultural impact

Qureshi also refutes the infamous "Satanic Verses" legend with which Watt and generations of his fellow orientalists have shamelessly used to denigrate the authenticity of Holy Qur'an and the Holy Prophet's mission or upholding and propagating Tawhid.

Unfortunately, the second half of Vol. II, which attacks the Bible, Judaism and Christianity, apparently having little 'coherent connection to the rest of the book, degenerates into futile apologetics and polemics. Qureshi unfavourably contrasts Muhammad upon whom be peace with Mosses in the Bible and Jihad with the latter's horrible wars of extermination and genocide. Quoting from Sigmund Freud's Moses and Monotheism, he even casts doubt on the historicity of Moses and uses quotes from books of "Higher Criticism" to try to prove that the Bible is not Divine Revelation but only an ordinary book no better than other books full of errors. To quote atheists and renegades like Freud to attack the Judeo-Christian heritage of the West is outrageously unfair at the least - really "hitting below the belt", one must say. As Muslims we have no cause to gloat over the misfortunes of Christianity and the destruction of the spiritual tradition in the West, for the destruction of one religion leads to the destruction of others: the irreligiousness in the West cannot but adversely affect the rest of the world, including the Muslim world, to a catastrophic extent.

Qureishi's apologetics reach their height when he asserts that Islam is the parent of modern civilization without which there could have never been any Renaissance, Reformation, Age of Reason or even Industrial Revolution! Although Muslim scholars did preserve and hand on the classical Greek legacy to medieval Europe without doing any permanent damage to Islam, contemporary Muslim apologists are unique in all history in complaining about the immunity of their ancestors to a deadly virus. In the West, this same virus (the revival of the classical heritage of pagan antiquity) brought about the total destruction of traditional Christian civilization and the triumph of atheism, secularism and materialism. The much-praised "Renaissance" was really the resurrection of Greek and Roman paganism on a hitherto unprecedented scale. Since then Western civilization has taken a monstrous, abnormal course, being the only human culture known in all history based on denial of God and Hereafter. Instead of boasting of Islam's alleged contributions to this se-called "Renaissance", we Muslims should be fully aware that a terrible mistake was made and feel utmost sorrow and regret it ever happened.

While the first volume of this book is an eloquent refutation of Watt and fellow orientalists which should have ended there, regretfully the latter pages of vol. II are entirely irrelevant and ineffectual to Qureshi's basic task of rectifying their gross distortions of Seerat.

Maryam Jameelah

Epistemology - Theory of Knowledge by Archie J. Bahm. Published by Word Books, Ablurqerque, N.M. (U.S.A) Page svii + 261, 1995, price US $ 15.00.

Archie J. Bahm hasn't put forward any far reaching theory in philosophy. Yet he is known, quite well one might say, for his introductory book on the subject. This book, though seems to have been written with precisely the view that he claims that he sets forth therein, will be fundamentally different from the 'usual' track this of course is a liberal generalisation of Western philosophers. On the back cover is a photograph of Prof. Bahm with a brief mention of 'five innovative claims'. These are:

1) Intuition is essential to knowing...

2) Mind is substantial...

3) Mind and body are not merely interdependent but are also mutually immanent.

4) Mind body mutual immanence results from "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny"

5) All reasoning is strictly analogical...

The blurb also indicates that Prof. Bahm has incorporated influences from Indian and Chinese philosophies in the book. Quite appropriately, one is warned though not in such harsh terms that the book was intended as a companion volume to the author's METAPHYSICS AN INTRODUCTION, Which was published twenty years earlier. Indeed, many of the claims that Prof. Bahm makes would perhaps make more sense were they to be read with his earlier book. Of his novel claims three in fact pertain to what is known in modern philosophy as metaphysics, though the proper term for that is ontology.

Be that as it may, the novelty of the claim if that at all, is only skin deep. The fact is that Prof. Bahm has taken certain key notions from traditional philosophy and transposed them to a totally modern setting. By modern, of course, we mean that which is a consequence of the Cartesian project. With such a transposition, illegitimate as it is, there is bound to be a grand mix-up. Let's take his five innovative claims, one by one:

(1) Intuition: There is no doubt that intuition is essential to knowing but this intuition is not just any sort of intuition Cartesian so called rational intuition is far removed form the nihilistic intuition in Nietzsche, based as it is in instinct, and these two are poles apart from the intellectual intuition envisaged in traditional philosophy[200] More pertinently, intellectual intuition from the latter point of view is not merely a guide to 'awareness of appearance' but to quiddity itself. Neither is it limited to quiddity of objects.

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[200] On this see the many works of Reno Guenon, Frithjof Schuon but especially S. H. Nasr. The latter's, " The Need for a Sacred Science' (New York, Suny, 1993) is especially instructive. So is the following article in Al Tawhid Vol, IX No. 1, which adumbrates the point from the vantage point of Mulla Sadra's theosophy, 'The Unity of Aqil and Maqul'.

Depending upon the nature of the self having the intuition, the intuiting is an immediate guide to the nature of reality which by definition exceeds the merely human. One could go on in this way to highlight the differences and hence the shortcomings of his conception but this is not the place for it. Suffice it to say that this concept of Prof. Bahm has a striking resemblance to the Cartesian 'natural light of reason[201]

(2) Mind: The term, as Prof. Bahm uses it, is quasi-Cartesian. He then goes on to intermingle concepts from the pragmatic school to build up his theory of mind. It is clear that he is not aware of the psyche/spirit distinction as it exists in oriental schools of thought.[202] Not surprisingly then he is led to assign all psychic functions to the mind. What is most lacking in this account, given his claim that 'mind is substantial', is the total absence of an ontological description of that faculty. He completely skirts this issue by simply skipping on to the functions of the 'mental' faculty. Accounts of 'mind-mody' interaction are equally superficial. This also leads him to the next obscure statement viz.,

(3) "Mind and body... are mutually immanent".

This is an uneasy mix of the Cartesian and the pragmatic. Having already claimed substantiality for 'mind' one searches in vain for a fuller statement of its ontology. Without this his account remains incomplete and superficial. Need one remind oneself of the myriad problems that Cartesian ontology has generated for western and westernised posterity. It might be objected that in a tract on epistemology such things are beside the point. But that precisely is the point. Bahm's claims are inexplicable without an ontological account an extended one at that given that in today's sceptical thought climate these claims do need substantiation. The fact is that he does profess a sort of naive realism but then, apart from the misleading terminology hinted at earlier, there is nothing novel about realism. In fact. 'realism', wholistic realism at that, is the hallmark of every traditional philosophy which

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[201] See, for instance, Desecrates, Rene, 'Meditation-IV'

[202] See, Guenon, Rene, "The Reign of Quantity & the Signs of the Times (Lahore, Suhail Academy, 1983)

conceives of the universe as a multi-levelled entity, not the bicameral one that Bahm makes it out to be.

As to logic, there is a dash of Hegel with a basically Aristotelian structure. One must commend him for admitting that logic follows from 'metaphysics' (read ontology) and is not something independent and objective.[203]

As with his account of logic, his whole presentation shows influences from the various schools of European thought ranging from Hegeleanism to existentialism and to the consequent true appraisal of science for what it is.

The reader is welcome to look upon this as an attempt at eclecticism, one of many in the western fold. It would, be a grave error to imagine that the author has even been able to attempt feebly a marriage of the two trends of thought, Eastern and Western. The gulf that separates the two is far too foundationally real to be bridged by facile attempts like these.

Javid Iqbal Amiri

Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, Seyyed Vali Reza Nast's,

University of California Press, U.S.A, 1995.

Mawdudi is one of the leading Islamic ideologues of the contemporary world. His thinking has had a profound influence on Islamists and their increasingly important discourse. The book by Nasr was published after his earlier well-received The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at--i Islam of Pakistan. Although published later the book should be read before the Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution and not after.

In the first part of the book Nasr has done an excellent job of tracing Mawdudi's career and the milieu that helped shape it. The predicament of Indian Muslims at the loss of their power and their peculiar circumstances

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[203] Page 171, Part 2, "Organicity"

led to a number of responses. Revivalism was one such response. The uncertainty of the Muslim fate and the challenges faced by them in India had

a profound impact on many Indian Muslims, including Mawdudi.

His earlier writings are to be seen as largely "communalist" a and as a "crusade for the preservation and propagation of Islam" which adds Nasr, "remained divorced from real political and social problems". The author adds that Mawdudi's "political views were formed in the abstract and had little to do with the political dynamics of the society to which they were meant to refer ... This apolitical approach to political thought and practice remained a mark of Mawdudi's movement and distinguished him from other revivalist leaders such as Ayatollah Khomeini, who maintained a more accommodating approach to the Left and premised his ideas on the prevailing concerns of Iranian society". The remark is unwarranted and at best misplaced because Nasr later on does deal with Mawdudi attempt to politicize Islam. Just because Mawdudi does not agree with the so-called Left does not necessarily mean that he, unlike Khomeini, is any more less concerned with the affairs of his own society. Nasr points out interesting aspects of the development of Mawdudi's career and personality. One cannot but infer that Mawdudi had developed an earlier dislike for traditional Islam and the ulama establishment. He was confident of his own scholarship to the extent that he "had little patience for the restrictions of the institution of the ulama". Nasr quickly adds that "this castigation of the ulama was not free from the condescension that at least in part had emanated from the esteem in which he held his own familiarity with modem thought". Mawdudi's disenchantment with the ulama is well known and documented elsewhere also. It was this disillusionment that forced Mawdudi to chart his own course and even undergo a born-again type "conversion" to a new Islam. Mwdudi realized early on that the very enforcement of the famous Islamic injunction of "amr-ibi ma 'ruf wa nahy 'enl-munkar required the creation of a new party. It was only in 1937 that Mawdudi's revivalist "solution" and reconversion to Islam was stated in political terms, says the author. Nasr derides Mawdudi for his apparent personality and character flaws. For example, he points out that his marriage to a wealthy and liberal Mahmudah Begum "cast doubt on the extent of his commitment to the cause". Again, Mawdudi "allowed her greater latitude than he did Muslims in general". Nasr's biting remark follows. He

categorically declares that: "The standards that prevailed in his household were very different from the standards he required of others, including Jama'at members". The statement cannot be substantiated, however. Moreover, even if the allegation of double standard is correct it does not necessarily make Mawdudi a lesser scholar. Nasr does correctly point out that concept of tajdid required the establishment of a new party that would empower him and enhance his authority. "high opinion of his own abilities seemed to be confirmed by the approval with which his works were received". He finally founded the Jama'at-i Islami in August 1941. Nasr adds that "from the very beginning, it was the platform for Mawdudi'd ideas".

From here the author embarks on the more interesting part of the book pertaining to Pakistan.

Nasr says that in Pakistan the party was soon involved in politics. "Mawdudi became more and more a politician and less and less an ideologue and a scholar, and the Jama'at changed from a religious movement to a political party. The Pakistan years were therefore not a time of great intellectual activity for the Jama'at. In Pakistan, and the Jama'at would leave their mark as political actors". The statement is grossly exaggerated. A substantial part of Mawdudi's contribution was in Pakistan and the party itself perceived its primary role to be that of an intellectual movement. Perhaps it was later on, after the dearth of Mawdudi in 1979, that the Jama'at became more of a political party but certainly not during the early decades of Pakistan. sacrificed principle on the aegis of political pragmatism. President Ayub

Khan persecuted the party for its Islamic stands and the Jama'at reacted. Nasr points out that the party "even went as far as supporting the anti-Ayub candidacy of Fatimah Jinnah in the presidential elections of 1965, an endorsement that ran counter to Mawdudi's views on the social role of women". In this was severely castigated by some of the ulama. In the 1970 general elections the political hopes of the party were smacked when it won only four seats in the National Assembly and four in the Provincial Assemblies. The Jama'at joined the conflict in East Pakistan on the side of the government and tried to prevent East Pakistan from becoming Bangladesh. Nasr does not criticize the Jama'at for its role in thwarting democracy. A serious political mistake of the Jama'at has been ignored.

Nasr says that Mawdudi began having second thoughts about the Jama at's political direction after the 1970 elections. "The party had lost its innocence and found itself in compromising moral dilemmas, most notably the rising number of violent incidents involving the Jama'at student wing.... In 1975, he advised the Jama'at shura to reassess the party's course of action and to opt out of politics, but by then the party was far too politicized to follow his counsel. By some accounts, Mawdudi was disappointed with what he had created". Nasr adds that Mawdudi confided to a friend that "when historians write of the Jama'at, they will say it was yet another tajdid movement that rose and fell." Although it is possible that Mawdudi was disenchanted with his party, especially the violence of the student wing, it does not seem probable that he really meant what he apparently did say. Most probably his remarks were made when he was in low spirits and need not be taken more than just that. After all, Mawdudi was not super human and his critics and biographers must be more charitable than what Nasr seems to be at this point. To the credit of Mawdudi and his Jama'at Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto did admit in the end that they were the main forces opposing his rule.

On April 16, 1977 Bhutto even paid a visit to Mawdudi in Lahore. For this to happen was quite surprising given Bhutto's disdain for Mawdudi. The Jama'at did play a dominant role in ousting Bhutto from power. Nasr does not comment on Bhutto's tyrannical period of rule and his open antagonism with Islamist forces, including the Jama'at. The religious parties, including the Jama'at, were persecuted and subjugated by Bhutto. To their credit they stood their ground valiantly and opposed his socialist and liberal policies. Bhutto was a failure by all accounts and not only that of Islam. The readers of Nasr would expect him to point out this achievement of the Mawdudi and the Jama'at. A missed opportunity on part of the author.

Nasr says that General Zia ul-Haq sought Mawdudi's advice and counsel and accorded him the status of an elder statesman. Nasr writes that "Mawdudi proved receptive to Zia's overtures and supported his decision to execute Bhutto". It is well known fact that Bhutto was hanged on the decision of the Supreme Court after a lengthy trial in the Lahore High Court. Although the death sentence might not have been warranted but still it was the Court that executed Bhutto and not General Zia. Whether Mawdudi

agreed or disagreed becomes immaterial and its mention alludes to conspiracy which was certainly not the case. It is true that Mawdudi did support General Zia and saw in the military regime "access to power and more room to maneuver" and the plausibility of realizing the vision of an Islamic state. But Mawdudi did not live to see Zia's Islamization experiment becoming sour and the disillusionment it caused in the lama' at itself:

The second part of the book pertains to the -reinterpretation of Islam by Mawdudi. Nasr says that his views "involved a process of modernization, but under the guise and in the name of Islam". Nasr is correct to point out that this modernizing

impulse of Islamic revivalism is not only the use of modern gadgets bur also includes institutions, values and idea. The author says that "Revivalists are not only moderns but modernists". Although Nasr did not say so but we can safely deduce that since Mawdudi is a revivalist therefore he is also a modernist. this is what Nasr would have us believe at this point. Ile continues to declare that Mawdudi did not hesitate to borrow from the West the very culture that he wanted to supplant by his own vision. He did this because he was "not all that firmly rooted in tradition and who was in addition enamored of the achievements of the West. Modernism was the path on which Muslims would be able to repeat the glories of the past". In Mawdudi'd view Islamic revival was essentially a political struggle that could succeed only if its modernizing impulse refashioned Muslim life and thought". Nasr is quite to the point in stating that "Mawdudi's ideal Islamic order was far more tolerant of western values, ideals, and institutions than his rejectionist rhetoric has suggested". The author notes and very correctly that: "This is an important aspect of contribution to contemporary Islamic thought because it sets him apart from those who wish to simply reform Islam". Nasr adds that "Mawdudi did not masquerade modern ideas behind an Islamic veneer; he interpreted and assimilated the foundations of modern thought and social organization into an essentially a new and integrated perspective". Nasr adds that Mawdudi" sought to appropriate modern scientific thought and Islamize it". Here Nasr adds that the "modernists wanted to modernize Islam whereas Mawdudi wanted to Islamize modernity. The distinction was enough to permit Mawdudi to inveigh against his modernist rivals". At this point it

becomes unclear whether Mawdudi himself is to be considered a modernist or not. Nasr had clearly implied that he be considered as one.

Nasr says that Mawdudi's views were essentially reductionist in nature. He wanted to resuscitate the Islamic faith as a mujaddid would. He talked about Islam as a complete system. Mawdudi wanted to "scientifically prove that Islam is eventually to emerge as the World-Religion to cure Man of all his maladies." Nasr correctly points out that Mawdudi's "scheme was holistic and all-inclusive; it began with the individual Muslim and culminated in a new universal order." "The pivot of Mawdudi's thought was tajdid "I le described his agenda in great detail and with the compelling logic of a scientific formula." For Mawdudi, says Nasr, the tajdid doctrine was not just a religious one but more significantly "as a historical paradigm to relate political exigencies to faith, mobilize Muslims, and. above all, claim the authority to reinterpret and rationalize the Islamic faith." Mawdudi's stress was not on theology but on social organization emanating from a correct comprehension of what God's supremacy really meant. Nasr writes that

Mawdudi wanted to divert man's attention away from individual salvation and concern with spirituality, which he viewed as narcissistic anthropomorphism and the reason mankind neglected the nature of his or her relation to God. For whereas theology and philosophy provided humans with knowledge of God and the working of the world for solace, the power of ideology lay in its capacity to organize and activate its adherents, thus producing organization and action. For Islam to produce social action it had to pose as ideology, which in turn demanded less attention to salvation and more to social action." This is one of the most important aspects of Mawdudi's thinking and Nasr has certainly been able to capture its essence. Mawdudi's emphasis on ideology is what differentiates him from others like the revivalist Tablighi Jama'at. How this' will happen is not clear.

Nasr continues to explicate Mawdudi's rendering of Islamic history. In his view "the history of Islam stopped with the rightly guided caliphs, for the social and political institutions were incapable of reflecting the ideals of Islam in any fashion. The revival of Islam, it followed must entail the total rejection of what came after the rightly guided caliphs and would be realized by reconstructing that period... In effect, the history of Islam would resume, after a fourteen-century interlude, with the' Islamic state." This view, Nasr

notes, has shaped the viewpoint of many revivalists. What is the relationship of politics with religion? Nasr correctly points out that "the inseparability of religion and politics has been a part of the teachings of all schools of Islamic law and theology; however it has not necessarily been maintained in Islamic history. "throughout its course, institutions have been based on the de facto separation of religious and political authority." 'F he revivalist agenda, says Nasr, is "the transformation of the old into the new and of faith into politics". Simple as that."Ihe differentiated meaning of history between Mawdudi and other traditionalists has been well explained by

Nasr. For Mawdudi the Islamic Prophet was" not only the ideal Muslim or a hallowed subject of religious devotion, but the first and foremost Muslim political leader and, hence, a source of emulation in political matters. It was this appropriation of the fundamental sources of Islam and a single-minded reinterpretation of their role within the framework of the Islamic faith that permitted Mawdudi to extend personal piety into a quest for political power. Politicization of Faith could only follow its rationalization, however." Well put, indeed.

His detractors accused Mawdudi of going over hoard in the direction of Islam's social dimension at the cost of personal faith. Nasr does point out that Abu'I-Hasan Ali Nadvi, a renowned scholar, emphasized that the establishment of a theocracy was "at best only a means to the higher end". Nadvi criticized

Mawdudi for his use of the, term iqamat-i din - the Islamic order -.as covering only the social dimension of Islam. This view, according to Nasr was acknowledgment of the Tablighi Jama'at's apolitical work. Nasr does seem to suggest that the view was not wholly accurate. He says that: "Unlike Ayatollah Khomeini or Sayyid Qutb, Mawdudi did not argue exclusively for a utopian order in this world; he was more directly concerned with salvation... This meant backtracking on, although not renouncing, his earlier position. The result of this contradictory posturing was to confuse the aim of his ideology and to check the chiliastic and revolutionary tendency of his formulation. Muslims should not he disheartened if their revolution (lid not materialize. Mawdudi wrote on occasion, for they would he rewarded in the hereafter." This, among other things, explains the Jama'at's ambivalent attitude toward revolution, says Nasr. Mawdudi, in practice stayed away from

revolutionary activism. Nasr is quite right to note that his "harangues" against the political order never went beyond "expressions of dissent and were never systematized into a coherent revolutionary worldview... When pressed to define Islamic revolution, it was of evolution, rather than revolution, that he spoke."

Mawdudi wrote extensively on the theme of the Islamic state. Ile thought that it was indispensable for Islam itself: Nothing more could be truer. Thus, Muwdudi is one of the trailblazers of the contemporary Islamist movement.

Nasr puts it brilliantly: Without political power, concluded Mawdudi, true Islam would remain only an ideal, forever threatened with annihilation. The Islamic state could not he only a utopian order - the end result of Islamization --it had to he the beginning of' Islamization, the guarantor and harbinger of the entire process. 'Ibis politicized Mawdudi and the Jama' at more completely.. Mawdudi retorted that the activities of the Jama'at had no meaning outside or politics and that politics was the logical end of the Jama'at's activities. Polittis, he declared, was not merely a means to an end but the end itself As politics came to be the raison d'etre for the Jama'ai, the concept of an Islamic state found new meaning... In the final analysis, the Islamic state was

not merely a means of creating an Islamic order of life, but a model for perfect government with universal application - political end for a political movement. In this light, the political teachings of Islam and, subsequently, the Islamization of politics would have to be implemented, even through coercion. 'This argument extended the discussion of the Islamic state further: If politics were to be subject to religious values, then religion could only be understood in light of politics. Islamization of politics in a logical continuum led to the politicization of Islam... In Islam the religious, the political, the economic, and the social are not separate systems; they are different departments and the parts of' the same system."

What was Mawdudi's Islamic state like? Nasr maintains that Mawdudi's debate with the Western political thought is belligerent,. but it also "assimilated Western ideas into his interpretation of Islam and the Islamic state. Mawdudi was not influenced with liberal values but only with a

mechanism for promoting and protecting an Islamic order, says Nasr. He adds: "Whether or not the state would be a democracy was a later development, the inevitable outcome of his debate with Western political thought and the Jama'at's involvement in electoral politics in Pakistan". Nasr correctly points out that the nature of Mawdudi's Islamic state is ahistorical and idealist in essence.

In Mawdudi's thought democracy was "merely an adjective used to define the otherwise undefinable virtues of the Islamic state". He used the term because it had positive connotations. His critics did point out authoritarian tendencies implicit in his vision of the Islamic state. In his quest to attract educated people to his cause Mawdudi made the "concession" of democracy to them but not out of conviction. In Mawdudi's view the Islamic state would itself exercise ijtihad which had been the domain of the ulama. Nasr writes that Mawdudi's Islamic state was "given shape through the use of unmistakably Western terminology and theoretical constructs. It was seemingly Islamic system that was in fact premised on modernising ethos. The issue of the absolute sovereignty of God aside, Mawdudi's assimilation of Western issues in his discourse flowed without interruption. The Islamic state duplicated, assimilated, and reproduced Western political concepts, structures, and operations, producing a theory of statecraft that, save for its name and its use of Islamic terms and symbols, showed little indigenous influence. The synthesis, although systematic and consistent in its method, was not always free of' theoretical inconsistencies and operational handicaps". Nasr is not the first scholar who has complained of inconsistency in Muwdudi's thought but he seems to be one who does not hilly appreciate his original indigenous Islamic contribution. We would hope that it be recognized in a much more positive manner. Nasr is at pains to explain to his reader that Mawdudi does not really understand contemporary Western democracy. Mawdudi Failed because he "understood democracy in parts, rather than as a whole, as a concession by the state and not as a system". Mawdudi has been rightly criticized by Nasr for having somewhat skirted the issue of human rights. Nasr writes that Mawdudi maintained that Islam in its pure form could never support despotic rule because by its very nature it was attuned to the needs of man and was the best guarantor of' his rights. The human rights people in the West had to fight for, Mawdudi argued, already existed in the shari'ah. The

advent of' Islamic state would resolve rather than generate the problem of' guaranteeing human rights. Mawdudi's apologetics does not seem convincing and Nast- seems to be right on the point in saying that Mawdudi's Islamic state was democratic because its strengths could be best described by that term. In essence his Islamic state remained at odds with democracy. The inconsistency of the Jama'at's internal and external conduct is clear on the issue of elections. Inside the party there are no candidates but outside it the party does field them in the general elections. Nasr says that the discrepancy "is just one example of the distinction Mawdudi was forced to make between the tenets of the Islamic state and actions permissible during the straggle to achieve it. It also underscores once again the difficulties of accommodating democracy in such a state". Nasr seems to have got it right this time.

Mawdudi's Islamic state was not prominently based on any system of checksand-balances. Resultantly, the state is subject to discord and has no viable method to solve the dissension. Nasr maintains that in Mawdudi's Islamic state "the din was the only glue that bound the otherwise fragile stricture of the state together". Nasr is right to point out that for Mawdudi, unlike Khomeini, Islamization of society preceded the Islamic state. This cause mush confusion about the aims of the Jama'at " because participation in politics meant that the Jama'at sought to establish the Islamic state before the Islamization of' the society", says Nasr. Mawdudi's orientation was essentially authoritarian. Allegiance to the Islamic ideology of the state "could be used to augment the powers of the executive and limit those of the legislature".

The question to be asked is whether Mawdudi was correct or not in his interpretation of the Islamic state? Nasr seems to suggest that Mawdudi was erring in his authoritarian tendencies. Later on Mawdudi, says Nasr, became suspect of the centralization of power in the executive branch. He gave greater scope to citizens rights which was in contrast to his earlier writings where he expected greater obedience from the subjects.

Whether the Islamic state is democratic or authoritarian is debatable. The evidence would suggest that the real Islamic state in its basic essence is not democratic in the way democracy is understood and practiced say in Western Europe and the USA. Meaning that Mawdudi may he was not all that wrong in his authoritarian proclivities.

Nasr is right to point out that Mawdudi was a gradualist and believed in evolution rather than revolution. the author correctly points out the main weakness of the Jama'at - lack of a populist ideology. The Jama'at made "no effort to respond to the demands of the underprivileged, whose problems would advent of Islamic state would resolve rather than generate the problem of guaranteeing human rights. Mawdudi's apologetics does not seem convincing and Nasr seems to he right on the point in saying that Mawdudi's Islamic state was democratic because its strengths could he best described by that term. In essence his Islamic state remained at odds with democracy. The inconsistency of the Jama'.at's internal and external conduct is clear on the issue of elections. Inside the party-there are no candidates but outside it the party does field them in the general elections. Nasr says that the discrepancy "is just one example of the distinction Mawdudi was forced to make between the tenets of the Islamic state and actions permissible (luring the struggle to achieve it. It also underscores once again the difficulties of accommodating democracy in such a state". Nasr seems to have got it right this time.

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Nasr hen narrates how Jama'at has been pushed back into traditional Islam but is adamant in creating some distance from it so that it can pass off as a vanguard of the Islamic revolution. The current leadership and policies of the Jama'at are ample proof of this setback. The Jama'at remains the best organized cadre party in Pakistan but is not expected to gain much politically.

In the book Nasr narrates some information that would have us believe that Mawdudi had a personal character flaw. He thought too much of himself and his abilities. His disciples called him a mujadid and one even referred to him as an Imam. He never liked disagreement in his circles. People were free to ask questions but not debate with the great scholar. It is not by chance that Mawdudi was not followed by a scholar of some ranking. May be Mawdudi's personality did not allow it to happen. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of-the book it is still an excellent effort. Nasr's account of Mawdudi's thinking is definitely eloquent and readable. The work is well researched and can certainly be counted among the best few on the subject. Along with the second hook, Nasr has made a sizable contribution of our understanding of an important part of Muwdudi is one of the leading Islamic ideologues of the contemporary world. His thinking has had a profound influence on Islamists and their increasingly important discourse. The book by Nasr was published after his earlier well-received The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution.' The lama at-i Islami of Pakistan. Although published

later the book should be read before the Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution and not after.

In the first part of the book Nasr has (lone an excellent job of tracing Muwdudi's career and the milieu that helped shape it. The predicament of Indian Muslims at the loss of their power and their peculiar circumstances led to a number of responses. Revivalism was one such response. The uncertainty of the Muslim fate and the challenges faced by them in India had a profound impact on many Indian Muslims, including Muwdudi.

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On April 16, 1977 Bhutto even paid a visit to Mawdudi in Lahore. For this happen was Pakistani politics. I would unhesitatingly recommend the book fa all students of Pakistani politics and that of Islam.

Dr. Sohail Mahmud