


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THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY



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THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

A CRITICAL & CONSTRUCTIVE STUDY
IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT THOUGHT

BY

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FOREWORD.

THE present work represents an effort to state the problem of Personality in relation to some of the fundamental truths of philosophy and theology. The kingdom of truth is to be found, if anywhere, 'within you'; and it is worth while to seek to clarify our ideas regarding the somewhat vague concept of Personality in order that the constructive spirit which is manifest everywhere to-day may have some materials with which to work. This is but a partial attempt to express certain opinions, which, whatever their defects may be, have at least passed through the fires of criticism in three universities, and have proved to the author and others with whom he has discussed them that, in an age of much questioning, they have a helpful influence upon the truths by which we live, and upon the life itself which is 'more than they.'

The substance of this work is a Thesis which is hereby published with the authority of the Division of Philosophy of Harvard University, by whom it was accepted as part of the work for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, on the recommendation of the Examining Committee, Professors J. Royce, G. H. Palmer and R. B. Perry. To these and other Harvard teachers and friends, especially the late William James and Professor H. Münsterberg, I have to make acknowledgments. Also I am grateful to Professors Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison and James Seth (of Edinburgh), and to Professor Francis Anderson and Principal Andrew Harper (both of Sydney) for their earlier help.

As the first part of the book is occupied with an examination of certain views of the Self held by recent philosophers in Britain and America, and is somewhat technical to a certain class of readers, some may prefer to begin with the Second Part in which the subject is more constructively treated.

The following characteristic note from the late Professor William James upon the views set forth in this work should be of interest to those who knew him, and who admire his brilliant

work as philosopher and teacher. It expresses a certain facet of his theory of the Self, which supplements what is given in Chapter I by way of estimating the place of Personality in his thought :—

‘ The part of your thesis that hits me hardest is the remarks on “ Experience ”—with the rest I am in sympathy of tolerance if not of active echo. I have worked for so many years with the “ passing thought ” formula which pragmatically does all the work of a Self, that the inability to define the Self except by its work makes me perhaps unduly hostile, not to the word, of course, but to the use of it as a fundamental term in philosophy. The “ train of experience ” kind of self gets its unity after the facts only ; but the “ unanalyzable principle ” kind is anterior to the facts and seems to warrant their having unity. But if one makes of each stage of unity already achieved in fact, an active worker for more unity, with efficacy too, doesn’t the warrant also seem to exist ? ’

In reply, I must say here simply, it all depends upon the point of view, and leave the reader to form his own opinion in the sequel. But may I acknowledge my debt in heart and mind

to this knight-errant of Truth, the greatest of the century, and most beloved by all who were honoured with his friendship? To the memory of William James I dedicate anything of worth in this book.

While the manuscript was in the publisher's hands, Professor Henri Bergson announced as the subject of his Gifford Lectures the title which had been given to this work. This is a coincidence; but here is another evidence of the recognition in our time of the great importance of this subject. All students of philosophy and theology will eagerly await the fuller pronouncement by Bergson of his views upon Personality, which will doubtless be made available in book form at no distant date. Meanwhile there is room for study and treatment of the problem of the inner life by those who are occupied with the theme in their own way, and are keenly alive to the privilege of being admirers, and perhaps disciples, of the great thinkers of our time.

E. N. M.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND,
March 1914.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE concept of Personality is so vague and undefined, and the possible problems connected with it are so numerous and far-reaching, that it is advisable to state as briefly as possible my main thesis. I am not concerned primarily to discuss the relations of Personality to Logic, Psychology, Ethics, Sociology, Cosmogony, Theology, and the like, except in so far as the line of thought passes through these regions. And even in Metaphysics I have allowed myself but little space for the problems of Epistemology, Individuality and Immortality. The reason is twofold. In the first place, the treatment of this subject is essentially an exercise in the much-needed discipline of *self-limitation*; for one could easily lose oneself in seeking metaphysically to find 'the Self'! Further, it is plain that these problems are insoluble *apart from a general theory of Reality*. Instead of seeking to defend any

special theory represented by these terms directly, we do better, perhaps, to get an adequate metaphysical view of the Self; and then these problems will precipitate a solution in the theoretical medium that has been provided. This is especially true of Immortality; on which, accordingly, there is not much said directly; but the answer to this great question emerges positively with a Personalistic Theory of the Universe.

Our thesis then is to examine the main problems of Personality, with especial reference to recent works in metaphysics. Accordingly, the First Part of the work is devoted to the exposition and criticism of the leading doctrines of Personality as maintained by some of the principal present-day philosophers, who have dealt fully with the subject. We are concerned with them only to the extent required for an understanding of their views upon our Problem; and so we are not called upon to investigate their systems in other respects, however important they may be from a different standpoint. And as the 'reaction' is constructively given in the Second Part, the criticisms in the First Part are very brief and pointed. The Second Part will carry on the alignment negatively shown in the

earlier criticisms, to a positive view of the answers to our main problems.

What then is the Problem of Personality ? It is primarily the Problem of the Reality of the Self, and the meaning, and the place of this and kindred Concepts in a metaphysical theory. Following upon that are the questions concerning the Personality of God, and of the Absolute ; the demands of our moral and religious nature ; and the relation between Spirits ; the questions of Monism and Pluralism ; the metaphysical importance of our Ideals and Values ; the implications of Freedom and Duty, and belief in Immortality.

The First Part of the book does not aim at giving an epitome of all recent thought upon the subject before us. That would require more years of research and preparation than I have been able to give, and a large volume as the result. The aim is to treat the views of those whose work upon the Concept has been central to their thinking. I confine myself for the most part to the thinkers of Britain and America who have been fairly influential. Accordingly I shall treat of constructive philosophers chiefly, such as James, Bradley, Royce, Howison, Rashdall, and

4 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY

Schiller. For his valuable works of criticism Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison is included.

The subject is one that spreads so naturally that a rigid conciseness of matter and treatment is essential. The study of the Self easily leads one into relations with almost any and every conceivable concept; and this is for the very good reason that it fulfils the claims of centrality and supremacy made here on its behalf.

It may be remarked that there is need of a Synthetic Psychology or empirical side of metaphysics which shall study the Self, and such concepts as Organism and Life in their wholeness. And this must be done not in an unsympathetic spirit, but as seeking for light upon the totality of conduct and behaviour, and the deeper facts and principles which are most important and significant in psychology, ethics, and philosophy, as well as in life, and which the analytic methods of the present day, and merely methodological ideals of truth, are absolutely incompetent to furnish.¹

¹ Miss Calkins has recognized this by her provision for Psychology as Science of Related Selves in *A First Book in Psychology* (Macmillan, 1910), p. 273 ff. Professor W. R. Boyce Gibson has made a plea for the recognition of the limitations of Phenomenalistic Psychology in his *Philosophical Introduction to Ethics*, p. 193 ff.

It is part of the Thesis that not only is the Self the true starting-point for a Metaphysic of Existence, but, as Personality, it forms the groundwork of a Metaphysic of Values also, while it proves to be the supreme category of explanation, the goal and the consummation of a Metaphysic of Reality.

PART I.
EXPOSITORY AND CRITICAL.

CHAPTER I.

WILLIAM JAMES.

THE metaphysical study of the Self is distinct from, but not wholly independent of the psychological treatment of the various problems connected therewith. The late William James has given a valuable psychological analysis of these problems,¹ and he has also passed beyond this stage into the region of metaphysics, in which his view of the Self is naturally important. His system of Radical Empiricism is partially worked out in his later books and in various articles which we shall refer to as occasion requires.²

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, by Prof. William James. Two volumes. New York, 1890. Especially chapters ix, x.

² The more recent books of James expound the main ideas indicated in this chapter, so far as our topic is concerned. His chief works are *Pragmatism*, *The Meaning of Truth*, and *A Pluralistic Universe*. In the last-named book—perhaps his greatest—James works over the Problem of the Self once more, arrives at the same conclusions as previously adopted; but, at least as it seems to the author, with certain qualms of his philosophic conscience.

Accordingly we shall pass rapidly along the track of his thought until the bridge between psychology and metaphysics is crossed, and we are introduced to the region where lie our main problems.

I.

The distinct starting-point is his conception of consciousness as '*the Stream of Thought.*'¹ Our psychical life is essentially characterized by *change*. Mental life is ever flowing. Never does the same sensation recur. As Shadworth Hodgson has said, 'the chain of consciousness is a sequence of different.'² Here is the point of divergence from Locke, Hume and Herbart, although in their insistence upon succession they approximate to this view. But they wrongly held to atomistic units of consciousness, sensations and ideas, supposed to remain unchanged except for the different combinations by which the mental processes were built up. It is impossible to think of the brain as unmodified by the constant change. The same 'object' may recur, but that is quite distinct from the same bodily sensation, which cannot repeat itself.

¹ *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. ch. ix.

² *The Philosophy of Reflection*, i. p. 290.

But, further, this sequence of changes is characterized by felt *continuity*. Even after breaks, as on awakening from sleep, the personal consciousness manifests gregarious tendencies in regard to preceding thoughts, and accepts what it regards as *its own* past experiences. What is its criterion in this unifying process? James replies that certain qualities of 'warmth, intimacy, and immediacy'¹ are possessed by those past feelings which are welcomed as personal property. Later² he inclines to the opinion that these characteristics which constitute our sense of Selfhood are chiefly, if not wholly, physical. But, leaving that for the present, we have seen reason to prefer the conception of consciousness as essentially changing and continuous to the notion of it as something static. This smoothness and flow are represented by the 'Stream of Thought.'

Now we are ready to ask—How is the personal character of mental life provided for in this procession? How can the train of thought explain the Self which seems to own all its

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 239.

² *Ibid.* vol. i. pp. 241, 242, 299, 300. See also his article 'Does Consciousness Exist,' *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods*, vol. i. No. 18.

thoughts, and to be the centre of its feelings and desires, and the agent in its volitions? James admits the existence of the personal element. No psychology can question it. But when it comes to definition of it, divergence seems inevitable. Common-sense and spiritualistic philosophy stand for a Soul, an identical being throughout the psychical change, while the scientific interests require a more workable hypothesis.

James tries to meet these claims by his view of the Self as the 'Passing Thought.' If the feelings of Selfhood be regarded as themselves parts of the 'stream,' the difficulty of reconciling common-sense and science seems to be met. For whatever those thoughts and feelings of Self may be, they are formed *in the present*, and projected from this 'section' of the stream. This is a pragmatic account of the Self, and it seeks to express its 'face-value.' It regards the field of consciousness as given all at once in every instant, with feelings of relation and tendency, thus doing away with the need for an Ego to unify a manifold of ideas.¹ Consciousness, in

¹ Cf. Critique written by the late Professor James upon the views given in this work, printed in the Foreword.

fact, is fundamentally a selection within this field, some ideas being emphasized and others being ignored. Elsewhere he has described it as a 'fighter for ends.'¹ The greatest division due to this emphasis is that which we find between the 'Me' and the 'Not-Me,' which are thus viewed as expressions of relation. By the 'Me' we understand the Empirical Self, the so-called 'contents of consciousness,' and the various relationships in which the 'I' stands, and which constitute Personality. So James speaks of the Material, the Social, and the Spiritual Self, reserving the Pure Ego for later consideration. The Material and Social Selves may be readily conceived, but what is the Spiritual Self? It represents the psychical faculties and processes; and it may turn out to be either the 'Stream' as a whole, or the present 'section.' Examining these in turn, as the abstract and concrete views of the Spiritual Self, James admits that the former gives an account of the intimate and incessant nature of the Self, which accords best with ordinary feeling and opinion.² But, again, definitions will cause divergence between the advocates of the

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, i. p. 141.

² *Ibid.* i. p. 297.

Soul and those who attribute the self-feeling to a fiction denoted by the personal pronoun, 'I.' An examination of the actual *feelings* is what concerns James, and for his part, introspection seems to reveal nothing but intra-cephalic movements and sensations between the head and throat. Our feeling of activity in the 'nuclear' Self is viewed as due to these bodily sensations of movement.¹

Accordingly the concrete method is adopted, and the Thinker is regarded as a postulate of the present Thought. The Self is identical, in fact, with the Thought, which judges the past, knows the preceding thought, and 'finding it warm,' that is, possessing the qualities previously described, adopts it.² As every thought passes away it is taken up by a present one, which knows it, and transmits itself in turn to a successor. This 'trick' of the present Thought in appropriating the past constitutes the Self. This

¹ Cf. Stout, *Analytic Psychology*, vol. i. chapter on 'Mental Activity' for a criticism of this view. See also James' article on 'The Experience of Activity, in the *Psychological Review*, vol. xii. No. 1 footnote, pp. 7-9. In *A Pluralistic Universe*, pp. 378-380, James replies to Stout's criticisms, and again endorses his view of the 'I' as essentially a bodily term, expressive mainly of the relation of position.

² *Principles of Psychology*, i. p. 339.

also explains the sense of Personal Identity without invoking any metaphysical principle. The judgment of my Identity is like any other judgment of sameness, a matter of thought; no direct spiritual feelings are required, the mere 'warmth' of bodily quality which gives all such thoughts a generic unity is sufficient.

A criticism of the three leading metaphysical theories of the Inner Principle of Personal Unity, or Pure Ego, is given,¹ viz. the Spiritualistic, Associationist, and the Transcendentalist. As to the first, James regards the Soul as a superfluity. The Associationists missed the mark by failure to describe Self-consciousness. The Kantian Transcendental Unity of Apperception and the Self-distinguishing consciousness of the Neo-Kantians—Edward Caird and T. H. Green—are dismissed as cumbrous and erroneous, through the effort to explain relations by the knower rather than by the known. James provides for relations in the world of objects rather than on the subjective side. The Subject submits to 'feelings of relation' as naturally as any other experience. While James has been largely influenced by Locke, Hume, and Mill, he disagrees

¹ *Ibid.* i. p. 342.

here with his authorities. So he stands out of all three schools. He leaves the reader free to supplement his view of 'the Passing Thought' by the theory of the Soul as an actual being or substantial Ego, if he chooses; but for himself he finds no need for such hypothesis. He accordingly speaks of the empirical person as 'Me,' and the judging Thought as 'I.' 'There need never have been a quarrel between associationism and its rivals, if the former had admitted the indecomposable unity of every pulse of thought, and the latter been willing to allow that "perishing" pulses of thought might recollect and know.'¹

In addition, it should be remarked that James discussed some of the psychological difficulties attendant upon the belief in the Self as commonly held, especially the phenomena of changes of personality, of hypnotism, and of the possession of many selves. Such abnormalities seem to indicate the transitive and unsubstantial nature of what we esteem as Selfhood, and sufficient evidence is forthcoming to establish the genuineness of these facts.

Turning now to the later developments of his doctrine in his metaphysical system, we find that

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, p. 371.

the Self approaches the vanishing point in Radical Empiricism. The negative side of his earlier doctrine of the Self becomes more and more prominent, till the Person is scarcely distinguishable among the multitude of 'experiences' which compose our psychic life. Consciousness itself is mistrusted and even discarded!¹ The function of consciousness is performed by thoughts; and 'that function is knowing.'² There is a common medium of knower and known which James calls 'pure experience.' He boldly denies the inner duplicity of consciousness and content. Both are alike, and may be designated 'experiences.' In perception or thought what happens is this—certain experiences get themselves presented twice at least, once in a context of relations which concern a field of objects or ideas, and again in a context which is made up of relations of 'personal history.' These relations are themselves felt experiences, according to the view which we have found in his *Psychology*. He illustrates the process of the dual context by the point at the intersection of two lines, in both of which it may be counted.

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, etc.*, i. No. 18, p. 478.

² *Ibid.* p. 478.

I think this may be made clearer by considering the instance of the bright circle thrown by a search-light upon the sea. The bright circle is counted in the stream of light and also in the surface-plane of the sea,—two different contexts; the former may be compared to the person, the latter to the ‘thing.’ But the analogy fails in so far as it does not indicate the oneness of nature which is claimed in James’ Theory for both contexts, as parts of ‘pure experience,’ instead of regarding them dualistically as matter and mind, subject and object, and so forth.

Self and its activities are regarded as belonging to the content of experience. In a later article¹ James speaks of Personality as the experienced relation between terms that are conscious of continuing each other. This ‘*relation*’ by which the Self is organized as a system of memories, purposes, strivings, and so on, is admittedly the most difficult to explain. But this is just the strategic point of Radical Empiricism, directed against all the fictions of rationalistic metaphysics. As to what this ‘witness’ which constitutes our

¹ ‘The World of Pure Experience,’ *Journal of Philosophy, etc.*, vol. i. No. 20, p. 3. Also vol. ii. No. 2, ‘The Thing and its Relations.’

personal life is, we can only describe it as experience of conjunctive relations, continuity or absence of break. The schools in the past have recognized disjunctive relations, the disconnectedness of experience, but they have not accepted conjunctive relations, as equally 'given'; had they done so, they would not have needed to employ transcendental principles to explain differences, and to unify the discrepant subject and object which their one-sided abstract method provided. Even our minds are not so absolutely separate as is supposed; they may and do become conterminous in our common world,¹ and perhaps even confluence will be possible at some future time. James admits his affinity here with Natural Realism rather than with views similar to those of Berkeley and Mill. He maintains a pluralistic, as opposed to monistic, view of the world, and rejects infinity.

Self-activity and efficient causation are defended by James,² although he regards the body as the centre of such feelings, as opposed to theories like Wundt's *Innervationsgeföhle* which

¹ *Journal of Philosophy, etc.*, vol. i. No. 21, p. 15 ff.

² 'The Experience of Activity,' *Psychological Review*, vol. xii. No. 1.

James had attacked in his *Psychology*, and had reduced to associated and present muscular feelings.¹ He champions the cause of free-will² as against determinism of every sort, not, however, as an ethical principle, but as a natural manifestation of novelty and chance in our 'activity-situations.' His pluralism is radical, and is hostile to absolutism in every form.

In his treatment of the religious consciousness, he follows his characteristic 'Method' of Pragmatism. Instead of the scholastic arguments, he asks for the practical effects, the individual reactions upon our attitudes towards the unseen. From a long and valuable survey³ of such religious experiences, he concludes that there is a wider spiritual universe, personal communion with which has recreative value and moral worth. There may be many Gods rather than one; but Personality, presumably as conceived by James himself, both of man and of Gods,

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. ii. pp. 493-518. Cf. Münsterberg's *Die Willenshandlung*, pp. 73, 82.

² *The Will to Believe, and other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, Longmans, 1897.

³ *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, Gifford Lectures, Edin. 1901-1902, Longmans, pp. 444-485 ff.

✓ must be regarded as Reality in the completest sense of the term.¹

II.

As stated in the Introduction, my critical reaction upon the expositions of the different systems will be brief, as the latter part of this work will permit a fuller commentary and a constructive statement. In regard to James' views, I will merely make a few critical remarks.

1. There seems to be a lack of homogeneity in the various presentations of Personality at different stages in his thought. Two warring tendencies are seen at work, and the terms of peace have never been made public, so far as I am aware. One line fights for a sort of simplicity, and what looks like a monistic empiricism, while the other contends for fulness of life, individualism and pluralism. The key to the struggle is given, I believe, in the Psychology, where the person is admitted as uniquely real, and yet is pushed into the whirling 'stream of thought.' I believe Interactionism to be a thoroughly defensible doctrine of mind and body, but it is not clear in James' system what *distinguishes* the psychical

¹ For his treatment of the Soul, *Ibid.* pp. 195-6, 498-9.

from the physical. Especially is this true in Radical Empiricism, where the Self is dismissed, and Experience is called upon to play the leading rôle. James' early dualistic tendencies¹ are contradicted by his later philosophy of Pure Experience.

2. There is a similar inconsistency involved in the attack on Consciousness, which was a 'fighter for ends' at first, but which is subsequently reduced to pathological feelings, especially in its higher forms! The bodily feelings brought to light by James' introspection do not seem to me in any way to disprove consciousness or the reality of the Self, but rather to confirm it. What we want is the Introspector, not the results of his analysis. Those results seem to me to concern a psychology of *vital feeling*. What is described is the bodily background or object to the Subject in its quiescent contemplation.

3. The Self is the spiritual factor manifested in our highest psychical experiences, where bodily terms are absolutely unmeaning. As a matter of *fact*, which should surely concern psychology, and quite apart from logical and metaphysical theories, consciousness is given as the presupposition

¹ *Psych.* i. p. 218 ff.

and active participant in all experience. In comparison, judgment, selection, love, aspiration, and volition, the Subject preponderates over the field of objects, which do not seem to be given in that 'hyphenated' condition which James represents¹ as being the characteristic of the field of consciousness. If the active and synthetic character of subjectivity be admitted, no account of 'experiences reporting themselves to one another,' in the epistemology of Radical Empiricism, will suffice to account for the apparent dualism.

4. Side by side with the *impersonal* character of James' descriptions, his remarks upon the 'judgment' of Personal Identity also call for criticism. The judgment itself implies a synthetic activity of Self. Further, it is as difficult to explain metaphysically the identity of two
2 instants as of a life-time. This difficulty is hardly
3 overcome by endowing experience with the innate relational quality usually attributed to the mind. As to abnormalities, they should be the most common of psychological phenomena, if the personal life merely consisted in 'next-to-nextness,' whereas, in point of fact, they are so rare as to be regarded as curiosities.

¹ *Ibid.* i. p. 278 ff.

5. The 'Passing Thought' is inadequate to do justice to the Self. Have not the conjunctive relations been ignored here in favour of the disjunctive? If so, James has committed the error which he charges against the schools. Metaphysically, some sameness is required to constitute even a 'sequence of different.' No explanation of the 'trick' of thought in appropriating the preceding thought need be looked for. If it be demurred that these are merely psychological accounts, it must be remembered that most of them are reproduced in the metaphysical system of Radical Empiricism.

6. Opposed to the disintegration represented by the 'Passing Thought' is his preference for an *anima mundi* thinking in all of us, to a number of individual Souls!¹ Instead of seeing in this startling confession an inclination to Absolutism, we should rather look upon it as a premonition of his later attraction to the tendency of the 'Pure Experience' philosophy of Avenarius, Mach, Petzoldt and others, whose general position will concern us later.²

¹ *Psych.* i. p. 346.

² Chapter I. of the Second Part will deal with the important relation of Experience to the Self.

7. The strong argument of Individuality in favour of the Soul is not justly met by James' reference to present-day tendencies towards spirit-transference and the like,¹ as indicating the removal of the middle wall of partition between Self and Self. So in his *Radical Empiricism* we find no explication of this fundamental difficulty, except the conterminousness of minds in objects, and the hope of confluence. Karl Pearson's² singular expectation of the time when we shall know the thoughts of other persons by observation of their brains seems to be along the same line. Altogether, I feel that the examination of the efforts of Professor James to provide for a theory of experience without a Self confirms the opinion that such a theory, no matter how ingeniously worked out, is wholly unsatisfactory and in its very nature liable to all the objections brought against Hume's view by psychology and metaphysics.

¹ *Psych.* i. p. 350.

² *Grammar of Science.*

CHAPTER II.

MR. F. H. BRADLEY.

WIDELY different thinkers these, James and Bradley! And yet their systems resemble one another in two respects at least, both of which concern us here; first, the emphasis upon Experience, and second, the disparagement of the Self. I am hopeful that by expanding these two texts I may be able to set forth Bradley's views at sufficient length for our purpose. Brevity, however, is here indispensable.¹

I.

We need not delay long over Experience, although it is a concept of prime importance in Bradley's theory of Reality. It will suffice to

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, a Metaphysical Essay, by F. H. Bradley; Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Second Edition, 1899.

The new book by Mr. Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914) appears to exhibit the same general standpoint as that given in the former work.

get two purposes fulfilled in this part of our treatment, viz. to obtain a general conception of Bradley's system, and the part played by Experience therein; and in the second place, to notice the relation—or lack of relation—between this concept and that of the Self. We are enabled to state Bradley's general position under this head of Experience, because that concept provides him with a starting-point and also a goal, in his search for reality. It does not become prominent, however, till the beginning of the Second Book, entitled *Reality*. The First Book, as is well known, is designated *Appearance*, and is utterly negative in character. Nothing can withstand the onslaught of Bradley's logic. Primary and Secondary Qualities, Substantive and Adjective, Relation and Quality, Space and Time, Motion and Change, the Perception of Change, Causation, Activity, Things, the Self, and Things-in-themselves, disappear in rout and utter confusion. Reality is not to be found in any of these.

Bradley's three chief arguments are: (a) *incompleteness*; (b) *relativity* (which follows from the former); and (c) the *discrepancy of identity and diversity*, of the One and the Many, which is manifested in them all. Such contradictoriness

disposes of any claim to be considered as real. And non-contradiction is Bradley's criterion of Reality. 'Ultimate Reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion.'¹ Tested by this touchstone of logic, our seeming real world is proved to be alloy, 'mere appearance' and 'illusion.' But this criterion is also positive; it directs us to an Absolute Reality, One and Individual, in which the world of appearance is somehow transmuted, and harmonized within the Whole, which is also a System. But Bradley says that the concrete nature, the matter of this Absolute must be Experience, which 'means something much the same as given and present fact . . . Sentient experience is reality, and what is not this is not real.'²

This point of view is maintained to the close, although it appears that the Absolute Reality is beyond Truth, and therefore, in a sense, transcends experience as actual. But this agnostic and even sceptical attitude is not final in the explicit presentation of Bradley's doctrine, although comparisons with Spinoza's Substance and even Spencer's Unknowable suggest them-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 136.

² *Ibid.* p. 144.

selves to the reader. Yet, against such an 'empty transcendence' and 'shallow Pantheism,' Bradley intends his work to be one sustained polemic.¹ He follows Hegel's lead of seeking the Absolute in experience, and in his doctrine of Degrees of Truth and Reality he acknowledges his debt to the German philosopher. According to this doctrine, the 'appearances' find their places in hierarchical rank in the Absolute System. The standard is in one sense Reality itself, and it may be applied as a test under the forms of all-inclusiveness and harmony within the System as a Whole. So judged, 'pure spirit would mark the extreme most removed from lifeless Nature.'² So, in spite of seeming contradiction, Reality is revealed only in the world of 'appearance,' and in the higher more than in the lower.³

Reality is Experience. The Absolute must be sentience. No Reality can be supposed that is not felt or experienced. Reality satisfies our whole being, and the Absolute is more than thought and volition, it possesses the direct nature of *feeling*. And yet it would be incorrect to say that the Absolute is personal. It is supra-personal.⁴

¹ *Ibid.* p. 551.

² *Ibid.* p. 498.

³ *Ibid.* p. 550.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 533.

Further details will come to light as we proceed. Let us now face the difficult task of stating what is the relation of the Self to Experience. That will prepare the way for the minute examination of his sceptical treatment of the Self.

When Bradley contends that Experience is Reality, he denies what he regards as a fundamental error, the position, namely, that the Self can make any valid claim to be real. It is true, he holds, that all being and fact fall within sentience. No other content than is supplied by feeling, thought, and volition is even possible.

Bradley purposely chooses these impersonal terms as free from the erroneous reflection of subjectivity. He does not 'divide the percipient subject from the universe: and then, resting on that subject, as on a thing actually by itself—urge that it cannot transcend its own states.'¹ Such a vicious abstraction leads to impossible results. What we find is a unity in which distinction, but not divisions, may be made. This is the unity of the sentient experience.

The private and immediate character of the 'whole' of sentience in which subject and object

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 145.

appear together is an obvious difficulty in the system. This Bradley discusses in the chapter on 'The This and the Mine.'¹ He admits that particularity and even uniqueness characterize 'an experience.'² He *assumes* that there are an infinite number of 'this-mines.'³ By this unusual term he means the immediate character of feeling, which appears in 'a finite centre.' The question is—are these 'finite centres of experience' incompatible with his Absolute? He has to confess that this plurality and particularity are in the end inexplicable.⁴ Yet Reality may be enriched thereby, and feelings may surely be fused together in the Absolute. The 'this' seems exclusive, but when examined, it is found to have no content which does not go beyond itself. And it is so, too, in the case of the 'mine.' It has no content but what is left over by our impotence.⁵ Even the positive special feeling of Self is referable to an ideal Whole, in which *somehow* the rough places must be made plain. There is nothing which, to speak properly, is individual, except only the Absolute.⁶

¹ *Ibid.* p. 223.² *Ibid.* p. 223. Italics mine.³ *Ibid.* p. 223.⁴ *Ibid.* p. 226.⁵ *Ibid.* p. 239.⁶ *Ibid.* p. 246.

In the course of the examination of the impossible theory of Solipsism, he divides experience into direct and indirect. Direct experience means what is 'confined to the given simply, to the merely felt or presented.' Indirect experience includes all fact that is constructed from the basis of the 'this' and the 'mine.'¹

Direct experience gives us the 'this-mine,' not the reality of my self and its states. We must go on to the indirect experience, postulating existence beyond our momentary feelings. The 'this' and the 'mine' must be transcended. And yet this result must itself be 'felt!' Bradley admits this, but denies that the 'felt reality is shut up and confined within *my* feeling.'² What then is this 'more?' Bradley falls back upon his statement of the Reality as a direct, all-embracing experience, and claims that it is present in 'my' feeling. 'My "mine" becomes a feature in the great "mine," which includes all "mines!"'³ I consider this a crucial point in the development of the relations of the concepts we are considering. We reach our own past and future by a process of inference

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 248.

² *Ibid.* pp. 252-253.

³ *Ibid.* p. 253.

similar to that by which we reach the belief in other selves.

And yet it is true that 'all I experience is my state—so far as I experience it. Even the Absolute, as my reality is my state of mind.'¹ But we cannot limit it to that one aspect. 'The import and content of these processes does not consist in their appearance in the psychological series.'² In short, because experience is *my* experience, it does not follow that what I experience is no more than my state.

In concluding this chapter, however, Bradley is ready to admit that 'in the end to know the Universe, we must fall back upon our personal experience and sensations.'³

To sum up, then; Bradley puts the Self in the realm of indirect experience, with other 'intellectual constructions,' and with the 'import and content of my states.'

All reality burns in the focus of my state of mind.⁴ So Bradley speaks constantly of 'finite centres of experience.' But we should err if we supposed that he means that Experience requires an equally real Experiencer or Self. And he says

¹ *Ibid.* p. 258.

² *Ibid.* p. 259.

³ *Ibid.* p. 260.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 260.

in his chapter on Ultimate Doubts that 'a self is not the same as such a centre of experience. . . . From immédiate experience the self emerges, and is set apart by a distinction.'¹ Experience transcends the Self, and is itself Reality. He traces the development of Self, other selves, the world and God, from undifferentiated experience. 'For certain purposes what I experience can be considered as the state of my self, or again, of my soul . . . because in one aspect it actually is so. But this aspect may be an infinitesimal fragment of its being.'²

Having settled this question for the present, we must now take up Bradley's negative treatment of the Self, which begins early in the book, although, like the best wine, we have kept it till the last. In two Chapters on the Meanings of Self, and the Reality of Self, the most glaring inconsistencies in this concept are brought to light. It is certain that if pure logic had guided us, we could never have believed in it. But as men have forsaken this 'dry light,' Bradley has to convince them by means of argument. In the first of these Chapters,³ it is shown that we do *not* know

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 524.

² *Ibid.* p. 526.

³ *Ibid.* p. 75 ff.

what we mean by the Self. And that is itself sufficient condemnation for metaphysic, since only by definitions can truth be attained. But Bradley goes into psychology to bring to light the diverse meanings of Self. A mere statement of these results must suffice.

Leaving aside the body, by the Self may be meant :—

(1) The present contents of experience — a ' cross-section ' at any moment.

(2) The constant average mass, habits, character, behaviour, dispositions.

(3) The essential Self, the inner core of feeling called Coenesthesia. This leads to the problem of Personal Identity, which Bradley regards as insoluble, owing chiefly to the difficulty of fixing the meanings of ' person,' and of ' continuity.' Memory is equally powerless to explain the supposed sameness.

(4) The Self as a kind of Monad or simple being.

(5) That in which I take an interest.

(6) The distinction of Subject and Object, which has two main forms—as theoretical, involving perception and intelligence, and as practical, involving desire and will. In each case, the Self

as related to a Not-Self is found on introspection to be some concrete form of unity of psychical existence. And probably every detail of the Self can be presented in turn as Not-Self in the theoretical relation. And in the practical relation, any feature in the Self may be felt as a limit against which it could react. And taking the Not-Self, most of its elements can be regarded as passing into the background of feeling, and so becoming Self. Bradley admits that there is a margin, as it were, which cannot be crossed, but he affirms that it is unreasonable to make this margin ultimate. So Self may mean either the *feeling* of the psychical contents, or a distinction within the whole mass of certain contents as a background, against which as a Not-Self, the Self is realized as existing; or finally in the practical relation as an end to be achieved, with which, as is said, one actively identifies himself. This leads to a psychological discussion of the perception of activity in relation to the Self, and it is shown to involve an *idea* of the change desired.

(7) The 'mere self' or the 'simply subjective,' which is not relevant to a definite psychical function: it is the unessential in any mental

process. This is a merely 'chance self,' the residue, not used, but only felt; and the meaning is both too wide and too narrow for our purpose.

Bradley now passes on to discuss definitely the Reality of the Self.¹ He repeats once more his admission that one's own existence in some sense is an indubitable fact,² but the question is whether the claim of the Self to possess reality and even to guarantee the reality of appearances, can be maintained. We are not long left in doubt as to the weapons or the result of the encounter. 'It is the old puzzle,' Bradley says, 'as to the connection of diversity with unity.'³ The assurance of personal identity is irrelevant to the issue. It is a question of intelligibility. Does the Self give an experience which will enable us to *understand* the way in which diversity is harmonized? Bradley answers, 'No.' His reason is that, whether taken as mere feeling, or some form of self-consciousness or self-identity, the analysis is made either in the plane of relations with their inconsistencies, or else in the deeper region of immediate experience, without distinction be-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, Chapter IX.

² *Ibid.* p. 103; cf. pp. 76, 119, 357.

³ *Ibid.* p. 103.

tween subject and object. 'Feeling is an apprehension too defective to lay hold on reality.'¹ Feeling cannot deal with terms and relations which, 'as it commonly appears,' constitute Reality.² Neither can self-consciousness satisfy the claims of intellect. 'It is a mere experience.'³ It cannot give a consistent account of itself or of Reality. Self-consciousness has too much the form of feeling. The subject can never wholly become object to itself, and so cannot become matter of 'perception.'⁴ As to personal identity, Bradley confesses that the self is 'the same within limits and to a certain extent,' but denies that any metaphysical conclusions follow, until the understanding of *how* the Self is the same, is forthcoming, and is presented for criticism. Neither will he accept any view of the Self as timeless, supposed to be furnished from the function of comparison in mental life.

Bradley then treats of the Self as Will or activity, and denies that intellectually it is better off than those meanings previously discussed. The ghosts of change, of unity and diversity, of relation, will not be laid to rest. Psychologically,

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 106.

² *Ibid.* p. 107.

³ *Ibid.* p. 109.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 111.

the experience of activity is illusion. The same result follows the discussion of Monads. The same arguments recur with fatal regularity.

The conclusion of the whole matter is that the Self, whatever meaning be attached to it, is 'appearance' merely. It bears the burden of external relations, the stigma of unintelligibility, the brand of inexplicable diversity and unity. No doubt it is 'the highest form of experience which we have, but, for all that, it is not a true form. It does not give us the facts as they are in reality; and as it gives them, they are appearance, appearance and error.'¹ The principle which metaphysics requires in order to resolve the contradiction of diversity and unity, the Self cannot supply. On the contrary, 'when not hiding itself in obscurity,' the Self 'seems a mere bundle of discrepancies.'

In the Chapter on 'Body and Soul'² similar results are obtained. The Self is distinguishable from the Soul. The latter is defined as 'a finite centre of *immediate* experience,' 'possessed of a certain temporal continuity of existence and again of a certain identity of character.'³

The Soul is a personal centre, not taken at an

¹ *Ibid.* p. 119.

² *Ibid.* p. 295.

³ *Ibid.* p. 298.

instant, but considered as a 'thing.'¹ Accordingly, it is an ideal construction and not a presented fact. It is a result of a process of idealization of 'experience,' bringing out the oneness of past with present. So it is endowed with an ideal and eternal character, which raises it out of the time-series, although it is realized in that series. So it is inconsistent, and 'rooted in an artifice!' It has the unfailing mark of 'appearance' given, in the separation of the 'that' and the 'what.' The same conclusion is reached also from the Absolute side—no plurality of such existences can be Reality.

Bradley discusses objections to this view, based on the independence of Souls, especially in relation to bodies; the claim for a transcendent Soul or Ego; and, lastly, the psychical warrant alleged to be given for a Soul as being beyond mere phenomena. Bradley declines to be a party to the identification of soul with body.² Even if psychologically tenable, it would yet involve a vicious circle. The Ego only serves to increase our difficulties and is dismissed. As for the psychical evidence for a Soul, it is either manifested in events in the time-series, or not at all.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 302.

² *Ibid.* p. 308.

If in events, we cannot claim as evidence the intellectual constructions which are built upon them, since the self-transcendence, the import, of experience cannot be classed in this way. If in more than mere events, they must take their chance in intellectual criticism, and, as we have seen, their 'chance' is not worth much in a System of Reality.

Both Soul and Body consist of phenomenal series, and come together in Absolute Reality, and their special characters must there be 'lost' and 'dissolved in what transcends them.'¹

As to the relation between Souls, experiences are certainly separate from each other, and are capable of influencing each other, so far as we know, only through the body. We have a 'common understanding' in regard to the world of discourse, and further we behave as if our internal worlds were the same. There is an ideal identity between Souls. In the individual's life, both bodily and psychological, an active function of identity is required. And the Soul is 'less unreal' than the physical world; for it shows more clearly the self-dependence and harmony which are the marks of Absolute Reality, to

¹ *Ibid.* p. 342.

which we are driven, as the explanation of all 'appearance,' and the resolution of all discords.

II.

With the main outlines of Bradley's formidable system before us, I may now briefly express some of the respects in which it seems to me to come short of, or to transgress, the requirements of a metaphysic, from the standpoint of our special problem. It is abundantly evident how prominent the Self is in his polemic. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that it affords him his chief difficulty, increased doubtless by his apparent hostility to the concept throughout. It is hard to resist the feeling that he means to keep the Self in the background, and so to preserve an impersonal character for his Absolute Idealism.

(1) The first criticism is directed against Bradley's use of the Concept of Experience as over against that of the Self. Sentience, Experience, and the like are abstractions when taken out of relation to a conscious Subject. The use of these impersonal concepts is at the basis of his grand mistake in setting up Experience as Reality, while the Subject involved in all experience is shut into the outer darkness of 'appearance.'

As this objection will appear again in different aspects of the subsequent criticism, and will be more fully discussed in the opening chapter of the Second Part of this book, I leave it for the present.

(2) The foregoing difficulty is obscured by the use of such phrases as 'this-mines,' 'finite centres of experience,' 'experiences,' 'souls,' 'immediate feeling,' 'felt wholes,' and so on. Bradley is forced to admit again and again that the Self is real in some sense. But while he complains that nobody tells him *how* it is able to transcend these logical difficulties, he never submits 'Experience' to the same test. Experience is a vague and ambiguous term which is supposed to include the Self, and yet escapes all its difficulties by *ignoring* them. It must surely consist of 'appearances' in the wildest confusion, from a logical point of view, since it includes all the contradictions and inconsistencies of the Subject, *plus* those of the Object. And *in itself* it has no remedy for these difficulties. It is only when adjectived by Absolute, and spelt with a capital, that it can solve them. If time permitted, a minute examination of the relations of the concepts of *Experience* and *Appearance* would reveal the double part which

the former plays in Bradley's system. I am satisfied that just here the opening wedge must be applied, and when it is driven home, Bradley's 'block universe,' which seems so compact, will appear streaked with gaping inconsistencies.

(3) What are we to say of the argument, upon which so much depends, that the power to transcend direct experience introduces us to a world of Reality from which the psychical fact of Self has disappeared? Our answer is simply to point to Bradley's own confessions that the dual relationship of Subject and Object is never really sundered. 'Even the Absolute is *my* state,'¹ he says. Therefore the import of experience does *not* do away with its relationship to a Self, as essentially part of the experience. And in his endeavour to transcend the 'this-mine,' Bradley faces this question. At the critical point he fails. He admits that the 'more' must be felt.² 'It is somebody's experience then,' we say,—'Whose is it?' Bradley falters, and then falls back on his *a priori* position! It is mine, but 'what I feel is the all-inclusive universe,' that is, it belongs to the Absolute Experience! I contend that at any rate it implies the Self, by

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 260.

² *Ibid.* pp. 252-253.

his own admission. It would alter the whole character of his impersonal System, if Bradley were to take fully into account this implication of the subject in 'indirect experience.'

(4) Bradley fails to make the all-important distinction between the Self as an intellectual construction and as an essential element in all experience.¹) This is the only serious ground he suggests for the superior reality of experience over the Self. This is an instance of the 'psychologist's fallacy.' The 'limited aperture' where reality burns as in a focus may be called 'an experience,' but by his own confession it is 'our sole means of getting at Reality,' and, as such, it involves subjective awareness, that is, essential selfhood, apart from all construction. Merely psychological and genetic problems must not be confused with the metaphysical issue.

(5) No grade, no totality of experience can possibly be more real than that which is its condition, viz. the experience of it by a Subject or Self. If the Subject can be excluded from the Reality which is granted to experience, then knowledge is for ever beyond us. If we cannot

¹ Cf. Prof. James Ward's Article 'Psychology,' *Ency. Britt.* Ninth Edition, vol. xx. p. 83.

rely upon our own reality, if our existence is not as real as any matter of human experience, then is our philosophic and scientific faith vain. This is our ultimate nerve of truth. This is the *rationale* for our existence as seekers after reality. If there be no point of absolutely real contact with fulness of Reality, then scepticism is the logical result. And impersonal Absolutism is not far from its kingdom either.

(6) Bradley practically admits this frequently, but by his complexity of phrases, the admissions which he makes regarding the Self's place in Reality are quite overshadowed by the assertions of its place in the world of 'mere appearance.' I refer not only to his confessions of the Self's supreme place in existence, but to his express conviction that 'even the Absolute is *my* state,' and all Reality exists only in centres of sentient experience.¹ What then can withhold him from recognizing the reality of Personality as above every other form of finite experience? He grants this too,—but 'experience' has been replaced by the sinister word 'appearance.'

(7) The method of Bradley is surely somewhat slighting to the universe. He applies our 'logi-

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 260.

cal' paradoxes and abstract puzzles,—which might stand with Buridan's Ass in the road until they should perish—to the full, rich, growing universe.¹ The negative results are a reflection upon his methods, and upon logic itself; but not upon the revelation of Reality which experience, in the true sense, is every day presenting to us. If we want an explanation of unity and diversity, instead of throwing away everything that manifests it, we ought rather to free our minds from the burden of scholasticism which is so powerless to cope with actually existing facts and principles. Life is more than concepts. Reality sets us the task of following her lead. The 'Owl of Minerva' which, as Hegel tells us, 'does not start on her flight until the shades of evening have begun to fall,' cannot imitate the lark which heralds the day with prophetic song. Life makes the way for Thought.

(8) But, more in detail, the solution of incompleteness, relations, unity and diversity is to be found 'within us.' Professor Royce has shown

¹ Such works as Bergson's *L'Evolution Créatrice* and James' *A Pluralistic Universe*, represent a very proper as well as popular revolt from the dry scholasticism which lurks in many systems of Absolute Idealism. The present tendency is wholly towards a 'concrete' and living Idealism

that Thought gives a concrete solution of the puzzle of the One and the Many.¹ The answer to the difficulty is *solvitur ambulando*. The Self is the key to these mysteries of logic, and it affords an actual hint and illustration of the way in which fragmentariness is overcome, relations subsist in a whole which embraces them, unity and diversity are positively experienced. This key Bradley deliberately throws away. The *somehow* must be cleared up.

(9) But even in the case of the Absolute, the *somehow* is never changed into an account of *how*. If we are excused for crying 'mystery' now, why were we birched for doing so in the case of our immediate experience? This act of faith on Bradley's part results from his method, because only in our experience can the conceptual difficulty be overcome. The paradox therefore recurs, and creates discord even in the Absolute. The logical discord grates upon the ear until the noise is drowned by the mystical chorus hymning the supra-relational, all-absorbing and reconciling Absolute Experience which enjoys a balance of pleasure over pain! *Here* sameness and diversity

¹ *The World and the Individual*, vol. i. Supplementary Essay, p. 490 ff.

simply *must* be real. *There*—in the case of the Self—they were real but were disowned!

(10) In regard to the ambiguities in the term Self, Bradley's contention must be admitted. He has performed indirectly a great service by calling attention so acutely to these various meanings. In a humble way, I shall endeavour to fix some meanings elsewhere in this work.¹

But from this bundle of meanings some stand out as proof against Bradley's attacks, although he is reluctant to admit his failure to demolish them. For example, in his third case of Essential Self, Coenesthesia, the Self is twitted about the problem of change, about its own undefined limits, and its character as 'a wretched fraction and poor atom,' if it be merely the identical element through change. Then he proceeds to the problems of personal identity, continuity, and memory. This view of the Self is really scouted because of our inability to define what we feel. But I am not aware that the slightest feeling has ever been any better off in this respect. We are not clever enough to turn ourselves inside out, and then take a snapshot photograph. But are we therefore unreal?

¹ Part II., Chapter II.

No, the feeling and consciousness of Self cannot possibly be treated as objects on our horizon, and no one but an intellectualist would desire it. But Bradley himself does not challenge feeling so long as it is not *feeling of Self*, the most intimate experience, and the most difficult to describe,—and then he objects! In his system, feeling is given a clear course to the highest peak of Reality, and luxuriates in state as Absolute Experience, while the Self is refused admittance except in the guise of a beggar, and on condition of forfeiture of character.

Bradley's criticism of Subject and Object is also most inconclusive, and quite unconvincing. The fluctuating margin of Self and Not-Self is a psychological characteristic devoid of metaphysical interest, since both subject and object are still essentially present in all experience. These two important meanings of Self therefore remain intact.

(11) As to the criticism of the Self's Reality, we have already examined Bradley's method and aim, and little further need be said. It is evident that any existing object of attack might be proved unreal in Bradley's way, for it consists in showing its entanglement with the aforesaid contradic-

tions. Even the Absolute would succumb but for the special consideration shown. But in the main, the reality of the Self is attacked because of our failure to intellectualize it, which has just been adverted to. It may be added that, whether we will or not, we must accept experience as our portion. And by this term I mean the concrete personal kind of experience which we actually have, and not something which can set itself over against the life of the Self, and call our contents of consciousness hard names, from its vaunted eminence as being 'somehow' Absolute. After all we must own the 'I' that makes a judgment, that feels a pain, that resolves, strives, and wills, as having a reality which will *not* be decried, and which we assert even in denying and in doubting. When the Self is intellectualized, as far as that is possible, Bradley calls it a 'construction,' and mocks at its lateness in appearing on the scene of experience! When it is immediate, it is blind feeling. What is the poor thing to do? The confusion in the issue is brought out by his dissatisfaction with the Self when analysed below relations without distinction between Subject and Object, because it cannot deal with terms and relations of which, 'as it

commonly appears,' Reality consists!¹ And yet when it is taken 'higher up,' it is infected with relations, and with diversity and unity, and is an intellectual construction! Significant is his remark on self-consciousness: 'It is a mere experience!' How it bears out the contention in regard to the mistaken use of Experience in this wide, vague sense so prevalent to-day!

Surely the truth is that the Self and Experience stand or fall together in this matter. Neither are accurately definable. Both must be accepted. The Absolute Reality must be revealed in Experience as embodying Subjects of experience. Bradley's frequent admissions that the Self is 'less unreal' than any other finite thing are forced out in spite of his dialectic. If the Self were not associated with a world long before designated as 'mere appearance,' it would be able to come unto its own. It would manifestly range on the supreme levels of experience as essentially real, in subordination to a transcendental Absolute, which really gives an entirely new point of view. But even so, Self and Experience should appear as in essential relation.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 106-7.

(12) The denial of Selfhood to the Absolute in any real sense is the outcome of the position so frequently admitted before. As has been well pointed out by Professor A. Seth Pringle-Pattison¹ and Professor Royce,²—from different points of view—Bradley's Absolute Experience really *involves* the attribution of what is indistinguishable from Perfect Personality. The unwillingness to characterize his Absolute as Self is not consistent with the Idealistic position.³ His accommodation of 'personality' within the Absolute beside moral and æsthetic and other 'appearances' is open to the objection that it limits Reality while seeking to guard it from determination. Further, the Self, for which moral purposes are, is on a higher plane than moral relationships. Instead of being supra-personal this type of Absolute tends to fall to the level of infra-human or impersonal, or else becomes a mere Unknowable, hardly distinguishable from a monstrous Thing-in-itself except for the unmeaning designation of Experience. The inconsistency in the

¹ *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, Essay on 'A New Theory of the Absolute,' p. 218 ff.

² *The World and the Individual*, vol. i. Supplementary Essay, pp. 550-554.

³ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 558-9 (Appendix).

use of that concept which we have traced throughout is so obviously magnified in the final result, that further criticism here is unnecessary. The prominence of feeling in the final Reality, and the discussion of the Absolute's enjoyment, coming after the denial of personality¹ strike one as incongruous, and form their own commentary on the position.

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 532-5.

CHAPTER III.

PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE.

To the student of Professor Royce's more recent works,¹ it is evident that the concept of the Self occupies a central position in his System. In his earlier philosophical writings² the palpably *ethical* interpretation of the Self and the Universe was conspicuous—an influence which continues to be prominent, but now more in relation to the interpretation he gives of the Self. In the two later works we find sufficient material for the problem of our Thesis.³ Royce approaches the

¹ *The Conception of God*, by Profs. Royce, Howison, Mezes, and Le Conte; New York, Macmillan Co., 1897. *The World and the Individual*, Gifford Lectures, University of Aberdeen, by Prof. Royce; N.Y., Macmillan Co., 1st and 2nd Series, 1901.

² *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, 1885; *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 1892; both of the Riverside Press, Cambridge.

³ Since these words were written, Professor Royce has given us *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, *William James*, and *Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life*, and *The Problem of Christianity*, 2 vols. (all Macmillan). These works express in fresh relations

Self through his Idealistic Theory of Being. But he does not regard his system as *a priori*. Accordingly we are at perfect liberty to expound first his view of the Self, and then the place of the Self in his Theory of Reality.

I.

What, then, is the Self? Royce's answer is partly negative, but finally positive. He criticizes certain current conceptions of the Self, and then gives what he believes to be the idealistic and the true view. Let us state in turn these two aspects of his answer.

He begins his discussion of the Self with a psychological account. Viewing the merely brute facts of self-consciousness, one must see that there is no stability, no verifiable identity to be found. The Empirical Ego is the product of growth, and the outcome of experience, having a genesis in time, and a connection with the body. In the aspect of mere *fact*, a passing mood can

the view of the Self given in *The World and the Individual*, which is discussed in the Chapter, but do not greatly modify the definition of the Self given by Royce, in terms of its relation to the community and the past and present values of the individual experience. In other words, the Self remains for Royce an interpretation, a logical, ethical and social conception, rather than a basic fact correlative with experience.

alter spiritual stability, while the idea of the Self is largely made up of bodily sensations, especially muscular and visceral. These form a nucleus to which are added *habits* and *social experiences*. These latter elements are most important in producing that *contrast-effect*, in which the idea of Self mainly consists. The child's natural dependence on others becomes consciously weakened, and gradually the discovery is made of the distinction between himself and all other selves. Stages in this process are indicated by quarrels, loves, the sense of rivalry, the conflict of desires, and especially by conscious imitation and docility to another's will. Then comes the sensitiveness to the approval and disapproval of others. But it is not till the formation and growth of an Ideal that true selfhood begins, bringing order, connectedness, and permanence into the inner world. This important factor is essentially social in character, and of the nature of a contrast. When an inward comparison of ideals takes place, however, then the progress to selfhood only lacks the fulfilled purpose in order to reach completion. The meaning or value of a life as expressed in an Ideal, gives Self its unity and reality. By attention—the essence of Will—to the life-plan which

is selected as the Ideal, the seeking Self partly realizes his selfhood, which is only to be perfectly fulfilled, however, in the Absolute.

Thus we have passed from the negative to the positive point of view, or—as it comes to mean—from the psychological to the metaphysical. In other words, we have found that the reality of the Self can only be reached by regarding the significance or value of certain elements of inner experience, which, as merely empirical facts, are incompetent to furnish a doctrine of the Self. 'The real Self is the totality of our empirical consciousness when viewed as having unity of meaning, and as exemplifying, or in its totality fulfilling an idea.'¹ So instead of vainly seeking for an Ego among the empirical facts of consciousness where all is variable and fragmentary, we realize that the only real and permanent Ego is to be found in the consciously selected and adopted plan of life, which pervades such elements and gives them unity and meaning. By such an Ideal a Self is constituted, and without some such purpose no Self can exist. Nay, does not psychology show that, apart from this standard, we may be said to possess many selves

¹ *The Conception of God*, p. 288.

rather than one? So our Self must be viewed metaphysically and even morally, if it is to be seriously reckoned with at all.

Before we finally pass over into this metaphysical region, however, let us supplement what has been said by a further survey. In the Second Series of *The World and the Individual* the subject is more fully treated. After speaking of the ambiguities in the meaning of Self—shown, for example, in our contrary ethical maxims—‘forget yourself’—‘find yourself’—Royce maintains that the usage of Self in the higher ethical sense is the only defensible mode of employing the concept. Then he proceeds to discuss three different conceptions of the individual Self.

① The first conception is an empirical view of the Self, as a certain unity of facts, contrasted with all else, partly physical and partly psychical as including the conscious states. That there is a variable character about the common-sense distinction of Self from Not-Self must be admitted. Royce claims that the psychological unity observable in this series is due to the principle that the distinction between the Self and Not-Self is essentially *social*, and depends upon a succession of contrast-effects, together with

the psychological processes of habit, memory, and imagination.

The second conception consists in the view of the Self as a real and independent being, in some metaphysical sense. The Self is one, and is called the Soul, and is regarded as a Substance. It is not to be confounded with the mere states of consciousness. It gives unity and order to mental life. But Royce contends that this doctrine is condemned already as Realistic ; and the refutation of Realism has been given previously in his pages. In short, both this and the first conception of the Self are inadequate since they are incompatible with the only tenable Theory of Being, namely the Idealistic. To this view Royce addresses himself as the third conception of the Self, which shall provide all that is worth contending for in the others. The following out of this conception will lead us into the realm of metaphysics and into as much of Royce's System as it will concern us here to explore.

This third type escapes the two great difficulties of the former conceptions. It is not burdened by the ethical contradictions which a criticism of the common-sense Self brings to light ; nor yet is it disturbed by the psychological

theories of the 'Passing Thought,' and the like, or the complexities of empirical processes. What this third type is we have previously indicated. It consists in the view of the Self as a 'Meaning embodied in a conscious life.'¹ The Self is not an entity, not a Substance, not a Soul, nor yet a series of inner states. What the Self is can only be fully revealed by the fulfilment of the Ideal which constitutes its Selfhood. That Meaning is relative to other Selves or Meanings and to the Absolute Self, or Infinite Meaning. And yet it is distinguished from them, for the Whole is an infinitely rich and complex unity.

We can no longer keep closed the floodgates of Royce's Idealism, if we would float down the river of his thought. In the First Series he has discussed the Four Conceptions of Being,—the theories of Realism; Empiricism and its logical outcome, Mysticism; Critical Rationalism; and finally his own Idealism, that is, the ultimate unity in the Absolute of the Internal and External Meaning. Now, the Self, as a merely fitful flush of conscious purpose, seems to be just as strongly contrasted from the wider Not-Self, as the Internal from the External Meaning. But reflection

¹ *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii. p. 269.

shows the same ultimate transcendence in the Absolute. The outer world, the Not-Self, the External Meaning, are seen to be reducible to the true Internal Meaning, although without loss of individuality. So an 'infinite number' of such contrasts of Self and Not-Self can be made,¹ which in reality only express the wealth of meaning in the Absolute.

And when in any one instant I seem to have such a contrast between Self and Not-Self, the fact is that I identify the past and the future experiences of what I consider Myself with the present, not by any psychical entity, but by a unity of purpose which at least I 'ought to possess'² in contrast with all else. Personal identity is not the discredited psychological type, but that of ethical meaning and purpose, which, as we have seen, constitutes the Self. This Ideal implies the will to preserve one's own significance in subordination to the essential Unity. In the true Theory of Being, therefore, this ethical conception of Self will predominate; and it will be valid not for the human individual alone, but, as we shall see, for the Absolute also, and even for Reality in its essential structure.

¹ *The World and the Individual*, p. 273.

² *Ibid.* p. 274.

For since you cannot find out *what* the Self really is by mere experience however prolonged, but must regard its Meaning in the light of the Absolute who is precisely this system of values consciously fulfilled unto perfection in his own infinite Unity, you must look to this standpoint for a true doctrine of the Self. And it is for this reason that Royce approaches the Self through his Theory of Being. But this conception of Reality is essentially based on the ethical nature of Selfhood—for that is what the Unity of the Internal and External Meaning comes to mean. Hence the realm of the Absolute is throughout conscious and the perfection of Meaning. That is, the Absolute is a Self, a Person. And Reality is of this structure also. For it is the completely organized life of the Absolute, inclusive of the infinite variety of meanings, in fulfilled Unity, in which our various finite Selves have a place, with all that constitutes God's universe.

Royce's favourite argument, however, for this constructive view is drawn from his doctrine of the Self-representative Series, based upon the formal structure of the Self and extended in relation to the number series of mathematics.

The Self is found to be inclusive and included. It is essentially dual and self-representative in its structure. And Reality is found to have the same form, which is shared by the Infinite of the 'New' mathematics.¹ Accordingly, against Bradley, Royce maintains the fundamental *reality* of the Self as he conceives it, and he defends as an integral part of his system the Personality of the Absolute. This conception of the Self-representative System also supplies him with the solution of Bradley's great riddle of the One and the Many. For in such a System, as in the Self also, variety is constituted by unity, and unity by variety. The life's Meaning makes a Self out of fragmentary and multitudinous elements, which only get their being through relation to the Self, although not fully discovered as yet. And, on the other hand, the Series of self-inclusive representations, for example, maps of maps, is such that every point is in an infinite unity, while yet different from every other. In short, this formal conception gives Royce the clue to the structure of the Whole of Reality as an Infinite Collection of the essential type of a Self-representative

¹ *The World and the Individual*, vol. i. Supplementary Essay, p. 512 ff.

System. Hence his definition of consciousness, and of the Self, conceived as we have presented it, as *that which can be content to itself*; for, so viewed, the Self is the system of unfulfilled meanings, unsatisfied longings, by which it seeks to express itself, and yet it is included in these as the conscious Self with a certain conception of its meaning at any given stage in the temporal process. But this is supremely true of the Absolute Self who includes within his life the infinite collection of Selves. And in this way the appearance of new Selves is to be interpreted. A New Self arises *within* a more inclusive Self.

The concept of Infinity is freely used by Royce, and it is interpreted after the pattern of the 'new' infinite of Mathematics as required by the Self-representative Series. An infinite totality is provided for by the inclusion in the Absolute of all actually fulfilled, as opposed to all barely possible, ideas and meanings. This Self-determination on the part of the Divine Will removes the objection to Personality as imposing an arbitrary limit upon the Absolute.

This leads to the problem of the relation of the Selves, as essentially moral beings, to the Absolute. Royce faces the difficulty which is

so strongly emphasized by Howison.¹ How are genuine moral autonomy, ethical freedom, and personal immortality compatible with such Monism? Well, since Royce is so insistent upon the ethical character of Selfhood, it is a most relevant point to raise. And, further, he seeks to provide a distinct theory of Individuality.

Royce considers his system compatible with the highest claims for moral freedom and ethical autonomy. For it is the essence of my individuality to define myself as distinct from all else by the unique life-plan chosen and adopted. And my doing so is God's will also. While Royce conceives the universe as interpretable teleologically, and as a Divine Unity, he yet regards every fragment of the world as being in its individuality an essential aspect of the life of the Whole, as the positive embodiment of conscious will and purpose. The antinomy between human freedom and Divine Purpose is solved by the category of Time. The fact of the dependence of the Self upon another Will in Time does not conflict with the assertion that in the aspect of Eternity, the Self exists as Self-defining, and yet as the expression of the Divine

¹ *The Conception of God*. See also the next Chapter.

Will. The Divine Will expresses itself in the Self's own purposes, and includes them in its own. So freedom, individuality and immortality are provided for in the System. The Self is real as an expression of its own meaning, freely chosen and adopted. But that is so because it is the Divine purpose. The Absolute supremely solves the problem of the One and the Many. The various Selves are many because in God they are One ; and God is Unity because of this Plurality, and infinite variety.

The Selves are not independent beings, and Royce considers any such Realistic Theodicy beset with the greatest difficulties. Evil he regards as due to inattention to the highest. It is atoned for in the Absolute, and so is reconcilable with the Perfection of Reality. The uniqueness of our individuality is preserved in God, the Supreme Person and Individual, in whom our Eternal Selves find fulfilment and immortality. God's life includes the temporal process and He views it eternally, as in one indivisible instant. In His totality as Absolute He is 'conscious not *in* time, but *of* time, and of all that infinite time contains.'¹ As sharers in that Divine Life, the

¹ *Ibid.* vol. ii. p. 419.

Selves, from the eternal standpoint, consciously attain their perfection by the knowledge of their temporal strivings in their wholeness, and by beholding their fragmentary meanings as fulfilled in the Absolute and revealed in the light of Eternity.

II.

Royce's System of Absolute Idealism is logical and impressive. It represents the results of the best thinking of one of the foremost living metaphysicians, after many years of profound reflection upon philosophical problems. It was not cast into the literary mould before it was melted. It has glowed in the crucible of personal life and conviction; it has been fused beneath the white heat of honest criticism.

This conviction, however, must not be emphasized here; but rather we must go on audaciously to our work of appreciation and criticism. A word or two more of appreciation will suffice. I believe that in the latter part of this Thesis, it will be found that the conclusions indicated will not very widely diverge from the main outlines of Royce's System, with which I am largely in sympathy, as the best expression yet given of

Idealism. And now, in regard to criticism: My first and fundamental divergence is concerning Royce's view of the Self. I cannot accept the doctrine,—however widespread it may be, and however capable of conserving spiritual interests, that the *only real* Self is the idea of a life-purpose, the Meaning intended, the Ideal sought. For the resort to the Passive Voice here will serve as a hint of my objection, which I may at once state bluntly. *What* intends, means, seeks ideals? To my mind the only answer is the *Subject* or *Ego* to whom these thoughts, purposes, and strivings, are Object, albeit expressive of the ethical nature of the Person. Now this Subject-Object aspect, so fundamental to an existential account of experience, is not explicitly prominent in Royce's treatment. Yet it seems to me to lie right across the track of his thought. The duality in Selfhood is present, and figures occasionally in the 'Self-representative' and the 'Well-ordered Series,' under the old terms, Subject and Object, but on examination it will be found to be distinct, and consisting of twofold Meanings, or *objective content of some kind*. Yet this undeniable fact of '*my*' experience, which we have had occasion to miss in James and Bradley, does not

fully come to its proper rights even in Royce. To be sure, the Self is placed with Experience, even in the Absolute. So far that is well. But the 'Self' is not the Subject of Experience, which I contend is essential to a true metaphysic.

In other words, the Self is pushed into the conceptual realm, where it is very much at home with mathematical and other impersonal concepts. But thereby it loses its immediacy, its character as directly felt and experienced. And this is precisely the essential thing about the Self which must be taken into account in Metaphysics. Royce charges such views with being Realistic, and accordingly dismisses them. But surely this is a hard saying to those who believe all reality to be given in terms of experience and thought. It is certainly remote from the Realism of independent things in themselves or relations apart from knowledge. Of course, the brunt of the charge is against the Soul-Substance Theory, which regards the Soul as an independent thing or entity. But there are many and diverse forms of this theory; and, in any case, the reality of the 'Spiritual Self,' even of James' *Psychology*, the Subject of our thinking, feeling, willing, striving, yes, even of our meaning, imagining, and

planning, must be given a prime place in a system of Reality.

As to the disintegrating facts of empirical Psychology, what do they really teach? A genesis of the Self; a process of growth in the idea of the Self; the possibility of manifestation in one individual of different *groups of habits*, or as we call them in this ethical sense,—selves or personalities, the social character of Selfhood; the flowing moments of consciousness. I maintain that there is nothing really new, and nothing of metaphysical significance to the problem of the *Subject* of experience in any of these facts. And as to the Personal Identity in regard to the Self for whom this stream of experiences is, I contend that it is no whit less authenticated, rational, and defensible than the belief in the identity of the world. (In one case we build up an identity amid the *objects* presented in the stream of thought and in the other we believe in an identical *Subject*, which has the great advantage over the former of being the most intimate experience, and most verifiable identity, for it is the pivotal spectator around which the objective kaleidoscope revolves! If we are to disintegrate experience, let us treat both sides alike, and then we

can turn our open books face downwards, and confess ourselves utter sceptics! As this will come up again in the sequel, I pass on to other aspects of the same tendency.

In close connection with the foregoing is the criticism that the Self of Royce's doctrine is essentially ethical, and therefore stands on a different plane from that which is claimed for the Self as an entity. (Even if Being is only constituted by Meaning or Value, as Royce maintains, from our human point of view, then that Meaning is relative to some kind of identical Self *other than the Meaning*. The Meaning requires a conscious Self for which different experiences are. The same truth applies to all forms of Pragmatism. Schiller and the Oxford School realize this important basis for reality in terms of value. Royce's Absolute may serve as the ultimate standard, but it is hardly fair to fall back upon it as the ground of the reality of the Self as Meaning, after discussing psychological and genetic problems! We must, and we do recognize the different standpoints of reality for *man*, and final Reality for *God*.

Accordingly, I maintain that the Ethical Self implies a real being, a Subject, an 'I,' in relation

to which all my experiences are, and which my meanings, purposes, ideals imply, as surely as currency implies some actual medium of exchange. And, on the other hand, if you allow me a Real Ego, I will have no difficulty in seeing my way to an Ideal Ego. But without such an admission, so imperatively demanded by inner experience, we cannot set one against the other, or even conceive how an Ideal Ego can possibly be real in the prime or exclusive sense.

Accordingly, when Royce says that there is no real Ego or permanent being apart from the life-plan which pervades our mental experiences, and which alone makes what I call 'myself,'¹ I have to protest that he is employing one conception of the Self—namely the ethical—to the exclusion of the existential Self or Subject, without drawing the distinction between them. Perhaps the criticism of Royce might be put thus: he identifies the 'I' with an ethical and intellectual 'Me,' to the exclusion of the real Ego as Subject. He repeats Bradley's mistake of treating the Self as an intellectual and ethical construction, as if there were no other meaning

¹ *Conception of God*, pp. 289-290.

of Self. Our distinction between terms in the Second Part will make this clear.

The emphasis upon the formal and conceptual side of all Reality follows as a corollary from the subjection of the Self to these relations. Ethical and Mathematical concepts and judgments go together here,—an instance of history repeating itself—and they accord well with the principles of Symbolic Logic. To some, no doubt, these purely formal discussions will appear valuable; for my own part, conviction as to Reality does not follow from such formal considerations.¹ But, leaving this aside, the duality in the Self-representative Series, which gives the clue to the structure of Reality is after all confessedly the structure of Subject-Object. Now, if this were fully recognized and worked out in the case of the Self,

¹The reader of Royce's latest books, especially his recent fine work on *The Problem of Christianity*, will have an opportunity of observing how far he has gone in following the lead of Symbolic Logic and the New Mathematics in the elaboration of his system. Concepts are the pieces on the metaphysical chess-board, and the game of thought is played with them rather than with the facts of life and experience. Christianity is the evolution of concepts, loyalty is the abstract principle which unites the individual with the Divine Community. Great as may be the truth underlying such a conclusion, one feels as if the philosopher reaches it *a priori*. He seems to be thinking in one language, as it were, and speaking in another.

we should have a system free from the objection which has been previously urged. In such a system our hold would be retained upon the essence of empirical reality,—namely, our own existence as the Subjects of Experience,—while at the same time we should be able to seek for the ultimate Reality without forfeiting our immediate feeling, our self-activity, and our sense of life.

The claim of Royce that his system is not *a priori* is scarcely manifested by his method of reading his facts in the light of his conclusions from the start of his constructive work. It is true, his writings are on Religious Philosophy; but, to my thinking, a clear progress from starting-point to conclusion, from finite to Absolute Reality, would avoid the abstractness and deductive character of his reasoning, shown for example in his dismissal of his Second Conception of the Self,—as a real entity—on the grounds of Realism. Akin to this method is his over-emphasis,—as it appears—upon the Social side as constituting selfhood. Again, we seem to have relations without any real and experienced terms, short of the Absolute itself.

With his conception of the Absolute as a Self,

I am in accord, with reservations, which will readily be perceived from what I have said in criticism of the ethical and conceptual character of the Self. The relation of God to man as a moral being will come up in the next Chapter. I may state here that I cannot regard either Royce's provision for the moral, or Howison's provision for the metaphysical, necessities of Personality as fully satisfactory. Royce's view is still too monistic to meet the requirements of true freedom and responsibility, while Howison's conception is too pluralistic.)

CHAPTER IV.

PROFESSOR G. H. HOWISON.

ONE of the most interesting expressions of the present reaction of many minds against the recently prevailing Monism is the system of 'Personal Idealism' as expounded by Professor G. H. Howison.¹ It is quite distinct from the views set forth by Eight Oxford Graduates in a recent volume bearing the title of *Personal Idealism*, to which reference is made elsewhere.

I.

The kernel of Howison's thought is to be found in his protest that Idealistic Monism is irreconcilable with Personality, human or divine. As

¹ *The Conception of God*, by Professors J. Royce, J. Le Conte, G. H. Howison, and S. E. Mezes; N.Y.; The Macmillan Co., 1897. *The Limits of Evolution* and other Essays, illustrating the Metaphysical Theory of Personal Idealism, by Professor G. H. Howison, Second Edition, revised and enlarged; N.Y., The Macmillan Co., 1905.

we have seen, this opinion was freely expressed at the Discussion with Professor Royce, reported in the *Conception of God*. Equally incompatible with personality are the claims of Naturalism ; and that the polemic against this latter view is no less strenuous is indicated by the Essay on ' *The Limits of Evolution*,' which gives to his book its title.

Howison contends for a Rational Pluralism of free spirits forming an eternal Society, including God, not as the Efficient Cause, but as the Final Cause, or determining Ideal of all. Not only the *moral* claims of personality,—infinitely momentous as they are,—but also the intellectual self-activity of minds, leads him to the formulation of Pluralism as a system. In fact, the theoretical activity is not to be set over against the ' Practical Reason ' as separate or fundamentally distinct ; he maintains that the intellectual is ultimately reducible to the moral relation, that consciousness is best interpreted as conscience. In each case the act of Self-definition is at the root of experience ; and this personal determination is necessary owing to the presence of a system of conscious Subjects, other Selves and God, or the Supreme Self, which together constitute the

world of Persons, the 'City of God.'¹ This Self-defining and moral activity is so essential that the ultimate reality must be stated in terms which do justice to Personality above all. Monism, whether Idealistic or Naturalistic, fails in this supreme task, and therefore is false to the highest truth of experience. Howison attributes this fundamental error to the prominence of Efficient over Final Causation in such systems. The old form of Monotheism, with its doctrine of Creation and Regeneration, falls under the like condemnation, in his opinion.

If we go to the heart of the matter and ask—'What is a Person?' we shall bring out Howison's thought more fully. Howison answers that a person is a self-active member of a manifold system of real beings.² The true person is possessed of independent origination; and yet he is essentially related to an inclusive society of beings equally characterized by initiative; and all are attracted to the Ideal and Perfect Person, God, the Final Cause and bond of union of spirits. 'It is the essence of a person to stand in relation with beings having an autonomy, in

¹ *The Limits of Evolution*, pp. 174-5.

² *The Conception of God*, p. 91.

whom he recognizes rights, and toward whom he acknowledges duties.'¹

The person is the real creator of Nature, and cannot be explained as derived from Nature. He has no origin,² for he is above time. Hence a philosophy of Evolution is incompetent. The elements of self-active consciousness are *a priori*, as Kant has established, and when this truth is fully recognized, and consistently worked out, Howison claims that rational Pluralism will result as the true Idealism, and the only adequate philosophy. Each person is a 'focal point' of the universe, receiving rays from other conscious centres and reflecting them back with added brightness. The universe is the product of the consciousness of this Society of Persons, who constitute Nature by their self-activity according to the laws of cognition summed up in the Categories, as *a priori* modes or conditions of experience. Accordingly, the Person in its whole reality is the one intelligible creative unity, the single synthetic energy, 'blending in one energetic whole above the categories the two activities of absolute subject and absolute cause.'³ Howison illustrates his extension of the Kantian argu-

¹ *Limits*, etc. p. 52.

² *Ibid.* p. xiv.

³ *Ibid.* p. 174.

ment by treating Time ¹ as a form of consciousness in each of us, expressive of our self-activity. Time is 'a changeless *principle of relation*, by which the active-conscious self connects the items of experience into the serial order which we call sequence or succession, and blends the two concomitant series, physical and psychic, into the single whole that expresses the self's own unity.' ²

While it is indubitably certain, as Descartes said, that the Self is real, still that conviction rests, as a matter of fact, upon the essentially social relation with other selves, that is, upon the consciousness of Self as *personal*. But this fundamental recognition of the Society of Minds leads to emphasis upon the *moral* relation as the deepest reality, and the spring of the intellectual and æsthetic. Yes, from the connection of the *idea* of self and the *idea* of God, the best proof of the *actual* existence of God is to be found. God is the Supreme Person in this Society, defining himself from every other as the perfect Self-fulfilment in eternity, the reality of all ideal

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 299-302.

² *Ibid.* p. 301. There appears to be evidence of affinity of thought with Bergson in this view of time.

possibilities. Human souls define themselves from God, as from other persons ; so the reality of each member depends upon the reality of the Ideal, and the reality of God is involved in the reality of each member. This mutual self-definition ensures the 'singular and unrepeatable personality' of each soul. This moral relationship and mutual dependence of souls and God is the only creation which Howison recognizes.

Howison seeks for a reconciliation between Freedom and Determinism by means of Self-determination or purposive action as 'free causation,' together with the attraction of those Ideals which constitute the rational bond of Souls, and which centre in the perfection of God. The 'Dilemma of Determinism' can only be avoided by regarding freedom as rational choice, and by adopting Final instead of Efficient Causation.

Each Self-defining individual is eternal, and yet gives rise to 'the phenomenal world of defect' in defining himself from God, and has, on the one hand, the trait of empirical alternative ; and, on the other, the power to respond to the vision of Good, an influence eternally real throughout the City of God, emanating from the Spirit who is the perfection of all Ideals. Evil enters through

failure of will on the part of human selves. Immortality is provided for on the basis of the reality and eternity of all members of this Society of Persons.

Let it be noted that Howison guards his system against the charge of being merely Subjective Idealism by his provision for objectivity. It is true that he views Nature as the product of the individual's formative consciousness. But as this is a part of the soul's act of self-definition, it can only be done with reference to other minds and God, the Type of all intelligence. So the same social and ethical principles which constitute the Person provide the unity of Nature as a 'communal system of experience.' Time and Space exist because of this correlation of minds, involving a logical and moral order in the self-defining consciousness of each.

The *motif* of Howison's System is, as we have seen, the conviction of the inalienable worth and absolute reality of personality. Accordingly he falls back upon a Pluralism in opposition to Monistic and Naturalistic systems which seem to sacrifice the highest values of morality and individuality. Royce's provision in his System for both these values, Howison rejects, on the grounds

that the distinctness of our minds cannot be preserved in the Absolute, nor can the significance of moral personality be maintained.¹ In such Absolutism he contends also that the Personality of God is unrecognizable. Upon this attempt to vindicate personality Howison's system is built. What shall we say about it ?

II.

With Howison's motive I have considerable sympathy. I cannot but feel that Absolutism has been half blind to the intellectual, moral and emotional implications of Personality, the most significant fact of which philosophy must take account. But in addition to what has already been said in the criticism of Royce, we shall have occasion to refer to this subject again, and so need not pursue it here.

In regard to Howison's Pluralism, so fundamental in his system, we cannot rest in that as a final account of Reality. The problem of Relations is certainly too strong to allow us to accept a divided universe. If it be said the price is less than that paid in the sacrifice of personality, I

¹ *The Conception of God*, p. 129.

agree ; but I am hopeful that such an alternative is not ultimate.

Howison does not contribute to a theory of the Self in his pages, but expounds the concept of the Person in an essentially social and ethical way. No doubt he is thus emphasizing a valuable truth, but, it seems to me, a very partial one. Considering how important the concept is in his system, he might have given less reiteration of a few truths about personality, and assisted in the pressing work of clearing the intellectual atmosphere that surrounds the concept of the Self. He shows similar tendency to repetition in the case of Final Causation, as if it were the ' skeleton key ' for all locks. Change the term to Teleology and it ceases to be so flexible—its dangers and ambiguities come to light,—while the magic word ' cause ' drops out of sight. As far as I can discover he has not given us a *definite* account of what he *means* by Final Cause, nor of *how* it is sufficient for all these things. I think that his assertion of Efficient Causation as the unpardonable sin of all Absolutists and theologians is an instance of false emphasis.¹ Cause is not a category to conjure with in metaphysics, and the less

¹ *Limits, etc.* pp. 343, 384, 396.

said about it the better, except as a working hypothesis. The inspiration of 'the great Stagirite' was hardly 'verbal' after all.

The social analogy is pressed too closely and made too prominent. In fact, such phrases as the 'City of God,' 'Eternal Republic,' and so forth, do not help us to the solution of the problem of *existence*, but rather serve as illustrations in the ethical sphere. The account of Nature is meagre. The merely formal aspect of social relationship is unable to bear the weight of a Universe.

The place of God in this system seems to me to be unworthy of the name. That is a serious defect in a system which professes to rescue divine Personality from the blankness of Monism. As Dr. J. M. E. M'Taggart pointed out in his review,¹ the rôle of the Deity in Howison's system is inadequate to meet the requirements of traditional and Christian thought. Howison replies² that the moral qualities are more important than Self-existence. But, after all, does Howison give us concrete holiness, love, and truth in God? I think not. God becomes the meeting-place of mere abstractions. He is somehow perfect, but without living Personality.

¹ *Mind*, July, 1902.

² *Limits, etc.* p. 429 (Appendix).

If this be true, as I believe, then Howison has failed in his object, and chiefly through loss of contact with the *matter* of experience. He seems to save the soul ; but he has merely preserved the formal fact of relationship between souls, and does not touch concrete experience anywhere. In consequence, even human personality becomes a mere intersection of abstractions ; and no one is likely to glow with enthusiasm over his Personal Idealism. It is too academic, too *a priori*, too eclectic, for a system professing to deal justly with living personality. At the same time, it must be admitted that the unsystematic form of presentation as popular Essays on diverse topics may account for some of these defects.¹

¹ Professor James Ward has given a critique on Howison's views, with special reference to Creation, in the Supplementary Notes to his recent book, *The Realm of Ends*, p. 455 ff.

CHAPTER V.

MR. F. C. S. SCHILLER.

THE works of Mr. Schiller which we shall here study are his *Riddles of the Sphinx*,¹ his essay on *Axioms as Postulates*, in *Personal Idealism*,² and his later contribution of Philosophical Essays published under the title of *Humanism*.³

As these writings extend over an interval of a dozen years, it is not surprising to find a natural development of his thought, and in some instances a change of ideas. Mr. Schiller's first work was the most ambitious in its range of treatment, although possibly it was not so expressive of his characteristic courage as the later essay on *Axioms as Postulates*, which, if accepted as valid,

¹ *Riddles of the Sphinx, A Study in the Philosophy of Evolution*, by a Troglodyte; London, Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

² *Personal Idealism*, by Eight Members of the University of Oxford. Edited by H. Sturt. London, Macmillan & Co., 1902.

³ *Humanism*, Philosophical Essays by F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., Macmillan, 1903.

would revolutionize our notions of Truth. But this view is still adopted generally in his collection of essays entitled *Humanism*, and, although he has not yet sought to systematically establish and defend this view, he holds out the hope of so doing in the future. Meanwhile he shows the full scope of his doctrine to be wider than an epistemological theory; involving as it does certain views of experience, the world and God, which he seeks to embody under the inspiring designation 'Humanism.' This he prefers to such titles as 'Pragmatism,' which is good, but not the final term of philosophic innovation, and 'Radical Empiricism,' which it interprets synthetically, and 'Personal Idealism,' which is perhaps liable to ambiguity, and has already been adopted for the System of G. H. Howison in his *Limits of Evolution*. Humanism is the watch-word of the movement which sets up the whole personality in philosophy to the place which it actually occupies in life, namely the *supreme* place; and from this vantage-ground alone can the problems of thought be properly surveyed and correlated with the essential conditions of will and emotion.

I.

Upon plunging into the *Riddles of the Sphinx*, which, notwithstanding Mr. Schiller's development of thought, still contains sufficient permanence of material, especially in its relation to personality, to preserve its value for the student of *Humanism*, we soon find something bearing on our topic to catch hold of, and upon which we can drift to 'high and dry' philosophic certainty, secure from the waves of Agnosticism, Scepticism, and Pessimism. As it was with the *γνώθι σεαυτόν* of Socrates and the *Cogito ergo sum* of Descartes, so it is with 'the one indisputable fact and basis of philosophy' of Schiller; the reality of the Self it is impossible to doubt. For to deny it is to resolve everything, including our 'only chance' of knowledge, into a destructive whirl of 'appearance' and illusion, from which there is no escape. It is no idle coincidence then that the historical representatives of Scepticism and Agnosticism, Hume and Kant, have been just those who tried to disprove the reality of the Self. Their arguments Schiller refutes, and then fearlessly proceeds to examine the cheap phrases and empty charges of anthropomorphism

flung at religion and any philosophy that recognizes the uniqueness of personality in our own interpretation of experience. Science is itself infected with the dreaded taint of anthropomorphism. So is philosophy. It behoves thought, therefore, to be conscious of itself and to construct a system true to the noblest part of reality, the *conditio sine quâ non* of experience, namely, the Self, which furnishes the key to all else, and therefore makes necessary a teleological explanation of the universe.

Before examining more closely Schiller's doctrine of the Self, let us briefly state the leading principles of the system laid down in the *Riddles of the Sphinx*. The 'Riddles' themselves are the relation of Man to the *World*, to his *Cause*, and to his *Future*. The first is to be solved by the doctrine of the Plurality of ultimate reals; the second requires God, non-phenomenal and personal, but also *finite*; and the third is met by a theory of Immortality, qualified by the degree of consciousness reached by the soul in its past. Prominent in Schiller's system is the process of Becoming, a real process with a beginning and an end in *time*. Time comes into being with the World-Process, through a determination

of the Divine Spirit to form the ultimate spiritual entities into a harmonious cosmos. Between the individual selves and God there is interaction. Evil enters through non-adaptation of the Ego to the interaction with God. Hence Evil tends to become less as Evolution goes on. Error is in the same case as Evil. The material world is due to the Divine side of the 'stress,' while on its own side the Ego produces the phenomenal Self. The process of Evolution means the perfecting of the interaction, so that the development of the world will reveal more and more the nature of God, until at the completion, the perfected spirits would behold the countenance of God. The perfection of the individuals and their grouping into societies must go together, and this is the true End of the Process. The Ideal is to be conceived as the perfection of activity (as in Aristotle).

Beginning, then, with the reality of the Self, Schiller examines the question whether our consciousness of our own existence can be made the basis of theoretical inferences.¹ Kant denied this principle put forward by Descartes in his famous formula. But Schiller shows that this is based

¹ *Riddles*, p. 51.

on a misunderstanding of the Cartesian formula, due to its necessary presentation in an *intellectual* form in a philosophical argument. But its force does not lie in 'I *think*,' but in the 'I' whose reality is intuitively assured in all experience. So viewed, the supposed objections are seen to be in the form of an *ignoratio elenchi*. Schiller goes on, however, to refute Kant from his own words. Because thought cannot adequately think the Self, the latter is a conception only, and—that is to say—no reality. But the true reason for thought's inability to think the subject, Kant has previously implied, namely, because it *is* the subject for every conception, and for every experience besides!

Having passed through the extremes of Agnosticism, Scepticism, Pessimism, and being on the brink of despair, Schiller revives this conviction of the Self's reality as the one truth which is left and which may be plucked like a brand from the burning—though it merely serve to light the funereal pyre of Knowledge! But no, it serves a purpose far more useful than that, even to kindle one by one the torches of reality in this otherwise dark and unintelligible world. Its light *is* intelligence! Schiller exposes the futility

of Hume's objection to personal identity. Hume declared that he could not find the Soul without stumbling upon some impression or idea. If absolute blankness of all content was the condition of the 'self' for which he was seeking, and to which he was willing to grant reality, then indeed he was on a vain quest, for it would be a most uncanny ghost of a soul that would satisfy him.

And so Schiller finds a basis for his Reconstruction of Reality.¹ The Self is the most certain of all things; it is the Alpha, and it would not be surprising if it turned out also to be the Omega, the goal of philosophy.

As the unity of thought and feeling, the conscious Self is a better guide now than either (abstract) thought or (phenomenal) perceptions. Schiller has not yet grasped fully the Pragmatic theory of knowledge, for he speaks of 'the use of the categories and first principles of our thought.'² And yet he had previously given evidence of having the germ of the later development, when, as a test concerning certain principles of knowledge, he had asked of one 'does it *work*?'³ But there he concluded that this

¹ *Riddles*, p. 141 ff.

² *Ibid.* p. 142.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 91-92.

is *not* enough ; for the principle is not completely disproved because it does not work ; logical considerations must be taken into account. And further, the pessimist admits that knowledge *appears* to work. Schiller's development of the teleological principle of explanation approximates to the later ' Humanistic ' view,¹ in some of its statements. These signs are not only interesting ; they are relevant to our inquiry ; for between the acceptance of the reliability of the Self and such theories of knowledge as are represented by the designation of ' Humanism,' there is close connection.

Schiller finds use for the distinction, familiar in philosophy, between the phenomenal Self and the Transcendental Ego, that is, between the Self as it appears to itself in its interaction with the Deity, and the Self as the ultimate reality. He seeks to avoid the dualism, however, which proves so dangerous in Kant's theory. There is needed something in consciousness to connect the moments of experience. The Transcendental Ego serves to do this, as a permanent being, and as the *form*, which contains the whole of our psychic life as its *content*. The error of Kant in separating

¹ See also *Ibid.* pp. 167-168, 260 (footnote).

the form from the matter is avoided by maintaining that the two selves are in some way *one*, an empirical truth corresponding to our conviction that the Self changes and yet is the same. The Transcendental Ego is defined as the 'I' with all its powers and latent capacities of development, the ultimate reality which we have not yet reached.¹ In the progress of development the approximation of the two goes on, until at last coincidence and perfection shall be reached. This is supported by the testimony of Psychology to the phenomena of multiplex personality and 'secondary' selves. Our whole Selves are deeper and more real than our ordinary selves.

The existence of other selves and of their worlds of objectivity is explained after the analogy of hypnotism. As 'several subjects may be made to share in the same hallucinations,' so may 'an operator of vastly greater knowledge and power' create subjective worlds valid for several persons.² Between the Ego and the Deity interaction is going on, and the material world is the resultant, from the Divine force, and our phenomenal consciousness is due to our imperfect adaptation to the 'stress.'

¹ *Riddles*, p. 281.

² *Ibid.* p. 286.

Schiller makes the sensible distinction¹ of a *good* and *bad* (including *false* and *confused*) anthropomorphism. The *false* kind consists in the ascription to beings other than ourselves of qualities which we know that they cannot possess. The *confused* sort is due to a contradiction entering in between the points of analogy with which we start, and the principles with which we conclude. *Good* anthropomorphism (seeing that non-anthropomorphic truth is a fiction) will seek to parallel all things to the principles of explanation furnished by the human mind, and *ultimately the universe must be stated in these terms* (the highest) if it is to be explained. And so Teleology comes in. Action for the sake of rational ends is implied in our natures, and we cannot avoid this, the best explanation of change, in regard to natural processes. A historical method will not suffice, for no description, no mere regress of causes, can satisfy our rational nature. To discover the *significance* of things is the task of metaphysics, and therefore it is necessary that we explain the lower by the higher, and not the reverse, as the extreme physicists and biologists urge. The final cause will be found to be the true ground of

¹ *Ibid.* p. 145 ff.

existence, and this is possible only through the Deity transcendent above the evolutionary process. Evolution, 'which was to have abolished teleology, turns out itself to require the most boldly teleological treatment.' But to be free from objection, the teleological explanation must not be narrowly anthropocentric. The universal end of the world-process is being subserved by the lesser ends. If teleology be kept from conflict with scientific mechanism, both philosophy and science will gain. It is only by a knowledge of what has been, that we can venture a prediction of what is to be, and that an adequate explanation can be given of the natural Process as a whole ; while, on the other hand, the teleological formula of metaphysics should eventually be of benefit to the sciences of ethics, sociology, biology, and, lastly,—the order being one of time as well as of logic—physics and mechanics. Such is Schiller's contribution to the Problem of Teleology.

Bearing in mind his general Theory of Interaction, previously indicated, 'the following supplementary ideas¹ on the nature of God are given. God is the Creator, 'the non-

¹ *Riddles*, p. 310.

phenomenal and unbecome Cause'; the Sustainer, as interacting with the Ego; it follows also that he is personal and intelligent Spirit. The reasons given for Personality are to the point:—

(a) Cause is a category which is valid only if used by persons and of persons.

(b) Personality is the conception expressive of the highest we know.

(c) Not only as Cause, but also as Perfector of the world-process, God must be regarded as possessing Personality.

(d) Since purpose belongs only to intelligent beings, and Evolution is meaningless if not teleological, therefore we acknowledge the divine Personality, rather than contradict our principle of not multiplying entities needlessly to invent gratuitous fictions like an unconscious or an impersonal intelligence. In a footnote¹ he expresses his willingness to accept the terms 'supra-personal' or 'ultra-personal' as applicable to God; for doubtless the Personality of God transcends that of man as far as man transcends the atom. But he adds a proviso which is needed in the light of F. H. Bradley's doctrine of the

¹ *Ibid.* p. 310.

Absolute as 'supra-personal but *not* personal.'¹ Schiller is wise therefore in clearing himself from such a meaningless position (which really asserts the Unknowable in a new dress !) by the stipulation that by supra-personal we mean something including and transcending, rather than excluding personality.

But there is a fourth attribute of God, insisted on throughout Schiller's writings, viz. that God is finite, or rather, that to God as to all realities, 'infinite' has no meaning. For firstly, Kant's rebuttal of the so-called Teleological (or 'physico-theological') 'Proof' of God's existence turned upon the conclusion to an *infinite* God from inadequate *finite* premises. All that could be inferred was a cause adequate to the production of the world. To go beyond this is to argue for the unknowable from the known, to seek the infinite from finite *data*. Again God is finite as Force, for resistance is implied in Force ; and God cannot *be* all if He is to enforce His will upon the world—'unless He is by some *inexplicable chance divided against Himself*.'²

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 173, 531-33. See *supra*, Chapter I. ; also see Part II., Chapter VI.

² *Riddles*, p. 311. Italics mine.

From his previous account¹ of the universe the same result follows. Regarding infinity as negative and conceptual, he had denied that Space and Time possess it; and he had refused to acknowledge an infinite process of Becoming, or the conception of 'the world as a whole' as infinite. 'An infinite whole is a contradiction in terms.'² The belief in infinity contradicts the important conception of causation, to which Schiller holds under the form of a First Cause, as against the unprofitable notion of an endless regress. While he is influenced by the Cosmological and Teleological Proofs, it is evident that he has departed from them considerably, inasmuch as he argues to a finite Being.

But the grand indictment is not yet complete. The philosopher must be told that he has false grounds for the assumption of infinite existence, and the theologian that the doctrine is not only illogical but irreligious, and detrimental to piety, to faith, and to good works. Infinity in God would make Him the Author of Evil would neutralize His Personality, and would deprive the worshipper of his true heritage of religious emotion. Personality and Infinity are

¹ *Riddles*, Chapter IX.

² *Ibid.* p. 253.

incompatible, for Personality rests on the distinction of Self from Not-Self. With this highest attribute sacrificed at the altar of an abstraction, there would disappear also power, intelligence, wisdom and goodness, from an Infinite Being.

The religious and philosophical doctrines of infinity meet in Pantheism, which leads into the general discussion of Monism and Pluralism. The pantheistic tendency is in every way a mistake, emotionally, scientifically, logically. The result is practically indistinguishable from Atheism. Change and Becoming are impossible on strict absolutistic grounds, as the Eleatics consistently maintained. From the standpoint of the finite, God comes to mean nothing, and from the standpoint of the Infinite, the world is nothing—a practical and theoretical failure is really the result.

Examining Monism, Dualism, and Pluralism, Schiller at once discards Dualism. Between the other two systems he proceeds to a defence of Pluralism. The unity claimed by Monism might indeed have the advantage if it were not necessarily abstract, and devoid of all practical value. It does *not* simplify the understanding of the world. This merely abstract unity cannot explain the phenomenal manifold. Pluralism escapes the

difficult problem of origins. But it is prone to fall into another danger quite as great as that which seems fatal to Monism. A relation between the Reals seems required, and this relation seems to imply a Unity. In such a manner, then, does Pluralism imply the Unity of the world. This difficulty is to be avoided by a rational assumption that "the possibility of the interaction of the many is implied in their very existence, and does not require any special proof."¹ In a sense, therefore, Pluralism seems to be based on Monism, but the One is without reality, being merely an ideal factor in a real plurality. Pluralism seeks a better unity, the actual result to be arrived at by the process of interaction, the perfection and harmony of a real universe, evolved in the course of Time. In this conception Pantheism and Individualism are transcended. The Many and the One are recognized, but the primacy and reality of the Many are more valid than the abstractions of the One. The influence of the Divine factor in the interaction provides the element of good in the moral world of our experience. In this sense God is immanent in all things. But He is also transcendent in Himself, though finite.

¹ *Riddles*, p. 355.

Leaving the *Riddles of the Sphinx*, the exposition of which has run into some length—but into no greater than it deserves—I turn to the essay on ‘Axioms as Postulates’ in *Personal Idealism*. Here there is the same emphasis, even in the opening words, upon the Self as real and valid, upon the part played by the ‘*whole personality*’ in the formation of a metaphysic as in every other human enterprise. Schiller sets forward a two-fold ground of agreement among philosophers. The first is that the world is *experience*, and the second is that for the organization of this experience into a reality for philosophy certain connecting principles are needed. Then he asks that pointed question, which causes such heart-burnings among the ‘Experience’-Philosophers—‘*Whose experience?*’ and secondly, ‘*Of what is it the experience?*’ In reply to the first question, it is vain to say that it is the experience of the Absolute. Schiller’s answer is, ‘*our experience,*’ or if that is assuming too much, ‘*my experience.*’ ‘Here again,’ he says, ‘I must be prepared to be assailed by a furious band of objectors intent on asking me—Who are you? How dare you take yourself for granted? Have you not heard how the self is a complex psychological product,

which may be divided and analysed away in a dozen different ways? And do you actually propose to build your philosophy upon so discredited a foundation?'¹ In reply, certain observations are made:—

(a) There is a divergence among the analyses of the Self.

(b) A Self conducts the analysis in every case.

(c) These analyses must serve some purpose, which is relative to selfhood.

(d) For the acceptance of an analysis *choice* is involved, and 'if I *choose* to analyse differently or not at all, if I find it convenient to operate with the *whole organism as the standard unit in my explications*, what right have Scribes and Pharisees to complain?'² Now comes the Pragmatism, which is to be so prominent in Schiller's subsequent work. Since consequences must justify the choice made, it is damaging to the afore-said analyses that nothing valuable or workable has resulted. He is therefore hopeful that the assumption of his own existence may perhaps prove more valuable than any of the denials of the Self that are propounded by 'psychologies

¹ *Humanism*, p. 52.

² *Ibid.* p. 53. Italics after '*whole*' are mine.

which neglect their proper problem in their anxiety to be ranked among the natural sciences.'¹

Schiller interprets the Self as not yet completely known, but as revealed in its true reality with the process of experience. The World, too, is only imperfectly known as yet. This leads him into an exposition of his Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge. Briefly put, it is that our knowledge is gradually evolved by a series of experimental guesses or 'postulates.' There is a large element of indeterminateness manifested in the World. The same characteristics of plasticity and growth are present in the intellectual cosmos. Logic is essentially dependent upon psychological needs. This, too, must be the method of super-human intelligence, if there be one at work in the forming of the cosmos. 'Its nature must be the same as ours; it also proceeds by experiment, and adapts means to ends, and learns from experience.'² Matter is the raw material and is conceived after the Aristotelian view of *potentiality*. Bearing this in mind, Schiller criticizes ordinary Empiricism, in which the activity of the Self is ignored in the presence of 'impressions and ideas'; and Apriorism, which in its intellec-

¹ *Humanism*, p. 53.

² *Ibid.* p. 58.

tualistic bias has maintained certain 'necessities of thought.' This 'necessity,' this 'universality' claimed for *a priori* truths, the Postulates of Pragmatism are quite capable of yielding. So Schiller boldly sets out to compel the Axioms, and even the Laws of Thought to own their true nature as Postulates, justified in experience by their working, and by the satisfaction they bring to the whole nature of man. These Postulates depend upon psychological temperament, and 'radiate from human personality as their centre.'¹ This is a confession of the indissoluble relation which exists between a Pragmatic doctrine of knowledge and a conviction that the Self is real. This is the pragmatic *motif* for Schiller's insistence upon the fact of the Self, at a period when it is very unfashionable to do so.

He assumes also the characteristic features of consciousness, *e.g.* its continuity, coherence, conativeness, and purposiveness. Consciousness cannot be defined, and is the $\pi\omicron\upsilon\hat{\omega}$ $\sigma\tau\hat{\omega}$ of this, and every such inquiry. But more than all the features above named is the consciousness of an *identical* Self. The psychological theories do not

¹ *Ibid.* p. 94. For other assertions of this aspect of Pragmatism, see pp. 95-6.

affect more than the scientific aspect of the matter. Upon this Self-identity of consciousness, which is a psychological fact, he raises his theory of the postulation of logical Identity, the greatest principle of thought. This has come to be through our demand for identity, based upon our consciousness of identity, and ratified by its working in the world of objects. So, too, the consciousness of Self and of Not-Self (as equivalent to the external world) has grown up through successful postulation to account for the felt unsatisfactoriness of experience. This gives the clue to his explanation of the rise of other Postulates—Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, Hypothesis, Causation, Sufficient Reason, Uniformity of Nature, Space, and Time. One postulate is not yet fully axiomatic, that is, Teleology. Schiller again argues in favour of Teleology, and the necessity for anthropomorphism.¹ The bias of Natural Science against these postulates, and the crude treatment of them in the past by their advocates account for the fact that Teleology is still a postulate and not an axiom.

The Personality of God is again briefly vindicated,² as also is His Goodness, as a methodologi-

¹ *Humanism*, p. 118 ff.

² *Ibid.* p. 122.

cal postulate. Infinity is again denied.¹ And Schiller concludes his powerful Essay with a polemic against intellectualism, and a plea for the Pragmatic Theory of Knowledge. The Will-to-believe must be regarded, and philosophy must be reconstructed on a voluntaristic basis.

Passing now to the consideration of *Humanism* we may reserve the examination of the Preface to the last. For it is Schiller's latest contribution in the book, and also his most pronounced expression of opinion on our general problem.

In the first Essay on the *Ethical Basis of Metaphysics*, the development of his theory of knowledge is made clear. Schiller distinguishes between Irrationalism as a doctrine and the view that our cognitive activities are pervaded by the purposive character of mental life generally. The question of value must be raised; purpose and end are, in fact, fundamental to the right understanding of experience. This is further expounded in the 'Discourse Concerning Pragmatism,' entitled *Useless Knowledge*, in which the position is maintained that action is primary, and knowledge only secondary—that the Good is the Source of the True. This is completed by the third Essay

¹ *Ibid.* p. 130.

on *Truth*, in which the various definitions of truth are examined and shown to be open to serious objection. Truth is not individual either ; it must win recognition from society. Pragmatism can show how this is possible, viz. by efficiency and usefulness being taken as the criteria of truth in our intellectual activity. The usefulness is relative to any human end, but ultimately to the perfection of our whole life.

In the Essay on *Lotze's Monism*, that philosopher's 'proof' of the underlying unity is subjected to attack. Schiller enlarges upon his previous view that Pluralism may 'beg' interaction.¹

In regard to the argument from Change, appeal must be made to our inner experience, and there we find the consciousness of change based on a feeling of our identity. But this does not apply to the Absolute, for we can have no such *feeling* of its identity. Lotze's re-creation of spiritual beings by their stepping out of the Absolute, at the close of his argument is an effort to save his theory from abstractness.

Schiller agrees with Lotze's arguments to prove that God must be conceived as personal and

¹ *Humanism*, p. 66.

spiritual. But he differs from him in the attempt to connect this view with the doctrine of God as the Unity of things. Even religion does not require this identification. The Unity of the Absolute could have no religious value. Lotze's admission of free-will affords a ground for the conception of a Divine guidance and Providence, but it creates an inherent instability in the Absolute. The mysterious problem of Evil thwarts the Unity of things, and destroys the argument. Lotze's identification of God with the Absolute leads him, according to Schiller, into a kind of Pantheism. The *a priori* proofs share, in common with Lotze's proof from interaction, the weakness of being too abstract. This kind of reasoning would hold in any kind of world.

In the Essay on *Reality and Idealism*, Schiller clearly indicates the connection between Pragmatism and the conviction of the Self's reality. 'The only certain and ultimate test of reality is the absence of internal friction, is its undisputed occupation of the field of consciousness, in a word, its self-sufficiency.'¹ Upon this criterion the distinction between real and unreal,

¹ *Ibid.* pp. 118, 119.

and even that between the Self and the World, is based. The emotional consequences of presentations in experience are various ; so the subject must, of necessity, distinguish himself from the object, the world, which does not 'feel' ; and he must seek to control this realm. Hence the attention to phenomena which are followed by pains or other consequences which are practically important.

The chief remaining essay for our purposes—since I am compelled to exclude the arguments concerning Immortality—is that which controverts the main tenets set forth in Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, in the interests of Schiller's pragmatistic theory. The title, '*On Preserving Appearances*,' indicates its polemical aim. Schiller is opposed to the whole *method* of the dialectic of Bradley, by which everything is first convicted of unreality and then 'somehow' reconstituted by the Absolute. Such a negative procedure is itself a verdict of condemnation upon the arguments employed, and, perhaps, upon Logic itself, for '*nothing which exists* in however despicable a sense can really be contradictory.'¹ The contradictions can only

¹ *Humanism*, p. 187.

be in our thought, for the reality is there in spite of them ! Therefore, Bradley's criterion that the real is that which is not self-contradictory is only partial, the complete criterion being, according to Schiller, the principle of Harmony. The Absolute, furthermore, is 'quite as unknowable as Spencer's monstrosity.'¹ And then once again Schiller lays it down² that the only reality we can start with is our own immediate, personal experience, and that apart from this basis no ultimate reality can be reached. The distinction of 'appearance and reality' remains always relative to our knowledge of our world, or, if preferred, Schiller is willing to say 'that *for me* it remains relative to my world.'³

In the Preface, the chief topic is the advent of 'Humanism,' in place of the terms 'Pragmatism' and 'Personal Idealism.' It represents an attitude of thought which is sympathetic towards the full life of Personality. It signifies an attempt to put forward a philosophic theory of a 're-anthropomorphized' or, as Schiller prefers, a 're-humanized' universe. He is ready to stand by Protagoras, and maintain that *Man is the measure of all things*. Instead of illusory hopes

¹ *Ibid.* p. 191.

² *Ibid.* p. 192.

³ *Ibid.* p. 192, footnote.

of a philosophy without assumptions, Humanism candidly confesses that its starting-point is our immediate experience and experienced self, from which it can proceed in any direction. Even the *a priori* philosophers really take this for granted, and cannot give us any superhuman system.

II.

With much of Schiller's philosophy of personality I find myself in hearty agreement. Without committing myself to his theory of knowledge, it seems plain to me that such a Pragmatism or Humanism depends for its very life upon the conviction of the reality of the Self. This is the starting-point, actual no less than theoretical, for a philosophy of postulation. If the fashionable 'Experience' philosophy will hide a multitude of distinctions in other realms, both of Absolutism and of Empiricism, here in Humanism it has to own its twofold aspect of subject and object. Schiller is ready to ask the simple question 'Whose experience?' which causes such a commotion among the 'Pure Experience' philosophers. And with the problem of the Self thus raised philosophy must deal. The task of Metaphysics is to explain the distinctions which

palpably lie *within* experience, involving the problems of the relation of the Self to Nature, of Self to Self, and of Self to God.

Let us briefly consider now the more detailed view of the Self given by Schiller. It seems to me that he does not improve his system by his distinction between the Empirical Self and the Transcendental Ego. For the latter is confessedly an ideal. The difficulties of the Kantian dualism concerning the Ego can hardly be avoided by clipping off the epistemological function of the Transcendental Ego, or by saying—with surely a Bradleian reminiscence—that the two are somehow *one*. Nor can the difficulty of knitting up the moments of our experience with an identical Ego, which *we know* as ourself, be overcome by making an Ideal Ego do it. Of course, there is this Interaction Theory to support, and both the Ego and the Self are needed for the ‘stress’ of the Divine and the human sides. But neither this nor the hypnotistic analogy will carry our sympathies any further in this direction.

Briefly then, Schiller’s view of the Self as real and the centre of experience and philosophy accords entirely with that adopted in the present work. Humanism insists on Personality through-

out. With the *intention* of Schiller in giving a place to the Transcendental Ego as opposed to the Self as existing at any one moment, I am in sympathy, but I cannot endorse his use of the term so redolent with historical associations, nor can I approve of his method of seeking the Ego as distinct from the Self, *in the future*, as an Ideal. I agree with his maintenance of self-identity (worked out in 'Axioms as Postulates') as the basis of all postulation of identity and of the Law of Identity. His emphasis upon the whole Personality throughout his works, as opposed to a shallow empiricism, or an abstract intellectualism is also valuable. His recognition of purpose and practical needs, of individual and social satisfaction when experimentation is found to work is also true to a certain extent, and may be true in the sense that Pragmatism or Humanism claims.

With Schiller's views on Anthropomorphism and Teleology I am in accord, and so I may pass them over. It is the outcome of the Humanistic view of things to see that the significant thing in thought, as in all else, is to be aware of the *active personality* which reclaims an unknown void, and is rewarded by reality and enrichment

of experience. And so the highest explanation of the Universe must be in the highest terms, along the lines of purpose, meaning, and development towards an Ideal, as we know it in ourselves.

A discussion of Schiller's views of the Deity would strictly involve an estimate of his Interaction Theory. But this is not possible here. And we are concerned more with those doctrines which have been emphasized in his recent writings. As to the Personality of God, I consider Schiller's views well-founded. At the same time some of his conclusions appear to be uncritically anthropomorphic, not only in his early work, but also in his later Essays, as when he says that the nature of a superhuman intelligence must be the same as ours, proceeding by experiment, adapting means to ends and learning from experience!¹ This surely deserves the charge which Professor Howison brings against Schiller's 'God,' of being 'finite and pathological.'²

But there is another serious question to which my answers would scarcely coincide with his. I refer to the view of the *finite* nature of God. This is, of course, a part of the general discussion

¹ *Personal Idealism*, p. 58.

² *Limits of Evolution*, p. xii.

of Infinity, against which Schiller is strenuous in season and out^{er} of season. But strictly the question arises in this paper merely as bearing on our prime subject.

Now I am unwilling to dogmatize in regard to the Infinite, and for this reason especially, viz. that mathematical usage has so put its stamp upon the term, as to invalidate any outside claim for it. Accordingly I consider that a different concept should be employed in philosophy. Again, I would not maintain that this metaphysical concept will meet the requirements of the definition of 'Infinity.' Hence it is of no avail to try and refute such a metaphysical Absolute or Perfect, with the objection that it does not answer to Kant's definition of Infinity, viz. 'that which cannot be completed by successive syntheses.' If the conception 'Absolute' be granted in a relative sense, relative like all else to our capabilities (surely a Humanistic position), there is no contradiction in regarding such a conception as preserving all that was valuable in the conception of the Infinite, without incurring the charges of falsity and abstractness which are hurled at us for using it in a 'philosophical' sense. The proper distance between the science of mathe-

matics and constructive metaphysics is thereby preserved. If this, then, be what Schiller means when he says, 'to God, as to all realities, infinite has no meaning,' I should agree with him. But it is not. He will not allow one uninterrupted gaze towards reality as a whole. He denies that the universe may be conceived under such ideas. His pluralism is vital and fundamental. Not only is there no Absolute, no Unity of all; there is division and discord at the heart of things. We may hope for a unity as the world learns to swing together better, as Evolution does its work in nature, society, and the individual; but there is no underlying unity or world-ground. The whole process is one of approximation toward unity, never before realized in thought or existence; the Becoming is essential to the true conception of things, and it is in Time.

The idea of God as being but a part of the universe does not satisfy 'the craving for unity' which, abuse it as one will, has at least a pragmatic bearing. It seems to me that we require a Personal Ground of all things, the Supreme Unity. But I leave this for the present.

God is not limited by some *accident* or 'chance,'

as Schiller implies as a possible view,¹—‘dividing Him against Himself.’ It is not reasonable to introduce chance in such a connection, but it is rational to endow the Perfect Personality with the power of *Self-determination*. I have previously indicated my objections to Pluralism. It lacks the definiteness at least which belongs to the One. The possibility of ultimate interaction between pluralistic entities is opposed surely to our notions of rationality. And why the unity, which even Schiller has to admit to account for this ultimate possibility of interaction, should be merely abstract, I am at a loss to conceive.

Schiller is willing to hold to Teleology as a postulate on its way to becoming an axiom. And yet against an ‘infinite’ unity he is emphatic. May not a similar *venture of faith* rationalize the universe, and so justify itself? May not Perfect Personality be the ground of all, even of the independence of the world of Egos? May not God be more than a strenuous Pilot wrestling with a refractory fleet in an unfortunate storm, and seeking to make a possible port? May He not be what unbounded worship wills, what faith believes, goodness

¹ *Riddles*, p. 311.

implies, reason justifies, and love demands, when it uses the controversial terms 'Infinite' and 'Unity'? In the light of the views which are set forth later, I think that the 'venture of faith' is reasonable and even necessary.

CHAPTER VI.

DR. HASTINGS RASHDALL.

AMONG the contributors to the discussion of our Problem Dr. Rashdall has a claim and rank for the views which he has set forth concisely and yet systematically in his Essay on 'Personality, Human and Divine,' in the volume entitled *Personal Idealism*. This closing essay perhaps fairly reflects the outlook upon ultimate problems, of the majority of the contributors to the volume. A very brief account must suffice here.

I.

Rashdall endeavours to describe the nature of Personality, and to discuss its metaphysical bearings. He assumes the position of an Idealist, and he does not aim at a full exposition of his arguments in so short a paper.

In answer to the question,—What is a person?—he arrives at the following conclusions. In

addition to the obvious possession of consciousness, a person *thinks*, and not merely feels. Involved in this power to think is the *permanence* of the personal consciousness, for it must be able to transcend the succession of mere feelings. And for the same reason the person must be a self-distinguishing consciousness, defining himself both from objects regarded as things, and from other selves. Individuality is recognized as essential in the idea of Personality. Further, the person can originate acts, or, in other words, is will as well as thought and feeling. Personality is not confined to man, but in some degree characterizes all forms of conscious life. Even on grounds of morality, we are not compelled to exclude the lowest animal from possessing a rudimentary sort of personality, for some kind of conflict of impulses is conceivably present in even the lowest organisms.

Yet even man is not fully possessed of the essentials of Personality. For the best of men fail to realize fully the permanent elements of personal experience. And in moral achievement they fail more or less, to realize what Personality fully means. Accordingly, Rashdall follows Lotze

in regarding Personality as an Ideal pertaining to God. He gives a proof of God along Idealistic lines, rising above a Universal Thought or Self-Consciousness to the Thinker and Will demanded by rational consistency. He then discusses objections to the Divine Personality. It is said that an object is required for the Divine Subject. Rashdall replies that the objects thought by the Divine Thinker are not to be regarded as existing independently of the Knower, but we must hold that the Subject may distinguish itself from its own changing states, which are willed as well as thought. In this way the Dualism is avoided which would make the world an alien Other to God—‘a sort of Siamese twin to which He is eternally and inseparably annexed but which is something other than the content of his Will.’¹ No immediate whole of experience, no ‘higher unity’ than that given by Subject and Object can be accepted—despite Bradley’s claim—and so no alternative to the Personality of God is possible.

The objections to Will are based on mistaken conceptions of causality, and are met by the extension of the latter to include Final Cause.

¹ *Personal Idealism*, p. 378.

If also we view thought as itself a manifestation of Self-activity we need not hesitate to ascribe Will to God.

What then is the relation between the Divine Will and the human wills? Is the moral universe in reality a Pluralistic Society of independent Souls? Rashdall does not regard this consequence as necessary. For not only is the original unity of the world sacrificed, but the dependence upon God involved in theoretical considerations, *e.g.* in the relation of soul to body, is not to be ignored. But when Rashdall passes from the question of origins, he inclines to a Pluralistic view of the relation between the Souls as existing beings, and God, rather than to the Monistic conception of God as including finite Spirits. He criticizes Royce and the Neo-Hegelian School. These thinkers commit the 'supreme fallacy' of identifying existence for others with existence for self, the knowledge of persons with a person's private experience of himself. This is the outcome of intellectualism. The social relations which help to constitute the individual furnish only one aspect of the truth, and miss the essential side of the Self's reality. From this source also spring Bradley's objections

to the Self as real. A distinction must be made between the reality of persons as they exist for the Absolute, and the reality peculiar to Selves alone—of which they are immediately aware as conscious persons. God must know the Self as a being which is not identical with His knowledge of it. The Universal Consciousness, supposed to include all Selves, does not as a matter of fact explain the possibility of the knowledge of one finite Self by another finite Self. The conception of the Self as included within a larger Self, is met by the objection that the *appearance* of externality and independence must imperatively be made clear. Then again even the content of our individual experience is not shared by another. As to our knowledge of other Selves, Rashdall thinks that the difficulty has been over-estimated, and he regards it as the duty of philosophy to treat such elementary cases of inference as fact, and part of our manner of thought. The distinction between the universal content of thought, and the private thinking, feeling, and willing consciousness, is one of most fundamental importance in philosophy.

Rashdall holds therefore to a view intermediate

between Monism and Pluralism. According to this conception, the One Mind gives rise to Many. We may call this whole collection One Reality, but after all it consists of a community of Persons. Rashdall cares little if this view is regarded as incompatible with the infinity of God. In regard to Time, his opinions are not fully exhibited, but he aims at preserving the time-consciousness of the human individual with the supra-temporal reality of God. Between God and the Absolute he draws a distinction necessary for common-sense, philosophy and religion. God is personal. The Absolute as the Infinite Being cannot possess personality. The Absolute then means the collection of Persons including God, not as an aggregate, but as an organic Society.

II.

Rashdall's Essay gives a good presentation of the side of our subject which lies closer to the standpoint of Theism than the views previously discussed. He has improved upon the work of another author, J. R. Illingworth, whose *Personality, Human and Divine*,¹ is gracefully written,

¹ Bampton Lectures, 1894.

but might well be stronger on the metaphysical side.

To criticize Rashdall is unnecessary here, since positive views will be set forth in the Second Part, and respective differences in method and conclusions will then become apparent. I may say, however, that the need of a discrimination between the terms used almost at random as synonyms for Personality is plainly shown by Rashdall's treatment. The employment of Personality as a metaphysical, practical and social concept is fraught with ambiguity and error, and makes more imperative the task of distinguishing the various terms used to designate the Self. This looseness may partly account for the omission on Rashdall's part of a clear statement of the Moral side of Personality, and of the relation between the ethical and the existential theories of the Self.

Rashdall comes between Royce and Howison in his ultimate statements. He holds to a partial dependence of Souls upon God, including their origination from Him. Yet he declines to be a party to the identification of the purposes of finite Selves with those of God. He holds to an ultimate Society of Souls, but, unlike Howison,

views all as Reality, as the Absolute, as originated by God's Will, and as Objects for the Divine Knower, but still preserving their initiative and private consciousness. The Souls are not viewed as co-eternal with God. Nor does Rashdall follow M'Taggart¹ who holds to Reality as a 'System' of eternal souls without God. Rashdall maintains that the 'System' requires a Mind to know it. For him the Absolute consists in God and the Selves who are present to the divine Mind, but who have a beginning in time. His system is incomplete; but even as it stands it is valuable as a vindication of the claims of Personality.

¹ *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 60 ff.

CHAPTER VII.

PROFESSOR ANDREW SETH PRINGLE- PATTISON.

HITHERTO we have been dealing with authors whose treatment of the Self has formed part of a constructive system of metaphysics. Now we turn to one whose works are well worthy of study in connection with our Problem, not on account of any system which he has propounded, but because of his insistence upon certain truths pertaining to this subject, in his expositions and criticisms of various philosophical systems. In this duty he has wielded a very important influence upon recent thought, and has commended his views to many minds by his vindication of certain basic principles of common-sense and sound reason. Accordingly we have here a different task. While running with the hare we must hunt with the hounds. While Professor Pringle-Pattison is criticizing others we must seek to take stock of the critic himself.

Most of Pringle-Pattison's work has been devoted to the Idealistic Philosophy of Germany and England, since Kant. In this field he ranks among the best living commentators, and for this reason his criticisms of Modern Idealism have had great weight. His epoch-making book, *Hegelianism and Personality*, has probably tended more than any other recent work, to shake the foundations of the 'block universe' of a rigid Absolutism, and to quicken the recent growth of philosophies of Personality.¹ In his other writings² also we find able criticisms of contemporary tendencies. I shall endeavour in a brief space to set forth his views upon our topic, so far as they have been published.

In his criticisms of the doctrines of Kant and the Neo-Kantians, especially Green, and of Hegel and the Neo-Hegelians, notably Bradley, the main outlines of Pringle-Pattison's standpoint may be briefly represented as follows:—

1. He is hostile to every attempt to substitute

¹ *Hegelianism and Personality*, Balfour Philosophical Lectures, Second Edition; Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1893.

² The following will be sufficient for our purposes: *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, and other Essays; Blackwood, Edinburgh, 1897. *Two Lectures on Theism* delivered at Princeton, N.Y.; Scribner, 1897.

abstractions for real existence as given in our immediate experience. The chief examples of this error he finds in Hegel's transition from Logic to Nature,¹ and in Bradley's sacrifice of phenomena for the logic of abstract identity.² This attitude characterizes Pringle-Pattison's whole position, and the next point is one among many instances of his unwillingness to accept a logic for a metaphysic.

2. The Self is real, our bed-rock of fact, our foundation of Truth, and our highest category of explanation. Unless we have this basic affirmation of the real existence of the Self, we cannot, in strictness, go on to positive statements about the universe of Being at all. 'We must touch reality somewhere; otherwise our whole construction is in the air.'³ This *given* element which is necessary must primarily be correlated with the reality of our personal experience. For him, experience involves the essential subject-object relation, and all existence ultimately depends upon the immediate experience and the undeniable conviction of our

¹ *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 110-13, 124-7.

² *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, pp. 155-160.

³ *Hegelianism, etc.* p. 124 ff.

own existence. Accordingly, Pringle-Pattison vigorously criticizes Bradley's negative treatment of the Self¹ which we have previously dealt with, and maintains that the clue to his mysterious transformation of existence into 'appearance' is to be found in his polemic against the Self, which is our saving instance, and living experience, of unity in diversity. We need not follow this argument any further after what has been said in our Chapter on Mr. Bradley.

3. Pringle-Pattison regards the Self as manifesting its reality in its *activity*, with the feeling that accompanies it, as well as in thought. Accordingly his version of Descartes' formula would be not *cogito*, but *ago ergo sum*. The phenomenistic theories of Will, such as Professor Münsterberg's,² seem to Pringle-Pattison to leave out the essential element of 'feeling-directed activity' as distinct from the content with which it deals.³ The act of attention is itself an act of Will. He joins with Professor James Ward in maintaining that no phenomenistic account can give a true theory of

¹ *Man's Place, etc.* p. 160 ff.

² *Die Willenshandlung*, Hugo Münsterberg, 1888.

³ *Man's Place, etc.* p. 99 ff.

Will, for Will essentially implies the self-activity of a unitary conscious being.¹ However, it is sufficient to say that for Pringle-Pattison a better assurance of the Self's reality than that given by knowledge is imparted by the Will, which in its purposive activity refuses to be dissolved away into a passing succession of phenomena. So while thought, feeling, and will are not separable from the Self, yet it is the self-existence implied most clearly in the felt activity of the Subject that we must give as a reason of the conviction that is in us.² This is borne out by considering the voluntaristic basis of all mental life, including thought, to which theory Pringle-Pattison inclines.³

4. Perhaps the most prominent feature in our author's critical work is his polemic against the doctrine of a Universal Self or Self-consciousness which thinks in all of us. This is his central objection to Hegelianism and Neo-Kantianism. He claims that such a view is destructive to the Personality of man and of God. Green's Spiritual

¹ Professor Münsterberg replies that he does not profess to give an account of the *true* Will, which belongs to Life, to the world of appreciation, *not* to descriptive psychology, *Psych. Review*, 1898, p. 640.

² Cf. *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 46. ³ *Man's Place, etc.* pp. 123-5.

Principle¹ he regards as a mere extension of Kant's Transcendental Unity of Self-consciousness to the place of Absolute or Universal Self-consciousness, constituting the universe of relations, our knowledge of it, and the source of morality.² We are reproductions of this eternal Spirit, which uses as its vehicle in time our bodily organisms. Pringle-Pattison regards this as an extension which Kant would have repudiated; and—what is far more important—a doctrine which denies true Personality, to both God and man. The merely formal principle of consciousness-in-general is very different from the Universal Consciousness. The former is based upon an abstraction from the actual human Selves—the latter is supposed to be endowed with Personality unto perfection. He regards this as akin to the hypostasization of universals—which thus include individuals as accidents—by the Scholastic Realists. It is the method, however, of epistemology, which is particularly obnoxious to Pringle-Pattison; for questions of ontology must be settled by a metaphysic of real exist-

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, T. H. Green, Oxford, Chap. I. p. 15 ff. Fourth Edition, 1899.

² Sidgwick denies this—mistakenly, in my opinion.

ence. In short, his attitude of hostility towards the 'Ontological Proof' of Theism is manifest throughout his works, and may be the briefest way of expressing his aversion to all forms of conceptualism which hypostasize abstractions and then convert an identity of type into a numerical existence.¹ He finds in Hegel, and Fichte—in his later works—the tendency which has been criticized in the case of Green. Despite the most valuable emphasis placed by Hegel upon self-consciousness as the highest manifestation of reality, he finds that in regard to both the Absolute Idea and the human Self, the Hegelians of the Left were nearer the logical truth in their interpretation, than were those who advocated Personality and defended the harmony of their master's thought with Christianity. The same is true of Neo-Hegelianism, with its universal Self that thinks in all of us. Such a 'Self' is devoid of all true Personality, and it deprives us also of our inheritance. It is opposed to our own assurance of '*imperviousness*' as individual Selves. 'I have a centre of my own—a will of my own—which no one shares with me or can share—a centre which

¹ *Hegelianism, etc.* pp. 69, 124.

I maintain even in my dealings with God Himself.'¹ Religion requires this, and so its testimony is against such identification of the human and divine Self. Morality protests also. Experience, and even a true metaphysic of knowledge will have none of it. At the same time, the Personality of God must be advocated, if we are to be faithful to our highest category. With this position stand human worth and immortality, as against a universal consciousness which denies both. And without Personality Idealism strictly speaking ceases, for all ideals are bound up with the person, including intelligibility, the inspiration of philosophy.

II.

The value of this work of Pringle-Pattison is seen in the light of our previous survey. Between Radical Empiricists like James, and Humanists like Schiller, on the one hand, and Absolute Idealists like Green, Bradley and Royce on the other, he stands midway. Rashdall is close beside him, and Howison has many points of affinity, except for his Pluralism, which Pringle-Pattison will not accept. But

¹ *Ibid.* p. 228.

what is his solution of these difficulties? It is not given. He falls back upon a reverent agnosticism—reasonable enough, no doubt—in regard to the Absolute. Religion, morality, and poetry can teach us more on these ultimate matters than philosophy; and a revelation of the Absolute is ever given us in our experience.¹ At the same time he repudiates the historical Agnosticism of an earlier decade. But philosophy cannot rest in either of these attitudes. While we can never know Reality as it is *for* the Absolute, as Pringle-Pattison truly says, yet we can try to reach a better conception than that which merely affirms Monism and yet insists upon the sacred privacy of our Personality. The problem is hard, but our calling is high as lovers of truth, and we must, as William James said, refrain from adopting as our motto, ‘*hypotheses non fingo*,’ until the end is in sight.

So Pringle-Pattison apparently gives no positive system. He does not furnish a clear doctrine of the Self, in whose reality and importance he so strongly believes.² Nor does he clear up

¹ *Theism*, p. 57.

² Professor Dewey criticizes his use of the term Self in *Hegelianism and Personality* as ambiguous. *Mind*, xv. p. 58.

the ambiguity and confusion of terms connected with Personality. He does not definitely state his theory of God and the Absolute, nor the extent of his objection to an Absolute Self, when reached by a line of argument different from those which he condemns as epistemological, merely logical or abstract. His view of time as ultimate is near to common-sense, but by no means free from difficulties.

At the same time it must be acknowledged that Pringle-Pattison has given the greatest possible stimulus towards the formulation of a revised philosophy of common-sense. The present tendencies are largely the outcome of his strong and sound work in metaphysics, and the Scottish philosophy is in safe keeping while following the lines of scholarly exposition and criticism. His insistence upon the rights of Reality in life and experience, as against abstract generalities, is vitally related to the growth of such systems as those of William James, Bergson, and James Ward. The place of Personality in present-day philosophy has been made secure by just such critical work as this.

CHAPTER VIII.

LATER TENDENCIES.

THE valuable movement of reaction which has set in recently against a hard and fast Absolutism, in favour of life and experience, chiefly through the medium of James and Schiller in their own respective ways, probably dates from Pringle-Pattison's attack on Hegelianism and his plea for Personality. This is a fitting place therefore to add a very brief survey of present tendencies in regard to the Self.

We see that those who deny the Self a reality of its own are drawn from different schools of thought. The 'Pure Experience' Philosophy, or the 'Immanence Movement,' closely allied to a form of Realism, has grown from such views as those of Avenarius,¹ Mach, Petzoldt,² on the Continent, S. H. Hodgson, G. E. Moore, and

¹ *Der Menschliche Weltbegriff.*

² *Die Philosophie der Reinen Erfahrung.*

the Cambridge School in England, William James in his 'Radical Empiricism,' Dr. R. B. Perry, Dr. E. B. Holt, and others in America. These seek to approach the Self and Personality, and even Consciousness, from a universal point of view, called 'pure experience'; and end by practically denying to them any veritable reality. Consciousness is but a selection of objects from the world of 'experience.' On the other hand, we have Mr. F. H. Bradley and his disciple, Professor A. E. Taylor, on the side of Absolute Idealism, viewing the Self negatively, as compared with 'experience' also. Hence my thesis against this vague use of experience so prevalent to-day. Royce is capable of being classified with these, when we treat the existential aspect of reality as important, as I do here. A. E. Taylor's doctrine of the Self is set down in his recent book.¹ It presents a union of the negative views of Bradley, Royce and James compressed into one clearly written chapter. The social side is very prominent in his interpretation of experience to the detriment of all real selfhood. The attacks of Mr. Taylor upon the idea, concept, or even consciousness of Self do not disprove the

¹ *Elements of Metaphysics*, 1904, Book iv. Chap. III. p. 335.

Reality of the Self as the essential factor in all experience, except upon the basis that Reality is reducible to ideas,—a position which is dismissed by the whole anti-intellectual school of to-day.

Professor Hugo Münsterberg views the psychical and physical as constructions by the Will, that takes attitudes, and is itself in the realm of life, of values, of Reality; this Personality, however, is but a part in the supra-temporal Reality which is constituted by Values.¹

On the other hand, we have many advocates of the Self, such as the Oxford Personal Idealists, including Professor G. F. Stout, Dr. Rashdall, W. R. Boyce Gibson (now of Melbourne, Australia), G. E. Underhill and H. Sturt; in addition to F. C. S. Schiller, who has now come out as a Humanist. Then Professors Pringle-Pattison, James Ward, Sully, Bakewell, Ladd, G. H. Palmer, C. M. Tyler, J. Le Conte, Howison, and the late Thomas Davidson and Borden P. Bowne, defend Personality, and make it prominent in

¹ Professor Münsterberg's main works in English are *Psychology and Life* and *The Eternal Values* (1909). His principal work in German is his *Grundzüge der Psychologie*. His emphasis upon Will places him in considerable affinity with philosophies of Personality.

their views, the three last-named building their metaphysical systems upon Personality as an ethical concept. Thomas Davidson held to a Personalistic Pluralism of a very individualistic type,—he called it Apeirothism—in which the human Egos are themselves sufficient to constitute the world of reality. Professors Dewey and Baldwin would perhaps belong to the main group of believers in the Self, although they are more difficult to classify. Charles Renouvier recently published his system under the title of *Le Personnalisme*, in which the doctrines of Absolutism and Infinity are opposed, and an empirical theory is held.

A mighty contribution to the psychological and metaphysical treatment of the subject is furnished by Dr. Wm. M'Dougall of Oxford in his book on *Body and Mind*.¹ His patient examination of the animistic hypothesis in the light of physiology and the mechanistic tendencies of present-day science is worthy of all praise. After giving full value to the hostile views, Dr. M'Dougall gives conclusive reasons for preferring the old belief in the soul as an entity to the

¹ *Body and Mind, A History and Defence of Animism* (Methuen, 1911).

pseudo-scientific hypotheses of a materialistic or empirical kind.

The works of Bergson and of Eucken on the Continent have provided recent philosophy with much material for fresh advances, but in neither instance has an explicit doctrine of the Self been as yet fully formulated. Bergson certainly holds to the reality of conscious life with the efficacy which we associate with will.

Bergson's Philosophy of Change expresses a revolt against concepts and the construction of Reality by means of the intellect. Deeper lies the stream of Reality, which is consciousness in ceaseless, creative activity. Reality is to be apprehended by Intuition rather than by Intellect. This stream of consciousness, with which Duration is identified, is more than the individual experiences. Hence for Bergson, personalities are but means to the end of supra-personal spirit. We await further light from this inspiring thinker regarding the Problem of Personality. Meanwhile, it appears that he has not provided in his Monistic Activism, as we may call his system, for the rights and reality of the Personal Will.

Eucken provides a spiritual interpretation of

life, society and history, based upon a union of idealism and activism; but does not the student of Eucken look in vain for a satisfying dialectic, a critical philosophy of consciousness? One is constantly in the world of values while in the company of this stimulating German thinker, but there is no cogent answer given to the questions that rise regarding the reality of the distinctions which mark off God, man and the world.

It is not too much to say, however, that Bergson and Eucken have rendered invaluable service to the cause of religion, ethics and philosophy by their strong vindication of life as against mere conceptualism. Whether the Intuitive method of Bergson or the Interpretative method of Eucken afford us an alternative pathway to Reality, better than that of rational investigation and induction, is a question too large for discussion here, but the insistence of both these thinkers upon the final reality of conscious life and Personality, in some sense or other, expresses the genuine conviction of all who base reflection upon life, and concepts upon experience.

As to the Divine Personality, except for the

'Supra-Personal' Absolute of Bradley and Taylor most of the leading thinkers of to-day hold that the reasonable attitude to take towards the nature of the highest Being, whether regarded as the Absolute, or pluralistically, is to postulate Personality in some form or other. The problem of the relation of the Absolute to human Personality divides Bradley, Royce, Taylor, and,—according to Pringle-Pattison—all Neo-Hegelians, such as Green, the Cairds and Watson—from the champions of human Personality, such as Howison, Davidson, Rashdall, Schiller, Bergson, Eucken, and others, including Pringle-Pattison himself. Royce, at any rate, comes nearer to providing for a solution of the problem from the Absolutist's side than do the others. If we can accept his view of the Self as satisfactory, Royce is certainly a defender of the use of the concept. James seemed to be anxious to regard Personality most favourably, but the psychological 'passing Thought' is accepted by him; and the Pure Experience theory of his Radical Empiricism has to be accommodated. Other tendencies are summed up in the Panpsychism of Fechner, Paulsen, and C. A. Strong.

That there is much confusion current upon

the question of the Self is plain. It is partly due, I believe, to the exclusion of the Self from much of the 'new' physiological psychology; partly to the hesitation of metaphysicians as to the treatment of the empirical side of the Self; partly to the intellectualistic bias of science and philosophy which waits for definitions before acknowledging reality in life or spirit;—and chiefly to the vagueness of the concept of Experience, which has to play the most important rôle in the majority of prevalent systems of philosophy. But over and above all, it is evident that the tendency is very strong to restore Personality and Life to their place as fundamental to a theory of Reality.

PART II.
CONSTRUCTIVE.

CHAPTER I.

EXPERIENCE AS A METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT.

IF there is one concept about which it would seem that philosophers are agreed, it is surely that of Experience. For it is in all the systems of metaphysicians, the great and the small. One has only to gasp out 'Experience' to pass the sentinels of philosophical orthodoxy; and the constant repetition of the password seems to have a value which has long ago been recognized outside of the ranks of the mystics. 'Experience' is thrust forward by every one as a guarantee of intelligence and good faith. It is pronounced with great unction as the starting-point of all extant systems,—not excluding the Transcendentalists. The announcement is received with nodding heads and smiles of approval by the circle of philosophers and critics. So long as the tyro in philosophy adheres to

experience and 'rings the changes' on ideas, and things, and what not, as 'experience,' there is no obvious reason why he should not draw an admiring crowd. The only apparent check to his career would arise if some one inquired as to the significance of the term. The rude question, What do you *mean* by it? might suggest a dim world of realities lying beneath the fog that has settled so heavily upon philosophy. It might then and there appear that the very widespread use of this concept should itself cause uneasiness. Popularity does not conduce to definition. It might also occur that in spite of this agreement as to premises by very diverse schools of thought, the conclusions are as wide asunder as the poles. Surely what has happened is this: the several schools have taken *everything* for granted, have, in fact, 'begged' the universe, with the most comprehensive term in existence; and have then proceeded to develop some one or more of the multitude of distinctions which palpably lie *within* experience.

Like a great snowstorm, this vague concept has buried beneath a colourless and uniform surface the various grades of reality, and the

chief problems of philosophy. But the much-needed thaw that can restore the vanished world to light has already begun. Schiller has insisted upon the questions which cause such concern to the Absolutists like Bradley, and to the 'Pure Experience,' and Realistic School,— 'Whose experience is it; and of what is it the experience?' Ward has ably maintained¹ that this concept conceals the duality of subject and object implied in experience. And the foregoing criticisms of Part I., on James and Bradley in particular, have already made manifest the error and ambiguity latent in this term, the contradictions of which are really worked out into such divergent results. The unanimity of a Kant, a Mill, a Bradley, a James; of Idealist, Mystic, and Realist; of Absolutist, Pluralist, and Radical Empiricist in adopting Experience as the starting-point is not really an evidence of the value of the concept as used; but it is rather an incentive to the critic to point out the

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 131 *et passim*. Dr. Ward's new book, *The Realm of Ends, or Pluralism and Theism* (1912) gives an impressive presentation of Idealism with special reference to the category of Personality. I take this opportunity of expressing many obligations to this thinker for the clarifying influence of his works upon the problems connected with this subject.

vagueness and ambiguity of the term, and to see in it one cause of the present-day confusion in metaphysics.

This is most marked in the case of the Self, which is the chief victim in this usage. It has ever been the most difficult concept for metaphysics, and the most recalcitrant fact for science. The concept of experience is a 'neutral and non-committal term,' as William James said; and so it seems to offer an opportunity of constructing a system free from the embarrassment of a Self.

(1) But one of my main theses has been to contend that Experience essentially implies the Subject of experience, and that apart from such a reference, it has no meaning. It is erroneous to identify the objects in the 'stream of consciousness' with 'experiences' which become thereby capable of personal activity. Yet the term does not give us the shock that 'entities,' or 'things,' or even 'ideas' would. We noted this incongruity in James' Radical Empiricism, where 'experiences report themselves to one another'! I maintain that there is a change of meaning here from that which Experience bears as the states of a conscious Subject, to

that of a mere portion of the stream of objects when treated as un-referred to a Subject.¹

(2) In addition to this error, the hidden duality of the concept really carries with it a reference to the Self which is supposed to be explained, or even explained away, by it. The substitution of universal experience for that of finite Selves is really meaningless, unless the self-reference which experience implies, can be fastened upon some Self. To fix it upon the Absolute Self is not the first, but the *last* step in metaphysics. Or again, to make all things conscious is either a gratuitous assumption, or else should come at the *close* of a Panpsychistic course of reasoning. Hence the unfitness of Experience without qualification to be a starting-point in a metaphysic is plain. It is either used uncritically; or else it presupposes the whole theory constructed upon it. And in either case we have error and fallacy.

(3) The genuine problems of experience—in the true sense as implying Subjects of experience—are not solved by adopting a merely universal point of view, apart altogether from the erroneous use of the term. The problems of the relation

¹ Cf. Ward, Art. 'Psychology,' *Ency. Britt.* (9), vol. xx. p. 39.

of Subject and Object, of Self and the World, of Self and Self, of Self and God, persist, and demand solution as the outstanding questions for any theory that claims to be ultimate. But these are the very problems supposed to be solved by adopting the starting-point of Experience! How gratuitous that assurance is becomes evident upon examination.

(4) A breach with genuine reality is made by ignoring the condition of knowledge, and the pre-supposition of experience. The most important factor is left out of account, that which makes the series of presentations into a unity, and which renders knowledge and rational activity possible. In the emotional and volitional processes this element is even more obvious. (The centre of susceptibility and the agent of purposes which are conceived intellectually also by the same Subject, are not to be labelled with the same term as the objects which exist for the Subject.) This ignoring of the prime factors in experience is equivalent to turning our backs upon our citadel of reality.¹

¹ The Will is the great divider and judge of systems of Monism. Perhaps the chief value and final impressiveness of systems of Voluntarism and Activism, for instance, as given in such diverse forms as by Fichte, Schopenhauer, Münsterberg, Bergson, and

(5) The patent distinction between *my* experience and the experience of others is not provided for in this method. A fact, *e.g.* a pain, has to be reported to be known. But it is *not* the genuine fact which is reported, and multitudes of other facts never get reported! And yet, who can deny that they are genuine experiences for me? In a word, this notion of experience as an absolute, universal and impersonal medium is altogether false to experience in the true sense of the word. And observe the ambiguity in the term. It is high time to stand by immediate experience against the assumptions of *a priori* systems of philosophy. And that 'stand' must begin, as Ward, Pringle-Pattison, and Schiller have maintained, with the bed-rock of reality, our own existence as conscious Selves.

(6) The making of a class of 'special difficulties' in works of Psychology and Metaphysics, of our most intimate, real and significant experiences, is itself an indication of the fallacy of the method of 'experience' as 'pure' or

Eucken, are to be found in the fact of the indubitable reality of Will as an experience, and as efficacious in disturbing the flow of intellectual presentations of objects.

‘transcendental.’ I refer to feeling, volition and the higher processes of mind. That any doubt should arise as to the central place of these fundamental facts in a theory of reality is an instance of the inadequacy and futility of the whole method. It is false to epistemology, to metaphysics, and to life.

(7) The ambiguities of the term ‘experience’ may be further brought out by considering some of its meanings.

(a) Originally, a trial or experiment by someone.

(b) A striking event or series of events in the life of a person.

(c) The content of consciousness, the stream of objects as present to the Subject, or Subjects, whose experience it is. This is the correct meaning in my opinion.

(d) The series of all possible conscious facts, including among them the Self or Subject, and even the hypothetical ‘Pure Ego.’ This use is misleading.

(e) The ‘things,’ colours, motions, causes, and so forth, belonging to the world at large; and all thoughts, feelings, volitions, and the consciousness of Selfhood so far as known. In fact, anything and everything that can find a place

in the 'universe of discourse' is called by this term, as equivalent to 'actual and possible experience,' with a singular and a plural. This usage is vague and dangerous.

(f) Experience as something universal or 'Pure,' cutting beneath the distinctions of Self and the world; only *nominally* distinguishable from independent Being, in the Realistic sense. This is perfectly fallacious.

(g) Absolute Experience, as Reality more transcendental and idealistic than the previous usage. Here the meaning of Experience may vary, as on the lower plane; but when used out of relation to an Absolute Self or a plurality of Selves, it is really quite meaningless.

(h) Experience in the phylogenetic sense, as used by Evolutionists in opposition to *a priori* or transcendental theories of origin or development.

In the face of these numerous varieties of meaning, the term is hopelessly ambiguous, unless qualified by the implication of Selfhood, as stated in (c) above. As a starting-point in Metaphysic the Concept is fraught with error and confusion, and is liable to objection, except as expressing what is implied in the relationship of subject and object.

CHAPTER II.

THE MEANING OF PERSONALITY AND RELATED CONCEPTS.

IN the First Part we have had abundant evidence of the criticisms directed against Personality for the various meanings which may be attached to it, and to the other terms expressive of diverse phases of Selfhood. We have also seen for ourselves the need of clearly distinguishing these meanings. Accordingly we shall devote ourselves to the following purposes in this Chapter : first, to the examination of the concepts pertaining to Personality, including the Not-Self as well as the Self ; and then we shall proceed to the consideration of some difficulties, or paradoxes, connected with the Self.

A complete list of these related concepts would include person, personality, individual, individuality, self, selfhood, consciousness, self-consciousness, subject, soul, ego, spirit, mind, ' I,'

and the 'me'; also the correlatives, not-self, object, non-ego, and not-me. Then there are concepts in the form of phrases which have become current, such as Kant's 'synthetic unity of apperception,' or 'transcendental unity of self-consciousness,' the 'noumenal' as distinct from the 'phenomenal' ego, and the 'empirical self'; the 'material,' the 'social' and the 'spiritual' self, the 'stream of consciousness,' and the 'Passing Thought,' employed by William James; the Personality of God; the 'Perfect Personality' advocated by Lotze; the 'Absolute Self' in Royce's system, and the 'Absolute Experience' in Bradley's,—and so on.

The mere mention of these current phrases is all that is possible here. Most of them are treated and made clear in the course of the Thesis. From the first list we shall select the principal terms for specification.

Let us start with the true basis of mental life, as we have seen it in our discussion of the concept of Experience. That resolves itself, as we saw, into the relationship of Subject and Object. Let us take this ground, and begin with the Subject. We do not stop to ask now whether we can distinguish the Subject by itself. Bradley

we know suffers pangs at the bare suggestion of such an abstraction, although he is more hardened when dealing with experience. But that question will recur in the next Chapter. Meanwhile, if anyone has qualms similar to Bradley's, he can display his mental agility by correlating the idea of Object with that of Subject, while the latter is under discussion.

1. The Subject signifies the one *for whom* any set of experiences is, the centre to which various objects are consciously present, and from which they derive a special relationship to one another, as facts of one felt whole. It is usually employed to denote the knower as related to the known; but it may also imply the one who feels, who is susceptible to pleasure and pain. It does not generally signify, however, the one who is active, who wills, who strives, who conceives, plans and executes them. We may for the present speak, in reference to this self-activity, of 'the Agent,' or more simply, of Will. The Subject then has primarily this epistemological and affective reference, and may be regarded as signifying the knower, the experiencer, as distinct from the objects known, and from the content of experience.

Now let us pass to the terms closely connected with the Subject, yet possessed of important shades of meaning. Such are 'I,' Ego, and the Soul. Now we have the *identity* of the Subject in time brought out, its character of permanence through change, of unity in diversity. This is not necessarily implied in the Subject itself. It appears as the correlative of the series of Objects which are essentially in time, and as such does not express the character of identity, which, whether philosophically acceptable or not, is at least the postulate of reflective common-sense, and as such is sufficient for our present purpose, viz. the determination of meanings. The philosophical question of identity will come up later. But there is another change made by the terms 'I' and 'Ego.' Now the recognition of the agent in volition is brought in; the pale fact of mere subjectivity is transformed by the organic presence of Will. The terms 'I' and Ego express a unitary conscious Subject which is also active, as the Agent. The Soul signifies the Ego as a permanent entity or Substance which endures through all the temporal manifestations, and is related to the affective, emotional and moral aspects of

experience rather than to the side of volition. Spirit is closely allied to the Soul, in antithesis to the bodily and material, and as inclusive of self-activity. Mind is used to denote the Subject as Thinker, *plus* the objects of thought. Similarly the concept of the Self in metaphysics involves the relation of Subject and Object, not in intellectual terms merely, as is the case with the Mind, but in the organic totality of feeling and will. While this relation is present in the constitution of the Self, however, a distinction is made upon the objective side between what is Self and what is Not-Self. I will return to this presently.

The medium of awareness, in which experience, so to speak, comes to light, is Consciousness, and in Self-consciousness there is a recognition of the rational, constitutive and moral part performed by the Self in our highest experiences.¹

The positively social and ethical character of Selfhood is expressed by the concept of the

¹ Abnormal forms of self-consciousness which are related to moral or pathological conditions, usually in a more or less morbid way, are not included in this treatment of Self-consciousness. Recent advocates of Realism are apt to lay undue stress upon this aspect, as vitiating the Idealistic claims of Self-consciousness. It is perhaps advisable to point out that all morbid forms of Self-feeling are distinct from the rational Self-consciousness.

Person.¹ Although in popular usage the Self is employed in this sense, it is much better in Metaphysics to confine that concept to the meaning given above. Individuality expresses the aspect of uniqueness in the various Selves, as Persons. And Personality includes all the foregoing meanings of Ego, Self, Individual and Person, with the full circle of relationships to other Selves, the world and God. Moral character, rights and duties are provided for by this concept. Æsthetic, social, intellectual and religious ideals are the portion of man as the possessor of Personality. But God is regarded as the Source and Inspiration of all such aspirations, and is the Ideal and Perfect Personality.

In regard to the Object which is in relation to the Subject, we may distinguish between the Non-Ego and the Not-Self. The Non-Ego is equivalent to the 'Me,' that is, the empirical content of the consciousness of Self; but it may

¹ The Theological usage of 'Person' in the doctrine of the Trinity is quite distinctive, and is associated with historical and metaphysical considerations which, if fully treated, would lead us into another region than that contemplated in the present work. The Legal connotation of Person, to which some writers have given special prominence (as William Temple, in his *Nature of Personality*, 1911), is but one among many of the aspects of social value, which belong to Personality.

be distinguished from the Not-Self, or the Not-Me, by which we signify that which is distinct and separable from the Self. The Not-Self is a part of the objective series, which is marked off on the basis of the Will. Certain presentations are capable of being dissociated as unnecessary to our immediate consciousness. They are branded as the Not-Self. The limit of the body is a fair indication of the demarcation ; but it is a mistake to take it as an absolute test, or as the explanation, of the Not-Self, for certain psychical processes may also be regarded as the Not-Self. The Non-Ego, on the other hand, consists in the states of consciousness, the processes in building up our experience, which may be introspectively presented and branded as *not* the Ego. The Self as Subject-Object includes the Ego and the Non-Ego, but not the content of experience which has rightly been termed the Not-Self. Yet it is quite misleading to separate the Not-Self, as a part of experience, from the Subject of experience.

We will now discuss very briefly some difficulties and seeming paradoxes in connection with the general question of Personality. The first—Hegel's problem of 'negativity'—arises from

the effort to define the Self. Every such effort involves the presentation of the Self as object, and therefore it cannot be the true Self. So Hegel, to characterize subjectivity, defined it as the refusal to recognize the Self in any one object. But that refusal itself is related to the Self. Hence the Self must express itself in that which is objective, and therefore not the Self. The paradox is obvious. But our doctrine of the Self does not seek for such a definition. Verily the paradox is the outcome of seeking to present existence in the forms of logic, which we have had occasion to criticize in the First Part. And in our view of the Self the place of the Subject is assured; while in all attempts to substitute definitions for genuine experience, a breach with existence and reality is—as Pringle-Pattison maintains¹—inevitable.

A second difficulty is allied to the former one. The essence of Selfhood is subjectivity and particularity, and yet the striving and development of the Self is toward objectivity and universality. To be conscious of a limit implies the transcendence of it. Our life, as Fichte felt and taught, is one continual striving, longing

¹ *Supra*, Chapter VII.

and seeking. What constitutes selfhood thus seems to be denied by rational selfhood. We pursue the universal and objective. This difficulty is really due to our taking the Self in one aspect as existential—a limited subjective world—and in the other as ethical—as a seeker after ideals. The Subject-Object relation persists just as much in the latter, as in the former case, if we view them both as existences. And full of meaning is the ethical aspect presented in this seeming paradox. The transcendence of limits may be said, with equal truth, to imply the previous consciousness of those limits.¹ This rendering of Personality is but an extension of the truth that we must lose our life to find it.

Finally there is the paradox stated by Professor Palmer in his *Nature of Goodness*.² In the progress towards true Personality, how can I really develop myself? That would require that 'I make myself'! Truly significant is the distinction involved in this difficulty. From the standpoint of the Self, as the Subject of certain experiences, I am now as real a being as ever I can be. But from the standpoint of values, I

¹ Cf. Art. 'Cartesianism,' Edward Caird, *Ency. Britt.* 9th Edit.

² Chapter V. on Self-Development.

am not yet my true Personality. These are insuperable paradoxes only to those who deny the right of the Self to exist apart from the Ideal Ego ; or, on the other hand, to those who fail to recognize the valid place of ideals and their significance in Reality. For the difficulty expresses twin truths, which must not be confused, but which, in a complete view, are ‘ never to be sundered without tears.’

CHAPTER III.

THE REALITY OF SELF.

IN the present chapter I shall defend the thesis that the Self is real, and the true basis for any theory of Reality. In this part of the discussion I am not using Reality in any absolute or final sense, but as implying genuine *being*, or real existence. What Reality may be in the last analysis is a problem which will come up later.

Our previous discussions have cleared the ground, and now we may get our material together and begin to build. We have seen that Experience is unfitted to serve as a starting-point in metaphysics. It is a vague and ambiguous concept. It is too wide. It cannot serve as a criterion for reality, because *everything* shares in the universal promotion. But when Experience is taken in connection with the Subject of experience, we are nearer the truth. It is natural to go a step further and

ask—what if this Self as Subject in relation to Object be our criterion of reality? Is not the reverse contention an impossible position? The very denial of the Self implies the affirmation. There can be no surer test of reality than that. And all experience, thought, and reasoning imply the reality of the Subject or Knower. There is not a theory of knowledge which does not implicitly depend upon the reality of the Self. We have noted how Pragmatism and Humanism are forced to throw the whole burden of proof upon the Self's reality, whose satisfaction is the key to what is accepted as truth. All theories of knowledge as 'practical value' have the same axiomatic—and therefore often neglected—basis. Even the Rationalistic theories imply the *cogito* in which Descartes, himself a Rationalist, detected the prime certainty of the Self's reality. But we do not need to stay upon the narrow track that has been worn by the feet of the Rationalists. The universe is ours; abundance of life is ours; the experiences of emotion, activity, imagination, memory, aspiration and purpose, as well as thought, are all ours! Why should we narrow our world to a mere *cogito*? Such a limitation was the source

of Kant's refinements of the Self. Feeling and will give evidence of stronger convictions than thought, and furnish many infallible proofs.

In short, the reality of Self cannot be denied without at the same time being affirmed. It is implied in every theory of reality, and forms the secret source of whatever plausibility such a theory may have. It is not proved merely from the side of thought; it is also felt and realized in our pursuit of ends, and in the execution of our purposes. In addition to these very cogent considerations, we have the metaphysical necessity that if we cannot trust the reality of ourselves, then we are in the darkness of agnosticism, and the deep darkness of scepticism. And further, it is evident that if there be no such reality as ourself, then there is no link between the mere constructions of a world in thought on the one side,—perhaps as arbitrary as the 'moves' allotted to the various pieces in chess—and, on the other, the world of genuine existence and experience with which we have actually to deal.

Bradley admits off-hand that the Self is of course a fact in some sense and to some extent, but the question is, *how*?¹ He never seems

¹ *Appearance, etc.* p. 103.

very concerned about the positive problem. He shares with Cleon the glory of an accomplishment in which philosophers have been somewhat proficient,—

‘ And I have written three books on the soul,
Proving absurd all written hitherto,
And putting us to ignorance again.’¹

We saw, however, that he could not really dispose of two meanings of Self, viz. the Essential Self as feeling, and the Self as the Subject in relation to the Object.² Now these are precisely the two meanings most accordant with our view of the Self. Accordingly we may proceed with fuller confidence to our constructive exposition.

What is here meant by the Self will become clearer upon closer examination. When it is said that the essential relation of Subject and Object precludes us from treating of the Subject in itself, I demur. Such a complete prohibition of all distinctions would destroy all knowledge. We would be unable to speak of anything at all as distinct from the whole system of relations; that is, we would need to keep absolute silence. We may certainly distinguish, but not separate,

¹ The *Poetical Works of Robert Browning*, vol. i. p. 542.

² *Supra*, Part I., Chapter II.

the Subject from the Object. This is all I desire to do in bringing out what is implied in the Self, as Subject.

(1) Consider then, in the first place, the different plane occupied by the Subject to that which is occupied by the Object. Further light will come by reflecting that the 'Object' of which we speak, in relation to the Subject, denotes nothing in particular, while the Subject does. The objective side of inner life may contain any kind of presentation, from the perception of a varied landscape to the thought of oneself! In this way then the Subject is the one centre of a shifting circumference, in addition to its being the condition of the experience of such a world of objects, as I have previously shown.

'I am a part of all that I have met ;
 Yet all experience is an arch wherethro'
 Gleams that untravell'd world, whose margin fades
 For ever and for ever when I move.'¹

(2) But secondly, this one Subject is also realized to be the same 'I' as that which feels, and that which wills. Hence the Subject is already consolidated by fusing with the centre

¹ Tennyson's 'Ulysses,' *Works, etc.* p. 95.

of all our experiences. The old 'faculty' psychology has been abolished; all subjective phenomena are now seen to be related to the Self as a unitary being. But, behold, no sooner is this position accepted than we have threats of execution of the Self, as a *caput mortuum* of metaphysics! And we hear of 'psychology without a Self'! Well, our concern is not with psychology here; but it seems the height of perversity to repudiate faculties, and then deal treacherously with the conscious unity which must take their place.

(3) Now thirdly, this Self must be *identical*; must include the Ego. For the mere series of states could not know itself as a unity unless the Subject were the common centre of reference to the different presentations. To deny this identity of the knower would mean that we are shut up to merely instantaneous experiences. The rejection of this latter absurdity is also involved by our Self-activity, which consciously passes over the elements of the time-series in the steadiness of purpose and in the fulfilment of the plan of a life. And feeling speaks out for the Ego, not only by its *immediate* testimony, but from the place which it pleases

the Ego to assign it in his life. The emotion may be controlled ; the appetites may be related to a Self, which is conceived as permanent ; and which defers its gratification till the time required in its own plans as a rational harmony. Let us not be ashamed of this belief in personal identity ; but rather let us regard its ancient vogue as confirmatory of the conclusions of philosophy, experience and common-sense. I shall touch on some objections presently.

(4) Fourthly, the objective series is subordinate to the Will of the Ego. The object is a changing manifold. The objects get related by being apperceived by a Subject, which gives to them a certain permanence reflected from its own. They are unified and related to past objects. They are constructed into an identical world, that lasts from moment to moment, and is subject to the laws postulated by the reason. This is posited as the Not-Self. But there is a much more manifest evidence of the Will than this, which is somewhat subtle, and is obscured by epistemological questions. This is the direct evidence, and absolute conviction that by the exercise of my will I can make changes in the world of objects. It is manifest therefore that

we have here, in the Self, an emphasis upon the subjective and self-active element which predominates over the objective, as the potter over the clay in his hand. And to refuse to form an estimate of the Subject, because it is related to the Object, is like refusing to credit the potter with anything more than the abstract relation to clay.

(5) Fifthly, what are we to say of the alternative, adopted by some psychologists and the Radical Empiricists, of seeking in the stream of consciousness for the Self, as the 'passing thought,' or as 'the mere idea of the Ego' which is constructed in the course of experience, and plays its part with other conscious elements? Well, in addition to our previous criticism of James,¹ I may add that this device really involves the Self which is supposed to be disintegrated. For the accusations that the Self is an intellectual construction involve also in the same charge the theories of the 'stream of consciousness' and the 'passing thought' and 'the Self as a mere idea.' For they, too, are constructions. Experience gives none of these hypothetical moments of consciousness in which

¹ *Supra*, Part I., Chapter I.

the flow consists ! On the contrary, it gives us longer or shorter glimpses, or synthetic apperceptions, of things, which are as cogent evidences of identity as the 'allotted span' of human life ! And further, such constructions as Empiricists put forward are incapable of being made, except by the active mind of a Self, enduring through time, and able to transcend the terms of the series, and connect them into a system. Nor does the endowment of the 'passing thought' with spiritual privileges help us. It is false to experience ; it is a mere device ; and it is a less simple theory than that which it seeks to supplant. Such atomistic theories of mental life and of Selfhood either involve the error and scepticism of Hume ; or else they 'beg' personal identity, and reproduce it in the mysterious capacities of the 'passing thought,' while professing to have explained it away.

(6) Sixthly, the psychological difficulties of *multi-personality* and secondary selves do not affect the Self as we have viewed it, from the metaphysical standpoint. The old sets of habits, or the strange modes of behaviour, which appear in such abnormal cases, affect only the ethical personality, and not the existential Self. It is

the same Subject still, in an epistemological sense ; but the habits and meanings are different. Much of the emphasis placed upon the phenomena of so-called ' multi-personality ' causes a departure from scientific views of mental processes to such an extent as to imply the miraculous, without any intention of such a concession. If it be true, as every psychologist holds, that perception, habit, memory, and the other mental conditions are built upon the data of previous experience, then there cannot be an absolute break in the continuity of the mental life, or there would be no materials for the new experiences. If the old material is drawn upon, it must be by the same epistemological Subject as existed before. I believe that these phenomena are abnormalities of habit, and certainly belong to the realm of values, and not of existence, in so far as the Self is concerned. Professor Royce says that there are many so-called Selves which are not true Selves, on his theory ; and under this head he would no doubt dismiss such abnormalities. Were it not for this proviso, he would find this side of empirical psychology most damaging for his view of the Self as ideal ; and he would then be unable to claim that his

theory avoids the empirical difficulties. The theory here set forth misses these, in maintaining that the Self as really existing is not concerned with the attainment or non-attainment of certain purposes, meanings, or ideals. And it is evident that the purely social character of selfhood on Royce's theory and its nature as a mere contrast-effect is quite remote from my view, which insists that the Self must be a real being. We do not need to employ the misleading term Substance, of which no one knows anything, except that in the material world qualities were supposed to inhere in it. It is an entirely different point to maintain that this 'I,' this Self, which thinks, feels, and wills, which is the centre of experience *for me*; which is capable of making judgments and of conceiving purposes, is a real being. Viewing the Self as the identical, constitutive and active centre of reference in consciousness, as the Subject in relation to the spiritually conditioned Object, can it be denied that the Self exists, is real, and is our first criterion of Reality at the human point of view?

CHAPTER IV.

METAPHYSIC OF EXISTENCE.

THE reality of the Self constitutes the reality and trustworthiness of our experience. This furnishes the *motif* of the profound efforts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and more recently, of Green, Münsterberg, Schiller and others, to evolve the world of experience from the Ego, whether it be conceived as in some way a transcendental, noumenal, absolute, or universal principle; or as the will that takes attitudes; or as the active Self which seeks satisfaction. In diverse ways these theories express the central importance of the spirit in a theory of reality.

① Now we are in a position to accept experience as it burns in the focus of subjectivity. Whence these rays of light come, we do not yet know; but meanwhile we have guarded against the

acceptance of the rays apart from the focus ; and have provided against the substitution of merely conceptual for actually existing rays, burning in a real focus. And we have seen that whatever reality the rays may have, they derive it from their appearance in the focus. In other words, we find two truths about the Object ; first, that it is conditioned by spirit, that is, by being known, and otherwise related to the Ego ; and second, that the Self which provides the unity of Objects in relation to a Subject, imparts to them also of its own reality.

A word or two more on these points will lead us beyond them. I say firstly that what the Object is apart from a Subject we can never know. It cannot be said to exist independently of Spirit. Nor could it be constituted in its nature as it is but for the synthetic activity of Spirit. I do not surely need, at this time of day, to inveigh any further against the *Ding-an-sich* or any such 'rudimentary organ' of Realism. As to this point, namely, the constructive part played by the mind in experience, we do not require merely logical and abstract categories, which are drawn up *post rem*, and are reminiscent of Scholas-

ticism,¹ but we may emphasize the case of idealization. There the contribution of the Mind appears as an agreeable exaggeration of the part played by it in perception. In Art, 'a portion of life,' as Zola said, is 'seen through the medium of a temperament.' In common life, do we not often consciously *read* into things our memories and imaginings, and so transform them to our wish by our Self-activity? For my own part, I do not believe that we really *know* any subject till we have thus fused it with our memories, interests and associations in the heat of feeling and will,—a process closely akin to idealization. And I am perfectly convinced that experience and knowledge are so constructed by Self-activity. Voluntarism best expresses this truth, and hints at the essential attempts of the Subject to reduce the Object to identity with itself. But I must pass on to the second point.

The reality which we have seen to belong to the Self cannot be withheld from the Object which is essentially related to the Subject, and

¹ Kant's Deduction of the Categories from the Transcendental Unity of Apperception is, however, the classical instance of the way in which the spiritual or noumenal Reality constitutes the intelligible world of experience, and even the world of phenomena as manifesting the order of Nature.

thus expresses the nature of the Self. So we have now a valid claim to regard the experience of the world as real.

Now this raises the question which has not prominently appeared as yet. What is the relation between different Selves? How do we pass from one to another? I answer: (a) in the first place, that the question is really less difficult for us than for the man who takes 'Experience' as his starting-point. He thinks that he escapes the problem by *assuming* the standpoint of a communal experience! But the problem is there all the time, with others which are apt to be ignored! (b) In the second place, the bodily presence of others is guaranteed as real by our foregoing argument proceeding from the reality of Self to that of experience, in which other Selves play a part. (c) But thirdly, the recognition of other personalities as located in human bodies springs up with the earliest convictions, in point of temporal development; prior in fact to the consciousness of Self. The child depends upon his mother and nurse, and in his dawning consciousness lives through them. The point of metaphysical interest in this, however, is not the temporal and genetic priority

of the consciousness of other Selves ; what concerns us is the *logical* truth that emerges, viz. that experience is essentially of such a nature that other personalities exist and share in it. In other words, it does not lead us to regard Selfhood as a mere contrast-effect and a purely social relationship, as Professor Royce holds, but it leads us to view *experience* as partaking of this social character just as surely as it involves the representation of things as separate in Space and Time. This conviction is also dependent upon the reality of the body, in which our own Selfhood as voluntarily active meets with other Selves under objective conditions ; and so the body plays a unique part in our experience not only of other Selves, but of the World, and of the essential relation existing between Selves and the World. (*d*) But finally, this community of experience is not sufficiently explained without seeking to account for the agreement and harmony of Self with Self, and of the World with Selves in certain respects. What imparts to us this similarity in knowledge and experience ? How can the common intelligence in Selves, and in the World,—which Selves explore and reduce to rationality,—be explained ? Not by the mere

effulgence of light from the particular Subject for which it exists epistemologically ; for as we have seen the Object is broken up and part is postulated as Not-Self ! And this is the part which unexpectedly manifests that striking identity, rationality, and intelligibility which is so awe-inspiring, and which must spring from a spiritual source. The conviction of the absoluteness and objectivity of the World, this Not-Self, cannot be given up. Nor can the wondrous harmony of Spirit and the Universe be ignored. This antinomy Idealism recognizes and solves. The universality and pervasiveness of Intelligence, Order, and Law point to a Spiritual Principle which constitutes existence as rational and harmonious. The conditions of experience point to the same conclusion. The world of relations can be synthesized and known only by a Mind, and so it is required that the Universe be conceived as constituted, as surely as it exists, by the Supreme Mind for whom all things are. So conceived, the Spiritual Principle must be of the form of Subject and Object ; for that is precisely the relationship which must obtain between the Universe as existing *for* such a Spiritual Principle and the Spiritual Principle as knowing and

so constituting the Universe. But this answers to our description of a Self. Therefore, the Spiritual Principle, whatever else it may be, must be a Self.

Let us now look once more at the relation between Selves. We saw that their mutual relationship, and their relation to the World demanded a Spiritual Principle to explain their community of agreement and intelligibility. This appears as an immanent principle in regard to the content of their experience, but it leaves their particularity and private Selfhood intact. The failure to provide for this on the part of 'Pure Experience' philosophy breaks down its argument. The respects in which this *immanence* may be found to consist, may be here specified as follows :

(1) First, it gives us subjectivity of such a kind that its objective content harmonizes with the worlds of all rational Selves. This is the so-called *a priori* Self-activity of minds.

(2) Second, it provides the *data* of our experience with their capacity for being known, because they are themselves the Objects of a Supreme Mind. This saves us from all the perils of a merely Subjective Idealism.

(3) Third, our 'universe of discourse' and common rationality may be said to manifest the same immanent Principle. Hence Science and Education owe their existence to the presence of the same principle of intelligence and rationality in the Selves.

(4) And fourth, the objectivity of view which Selves seek, the desire to see the universe *sub specie aeternitatis*, and all ideals of truth, as well as those of beauty and goodness, with which we shall be concerned in the next Chapter, are manifestations of this immanent and universal Principle.

A deep conviction which gives rise to many of the subjoined criticisms and theses may be here stated. There is a profounder meaning in existence than metaphysicians have usually been ready to discover. Their training in the world of conceptions and methods of logic has tended to make them restricted in their vision. Is not this the living message of James and Bergson for our day? Everything that actually *is*, is bearing witness, clear and infallible, so far as it goes, to the nature of Reality. The mere theory that you or I may mean by our manipulation of conceptions may or may not be true: and con-

sidering the wide diversity of opinions, we have to say, *cannot* be quite true. But everything that actually has come to be in the universe, that really exists is a messenger and a revelation from the Unseen! It does not mean that we should study the mere form. That would lead us into the conceptual realm again. But it means that we should regard the interpretation of these things as organized capacities showing that the Unseen must be such that it is so manifested. And as interpretation, this is not so mysterious and productive of difference of opinion as the objector might think. For it is patent to all reflective minds that in life, growth, animal organism, consciousness, and Selfhood we have stages of development, in which, even without going into teleology and the world of values, we have different kinds of being, representing various modes or functions of Existence. Sufficient is it to say that in Selfhood we have evidence of a completer being than any so-called lower kind can give. Hence we view the Universe and the Reality which it represents as being such that Selfhood, ultimately stated in terms of value as Personality, expresses its highest form of Existence.

So, when we are honestly and critically anthropomorphic in our construction of Reality, we may feel a conviction which no shallow arguments can disturb. And when we see in Personality our highest category of explanation, and apply it in order to understand the Universe and the ultimate Reality, we have two infallible proofs. First, we have the testimony, and now so rapidly growing conviction that this is almost the last word of present-day philosophy, that Reality *must* be conceived in terms of Thought, Spirit, and Personality. And secondly, we have a reflection, which we do not need to suppress when we leave our study and class-room, and have the budding trees of spring, the singing birds and the gay butterflies as our companions ! We may feel with the poet—

‘ To me the meanest flower that blows can give
Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears.’

For the conviction may well sweep over us that there is nothing incongruous in Personality’s claim of a relationship with this world of Nature, nothing unsound in our application of Personality as our category of explanation, not merely because all things are *ours* as knowing Subjects,—that thought we have banished mean-

while in place of another. The fresh thought is this—the Universe is so related to Personality that Personality *has really appeared* as the child of All! It exists; it is real; it has being, however it may be interpreted; and it cannot be gainsaid. And not only so; but all things else appear as stages in its growth to produce for Nature, ‘Man, her last work,’ who seems so fair! And he, as Personality, can know nature and rethink her laws, which so far from being dead and impersonal have actually produced Life and Personality!

Now it seems to me that this is so much better than the halting forms of logic, that it is in reality the source of what is valuable in formal logic itself. Bradley comes too late to tell us what the world should be like to harmonize with his riddles; for, in however abstract a fashion, logic has had only this basis of experience to go upon in spite of itself. And from the life of the Ego have come its forms of Identity, and the like, and the categories of Causality, Substance, and so on. That is part of the heritage left us by Kant. Fichte expounded the great thought in his own wonderful way. And when Hegel turned to the world of experience

with his abstract forms, and sought to reconstruct it in Schelling's phrase as 'a petrified logic,' he was really building better than he knew. For the deepest motives for such attempts, and their secret source of profound rationality are not to be found in their conceptualizing a living universe, but in their re-vivifying of logic by laying the quick, breathing body of Experience upon its corpse. And as a matter of fact, we see how Hegel was driven to urge the revision of logic; and he built his great dialectical process upon forms which ran counter to the rules of the scholastic logic. And so rationality is more than a mere name, not because it is understood to be postulated in the text-books of logic, but because it is immanent in us, and in the Rock of Reality from whence we are hewn. Or, to drop the figure, the stages of real existence which culminate in Personality give us our best and surest hints, inklings, and even revelations of the nature of the Unseen, and teach us that Reality indubitably manifests Rationality and Personality, that the Living God is at the heart of things.

Accordingly we must characterize Reality as essentially of the nature of an Absolute Self.

This result may be reached by another line of argument, in addition to those which I have employed on the grounds of Existence. Such, for example, is that which seeks to provide for the ultimate principle of Unity. No final plurality of reals can stand the onslaught of the argument from relations. In the last resort existence must be a Unity. But in characterizing this Unity, philosophers have had recourse to various abstractions, such as Being, Substance, the Absolute Idea, Energy, and so forth. But no conception of the Unity will suffice which does not provide for the disconnectedness of things and the plurality of Selves. And the only type of Unity which can meet these demands is that which also provides us with our solution of the puzzle of the One and the Many, and is by its very nature a Unity in diversity. The manifold of experience is given to us in the unity of one conscious Subject. That is the prototype of the relation between monism and pluralism. And so Personality not only proves to be the prime unit of reality, the criterion of existence, the synthetic principle, the condition of experience, the best mode of existence, and the highest category of explanation, but it is also the

supreme type of Unity, and the only solution of the Sceptic's problem of the One and the Many.

And now I will briefly state, from the standpoint of a Metaphysic of Existence, a theory of the Absolute, reserving a more detailed exposition of it till the concluding Chapter, after an examination of the influences derivable from a Metaphysic of Values. I hold that we are led to view Reality as the Absolute Self who is also the Unity of all. So far we have seen that the Self is at least Subject in relation to Object. Such too, we find, not from analogy alone, but from the nature of the conditions of Being, must the Absolute Self be. As Subject and Object He embraces all existence, and in fact constitutes it so. We can further say that as we—although in an imperfect manner—constitute our Object, so does He, as Subject, but unto perfection. As the distinction of Subject and Object, however, implies an inevitable difference between them, as well as an essential relation, so the Absolute as Subject is necessarily different from the Absolute as Object. This is essential to the Divine Self-consciousness. It implies also the existence of a world of conscious beings, who constitute the 'Other' to God. But while with

us the difference between Subject and Object is beyond our complete control, with Him the Object is Self-determined to be distinct from Himself as Subject. This delivers the universe from the mere identity, the blank undifferentiated Unity of Pantheism, and most forms of Absolutism. Self-limitation is a most important category—as Hegel showed—and is the essential attribute of the Absolute as Subject; and this Self-determination posits relative independence to the Object. Three logical stages in the Divine Life may be stated, and subsequently explained on the basis of our own Selfhood. (1) The first is His Subjectivity, Omniscient, Eternal and Self-determining. (2) The Second is His Objectivity, posited in relation to Himself as Subject, and consisting of the real universe in time, including our experience, and being thus itself of the same type of Subject-Object. (3) And the third stage is included in the second, as Object, but is given the special character of *Not-Self*, by the Divine Self-limitation. It is posited as autonomous, apart from essential and constitutive conditions.¹ His highest glory, His

¹ Cf. the political relationship of the British Empire and the self-governing Colonies.

essence of rationality, and His sign of Personality is revealed in this Self-determination. This Divine positing of an Other in Himself as Not-Himself is equivalent to the so-called 'creation' of an infinity of Selves with their own point of view, as finite Subjects, with their own moral autonomy and individual freedom, with their own privilege of the voluntary choice of goodness, and participation in the life of God. Now the essence of this Not-Self as posited, is the likeness of the human Selves to God Himself. These Selves are microcosms of the Macrocosm, the Divine Self. In spite of finitude and imperfection, they may realize their spiritual privileges of progress towards likeness to God. And as they seek the Ideals which are the earnest of their inheritance they become imbued with the Immanent Principle, or the Logos which, as we saw, gives to the Selves community of experience, rationality, order, and objectivity of vision, besides the moral, æsthetic and religious evidences of Divinity in humanity. This Progress or Development, whether in the individual or the race, is the striving of the Objective side of the Absolute back to Subjectivity. And all the concrete forms which the Object has mani-

festated in the course of historical Evolution are but growing revelations of the Absolute Spirit as living, organized, conscious, and finally self-conscious and self-determining, as it is the essence of Divinity to be, unto perfection. When we say that these forms, produced in the course of development, are stages in the progress to Divine Subjectivity, and are also stages towards the Not-Self, or in the direction of alienation from Divine Subjectivity, we are stating a paradox which contains a great truth, as an illustration will make clear. In Nature every such manifestation is a step towards independence and self-activity. The simple unity of a passive material universe is broken up by each sprout of life, organism, or personality, that sets itself up to be something on its own account. The essence of human subjectivity, for example, is exclusiveness and isolation,—‘ I am I ’ ; but, as Hegel showed in his dialectical treatment of the Person,¹ this is but the first step to larger organization and ultimate unity of the Individual with Society, with the Universe, and with the Absolute Spirit.² So the progress of Divine

¹ *Philosophy of Right*, Introduction.

² Professor Muirhead expounds this principle in relation to

Objectivity to Divine Subjectivity is through negation and alienation, by becoming part of the Divine Not-Self, and finding in this life of otherness the immanence of the Logos which shall make possible a life of Godlikeness, akin to the full organization and Self-determination of the Divine Subjectivity.

Before closing this Chapter, some illustrations may be given of the relation of the Divine Self and Not-Self. If it be said that it is unreasonable to speak of the Divine Object, and of the Divine Not-Self, as in any real sense God, I reply by referring to instances in human life. (a) In ourselves we find the world of experience within a unity of Self, part of which is yet posited as Not-Self. God *needs* no such external World to constitute His Personality—as Lotze convincingly showed in answer to objections ¹—as if the Absolute were dependent upon the conditions of

Idealism (Art., *Ency. Brit.*⁽¹¹⁾, vol. xiv. p. 285). The *momenta* of Idealism are found in the successive and correlative principles, 'Without mind no orderly world': 'Without the world no mind.' He concludes by saying, 'Subject and object grow together. The power and vitality of the one is the power and vitality of the other, and this is so because they are not two things with separate roots, but are both rooted in a common reality which, while it includes, is more than either.'

¹ *Microcosmus*, Bk. II. Chap. IV.

development peculiar to finite beings! But the Universe of the Self-existent Absolute Experience is posited as 'the Other' by His Self-determination, while He is also in a certain sense the Unity of all. (b) Again, we are able to present to ourselves the objects of desire and aspiration, although, in spite of the æsthetic pleasures of idealization and anticipation, we have to confess them unrealized and unattained, and to admit their character as Not-Self. (c) And, as another illustration of the same principle, we have habits and modes of activity which manifest the Self and which yet have sunk from the level of consciousness and will. These are a Not-Self to us, although produced by our volitions in the past, and they are still part of our wider Self. A certain autonomy is shown in habit. (d) And finally, in self-sacrifice and self-determination, that which is ours is at once owned and disowned, and we have the glory of the Cross, a reflection of the Divine Nature, and a cumulative proof of the reasonableness of the view sketched so imperfectly in this chapter.

CHAPTER V.

METAPHYSIC OF VALUES.

DIFFERENT from the point of view of Existence is that of Meanings, of Ideals, of Values. For a full exposition of this difference between that which merely is and that which is appreciated, appraised and approved, we would need to refer to Kant, Royce, Ward, Münsterberg, and Eucken. It is only possible here to insist upon the importance of this distinction between the realm of mere Fact, and the realm of Value. To the latter sphere we now pass. Here we may substitute the Concept of Personality for that of the Self. Personality, as we have seen, refers to all the relations which pertain to Selfhood, the social, ethical, æsthetic, intellectual, and religious ideals which give life its worth and meaning. In the past Chapters this aspect has not been always completely excluded, owing to the limitations of the method of abstraction.

If we have not suffered the brightness of the Ideal to shine forth like the full-orbed moon in the heavens, we have not always been able to hide the iridescence of its silver glory through the cloud of Existence.

Beginning again at our finite point of view, we must consider what constitutes us as real Persons. And I may be very brief, as I am in substantial agreement here with the conclusions of Professor Royce, in regard to the Ideal Ego.¹ But I consider that in the world of Existence the Self is a real being. In the world of Values, however, I agree that the Personality is constituted as real by the meaning, purpose, or ideal, which produces order and unity out of the chaotic confusion of mere impulse and caprice. And it is just in proportion as this plan is organic to all the true interests of the life of the individual and of the 'over-individual,' that Personality is attained.

The question arises then, to what do these values, meanings, and ideals refer as their standard and end? We find certain moral, intellectual, æsthetic and religious appreciations, which are considered as constitutive of Personality, on account of their place in a normative

¹ See *Supra*, Part I., Chapter III.

system. For these we all live, for these some would even dare to die. Is the norm a matter of individual and subjective taste, or has it a certain universal validity and objective character? In ordinary life we find that what we do has a reference to some end, which gives to the action a purposive character. But further, out of these voluntary acts certain are approved and certain are condemned. Now I maintain that this critical reference of purposes to a standard is but a higher form of the relation of all action to an end. In other words, all judgments are cases of teleological or purposive reference.

We shall select the moral aspect as that which may best present the argument. The elementary fact here is that of voluntary or purposive activity, upon which, as I hold, the explanation of the highest development of validity depends. It is brought out by the simple question,—*Why* did I act so? The answer is—I had some end in view. Now what is this end? The Hedonist rashly answers in terms of personal sensibility. But if I always act so from my own pleasure, no solution of the problem of the subsequent approval and disapproval is forthcoming, and we are left with merely a universal principle, by which to

interpret *all* human actions! Accordingly the Hedonist has to set out on his long voyage for the End in terms of pleasure, and yet as providing for the problem of approval and disapproval. We do not need to follow him into the deeps of metaphysics where his Universalistic needs compel him to steer his course. It is sufficient to know that he is afloat on this ocean of speculation, which allows a course for all kinds of craft. So, setting out again for ourselves, we observe in the first place that the end to which all purposive conduct must be relative is centred in the Personality which conceives, appreciates and executes it. Apart from this no ground for values can be found, any more than a theory of reality can be held by an unreal Self.¹ The result is that Personality is in some way an end in itself. But evidently this end is not *mere* sensibility.

For if so, we must either deny the distinctions of worth in conduct; or else we must regard these moral distinctions as unproductive of any genuine act, and merely an empty phrasing of

¹ This is manifestly one of the main contentions of Pragmatist and Humanist. These theories of truth depend upon the existence of a Self, whose satisfactions or dissatisfactions are implied in the estimate of the results of conduct, by which Truth is, in their view, to be explained in the long run.

thought, after the fact. Both alternatives are absurd. Therefore, whatever part pleasure may play in the End, it is not the sole constituent of it. The conclusion is, then, that every purposive act is expressive of some phase or other of Personality, which is alone capable of being conceived as an end in itself. This contention is vastly strengthened by the consideration of Obligation. But in the second place, the merely individual Person cannot be viewed as the End. His life, his meanings, his ideals are unrealizable in isolation. He is a member of society, and is dependent upon others for the expression of himself, and for the realization of values which make his life. He has relations, also, to the World, and to God, which form an integral part of his true Personality. Hence the End is Personality, not in isolation, but in its complete circle of relations. As Professor Palmer says, the 'conjunct' character of Personality must essentially be present in the End.¹ In Self-realization, then, as the development of the whole Personality in all its relations, is to be found the End.

¹ *The Field of Ethics*. Kant's Categorical Imperative involves the worth of the good will in relation to the Kingdom of Ends.

The central fact of ethics is Conscience. Upon the interpretation of that psychological *datum* the general ethical doctrine largely depends. The theory of Conscience which I here present has close affinities with the view of the End as Self-realization, and with a theory of the ground of Moral Obligation. In my view Conscience is the consciousness of the Ideal Self, not as a conception of it in perfection—which is unthinkable,—but as the implication of the bettered Self of the succeeding stage of life. This Ideal, which constitutes the moral Person as the Unity of impulses that are in themselves discordant and fragmentary, is presented to consciousness, and the reactions of the actual to the Ideal Self in terms of feeling, thought, and will, produce the phenomena of Conscience. As feeling, it expresses the congruity or incongruity of the actual Self with the ideal Personality. As will, it represents the response of activity called forth in us. As thought, it has the prerogative of taking into account the full set of circumstances, and also the rational law which is behind the contrast. So Conscience is always adapted to the conditions of the individual and the race. And what is the Law itself? It is the fundamental principle

of Progress upon which the universe and Personality rest, as the Objective of the Divine Subject. The differentiations of the real world, its stages of development, the values of life, the reality of Selfhood, and Personality as an End, all depend upon this fundamental law of Progress on the part of the Divine Object towards the Divine Subject. Or to state the matter in less controversial terms, the law which makes the 'Categorical Imperative,' the 'Ought,' is the fundamental one of all experience, namely, that in the process of change, which is ever going on in the universe, the moments should add the present conditions to the past. It is unthinkable that decay and subtraction could have constituted the temporal universe. On the other hand, it is the essence of rationality to synthesize; it is the essence of life to grow, of organism to become more completely organized, of Personality to realize more and more fully the capacity and harmony of its nature. But even this cannot give the weight of moral responsibility to the Law which experience and reason attest. Neither the Obligation, nor the law of Progress on which it rests, nor Conscience as we have explained it, nor the meaning of Personality itself, can be

adequately explained without reference to the Objective and Perfect Personality, through whom alone the Law and the process are explicable, and without whom the community of interests in the Good would be beyond our understanding. Once more we are led to Personality as the Supreme Principle, in this case from the side of moral values.¹

And the argument from intellectual and æsthetic values is somewhat similar. I believe that the theories of knowledge as practical value, which, as we have seen, demand the reality of Personality, to confirm or reject—according to the reaction upon experience,—will find their true warrant in terms of the satisfaction of the whole man in reference to his Ideal. So truth will be regarded not merely as that which ‘works,’ but as that which accords with the implicated Ideal of a progressing Self and a wider experience, in a parallel manner to the case of Conscience; and the Laws of Reason will be found rooted and grounded in the same principle of Progress. And only by the postulation of a Perfect Personality

¹ Lotze reserved the term Personality for God. This usage, however, is apt to deny to man genuine, albeit imperfect, Personality (*i.e.* the Self, as it is termed in this work), as Royce appears to do, so far as the world of Existence is concerned.

can the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness be explained. For æsthetically also, our sense of the beautiful is similar to the fact of Conscience, in which the coming event casts its shadow before,—a reversal of the psychological fact of after-images, being rather the content of a kind of sense of *expectancy*. And the compatibility of the Ideal, so far as it is conceived, with the Actual presentation to consciousness, gives pleasure, intellectual stimulation and artistic activity; while incompatibility offends our taste. But such things are only for a being who 'looks before and after,' who can appreciate, and harmonize the various claims of the Ideals which are sought. Therefore, whether the artist knows it or not, the passion for a perfect form which fills his soul, and the longing for a deeper harmony than any known before, are akin to the hunger and thirst after righteousness, and point to an Ideal Unity in which our aspirations shall be satisfied. All ideals are glimpses of the Perfect Spirit, who, as religion also testifies, has formed us for Himself. And our heart is restless until it finds rest in Him.

The positive definition given to Personality in Chapter II. of the Second Part, as the Self in the full circle of its relationships, not only helps

us to understand the various qualities that mark off one human personality from another, in regard to individuality ; but also gives us a clue to the interpretation of Divine Personality in other than negative terms, and thus removes the favourite objection to the Personality of God as implying limitation. God, we may say, is fully Personal in the infinity of His relations (compare Spinoza's ' Substance '), and is only limited in the world of Values as of Existence by His Self-Determination.

The remaining questions may be left over to the closing Chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

METAPHYSIC OF REALITY.

WE have now seen that the trend of the argument from the side of Values is as strongly in favour of Perfect Personality as the argument from the side of Existence was in favour of the Absolute Self. The result is the fusion of the two ideas. As in ourselves we find one Personality, although conceivable either as an existing Self or as appreciative Personality, so we reach the conclusion that there is an Absolute Personality, who exists, and whose nature is the perfect fulfilment of all meanings, values, and ideals.

And further, as we saw that the *stages* of successive existence in the World-Order represent under the form of Time the living and Personal Reason immanent in Reality ; now we supplement that view by the recognition of the meaning and significance of these stages in the development. These stages are seen to be explicable only

teleologically, as involving a reference to a standard, an End, which is hid in the Absolute,—

‘ That one far-off Divine event,
To which the whole creation moves.’

And in our view of Reality as Personality, these stages are *gradations* in which the Divine Subject is immanent in proportion to their manifestation of His own transcendent life. And so there are degrees of Reality—in the full sense of the term,—according to the ‘all-inclusiveness and harmony’—to borrow Bradley’s phrase—of these several orders of Existence, in relation to the Absolute Life. But this progress to Divine Subjectivity involves on the part of the Divine Objective, a kind of alienation as the condition of the realization of ultimate harmony with His transcendent nature. And the forfeiture of that independence on the part of the human person under any condition implies the loss of the promised inheritance, and the retrogression to the merely Objective plane. Whereas, the immortal distinctness of our life as a fully organized, complex and progressive Personality is essential to the realization of a reflection of the Divine Nature, of which we are ‘*broken lights*.’ And the autonomy of moral persons as free and

responsible is so necessary to a theory of ultimate Reality that we are prepared to side with those who maintain the rights of Personality, even to the detriment of the final Unity or Absoluteness, if such an alternative is the only one possible. But this view seeks to provide a place in the Absolute for independent persons, by the distinctions which we have seen to be necessitated not only by the analogy of human Personality, but also by the rational conditions of existence and by the truest harmony of meanings. In our view, the Absolute is not the All, in any sense of an immediate and resistless Unity ; *but He is so only through profound distinctions, not imposed upon Him from without, nor the product of chance ; but as Self-determined by His own Personal Nature.* Instead of a blank Monism, we have a Unity capable not merely of relative independence of the various parts, implied in the category of organism, but capable of the positive otherness clearly required by the only available and competent category to apply to the conception of the Absolute, namely, that of Personality. And as we have seen, the universe of separate things, of living beings, of organisms, of consciousness, of Personality, with its Self-distinguishing, Self-

determining, Self-sacrificing nature, can be truly unified only in an Absolute which produces these distinctions, and provides for this independence,—that is, Perfect Personality. And the reduction of form to matter, the annulling of distinctions, the negation of autonomy which are characteristic of every form of Pantheism and of Absolutism, except of some such Personalistic type as I have endeavoured to present, must be regarded as radically defective, however successful such systems may be in displaying a smooth logical surface to the conceptualist.¹ The inspiration of the poet and the mystic in their pantheistic moods we shall regard as emphasizing one side of a never-failing truth, namely the fundamental Unity of all, but as neglecting what is perhaps an even greater aspect, that of Difference, of Meaning, of Value, and of Personality. We shall therefore supplement their Absolutism with the recognition of the validity drawn from Personality and Life, and confirmed by our highest reasoning, even when it finds captivating expression as in William Watson's

¹ Cf. Art. 'Cartesianism,' by Edward Caird, *Ency. Brit.*(⁹), vol. v., on the defects of the Infinite of Spinoza, and of all Pantheists.

Ode in May, in which he says, addressing the sun :—

‘ Thou art but as a word of his speech,
 Thou art but as a wave of his hand ;
 Thou art brief as a glitter of sand
 ‘Twixt tide and tide on his beach ;
 Thou art less than a spark of his fire,
 Or a moment’s mood of his soul ;
 Thou art lost in the notes on the lips of his choir
 That chant the chant of the Whole.’

The immanence of God in the world is a hopeless doctrine unless counterbalanced by and harmonized with that of His transcendence. Our view seeks to reconcile immanence and transcendence, and to include a theory of gradations in the manifestation of the Reality appropriately regarded as Divine. In the universe, God is immanent *as Object* merely, in regard to the matter, which serves as the passive condition for development towards Subjectivity. In the stages of Development, there is a movement towards Otherness, and through that independence a fuller manifestation of Subjectivity, which becomes more immanent as the organism becomes more like the Self-existent, Self-determining, Divine Subject. In man’s higher spiritual life and progress in the search for truth, goodness and beauty,

the microcosm expresses itself in the highest form, and these ideals,—now become so precious and significant,—are evidences of the immanence of the Divine as Subject—not, however, to the negation of individuality, of the real being of man as a part of the Divine Not-Self.

As Professor Howison would say, God is attracting the Society of Spirits unto likeness to Himself by Final Causation and through the immanence of Ideals. In my view, however, Pluralism is only a phase of the Divine Unity which is rationally necessary. The problem of the One and Many is capable of solution only under the form of Personality. But this question of Monism and Pluralism and the questions of Infinity, and Supra-Personality, I have dealt with in my criticisms in the First Part, and may refer the reader to those pages for my views.¹

As to Time, I hold that it has its place in the Divine Objective as the mode of the manifestation of the Divine Subject. The existent is temporal because Time is one of the meanings of the Absolute, who is not in Time, any more than judgments of value are in time, but who knows all as in ‘an indivisible instant,’ and who manifests Himself

¹ *Supra*, Chaps. III.-VI.

under the form of Time, which therefore may never be done away, unless a state of blank identity is to supervene upon the order of rationality. Such a condition, even in Eternity, is unthinkable.¹

In regard to Supra-Personality, we may admit that the Absolute is above our highest conception of Personality, without detriment to those essentials of Personality in which we have seen reason to believe. And it is therefore more than a risk of depersonalization to speak of Supra-Personality of the Absolute as prohibitory of the ascription of Personality to Him. The result of such a position is the postulation of a Supreme Thing-in-Itself or Unknowable. This was far from Pfeiderer's thought when he used the term 'super-personal,' and urged Theists to follow suit.² The danger of such a course ensues upon placing the emphasis on the prefix, thus changing Theism into Agnosticism, as Bradley practically does. But Perfect and Absolute Personality are

¹ Bergson's idea of the identity of Duration and Consciousness appears to me to be an instance of hypostatization, which is foreign to much in his system that makes for a concrete view of Man and Nature.

² *Philosophy and Development of Religion*, by Otto Pfeiderer, Gifford Lectures, vol. i. p. 168.

terms which will meet the requirements of metaphysics, which, as we have seen, both on the side of Existence and of Values, demands that the Supreme Unity be viewed as Personal.¹

In conclusion, what then is the relation of Existence and Value? From the synthetic and Absolute standpoint, so far as we can conceive it, of what does Reality consist—of Existence, or of Value, or of a union of both? What are the mutual relations of these fundamental principles? Such questions would demand in reply a Metaphysic of Reality in the final sense.

From the human point of view, the matrix of the outer reality of existing things cannot be explained in terms of value. The given element exists, not because of my attitude towards it, but as a *datum* of experience which I must accept as material of experience, and make the best of. And if we view 'things' in this light as conditions of spiritual progress, we are not really

¹ The objections to Divine or Absolute Personality on the score of its limiting the Divine Infinity have been stated over and over again from the time of Spinoza to the present day, but do not find so much currency now that Intellectualism and Absolutism are being challenged in so many directions. They have been well answered by Lotze, *Microcosmus*, Bk. II., Chap. IV.; Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 181; Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. ii. pp. 418-425.

at the human standpoint any longer. And I repeat that Existence is inexplicable in terms of my meaning, for it goes beyond my meaning, and presupposes my values, inasmuch as my own existence as a Self is something which, of course, I could not accomplish or effect. But when we take the hint as to the teleological explanation of Existence, that is, when we pass to the Absolute standpoint, so far as we can, we are impelled to believe that Existence is expressive of the Meaning of the Perfect Personality. As the existing details of a picture may be pointed out by a critic, with only a partial conception of the meaning of these details, so we as human beings are able to say what *is*, from the standpoint of Existence, without resolving its existence into what *we mean*, or to terms of practical value. But every stroke of the brush had a meaning for the Artist, and the existence of every detail is but an incident in the complete meaning which is expressed in the existence of the picture. So the universe as Existence is explicable in terms of the Absolute Meaning, and at that ultimate point of view, the worlds of Existence and of Value upon which, in distinction from each other, I have laid so much stress, coalesce as the complete Expres-

sion of Divine Purpose and of Absolute Value. Or, as Professor Royce would say, the External is ultimately reducible to the Internal Meaning. In this final synthesis of the logical stages of the Divine Life and Purpose, we pass from the finite and human standpoint in which the real and the rational, the 'is' and the 'ought,' the Existent and the Ideal, the Self and the immortal Personality, are in irreconcilable dualism,—to the view 'under a form of eternity' in which all is known as the manifestation of Meaning and Purpose. And the Plan of the Divine Subject 'which brought us hither,' and has revealed Himself to mankind by the Logos, ever present with the race in Spirit, and historically manifested in Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word, and the 'express image' of the Person of God, will not be defeated by the dissolution of our personalities; but will be more completely fulfilled in our immortality as individuals. For, as we have seen, this distinctness from the Divine Subject is the condition of the Universe as significant and ordered, the path to its truest unity and fullest organization, and the expression of His Eternal Will and Purpose in bringing many sons unto glory. And while now we know only in

part, when that which is perfect is come, we shall know even as also we are known. In that fuller light all Being will be seen as Value—our own Personalities will be known as expressions of the Complete Ideal. We shall behold God's face in righteousness, and we shall be satisfied, when we awake, with His likeness.

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