


S. QUDRATULLAH FATIMI

Pakistan
Movement
&
Kemalist
evolution



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PAKISTAN
MOVEMENT
AND
KEMALIST
REVOLUTION

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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“I would like Turkish and Pakistani historians to bring out the parallels and divergencies between our respective Ottoman and Mughul backgrounds, the impact on us of the modern age and the similarities and differences in our separate adjustments to it. I am sure that such enquiries would be of immense value not only to our intellectuals but to those who are engaged in social action at higher level.”

—Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Prime Minister of Pakistan,
while unveiling the Atatürk
Memorial at Larkana on
30 November 1973

Preface

The present study is based on a paper entitled :
“Kemalist Revolution and the Pakistan Freedom
Movement: A Study in Historical Parallelism,”
read by the author at a Seminar held by the
Pakistan Branch of the R.C.D. Regional Cultural
Institute, on 13 November 1973, at Islamabad, to
celebrate the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Republic
of Turkey. His Excellency Mr Erdem Erner, the
Turkish Ambassador, most graciously presided
over the function.

Parts of the paper were published in the
Journal of the RCD Regional Cultural Institute,
Tehran, and the mimeograph of the complete paper
was widely circulated and comments, criticism and
corrections were solicited. Begum Alys Faiz, Dr
Mrs Nasim Zia, Dr Detlev Khalid and Dr Aftab
Ahmad very kindly responded to this request and
their comments and suggestions were most help-

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ful in its revision. The responsibility for the text, however, lies with the author.

Professor Talat Sait Halman, the former Minister of Culture of the Republic of Turkey, very kindly encouraged me to get it published. I wish I could further expand this thesis and had it translated into Turkish as was so rightly suggested by the erudite Professor.

I was greatly inspired by the speech of our Prime Minister, a paragraph of which has been quoted on page 3. I am conscious of the fact that the present monograph falls far below the standard set by him. However, I hope that the inadequacies of this preliminary study will spur other scholars, much better equipped than myself, to write on this vital but sadly neglected subject.

To the affectionate support of Faiz Sahib (Poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz) this treatise owes its genesis.

My colleague, Mr Muhammad Amin, supervised the processing of this study, its being typed and retyped a number of times and mimeo-

Preface

graphed, with great patience and lovingly meticulous care.

I am beholden to Professor M. Saeed Sheikh for having accepted it for publication by his Institute, which is the first and one of the foremost of its kind in Pakistan, on the most auspicious occasion of the Quaid-i Azam Centenary: a twice-blessed distinction!

Mr M. Ashraf Darr has very kindly prepared the Index and read the proofs.

I say to each one of them: I thank you most heartily and جزاكم الله احسن الجزاء (may Allah reward you the best of recompense).

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19 November 1976

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The Perspective

It was towards the middle of the ninth century that the Turks appeared on the stage of Muslim history as the all-powerful praetorians of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mu'tasim (833-842). As the power of the Caliphs declined that of their Turkish recruits from Transoxiana increased,—this can as truly be said the other way round, for the Turks' increasing influence was both the cause and the effect of the rapid Abbasid decline—till from the end of the ninth century sundry independent States started rising from the ruins of the once glorious Abbasid Empire. Of these were the Turkish dynasties of the Tulunids (868-905) and the Ikhshidids (935-969) of Egypt and the Ilig (or Kara-) Khanids (932-1212) of Turkistan.

But it was in the eleventh century that the

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Turkish era of Muslim history dawned when one of the greatest Turkish Sultans, Mahmud Ghaznawi, launched his raids into the fertile valleys of the Indus and the Ganges from the year 1001 to 1026. These raids proved as decisive for the history of Islam in South Asia as the battle of Malazgird (Manzikert), 1071, was for that of West Asia. Contemporary with the Ghaznawids was another illustrious Turkish dynasty, that of the Seljuks. In the year 1040 they defeated their Ghaznawid kinsmen at the battle of Dandankan. They then advanced towards Anatolia which fell to them when Sultan Alp Arslan destroyed a strong Byzantine army at the battle of Malazgird which we mentioned just now. From that time till the Mongol eruption in the middle of the thirteenth century the Seljuks reigned supreme over the central lands of Islam.

The defeat suffered by the Ghaznawids at Dandankan made them turn their attention solely towards the lands they had conquered on the western periphery of the South Asian subcontinent, i.e. modern Pakistan, and it was during the two

centuries of their rule here that Muslim culture took roots.

The dominions of both the Anatolian Seljuks and the Pakistani Ghaznawids were the principalities of the marches and had a distinct way of life which could be described as a frontier culture, and the faith of both the Turks and the Pakistanis has from then till now retained some of the peculiar quality of what has been called "the frontier Islam," "the militant and uncomplicated religion of the frontiersmen".¹ Professor Wittek thinks that the Islamic traditions relating to the Byzantine frontier districts, which developed under the Caliphate, were the dominant factor in forming the frontier characteristics of Turkish Islam. Professor Kōprülü, on the other hand, believes that the traditions and customs of Central Asian Turks survived strongly among the semi-nomadic Turcomans of the Anatolian marches.² Professor

1. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 11; see also, *ibid.*, pp. 26-27; and Halil Inalcik, "The Emergence of the Ottomans," *Cambridge History of Islam: The Central Lands* (henceforth *C.H.Is.*), p. 269.

2. *C.H.Is.*, p. 271.

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Halil Inalcik finds the middle way and states: "It is really a question of degree to determine the strength of each of the two traditions in forming the common way of life in the marches."³ The Pakistani parallel seems to corroborate Professor Köprülü's contention.

Though the Mongols were a constant source of harassment for the northwestern frontier of the South Asian subcontinent, its hinterland was mostly saved from their ravages through the vigilance of Iltutmish, Balban and 'Ala al-Din Muhammad Khalji and the heroic resistance offered by the martial people of the Pakistani region which was turned into a buffer zone by the Delhi imperialists. The Ghaznawids were succeeded by other Turkish dynasties,—Ghurids, Khaljis, and Tughluqs. In Anatolia the Mongol invasion intensified the process of turcification. A large number of Turkish tribes settled there, out of whom the Kayi tribe of the Öghuz confederation succeeded in 1288 in founding a principality that eventually emerged as the Ottoman Empire. The migration of the Turks to

3. Ibid.

South Asia also seems to have progressed quite steadily till the end of the thirteenth century. When Malik Firuz, the founder of the Khalji dynasty, ascended the Delhi throne in 1290, the Muslim population of the metropolis was overwhelmingly Turkish and did not welcome the change; for the Khaljis, because of their long sojourn in the borderlands of Pakistan before their migration eastwards, had forsaken many of their Turkish customs and manners.⁴

The advent of the Khaljis saw the end of the largescale migration of the Turks to South Asia. Later Turkish *conquistadors* mainly relied on the Pakhtun and Punjabi soldiers recruited in the northwestern regions of Pakistan where Islam and a semblance of Perso-Arab culture had found a nucleus by that time. Early in the fifteenth century the Turkish rule over South Asia was replaced by that of the Sayyids and the Pakhtun tribes of Lodis and Surs. These were some of the reasons why, unlike Anatolia, the long Turkish rule over Pakistani area did not lead to its being

4. Kishori Saran Lal, *History of the Khaljis*, pp. 5-13.

turcified.⁵

At the time when the Ottoman Sultan Yavuz Selim (1512-1520) was extending the frontiers of his Empire to Ethiopia, Central Africa and the Indian Ocean, a dynasty of the Chagatai Turks was being founded in the subcontinent that produced monarchs of the same stature as that of the house of Osman. The glorious days of the two dynasties—Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566) and Akbar the Great (1556-1605), Murad IV (1623-1640) and Shah Jahan (1628-1657), etc.—as well as the symptoms of their decline—Treaty of Carlowitz, 1699, and of Passarowitz, 1718, matched with the death of the last of the Great Mughuls, Aurangzib in 1707—strangely coincided. History seemed to be repeating itself at both the eastern and western ends of the vast Turkish dominions.

5. Percy Brown, *Indian Architecture (Islamic Period)*, pp. 13-14, finds in the Ala'i Darwazah, the magnificent gateway of the Qutb Minar mosque at Delhi built in A.D. 1310-11, a marked influence of the Seljuk architecture. But it is perhaps a solitary example of its kind among the monuments of Imperial Delhi. There are, of course, traces of Turkish influence on the provincial architecture of the Deccan and Gujerat which being on the western coast of India were more prone to Ottoman influences than the "land-locked" imperial capital.

But here the coincidence ends. The Ottomans recovered, some of the territories ceded at Carlowitz were regained by them, and, what is much more important, an era of reforms was set in. Mahmud II (1808-1839) is rightly regarded the Peter the Great of the Ottomans. More extensive reforms were undertaken between the years 1839 and 1876 during the reigns of his two sons. The reforms were, however, not extensive enough and some of their benefits were dissipated by the despotism of Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909). Nevertheless, the Ottoman Empire survived till it gave place to the Turkish Republic in 1923. At the lowest ebb of their history, the Turks lost their empire but never their freedom. How different this situation is from the legacy of the Mughuls!

Why this divergence? 'Allamah Muhammad Iqbal seems to have been troubled by this question. In a *ghazal* of the *Bal-i Jibril* he laments:

کوئی تقدیر کی منطق سمجھ سکتا نہیں ورنہ
نہ تھے ترکانِ عثمانی سے کم ترکانِ تیموری

[Inscrutable are the dialectics of Destiny;
Otherwise, the Taimurid Turks were not of a lesser
calibre than their Ottoman kinsmen.]

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Destiny as determined by the dialectics of History works in a most subtle and complex manner. To unravel its mysteries and to find out the causes of this divergence would be a fruitful exercise. Indeed, to have a true grasp over the history of the Muslim community in the South Asian sub-continent one must get the right answers to the above question. But for the purposes of the present study it appears to be a digression which we feel constrained to avoid.

II

Parallels

Having made a rapid survey of the parallel courses of the history of Islam under the banners of the Turkish empire-builders in the two regions of Asia and their divergencies we must now follow the different nationalist trends in Turkey and Pakistan which culminated in the emergence of the Turkish Republic and the independent State of Pakistan.

Professor Karpat has made a general remark that "the history of nationalism in Turkey is intimately associated with the evolution of state ideology from Islamic universalism to multi-national Ottomanism, and finally to one-nation Turkism and patriotism".¹ If we add pan-Turanism to this list, we would get all the elements that led

1. Kemal H. Karpat, "Modern Turkey," in *C.H.Is.*, I, 551.

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to the evolution of Turkish nationalism. Professor Karpat has further observed that "Islamic traditional influences supplied the emotional stamina of Turkish nationalism, long provided for some sense of unity, and only recently began to be replaced by objective local influences".² These remarks can be aptly applied also to the nascent Pakistani nationalism. The reason for this can be sought in the frontier culture stamped on the Islam that was spread in the two regions. The Turks had submerged their identity in Islam. The following observations of Professor Bernard Lewis are true both for the Anatolian-Rumelian and the Indo-Pakistan Turks :

"There is no Turkish equivalent to Arab memories of the heathen heroes of old Arabia, to Persian pride in the bygone glories of the ancient Emperors of Iran, even to the vague Egyptian legends woven around the broken but massive monuments of the Pharaohs."³

The Turks' identity with Islam was recognized both in the west and the south. A Western convert to Islam was said to have "turned Turk"

2. Ibid.

3. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 8.

“even when the conversion took place in Fez or Isfahan”.⁴ The same happened in the South Asian subcontinent where Turk, more commonly in its Sanskritized form “Turushka,” became synonymous with “Muslim”. In the epigraphical literature of South Asia we find this epithet being used for such indigenous local dynasties as the Ilyas Shahis of Bengal⁵ and the Bahmanis of the Deccan.⁶ Jonaraja in his *Rajatarangini* calls Suhabhata, the neo-Muslim minister of the Kashmir ruler, “Suha, the Turushka”.⁷ The result is that, in the eloquent words of Professor Lewis :

“One may speak of Christian Arabs—but a Christian Turk is an absurdity and a contradiction in terms. Even today after thirty-five years of the secular Republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen, but never a Turk.”⁸

With Muslim consciousness so deeply ingrained in the Turkish mind, “Muslim nationalism”

4. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

5. R.C. and A.K. Majumdar and A.D. Pusalkar, Eds., *History and Culture of the Indian People: The Delhi Sultanate*, p. 211.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 290 and 301.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 378.

8. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

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developed because of the internal factors which brought the anti-Turkish, anti-Muslim feeling in the West and the anti-Western, anti-Christian sentiment in Turkey to a climax which was reached between the fall of the Tanzimat in 1871 and the proclamation of the Constitution in 1876.⁹ The most eloquent exposition of this sentiment was in the works of Namik Kemal whose ideology of patriotism was—in the words of Professor Niyazi Berkes—“pan-Ottomanism with Islamist ‘nationalism’ as its base”.¹⁰ To him

“what the Europeans called Turks were nothing but the ‘Osmaniyan’. Even that was a political concept; in a cultural sense, there were only Muslims, or, more correctly, ‘the Sunni Hanafi Muslims speaking the Ottoman language’.”¹¹

9. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 218. Sarif Mardin discussing the growth of the pan-Islamic idea in the Ottoman Empire traces with keen discernment its origin in the new pattern assumed by the European balance of power following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. He has shown how the Young Ottomans were confronted with the rising tides of Russian pan-Slavism and the pan-German movement and to meet their challenges “invented” pan-Islamism (*The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 59-61).

10. Berkes, *op. cit.*, p. 221; Mardin, *op. cit.*, pp. 283-336.

11. Berkes, *op. cit.*, pp. 317-18. Cf. Sarif Mardin (*op. cit.*, p. 332): “Towards the end of his active life as a theorist Namik

In the Turkish milieu Muslim nationalism in its pan-Islamist sense and Ottomanism were interwoven for the obvious reason that the Ottoman Padishah was also the Khalifah of all Muslims. More particularly it served the despotic interests of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.¹²

In South Asia, Pakistanis inherited Muslim consciousness from their Turkish rulers. It was nurtured through the mutual animosities of the Hindus and the Muslims which were originated in Muslim rulers' imperialist policies and the vanquished Hindus' sulky xenophobia and perpetuated by the Hindu caste system. In the earliest phase of the Pakistan Freedom Movement it found expression in its purest Islamic universalist form. The *Jihad* movement of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid and his followers which with many ups

Kemal faced with an increasingly strong current of pan-Slavism in the Balkans gave up the idea of Ottoman *nation* made up of various national and religious groups and seemed resigned to the loss of the greater part of the European holdings of the Empire. His attention was turned towards the 'Islamic people'. What he hoped was that the Ottoman *State* could now be reinforced by the union, within its fold, of all Moslems, with the help of the Ottoman 'elder brothers.'

12. Berkes, op. cit., pp. 231 and 267-68; Mardin, op. cit., pp. 105-06.

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and downs continued from 1826 to 1863 was purely Islamic and universalist—and not at all “Muslim nationalist”. In fact, a movement like that of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid shows by contrast the hollowness of “Muslim nationalism” which is a contradiction in terms, for Islam is universalist and nationalism must find its roots in a homeland. These Islamic universalist traditions were kept up by a section of the Ulema and found sporadic expression in the “Silken Handkerchief” Conspiracy of 1915 led by Mawlana ‘Ubayd Allah Sindhi, the *hijrat* movement of 1921 and *Al-Hilal* period of Mawlana Abul Kalam Azad’s writings. The Khilafat movement too was essentially an Islamic-universalist movement.¹³

13. Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 140-81, 242-56, 260-70; K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement*; Detlev Khalid, “‘Ubayd-Allah Sindhi: Modern Interpretation of Muslim Universalism,” *Islamic Studies*, VIII (1969), 97-114; and “‘Ubayd-Allah Sindhi in Turkey,” *Journal of the RCD Regional Cultural Institute*, VI (1973), 29-42; Afzal Iqbal, *Life and Times of Mohamed Ali*, pp. 161-250; *My Life: A Fragment*, pp. 36-48; for the international links of the *Mujahidin* movement, Fatimi, *Review of The Wahabi Movement in India* by Qeyamud Din Ahmad, *Islamic Studies*, VI (1967), 199-203. Dr Hardy has, in his article “The ‘Ulama in British India,” rightly emphasized the fact that the role of the Ulema

Ottomanism of Turkey found its counterpart in our part of the world in the Aligarh movement and in the politics of the All-India Muslim League.¹⁴ Like the "Islamic nationalism" of Namik Kemal which was mixed up with Ottoman nationalism, the "Muslim nationalism" of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and his followers and subsequently of the Muslim League was in fact Mughul nationalism though it never overtly called itself by that term for the obvious reason that, unlike the Ottoman Empire of the Turkish "Islamic nationalists," the Mughul Empire had ceased to exist long before the birth of those South Asian movements. The fact that the "Muslim nationalism" of Sayyid Ahmad Khan was not at all Islamic universalist is evident from his writings. In one of

was "more cultural and social than immediately political" and they played only a subsidiary role when in the twentieth century they dabbled in politics. But he has completely missed their Islamic universalist trends and surprisingly did not even mention Sindhi.

14. For a general survey: Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims: A Political History*, 1959; Abdul Hamid, *Muslim Separatism in India*, 1967; Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase*, 1968; Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Struggle for Pakistan*, 1971; and P. Hardy, *The Muslims of British India*, 1972.

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these he made it quite clear that

“Muslims owed their primary loyalty to the British Government which had ensured peace and religious freedom in India. Muslims were not subject to Sultan Abdul Hamid of Turkey. He was only a Muslim king and not their Khalifah.”¹⁵

It is also remarkable that Jamal al-Din Afghani who stayed in India from 1879 to 1883 under strict British surveillance strongly denounced Sayyid Ahmad Khan's both religious and political ideas.¹⁶ The horizon of the “Muslim nationalism” of this brand was restricted to the areas governed by the Mughuls. It is very significant in this respect that the Muslims of those regions of

15. Muhammad Isma'il Panipati, Ed., *Maqalat-i Sir Sayyid*, I (*Madhhab-i awr Islami*), 159, also 156-69; and XIII, 411-13, 425-29 and 430-33.

16. The only sustained writing bequeathed by Afghani is his polemical treatise which he composed during his detention in India to denounce the “Naturalism” (نیچریت) of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and was entitled *رسالہ در رد نیچریت*. It was translated into Arabic by Afghani's illustrious disciple, Mufti Muhammad 'Abduh, under the title *الرد علی الدھریتین*. It was first published in Beirut in 1886 and has gone into many editions separately as well as in the collection of Afghani's articles and essays. See, also, *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*, pp. 45-46, 382-87 and 399.

the Indian Empire of the Britishers which never came under Mughul suzerainty were ignored by them. The Laccadive islands have almost hundred per cent Muslim population and were in all respects as much a part and parcel of the Indian situation as any of their littoral towns and villages, but were totally ignored by the All-India Muslim League, for they never came under Mughul rule. Burma had considerable Muslim population and its Arakan district had a Muslim majority. Its metropolis was "greatly indebted to Muslim merchants from Bombay and the various forms of labour supplied by the Muslims of Bengal".¹⁷ Till the year 1937 it formed as much a part of Great Britain's Indian Empire as any other Indian province, but as Mughul rule was never extended to it, Mughul nationalists of the Muslim League seldom took notice of their Muslim brethren there. All they knew or cared to know about Burma was that it was the place where the last

17. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, II, 48 (Sir Abdur Rahim's Presidential Address to the Annual Session of the All-India Muslim League, 1925).

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Mughul Emperor was deported by the Britishers and where he lay buried in an unostentatious mausoleum. It is also significant in this respect that the stronghold of "Mughul nationalism" was the Doab of the Jamuna and the Ganges which was also the nucleus area of the Mughul Empire.

These romanticists, like Dr Aziz of Forester's novel, *A Passage to India*, drew their inspiration from the memories of the glorious days of the Grand Mughuls. The Address presented by the historic Simla Deputation to the Viceroy of India, Lord Minto, on 1 October 1906, that subsequently became like a Charter on the basis of which the All-India Muslim League was founded, submitted that the deputationists hoped that his Excellency would be "pleased to give due consideration to the position which they [Muslims] occupied in India a little more than hundred years ago and of which the traditions have naturally not faded from their minds".¹⁸ The Repre-

18. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, *Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement*, p. 19.

sentative of the King-Emperor who had succeeded the Grand Mughuls did not tarry in encouraging these romanticist sentiments of the deputationists. He called them "the descendants of a conquering and ruling race"; there was room for mutual appreciation, as the leaders, too, were grateful to the Viceroy for "the personal freedom, the liberty of worship, the general peace and hopeful future which British administration [had] secured for India".¹⁹

In its very formative phase Mughul nationalism was put on a collision course with what half a century later was destined to emerge as Pakistani nationalism. In 1886, a Public Services Commission was appointed to review the employment question which was the main source of Muslim grievances during the British rule over the sub-continent. To remove this inequality it was then proposed that the proportion of Hindus and Muslims appointed be related to the population proportion in the Provinces. It so happened that in the U.P., which was till then called North-

19. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

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Western Provinces (reminding the political situation that existed before the British annexation of the Punjab), Muslims had at that time a share of office larger than their proportion merited. Keeping this in mind, Theodore Beck, the all-powerful Aligarh Principal, opposed this equitable move for numerical representation which would have immensely benefited the Muslims of the Pakistani provinces. Appearing as a witness before this Commission he announced :

“If the system of numerical representation were adopted, there would be five Hindus to every one Mahomedan in the North-Western Provinces. The result would be the enormous political preponderance of Hindus and the practical extinction of Mahomedan influence in civil affairs. It must be remembered that Mahomedans ruled this part of India for five [*sic*] centuries, and are not prepared to accept a position of political insignificance.”²⁰

The culture that was developed at the Mughul courts was according to these Mughul nationalists *the* Muslim culture. As such, they never cared for the indigenous cultures of the Muslims

20. *Report of the Public Services Commission, 1886-87, Part II, Section 2, pp. 38-39, quoted in Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism, p. 323.*

of the majority provinces which eventually became the Pakistani provinces. Their love for Urdu, too, was due to its being presumed a Mughul heritage. Therefore, they frowned upon the slightest deviation from the Delhi and Lucknow idioms.

Thus, Muslim nationalism of the Western-educated liberals of the South Asian subcontinent was a misnomer for what was in fact Mughul nationalism and was distinct from the Islamic universalism of the Ulema, though it did get sometimes mixed up with it. For instance, though the Khilafat movement was essentially Islamic universalist, yet its widespread popularity among South Asian Muslims was because the Ottoman Empire was for them, in the words of Toynbee, "a psychological compensation for the loss of their former imperial dominion to the British".²¹ Toynbee's perceptive comment is corroborated by the highly significant fact that the Quaid-i Azam kept himself aloof from the Khilafat agi-

21. A. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, VIII, 6941; Berkes, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

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tation,²² while Iqbal developed a hostile attitude towards it."²³

22. The Quaid's Pakistani biographer who served him for many years as his Private Secretary explaining this abstention of the Quaid states: "Jinnah's objection was in the belief that a sort of false religious frenzy had got hold of Indian political activity and would ultimately lead the country to confusion. It would do more harm than good to India in general and Muslims in particular" (M.H. Saiyid, *Mohammad Ali Jinnah: A Political Study*, p. 93). Dr Afzal Iqbal has quoted an interesting episode in his *Life and Times of Mohamed Ali* (p. 250) which illustrates the contrast in the approach of the two great leaders:

"At this [i.e. Nagpur] session [of the Indian National Congress] Jinnah raised a hornets' nest by mistaking Gandhi and Mohamed Ali. 'Call him Mahatma,' the crowd demanded when Jinnah spoke of Mr Gandhi. 'Call him Maulana,' shouted the infuriated audience when he referred to Mr Mohammad Ali. 'I refuse to be dictated by you,' Jinnah retorted. 'I am entitled to use my discretion to call a man by whatever designation I choose, provided it is parliamentary. I do not recognize Mr Mohamed Ali's claim to be Maulana.'

"It is said that Mohamed Ali's Big Brother, Shaukat Ali, rushed to the stage with a stick but the cult of non-violence came in his way!"

23. Though Iqbal hailed the release of the Ali Brothers from the British prison by a beautiful short poem (*Bang-i-Dara*, poem entitled "Asiri," *Kulliyat-i Iqbal [Urdu]*, p. 253), yet in a letter dated 27 September 1919, addressed to Mawlana Sayyid Sulayman Nadwi, he strongly condemned the Khilafat movement for its being a London-inspired conspiracy (*Iqbal Nama*, I, 106; cf. K K. Aziz, op. cit., p. 370); lampooned the Khilafat Deputation in a poem entitled "Daryuzah-i Khilafat," i.e. "One who begged for Khilafat," which has found place in the collection of his Urdu poems next to the above-mentioned laudatory piece of poetry (ibid., p. 254); and while the Khilafatists successfully preached for the renunciation of the honours granted by British rulers Iqbal showed his strong dissent to this call

As we said earlier, besides Islamic universalism and Ottomanism there was a third element that led to the evolution of Turkish nationalism, viz. Pan-Turanism. These romanticists made their appeals in the name of Turan and *Kizil Elma* (Red Apple), a legendary mythical country towards which the Turks converged.²⁴ Pan-Indian nationalists among the South Asian Muslims also laid emphasis on racial affinity as the basis of nationality. They, too, had their *Kizil Elma* in the myth of the geographical unity and indivisibility of the Indian Empire of Her Britannic Majesty. This myth was cherished by the Mughul nationalists, as well, for it was the Mughuls, especially Aurangzib, who for the first time united practically

for non-co-operation by accepting a Knighthood for himself and by requesting the bestowal of the title of Shams-ul-Ulama on his teacher, Mawlana Mir Hasan. During the Non-Co-operation Movement Mawlana Muhammad Ali came to Lahore to get the Islamia College closed but Iqbal who was the Secretary of the Governing Body of the College thwarted his attempts, at which he reacted strongly; see Muhammad Sarwar, *Madamin-i Muhammad Ali*, pp. 425-26.

24. Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Zia Gökalp*, p. 111; cf. Berkes, *Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization*, pp. 8-9.

the whole subcontinent under their banner.²⁵

Islamic universalism, Ottomanism and Pan-Turanism—all three had their bases in the history and ethos of the Turks and had an element of truth in them. But under modern compulsions they had become anachronistic. Atatürk was not only a maker of history, he was also a historian. In his Great Speech (*Nutuk*) of October 1927 he at length discussed the problems and prospects of Turkish Nationalism. In a masterly way he exposed the hollowness of Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism, and established his own interpretation of nationalism for the Turks. The lengthy quotation that follows needs no apology. He said:

25. A leading exponent of this Mughul-Muslim nationalism was Mr F.K. Durrani, who fully agreed with the Hindu nationalists that there was no country "marked out by the sea and the mountains so clearly to be a single whole as India" and that "If the unity meant is geographical, nobody denies it" (*Meaning of Pakistan*, pp. 2 and 23). The upholders of "Muslim" nationalism, both the Westerners and the Pakistanis, always write about Muslim India in relation to history and culture and never about Pakistan as such. For them it did not exist before 14 August 1947. The myth of the indivisibility of the subcontinent has been examined by this author in his "Territorial Basis of the Two-Nation Theory," in Waheed-uz-Zaman, Ed., *Quest for Identity*, pp. 32-38.

“To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, to subject them to the same conditions and thus to found a mighty State is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one. It is an unrealisable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe all the Turks existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. Herein lies a truth which the centuries that have gone by and the men who have lived during these centuries have clearly shown in dark and sanguinary events.

“There is nothing in history to show how the policy of Panislamism and Panturanism could have succeeded or how they could have found a basis for their realisation on this earth. As regards the result of the ambition to organise a State which should be governed by the idea of world-supremacy and include the whole of humanity without distinction of race, history does not afford examples of this. For us, there can be no question of the lust of conquest. On the other hand, the theory which aims at founding a ‘humanitarian’ State which shall embrace all mankind in perfect equality and brotherhood and at bringing it to the point of forgetting separatist sentiments and inclinations of every kind is subject to conditions which are peculiar to itself.

“The political system which we regard as clear and fully realisable is national policy. In view of the general conditions obtaining in the world at present and the truths which in the course of centuries have rooted themselves in the minds of and have formed the characters of mankind, no greater mistake could be made than that of being a

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utopian. This is borne out in history and is the expression of science, reason and common sense.

"In order that our nation be able to live a happy, strenuous and permanent life, it is necessary that the State pursue an exclusively national policy and that this policy be in perfect agreement with our internal organisation and be based on it. When I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. We must not lead the people to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which can only bring them misfortune; we expect from the civilised world civilised human treatment, and friendship based on mutuality."²⁶

Coming to South Asia we find Iqbal, the

26. *A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk*, 1927 (henceforth *Speech*), pp. 379-80. On 24 April 1920 Atatürk laid emphasis on the same theme in a speech to the Grand National Assembly, saying:

"Every one of our citizens and of our fellow-countrymen can entertain an exalted ideal in his mind. No one can interfere with this. But I shall say this: we are not of those charlatans who pursue elusive fancies and pretend that we can achieve the impossible. In the past we have gained the hostility of the world by looking as if we were doing great and fanciful things, without in fact ever achieving them. We never practised Pan-Islamism, but we said, 'perhaps we are practising it, or perhaps we shall'. So to stop us our enemies said, 'let us kill them before they do any harm'. We never practised Pan-Turanism, but we said, 'perhaps we are practising it, perhaps we shall.' So they said again, 'let us kill them'. This is what all the fuss is about. So instead of increasing the pressure of our enemies by pursuing these ideals which we never achieved and never could achieve, let us be sensible. Let us know our limitations". (*Atatürk*, Turkish National Commission for UNESCO, 1963, p. 198).

Father of Pakistani Nationalism, undergoing many phases of his thought before accepting the Turkish solution. In an earlier study we have shown how in the Pakistani nationalist phase of his thought he synthesized his religious pre-nationalism of the second phase with modern territorial nationalism laying emphasis on the deepening of one's patriotic feeling.²⁷ In this transformation he was certainly inspired by the Turkish Revolution. He read Ziya Gökalp, the philosopher of Turkish Nationalism, and extensively quoted him in his *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.²⁸ He did not agree with all the reform measures taken by Atatürk, but vehemently supported him in his major decisions like that of the abolition of Khilafat. Discussing this vital question in his *Reconstruction*, he stated :

“For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself

27. See this author's Urdu monograph on a geohistorical analysis of Pakistani nationhood (*Pakistani Qawmiyat : Jughrafiya'i wa Tarikhi Tajziyah*, pp. 151-80).

28. Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, sixth lecture on “The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam,” pp. 146-80.

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alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy as to be achieved by a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a multiplicity of free independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration."²⁹

In this statement of Iqbal there is a clear echo of Atatürk's Great Speech of 1927 in which he said :

"If the delegates of these hypothetical independent Mohamedan States would unite in a congress and declare that this or that relationship has been established between

29. Ibid., p.159. Iqbal defended Atatürk's reforms in a number of his English writings, the most detailed one is in his Reply to Questions raised by Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru (A.R. Tariq, Ed., *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, pp. 130-37). There is an interesting passage in this correspondence which shows Iqbal's sound intuitive evaluation of Atatürk's reforms and his zeal in the Turkish leader's defence. It runs as follows :

"It is, therefore, clear that if the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism, he is going not so much against the spirit of Islam as against the spirit of the time. And if he is a believer in the absoluteness of races, he is sure to be defeated by the spirit of modern time, which is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Islam. Personally, however, I do not think that the Ataturk is inspired by Pan-Turanianism, as I believe that his Pan-Turanianism is only a political retort to Pan-Slavonism, or Pan-Germanism, or Pan-Anglo-Saxonism" (p 136).

The above passage, *inter alia*, also shows how misinformed the leaders of British India, even of the calibre of Jawahar Lal Nehru and Iqbal, were kept about the true state of the development of Turkish nationalism.

certain States, that a committee had been formed for the purpose of maintaining such mutual relations and securing joint action under the conditions established by these relations, that the Mohamedan States united in this manner would be represented by the president of this committee, then they will, if so desired, give to these United States of Islam the title of Caliphate and to the person elected to be president of this united assembly the title of Caliph.

“But neither common sense nor reason will ever admit that any individual Mohamedan State will confer on any man the authority of guiding and administering the affairs of the whole of the Mohamedan world.”³⁰

Atatürk had to make a very difficult decision of forsaking all claims on those vast non-Turkish dominions of the Ottomans in the Near East with which the Turks had long and deep relations of common religion and history, contiguous geography, and shared political interests. This he had to do because nationalism could flourish only in a well-defined and homogeneous territory.³¹ Iqbal, following Atatürk's example, advised that “the Muslims of North-West India and

30. Atatürk, *Speech*, p. 594. See, also, Detlev H. Khalid, “Atatürk's Concept of Islamic Reformism and Muslim Unity,” *Journal of the RCD Regional Cultural Institute* (Tehran, R.C.D. Cultural Institute, VII (1974), 50).

31. See note 43 and the relevant text on pp. 46-47, below.

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Bengal ought at present to ignore Muslim minority provinces".³² Pakistan of his dream had to be built only in the areas where the Muslims were in a majority. To safeguard the interests of the Muslims of the minority provinces was the chief aim of the Mughul nationalism of Aligarh and the Muslim League but now those oppressed Muslims had to be ignored for the sake of Pakistani Nationalism.

Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah also moved through three phases in his political life. He was never a Pan-Islamist. But like Iqbal in his earliest phase he was an ardent Pan-Indian nationalist. Then we find him in the famous Lucknow Pact of 1916 sacrificing the interests of the Muslims of the majority provinces—which were to constitute the Pakistan of his making—for the sake of giving "weightage" to the Muslims of the minority provinces, which are now India, that is

32. Iqbal's letter to the Quaid-i Azam dated 21 June 1937. These important letters published separately by Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, went into a number of reprints and have found place in a number of collections, e.g. G. Allana, Ed., *Historic Documents*, p. 133; *Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, p. 36.

Bharat. This could only be justified in the terms of what we have called Mughul nationalism.³³ Eventually, he adopted Pakistani nationalism as the sheet-anchor of his political activities and succeeded in putting a new Nation-State on the map of the world. He, too, now had to "ignore" the Muslims of the minority provinces. He propounded the concept of "sub-national groups" which was a vital part of his famous Two-Nation theory. Explaining this term he said:

"This is only a constitutional phrase which means people belonging to a nation who are scattered all over a given territory or even islands, such as the Muslims are in the minority provinces".³⁴

On another occasion he still more forcefully declared:

"Muslims in the United Provinces are not a national group; they are scattered. Therefore, in constitutional

33. Cf. 'Allamah Iqbal's comments on the Lucknow Pact in his historic Presidential Address to the Allahabad Session of the All-India Muslim League (1930), in which he called "the repudiated Lucknow Pact" as one of "the two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell" (S.A. Vahid, Ed., *Thoughts and Reflections of Iqbal*, p. 184).

34. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah* II, 82; see, also, pp. 30 and 225.

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language, they are characterised as a sub-national group who cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civilised government to a minority. I hope I have made the position clear.”³⁵

In his Two-Nation theory he, of course, validated the existence of a Muslim and a Hindu nation in the subcontinent. He proved that there was a Hindu India and a Muslim India. But in all this talk the term “Muslim” was synonymous with Pakistani, and “Muslim India” with Pakistan. This identification may not appear strange to the students of Turkish history who know that even today after half-a-century of the secular Republic, a non-Muslim in Turkey may be called a Turkish citizen but never a Turk.³⁶ In the most important speech of his political career he cleared up any doubt that might have been left in this regard. This was the speech that he delivered while inaugurating the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan and wherein he laid down guidelines for the Constitution-makers of Pakistan. We feel we must quote

35. *Ibid.*, I, 68.

36. Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 15 ; see p. 21, above.

from this Great Speech extensively because of its fundamental importance and also for the reason that this speech was suppressed for a very long time.³⁷ He said in this inaugural speech :

“If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.”³⁸

Further on, he declared :

“You are free : you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”³⁹

Dilating upon the historical development of the ideal of the equality of all citizens irrespective of their caste, colour or creed, he concluded :

“Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Mus-

37. See p. 69, below.

38. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches*, II, 402.

39. *Ibid.*, II, 403.

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lims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.”⁴⁰

The Quaid-i Azam came under the spell of Atatürk in November 1932 when he read H.C. Armstrong's *Grey Wolf*. “For two days Jinnah was absorbed in the story of Kemal Atatürk,” writes Hector Bolitho: “when he had finished, he handed the book to his daughter—then aged thirteen—and said, ‘Read this, my dear, it is good’.” He further records, “For many days afterwards he talked of Kemal Atatürk; so much that his daughter chaffed him and nicknamed him ‘Grey Wolf’.”⁴¹

Bozkurt (lit. “grey wolf”) is the legendary wolf of the Turkish folklore who is said to have led the Turks across a mountain barrier into the open world. The title of Armstrong's biography thus eloquently delineated the great role played by Atatürk in leading his *millet* across many insurmountable barriers into the open field of peace, stability and prosperity. However, Arm-

40. Ibid., II, 404.

41. Hector Bolitho, *Jinnah: Creator of Pakistan*, p. 102.

strong's book miserably fails to depict the greatness of Atatürk. The author was much too fond of cheap stories and a sensational style of writing to present the true image of the great man. The scurrilous book had to be banned. But the strong impression that it nevertheless made on the Quaid's mind shows his keen discernment which could separate the chaff from the kernel.

The Quaid was at that time residing in London and had completely retired from politics. A few months after his confrontation with the *Grey Wolf*, Liaquat Ali Khan and his wife arrived and begged him to return to India and to political action. The Quaid agreed. One can only guess the part played by Armstrong's biography of Atatürk in this momentous decision of the Quaid. But one can be sure of the fact that in Atatürk the Quaid had found a kindred soul, for the two builders of their respective nations shared with each other the basic elements of their traits: their indomitable will, incorruptible character, indefatigable labour, hard-boiled realism, robust laicism and utter abhorrence of Pharisaism and

cant in all their shapes and masks.

In his Presidential Address delivered at the Patna session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1938 he paid tribute to Atatürk in these words:

“His death has come as the greatest blow to the Muslim world. He was the foremost figure in the Muslim East. In Iran and Afghanistan, in Egypt and of course in Turkey, he demonstrated to the consternation of the rest of the world that Muslim Nations were coming into their own. In Kamal Atatürk the Islamic world has lost a great hero. With the example of this great man in front of them as an inspiration, will the Muslims of India still remain in quagmire? (Cries of no, no).”⁴²

During his constitutional struggle for the freedom of Pakistan, the Quaid continued to draw inspiration from Atatürk's life. A political pamphlet entitled *Nationalism in Conflict in India* was written under his guidance and published in 1942, with his own Foreword, from Malabar Hill, Bombay, where he resided. In this monograph we find an illuminating analysis of the Turkish experiment. It is contended there that before the First

42. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches*, I, 72-73.

World War Turkey had double its present population and resources but she could never enjoy peace and security. Then Atatürk with his far-sighted statesmanship accepted the post-war settlement as a result of which "the heterogeneous Turkish Empire of 1914 became the homeland of a single coherent nation in 1921". Tribute is paid in this pamphlet to Atatürk for having "recognised the right to independent existence of the non-Turkish peoples of the former Turkish Empire and abolished Caliphate". The Turkish people are also lauded as they "have nobly stood by the true mission of their leader and have fraternised with all their neighbouring states as members of the same family".⁴³

Soon after achieving independence while inaugurating the Pakistan Broadcasting Service on 15 August 1947, the Quaid gave a message to his nation in which he said:

"Our object should be peace within and peace without. We want to live peacefully and maintain cordial and friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and with

43. "M.R.T.," *Nationalism in Conflict in India*, pp. 58-60.

the world at large.”⁴⁴

A comparative study of the internal and external policies of these two fathers of their respective nations⁴⁵ would show that it was not just a coincidence that the Quaid's noble maxim of “peace within and peace without” was identical with Atatürk's famous saying “*Yurtta sulh, cihanda sulh*” (peace at home and peace in the world).⁴⁶ A brief survey of the policies of these two leaders may be helpful in illustrating the parallelism which is the central theme of this

44. M. Rafique Afzal, Ed., *Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah*, pp. 428-29.

45. On 24 November 1934, the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Turkey passed a law granting Ghazi Mustafa Kamal the surname “Atatürk,” meaning “Father of the Turks” (UNESCO, *Atatürk*, p. 232). On 12 August 1947, a resolution was moved in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan that Mr Muhammad Ali Jinnah would be addressed as Quaid-i Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. In the course of his speech while moving this resolution, Liaquat Ali Khan said :

“Any one who has rendered services to the nation like what Quaid-i-Azam has done to the Muslim nation in India, has always been described in some endearing term or the other. Do not Honourable Members know that when Mustafa Kamal Pasha was always called in all official documents as ‘Atta Turk’ [*sic*], it meant the ‘Father of the Turkish Nation?’” (M. Rafique Afzal, *Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan [1941-31]*, p. 119).

46. UNESCO, *Atatürk*, p. 200.

study.

Evidently, the above maxim was based on two very sound principles:

First, that the foreign policy of a country is invariably the corollary and the external projection of its domestic policy; and

Secondly, that peace is indivisible.

Atatürk drew attention to the above-mentioned first principle in a speech which he delivered a few days after the opening of the Grand National Assembly. He said:

“Gentlemen, foreign policy is largely affected by and is based on the internal organisation. The home organisation of a State embracing varying elements in the east and the west, each having a different character, a different culture and different aspirations, can only be unsound and unsafe. This means that its foreign policy cannot be firm and resolute. In so far as the home organisation of such a State is not even remotely national, so too its political course cannot be national. In consequence, the policy of the Ottoman State was not national, but personal, vague and unstable.”⁴⁷

The indivisibility of peace was emphasized by the Quaid in his Great Speech to which we have

47. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

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made repeated references above. It is significant that the declaration of the principles on which the Quaid resolved to base his foreign policy was preceded four days earlier by the above-mentioned Great Speech in which he laid down principles for building up peace at home which could be ensured only when all citizens of the State irrespective of their creed or status in life had equal rights, privileges and obligations. Having laid down these guidelines, the Quaid invoked the principle of the indivisibility of peace and toleration when he said:

“I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on and among the Hindus you have Brahmans, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on—will vanish.”⁴⁸

In another broadcast talk, which was addressed to the American people, the Quaid again spelt out his maxim of peace within and peace

48. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches*, II, 402-03.

without. In this reiteration of his foreign policy he stated :

“We believe in the principle of honesty and fair play in national and international dealings.”⁴⁹

This emphasis on honesty and fair play was very typical of that great politician whose incorruptibility and integrity of character were acknowledged even by his bitterest enemies.

The greatest test of his sincerity in his professions of a peaceful foreign policy came in the formulation of his policy towards India. In this respect, too, he was unequivocal and a few months before the advent of Pakistan he offered India an equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine. This generous offer of his as reported by the Indian and foreign correspondents on 15 November 1946, was as follows :

“Mr. Jinnah dismissed Pan-Islam as ‘exploded bogey’ and declared, ‘Whatever others might say, I think that these two States of Pakistan and Hindustan, by virtue of contiguity and mutual interest, will be friends in this sub-continent.

“They will go to each other’s rescue in case of danger

49. *Ibid.*, II, 463-64.

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and will be able to say 'hands off' to other nations. We shall then have a Monroe Doctrine more solid than in America."⁵⁰

But we know it too well how the hands of friendship extended by the Quaid were spurned by the Indian leaders and we also know the disasters to which this arrogant rejection led.

With all his earnest efforts for peace within and peace without, the Quaid was not a starry-eyed pacifist. During the course of a debate in the Central Legislative Assembly he said :

"I am not now concerned with those honourable members who believe in pacifism. For myself, it is not a question of belief in pacifism or not believing in pacifism. I believe in saving my neck if I am in danger. I do not want to hurt anybody. I want to be a very good man, but it does not follow that everybody in this world is good and does not want to hurt me. Therefore, I say that it is really not a question of pacifism or non-pacifism. As practical men are we going to defend ourselves or not? That is the question. I say, I am going to defend myself."⁵¹

The Quaid made this forthright declaration in August 1938 when the clouds of the Second World War were gathering thick over the horizon

50. *Ibid.*, II, 363.

51. *Ibid.*, I, 53.

of our planet. Ten years after that debate in the Central Legislative Assembly of British India, the Quaid reiterated it while addressing the establishment of the Pakistan Naval ship *Dilawar*. In the course of this address he recalled how the First World War and then the Second one were fought to end war; how the League of Nations and the idea of Collective Security failed. With his keen foresight he visualized the not-so-effective role that the successor to the League of Nations was destined to play. So, he said:

“While giving the fullest support to the principles of the United Nations Charter, we cannot afford to neglect our defences. However strong the United Nations Organisation might be, the primary responsibility for the defence of our country will rest with us and Pakistan must be prepared for all eventualities and dangers. The weak and the defenceless, in this imperfect world, invite aggression from others. The best way in which we can serve the cause of peace is by removing the temptation from the path of those who think that we are weak, and, therefore, they can bully or attack us.”⁵²

The Quaid believed not only in a peaceful

52. *Ibid.*, II, 439-40.

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internal and external policy but also in employing entirely peaceful means to achieve this end. He succeeded in getting his demand for the liberation of Pakistan accepted by all the parties concerned wholly through constitutional means without shedding a drop of blood. The tragic violence that followed the unanimously and peaceably agreed settlement of 3 June 1947 had no place in his scheme of things. But, in sharp contrast with the parliamentarian-constitutionalist Quaid, Atatürk was first and foremost a *Ghazi*. To adopt the policy of twin peace he had to turn his swords into ploughshares and that is exactly what he pleaded when he stated :

“Friends, from now on we shall win new important victories, but these will not be won by the bayonet; they will be economic, scientific and educational victories. One cannot say that the victory won by our armies has brought true salvation to our country. This victory provides valuable ground on which our future victories will be won. Let us not pride ourselves on our military victory, but rather prepare ourselves for new scientific and economic victories.”⁵³

53. UNESCO, *Atatürk*, p. 188.

He further said:

“Those who conquer by the sword are doomed sooner or later to yield to those who conquer by the plough. The wielding of the sword tires, but the arm that guides the plough gains new strength each day, and each day acquires a growing mastery of the soil. . . . The greatest political and military victory cannot last and is doomed to fade away quickly unless it is crowned by an economic victory.”⁵⁴

While Atatürk was a *Ghazi*, the Quaid was a *Shahid*. He sacrificed his health for the sake of the liberation of Pakistan. He was very seriously ill at the time when his goal was achieved and expired soon after its achievement. But Atatürk lived long enough to put his maxim of the twin peace into practice. Internally, despite the dismemberment of the multi-national Ottoman Caliphate, Atatürk inherited the minority problems of the Armenians, the Greeks and the Kurds that had resisted solution all the long centuries of Ottoman rule. The Treaty of Gumru (1920) healed the pestering sore of the Armenian Question that had resulted in much bloodshed in pre-Kemalist days. The war with Greece was followed up by

54. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

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the pursuit of peace and after a mutually agreed exchange of population, the Turco-Greek Treaty was signed in 1930 followed four years later by the Balkan Entente by which all the five Balkan States including Greece entered into an alliance against the rising dangers posed by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Kurds were a part of the Turkish nation but were aroused and arrayed against their own government by the internal fanatic forces of the obscurantists and the foreign ill-wishers of Kemalist Turkey. Atatürk put down their revolt firmly and with still greater resoluteness he took measures to pacify and assimilate them in the Turkish *millet*.⁵⁵

Externally, he realised the strength of his northern neighbour. There was traditional hostility and inherent clash of interests between the two neighbouring countries, but both had started an altogether new chapter in their life histories; Atatürk seized this opportunity and cultivated

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 195-203, and Kinross, *Atatürk*, pp. 458-64. Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 226-48, not only makes a masterly analysis of Atatürk's foreign policy but gives an authoritative account of its progress under his successors.

friendly relations with the government of the Soviet Union. He was obliged to the revolutionary leaders of Russia for the help given by them at the most critical juncture in the history of the new Turkish Republic. After having settled the Armenian Question with the Soviet Union in December 1920 he signed the Treaty of Moscow in March 1921 and entered into a Non-Aggression Pact with her in December 1925. With his western neighbours Atatürk entered into the Balkan Entente as we mentioned above and in the year 1937 he completed the series of Treaty arrangements with the Muslim states on his eastern flank, viz. Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. The last-mentioned Alliance which was known as the Sa'd-abad Pact showed that in the modern world Islamic universalism is feasible only when it works with a vigorous and self-confident territorial nationalism. It was the first tangible step taken towards Muslim solidarity and was initiated by the laicist and nationalist Atatürk.⁵⁶

56. Dr Detlev H. Khalid has made an interesting study of this subject in his article entitled, "Atatürk's Concepts of Islamic Re-

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One of the main reasons for the precipitous downfall of the Muslims in general, and of the Safawid Iran and Ottoman Turkey in particular, was the bitter hostility between the Safawids and the Ottomans, each one of them proud of its "Muslim consciousness" claimed to be the champion of true Islam. The founders of Modern Turkey and Iran did the greatest service to Islam when they resolved the centuries-old hostility between the Sunnis and the Shi'ahs, and established the friendliest neighbourly relations amongst themselves. The Quaid in himself personified this spirit of the Sunni-Shi'ah concord.

Like the Quaid, Atatürk knew that the best guarantee for peace was a firm policy of self-defence and self-strength. In a prophetic speech Atatürk declared:

formism and Muslim unity" that was published in the *Journal of the Regional RCD Cultural Institute*, Vol. VII (1974), No. 1, pp. 39-52, dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish Republic. Dr Khalid wrote another illuminating paper which is connected with this subject, for the Institute's Commemorative Volume: *The Reforms of Atatürk* (Ankara, 1973). The title of the last-mentioned article is "A Study of Atatürk's Laicism in the Light of Muslim History".

“If war were to break out suddenly like a bomb explosion the nations of the world must not hesitate to combine their armed resistance and their financial resources against the aggressor in order to arrest it. The swiftest and the most effective remedy is to show the potential aggressor that aggression does not pay.”⁵⁷

Atatürk's stirring call for Collective Security was not heeded by European powers. Munich showed that aggression did pay. The explosion about which Atatürk had warned took place shortly after his death. Turkish leaders saved their country from the conflagration that engulfed all its neighbours.

In short, both domestic and foreign policies of the two leaders were strikingly similar despite the basic divergence in the nature of their movements—one being revolutionary and the other constitutional.

As mentioned earlier, Turkish nationalism had evolved out of

- (i) Islamic universalism which played a pre-nationalist role in all the Muslim societies of modern times;

57. UNESCO, *Atatürk*, p. 203.

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- (ii) Ottomanism which gave State structure to the nationalist ideal in Turkey; and
- (iii) Pan-Turanism which supplied racial, linguistic and cultural cohesion to Turkish nationalism.

Though political exigencies synthesized these divergent movements, yet it was the genius of Atatürk that read the signs of the times and did not allow the conflicting claims of Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turanism and Ottomanism to pull apart the nascent Turkish nation which had just come out of the crucible of a fiercely fought war. In order to save the Turkish nation and Turkish nationalism Atatürk had to fight against the protagonists of these fissiparous trends. The *Ghazi* fought many battles in his long and glorious military career, but this was the bitterest and the most heart-burning one, for in it he had to encounter his closest friends and erstwhile comrades-at-arms, men like Enver (Anwar Pasha) and Rauf (Rauf Bey). Enver stood—and fell a martyr—for the Pan-Turanist ideal, and Rauf had a soft corner in his heart for the past glories of the Ottoman Empire and was, in his own words, “bound

by conscience and sentiment to the Sultanate and Caliphate".⁵⁸ Eventually, the *Ghazi* won this battle, as well, and consolidated his victory during his own lifetime.

Like its Turkish counterpart the struggle for Pakistani nationalism was a complex one. But, unlike the Turkish Revolution, it has suffered from over-simplification at the hands of its historians. It, too, had evolved out of three divergent and conflicting movements:

- (i) Islamic universalism of the Ulema;
- (ii) Mughul nationalism of the majority of the Western-educated liberals; and

58. The full text of the confession that Rauf Bey made to Atatürk is as follows:

"I am devoted heart and soul to the Throne and Caliphate because my father has received benefits from the Padishah and was one of the dignitaries of the Ottoman Empire. The recollection of these benefits is coursing through my veins. I am not an ungrateful man and could never become one.

"It is my duty to remain loyal to the Padishah. Regarding my attachment to the Caliphate, it is imposed upon me by my education. I might also mention considerations of a more general kind. It is difficult for us to make ourselves masters of the general situation; this can be secured by a higher office and the sublime dignity which everybody generally considers to be unapproachable. This office, this dignity, is the Throne and the Caliphate. The abolition of this dignity and the attempt to substitute it by a body of a different character would lead to disappointment and disaster. This is not to be thought of" (Atatürk, *Speech*, p. 572).

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(iii) Pan-Indian nationalism of the minority group from amongst the last-mentioned Westernized elite.

All the three elements had their deep roots in the history and ethos of the subcontinent. Also, their respective upholders had taken their due share in the struggle for the liberation of Pakistan. But none of these elements could form the basis for Pakistani nationhood. In fact, separately each one of these—Islamic universalism, Mughul nationalism and Pan-Indianism—was the very anti-thesis of Pakistani nationalism. But historical forces had synthesized these contradictory elements, and in the Quaid history found its fittest instrument for the implementation of its own dialectical process in the context of the South Asian subcontinent. The Quaid took the religious and moral content from Islamic universalism and the territorial base from Indian nationalism, and welded the two in the form of his constitutional struggle for Pakistani national self-determination. Though he was a “cold rationalist,”⁵⁹ yet—or, rather, because of it—he also used the emotional

59. Hector Bolitho, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66; also, pp. 67 and 147.

Parallels

appeal of Mughul nationalism for the achievement of the geohistorical reality named Pakistan. The last-mentioned fact has been unduly emphasized both by his admirers and adversaries. They seem to ignore the fact that his was a constitutional-parliamentary and not a revolutionary-military struggle and it is a well-known weakness of the democratic process that on the hustings it is the emotional appeal and not the cold reasoning that counts. Nevertheless, the Quaid knew that nations are not built on emotional euphoria: nation-building is an earthly and not an ethereal mission. He, therefore, emphasized that:

“[A] nation does not live in the air. It lives on the land. It must govern land, and must have *territorial* state and that is what you want to get.”⁶⁰

60. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches*, I, 234. Italics added.

III

Contrasts

Like Atatürk, the Quaid, too, had a fair share of Envers and Raufs among his comrades. But here the parallel ends and the tragic divergence begins.

The Quaid's supreme moment of success was soon followed by his being manoeuvred out of the organization that he had built into a mighty machine for the constitutional battle of Pakistan. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, the Rauf of the Pakistan Freedom Movement,¹ managed to get complete

1. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman had developed a great admiration for Rauf Bey [Hüseyin Rauf Orbay], the heroic commander of the Ottoman cruiser, *Hamidiye*, while he visited Turkey as a young member of the Medical Mission sent by the Muslims of the sub-continent during the Balkan War (1912-13). He found Rauf Bey "full of life, energy and smiles". This admiration grew into a firm friendship when during his banishment from Turkey Rauf Bey visited the subcontinent in 1933 at the invitation of the Jami'ah Milliyah and spent a week at Lucknow as a guest of Khaliquzzaman. This hospitality was returned in 1939 when Khaliquzzaman, while returning

control over the Pakistan Muslim League and became first its Convener and then its President.²

The concept of sub-national groups was a vital part of the Quaid's Two-Nation theory, as is evident from the statements of his which we have quoted earlier (pp. 41-42). It was inherent in the very arithmetic of his Two-Nation theory. He stood for *two* and not for *four* nations in the South Asian subcontinent, while the religious, or the so-called "communal" or "ideological," interpretation of the theory would have necessitated a demand for four nations: (i) a Pakistani Muslim, (ii) a Pakistani non-Muslim, (iii) an Indian Muslim and (iv) an Indian non-Muslim nation. But Khaliquzzaman and his colleagues and followers who ruled Pakistan conveniently forgot the Quaid's concept of sub-national groups and his emphasis on the territorial basis of the Two-Nation

from England as a member of the Palestine Delegation, stayed in Turkey for some time where Rauf himself had returned from his exile, and again during his tour of the Middle East countries in 1949 as the President of the Pakistan Muslim League (Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, pp. 25-26 and 209).

2. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, pp. 373-74.

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theory. Conversely, Khaliquzzaman accused the Quaid of having taken "the earliest opportunity to bid goodbye to his Two-Nation theory in his speech on 11 September [*sic*] 1947 as the Governor-General-designate of Pakistan and President of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan".³

After the Quaid's death Pakistan went on a romantic spree, and from the "territorial" state of the Quaid it was metamorphosed into the "ideological" state of the theo-bureaucrats. Pakistani nationalism was throttled in the name of the so-called Muslim nationalism. The vacuum thus created was inevitably filled up by regional territorial loyalties which were in turn blown up into attempts at secessionist revolts through the "language of weapon" used against the regionalists.⁴

The positive value of "ideology"—a word

3. Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 321. (There is a slip here, it was 11 August, and not 11 September, when the Quaid made his Inaugural Speech.) See Appendix, below.

Cf. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, pp. 256 and 271-72; K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism*, pp. 206-08.

4. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, *Politics of the People: Marching Towards Democracy (1970-71)*, p. 172.

having no equivalent in the Islamic vocabulary⁵—

5. The 1959 revised edition of the *Modern English-Arabic Dictionary* of Elias, which was first published in 1913 and is the only authoritative dictionary of its kind in the Pakistani market, translates "ideology" as follows:

فن البحث في الافكار و التصورات - الفكریات

It is nothing but the Arabic rendering of the primary meaning of the word "ideology," viz. "the science of ideas". In the latest Arabic periodicals and monographs one finds the original European word in its French pronunciation assimilated in Arabic as ایدیولوجی.

Still more significant is the fact that even in Pakistan where "Islamic ideology" and "Pakistan ideology" seem to have replaced "Islamic religion" and "Muslim faith" in certain segments of the society, the Urdu equivalent which is now in vogue, viz. *nazarīyah i hayāt* (نظریہ حیات), has not yet found recognition from the standard

lexicographers. The original 1937 edition of *The Standard English-Urdu Dictionary*, compiled by the late Baba-i Urdu Dr Maulavi Abdul Haq, translated "ideology" as follows: خیال پرستی: تصورات کا علم،

and the word "ideological," علم تصورات کا یا اس سے متعلق.

Now علم تصورات like Elias' Arabic translation, renders into

Urdu the primary meaning of the term, i.e. "science of ideas". The

second translation, which is a very apt definition of the "ideology"

which is fashionable among certain religio-political parties of Pakistan,

viz. خیال پرستی, seems to attempt to translate the secondary mean-

ing of the word: "visionary speculation". Its tertiary connotation,

i.e. "ideas at the basis of some economic or political theory or

system" seems to be unknown to Dr Abdul Haq. The 1968 revised

edition of *Dictionary* has added "تخیل یا تصور" to the Urdu

translations of the term "ideology", and تصویری, تصوراتی to that

of "ideological". Thus, نظریاتی and نظریہ حیات could not find

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in "creating a sense of national identity and purpose" proved "rather illusory," as has been rightly observed by Professor Gunnar Myrdal.⁶ This foremost living observer of the "Asian drama" further remarks :

"This outcome could have been foreseen. Islam, like Christianity but unlike Hinduism, is a universal rather than a national religion. Indeed, many religious Moslems, especially some of their most learned men, either held aloof from or actively opposed the struggle for an Islamic state on the Indian subcontinent as heresy or something close to it. On the practical level they could ask what the attitude of a Moslem state that identified religion with national patriotism should be toward the millions of Moslems remaining in India—or toward the many Hindus and other non-Moslem minorities within its own borders."⁷

The romanticism of Mughul nationalism was an exercise in self-immolation for the Muslims of the minority provinces. In his Introductory Speech at the meeting of the Muslim leaders who had gathered together on 30 December 1906 at

recognition even from the 1968 revised edition of *The Standard English-Urdu Dictionary*!

6. Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama : An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, I, 306.

7. *Ibid.*

Dacca to organize the All-India Muslim League, Nawab Wiqar al-Mulk exclaimed :

“Woe betide the time when we have to live as subjects of those people who want to take revenge of Aurangzeb from us after hundreds of years.”⁸

The foundation of truly democratic States in India and Pakistan was the only way to avert this calamity and that was exactly what the Quaid pleaded in the Great Speech that he delivered while inaugurating the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. But that speech was completely ignored and suppressed, as we mentioned earlier. It was even condemned as a heresy.⁹ Mughul nationalists of

8. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement*, p. 27.

9. Mr Justice Muhammad Munir and Mr Justice M.R. Kayani having quoted extensively from the Quaid's “memorable speech of 11 August 1947” in which he stated “the principle on which the new State was to be founded” state: “We asked the *Ulama* whether this conception of a State was acceptable to them and everyone of them replied in an unhesitating negative. If Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi's evidence correctly represents the view of Jama'at-i-Islami, a State based on this idea is the creature of the devil, and he is confirmed in this by several writings of his Chief, Maulana Abul Ala Maudoodi, the founder of the Jama'at. None of the *Ulama* can tolerate a State which is based on nationalism and all that it implies” (*Report of the Court of Enquiry for the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, “Munir Report,” pp. 202-03).

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earlier days had sought British protection against this self-invited danger and when the Britishers had to quit, Choudhry Khaliqzaman wanted to keep the Hindus as hostages in Pakistan for the same purpose. But the Choudhry's theory of "balance of hostages" was too immoral and inhuman to be accepted by the Quaid.¹⁰

Eventually, the Muslims of the minority provinces suffered the most by the rejection of the Quaid's sane and democratic interpretation of the Two-Nation theory and its logical corollary, the concept of sub-national groups. In the land of their birth it worsened their lot and in the land of their adoption for which they had suffered so much and had made so many sacrifices it kept them unassimilated and alienated. And in East Pakistan their romantic dream of

10. In his important letter to the Quaid-i Azam which he has appended to his autobiography Kbaliquzzaman states: "One of the basic principles lying behind the Pakistan idea is that of keeping hostages in Muslim Provinces as against the Muslims in the Hindu Provinces" (op. cit., p. 425). This thesis of the balance of hostages was pleaded by him while supporting the Pakistan Resolution at the historic 1940 Lahore Session of the Muslim League (ibid., pp. 236-37) and, again, while opposing the partition of the provinces (ibid., pp. 286-88).

Mughul nationalism was turned into a ghoulish nightmare.

“A ruined land on the edge of a precipice . . . bloody battles with various enemies . . . years of struggle and then, respected at home and abroad, a new country, a new society, a new State, and, to achieve these, ceaseless revolution—this, in a word, is the Turkish general revolution.”¹¹

That was the Kemalist Revolution succinctly described by its author.

Atatürk achieved this success by releasing the latent forces of the Turkish people through the nationalist fervour which was enshrined by him in these immortal words of his :

“HAPPY IS THE MAN WHO CALLS HIMSELF A TURK.”¹²

“Remember, that the establishment of Pakistan is a fact of which there is no parallel in the history of the world. . . .

11. Quoted by Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 480.

12. In his famous speech of 29 October 1933, quoted in UNESCO, *Atatürk*, p. 214. (In Turkish : *Ne mutlu Türküm diyene.*)

In the Imperial society of the Ottomans the ethnic term “Türk” was little used and then, as late as 1897, in a derogatory sense meaning “an ignorant boor” (Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2, and 333). It was a Kemalist miracle that the term underwent such a revolutionary change within two decades.

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“... The foundations of your State have been laid, and it is now for you to build, and build as quickly and as well as you can. So go ahead and I wish you Godspeed!”¹³

That was the message given by the Quaid on the occasion of the first anniversary of the liberation of Pakistan, which also happened to be his farewell message to its citizens.

The Quaid built the State of Pakistan but his work of building the Pakistani nation was interrupted. And we have yet to receive the clarion call:

**PROUD IS THE MAN WHO CALLS HIMSELF
A PAKISTANI.**

13. Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad, Ed., *Speeches*, II, 571-72.

Appendix

Khaliquzzaman's Interpretation of the Two-Nation Theory

Choudhry Khaliquzzaman was a very shrewd politician and an ardent patriot. He started his career in public office as Chairman of the Lucknow Municipal Board and served his dear old city in a most creditable way which won him acclaim from all its citizens irrespective of their caste or creed. He was an Indian Nationalist and remained consistent in that ideology throughout his life. At the same time he was a sincere Muslim who earnestly believed in the universalist message of Islam. For him both these ideologies were complementary to each other. He changed his political parties but remained a Swarajist and at the same time a Khilafatist through all the vicissitudes and vagaries of politics in the South Asian

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subcontinent. In his political career the two ideologies of Swaraj and Khilafat were admirably allied to each other when he took up the cause of the oppressed Muslim minority of British India in the larger framework of Indian independence. He was not much of a strategist but was a brilliant tactician and was admired and respected—even feared—for the shrewd moves that he made to achieve his high political aim of the amelioration of the conditions of the Muslim minorities of India. He took the two-nation theory as a grand tactical manoeuvre towards that political target.

He did not consider Muslims to be a separate nation in India. In his autobiography he has at some length and with considerable labour repudiated this "special feature of Muslim Nationalism". He rejected the comments made by Professor Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Lala Lajpat Rai on Muslims being Islamically incapable of evolving a national feeling, meaning loyalty to or even concern for a community transcending the bounds of Islam, and stated:

"I will not try to deal with other Muslim countries but so far as India was concerned the remarks of both Mr. Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Lala Lajpat Rai cannot find support from a history of Muslim rule of 800 years."¹

He argued that, despite this long Muslim rule, only twenty-five per cent of the population professed Islam at the time of the partition of the subcontinent while

"during one century and a half of British rule the Christian Church claimed sixty lakh converts. Besides, the languages of the Muslims—Arabic and Persian—had given way to the evolution of a common language, Urdu, which contained about seventy-five per cent words of Hindi and Sanskrit origin. Similarly a common culture and a common social life had also been evolved which were prospering until the British came on the scene and whether intentionally or not tried to introduce their own democratic system in the country, one to which the Muslims did not subscribe."²

And, finally,

"whether the two-nation theory was right or wrong the fact that fifty million Muslims are living peacefully and loyally as citizens of India, is a complete answer to the charge of Mr. Cantwell Smith and Lala Lajpat Rai."³

1. Choudhry Khaliqzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan*, p. 319.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, p. 320.

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Lajpat Rai was one of the originators of the concept of there being a Muslim and a non-Muslim nation in the subcontinent and the Quaid quoted him extensively in his historic Presidential Address of the Lahore Session of the All-India Muslim League. It was an old established creed of Hindu Nationalism which had firm roots in the geopolitics and geohistory of the subcontinent and the national psyche of the Hindus. It recurrently manifested itself in different garbs during the times of political crises in the subcontinent. One such manifestation was when during the troubled days of the "Quit India" movement (1942-43) Raja Maheshwar Dayal, the General Secretary of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, canvassed support for the idea of partitioning the subcontinent on the *religious* basis of the Two-Nation theory. When he unfolded his Partition Scheme to Khaliqzaman, the latter flatly rejected it. The reply that Khaliqzaman, according to his own narration, gave to the Mahasabha leader incisively and succinctly sums up *his* interpretation of the Lahore Resolution and the Two-

Nation theory. He told Raja Dayal: "You do not seem to realize the fact that by creating such preponderating Muslim areas in the north and north-west you would be doing a great disservice to India. The Muslim League resolution aims at having two States within Indian geography but you want to create a Pakistan State outside India. We want partition of administration within India; you on the other hand propose partition of the geography of India. I would never agree to it."⁴

With such notions about the geography of the subcontinent that he had one could not expect Khaliquzzaman to believe in the territorial basis of the Two-Nation theory. Moreover, he had scant respect for the cultural heritage of Pakistan's own territory and, therefore, could not appreciate the validity of the territorial bases of Pakistan's personality. He had good friends among Punjabi, Pathan and Sindhi politicians, and had very high regard for the services of 'Allamah Muhammad Iqbal and respect and affection for his fellow Aligarhian, Mawlana Zafar Ali Khan, and gene-

4. *Ibid.*, p. 286.

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rous recognition for other Muslim leaders from the Pakistani provinces. But the deepest impression that the common Pakistanis made on his mind was as soldiers in the service of the British. Once he remembers them when he complains that the Britishers handed over the entire Government machinery to the Congress "ignoring the sacrifices of the Punjabis and Pathans who had joined the Army far in excess of their proportion in the country".⁵ The second reference is more unsavoury and slanderous. Dilating on the need for having a separate State for the Muslims of the subcontinent, he wrote :

"If the British could use Muslim armies for the conquest of Palestine and the disruption of the Khilafat why would not the Indian Government a century later similarly use Punjabi and Pathan soldiers for the conquest of Middle East countries if they chose to do so? Should we be able to say at that time, as the Ali Brothers had in the Karachi trial, that it is sinful for Muslims to fight as soldiers of non-Muslim countries? Obviously not so, as by that time our progeny might have become completely Indianised and nationalised."⁶

5. *Ibid.*, p. 364.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

Scholars and politicians have been for a long time in quest of a *raison d'etre* for the country which is not only a geographical but also a geological isolate and, but for some intermittent decades of Delhi's imperialist rule, has a continuous six-thousand-year-old independent history of its own.⁷ The *raison d'etre* that Khaliquzzaman contrived for Pakistan in the above-quoted passage beats them all in its naivete!

He claims that he was against the partition of the Punjab and Bengal and expends much labour to prove that the Quaid brought this calamitous partition. But the very first argument that he advances against it shows the cultural chauvinism of the "Mughul Nationalist" that he was. In the letter addressed to the Quaid, which he proudly published in his autobiography, he wrote:

"If large territories on the east and west are to be carved out of Pakistan Zones, they shall either be made part of the present unit of administration or made into separate Provinces. In either case, long and hostile dis-

7. See the present writer's article, "The Territorial Basis of the Two-Nation Theory," in Waheed-uz-Zaman, Ed., *The Quest for Identity*, pp. 32-48.

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tances will intervene against the cultural influences of the minority Provinces on the Pakistan Zones. To explain my meaning, I will here quote only one instance where the growing cultural contact between U.P. and Punjab has resulted in practically ousting the Punjabi Language and introducing Urdu in its place within the last half a century."⁸

In Khaliquzzaman's scheme of things the Two-Nation theory had no *validity*, neither religious nor territorial, but it had a *utility* for the Muslims of the minority provinces which, too, was doubted after its having been put into practice. Narrating the correspondence that he had with Husain Shahid Suhrawardy, the Muslim League leader of Bengal, on this subject, after the Partition, he writes :

"He [Suhrawardy] doubted the *utility* of the two-nation theory which to my mind also had never *paid any dividends* to us. But after the partition it proved positively injurious to the Muslims of India, and on a long-view basis for Muslims everywhere."⁹

Earlier, he expressed his frustration over the unhappy fact that his attempt to use the Two-Nation

8. Khaliquzzaman, *op. cit.*, p. 425.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 400. Italics added.

theory had proved a boomerang for Muslims of the minority provinces. He wrote :

“The two-nation theory which we had *used* in the fight for Pakistan had created not only bad blood against the Muslims of the minority provinces but also an ideological wedge between them and the Hindus of India.”¹⁰

In short, according to him, the basis of the Two-Nation theory was to create a balance of hostages in order to safeguard the interests of the Muslim minorities. In his own words, “One of the basic principles lying behind the Pakistan idea is that of keeping hostages in Muslim Provinces as against the Muslims in the Hindu Provinces.”¹¹ For this reason he opposed “the territorial re-adjustment” proposed in the Lahore Resolution. He argued that this would—as eventually, it did—deprive him of most of his Hindu hostages.

It is in the above perspective that he accused the Quaid of having “bid goodbye” to the Two-Nation theory when Khaliquzzaman himself and his colleagues from the Muslim minority pro-

10. *Ibid.*, p. 390, *Italics added.*

11. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

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vinces, according to his own claim, impressed upon the Quaid the grave dangers that Muslims of India, that is Bharat, faced because of it.¹²

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 320-21.

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This study is based on this paper and the Institute of Islamic Culture takes pride in offering it to the readers on the most auspicious occasion of the Quaid-i Azam's Centenary.