

# THE FOUNDER OF PAKISTAN

*Latif Ahmed Sherwani*

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onal Committee  
Birth Centenary Celebrations of  
d-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah



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# THE FOUNDER OF PAKISTAN

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LATIF AHMED SHERWANI



**National Committee  
for Birth Centenary Celebrations of  
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## CONTENTS

	Page
Preface .. .. .	7
Ambassador of Unity .. .. .	9
Jinnah's Proposals for Joint Electorates Rejected .. .. .	19
Jinnah Disappointed with Hindu Attitude .. .. .	27
Jinnah's Reaction to Hindu Majority Rule .. .. .	33
Jinnah Defends His New Demand .. .. .	39
Pakistan Scheme Examined .. .. .	45
British Plan to Keep India United Fails .. .. .	51
Pakistan Demand Conceded .. .. .	57
The Last Phase .. .. .	63





The void is at last being filled. The present Government of Pakistan has set up the Quid-e-Azam Academy which will produce authoritative material about Jinnah and the cultural, social and economic history of the independence Movement in India and Pakistan.

The Academy will also provide facilities for the study of Pakistan and foreign, for doing research on the life and work of Jinnah and related subjects. The Government has also decided to observe 1976 as Quid-e-Azam centenary year and the programme includes holding of an international conference and award of prizes.

**PREFACE**

**S**PEAKING about the principal actors in the final act of transfer of power from the British to Indian hands, H. V. Hodson, a British historian, says that: "One can imagine any of the other principal actors . . . replaced by a substitute in the same role without thereby implying any radical change in the final denouement. But it is barely conceivable that events would have taken the same course . . . and that a new nation State of Pakistan would have been created, but for the personality and leadership of one man, Mr. Jinnah."

Likewise, Frank Moraes, a well-known Indian journalist, remarks: "Kemal Ataturk revived the ramshackle State which was Turkey. But Jinnah's achievement was in a sense more considerable. Out of next to nothing he willed a state into being."

The Aga Khan, the world famed statesman, refers to another facet of his achievement when he says that Jinnah "attained immortal fame as the man who, without any army, navy, or air force, created, by a lifetime's faith in himself crystallised into a single bold decision, a great empire of upwards of a hundred million people."

A leader who created the fifth largest state of the world is obviously a source of inspiration to his followers, an object of close study by the scholars everywhere, and the subject of general interest to the world at large. But this is possible only when the people are told something about the man and his mission. Unfortunately though, little effort, if any, has thus far been made to project the true image of this great leader. Inevitably, a great deal of misunderstanding about him and about the State which he created, seems to persist.

The void is at last being filled. The present Government of Pakistan has set up the Quaid-i-Azam Academy which will produce authoritative material about Jinnah and the cultural, social and economic history of pre-independence Muslim India and of Pakistan. The Academy will also provide facilities to the scholars, both Pakistani and foreign, for doing research on the life and work of Jinnah and related subjects. The Government has also decided to observe 1976 as Quaid-i-Azam centenary year and the programme includes holding of an international congress and national seminars, issuance of postage stamps, minting of coins and making of films, highlighting Jinnah's achievements.

The present booklet which seeks to throw some light on Jinnah, the man and his mission, represents an introductory volume in the centenary's programme.

L. A. SHERWANI

6 August 1976

## AMBASSADOR OF UNITY

**T**HE father of the Pakistani nation, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, popularly known as the Quaid-i-Azam (great leader) was born at Karachi on 25 December 1876. He started his education at a primary school in Karachi and in July 1887 he was admitted to the famous Sind Madrassatul Islam, where he studied, except for a few months, till January 1892.

Jinnah belonged to a prominent mercantile family (Ismaili Khojas) and his own father was a well-to-do businessman. In keeping with the family traditions, Jinnah would have normally joined his family business after school education, but at the suggestion of a British friend, the manager of Graham Shipping and Trading Company, Karachi, Jinnah's father sent him to London in 1892 for training in business administration. Young Jinnah, however, joined the Lincoln's Inn and three years later, when he was not even twenty, he qualified himself for the Bar.

Liberalism was ascendant in Britain at that time, and Jinnah felt at home in that atmosphere. He frequently visited the British Parliament and listened to the speeches of Gladstone, Morley, Chamberlain and other liberal leaders. Gradually, he became a votary of British liberalism and parliamentary democracy, and when Dadabhoi Naoroji, an Indian Parsee, stood for election to the House of Commons from the Central Finsbury constituency, young Jinnah worked hard in his election campaign. In return, Naoroji developed great regard for Jinnah and the two became good friends. Naoroji's success in the election got Jinnah deeply involved in politics. And because he was so close to Naoroji, his thinking was greatly influenced by Naoroji, who strongly believed that "it is in Parliament that our chief battles have to be fought".

In 1892 the British Parliament had passed the Indian Councils Act, under which the non-official membership of the legislative councils, as set up in 1861, had been enlarged and, for the first time, a number of Indian representatives on these councils were to be nominated on the recommendations of public bodies such as municipalities, district boards, chambers of commerce, and universities. Although the new Act was the first step towards representative government, it had not given any powers to Indian representatives. Naoroji and many other Indian leaders, therefore, regarded the Act as out of step with the spirit of the times. More importantly, the cautious manner in which the Act was implemented led to much dissatisfaction among Indians. Jinnah's political thinking was nurtured in this atmosphere.

Jinnah returned to India in 1896 but, in the meanwhile, his father had suffered financial setbacks in business. Apart from his desire to help his father, Jinnah thought that the lower courts in Karachi would not provide sufficient scope for his legal attainments. In 1897 he, therefore, went to Bombay but during the first three years he got very few cases. However, through the kindness of a friend, Jinnah had the unusual privilege of working in the chambers of the Acting Advocate General, John Macpherson. In 1900, on Macpherson's recommendation, the Judicial Member of Bombay, Sir Charles Ollivant, appointed Jinnah as Third Presidency Magistrate in a leave vacancy for three months, which period was later extended to six months. Jinnah's sound judgments made a great impression on Sir Charles, who offered to consider Jinnah for a senior appointment at an enhanced salary but Jinnah preferred independent legal practice and, therefore, declined the offer.

About the same time Jinnah started taking interest in the politics of his country. The only significant political organisation then was the Indian National Congress, which had been founded in 1885. Because of the association of such liberal leaders as Naoroji, Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Surendra Nath Banerjee, Jinnah felt greatly attracted to it. However, in the 'nineties, Hindu extremists, led by Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who regarded Muslims as foreigners and believed in the technique of violent agitation for extracting

political concessions from the rulers, had begun to acquire influence in it and, by the turn of the century, for all practical purposes they controlled it until their purge in 1907. It was under their influence that in the early years of the present century, when the Muslim leaders urged upon the Congress leadership to be fair to the Muslims in the matter of representation in the Central Council, the Congress refused to accommodate the Muslim viewpoint. In the result, Muslim participation in the Congress had been declining. Thus, at the 1905 session of the Congress, out of a total of 756 delegates, Muslims numbered only 17 as compared with 156 Muslims out of a total of 702 delegates at the 1890 session. And this, despite the fact that the 1905 session was presided over by Gokhale who was known for his liberalism and his passion for Hindu-Muslim unity.

Also in 1905, the unwieldy province of Bengal (area 189,000 sq. miles, population about 78 million) had been partitioned. Primarily an administrative measure, it had also resulted in the creation of a Muslim majority province. Even though the moderate Hindus themselves were upset by this measure, they were opposed to the violent movement, which included the boycott of British goods, launched by extremist Hindus, both inside and outside the Congress, for its annulment. Gokhale, with whom Jinnah felt so close that he wanted to become his counterpart among Muslims, then said that the problems of India can be solved only when it is governed in the interests of its people. He also said that in course of time India should get the same form of government as other self-governing colonies of the British Empire. These views were endorsed by Naoroji, who presided over the 1906 session of the Congress. Jinnah then came into prominence as Naoroji's private secretary.

While Jinnah had cast his lot with the Congress, most Muslim leaders thought that the Hindu movement for the annulment of partition was as much against the Muslims as against the British rulers. For this reason, when it became known that the British Government was planning to concede some reforms, 35 prominent Muslim leaders requested the Viceroy, Lord Minto, for separate electoral registers for Muslims for choosing their representatives

to various bodies—legislative councils, municipalities, and district boards. Some months later, in December 1906, Muslim leaders also set up their own separate political organisation, the All-India Muslim League.

Constitutional reforms were approved by the British Parliament in 1909, under which the rights of the legislative councils were extended, although they were not given control over the Executive. The membership of the councils was also further enlarged and the principle of election was introduced for the first time, although on a very restricted franchise. In addition, much to the dislike of many Hindus, the Muslim demand for separate electorates was conceded and a small number of seats in the councils were also reserved for them.

Jinnah was opposed to separate electorates. In fact at the 1910 session of the Congress he moved a resolution in which he deprecated the extension of the system to municipalities and district boards. But ironically enough he had first been elected in 1909 to the Central Council by the reserved Muslim constituency of Bombay. Moreover, he was later to establish his reputation as a legislator by piloting, at the suggestion of the Muslim League, a communal bill. This was the first bill to pass into legislation on the motion of a private Indian member and, *inter alia*, prevented Hindu creditors from wiping out Muslim family inheritances.

In December 1911 when the British Government, under pressure from the Hindus, agreed to undo the partition of Bengal, Muslims felt greatly disillusioned and their faith in the assurances of the Government was shattered. They thought that their interests might be served better if they reached an understanding with the Hindus. Jinnah, still a staunch Congressman but respected by the Muslims as well, was, therefore, specially invited in December 1912 to the meeting of the Council of the Muslim League which was considering a change in the League's constitution. In March 1913 Jinnah was again invited to the Leagues Council's meeting. It is believed that it was mainly because of his efforts that the Council adopted a new objective— "a system of self-government suitable to India". It should be noted that this goal was not very different from the one adopted by the Congress some years earlier.

In April 1913 Jinnah went to England on a holiday and there helped to establish the London Indian Association. Shortly before Jinnah was to return to India, he was approached by two Muslim leaders, Maulana Muhammad Ali and Syed Wazir Hasan, who had gone to London to place certain issues of special interest to the Muslims before the British Government, to enrol himself as a member of the Muslim League. Jinnah agreed but on the condition that his loyalty to the Muslim League and Muslim interests would in no way imply any disloyalty to the larger national interests to which he had dedicated his life.

In the following year Jinnah was included in a Congress delegation to London, which asked for reforms in the Council of the Secretary of State for India and for increased Indian representation on it.

The death of Gokhale in 1915 shocked Jinnah and many other moderate Indian leaders into finding a formula which would bring the Hindus and Muslims close to each other. In December that year the Congress was holding its annual session at Bombay. Jinnah invited the Muslim League to hold its annual session also there at the same time and the Muslim leaders agreed. Largely through Jinnah's efforts, among those who attended the League session were the Congress President and several other prominent Congress leaders. Jinnah moved a resolution for the appointment of a committee of the League to confer with other political parties and draw up a scheme of constitutional reforms for India. In moving the resolution Jinnah said that the Congress and the League were the principal representative organisations of India and if they could agree on a scheme of reforms, they could go to the authorities and say that the reforms were being demanded in the name of united India. The Congress reciprocated and appointed a committee of its own to cooperate with the League committee.

In October 1916, on Jinnah's initiative, 19 out of a total of 27 elected members of the Central Legislature, both Hindu and Muslim, submitted to the Viceroy a memorandum in which they asked for elected majorities in the councils, control of the legislatures on the budget and reduction in the regulating powers of the India Office.

Also in October the League and the Congress committees held a joint meeting at Calcutta, and framed proposals for the representation of Muslims in the councils and for constitutional reform. These proposals were endorsed by the two political parties at their annual sessions at Lucknow in December. Under these proposals, which came to be known as the Lucknow Pact, *inter alia*, Hindus agreed to separate electorates for Muslims in all the councils and the reservation for them of one-third of the elected seats in the Central Council. In some of the provinces in which the Muslims were in a minority they were given more representation in the councils than their population warranted. Additionally, the two parties agreed to what is called the double vote clause which provided that if three-fourths of the Hindu or Muslim members in a particular council were opposed to a bill or to any of its clauses, affecting their community, the bill or the clause will not be passed. Muslims, on their part, agreed to accept the principle of majority rule as well as to forego the majorities in the Punjab and Bengal Assemblies to which they were entitled on the basis of their population in the two provinces. The Lucknow Pact also contained a detailed scheme of constitutional reforms for India.

Although Jinnah was not thinking of it, the biggest gain to the Muslims from the Lucknow Pact was the recognition of the Muslim League as the representative organisation of the Indian Muslims.

Jinnah's principal concern at this stage was that India should be put on the road to self-government as soon as possible. To him an agreed formula between the Hindu and Muslim communities appeared a pre-requisite for this development. He, therefore, worked hard to bring about an understanding which the two communities thought would safeguard their interests also. It should, however, be noted that, personally Jinnah did not think that the Muslims had any special interests. He only thought that, compared with the Hindus, the Muslims were backward educationally and economically and needed some sort of crutch to stand on their feet. Addressing the Bombay Provincial Conference in October 1916 Jinnah said: "As far as I understand, the demand for separate electorates is



not a matter of policy but a matter of necessity to the Muslims who require to be roused from the coma and torpor into which they have fallen for so long."

In fact, at the 1916 session of the Muslim League at which he presided, Jinnah implied that he was not in favour of separate electorates:

"I have been a staunch Congressman throughout my public life and have been no lover of sectarian cries, but it appears to me that the reproach of 'separatism' some times levelled at Mussalmans is singularly inept and wide off the mark, when I see this great communal organisation rapidly growing into a powerful factor for the birth of a united India. A minority must, above everything else, have a complete sense of security, before its broader political sense can be evoked for co-operation and united endeavour in the national tasks. To the Mussalmans of India that security can only come through adequate and effective safeguards as regards their political existence as a community. Whatever my individual opinion may be, I am here to interpret and express the sense of the overwhelming body of Muslim opinion . . . ."

When the Congress and League committees were working on a plan of political reforms, Mrs. Annie Besant, daughter of a London doctor, who had arrived in India in 1903 and had later allied herself with Hindu renaissance, founded the Home Rule League and launched an agitation which found large followers in many parts of India. Although Jinnah was opposed to unconstitutional means, when Mrs. Besant was interned in June 1917, he joined this body and became President of its Bombay Branch. He then strongly protested against Mrs. Besant's internment and the methods adopted by the Government to silence the people of India. At the same time he asked for the acceptance of the Congress-League scheme: "As President of the Bombay Home Rule League, I can but repeat that all that we want, and all that our organisation is devoted to, is the realisation of the scheme of reforms adopted at Lucknow, with this difference that the Home Rule League is

an educationist propaganda and the Congress is a mere deliberative body . . . ”

By July 1917 Jinnah had established his reputation as one of the most outstanding and highly respected political leaders of India. He was at the same time President of the Muslim League and the Bombay Branch of the Home Rule League as well as an important member of the Congress and the Central Legislative Council. More importantly, because of the key role which he had played in bringing about an understanding between the Congress and the League, he had been recognised as an ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity.

Jinnah's popularity with all sections of the Indian population as well his courage of conviction were fully demonstrated in 1918, when he clashed with the Government. Early in that year a War Conference was held at Delhi at which Jinnah and his associates put forward a resolution on constitutional reforms for India. This resolution was ruled out of order by the chairman. Jinnah felt bitter about this ruling and said that officialdom was out to undermine the prestige of the Indian leaders.

After some weeks a similar conference was held at Bombay which was presided over by the Governor, Lord Willingdon. During the course of his speech, Willingdon criticised the Home Rule League leaders and accused them of creating difficulties for the Government in its war effort. Jinnah strongly protested against the Governor's remarks and said: “. . . if you wish to enable us to help you, to facilitate and stimulate recruiting, you must make the educated people believe that they are citizens of the Empire and the King's equal subjects. But the Government do not do that.”

The citizens of Bombay gave expression to their resentment against Willingdon's attitude by organising a massive demonstration in mid-June. Jinnah then said that Willingdon had publicly insulted Indian leaders and until he withdrew his insult, the people of Bombay would not attend any meeting over which he presided.

When Willingdon's term came to an end and some citizens of Bombay arranged a public farewell for him in December, Jinnah organised an effective demonstration against the meeting convened

to pass a resolution appreciating his work. Later Jinnah addressed the demonstrators and said: "Your triumph today has made it clear that even the combined forces of bureaucracy and autocracy could not overawe you."

Every section of the population of Bombay then praised Jinnah's leadership and courage and, in recognition of his services, at the suggestion of a Bombay attorney, the people contributed to a fund, with which Jinnah Hall was built.



## JINNAH'S PROPOSALS FOR JOINT ELECTORATES REJECTED

THE Government of India Act of 1919 introduced no major reforms in the Central Government but in the provincial field some subjects such as education, agriculture, public works and health were transferred for administration to Indian elected representatives responsible to the legislature while some other (which were more important) subjects, such as finance, law and order, and justice, were reserved for administration by the Governors who were nominees of the British Government. Since the Act had conceded much less than what had been demanded in the agreed Congress-League scheme and since high hopes had been generated by the big contribution made by India to the war effort, it was considered unsatisfactory by almost all Indian leaders.

More importantly, some time before the scheme of reforms passed through the Parliament, the Central Council passed certain acts which gave Government arbitrary powers to detain and try insurgents and persons opposed to its policies, without a jury.

Indians were bitterly opposed to these acts. Jinnah's protest took the form of resignation from the Council. In his letter to the Viceroy, Jinnah wrote: "The fundamental principles of justice have been uprooted and the constitutional rights of the people have been violated at a time when there is no real danger to the State by the overfretful and incompetent bureaucracy which is neither responsible to the people nor in touch with real public opinion, and their sole plea is that the powers when they are assumed will not be abused." In contrast, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, who now dominated the Congress, decided to rouse the masses

by asking them to observe strikes. Gandhi's policy led to much lawlessness and rioting and, in one case, when people were holding a meeting in a walled-in space in Amritsar (Jallianwalla Bagh) in April 1919, General R. E. H. Dyer foolishly asked his troops to open fire on them without prior warning. As a consequence as many as 379 persons were killed and some 1,200 wounded. The massacre was immediately followed by martial law and the people were subjected to humiliating indignities.

Indian Muslims felt bitter against the Government for another reason also. Prime Minister Lloyd George, it may be recalled, had given solemn assurances as late as January 1918 that at the end of the War Turkey would not be deprived of its capital and the predominantly Turkish territories of Thrace and Asia Minor. Yet, when Turkey signed the armistice in November, British forces overran Mosul while Constantinople was occupied by Britain in the name of the Allied Powers, and in May 1919 Greek forces, on behalf of Britain, marched into the Turkish homeland of Smyrna. Indian Muslims, who felt very close to Turkey because of the seat of Caliphate there, were shocked at these developments.

After his release from internment in December 1919, Maulana Muhammad Ali organised the All-India Khilafat Committee while his brother Maulana Shaukat Ali toured various parts of the country denouncing Allied policy towards Turkey. Later Muhammad Ali visited Europe to place the Indian Muslim viewpoint before the Allies. But there was no change in the policy of the victors. Gandhi then thought that an opportunity had come in his way which might not recur—viz., that of uniting the Hindus and Muslims in a common struggle against the British rulers for the dual purpose of achieving Indian independence and restoration of the Caliphate.

While most Muslim leaders welcomed Gandhi's move for "non-cooperation with the satanic government", which included giving up government service, renunciation of titles, boycott of law courts, and walk-out from educational institutions, Jinnah took the stand that, although he shared Muslim disappointment over the policy of the Allies towards Turkey, Gandhi's movement would result in chaos, anarchy and bloodshed. At the Nagpur

session of the Congress in December 1920, where Gandhi was able to get Congress approval for his movement, out of 14,582 delegates, of whom 1,050 were Muslims, Jinnah was the only delegate to disagree and he told Gandhi: "Your way is the wrong way: mine is the right way—the constitutional way is the right way." Jinnah then decided to leave the Congress.

It so happened that earlier in October, on the resignation of Mrs. Besant, Gandhi had been elected President of the Home Rule League. Gandhi was then keen on certain amendments to the constitution of the Home Rule League. Jinnah was opposed to those amendments and resigned from that body also. Some months later Jinnah wrote to Gandhi: "... Your methods have already caused split and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto... your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and the illiterate. All this means complete disorganisation and chaos."

The non-cooperation movement which had been launched in 1920 was abruptly called off by Gandhi early in 1922 when, at Chaura Chauri in the United Provinces, the mob set fire to a police station, burning alive 22 police officials. Gandhi justified the step by saying that the country was not fully prepared for a non-violent struggle. But the Muslims, who had taken a more prominent part in the movement as compared to the Hindus, felt greatly astonished as well as frustrated because all their sacrifices had been in vain. Some time after the movement ended an extremist Hindu political body, the Mahasabha, was founded and it soon became very active. About the same time the Hindus started a movement for reconverting the Muslims to Hinduism and another movement for greater unity amongst the Hindus of different schools of thought. Worse still, a large number of communal riots started in different parts of India.

Jinnah had kept himself aloof from the non-cooperation movement but his work for Hindu-Muslim unity continued. Early in 1922 he played a leading role in convening an All Parties Conference which asked for a round table conference between the

Government and Congress leaders on Khilafat, self-government and other issues.

In November 1923, the Muslims of Bombay again elected Jinnah to the Central Council (now called Assembly). He then decided to revitalise the Muslim League which had become inactive ever since the Muslims had got involved in the Khilafat question. But his enthusiasm for Hindu-Muslim unity remained as strong as ever. In a press statement before the League session of May 1924 Jinnah said: "The League will not accept a policy or programme . . . antagonistic to the Indian National Congress, the Khilafat organisation, or the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind. On the contrary, it will proceed to foster general national interests, not forgetting particular interests of the Muslim community." At the League session Jinnah declared: "I am as much of a nationalist today as I ever was . . . I am frankly opposed to separate electorates. I want the legislatures to be composed of the best elements in the country, but Muslims are not prepared to go as far as that. They will fight for *Swaraj*, but they demand some assurances in return. The communities do not oppose unity. Only a few warlike individuals do . . . Hindu-Muslim unity is the most vital condition of *Swaraj*." It was only because of distrust between the two communities that Jinnah asked that Muslims should continue to have separate electorates, that on communal matters the decisions in the Assemblies should be on the basis of the double vote clause and that the form of government should be federal.

At the Bombay session of the League in December 1924 Jinnah even invited several Hindu leaders to address the audience. But the Congress leaders were not prepared to satisfy the Muslims, and by 1926, Jinnah came to the conclusion that the Congress position with regard to the Muslim demands was anything but reassuring. No Congress or Hindu leader, he said, has made any concrete proposal. Even so, at the League session held in December 1926 Jinnah moved a resolution, which, *inter alia*, provided for the appointment of a committee of the League to confer with similar committees of other parties for the purpose of devising a scheme of constitution for self-governing India. In moving the resolution,



Jinnah said: "We desire nothing but justice and fairness and I assure you that if we, the two communities, can settle our differences, it will be more than half the battle for responsible government won."

Since the end of the non-cooperation movement, the Hindus had also been criticising the principle of separate electorates. In his keenness to unite the Hindus and Muslims, Jinnah worked hard in early 1927 to persuade Muslim leaders to be flexible in their stand on this question. Soon after, in March 1927, at a conference of thirty leading Muslims at Delhi, he got their approval to a new formula (called Delhi Muslim Proposals) which provided for joint electorates, with reservation of seats for the Muslims; separation of Sind from Bombay; raising of the status of Baluchistan and North-West Frontier to that of Governor's provinces; fixing of Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal Assemblies on the basis of their population; and allocation of one-third seats in the Central Legislature to the Muslims. These proposals were considered so reasonable that the All India Congress Committee accepted them as early as May. Later in Decemebr the plenary session of the Congress also accepted them. But, as the Assembly elections of 1926 had shown, the Mahasabha had a larger following among the Hindus than the Congress, and because the Mahasabha was opposed to Jinnah's proposals, nothing came out of this move. Jinnah, however, did not lose hope.

In November 1927, the British Government appointed a statutory Commission, headed by Sir John Simon, to elicit Indian public opinion with a view to make recommendations for constitutional reforms. The Commission did not have any Indian member on it and many Indian leaders felt that they had been insulted. Jinnah was one of them. He, therefore, decided that, like the Congress, the League should completely boycott the Commission and, as a consequence the League was split, with one of its groups led by Mian Muhammad Shafi deciding to cooperate fully with the statutory body.

The reason which the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, had given for the all-white panel of the Commission was

that the British Government wanted a unanimous report. This in itself suggested that the British and Indian leaders thought differently about the future of India. Birkenhead had also challenged the Indians to produce a constitution which would be generally acceptable to the peoples of India.

Congress leaders took up this challenge and decided to frame a constitution. At their suggestion, the All Parties Conference, on which all the non-cooperating groups were represented, appointed a committee, with Motilal Nehru as its chairman, to determine the principles of India's constitution. Under pressure from the Hindu Mahasabha and the Sikh League, this committee, *inter alia*, recommended that in the Central Assembly Muslims should get seats according to their population (which was about 25%) as against one-third seats agreed to by the Congress at the time of the Lucknow Pact, opposed reservation of seats for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal Assemblies and gave residuary powers to the Central Legislature. Almost all Muslim leaders opposed these and several other recommendations.

The recommendations of the Nehru Committee were to be considered at a convention of the All Parties Conference at Calcutta in December 1928. While a large number of Muslim leaders decided to have nothing to do with this convention, Jinnah made a bid to make the Committee's recommendations acceptable to the Muslims. With this end in view, representatives of Jinnah's wing of the League and at Jinnah's persuasion, some members of the Khilafat committee, attended the convention and asked for certain modifications in the recommendations.

Jinnah particularly wanted reservation of one-third of the elected seats in the Central Legislature for the Muslims, Muslim representation in the Punjab and Bengal Assemblies on the basis of their population in the two provinces in case adult franchise was not introduced, and allocation of the residuary powers to the provinces. In moving his amendments, Jinnah said:

“What we want is that Hindus and Musalmans should march together until our object is achieved. Therefore, it is essential that you must get not only the Muslim League

but the Musalmans of India, and here I am not speaking as a Musalman but as an Indian. It is my desire to see that we get seven crores of Musalmans to march along with us in the struggle for freedom. Would you be content with a few? Would you be content if I were to say I am with you? Do you want or do you not want Muslim India to go along with you? You must remember the two major communities in India are Hindus and Musalmans and naturally, therefore, these two communities have got to be reconciled and united and made to feel that their interests are common and they are marching together for a common goal."

But the convention was not prepared to accept Jinnah's amendments, though admittedly reasonable. Jinnah then felt so disappointed that he is reported to have told a Parsee friend, with tears in his eyes, that he and the Hindu leaders had come to "the parting of the ways". And thus ended in failure Jinnah's second attempt to reconcile the Hindus and the Muslims on the basis of joint electorates.



## JINNAH DISAPPOINTED WITH HINDU ATTITUDE

ONE of the arguments which had been put forward at the convention of the All Parties Conference to reject Jinnah's amendments was that he was not representative of Muslim opinion. In a sense this was true, because a very large number of Muslim leaders then stood for separate electorates. In fact, only a few days after the convention, Muslim leaders of various schools of thought were holding at Delhi an All-Parties Muslim Conference to reiterate their stand.

In this situation it was apparent to Jinnah that if he was to work for a Hindu-Muslim understanding, he must represent the majority opinion amongst the Muslims. He, therefore, gave up his own stand on the electorate issue, and lent support to the decisions of the All-Parties Muslim Conference. *Inter alia*, this conference demanded complete autonomy and residuary powers for the provinces, separate electorates for the Muslims and enforcement of the double vote clause for communal issues, weightage in representation of Muslims in the provinces where they were in a minority, and a fair share in all cabinets and government services. In March 1929, Jinnah voted with the Muslim members in the Central Assembly in rejecting the Nehru Committee's report.

To clarify his position further, also in March 1929, Jinnah framed his famous fourteen points in which he said that the future constitution of India should be federal, residuary powers should vest in the provinces, Muslim representation in the Central Legislature should be at least one-third, Sind should be separated from Bombay, reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier

and Baluchistan provinces, separate electorates should continue for the Muslims, and, in the case of bills relating to communal matters, the double vote clause should also apply, every cabinet should have at least one-third Muslim ministers, and any change in the constitution should be subject to the concurrence of all the federating provinces.

In June 1929, Jinnah urged the British Prime Minister to declare that in due course India would become self-governing, and to invite Indian leaders to meet British statesmen in a conference for the purpose of reaching an agreement about the future constitution of India. Sir John Simon had also suggested a conference between Indian and British leaders. Accordingly, a round table conference was convened in London in November 1930. The Congress decided to boycott the conference and to start a campaign of civil disobedience. But many prominent non-Congress Hindu leaders as well as leaders of minority communities attended it. Jinnah then reiterated his stand on the need for an understanding between the Hindus and Muslims. Addressing the delegates, he said: "Unless you create that sense of security among the minorities which will secure a willing cooperation and allegiance to the State, no constitution that you may frame, will work successfully."

But the conference could not arrive at a solution of the communal problem. The Hindu and Sikh delegates would not accept the Muslim demands, more particularly the principle of separate electorates and representation of Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal Assemblies in proportion to their population. Jinnah, it seems, wanted to break the deadlock. As he disclosed some months later at a conference:

"As to the most important question, which to my mind is the question of Hindu-Muslim settlement—all I can say to you is that I honestly believe that the Hindus should concede to the Muslim a majority in the Punjab and Bengal, and if that is conceded, I think a settlement can be arrived at in a very short time. The next question that arises is one of separate vs joint electorates. As most of you know, if a majority is conceded in the Punjab and Bengal, I would

personally prefer a settlement on the basis of joint electorates. But I also know that there is a very large body of Muslims—and I believe a majority of Muslims—who are holding on to separate electorates. My position is that I would rather have a settlement even on the footing of separate electorates, hoping and trusting that when we work our new constitution and when both Hindus and Muslims get rid of distrust, suspicion and fears, and when they get their freedom, we could rise to the occasion—and probably separate electorates will go sooner than most of us think.”

But Jinnah was not able to make any move because he knew that the other delegates thought differently. When the communal issue was referred to a sub-committee, Jinnah declined even to serve on it because he was convinced that the sub-committee would not be able to find a solution.

Interestingly though, Jinnah's reading of the situation proved correct. The communal question was not resolved at the first round table conference. At the second conference convened in September 1931, Gandhi, who had earlier signed a peace pact with the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, became the sole representative and spokesman of the Congress. He claimed to be the representative of all India and frequently said that he wanted a general agreement. In fact, he convened several informal meetings to find a solution of the communal problem but he was not prepared to concede any of the demands put forward by the Muslim delegates. Incredible though it seems, he ultimately asked the Muslim and other delegates to accept the Nehru report in its totality, which the Muslims and several other minorities had already rejected. In desperation the delegates of all the minorities (except the Sikhs) came together and framed their agreed proposals to safeguard minority interests. But these proposals were unacceptable to Gandhi, resulting in a deadlock. And so far as the issue of the representation of the various communities in the legislatures was concerned, the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald had to give his own award.

Jinnah was obviously disillusioned at the deliberations in

the two round table conferences and as a reaction decided to settle down in London. Some years later he described his disappointment in these words: "I received the shock of my life at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope for unity . . . . The Muslims were like the dwellers in no man's land."

Although Jinnah liked his life in London, he could not stay there for long. In July 1933, Liaquat Ali Khan, later to become the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, impressed upon Jinnah that Indian Muslims badly needed his guidance. Liaquat then obviously had in mind the new scheme of reforms which was at that time being considered by the Joint Select Committee of the British Parliament. Jinnah returned to India early in 1934 and decided to try once again for an understanding between the Hindus and the Muslims. Speaking at the meeting of the Council of the Muslim League in April, he declared:

"India looks forward to a real, solid, united front. Can we even at this eleventh hour bury the hatchet, and forget the past in the presence of the imminent danger and close our ranks to get sufficient strength to resist what is being hatched both at Downing Street and in Delhi? It is upto the leaders to put their heads together and nothing will give me greater happiness than to bring about complete cooperation and friendship between Hindus and Muslims; and in this desire, my impression is that I have the solid support of Musalmans."

Jinnah was thinking of the White Paper which the Joint Select Committee was then studying. He thought that it contained a "treacherous scheme" and he was anxious that it should not be forced upon India. This, he was convinced, could be done only when there was unity between the two major Indian communities.

The unity for which Jinnah was anxious could not be achieved and the White Paper ultimately became the new Government of India Act in 1935. The Act provided for three lists of subjects: federal, concurrent and provincial. Two of the most important



subjects, defence and external affairs, were made the responsibility of the Governor-General. A strong central government was provided at the federal level, in which the Hindus were bound to dominate. The provinces were made autonomous in certain defined areas and every province was given a Council of Ministers which was to administer all the subjects and was responsible to the legislature. However, the Governors were given special responsibility to watch the interests of minorities and the civil services and to prevent any grave menace to peace and tranquillity.

The Act disappointed most Indians. The Hindus were critical of the communal award also, which had been incorporated in the Act. They said that it disrupted the unity of India and was inconsistent with the principles of democracy. Jinnah's attitude was positive. As he declared in the Central Assembly in February 1935, he himself was unhappy with it but he was prepared to accept it because despite onerous and continuous efforts, the Indian leaders were not able to reach a settlement. In this situation, Jinnah argued, if the award was not accepted, no constitutional scheme would be possible.

But Jinnah had an open mind and was prepared for an alternative formula, which would be acceptable to both the Hindus and Muslims. When the Congress President Rajendra Prasad suggested that negotiations be held to resolve the matter, Jinnah readily agreed. Accordingly Jinnah and the Congress President held talks between January and March 1935 but the alternative formula which they evolved was not acceptable to some Congress leaders themselves. So far as the extremist Hindu leaders were concerned, most of them opposed the proposed formula. Hindu attitude once again completely shocked Jinnah.





*A view of the procession at the time of All-India Muslim League annual session at Allahabad in 1942*



*The Quaid-i-Azam with Rajagopalacharia*



The Quaid-i-Azam with Egyptian leaders and the Mufti of Palestine in Cairo (December, 1946)



The Quaid-i-Azam with Muslim League leaders at Lahore at the residence of Mian Bashir Ahmed (1940)

## JINNAH'S REACTION TO HINDU MAJORITY RULE

ONE part of the new Government of India Act, which dealt with the provinces, came into operation as from 1 April 1937. The Congress had decided to reject this part of the Act also, while the Muslim League, under Jinnah's advice, had decided to utilise it "for what it is worth". But the Congress also contested the elections which were held in the winter of 1936-37. In fact, the Congress had started preparations for the elections as early as 1934 and had collected enormous funds and had pressed into service thousands of volunteers to fight the elections. The League came into the field two years later and with a very weak organisation and little financial backing. But this situation did not worry Jinnah. He was hoping that the two communities would reach an agreement between themselves. He was interested in organising the Muslims separately only because he thought that this would make an agreement between the two communities easy. As he stated in March 1936: "The Hindus and the Muslims must be organised separately and once they are organised they will understand each other better and then we will not have to wait for years for an understanding . . ."

The election results were not surprising. Out of a total of 492 seats reserved for Muslims in the Provincial Assemblies, the League won only 108. The Congress won 711 seats out of a total of 1,585 but in the case of Muslim seats it also showed very poor results, for it contested only 58 seats and won as few as 26. In the Congress organisation itself Muslim representation was nominal—6 out of 143 in the All India Congress Committee in 1936. Even so, Jawaharlal Nehru had declared: "There are only two forces in

India today: British imperialism and Indian nationalism as represented by the Congress." And this was in sharp contrast to the League's policy of cooperation with other parties laid down in the election manifesto saying that "there would be free cooperation with any group or groups whose aims and ideals are approximately the same as those of the League party". Jinnah was, therefore, indignant with Nehru's statement and retorted: "There is a third party, namely, the Muslims. We are not going to be dictated by anybody."

Nehru was not unaware of the fact that the vast majority of the Muslims was outside the Congress. This, he thought, was due to the propaganda of some Muslim leaders who had created the communal problem although the Hindu and Muslim masses had no differences. Nehru, therefore, soon started a campaign for bringing the Muslims into the Congress fold but it yielded no results and had soon to be given up.

In May 1937 Jinnah appealed to Gandhi to use his influence in the Congress to encourage a settlement between the Congress and the League. But Gandhi expressed his inability to do anything in the matter. This was perhaps due to the fact that at that time the Congress was planning to reverse its earlier stand of not forming ministries in the provinces in which it had won majorities. By June the Congress decided to form ministries and then the question of Muslim representation in the Hindu majority provinces arose. In the United Provinces, where the Congress had won only one Muslim seat as against the League's 26, Congress offered to the League a share in the ministry, provided the League members of the Assembly would become members of the Congress Party, the Muslim League Parliamentary Board would be dissolved and, in the case of future bye-elections, the League would not put up its own candidates but support Congress nominees. Understandably such kind of participation was unacceptable to the League, whereupon the Congress formed one-party ministries in all the provinces where it found it possible.

Once installed in power, Congress adopted a number of measures which were unacceptable to Muslims. These included



the singing of the *Bande Mataram* song, which was idolatrous as well as anti-Muslim, before the Assembly proceedings began, hoisting of the Congress Party flag on Government and public buildings, and in the United Provinces substitution of Hindi for Urdu in Government schools. One result of these measures was that communal riots once again became frequent. Another result was that Muslim leaders of different schools of thought realised that unless they were united, there was hardly any future for the Muslims in India.

This was the background of the Muslim League session which was held at Lucknow in October 1937. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, who had formed a coalition government in the Punjab, attended this session and pledged his support to Jinnah in all-India matters. He also asked Muslim members of his Unionist Party to join the League. Similarly, A. K. Fazlul Haq, who had formed a coalition government in Bengal, attended the session and asked Muslim members of his Krishak Proja Party to become members of the League. So did Sir Muhammad Saadullah, Chief Minister of Assam.

In his presidential address, Jinnah strongly criticised the Congress on several counts. "The present leadership of the Congress," he said,

"specially during the last ten years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more, by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu, and since they have formed the governments in six provinces where they were in a majority they have by their words, deeds and programmes shown, more and more, that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair-play at their hands . . . . On the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand, that Hindustan is for the Hindus . . . . The result of the present Congress Party policy will be, I venture to say, class bitterness, communal war . . . ."

Jinnah realised that the foundations of the Muslim community

were very weak and it badly needed economic and social advance. He, therefore, told his audience: "... your foremost duty is to formulate a constructive and ameliorative programme of work for the people's welfare, and to devise ways and means for the social, economic and political uplift of the Musalmans."

But Jinnah was not thinking of the Muslims as a separate nation at this stage. He only wanted the Muslim masses to be organised and the League to become a powerful body. He therefore said: "I entreat and implore that every man, woman and child should rally round the common platform and flag of the All India Muslim League". A powerful League, Jinnah thought, would be able to negotiate an honourable settlement with the Congress, on which he was still very keen.

Muslims responded to Jinnah's call in a very big way and branches of the League sprang up even in small places. Within three months 170 new branches were set up, of which 90, with an enrolment of about 100,000 new members were in the United Provinces alone.

Jinnah's criticism of the Congress and the growing strength of the League led to some activity amongst Congress leaders. Gandhi, who had earlier ignored Jinnah's plea for a settlement, now wrote to say that he read in Jinnah's Lucknow speech "a declaration of war" and felt greatly disturbed. The two leaders exchanged letters for several months but there was no result because Gandhi was not prepared to accept the League as the mouthpiece of Indian Muslims.

About the same time Jinnah wrote to Nehru pointing out Muslim grievances in the Congress-governed provinces. But Nehru, too, was not prepared to see Jinnah's point of view. Indeed he specifically pointed out that although he regarded the Muslim League as "an important communal organisation", he could not ignore other Muslim organisations. Jinnah was firm on his stand that unless the League was recognised by the Congress "on a footing of complete equality and is prepared as such to negotiate for a Hindu-Muslim settlement", there could be no solution of the Indian problem. In 1938 Jinnah and Subhash Chandra Bose, the new Presi-

dent of the Congress, also exchanged correspondence. Jinnah then reminded Bose that the Congress had recognised the representative character of the League as far back as 1916 and that position had not been questioned till recently. But nothing came out of these negotiations also.

Also in 1938, at the suggestion of Jinnah, a women's sub-committee, which included such well known persons as Miss Fatima Jinnah, Lady Abdullah Haroon, Mrs. Ispahani, Begum Nawab Ismail Khan and Begum Shah Nawaz, was formed. This committee did very good work and a large number of Muslim women left the All India Women's Conference and supported the Muslim League.

In spite of Jinnah's talks with Congress leaders and the publication of Muslim grievances in Congress-governed provinces in the Pirpur Report in 1938 there was not the slightest change in the policies of Congress Governments. Besides, Hindu-Muslim riots continued and according to one estimate in the two-year period from October 1937 at least 85 serious riots occurred, in which 170 persons were killed and about 2,000 received injuries. In fact, in 1939 it came to be widely believed that if the Congress Governments continued in power for some time more, civil war on an unprecedented scale might break out.

Civil war in India was averted by the Second World War which broke out in Europe and in which Britain became a party on 3 September 1939. Congress then took the stand that Britain had dragged India into the war without the consent of its people. In compliance with the directive of the Congress high command, Congress ministries in all the provinces resigned by mid-November 1939. Jinnah then announced that Muslims would observe 22 December as the Day of Deliverance and Thanks-giving to demonstrate their relief at the end of Congress tyranny and oppression.

But even in that atmosphere Jinnah did not rule out the possibility of a settlement between the two major Indian communities. Speaking at a function of the old boys of Osmania University in September 1939, Jinnah said: "Within the honest meaning of the term I still remain a nationalist . . . I have always believed in a Hindu-Muslim pact. But such a pact can only be an honourable

one . . . One does not see much light at present but you never can say when the two communities would unite." On 1 January 1940, Jinnah wrote to Gandhi and urged him to use his influence to bring about an understanding between Hindus and Muslims: "More than any one else, you happen to be the man who commands the confidence of Hindu India and are in a position to deliver goods on their behalf . . . I believe that you might still use your stature in the service of the country and make your proper contribution towards leading India to contentment and happiness."

But the Congress leaders continued to adhere to the thesis, albeit technically correct, that the Congress was a non-communal body, and to ignore the obvious reality that the vast majority of Congressmen were Hindus and it was the Muslim League which commanded the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of the Indian Muslims and for that reason, by any standard, it alone could represent them. Jinnah's final reaction was that the Indian Muslims should have a separate homeland.

## JINNAH DEFENDS HIS NEW DEMAND

**P**RESIDING over the 1930 session of the Muslim League at Allahabad, poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal had expressed the view that the principle of democracy (with its implication of majority rule), was inapplicable to the Indian conditions and that at least in the north-west of India Muslims should have a self-governing state of their own. In 1933, Chaudhri Rahmat Ali of Cambridge had asked for a separate independent Muslim state, to be known as Pakistan, comprising of the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. In 1937 Iqbal had strongly pleaded with Jinnah for the redistribution of the country on the basis of religious, linguistic and racial affinities and had argued that the Muslims of north-western and eastern India were entitled to self-determination:

To my mind the new constitution, with its idea of a single Indian federation, is completely hopeless. A separate federation of Muslim provinces, reformed on lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of north-west India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are?

In 1938 the Sind Muslim League, meeting under the presidentship of Jinnah, had passed a resolution which recorded its disapproval of the scheme of the federation as contained in the Act of 1935 and had asked the All-India Muslim League to frame a constitution which would provide for the independence of Muslim India.

But all these years Jinnah was working hard for a Hindu-Muslim understanding and hoping that the Hindu leaders would show some flexibility in their attitude to the communal issue. As late as January 1940, Jinnah had suggested in an article in a British weekly journal: "... a constitution must be evolved that recognises that there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a constitution, the Muslims are ready to cooperate with the British Government, the Congress or any party..." However, there had been no response from the Hindus and in February 1940 Jinnah came to believe that the Hindus were not prepared for any understanding with the Muslims. Jinnah then decided to demand a separate independent state for the Muslims.

At the 1940 session of the Muslim League at Lahore, Jinnah declared:

It has always been taken for granted mistakenly that the Musalmans are a minority... The Musalmans are not a minority. The Musalmans are a nation by any definition... What the unitary Government of India for 150 years had failed to achieve cannot be realised by the imposition of a central federal government... The problem in India is not of an inter-communal character but manifestly of an international character, and it must be treated as such... The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs and literature... they belong to two different civilisations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions.

Jinnah asked the British rulers, who had all the authority, to divide India into autonomous states. He impressed upon the rulers that the divided states would not be unfriendly to each other. In fact, he thought that "the rivalry and the natural desire and efforts on the part of the one (community) to dominate the social order and establish political supremacy over the other in the government of the country will disappear. It will lead more towards natural goodwill by international pacts between them (the states)

and they can live in complete harmony with their neighbours."

In making his demand Jinnah, of course, knew that it would not in any way help the Muslim minorities in the Hindu majority provinces. But there was nothing which he could do about this situation except to ask the Muslims in the minority provinces not to stand in the way of the Muslims of the majority provinces.

In line with Jinnah's thinking the League session passed the famous Pakistan Resolution, which, *inter alia*, provided for the demarcation of contiguous Muslim majority regions in the north-west and east of India into autonomous states.

The demand for a separate homeland caught the imagination of the Indian Muslims throughout the country and from this stage onwards the popularity of the League among the masses grew very rapidly indeed. But the Hindus referred to the demand as the "vivisection of mother India" and bitterly opposed it.

The decision about the Muslim demand had to be made by the British Government, but in 1940 Britain was much more interested in getting India's support for the war effort than in deciding about the future of India. It is understandable that for the war effort the British Government should have wanted support from all sections of the Indian population. And because the views of the two major communities about India's future were diametrically opposed to each other, it was in British interest to try to satisfy both. With this end in view, when the course of the war was causing much alarm in Britain, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, with the approval of the British Government, issued a statement on 8 August 1940. In it, he, *inter alia*, said that the Congress demand for the framing of the constitution of India by an Indian Constituent Assembly would be implemented after the war had ended and that at the same time the interests of the minorities would be safeguarded and for that reason the British Government would not accept any constitution if its authority was "denied by large and powerful elements in India's national life".

It was on this basis that the Viceroy sought the cooperation of both the Congress and the League in the reconstitution of his

Executive Council and the formation of some new bodies. Jinnah sought clarifications of the Viceroy's offer. Although Jinnah was not wholly satisfied with the clarifications given to him, he accepted the offer. But the Viceroy was not willing to give effective representation to the Muslim League in his Council and Jinnah had to decline the offer. So far as the Congress was concerned, it rejected the offer outright on the ground that its demand for the immediate setting up of a national government had not been conceded.

Nevertheless, on Jinnah's advice, the League did not create any difficulties in the way of the war effort. Jinnah had taken the view that it was in the interest of Indians themselves that they should participate in the defence of their country. Accordingly, in the Muslim majority provinces the ministries also helped in the Government's war efforts.

Jinnah busied himself with propagating the ideology and aims of the Muslim League. In March and April 1941 he addressed several large gatherings. In one of his addresses to students, Jinnah said: "It is as clear as daylight that we are not a minority. We are a nation. And a nation must have territory. What is the use of merely saying that we are a nation. A nation does not live in the air. It lives on land, it must govern land and it must have a territorial state and that is what you want to get." Addressing the Madras session of the League, Jinnah declared that "the ideology of the Muslim League is based upon the fundamental principle that the Muslims of India are an independent nationality and that any attempt to get them to merge their national and political identity and unity will not only be resisted but, in my opinion, it will be futile for any one to attempt it."

Some weeks later Jinnah was able to demonstrate that the League had in fact become a powerful body. Linlithgow, it seems, wanted to give Jinnah the impression that the League could be taken for granted. Without consulting the League leadership, he nominated Muslim chief ministers and some other prominent members of the Muslim League to his newly created National Defence Council. Jinnah considered the Viceroy's action in making the appointments behind the back of the League Executive as



“deplorable”. Jinnah was then able to obtain the resignations of the chief ministers as well as some other Muslim Leaguers.

By early 1942 the Japanese had over-run all of Southeast Asia and it was widely believed that their next target would be India. The British Government then sent to India a prominent member of the War Cabinet, Sir Stafford Cripps, with a draft declaration for discussion with the Indian leaders, in which the Government undertook to give effect to any constitution framed by an elected Indian constituent assembly to be set up at the end of the war, subject to the proviso that if such a constitution was not acceptable to any province or state, it could opt out of the Indian Union, retain its present constitutional position, and later frame its own constitution. On this basis Indian leaders were invited to join the Viceroy's Executive Council to cooperate in the war effort.

Both the Congress and the League rejected this draft declaration. The Congress took the view that the declaration amounted to recognition of the principle of Pakistan and it did not provide for an immediate *de facto* transfer of power. The League's objection was that the declaration had not conceded the Muslim demand unequivocally. Congress leaders soon came to believe that Japan was shortly going to over-run India. They, therefore, demanded that British power should be immediately withdrawn from India. In the pursuit of this demand the Congress also launched its “Quit India” Movement which led to serious and widespread disorders in many parts of India. The League leadership thought that the Congress movement was also aimed at dealing a mortal blow to the goal of Pakistan. Jinnah, therefore, advised the Muslims to keep aloof from the movement. Jinnah then asked the British Government to “Divide and Quit”.

By 1943 Jinnah had good reasons to be satisfied with the results of his work to consolidate and vitalise the League. Apart from the very large following among the Muslim masses, the League then also controlled ministries in four provinces, Assam, Bengal, Sind, and the Punjab. The goal of Pakistan looked nearer and Jinnah then gave expression to some of his views on the proposed Muslim state.

The most important task before the Muslims, in Jinnah's view, was the framing of a constitution, which, he said, must reflect the wishes of the people and the *millat*. He asked the people to give thought to the constitution and choose their representatives for this task. He personally visualised that the constitution-making body should be "based on a very low franchise". Jinnah also said that the constitution to be framed should ensure democratic government and social justice. "Democracy", he said, "is in your blood. It is in your marrows. Only centuries of adverse circumstances have made the circulation of that blood cold."

Jinnah was emphatic about social justice. He wanted the richer classes to think of the poor. Jinnah, in fact, thought that the rich owed a duty to the poor. He, therefore, asked them to adjust their thinking to the changed circumstances. Referring to the landlords and the industrialists, Jinnah declared:

"The exploitation of the masses has gone into their blood. They have forgotten the lesson of Islam. Greed and selfishness have made these people subordinate the interests of others in order to fatten themselves . . . There are millions and millions of people who hardly get one meal a day. Is this civilisation? Is this the aim of Pakistan? If they are wise they will have to adjust themselves to the modern conditions of life. If they don't, God help them: we shall not help them."

## PAKISTAN SCHEME EXAMINED

THE wide support which the Pakistan demand had received from Muslim masses as well as classes made it impossible for the Congress to merely donounce it. Chakravati Rajagopalachari, a former chief minister of Madras province, prepared a formula to serve as a basis of settlement between the Congress and the League. In February 1943 he showed it to Gandhi who approved it. The formula provided that the Muslim League should endorse the Congress demand for independence and cooperate with the Congress in the formation of an interim government, that the Congress would agree to the setting up, on the termination of the war, of a commission to demarcate Muslim majority contiguous areas, where a plebiscite would be held to decide the issue of a separate State, and that if the plebiscite resulted in favour of separation, mutual agreements would be made for safeguarding defence, communications, commerce, and other essential matters.

Although the terms of the formula mitigated against the Pakistan demand, Jinnah agreed to discuss it with Gandhi in September 1944, when the two leaders considered other proposals also. During the negotiations, Gandhi took the unusual stand that he was meeting Jinnah in his personal capacity and not on behalf of the Congress. Gandhi also said that he was not prepared to accept Jinnah's view that the Indian Muslims constituted a separate nation by themselves and in their own right. Both these propositions were unacceptable to Jinnah.

During the course of talks it also became apparent that what Gandhi really wanted was that the British Government should first withdraw from India, handing over power to the Central Assembly

as then constituted, and that the question of dividing India should be taken up later. To this time table Jinnah was not agreeable for obvious reasons. Jinnah stated his position in these words:

“It would, therefore, be a Hindu majority government which would, when it became a permanent federal government, set up the postwar commission for demarcating frontiers and arranging the plebiscite. I am asked to agree, before the plebiscite and, therefore, before I know what Pakistan will be, to making arrangements on defence, finance, foreign affairs, commerce, customs, communications, etc., as a condition of our being allowed to have any kind of Pakistan at all; and it will be a 75 per cent Hindu majority government with which we shall have to agree . . . This is not independence. It is a form of provincial autonomy, subject always in the most vital matters to an overwhelmingly Hindu federal authority.”

In May 1945 the War ended in Europe. In the following month, Lord Wavell, who had taken over from Linlithgow in the fall of 1943, made a bid for Indian cooperation in the war against Japan. With the approval of the British Government he proposed that his Executive Council should be reconstituted so as to make it almost wholly Indian (the only exceptions being himself and the Commander-in-Chief), and that the Caste Hindus and Muslims should be equally represented on it. At the same time the Viceroy gave the assurance that the proposal to reconstitute the Council in no way prejudiced the settlement of the future constitution of India.

The proposal was discussed by the Viceroy with the Indian leaders in June-July 1945 at a conference in Simla. Jinnah and the Congress leaders then reiterated their old stands on the question of representation in the Council. The result was a deadlock. It was then arranged that Jinnah and Pandit Govind Ballab Pant, former Congress chief minister of the United Provinces, should have a private discussion. This discussion also failed to produce results.

The crucial issue at the conference was how the Indian Muslims were to be represented on the Viceroy's Council. The Congress

wanted that at least one of its nominees should be taken in the Muslim quota. The Viceroy on his part wanted that one prominent Muslim member of the Unionist Party should be included in the Council. Neither of these demands was acceptable to Jinnah who took the stand that the League represented Muslim India and, therefore, the League alone should nominate all the Muslim members.

More importantly, Jinnah looked at the proposal from its likely impact on the Pakistan demand. Since the British Government was not then prepared to concede that demand, Jinnah felt that the League's entry in the Council might work against the Muslim goal. The League, therefore, declined to participate in the proposed reconstituted council. Later Jinnah issued a statement in which he said:

“Our stand has been, and we have repeatedly made it clear to the British Government, times out of number, since 1940, that we cannot consider or enter into any provisional interim government unless a declaration is made by the British Government guaranteeing the right of self-determination of Muslims, and pledging that, after the war, or as soon as it may be possible, the British Government would establish Pakistan, having regard to the basic principles laid down in the Lahore Resolution of the League . . . . We are not a minority but a nation and we can only enter into a provisional arrangement, having regard to the necessities and exigencies of the moment created by the war, and fully cooperate in the prosecution of war, and that in this arrangement we claimed an equal number in the proposed Executive. The Wavell proposals set at naught both these conditions . . . .”

The Simla Conference had broken down on the claim of the Congress and the Viceroy that the League did not represent Muslim India. This claim could be tested only by a reference to the will of the people. The holding of elections was facilitated by the fact that in Britain the Coalition Government headed by Winston Churchill had been replaced in July 1945 by a Labour

Government which was keen to transfer power to the Indians as soon as possible. In August, Japan surrendered and under instructions from the new British Government, the Viceroy announced the holding of elections in the coming winter. As was expected, the League fought the elections on its two claims that it represented the Indian Muslims and that the Muslims wanted a separate state of their own. The Congress and its allies strongly opposed both these claims.

The election results fully established the claims of the League. It polled about three-fourths of the total Muslim votes cast and won all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly and 425 out of 492 seats in the provincial assemblies.

The claims of the League having been fully established, it was a mere formality that in April 1946 Muslim legislators met in a convention at Delhi and passed a resolution demanding that the Muslim zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the east and the Punjab, North-West Frontier, Sind and Baluchistan in the north-west "be constituted into a sovereign independent State and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay". Speaking at the convention, Jinnah said:

"Our formula gives the Hindus three-fourths of this Subcontinent . . . we shall have only one-fourth, and in this way we can both live according to our ideals, cultures and social construction of the two major nations . . . . We cannot agree to a single constitution-making body, because it will mean our signing our death warrant and we cannot agree to consider any interim arrangement unless the Pakistan scheme is accepted as a *sine qua non*."

In the meanwhile a three-member Cabinet Mission, headed by the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, had arrived in India to confer with the Indian leaders and representatives of princely states and assist in drawing up the future constitution of India. But only a few days before the Mission was to leave for India, the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee had made a statement to the effect that while the British Government was

mindful of the rights of the minorities, it would not "allow a minority to place their veto on the advance of a majority." This had made Jinnah very unhappy and he had issued a statement in which he had said: "I want to reiterate that the Muslims of India are not a minority, but a nation, and self-determination is their birthright."

After conferring with the representatives of the different communities and interests as well as the rulers of Indian states, the Cabinet Mission concentrated on the real problem arising from the opposing views of the Congress and the League. With this end in view, between 5 and 12 May the Mission met representatives of the Congress and the League at a conference at Simla and put before them a formula which provided for a loose centre dealing with defence, foreign affairs, and communications and two groups of provinces, one predominantly Hindu and the other predominantly Muslim dealing with some agreed subjects on a regional basis, leaving the other subjects for administration by the provinces. But no understanding could be reached between the Congress and the League on the basis of this formula.

The Mission then decided to examine the points of view of the two parties. In a statement on 16 May 1946 the Mission expressed the view that although they were "greatly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule", they were not convinced that the partition of the country provided a solution of the communal problem. The Mission put up a plan of its own which provided that there should be a Union of British India as well as the Indian states, which should deal with only three subjects, defence, foreign affairs, and communications; and should have the power to raise the finances needed for handling these subjects. To allay Muslim fears of Hindu majority rule, the plan provided that communal matters in the Union legislature would be decided both by a majority of the members voting and by a majority of Hindu and Muslim members voting separately. Additionally, the plan provided that there would be three groups of provinces, of which two, Assam and Bengal group in the east, and the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and

the North-West Frontier group in the north-west would have Muslim majorities. The three groups were to decide on subjects which they would deal in common and which would be dealt with by the provinces individually.

Jinnah was disappointed with the recommendations of the Cabinet Mission. On 22 May 1946, he issued a statement in which he said that he regretted the Mission's statement in which it had "thought fit to advance commonplace and exploded arguments against Pakistan and to resort to special pleadings couched in a deplorable language which is calculated to hurt the feelings of Muslim India". But Jinnah did not reject the plan. Two days later the Congress Working Committee took the stand that the provinces had the choice to join or not to join the sections to which they had been assigned in the plan. This was immediately rejected by the Mission which, in a statement, said that such grouping was "an essential feature of the scheme".

On 6 June, the League Council met under Jinnah's presidency and decided to accept the Mission's plan. Twenty days later the Congress Working Committee accepted the plan on the understanding that "there is sufficient scope for enlarging and strengthening the central authority and for fully ensuring the right of a province to act according to its choice in regard to grouping". On 10 July the new Congress President, Nehru, publicly stated that the Congress had agreed to go into the constituent assembly and "we have agreed to nothing else." "What we do there, we are entirely and absolutely free to determine. We have committed ourselves on no single matter to any body." On the question of grouping, Nehru said that "the big probability is from any approach to the question, there will be no grouping".

It was obvious from Nehru's remarks that the Congress was determined to use its majority in the constitution-making body to twist the Mission's plan and to draw up a constitution to its own liking. Understandably Jinnah said that Nehru had repudiated the Mission's plan, which the League had accepted in good faith. Jinnah was thus led into having second thoughts about the Mission's plan.



## BRITISH PLAN TO KEEP INDIA UNITED FAILS

THE Cabinet Mission's plan had also provided for the setting up of an Interim Coalition Government. Because the Interim Government was proposed to be set up immediately and it was to inherit almost all authority, the Congress leaders were anxious to have a controlling voice in it. The Viceroy's original idea was that the proposed government should consist of 5 Congressmen, 5 Leaguers and 2 representatives of the smaller minorities. This would have given the League an effective 40% representation in the new government and just for that reason the Congress refused to accept the proposal. The Congress instead proposed that there should be 15 members, of which only 4 should be from the Muslim League. The Viceroy then suggested that the strength be raised to 13, six Congressmen, five Leaguers and two others. Even this proposal was unacceptable to the Congress.

Thereupon the Viceroy, with the approval of the Cabinet Mission, issued on 16 June 1946 a statement in which he said that the new government would have 14 members, of whom 6 will be Congressmen, 5 Muslim Leaguers, one Sikh, one Indian Christian and one Parsee. It was specifically mentioned in the statement: "In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a Coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Government which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the Statement of May 16th."

This 'final' offer was also unacceptable to the Congress and it started secret negotiations with the members of the Cabinet Mission. On the other hand, the League, on the clear understanding

that there would be no further modification of the composition of the government accepted the offer. The secret negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of the offer, much to the surprise of those who did not know what was going on behind the scene. Naturally Jinnah was very angry and said: "I maintain that the Cabinet Mission and Viceroy have gone back on their word within ten days of the publication of their final proposals in not implementing the statement of 16 June and I fully endorse what has been put so well—'statesmen should not eat their words'."

It was in this situation that a meeting of the Council of the League was convened at Bombay in the last week of July. Before the Council met, the Viceroy made a fresh proposal for the formation of the Interim Government. But it was practically the same as the last offer and was rejected by both the Congress and the League. At the Council meeting Jinnah explained that the League had made "concession after concession" because of its "extreme anxiety for an amicable and peaceful settlement which would lead not only the Muslims, but also other communities inhabiting this subcontinent to the achievement of freedom" while the Congress had "done the greatest harm to the peoples of India by its pettifogging attitude" and had "no other consideration" except "to down the Muslim League". Jinnah also bitterly criticised the role of the Cabinet Mission and said that although the Congress had accepted the long-term plan with its own interpretation, which for all practical purposes amounted to its rejection, the Mission had taken the Congress acceptance as genuine and had gone back "on their plighted word". In this situation Jinnah felt that Pakistan was the only solution of the Indian problem.

The League Council decided to withdraw its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission plan. By another resolution the Council decided that "now the time has come for the Muslim nation to resort to direct action and achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour, and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination . . ." However, on 31 July, Jinnah clarified that by direct action the League was not declaring war against anybody.

The results of the secret negotiations became known on 6 August 1946 when the Viceroy invited Nehru to form the interim government. On 16 August, which had been declared by the League as Direct Action Day, there occurred serious communal riots in Calcutta where the Muslims formed 24% of the total population. These riots led to much strained relations between the Hindus and the Muslims throughout the country. On 24 August the Viceroy announced the new Interim Government which was to take office on 2 September. This list contained names of three non-League Muslims against the quota earmarked for the Muslim League. After the announcement, Wavell asked for the League's cooperation. Jinnah then replied: "The Viceroy has committed a double betrayal in going back on his solemn word in ignoring and by-passing the Muslim League."

Because of the very explosive communal situation, the Viceroy became anxious to bring the League in the interim government. He, therefore, met Jinnah on 16 and 25 September and discussed the disputed issues both in the Interim Government and the constitutional formula. Jinnah remained dissatisfied but at the same time he felt that the League's non-participation in the Interim Government was going against Muslim interests. He, therefore, decided that the League should join the government. About the long-term plan, Jinnah took the stand that he would call a meeting of the League Council as soon as he was satisfied that constitution-making would proceed according to the procedure laid down in the statement of 16 May.

In the second week of October communal riots broke out in some areas of Noakhali district in Bengal where the Muslims were in a majority. Although these riots were on a very much smaller scale than in Calcutta, the Hindu press published terrible and deliberately false stories, saying that the Hindus had suffered heavy casualties. Out of revenge, the Hindus started, in the first week of November, planned massacre of Muslims in the Muslim minority province of Bihar. According to Lt. General Sir Francis Tuker, who was in charge of the Eastern Command: "Of all the terrible doings of 1946, this fearful carnage was the most shocking. Its

most dastardly side was that great mobs of Hindus turned suddenly, but with every preparation for the deed, upon the few Muslims who lived and whose forefathers had lived in amity and trust all their lives among these very Hindu neighbours." Jinnah was very deeply touched by this tragedy and in a statement said: "... the tragedy of Bihar has eclipsed what are mere specks elsewhere. I condemn brutality in any shape or form, but the Bihar tragedy has no parallel or precedent in this record of cold-blooded butchery of the Muslim minority in the various parts of the country committed by the majority Hindu community." The Bihar killing was followed soon by another massacre of Muslims in Garhmukteshwar in the United Provinces, where, according to the British General quoted earlier, "practically every Muslim man, woman and child was murdered with appalling cruelty".

Meanwhile, the newly elected Constituent Assembly had been summoned to meet on 9 December and the Congress was insisting that either the League should decide to participate in the work of constitution-making or it should leave the government. Jinnah pointed out that the Congress had not genuinely accepted the statement of 16 May and was insisting on its own untenable interpretation about the powers of Constituent Assembly and the grouping of provinces. He also said that the communal atmosphere was far from conducive to the work of constitution-making and it was much more important that everybody's attention should be concentrated on restoring law and order and rehabilitating those unfortunate people who had become refugees. But the Congress continued to insist on its demand.

In a final bid to resolve the differences between the Congress and the League, the British Government invited the Viceroy, Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat and the Sikh leader Baldev Singh to a meeting in London. But the attitude of the Congress underwent no change whatsoever. Ultimately on 6 December the British Government issued a statement, in which it said that the Congress interpretation of the grouping clause was incorrect and urged the Congress leaders to re-consider their stand to enable the Muslim League to participate in the Constituent Assembly.

The Congress leaders criticised this statement and on 15 December Nehru stated: "Whatever form of constitution we may decide in the Constituent Assembly will become the constitution of free India—whether Britain accepts it or not . . . We cannot and will not tolerate any outside interference . . ." On 22 December the Working Committee of the Congress resolved that the interpretation of the British Government did not conform to the "fundamental basis" of the Cabinet Mission's plan. The All India Congress Committee meeting on 5 January 1947, passed a very equivocal resolution, in which it advised the Congress that the interpretation of the British Government might be accepted with regard to procedure in the sections but it "must be clearly understood" that "this must not involve any compulsion of a province and the rights of the Sikhs in the Punjab should not be jeopardised. In the event of any attempt at such compulsion, a province or part of a province has the right to take such action as may be deemed necessary in order to give effect to the wishes of the people concerned."

Jinnah extended his stay in London by some days after the meetings with the British Government leaders. During his stay, in an interview with Reuter, he said that he had no doubt that India and Pakistan would live as friendly neighbours. Later he addressed a meeting of the Muslim League Branch in Britain in which he explained that the League had gone to the utmost limit in trying to reach a settlement with the Congress but the Congress had not budged an inch. He then also established an Information Centre of the Muslim League in London. When he was returning, Jinnah broke journey in Cairo and met, amongst others, the King of Egypt and the Grand Mufti of Palestine.

The Congress attitude to the British Government's statement of 6 December naturally dissatisfied Jinnah. But he did not take the final decision in a hurry. He called a meeting of the Working Committee of the League at the end of January 1947. The committee considered the entire situation in depth and came to the conclusion that the qualifications which had been made in the Congress resolution "confer the right of veto within the section on 'a province' and what is more absurd on 'a part of a province'

as well as the Sikhs of the Punjab, and, therefore, they completely nullify the advice or so-called acceptance by the Congress of 6 December statement." The League, therefore, decided not to participate in the work of the Constituent Assembly. Thus, ultimately, British efforts to keep India united failed.

## PAKISTAN DEMAND CONCEDED

THE continued boycott of the Constituent Assembly by the Muslim League forced the British Government to make some new move about the future of India. Accordingly, on 20 February 1947, Prime Minister Attlee made a statement in which he said: "The present state of uncertainty is fraught with danger and cannot be indefinitely prolonged. His Majesty's Government wish to make it clear that it is their definite intention to take the necessary steps to effect the transference of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June 1948." At the same time it was announced that Wavell was being replaced by Lord Mountbatten, who assumed office on 24 March.

With the fixation of the date of the transfer of power, the Hindus and the Congress tried to put pressure on Jinnah in different ways. The communal riots became more frequent and spread to many other parts of India. A new move adopted by the Congress leaders was to impress upon Jinnah that if he insisted on a separate state, the two Muslim majority provinces of the Punjab and Bengal would have to be partitioned. Sardar Vallabhai Patel, the strongman of the Congress, thought that the British Government would not agree to the division of the two provinces. "In the end they (the British Government) will see the wisdom of handing over the reins of government to the strongest party."

The new Viceroy was alarmed by the communal riots and asked the Congress leaders and Jinnah to issue a joint peace appeal. Jinnah readily agreed. It was soon brought to Jinnah's notice that in the Punjab the Sikhs, under the leadership of Master Tara Singh, had made plans to destroy the Muslims and to set up their own state,

Khalistan. Jinnah was requested that the Muslims should be allowed to form a counter force to fight the Sikhs. Jinnah's reply was typical of his intellectual honesty: "How can you expect me to approve of such a scheme: I am not a hypocrite. I have just signed the peace appeal and I expect the Musalmans to observe the spirit of the appeal."

After his discussions with the Congress and League leaders, Mountbatten was left in no doubt that it was no longer possible to keep India united. He accordingly prepared a plan which provided "demission of authority to the provinces, or to such confederations of provinces as might decide to group themselves in the intervening period before the actual transfer of power". The plan was sent to the British Government for approval and the Viceroy requested that sanction be accorded by 10 May, 1947.

Early in May, Mountbatten arrived in Simla. His Hindu constitutional adviser, V. P. Menon, who also had the confidence of Sardar Patel, then revealed that Patel was prepared to accept transfer of power on the basis of dominion status although Congress had decided that India would be an independent sovereign republic. Patel's only condition was that power should be transferred in two months, which means that Pakistan would hardly get any time to set up its administrative machinery. Some days later Nehru came to Simla as Mountbatten's guest. On 10 May Mountbatten showed to Nehru the partition plan as amended by the British Government. Nehru at once rejected the plan. Thereupon Mountbatten asked Menon to prepare a fresh plan. The new plan provided dominion status as an interim arrangement, and, after ascertaining the wishes of the people, transfer of authority to one or two successor states as the case may be. Mountbatten put it to Jinnah that in case the League would not agree to accept the new plan, the British Government would be left with no option but to hand over power to one Interim Government on the basis of dominion status. The Viceroy personally took the plan to London so as to get the approval of the British Government as soon as possible.

When the Viceroy returned to India on 31 May he invited the Congress and League leaders to approve of the partition plan,



which provided for the setting up on 15 August 1947 of two Dominions, each with its own governor general, the division of the provinces of the Punjab and Bengal on the basis of the Muslim and non-Muslim majority districts if the members of the assemblies of the two provinces so desired, referendum in the North-West Frontier Province and the Sylhet district of Assam Province to determine the preference of the people of the two regions in respect of their joining either of them. In the case of Sind there was to be a vote of the assembly and the elders in Baluchistan were to decide the future of their provinces. If the votings went in favour of two separate states, two constituent assemblies would be set up, and two boundary commissions would be appointed, one to demarcate the final boundaries of the two Punjabs and the other of two Bengals and Sylhet. Jinnah's reaction to the plan was that he would place it before the League's Council for its consideration. Mountbatten, as reported by Alan Campbell-Johnson, then told Jinnah: "If that is your attitude, then the leaders of the Congress Party and Sikhs will refuse final acceptance . . . ; chaos will follow, and you will lose your Pakistan, probably for good." Jinnah reacted by saying: "What must be, must be."

Earlier it had been announced by the British Government that when India became independent, paramountcy of the British Government over the Indian princely states would lapse and the states would become free to join either successor state or to become independent.

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 provided that the two successor states in India might have the same person as Governor-General. This provision had obviously been made at the suggestion of Mountbatten, who wanted to have the unique distinction of being the Governor-General of united India as well as of the two successor states. The Congress was agreeable to have Mountbatten as India's Governor-General. But Jinnah thought that some times the two Governments might offer conflicting advices and in those cases the common Governor-General might find himself placed in a very embarrassing position. Jinnah, therefore, proposed that the two Dominions should have separate Governors-General and

Mountbatten should be appointed Super Governor-General with powers to arbitrate between the claims of the two Dominions. This proposal was unacceptable to Mountbatten and he personally canvassed for his own proposal with Jinnah. But Jinnah stuck to his stand. Mountbatten went so far as to tell Jinnah that unless his proposal for a common Governor-General was accepted, Pakistan would be placed at a very great disadvantage as compared with India and the responsibility for the losses to Pakistan would be Jinnah's. Even that argument did not lead to any change in Jinnah's attitude. Jinnah, of course, had not meant any disrespect for Mountbatten, but Mountbatten was a very vain person and his vanity was deeply hurt at Jinnah's refusal. Unfortunately, Jinnah remained unaware of Mountbatten's reaction.

From this stage onwards Mountbatten's policy was to help India at the expense of Pakistan. This later became apparent in several ways. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, chairman of the two boundary commissions, as was later revealed by well-informed sources, had originally awarded to Pakistan the Muslim-majority tehsils of Ferozepur and Zira in the district of Ferozepur. The Ferozepur tehsil was particularly vital to Pakistan because in it was situated a big headwork which irrigated vast areas in the contiguous Muslim-majority districts of West Pakistan. Obviously at the suggestion of Mountbatten this part of the award was altered and these two tehsils were finally given to India to placate the Sikhs. Similarly, Radcliffe awarded to India certain areas in Assam under "extraneous influences". Radcliffe's award also made it possible for the Muslim-majority princely state of Jammu and Kashmir to accede to India. The award, which was in several other ways also unjust to Pakistan greatly shocked Jinnah who, in a broadcast, said:

"No doubt we feel that the carving out of this great independent Muslim state has suffered injustices. We have been squeezed in as much as it was possible, and the latest blow that we have received was the award of the Boundary Commission. It is an unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse award. It may be wrong, unjust, and perverse; and it may not be a judicial but a political

award, but we have agreed to abide by it and it is binding upon us.”

Similarly, Pakistan suffered in the matter of the division of the armed forces and equipment and stores. This work had been entrusted to Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck in his position as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of India and Pakistan and was to be completed by 1 April 1948. Though opposed to the Pakistan scheme earlier, Auchinleck decided to be impartial between the two states and started making plans to deliver to them their due shares. At the time of partition most of the stores were in India and as soon as Auchinleck's plans became known to the Indian leaders, they started a campaign against him. The Viceroy, instead of supporting the Supreme Commander, arranged for the closing down of the headquarters of the Supreme Commander before any substantial share of Pakistan in the stores and equipment had been delivered.

Another instance of Mountbatten's disregard for Muslim interests may be given here. The British Governor of the Punjab had been telling Mountbatten that the Sikhs had made plans to create serious trouble. On 13 July 1947 he once again wrote to Mountbatten saying that the Sikhs were in a very dangerous mood. Particularly because the Sikhs had been active in many parts of the Punjab and had been butchering Muslims, Jinnah asked the Viceroy that the Sikh leaders should be arrested. Even though Mountbatten promised to take stern action, he did nothing and the killing of Muslims continued. At the time of independence, there was, therefore, widespread rioting in many parts of the Punjab. On 18 August Radcliffe's award was released to the press, under which a large number of Muslim majority areas had been given to India. This led to increased killings of Muslims in the East Punjab and the princely states of the Punjab. Indeed the Muslims suffered so much, specially at the hands of the Sikhs and their allies, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh Hindus, that it was ultimately decided to evacuate all Muslims to Pakistan.

The plight of these Muslims gave a great shock to Jinnah and he declared that—

“History will record its verdict on those whose treachery and machinations let loose forces of disorder and disruption in this Subcontinent causing death of lakhs, enormous destruction of property and bringing about suffering and misery to many millions by uprooting them from their homes and hearths and all that was dear to them. The systematic massacre of defenceless and innocent people puts to shame even the most heinous atrocities committed by worst tyrants known to history. We have been the victims of a deeply laid and well planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honour.”

It is obvious that if Mountbatten had taken some action when Jinnah had suggested the arrest of Sikh leaders, the Punjab Muslims would have been spared much of the sufferings which they had to undergo. But Mountbatten was completely indifferent to Muslim interests, and had been helping India at the expense of Pakistan. Understandably, therefore, rich tributes were paid to him by Hindu leaders. Nehru, for instance, said: “Earl Mountbatten has acted in India’s interests as zealously as any Indian could have done.”

## THE LAST PHASE

JINNAH arrived in Karachi on 7 August 1947 to take up the responsibilities of building the new Muslim state. The problems which Pakistan then faced were formidable. One of the major problems had directly resulted from advancing the date of independence from June 1948 to mid-August 1947. Within the very short period of ten weeks a new federal capital had to be established at Karachi and a new provincial capital at Dacca. The only developed city which Pakistan had inherited was Lahore, the provincial capital of the Punjab, but that capital had been denuded of a very large number of its senior employees who had opted to serve in the non-Muslim Punjab. Besides, the number of refugees who were pouring into Lahore was so great that the provincial machinery was on the breaking point.

Pakistan had also to frame its future policies. In his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August, Jinnah asked people to work hard and particularly for the welfare of the common people: "... If we want to make this great state of Pakistan happy and prosperous we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in cooperation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed."

Jinnah particularly wanted to assure the minorities. He, therefore, said:

"You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship... You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the

state . . . Now, I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you will find that in course of time, Hindus would cease to be Hindus, and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state."

The Constituent Assembly meeting also resolved to confer on Jinnah the title of Quaid-i-Azam.

Without knowing what Mountbatten had been doing to harm the interests of Pakistan, Jinnah paid a warm tribute to the Viceroy on 13 August: "You are the last Viceroy of India, but Pakistan and Hindustan will always remember you, and your name will remain cherished not only in the history of these two Dominions but will find a place in the history of the world, as one who performed his task and duties magnificently."

On 15 August, the Quaid-i-Azam was sworn in as the first Governor-General of Pakistan. On the same day he again assured the minorities in these words: "Let us impress the minorities by our words, deeds and thoughts that as long as they fulfil their duties and obligations as loyal citizens of Pakistan, they have nothing to fear."

Towards the end of October, the Quaid-i-Azam was shocked when it became known that the Dogra ruler of the overwhelmingly Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir, whose people had revolted against his tyranny and had sought the help of Pathan tribesmen in overthrowing his rule, had decided to accede to India in spite of the fact that he had a stand-still agreement with Pakistan. On the same day on which accession was announced, Indian troops landed in Srinagar, the capital of the princely state. When the Quaid learnt about these developments, he asked the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Douglas Gracey to send troops into Kashmir. Gracey did not carry out Jinnah's order; instead he got in touch with the Supreme Commander Auchinleck, who flew from Delhi to Lahore on 28 October and explained that unless Jinnah withdrew his order, British officers serving in the

Pakistan Army would immediately resign. In this situation, the Quaid-i-Azam had to withdraw his order.

The Quaid then tried to settle the Kashmir problem with Indian leaders. A conference with Indian Government leaders was fixed for 29 October at Lahore but could not be held because they failed to turn up. Ultimately on 1 November Mountbatten arrived in Lahore. Jinnah proposed that a proclamation be issued by the two Governors-General giving two days' notice to those engaged in fighting in Kashmir to stop fighting and the Governors-General be authorised to take all steps to restore peace and to arrange for a plebiscite in the state under their joint control and supervision. But Mountbatten expressed his inability to accept the proposal on the plea that he was a constitutional Governor-General and had no authority. The developments in Kashmir had a very bad effect on Jinnah's health.

In February 1948, in his broadcast to the people of the United States of America, the Quaid made two important policy statements. Defining the principles governing Pakistan's foreign policy, the father of the nation observed:

“Our foreign policy is one of friendliness and goodwill towards all the nations of the world. We do not cherish aggressive designs against any country or nation. We believe in the principle of honesty and fairplay in national and international dealings and are prepared to make our utmost contribution to the promotion of peace and prosperity among the nations of the world. Pakistan will never be found lacking in extending its material and moral support to the oppressed and suppressed peoples of the world and in upholding the principles of the United Nations Charter.”

On the issue of the future constitution of Pakistan, the Quaid declared:

“...I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential features of Islam. Today, they are as applicable in actual life as they were 1,300 years ago.

Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy. It has taught equality of man, justice and fairplay to everybody . . . Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state—to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims—Hindus, Christians and Parsees—but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.”

In March the Quaid-i-Azam paid his first and last visit to East Pakistan. He then dwelt at great length on the evils of provincialism. Addressing a very large public meeting at Dacca, the Quaid said:

“Having failed to prevent the establishment of Pakistan, thwarted and frustrated by their failure, the enemies of Pakistan have now turned their attention to disrupt the state by creating a split amongst the Muslims of Pakistan. These attempts have taken the shape principally of encouraging provincialism. As long as you do not throw off this poison in our body politic, you will never be able to weld yourself, mould yourself, galvanise yourself into a real true nation. What we want is not to talk about Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Baluchi, Pathan and so on. They are of course units. But I ask you: have you forgotten the lesson that was taught to us thirteen hundred years ago?”

In April the Quaid-i-Azam visited Peshawar and addressed a number of gatherings there and some nearby places. Jinnah was particularly pleased to meet the representatives of the tribes of the North-West Frontier Province. The tribes, it should be noted, had given many headaches to the Government of India, and even to Nehru, who once visited that area and had to face much opposition. Addressing the tribal representatives, the Quaid said:

I am glad to note that you have pledged your loyalty to Pakistan and that you will help Pakistan with all your resources and ability . . . I am fully aware of the



part you have already played in the establishment of Pakistan . . . Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurances and declarations, we ordered, as you know, the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a concrete and definite gesture on our part—that we treat you with absolute confidence and trust you as our Muslim brethren in the border areas.

The Quaid-i-Azam had been working hard to find solutions to the numerous problems which the new state was facing and as a consequence his health had suffered very badly. It was, therefore, decided in June that he should go to Ziarat in Baluchistan for some time. But on 1 July, the Quaid had to inaugurate the State Bank of Pakistan, which was to mark the sovereignty of Pakistan in the sphere of finance. The Quaid then made a very important pronouncement on economic policies:

“The adoption of Western economic theory and practice will not help us in achieving our goal of creating a happy and contented people. We must work our destiny in our own way, and present to the world an economic system based on the true Islamic concept of equality of mankind and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind.”


The State Bank ceremony impaired the Quaid's health further. But he continued to take interest in the affairs of the state. On the first anniversary of Pakistan on 14 August, he gave to his people that inspiring message which later became famous: “Nature has given you everything. You have got unlimited resources. The foundations of your state have been laid, and it is now for you to build, and build as quickly and as well as you can. So go ahead and I wish you Godspeed.”

Although the Quaid had returned to Ziarat, there was no improvement in his condition. In fact early in September his condition became serious and he had to be brought back to Karachi on 11 September. The Quaid-i-Azam died the same evening.

The Quaid-i-Azam will be remembered in history as one of those few world leaders who combined in themselves a large number of lofty traits. He was a great parliamentarian and his logic was unassailable. He would think a hundred times before coming to a decision, but once he had made up his mind he would not change it. He could never be purchased and had always the courage to say what he thought was right. He was willing to support to his utmost limit causes which he felt were just. More than anything else, he believed in high principles, both in private and public life.

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100



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