

# ARYAN PHILOSOPHY

BY  
JOHN GARWAY

*with a*  
FOREWORD  
BY  
BHAI JODH SINGH, M.A.




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## INTRODUCTION

In his brochure, the writer makes a scientific attempt at reuniting the two branches of a race, who in the remote past, for causes not yet quite known, got separated from each other. The pamphlet aims at explaining that although in this separation they developed distinctive civilizations of their own due to effects of wind and water of the lands they came to inhabit, the effects of their common origin can still be observed in their modes of life, their lines of thought and their tendencies towards religion. It is this truth of the community of their origin which the writer deals with in this brochure ; its production must have entailed a deep study of several days on the sources of his information and reference. It is however not this researchful nature of this book or the resourcefulness with which it has been written, but the genuine sincerity and honesty of purpose with which it has been worded. If once the English and the Indian can be made to know their common parenthood and the oneness of the basis of their present-day civilizations, many of the conflicting tendencies at present existing between these two Aryan peoples would get reconciled.

This pamphlet has received a "Foreword" from the head of one of the leading colleges of India, viz., by Bhai Jodh Singh, M.A., Principal of the Khalsa College, Amritsar, whose name and fame

in the literary as well as spiritual spheres of this Province need no comment. Though a talented Sikh, his free thinking, faculty of honest scrutiny and above all his strength of character are recommendations for this book to be read with keener interest and deeper thought.

I thank the Principal for his Foreword and I am sure that the author of this brochure will welcome it.

2, Racecourse Road, Amritsar,  
27th June, 1940.

J. S. JAAJ

## FOREWORD

It is a pleasure and a privilege to write a foreword to this small pamphlet. Possibly some readers may find fault with the data from which conclusions have been drawn or criticise the reasoning by which some propositions have been proved. But very few will be able to deny the grandeur of the ideal dilated upon in these few pages. That the spirit or mind must prevail in the end, is not a new cry, but from time to time it needs a new orientation to attract the attention of men and make them strive for the ideal. The whole of Europe and a large part of the Eastern Hemisphere are again passing through unparalleled tribulations and those whose liberties are being trampled upon are again paying at least a lip homage to this great ideal. But how to achieve it, is the great question and the author of this little brochure has drawn pointed attention to the fact that until a large majority of men of these nations become selfless in their conduct by choice, the ideal cannot be achieved. I may mention in passing that the greatness and power of the aggressor also consist in the fact that he had by force made every citizen of his country act selflessly in the interest of the State. But what is based on force is tyranny and men acting selflessly under duress for material ends, instead of achieving peace of mind and thus becoming instruments of doing good to their neighbours, have allowed

themselves to be used for their subjugation and destruction. This menace can only be averted by an organisation of men who will act selflessly of their own free will. And if this lesson is grasped by even a small number of readers of this pamphlet the purpose of the writer would have been more than achieved.

The writer is a British army officer who has asked me to say that it is written without any relation to political creeds or religious tenets, he has served among Indians of many different kinds of belief and would be very loth to offend the sensibilities of any. He has found in military service a kind of freemasonry that rises above differences of personal opinion, and he has written this essay accordingly as an attempt to reach the simple truth of what we think and why we think it.

But I would, on my own behalf, appeal to all Indians and Britons who believe in the greatness of the ideal whether the time is not now ripe to come together and achieve unity for this great end. Privations and troubles will not have been in vain, if they purify our nature, burn the dross and awaken the noblest in us.

In the end I congratulate the author on this noble attempt.

Amritsar,  
27th June, 1940.

JODH SINGH,  
Principal,  
Khalsa College, Amritsar.

# Aryan Philosophy

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## The Common Features of the Peoples

**A**S history takes its shape from the minds of those who make it, and as a great part of India has shown remarkable spontaneity in joining a group of Western countries in a European War, it is of interest to examine what it is in the Indian mind that has evolved this response. The issue of the present struggle, it is probably apparent, has little or no connection with land and sovereignty; it is the fundamental question as to whether relations between peoples are to be governed by reason or by brute force. The fact that Indian opinion is at one with the British, in the view that reason is the ideal relationship, rests upon ideas that have ruled those two peoples' modes of living for thousands of years, before ever the two races came into contact, and can be traced back to their common source of origin; those ideas confirm, which other evidence also indicates,

that a high moral philosophy used to exist among the ancient Aryan peoples in their home on the shores of the Black Sea. Their philosophy of life was carried by them eastwards into India and westwards into Britain, as well as into France and Greece and Rome; it has constantly been subordinated to the doctrine that might is right, and it has constantly reasserted itself; now that it is once again being put to the test of war it may be well to scan the features that have been a common philosophy to those various nations, and to verify their suitability to the conduct of everyday national life.

In referring to the Black Sea as the district from which they originated a presumption has been made, for their source has not yet been identified with certainty; the shores of the Black Sea were undoubtedly their home for a time, but whether from the outset or whether in the course of their migration has yet to be determined. It is a fascinating study to trace back the several lines of resemblance, and to endeavour to find whence the Aryan stock began; language, fairy stories and theology, all show a common foundation; and from their common

features can be deduced some of the characteristics of the people and of the land in which they lived. Tradition helps, but the period being so remote it is practically lost; the Celts of Britain have a record of having come from Constantinople, and the Jutes believe they came from the mouth of the Dnieper, and the Indians believe they came from somewhere in the north, apparently by way of Iran; deductions from the relics of their language and myths, though, have yet to be brought to a conclusive shape.

From the language it can be seen that the Western peoples migrated in at least two main branches, one using the letter P where the other used Q; this is exemplified in the Gaelic *Mac* or *Maq* (meaning *son of*) contrasted with the Welsh *Maþ*, or again in the Latin *equus* (meaning *horse*) contrasted with the Greek *hippos*. The Q branch were the older migration. Among the numbers the variations in 5 provide a good instance of the two branches; the original Aryan was *penque*; from that came the Latin *quinque* and French *cinq*, and in the other branch the Greek *pente*, Welsh *þymp* and *þump*, and German *funf*; closely related to the original is the

Urdu *panch*, with the *q* aspirated to *ch*. Similarly, for the number 4 there are the Latin *quattuor* and Urdu *char*, in contrast to the Welsh *pedair*. From the language it has been said that 'we find in them much that is to be found in their descendants—the love of parents and children, the closeness of family ties, the protection of life and property, the maintenance of law and order, and a great reverence for God. Also, they were well versed in the arts of life—they built houses, formed villages or towns, made roads, cultivated the soil, raised great herds of cattle and other animals; they made boats and land-carriages, worked in metals for use and ornament, carried on trade with each other, knew how to count, and were able to divide their time so as to reckon by months and days as well as by seasons. Besides all this, they had something more and of still higher value, for the fragments of their ancient poems preserved in the Hindu and Persian sacred books show that they looked upon sin as an evil to be punished or forgiven by the gods, that they believed in a life after the death of the body, and that they had a strong feeling for natural beauty and a love of searching



into the wonders of the earth and of the heavens.'

There is also probably much yet to be learnt from a study of the river names in the lands whence the peoples are believed to have sprung, because names of rivers are often kept even though the language of the people changes. Two examples may show the kind of similarities to be found. The river Thames in England, originally *Tamesa*, has the same name as the Sanskrit *Tamasa* that runs into the Ganges, the name meaning dark water; that root also appears in the Lithuanian *tamsus* meaning dark. Again, the river *Stour* in England comes from a Celtic *Staur* (meaning strong, powerful), which is similar to the Sanskrit *sthura*, and has the same root as the Greek *stauros*, Latin *stauro*, Lett *sturs*, and Scandinavian *staurr*.

Fairy stories, though, are a more attractive interest, representing tales that have been handed down from mother to child for five thousand years or more. Among them legends and real persons are mingled with old religious beliefs, ones that have become outworn but are still cherished for their memories of childhood. The story of the girl in

a red cloak ("Red Riding-hood") who is swallowed by a wolf, which is eventually killed by a huntsman, corresponds to the Indian story of the dragon that tries to swallow the sun, and is killed by Indra; it is the mythological picture of night swallowing the day at sunset, and eventually being overcome by the sun at dawn. The story of the girl who dropped her shoe ("Cinderella"), which was picked up by a prince, who married her, has its counterpart in India and ancient Greece, and many other countries today; it is the story of day being kept away from the sun by clouds or by night, and of its eventually being found. But mythological tales are too apt to be interpreted as sun-myths; not all the explanations met with in books can be taken at their face value. Most of the stories are probably many tales woven into one, containing a number of different elements, some being traditions of real heroes, some being myth, but having certain common features; thus the girl who let three drops of oil from her lamp fall on to her sleeping lover figures in the Greek story of Eros and Psyche, and in the Scandinavian story of the Land east of the Sun and west of the Moon,

both of which are related to the Indian story of Urvasi and Pururavas, and to the Gælic one of the Battle of the Birds. The yearly awakening of spring after winter is one of such themes; while "Jack the Giant Killer", perhaps symbolising the Wind, is very widespread, even appearing in Tartar stories. From these interpretations it can be seen that they carry the history of the peoples back to a time when their minds used to wonder at but could not understand nature; and they deserve investigation as perhaps forming a way to the identification of the land where they were first told.

Theology also retains evidence of their common source. The very name of the Supreme Being was common to all—*Dyaus Pitar* in Sanskrit, *Deus Pater* in Latin which became contracted into *Juppiter*, similarly *Zeus Pater* in Greek, *Dieu* in French, and *Du-w* in Ancient British; these came from a root word expressing light, which stood properly for mental light, or truth, symbolised in the physical light of the sun. Another original name is the one that appears in Indian as *Varuna* "The All-Surrounder" and in Greek as *Ouranos* "The

Heavens"; also there are the Greek *Daphne* and the Indian *Dahana*, and the Greek *Athena* and Indian *Ahana*. The great emblem of reverence was the Bull, still so regarded in India; it has left its mark all over the Middle East, in the names Tauric Chersonese and the Mino-Taur of Crete, and as the religious emblem of Persia, Assyria, Britain and Gaul, whose horns are still treated universally as a sign of "luck" in their representation by an inverted horseshoe. From the astronomical relation between the constellation of Taurus and the sun at dawn, at the equinox, it has been calculated that this emblem is likely to have been first adopted some six thousand years ago, a figure which gives an indication of the date of the period before the Aryan migrations set out east and west.

All of these resemblances go to show the extent to which traces of their common origin survive among the present-day Aryan peoples; and it is contended in this essay that much of their original mode of thought also survives. But it is not suggested that it is peculiar to them alone; on the other hand it is shared by many others today, and may well have had its origin at an earlier stage

in human evolution than when those peoples spread. The ideas are capable of universal application; but whereas some races have chosen to combat them the Aryan stocks have upheld them, and in spite of vicissitudes have developed them both in the East and in the West, along different lines because of differing circumstances, but with none the less a common fundamental character. When these ideas are examined one by one, it may be perhaps that the things which really matter in life take shape in a very simple form.

## The Idea of Predominance of Mind

First and foremost in this philosophy is the idea that matter should be ruled by mind; and over this it comes into close contact with religion,—religion teaching that the Divinity acts through the mind, philosophy holding similarly that the mind ought to be obeyed. Thus all the past Aryan beliefs have identified the Deity with the mind, which is only a degree removed from present beliefs that it is the Power behind the mind. All will recognise the thought expressed in the Roman Virgil's lines :—

In the beginning the earth, and the  
  sky and spaces of night  
Feed on an inward life, and with all  
  things mingled a Mind  
Moves universal matter, with Nature's  
  frame is combined.

Similarly the old British Druids held that there was a Supreme Being whose essence was pure mind. But the place that British Druidism fills in history needs special remark,

for it is subject to common misconception; it was the very reverse of its popular picture—savagery—it was a philosophy of a highly moral order, and existed in Britain in a purer form than it did on the continent: it was, in fact, almost the uncontaminated original Aryan philosophy, from which many of our present ideas are derived. Likewise the old Indian belief taught that the pure mind or soul is Divine but is marred by its union with matter, and that life should be governed by the purer part of the mind. Over this, perhaps it will be agreed, there is nothing controversial; it is the fundamental idea common to all.

Today this regard for action being governed by the mind appears in such characteristics as the desire for settling disagreements by discussion and by conference, and as the respect paid to logical arguments; but it is over "logic" where a great fallacy exists, for its literal meaning is no more than "talking", and the same people who affect to prefer common sense to logic are those very ones who have evolved the system of "parliament", which has that identical meaning. In truth most men respect rational

discussion ; and if logic may be unpalatable in one form (involving harder thinking), it is none the less demanded in another, with the simple aim that affairs shall be governed by sense.

But if the radical unity of character in thought between East and West is to be appreciated, two steps are needed ; first the current influences that distort their real nature require candid recognition, and secondly the common origin of their moral ideas should be recognised, for they are an inheritance, even if a neglected one, and not a recent acquisition. As regards the West, it is suffering from materialism, although underneath the surface better motives may be operating. Materialism is a tendency that has spread ever since the discovery of machinery gave man a greater control over the forces of nature ; and so, growth of mind is apt to be sacrificed to material gain, machines are used for financial profit instead of for relieving drudgery, individual ability is supplanted by mechanically controlled production, individual constructive thought is replaced by mass organisation, initiative is being deadened. A Western writer has said,



'Mass—that would appear to be the last word, as yet, of the twentieth century ; flat masses in decorative art, massive volumes in realism ; combines in capital, amalgamations in labour organisation ; mass formations in warfare, mob law in politics. But opposed to the stolid movement and fickle opinion of the big battalions, there stands inflexibly the individuality of the thinker. He goes on his way slowly evolving law and order out of the chaos around him, but observe, he frames laws for himself only and orders no man. He is all for precision, definition, and clarity ; he knows exactly what is right for himself, but he disclaims all pretension to prescribe what is right for others. Each must find out for himself, each must work out his own rules, each has complete liberty within himself ; and without, he is also free to do as he thinks fit, provided only that he does not interfere with the equal liberty of others.' This is but a single instance, yet perhaps it is that the pendulum is beginning to swing back, and man's mind will come more into its own again. As regards the East, in Western eyes it is a prey to inertia ; thought ends in contemplation, and lacks the energy

needed to turn it into concrete endeavour. An Indian writer has stated the same impression—'India is no longer playing her historic role as the vanguard of higher knowledge in Asia. Philosophy became confused with the history of philosophy when the creative spirit had left her. It abdicated its function and remained wrapped up in its illusions. Today tradition has become fluid again, and while some thinkers are busy rebuilding the house on ancient foundations others want to remove the foundations altogether; the present age of transition is as full of interest as anxiety.' Yet if there is any truth in the present essay the old foundations are surely sound. And the same writer remarks the very essence of this essay, 'the spirit of man craves not comfort but happiness'; which is to say, it finds happiness not in material luxury but in the contentment that comes from the mind. Surely at heart both Eastern and Western peoples are one in their aim over this. But it is a contentment which comes from achievement rather than from contemplation; as a man once wrote



character of Destroyer is one of disintegration for the purpose of re-integration). Similarly in the early British belief the Supreme Being had three aspects—Beli the Creator, Taran the Saviour and Yesu the Renovator; nor is it possible to disregard the resemblance of the present Western belief in a Father the Creator, a Son the Saviour, and the Voice of Jesus (Yeshu) in heaven which said 'Behold I make all things new.' In so doing it is worth pondering over the dim British tradition of the parentage of Christianity. Moreover the resemblance between the incarnation and virgin birth of the Second Person of the Indian Trinity in Krishna, with the incarnation and virgin birth of the Second Person of the Christian Trinity, coupled with the fact that the early Christians found the veneration of a Virgin already in existence in Gaul, these indications all point to a common association with some very old Aryan idea; nor does the association with an earlier idea detract from the value of the religious teachings, on the other hand its common survival seems to evidence the inherent goodness of the ethical thought that has been spread with the mystery of the

Incarnation. For it is only with the conduct of life, and without discussion of the supernatural, that this essay is concerned; and it is enough to recognise that both the Indian Vishnu and the Christian Saviour have the same attribute of Love or Kindliness towards one's fellow creatures, and that this outlook figures in all the religions developed from the original belief, and can therefore be held to be part of the peoples' philosophy of life. And as regards Islam the same ethics are evidenced, in magnificent wording—'Every Moslem who clothes the naked will be clothed by God in the green robes of Paradise.' The idea of kindness is not one of creed but of universal philosophy. The same idea has given rise to the conception of a "gentleman"—one which does not depend upon position or wealth, but which stands for a man who is gentle towards other persons' feelings, who prefers 'to hurt nobody by word or deed.' The foregoing may show that the ideal of kindness has a common and very remote origin; but history shows that its practical application, as well as that of other ideals, is too open to abuse by unscrupulous men, and that if it is to be

acted upon by some then it must receive reciprocal respect from all—

The rain it raineth every day, upon  
   the just and unjust feller ;  
 But chiefly on the just, because, the  
   unjust steals the just's umbrella.

The more the philosophy of the Aryan peoples is studied, the more apparent does it become that their ideals are directed towards gaining themselves a state of peace of mind, under which Thought can develop and perfect itself. The ideal of all mankind being kindly disposed towards each other, with its thoughts free from being absorbed in strife, and such ideas as compromise over conflicting aims, readiness to practise honesty in spite of poverty, readiness to fulfil a promise, the appreciation of impartial justice by wrong-doers, all of these indicate a preference for contentment of mind in contrast to the satisfaction given by material success. It is confirmed by the etymological fact that words derived from a common Aryan language relate to peace, words relating to war having been borrowed from foreign tongues. That its object is advancement of thought and moral perfection is a suggestion,

which has been inferred partly from the fact that the course of history shows progress to be taking place, and partly from the fact that all religions teach perfection as the Divine purpose in life. Nor does the belief that the object is inspired by the Supreme Being alter its position as the everyday philosophy of life. There is a noticeable trait in many men's character, that when appointed to a position of responsibility, no matter how small, they endeavour to leave it in a better condition than as they found it; sometimes it appears as improvement in material conditions, sometimes in morality, yet in each it is an idea of progress; and its presence or absence seems to mark the dividing line between those fit to be given authority, men who will exercise constructive thought, and those only fitted to follow. Peace and progress seem to characterise the aims of the Aryan peoples, tempered by the recognition that all men are not equally scrupulous; hence the watchword of a very practical leader of men—'Trust in God, and keep your powder dry.'

## The Idea of Freedom

The first outcome of the idea of predominance of mind is for each individual to desire complete freedom, in which he can follow out his own thoughts and direct his own affairs. Similarly small groups of people—unions, cities, states and countries—desire to be free of restraint, and one of the most marked characteristics of the Aryan peoples is their craving for independence. But in a world of limited space, and with distance being steadily diminished by science, the ideal of absolute independence has to give place to the idea of comparative freedom, and the problem becomes one of how to give the individual the greatest degree of freedom without his interfering with the equal rights of others.

Time and again in history endeavours have been made to solve the problem, and the tale is one of almost continual failure; but singularly enough it has always been the peoples who have voiced their desire for



freedom most loudly that have been those to lose it most easily; they have fallen into disunity, and under the rule of others. The Greek city-states failed to work together for a common cause; the Britons in the face of the Romans, the Scottish clans, the Celtic peoples (including the Belgians and Dutch today) have constantly failed to unite of their own accord; and the princes of Northern India in the face of both Greeks and Turks showed the same disunity. And yet it is equally noticeable that those same peoples under foreign rule, as for instance Britain under Norman rule, have lived contentedly and flourished under the unity given by outside influence. Not that the lesson is that outside rule is needed; the true lesson is that inside discipline has been lacking, and that its remedy could come from within if the people so willed.

Again, looking at these failures in retrospect, in the unprejudiced light of history, it cannot but be noticed how trivial the causes now seem, and what petty disagreements brought about the disunity that lost the peoples their real object. In each instance the failure has come about through

ill-judgment, the local need has been deemed of more importance than the national. And it becomes apparent that to a greater or less degree, according to the circumstances of the moment, all peoples must submit to some sort of authority, so as to gain them the strength for self-defence that lies in unity. From the gradual recognition of this lesson has grown the experiment, now being tested, of an association of peoples working together for the common weal; for those peoples whose mode of thought is alike there will always be a common cause, provided only that they can recognise it. Such is the teaching of history on the idea of freedom: past failures have come about through faulty judgment; consequently, if progress is to be made, the faculty for good judgment will need to be trained, so that a free choice will be exercised aright, and will be made from the individual's or people's own internal knowledge and good sense, not from outside influence. Future history will be made or marred accordingly. Reading between the lines this seems to be the philosophy of the Aryan peoples.

## The Idea of Government

All peoples having necessarily to be subject to some sort of authority, the problem arises as to how the system of government should be conducted, so that the least restraint may be imposed in general. It seems right to assume that the "least" is what is accepted as such by the general consensus of opinion; but history has shown a quantity of difficulties, still unsolved, in the method of assessing opinion. The regard paid to mind certainly postulates that all persons who contribute to the State should have a voice in its management—'what touches all should receive the consent of all' is a principle enunciated centuries ago; yet the amount of voice they should exercise seems from past experience to need qualifying by the natural facts that all men's opinions are not of equal value, and that many men have not the opportunity for giving considered thought to every subject of government. Part of the problem, therefore,

is how to bring the best sense the State possesses on to deciding its affairs.

At one time the best sense was sought for in the rich, because the poor were uneducated, a condition which is happily ceasing to exist; then the idea of the best was abandoned, and only the majority opinion was sought; time has shown this to be a still far from perfect system, in that matters which need a knowledgeable opinion are apt to receive an ill-judged one. Moreover there are several fallacies about present-day systems which prejudice the general view. In the first place, where political parties obtain, the defeated party in any constituency get no representation at all; in the second place, unless constituencies are of equal size it is possible for an actual minority of voters to command a majority of elected members, the converse of a majority opinion; thirdly, when ministers are chosen from the elected members it is possible for some of the more competent men not to be available, because they have failed to secure election, the converse of government by the best persons. Thus, using the British parliamentary system as an illustration, what

passes for government by selected ministers representing a majority opinion, is in actual practice government by a partially represented opinion, with much good talent discarded ; but, as people appear to be more or less satisfied with it, the conclusion is suggested that many people are content not to voice their opinion, provided that those in authority interpret it correctly and act in accordance with their interests. This appears to have been the real difficulty against which the many systems of government tried out in history have stumbled, the difficulty of ensuring that authority understands and acts in the interests of the governed, it seems to come from the human failing of few men being altruistically enough minded to wield power ; too often the possession of a little brief authority seems to engender high-handedness and discontent.

Two and a half thousand years ago, one of the Aryan peoples, the Greeks, developed the idea that the rulers should be the servants of the people ; before qualifying for an appointment of authority they had to renounce their worldly wealth, they had to live frugally and even austerely, and they had

to undergo a special training. Their college was known as the Academy; yet such is the perversity of human nature that the institution, which was founded for teaching a more practical endeavour than the world has since seen, has only succeeded in leaving its name to a term generally interpreted as "unpractical", the word "academic". That experiment failed through internal dissension in the State; neither were the people in general sufficiently public-spirited to accept the sacrifice of sectional interests, nor was the ruler ready to set the supreme example. None the less it marks the genesis of the idea.

As far as can be seen entirely unconnected with the early attempt, the same idea reappeared among another Aryan people six hundred years ago. At a time when the national spirit was being roused, the King of England adopted the motto "I serve" as indicating his conception of his duty to be the service of his people; the conception was carried a stage further by his heir, who made use of two emblems, one design included this motto which he called his "shield of peace", the other consisted of the designs he

always wore in battle; the implication is that he led his people in war, but served them during peace. Historians, however, have not always managed to recognise the underlying spirit of the time when this idea took shape, for the particular king is commonly believed to have been serving his own ambitions; yet a contemporary French historian saw the real relation between king and people 'the King of England must needs obey his people and do all their will.' Today that conception of kingship is more in evidence than ever, and the King's authority is revered accordingly, for he is the one man who by his position is free from party interests, and who is able not to obey but to serve the people's will, by ensuring that it is interpreted to him correctly by his ministers.

At the time that the King of England adopted the motto "I serve" it was also adopted by the great officers of State, though during the internal dissensions which set in shortly afterwards it became forgotten. The existence of the practice can still be traced; and it gives the conviction that the idea is inborn to the people, and is not a fashion

of any particular era ; but it is an idea which is only in embryo. Two recent instances in which it figures will be quoted : a century ago a British statesman held it unflinchingly, forfeiting his office and temporarily his popularity to a wave of opinion that wished him to serve lesser motives ; again, within the last year it has been reasserted, in a parliamentary rebuke to the suggestion that a minister was originating ideas—those measures, it was replied, had not sprung from the minister's will alone, ' they represented the will of people of this country expressed in Parliament, of which the minister was an instrument.'

The foregoing illustrations relate to two countries only, but it is suggested that they enjoy a wider appreciation, and that they represent a common philosophical idea, though one which is only in the process of development ; it is the idea that those in authority should serve rather than govern. Whether it is practicable or not is yet to be discovered ; history shows that so far the people being governed have themselves failed to live up to that standard of leadership ; for the altruism needed in the leaders calls for a



reciprocal altruism in the led, and people have to be ready, when the occasion necessitates it, to renounce cherished opinions and ambitions, and to submit themselves to the better judgment of others. Partly it is true that the original Greek conception of public servants trained to a scholarly knowledge of their task, and to entirely selfless characters, has never yet been put into practice; but equally so is it true that many persons are not inclined to admit they lack the degree of knowledge or training required for a sound judgment, and to recognise that in opinions on some affairs other men are their betters. It is an ideal of humility in opinion which has yet to be reached by men in general before it can become a practical proposition. All that can be said at the present time is that it is an idea which appears to be taking shape, and which is accepted in time of stress, but which is let slide in the happier times of peace; over a choice in government the good is prone to be "right but revolting" and the less good "wrong but romantic", and is there any one of us who has not a romantic imagination, even if only applied to an income-tax return?

If, therefore, history has been interpreted here aright (and its interpretation can only be a matter of opinion), the philosophy of the Aryan peoples as regards government is that all people have to be subject to some sort of authority, that all men who contribute to the State should have a voice in its management, that authority needs to be entrusted to men who will act entirely selflessly, that the duty of those in authority is to serve the best interests of the governed, and that the governed must be ready to sacrifice their personal or sectional interests for what is judged to be best for the common weal. Such is the ideal, but its practical application depends upon a criterion being found for goodness in judgment, which seems to postulate that judgment must be governed by reason.

## The Idea of Opinion Being Governed by Reason

Few will deny it is a philosophical ideal for authority to depend upon reason, and few will not recognise the great peril accompanying the idea. Yet, if as has been suggested it is natural to the Aryan peoples, then it will in the course of time inevitably come into effect; and so it is a peril to be faced, not one to be evaded. Moreover, all men are likely to be more content during the process of its evolution if they can appreciate the natural course it may be taking. Human nature being very much the same now as ever, the following account (quoted from a recent work) of what took place among one of the Aryan peoples two and a half thousand years ago, on the shores of the Mediterranean, may serve as a guide to our own times. Both the names of the man and of the country they refer to are omitted in order to avoid any preconceived opinion.

'*The man* was a citizen of respectable family and like all citizens of *that state*, spent a considerable amount of time on active service, and on two occasions at least we hear of his courage on the field of battle. But the first forty years of his life were otherwise uneventful. To understand the mission to which he from now on devoted his life we must consider the effect of the political and social upheavals of the previous hundred years upon the life of the individual citizen. The democratic revolution had shaken morality and religion to their very foundations. Not only in *the particular state*, but in sister states all over the *then known world*, the destruction of aristocratic authority had brought with it a freedom of spirit new in the history of mankind, a distrust of authority not only in the political but in the religious sphere, and a reliance on human reason as the only proper instrument for the solution of every problem..... Since reason and intelligence were now the standards by which worth was measured, the aristocrat and priest could be treated as ordinary men and judged on their merits. In future no one's opinion should carry extra weight

because of his family tree or social position or holy office. Thus the cult of reason developed into an individualist and equalitarian philosophy, which threatened to break up the whole fabric of society. Where each man is as good as his neighbour, political parties are inevitable; and *the city of that people* became a whirlpool of political intrigue. Where there are political parties there must be propaganda; and rhetoric and oratory became essential to the citizen of a democracy who wanted to compete for social or economic or political success. Where rhetoric is supreme, the decision of the law courts will be swayed by brilliant argument and appeals to the emotions; and so in the law courts it was persuasion, not truth, which prevailed. A policy, a point of view, a moral principle or a religion came to be valued not for its truth, but for its popular appeal, just as the goodness of an article in modern life is sometimes assessed by its sales. In the end the substitution of reason for tradition as the supreme criterion produced not freedom for the individual, as had been hoped, but power for the few individuals who were skilled in the arts of salesmanship.

'*The man*' was deeply perturbed by the people's complacency at the destruction of the old aristocratic religion and morality. He saw that intellectual freedom degenerates into mere licence unless the free individual voluntarily subjects himself to a new rational discipline. The old aristocratic order had imposed a discipline and an education upon the citizen. It had trained him for war and given him a rigid standard of right and wrong. It had provided an education, though not a rational one. Inevitably, therefore, the age of reason must develop a rational system of education, if it was to bring happiness and not misery to men. The man called the new education of which he dreamed **philosophy**—the search for wisdom. The state must be taught not to accept traditional morality, but to discover rational principles of conduct and to base its social life upon them. The old education had consisted in putting into the minds of the young the orthodox ideas about right and wrong: the new philosophy would try to develop the individual reason in each man so that he only accepted those ideas which he saw to be true, and so that he rejected all wickedness, not from fear of

punishment but because he understood its folly. Thus philosophy, according to its founder, must be the self-discipline of reason. .... 'Philosophical discipline is never popular, it is indeed the most exasperating torture to which the human mind can be subjected. It hunts out our dearest prejudices and shows that they have no rational foundations, and it exposes what we thought to be a logical theory as a mass of contradictions. Although it is directed to the development of the individual, it does not satisfy our ordinary ideas of self-realisation since it calls on each of us to relegate most of his personal interests to second place. It does not press for the free development of individual tastes, but demands that the individual should voluntarily regulate his life by the dictates of reason. *The man* believed that this discipline alone could save the democracy from collapse. Now that the bonds of tradition had been broken, the individual citizen must forge for himself the new morality. And education must be concerned to produce that change of heart which was necessary if he was to be willing to undertake these great responsibilities. For

this reason he was as much opposed to the type of culture and education which *a certain sect* were popularising, as he was to the point of view of the ordinary uneducated business man. He saw that education and intellectual training can be used for purely materialistic ends. Men can be naturally clever and highly educated, and yet totally unphilosophic. They can allow reason to be the slave of their passions, or of other peoples' passions: and education can be merely a useful weapon in the class struggle. He believed that the teaching provided by *that sect* was little better than this. It gave to men techniques for getting what they wanted, and *that sect* were interested not in the spiritual health of their pupils but in providing something useful for which people were prepared to pay. He agreed with the conservatives that such education was no substitute for the old-fashioned discipline of the aristocratic state. It put new power into the hands of the intellectual, but it gave him no principles for the use of that power. For this reason it produced a reckless individualism and disregard for the good of the community. Once the restraints of morality



and religion had been destroyed, the individual citizen was free to do as he pleased ; and education was merely embittering the class struggle instead of healing it. This, in his view, was the disease from which the democracy was suffering. Class conflict and imperialism were the results of a *laissez-faire* philosophy of individual licence ; and if reason could not produce a new self-discipline, then the belief that right is might would rule in the state.' The state was Athens, and the man was Socrates.\*

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\* " *Plato Today* " by Crossman.

## The Ideas of Selflessness and Fair Judgment

The same words might well be true of today; many must realise that what passes for reason is only oratorically swayed fancy, and that popular opinion is far from appreciating the cold impartiality of logical analysis. Today also, unless people as a whole, great and small, rich and poor, alike will be ready to discipline their opinions and to sacrifice pleasant illusions that cannot stand scrutiny, power will rule instead of mind, and authority will need force to maintain itself instead of sense. There are many signs, though, that the Aryan peoples are ready to discipline their opinions; the idea of impartial justice in law courts is strong, even if its realisation is imperfect; the idea of games being judged by an impartial umpire, and even of international disputes being so treated, is spreading—it is summed up in the words "fair play". Arbitration, round-table conferences, jury law, and the old Indian

system of panchaiyat, all evidence the readiness of men to defer their opinions to the judgment of their fellows, provided it be given fairly. But it is at this point where idealism and practical possibility tend to diverge; for it cannot be said that all men have an equal sense of impartiality; the degree of justice running in various countries represents the degree to which fair judgment is demanded, and the extent to which people in general are ready to sacrifice their personal interests. The standard of material justice met with in the law courts is identical with the standard of political justice that the people are competent to produce, sacrifice of material interests in the one corresponding to the sacrifice of social interests in the other. Yet a readiness for self-sacrifice is repeatedly seen in various forms: Spartan simplicity, religious asceticism, puritanical simplicity, the military discipline and the ethical discipline that periodically appear among peoples in times of stress, all indicate the presence of a spirit of selflessness, sometimes prominent, sometimes allowed to lapse, but latent none the less.

Yet even if it can be said of some, can it

equally be said of all the Aryan peoples that they are sufficiently imbued with the idea of selflessness as to govern their own internal affairs by impartial reason, and also their external affairs? When the present-day domestic affairs of Germany, an Aryan people, are viewed, and the assaults by her upon weaker neighbours, as well as the parallel behaviour of other nations in recent years, may it not be that such selflessness is with some only an ideal, and not a strong enough practical intention as to be fulfilled in everyday life? Again, do the people of India as a whole insist upon an absence of self-interest in public men, or do they condone a little personal advantage; may it not be that the incomplete selflessness which proved the ruin of the Greek attempt to govern by reason may also prove the ruin of this country? The answer seems to be that appearances cannot be taken at their face value, and that human nature must be looked into more deeply if its real character is to be recognised; it may well be that outside appearances are disturbing, but there also may be better motives within; if the distracting influences are understood perhaps

they will be lessened, and the better motives be fostered.

At the root of the apparent contradiction seems to be the dual basis in the conduct of life that has been made the subject of an essay by Sir Herbert Samuel ; each one of us has two natural lines of thought, self-interest and altruism ; in some persons the one thought sways, in others the latter is predominant. And life has to be regulated to serve both. As regards the German people they are certainly fighting for self-interest, yet many persons could not condemn them out of hand for doing so ; up to a point self-interest has got to be served. But when the present struggle is seen, not as an isolated event, but as one of a series of events in history, the particular trait in the people that causes the violence can be recognised ; and as that trait exists in all men to a greater or less degree, there is a lesson to be learned in that it entirely forbids a system of government by reason. A century and a quarter ago the same problem of the future of Poland was faced by England, Prussia and Russia ; England wished its integrity to be preserved ; the other two bickered over its division

between them. Finally the Czar laid his hand on the map, over it, and said—'with 600,000 men there is no need for me to argue much.' If that same trait has reasserted itself among those same two nations, and each with a changed system of government, there is good reason to suggest it is engrained in the people, and that it has a common origin. And so, it is here suggested that it is an inheritance from their Tartar forefathers; it is the old Hun character of violent seizure accompanied by terrorism, which is overlying the natural Aryan character of peacefulness and sense. From the Prussians that trait has been copied by other Germans, yet it is foreign to them. Force is now needed to subdue the temptation for seizure by force, and to let the better fundamental character rule; the self-discipline that is natural to the German peoples could produce a united effort in rational conduct just as well as it does for violent conduct, if the predatory streak were quelled. Scientific progress and physical power, it can be seen, do not alone constitute a basis for good government; the self-denial which will prevent an abuse of that power is its necessary

accompaniment.

The foregoing may perhaps serve to explain one apparent contradiction to the contention of this essay, that an idea of selfless behaviour is part of the Aryan philosophy of life; but it shows also the difficulties to be surmounted before the idea can take concrete shape as a practical part in everyday life, engrained habits having to be discarded, and morality having to be supported by armed force. Sceptics also may well doubt whether the materialism which at present characterises Western peoples, and which is spreading to the East, will ever be reconciled to selfless motives. Looking back through history, though, it seems that the true inclinations of the peoples, ordinarily inert and only showing themselves at a crisis, are nevertheless often simmering ready to be stirred; it seems that during quiet times, in the happier disinterestedness of peace, people acquiesce in a good deal of what they in their hearts resent. Much is to be learned from the character study of past leaders in history, for the leaders reflect the character of the people, both the failings that are tolerated and the better motives demanded at a crisis.

And in the changes of leadership made under times of stress are mirrored the very weaknesses which the people need to guard against in themselves. But the study has to be made in past history, at dates sufficiently far removed as to be uncoloured by prejudices of current feelings.

It is noticeable how often public men who have been chosen in quiet times fail in times of crisis; their judgment which had been relied upon for everyday decisions too often is found at fault over making one of moment; and the question needs answer as to what is it in the judgment that attracts normally but which lacks the inherent soundness needed in the extreme. How is it that so many a peace-time idol proves only to have feet of clay; and conversely, what is it that is normally inconspicuous but which fundamentally is of real worth? It seems that there is a connection between selflessness and clearness of judgment, and that the man who is inclined to self-indulgence of any description, even of opinion, is not to be relied upon for clear judgment in impersonal affairs; the same whims that cause indulgence in one direction, are liable to warp his



perspective in another. For instance, the man who is unscrupulous in his behaviour towards women may be excellent on a field of battle, carrying everything before him with a high-handed determination ; but is he to be relied upon in the council chamber, when delicate inter-allied susceptibilities are at stake, or when public opinion is shouting for reassurance by a spectacular victory ; is he the man to preserve a dispassionate even-balanced course, and to reassure allied misapprehensions, and to ignore the clamours of a sensational press ? In peace, untried, a cavalier character is more likely to be chosen than a cautious one ; the right but revolting will not seem forceful enough in comparison with the brilliance of the wrong but romantic. If it is correct to suggest that lack of a wholly selfless unconcern has lain at the root of faulty leadership in history, then those same failings in human nature need to be guarded against today, by the people in their choice of representatives ; for the more that history is read, the less does human nature seem to alter.

But selflessness is still further connected with clear judgment ; not only have the pros

and cons of a proposition to be weighed impartially, but in the first place there is required the knowledge of what are all the considerations involved. Gaining knowledge is a laborious process, and accuracy is tedious; the greater part of mankind is happier to judge on superficial knowledge, and to spend its time more sociably than in study, hence a considerable amount of unselfishness is needed if real knowledge is to be sought or the absence of it to be confessed. Once again, the wrong but romantic kind of judgment will generally be the popular one; and even though the idea of fair judgment is held to be part of the peoples' philosophy, it must be conceded that they have a long way yet to travel before real knowledge and a real recognition of what is prejudice or what is a whim have been reached by the people as a whole. Nor until such a stage has been reached will government by reason become a wholly practicable ideal.

None the less it is believed that the ideals of authority being founded upon reason, and of officials and people being guided by impartial judgment, and of all men sacrificing their personal interests and opinions to a degree

that will best serve the common good, is a part of the philosophy of all the Aryan peoples. It is a belief that comes from the history of their past and from an examination of their present-day tendencies. Each person will see the practical possibility of accomplishing it in a different light, judging the degree according to his own outlook upon life. And the strength of purpose among the people will be gauged from the general measure with which they observe all moral and selfless conceptions, such as honesty, generosity and integrity.

## Conclusion

If the teachings of history have been read aright in this attempt at an outline of the subject, it seems that there do in reality exist among the various Aryan peoples the seeds of a common philosophy of life. This philosophy must have been in existence among them some five thousand years or more ago, and has accompanied the peoples eastwards and westwards in their vicissitudes, and has undergone varying developments according to the influences of other peoples with whom they have come into contact. At the root of it is regard for the mind, and a readiness to be ruled by judgments of the mind rather than by brute force. This fundamental outlook is now being challenged to uphold itself against the might of scientifically controlled power; and if it is to survive it needs to be understood, as being the common cause for which all effort needs uniting to preserve. It is a simple philosophy, comprising a yearn for freedom coupled with an acknowledgement

of authority, and an endeavour to govern public affairs by reason coupled with the recognition that reason entails self-sacrifice; it is a reconciliation between personal wishes and the needs of others, and has as its aim the contentment which is found in peace of mind. Part of it has been summed up as a man's duty towards his fellow beings—'To do unto all men as I would they should do unto me. To love, honour and succour my father and mother. To honour and obey the King, and all that are put in authority under him. To submit myself to all my governors, teachers, spiritual pastors and masters. To order myself lowly and reverently to all my betters. To hurt nobody by word or deed. To be true and just in all my dealings. To bear no malice nor hatred in my heart. To keep my hands from picking and stealing, and my tongue from evil speaking, lying and slandering. To keep my body in temperance, soberness and chastity. Not to covet nor desire other men's goods, but to learn and labour truly to get mine own living, and to do my duty in that state of life unto which it shall please God to call me.'



