Social Science in Pakistan in the 1990s

Edited by

S. Akbar Zaidi

Council of Social Sciences,
Pakistan

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Preface

Since the emergence of Pakistan, the number of disciplines that fall under the general rubric of the social sciences has significantly increased along with the number of departments of social science in public universities and the number of teachers who teach these subjects. There are a series of crucial questions that are raised by this increase which most Pakistani social scientists have not raised or attempted to answer. These questions include: has the increase in social science departments and teachers been accompanied by a qualitative change in these disciplines? To what extent have they absorbed the ethos of science? To what degree have they developed an interdisciplinary orientation? And, how much of their development or otherwise have been shaped by society, culture, and the state?

The Faculty of Social Sciences of the Quaid-e-Azam University made the first modest attempt in 1988 in this direction. It organised a conference to discuss some of these questions. The papers presented in the conference were edited by S. A. Hashmi and were published in 1989 under the title of *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan.*

Since its emergence in June 2000, the Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan, has been pursuing these questions and reprinting and producing literature that continues to raise and answer them. First, it reprinted Hashmi's edited book and distributed it widely in the academia. Then in 2002 it published a monograph by S. Akbar Zaidi *The Dismal State of The Social Sciences in Pakistan*. Now in this series, the Council is publishing the present volume, *Social Science in Pakistan in the 1990s.*

In addition, the Council has launched a major research project in this field. Twenty papers are under preparation covering the study of individual social science disciplines as well as the overall movement of the social sciences in Pakistan, and six papers on "The State of Professional Associations of Six Social Science Disciplines". The Council has also collected data on PhD and MPhil theses produced by several public universities since their establishment. It has also collected data on the quantitative development of social sciences from 1963, the year the first *Handbook of Universities* was published, up to 2001. This data is being processed for publication.

COSS is grateful to the authors of these essays for their permission to reprint them. It is especially grateful to the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics and its Director, Dr. A. R. Kemal, for allowing it to reprint three essays on research and teaching of economics originally published in *Pakistan Development Review*. COSS is indebted to S. Akbar Zaidi who undertook the time consuming task of editing this book on a voluntary basis. COSS is also grateful to the local office of UNESCO and its Resident Representative Ms. Ingeborg Breines for providing it funds for meeting the cost of printing the book.

Inayatullah

COSS President
20 June, 2003

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Introduction

S Akbar Zaidi

This collection of articles published by the Council of Social Sciences (COSS), Pakistan, is the second volume of collected papers on the state of the social sciences, brought out by the Council. The first collection published in 2001, was a 1989 reprint of a book first published by the Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, entitled, *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan*, edited by S H Hashmi, which was based on a conference organised by the Quaid-e-Azam University, the Centre for the Study of Central Asian Civilisations (at the University) and the University Grants Commission, which took place in May 1988. Our collection, is based on articles which examine the state of the social sciences in Pakistan, and have all been written or published since the May 1988 conference in Islamabad, up to around the middle of 2002. In this series, COSS has also commissioned a third volume, which will take a far more detailed analysis of developments in a large number of disciplines between the period 1985-2003, which it hopes will be ready for publication in late 2003.

With the exception of only one article, the papers in this current volume have all been published previously. The purpose of bringing out this volume was to bring together collectively, under one cover, all such papers which had been published on the social sciences since the end of the 1980s. While COSS had thought of commissioning new articles for its third volume in the series to analyse the state of the social sciences fifteen years on, it felt that it ought also to close the gap between the first and the third volume by publishing previously published articles which had been written by their authors for varied purposes. This collection is meant to do that.

The first paper in this collection by Inayatullah, is a substantially revised and shortened version of the paper which appeared as Chapter 1 in the Hashmi volume in 1989. This paper forms a link between the earlier and present volumes and once again raises numerous issues which were pertinent in the late 1980s. The fact that many have still not been addressed fifteen years later, reflects rather sadly on how little many of the core issues in the social sciences in Pakistan have evolved. Since this is a paper written largely towards the end of the 1980s, it locates many of the problems which even today face Pakistan's social sciences, in the intrusive role that the state played in the 1977-88 period, damaging a key area of social and intellectual development.

The next three chapters of our volume, were all published in the *Pakistan Development Review* published from Islamabad by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, and were first presented at the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists in 1998. All

three deal with the discipline of economics and with the profession of economists. Economists in Pakistan (as in other countries, in India, for example), out-number most other disciplines in the social sciences, by a substantial number. They are considered to have higher public profiles, to have far more lucrative positions, to be invited by government and donors for advice and consultation, and a host of other distinguishing features, to the chagrin of other social sciences. These three papers, by well known economists, are an 'internal critique' or evaluation about their own discipline.

S M Naseem's first paper is an expansive review of the history of the development of the economics profession in Pakistan, looking at each political phase, and analysing its impact on the discipline and on the profession. It highlights and documents the different trajectories taken by individuals in the profession since the days of United Pakistan, and how institutions changed as political factors changed in the country. It explains why the economics discipline and profession have undergone this metamorphosis. The second paper presented by Naseem and two other economists which appears as Chapter 3, is a micro study which examines the teaching and research of economics in universities across the country, presenting a number of case studies as well.

Nadeem Ul Haque and Mahmood Hasan Khan's paper, Chapter 4, is also a critical review of the state of economics in Pakistan, and builds on the historical work done by Naseem, and has a far more theoretical and institution-based approach. While this paper also, like Naseem's, presents a history of the economics profession in Pakistan, it looks in more detail at institutions of economics and complements the Naseem paper which looks at key personalities in the economics profession in the country. Both papers (actually, all three) read together, provide a comprehensive and thorough critical evaluation of the state of the economics discipline in Pakistan.

Hassan Gardezi's contribution is a review of the state and history of sociology in Pakistan from the early 1950s to the 1990s. It presents a description and evaluation of how the discipline developed, particularly at the University of the Punjab, and the paper gives a history of the now inactive, Pakistan Sociological Association as well. Gardezi highlights many of the areas of specialisation in the discipline of sociology and lists some of the research output in each area. Much has changed since this paper was written in the mid-1990s. For instance, there is now growing research that is taking place in areas related to the urban sector, which seems to have replaced the rural sector in almost every manner, particularly in terms of research. Also, with new developments taking place in sociology around cultural theory, linguistics, ethnicity, identity, and where anthropology, economics and sociology, all phase into each other, there has been interesting research taking place world wide, and also increasingly in Pakistan. It might not be wrong to say that perhaps economics is now slowly being replaced with multi-disciplinary studies as the preferred choice of many budding social scientists.

Fazal Rahim Khan and his associates look at the history of what used to be called 'journalism' but due to changes in communications and the advance of Information Technology, is now called Mass Communications. They give a history of the discipline in Pakistan identifying developments and problems. However, the intellectual paradigm which they use to evaluate the discipline in Pakistan, is too extremely 'western' or rather, American, and seems a little out of context. In fact one of the main criticisms which both Inayatullah in Chapter 1 and Zaidi in Chapter 9 make, is against this aping of theory picked-up from different societies and used inappropriately in others. Also, they import very traditional and conservative theoretical tools rather than more progressive ones, and look at 'mass communications' very narrowly. Some of the use of their terms ('native', for example), are particularly jarring and reflect perhaps a weakness in the indigenous development of their discipline.

K K Aziz's paper is unlike the others as it does not present an overview of his discipline – history – like all the others, but looks at his own considerable experience of teaching the subject, which is generalised and from which one gets a fairly good picture of the discipline itself. He writes about the bureaucratic manner in which research is organised and how some petty officials determine what can and cannot be published. Aziz also laments the fact that very little research actually takes place and identifies a long list of themes which are crying out for research.

Rubina Saigol's paper is an outlier for two reasons: unlike all the other papers it has not been published before, and because it deals with education in history and social studies at the pre-university level. Importantly, her paper looks at how textbooks and the educational system creates images of the 'other' and plays a key role in developing prejudices. It is being added to this collection as it discusses themes which are not discussed frequently in the social sciences, and because these students are inculcated with images and values which surely hinder their ability to do unbiased social science research at a higher level.

The last chapter in this book, by S Akbar Zaidi, is an abridged version of a long paper (previously published as a Monograph by COSS) which evaluates the current state of the social sciences in Pakistan. Zaidi's research makes considerable use of the three papers included here on economics and of the first chapter to this book, the paper by Inayatullah. In many ways it completes the discussion started by the S H Hashmi volume and takes the debate up to the present.

There are two or three observations which emerge from this collection which are worth mentioning. Firstly, not surprisingly, the nature of 'tools' for looking at the disciplines of the contributors, vary. Some have used a rather more holistic analysis looking at developments in society or in the country, to develop their viewpoint and discussion on their disciplines. Others have not looked at anything beyond the very narrow confines of their own discipline and have used

a methodology and references which seem not to be related or developed to indigenous conditions. These differences distinguish the quality and content of the papers.

Interestingly, while many papers compare developments in the West regarding their own discipline, they fail to take cognisance of developments in South Asia, particularly in India. (The papers by Naseem and Nadeem Ul Haque and Mahmood Hasan Khan are the exception). One would have expected far greater comparative analysis with other countries in the region. However, in one area there is much greater indifference and most of the authors can be accused of severe *gender blindness*. While there is some mention of women having done some research here or there, discussion on the increasing contribution being made by them to the social sciences (and certainly not just to 'Women's' Studies), seems to be missing. This criticism falls most heavily on my own paper (Chapter 9) which is a review of the current state of the social sciences in Pakistan, yet I have overlooked the substantial contribution being made by women social scientists. Oddly, in the reviews and discussion that has taken place on my original paper and on the COSS Monograph, not a single reader/reviewer has pointed out this glaring omission. (I am grateful to the October 2002 *South Asia Special IV* issue of *The Book Review*, published from New Delhi, for highlighting this omission in my earlier work. The Special Issue carries a review of a large number of monographs and books by Pakistani women social scientists, most of which are published by ASR Publications in Lahore.)

As editor, my work has been limited to editing for size and for language. Some papers have been edited because they were too long and/or needed much re-writing to improve on them. Most have marginal changes and I have let the author's own voice speak in the way they intended it. I have also kept the referencing and citations as they existed in their original form. These papers were given to me by COSS. Many more, written in the 1990s, were considered, but I decided not to carry them as they were not very good. Even now, this collection of papers is determined by the quality of papers available on the social sciences in Pakistan.

Not surprisingly, this is a varied collection, both in content and quality, of the papers on the social sciences in Pakistan. The purpose of putting these papers together was to bridge the gap between the first volume which came out in 1989, and the one commissioned by COSS to be published later this year. I hope that this particular collection on its own, or as part of the three volume set to be produced by COSS, will throw some light on the state of the social sciences in Pakistan, dismal, or otherwise.

S Akbar Zaidi
Karachi, June 25, 2003.

1

The Social Sciences in Pakistan: An Evaluation*

Inayatullah

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the development of the social sciences in Pakistan on the basis of some criteria discussed below and to offer an explanation for the type of social sciences which have developed. With a few exceptions, much of the social science literature in Pakistan is not oriented to cumulative growth of knowledge in the specific field or in the social sciences as a whole. Generally, it lacks a theoretical orientation and a theoretical framework.[1] Wherever some theoretical framework is used, it is not itself subjected to a critical assessment. As a result, Pakistani social science has not made any significant contribution to the cumulative growth of social science knowledge.

Lacking a systematic theoretical framework, the social sciences in Pakistan have moved mainly in two directions: (a) superficial 'speculative' analysis or (b) what Mills calls 'abstracted empiricism' (1959: 50-75) and Waseem calls 'hyperfactualism' (in Hashmi, 1989). Superficial speculative analysis is particularly manifest in the journalistic style of analysis of political events (Shafqat, 1988), of foreign policy approaches, and in narrative and descriptive history (Qureshi, 1989: Malik, undated) and other disciplines. In this mode of analysis, causes of one set of present events are sought in another set of present events without systematically relating them to their historical context or tracing their social roots. When historical analysis is undertaken, it usually does not go beyond describing or tracing a given phenomenon in time without identifying the causes underlying it.[2] The divorce between history and the social sciences which occurred in the USA in the post Second World War period has been retained in Pakistan which has done considerable damage to the nascent social sciences. Some Pakistani historians have made incursions into other disciplines

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* This is a much shortened paper which was published in Hashmi, SH (ed.), *The State of the Social Sciences in Pakistan*, COSS Pakistan, Islamabad, 2001.

[1] Most of the papers presented in the three annual meetings (held in 1985, 1986, 1987) of the Pakistan Society of Development Economists illustrate this point (Inayatullah, 1986). See judgement of Sabeeha Hafeez (1989) in *The State of the Social Sciences*, S. H. Hashmi, 1989, *Ibid*, pp.139-141 on this issue concerning sociological research in Pakistan.

[2] A refreshing and insightful study by Waseem (1989) in Hashmi, *Ibid* is one of the few exceptions.

such as political science and given it a descriptive-narrative approach (Shafqat, 1989:129).[3]

There is also a tendency in some disciplines to explain events in terms of personalities and their peculiar attributes. Charisma is frequently used as an explanation both by professional social scientists and non-professional social analysts without taking into account the theoretical context of the concept. Scientific analysis in terms of fundamental social processes, dynamics of movements of history, the interrelationship between social parts and social wholes (for instance, the global context impinging on national and regional levels and regional or local levels impinging on them in turn) is less frequently undertaken, if at all. Generally, events and social phenomena are treated as unique rather than placed in a comparative historical and contemporary perspective. Explanations sought are ad hoc and not systematic and without an articulated theoretical framework.

While some of the speculative, historical and legal-formal analysis has come to the Pakistani social sciences from its indigenous intellectual tradition, abstracted empiricism or hyperfactualism has come from a superficial understanding of western sciences, both natural and social, through training of social scientists in the West.[4] Abstracted empiricism is equated with science from a mistaken notion that science deals only with facts, data and concrete evidence, which is only a partial, or at worst, a misleading truth. In the Pakistani social sciences, an obsession with 'facts' is dominant particularly in economics, demography, sociology and perhaps psychology, now facilitated by the availability and use of computers.

The import of abstracted empiricism is accompanied with the import of research techniques developed in the social sciences in the West which are not always appropriate for gathering facts in a relatively illiterate, predominantly rural society, lacking access to modern communication means.[5] As a result, the 'facts' gathered with these techniques are low on their reality content.[6]

While ethnocentrism is a problem common to all social sciences, its intensity and prevalence is high in Pakistan and is compounded by *xenophobia* (fancy for the new and foreign) emerging from Pakistani society's cultural integration

[3] Indeed, some Pakistani historian have made useful contributions to Political Science in Pakistan. One outstanding example is the work of Professor Rafiq Afzal on political parties in Pakistan (1986, 1987). However, this otherwise useful work also illustrates the gap between history and political theory.

[4] According to a survey conducted by Talent Pool Department of the Manpower Division (1983), out of 108 PhDs working in Pakistan a significant percentage was trained in the West particularly in USA.

[5] For inappropriate and obsessive use of these techniques in economics see Ali in Hashmi, op.cit., (1989).

[6] I have myself used these techniques in rural areas of Pakistan with dubious results.

with the Anglo-Saxon intellectual and cultural tradition. Ethnocentrism in Pakistani social sciences is particularly manifest in writings on Islamic history, history of Muslim separatism in India and the recent history of Pakistan. Indeed, any objective assessment of some aspects of Islamic civilisation in some periods of its history would find it as representing the highest human values and considerable cultural achievements. Also its role as a transmission belt for transferring intellectual achievements of earlier civilisations, particularly those of Greece, are indeed impressive. But writings of a number of historians in Pakistan dealing with Islamic history suffer from excessive exaggeration and unsubstantiated glorification of most Islamic history and fail to critically examine it. Very few, for instance, would have the courage of Iqbal to call Arab invasions of other countries during earlier period of Muslim expansion as 'Arabian imperialism' (1982: 158-159) or put the Muslim invasion of India in its objective and comparative perspective.

A second area where objectivity fails a large number of Pakistani social scientists particularly historians and political scientists, is the writing of the history of Muslim separatism and of Pakistan. The narration of events generally starts with the assumption of the inevitability of Pakistan, the culmination of a long historical process starting with the Arab invasion of India. Second, there is a romantic and non-empirical attitude towards the assessment of the character of the Pakistan movement invariably characterised as a mass movement without necessary qualification that its mass character emerged only at a late stage and it remained essentially an urban phenomenon, particularly in the areas now comprising Pakistan. There is a lack of objectivity on concerning the internal structure and method and the style of decision making of the party that spearheaded the movement for Pakistan. Furthermore, there is too wide a division between those who consider the movement emerging essentially from historical material factors and those who attribute it to a search for an ideal Islamic state. A synthesis combining the two, does not exist.

Pakistani historians also under-emphasise the role of some political and intellectual leaders in laying the ideological foundation of the Pakistan movement, such as Ameer Ali (Abbasi, 1981). Some Pakistani historian ignore or distort the role of those Muslim, and non-Muslim leaders who opposed the Pakistan movement but protected the interest of Muslims, and in some cases, of Pakistan. Recently, some historians have pleaded for recognition of the role of leaders of *Majlis-e-Ahrar* and *Khaksar Tehrik* in the struggle for independence, but this has yet to be extended to an objective treatment of *Khuda-i-Khidmatgars* and their leaders, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and others, who disagreed with the political course of Muslim League but waged an anti-colonial struggle.

Under instructions from a government agency allocating funds to universities, the writing of history of Pakistan is subordinated to national and ideological interests. The textbook writers are required to inculcate patriotism, pride, an unshakeable belief in the longevity and stability of the country but also a belief

that Pakistan's foundation lie in religion and not in other factors (Qureshi, 1989: 115). Such an attitude does not inculcate objectivity in viewing social phenomena, but creates closed and unthinking minds incapable of scientific inquiry.

There is a strong strand of thought in the Pakistani social sciences which tend to explain events using 'conspiracy' theory or theories and thus intentionally or unintentionally support the rulers in diverting the attention of the people from true causes of events. This does not mean that social scientists should exclude 'conspiracy theory' from their explanations even when there is enough empirical evidence for it, but a social scientist must remain sensitive to the abuse of it.

A third area where objectivity fails a part of the Pakistani social sciences, is the assessment of the social structure, political system, economic performance, military capability, foreign policy postures and interests and cultural achievements of presumed 'enemies'. This happens particularly with regard to writings on India with which a number of Pakistani social scientists, together with political leaders and the public find it hard to come to terms with.

Most of the current generation of Pakistani social scientists have been trained in the West. While a small number of them have developed a critical orientation to the knowledge they have gained from western universities, most of them accept it as an unquestioned 'scientific truth'. As a consequence of acquisition of this knowledge and exposure to the life in the West, they return with an uncritical attitude towards western ways of life, its political system, culture and foreign policies. On the other hand, some find the West essentially a declining materialist culture lacking any spirituality. The West is judged against its practices by Pakistani religious ideals without subjecting the Pakistani culture and society to similar evaluation by ideal western standard. The roots of ethnocentrism in Pakistani social sciences lie in the reluctance of many Pakistani social scientists to subject their own individual, group, class, regional, national and cultural biases to scientific scrutiny.

Working within the framework of government-controlled and government-funded academic institutions, some social scientists opt for the convenient and possibly twisted meaning of the doctrine of value neutrality and adopt the perspective and preferences of those whoever happen to be in power regardless of the nature of the rules they impose on society and the degree of their political legitimacy. This has been documented for the discipline of economics (Karamat Ali, 1989: 149). The judgement of an historian about writings on Pakistani history is similar (Qureshi, 1989: 10).

Creativity and the Pakistani Social Sciences

In some parts of Asia and Latin America there is evidence of some intellectual fermentation developed during last two decades and the appreciation of the need for scientific creativity. The emergence of the 'dependency theory' and 'Participatory Action Research' (PAR) are two possible indications of it. However, the major thrust of scientific work in the Third World still remains predominantly imitative and emulative. Most of the Third World social science community, if one can use this term, predominantly remains on the intellectual periphery of the western intellectual centres. Not many Third World social scientists accept creativity as an important part of their role and often, they become, what Hussain Alatas calls, 'captive minds' and 'retailers of knowledge' (1972: 14).

With some rare exceptions, creativity in the social sciences in Pakistan is indeed low. Even the relatively more developed social science in Pakistan -- economics -- has not shown much creativity. In the judgement of Karamat Ali 'the original contribution of economists within Pakistan to the discipline has been negligible' (1989:152-54pp). A large number of Pakistani social scientists are concerned mainly with gathering and compiling data without much creative interpretation. Whenever data is related to a theory, the latter is usually borrowed and used without critical evaluation and criticism. Social scientific paradigms imported from the West are rarely critically examined or new ones proposed.[7] In fact, the discipline which can encourage debates about basic philosophical issues underlying the social sciences -- the philosophy of social science -- remains virtually unknown in Pakistan even amongst most of the teachers and researchers; students are rarely exposed to it.

Another indication of a lack of creativity and prevalence of emulative orientation, is the absence of textbooks of high quality for undergraduates and graduate studies for teaching social science subjects and an indiscriminate use of textbooks produced in the West. Not that western textbooks should be used but they must be examined for their relevance to Pakistani conditions. The subjects of business and public administration represent the extreme degree of this emulative orientation. Their reliance on western, particularly American, textbooks seems to be high. The situation though not exactly similar in other subjects, does not significantly depart from this established practice.[8]

[7] Writing about the discipline of psychology, Ansari notes' Much of the psychological literature and writing on Pakistan, though not all of it suffers from the same problem. One finds lot of replications of researches carried out in the West, or at a higher level, validation of constructs derived from Western psychological literature in Hashmi (1989: 106).'

[8] For the discipline of psychology in Pakistan see Ansari (1989: 106). In Hashmi, *op.cit.*

One gets the impression that not many Pakistani social scientists accept creativity in knowledge as an essential part of their professional role.[9] Working under the heavy burden of the impact of their graduate and postgraduate studies in the West, frequently overawed by the amount of social science knowledge acquired during their training there and fascinated by new and fancy research techniques and sophisticated technology, most Pakistani social scientists find their critical and creative faculties numbed and stunted. Given this emulative orientation and disposition, continuous linkages with professional groups in the West, participation in professional meetings there and through access to professional journals and eagerness to publish in them, which otherwise should become stimuli for professional creativity, become an impediment to originality.

The pattern of specialisation and segmentation of the social sciences as developed in the West has been reproduced in Pakistan. Each discipline is developing in isolation, both in terms of teaching and research. Interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and trans-disciplinary concerns in which all disciplines develop common theoretical conceptual and methodological frameworks, are absent. The application of different disciplines for developing a holistic view of Pakistani society and culture and the understanding of significant problems of Pakistan is rare. There is no visible movement towards the unification of social science knowledge. Whatever interdisciplinary interests exist are due to a scholar's own individual interest in other disciplines. There is no conscious and planned effort to achieve a unity of the social sciences in Pakistan. The few social science journals that come out publish material in a single discipline; frequently, they pursue technical and academic research and put it in technical language incomprehensible to practitioners of other disciplines.[10]

Even the awareness of the limitations of segmented social scientific knowledge and its consequences for understanding man and society, has not emerged in Pakistani social science. Relatively more ‘developed’ (in the traditional meaning of development of a social science) discipline of economics, with a high degree of technocratism and specialisation, has dominated the field of social scientific knowledge in Pakistan (Karamat Ali, 1989: 148; Aliya Khan, 1988: 1-8). It is far ahead of other disciplines in terms of numbers -- thirty percent of all the social scientists working in the country are economists -- research publications, journals issued, and in the use of economic research by different sectors of society, particularly government. This is because it developed earlier in the sub-continent and received the support and encouragement of the state. This over-development of economics has created a lag between the different social science disciplines, which may have resulted in certain consequences for the overall development of society.

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[9] A leading economist of Pakistan told this author that Pakistani social scientists should aim for ‘creative application of Western social sciences’ rather than creativity and originality.

[10] One significant exception known to this author is the *Journal of Social Sciences* published by the Faculty of Social Sciences, Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad.

The uneven and segmented development of the social sciences in Pakistan has made the scientific understanding of Pakistani society unbalanced and produced undesirable consequences. Partly due to the over-development of the discipline of development economics, development in Pakistan has generally come to be viewed primarily as economic development resulting into a narrow and unbalanced view of the development of Pakistani society. How does economic development affect social, political, cultural and technical development? What non-economic factors facilitate or limit economic development? What is the cost of uneven economic development in terms of political, social and cultural development? What is the nature of balanced, even and comprehensive development of Pakistani society? What are the various indicators of such development? These are questions that have not been seriously asked by Pakistani social scientists.

The appropriateness and relevance of indicators of development imported from western intellectual centres and international organisations, such as the United Nations and the World Bank has not been seriously scrutinised. An example is the concept of 'social development' with its indicators which usually include the extent of literacy, life expectancy, infant mortality, availability of clean drinking water, modern medical facilities, etc. These indicators in fact do not reflect social development derived from social development theory. True social development is reflected in the degree of social co-operation or absence of conflicts between various groups, classes, communities; in adequate level of flexibility of social structure manifest in the extent of upward social mobility and removal of barriers against various weaker and underprivileged groups, such as deprived and weak ethnic and cultural groups, and emergence of new and differentiated groups and organisations performing specialised tasks.

Social Utility of Social Sciences

In Pakistan, the transfer of the theory of modernisation occurred at a large scale together with the American social science tradition. Now it is well established in the government agencies dealing with development planning, universities, and institutes conducting research in development and institutions for training the bureaucracy. Due to some of its weaknesses such as its overemphasis on internal impediments to development to the exclusion of external ones (Inayatullah, 1976), its stress is on strengthening of the elite component of the state apparatus to direct the development of the society on a 'rational' and 'orderly' basis and on regulating or controlling the mass participation in politics (Waseem, 1985: 39-40), it prescribed a state directed capitalist strategy of development. This strategy was applied in Pakistan by a configuration of interests -- the newly emerging industrialist class and the modernising military-bureaucratic regime of Ayub Khan firmly allied to the West. Its application also received intellectual support and urging from the Harvard Advisory Group along with some Pakistani economists, including the then

Chief Economist of Pakistan, who advocated its applicability, in his own words, ‘with a youthful exuberance and conviction’. (Haq, 1983: 1)

Besides being brought into Pakistan through the training of social scientists and civil servants working with the government and at an earlier stage by foreign advisers, the knowledge and theories imported from the West are also diffused in Pakistani society through the educational system. With higher education being a preserve of the privileged few in Pakistan, the social scientific knowledge disseminated through the educational system simultaneously integrates the educated class to the ruling elite by imparting them the dominant intellectual and political culture. This increases the capacity of the ruling elite to rule effectively, maintain the status quo and successfully contain the impulses for transformation of the society through internal dynamics. Thus the imported social scientific knowledge does not promote the long term development of the society but possibly, tends to ossify it.

Regardless of its relevance to Pakistani conditions, and its indirect impact on congealing the social order, the direct ‘social utility’ of imported and locally produced social scientific knowledge has remained limited even to the Pakistani ruling elite due to built in structural impediments. The ruling elite and policy makers in Pakistan share, though do not always articulate, a number of reasons identified by Atal for the lack of utilisation of social science research by the ruling elite of the Third World. They include the lack of relevance of research to government policy, its limited and micro base, its over-theoretical and technical nature, absence of timely availability of research findings, the researchers' inability to understand the limitations and constraints of the policies within which they function, offering policy recommendations which cannot be implemented within the established political framework (Atal, 1983: 367).

Social scientists in Pakistan, in turn, give their own reasons for lack of use of their findings. They include ignorance of research by the elite, their propensity to make policies on considerations other than scientific knowledge and hiatus between policy makers and social scientists. They attribute this to the anti-intellectual bias of policy makers and to their belief that they already possess more knowledge than the social scientists either because of the ‘practical knowledge’ they have acquired during their career or their superior intellectual versatility and competence. Finally, social scientists suggest that due to this hiatus, they are not involved or consulted on major national policy issues and whenever involved, their judgement is not given enough weight.

Analysed from another perspective, of the disharmonious and conflictual character of social order and incompatibility of the interest of the ruling elite and the people, the social utility of social sciences produced in state controlled research institutions and incorporating perspectives or world views of the ruling elite in Pakistan, has almost no direct utility for the people. Since the

level of literacy in Pakistan is low and higher education is inaccessible to the common man, whatever social science knowledge is produced does not percolate downward. Moreover, this knowledge is written in a technical language that makes it unintelligible to the common man. Given the 'ideological' character of this knowledge, its social utility to the common man will not be high even if it reaches him. It would not help him to develop a social scientific outlook and understand the social forces that shape his social consciousness and impart knowledge, organisational strategies and skills to liberate himself from the constraints of the present development-retarding social order. Such a knowledge is not even of limited use for understanding his more concrete and specific problems.

The social utility of current social scientific knowledge would remain low for the common man as long as the producers of social scientific knowledge come from privileged classes, are integrated to the existing elite structure, base their knowledge not on direct observations of reality incorporating the common man's perspective, present their findings in technical terms not intelligible to the people and communication, and when class barriers divide the social scientist and the common man.

Indigenisation - Response to Imported Social Science

One response to the lack of social relevance and utility of imported knowledge among some of the Third World social scientists is to bring about what is usually called the 'indigenisation' of the social sciences. Several meanings of the concept, including the use of the national language in teaching and research, dispensing with the foreign consultants and greater use of national experts, focussing research on national problems and substantive and methodological reorientation have been identified. The crucial element of this concept is what Atal calls 'self awareness and rejection of borrowed consciousness ... desirability of alternative human perspective on human societies ... attention to historical and cultural specificities...' opposition to 'false universalism' without adopting 'false nationalism', and 'narcissism' (1981: 192-193).[11]

The process of indigenisation has unfolded in Pakistan in some respect. The country has become considerably self-reliant in social science expertise and skills and has built an adequate institutional capability, although it is difficult to determine whether such capability is commensurate with national needs and requirements. Unlike the 1950s and 1960s, when a large number of social scientists were imported as teachers, advisors and consultants, in the eighties, there are very few foreign social scientists working in Pakistan. The increased level of self-reliance, however, has not necessarily increased the social utility of social sciences for the reasons discussed above.

[11] See also Kumar (1979, 104-105).

The issue of the use of the national language in teaching and doing research in the social sciences and for that matter making it a medium of instruction for higher levels of education, continues to be debated in Pakistan and has not yet satisfactorily been resolved. In the present conditions, however, the use of the national language -- which is Urdu -- cannot enhance the social utility of social sciences due to the high level of illiteracy and low level of education in the country. The diffusion of social science knowledge through the mass media occurs only to a limited extent.

The most important component of the indigenisation of the social sciences is what has been called their reorientation to accommodate different cultural perspectives, to build them on alternative assumptions about man and society, and to relate them to specific contexts and problems of a society. Indigenisation of social science knowledge, however, does not generate sympathetic responses from some local and most foreign scholars, as they fear that this can lead to the parochialisation of the social sciences undermining their universal character as well as reviving or strengthening the non-scientific mode of knowing social reality. Some western social scientists view it merely as a product of nationalistic or anti-western intellectual posture, part of the anti-colonial political rhetoric, and therefore, an intellectual aberration.

Indigenisation, however, should not be rejected just because it emerges in a particular political and historical context but on its intrinsic merit. Each case and effort should be examined for its contributions to make the social sciences more scientific and more universal. To remain true to their cultural ethos and their scientific methodology, the social sciences must remain open to self-criticism and accept alternative assumptions about man and society so long as there is compelling logic and empirical evidence for it. They should also be open towards the critique that the social sciences developed in the West and is one of the several possible approaches to the study of man and society and should not exclude the possibility of building other types of social and human sciences based on other assumptions about social phenomena. On the other hand, the advocates of indigenisation of the social sciences must articulate the criteria against which their new endeavour should be judged, and establish that these reflect the essential elements of science, that is, rationality, objectivity, the determination of a cause and effect relationship, on the basis of some universal laws and the creation of universal social sciences incorporating specificities of various social groups, societies and cultures.

Most mainstream Pakistani social scientists have remained indifferent to the basic issues involved in the indigenisation of the social sciences, though most of them would accept the need for greater self-reliance in the social sciences and enhance their social utility by engaging in research on problems of national importance. However, only a very small number has seriously accepted this challenge. As far as the more basic and important task of undertaking the

critique of paradigms, assumptions and methodology of western social sciences and offering viable alternatives is concerned, very few have moved in this direction.

The Islamisation of Knowledge in Pakistan

The only effort towards indigenisation in Pakistan is what is known as the 'Islamisation' of the social sciences. The greater assertion of revivalist movements in the Muslim world leading to the questioning of the intellectual foundation of modern knowledge, the financial support from some middle eastern countries, the introduction of 'Islamisation' in Pakistan during the rule of General Zia-ul-Haq which generated an 'effective' demand for Islamic social sciences, has lead some social scientists to try to Islamise social sciences in Pakistan. Several disciplines have been given the prefix 'Islamic', such as Islamic economics, Islamic anthropology, Islamic sociology, etc.

As part of the indigenisation process unfolding in the Third World, Islamisation of knowledge is an interesting intellectual challenge. Both natural and social scientists would be acting against their own claims of remaining open to new ideas and seeking alternative paradigms if they reject the indigenisation and Islamisation of the social sciences just because it repudiates the dominant paradigms of contemporary social science. Particularly, they should examine the claim of Islamic social science that they can unify human knowledge and create a holistic perspective on man and society (International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987: 15-16). If such a claim could be established by creative scientific works reflecting an Islamic perspective, this could enrich the social sciences and rectify certain mal-development and imbalances created by excessive specialisation and 'academisation' of the social sciences.

The Islamisation of knowledge has not yet been subjected to a serious evaluation and critique. Whatever limited critique it has received is of two types: the first suggesting that religious prescriptions cannot be wedded to the positivistic western social sciences (Zaman, 1984),[12] and second, that in fact what is called Islamic economics is essentially western, capitalist economics with marginal changes and adaptations (Haque, 1988). A serious evaluation, however, needs to go deeper into this effort.

The literature produced by the proponents of the Islamisation of knowledge, can be placed in three categories: that which is essentially within the framework of the dominant social sciences but is given the prefix or suffix of Islam; that which is essentially normative and prescriptive and attempts to elaborate the ideals of an Islamic society and the socio-economic and political

[12.] Zaman, Arshad (November 14, 1984); for a critique of this position see, Mohammad, Faiz (March 20, 1983).

system it should have; and that which delves deeper into epistemological issues, advances a critique of the dominant paradigms and offers alternatives.

Most of the literature produced so far falls in the first two categories, the work on Islamic anthropology falling in the first and that on Islamic economics in the second.[13] A very small number of works can be placed in the third category.[14] The proponents of the Islamisation of the social sciences, however, have yet to resolve some basic issues. First, can the Islamisation of the social sciences generate a viable alternative paradigm -- a task some of the advocates of the Islamisation of knowledge has set for themselves?[15] Although there is some indication that some scholars are making serious efforts in this direction, there is no evidence from the literature so far produced, that such a paradigm has actually emerged. Second, the Islamic social sciences have so far remained essentially prescriptive and normative. By itself it does not reflect a flaw so long it is understood that any normative prescription which is not rooted in the scientific explanation of the 'is' cannot produce the appropriate 'ought'. But Islamic social sciences have yet to produce alternative paradigms, theories, and research methods and provide alternative explanations of existing social realities different from the western social sciences. For instance there is a need to indicate in what ways the contemporary social sciences, whether capitalist or socialist, fail to explain the contemporary social, cultural, economic, and political phenomena or why western nations have assumed a hegemonic position over the rest of the world, particularly the Muslim world. Generally, when Islamic social scientists are faced with these issues they define and describe them more in an emotional than scientific way, and fall back on the prevailing 'materialist' theories in contemporary social science, or on 'conspiracy theories' for their explanation.[16] One frequent explanation of the decline of Muslims is considered to be their indifference to their religion that is not an adequate explanation and further begs the question why have they become so.

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[13] The judgement of Anis Ahmad, one of the leading advocates of Islamisation of social sciences in Pakistan, is somewhat similar on this issue (1989:94). However, a careful study of the only case he cites (Ahmed, 1989:95) 'as a preliminary effort toward true Islamisation of the social sciences' reveals a considerable degree of intellectual ambiguity and ambivalence toward Islamisation of anthropology. Ahmed takes several contradictory positions including the desirability of synthesizing the left and right intellectual stances under the umbrella of Islamic anthropology and declares the work of Gellner, Gaborieau and Nakamura as Islamic anthropology notwithstanding their being non-Muslim. For elaboration of these points with specific examples see Inayatullah (1989:35) in Hashmi,.op.cit.

[14] Some of the works of Khurshid Ahmad fall in this category. See particularly his 1980 article. See also Dar and Ansari (1988).

[15] See a pamphlet produced by International Institute of Islamic Thought (1987: viii & ix).

[16] See a paragraph describing the predicament of contemporary Muslims in a highly emotionally charged language which could generate sympathy or anger but not an insight into causes of it (Islamic Institute of Islamic Thought, 1987).

If Islamisation of knowledge means simply that social sciences should serve a higher moral purpose, abandon their amoral stance, be guided by universal moral considerations when pursuing knowledge, and should not base themselves on a single 'mechanomorphic' view of man, accept alternative assumptions and perspectives, then obviously such a pursuit can contribute to the enrichment of the social sciences so long as this pursuit is within the framework of the accepted principles of science. But if it means that every religious community and a nation should have a separate social science based on its religious beliefs or national culture then this trend is likely to create an intellectual anarchy and may become a serious obstacle to the realisation of the goal of universal social sciences.

Causes of the Underdevelopment of the Social Sciences in Pakistan

In the preceding sections an attempt has been made to define the development of the social sciences and identify indicators reflecting such development. In the light of these indicators some of the major characteristics of the social sciences in Pakistan, such as their level of objectivity, adherence to canons of scientific methodology, their patterns of growth, their imitative and emulative rather than creative thrust, their inability to offer a critique of the existing social order and failure to develop an autonomous character, have been noted. This leads to the next logical question: what explains the state of the social sciences in Pakistan? Two crucial factors that shape the character and pattern of development of the social sciences in Pakistan are discussed below.

The Nature of the Pakistani State

As social science in Pakistan has essentially developed in the state sector with assistance from the US, the causes of its development or otherwise, must be sought in the nature of the Pakistani state and its relationship with the US. Besides, the role of religious authorities in determining the limits within which the scientific inquiries could be pursued and the effect of a dominant religious perspective on shaping the intellectual culture in which social sciences have to develop also need to be taken into account. Four characteristics of the Pakistani state which have shaped its policies towards the production of knowledge in general and social sciences in particular, are discussed separately, below.

These characteristics of the Pakistani state have provided a basic framework from which an unarticulated policy towards the production of social scientific knowledge leading to the development of a type of social sciences which are essentially technocratic and tame, hyperfactual and empiricist, eschewing questions about the legitimacy of the basis of the power of the state and its nature, have taken place. How these characteristics shape the production of the social sciences are discussed below.

(i) The bureaucratic authoritarian state and the social sciences

Since its inception, Pakistan has remained essentially an administrative state, even when it had governments recruited from the civilian sector. By virtue of being a bureaucratic state frequently under the stronger element of bureaucracy -- the military -- it also became a highly authoritarian state -- a trait that sharpened with recurrent martial laws. Both these characteristics constrained it to place narrow limits on freedom of inquiry, expression and dissent. Reviewing the limits on social research in Pakistan until the mid-sixties, Professor Braibanti, the only scholar who has done research on the subject, writes that 'the conduct of scholarship and the limits on scholarship are determined by government, not by scholars (1966: 231)'. These constraints particularly affected the universities and research institutions that were deprived of institutional autonomy particularly after the military coup of 1958 (Braibanti, 1966: 40-44). This autonomy was further reduced under later military regimes until universities virtually became part of the bureaucratic structure of the state and the teachers and researchers became almost the civil servants subject to government efficiency, discipline and transfer rules. Several 'semi-autonomous' institutions created for research and training of the bureaucracy by the Ayub regime, remained essentially an appendage to the ministries under which they were placed as their governing boards were manned by career civil servants (Inayatullah, 1988).

During the Bhutto period (1972-77), though the nature of the regime did somewhat change, the bureaucratic and authoritarian structure of the state did not. One of its consequences was that the new legislation introduced by this regime granting universities a certain degree of institutional autonomy and greater participation of teachers in university affairs, more or less, remained unimplemented due the traditional control of the bureaucratic machinery of the Federal Ministry of Education and provincial education bureaucracies. Furthermore, the power of the administration within the university changed only marginally (Inayatullah, 1972). In this highly bureaucratic and stifling environment of universities with their hierarchical structure, not many teachers and researchers could develop or retain their intellectual commitment and their creativity.

The combined impact of the martial laws and bureaucratic polity was the emasculation of the autonomous and critical orientation in the social sciences and the consolidation of positivistic and value neutral 'applied' research, which if it performed any function, helped the rulers to strengthen their power. In fact, this knowledge fortified the existing structure of the state. In general, the critical tradition of the social sciences has either been neglected or discouraged. To quote Professor Braibanti again: 'a distinction must be made between the attitude towards research carried on within a bureaucratically regulated context and the freedom to probe and criticise public issues' (ibid. 339), suggesting that Pakistani governments were permissive towards the former and restrictive towards the latter.

The bureaucratic state also affected the social sciences by influencing the social values and the social structure. A high status, prestige, power, and privileges are attached to positions in the military and civil bureaucracy as a result of which these institutions suck some of the talent which otherwise could be available for intellectual pursuits. Very few among the civil servants have the time, and still fewer the motivation, to pursue intellectual work. Consequently this talent got wasted. Even those who did pursue such work chose problems and issues for study which were essentially technocratic or took an ideological posture which consolidated the existing state structure and the social structure.

By assigning a low value to intellectual work and a low position to intellectuals, the Pakistani state does not provide any incentive for such work. Occupying a powerful position in the administrative state of Pakistan, convinced of its superior intellectual status, and highly oriented to pragmatism and action, the Pakistani bureaucracy does not have, in the words of Braibanti 'deep residual respect for extra bureaucratic intellectual endeavour' (1966: 15). The status of the university scholars in the government hierarchy and in the society compared with the bureaucracy is low, and few talented people are attracted to intellectual careers in universities. Most of those who join universities are the ones who cannot get into the powerful government bureaucracy and throughout their career look for opportunities for joining it.

Modelled after the bureaucratic state structure, the universities have evolved an inflexible status system that rewards mediocrity rather than excellence. Instead of operating like an egalitarian community of scholars, they function like traditional bureaucratic organisations in which rank, rather than competence, the claim to have produced scholarly work in the past rather than the ability to be creative in the present, are the bases for allocating rewards, prestige, power and privilege. Senior teachers who occupy positions of authority run the institutes and departments like a bureaucratic organisation. Such a status system does not attract scholars with creative abilities and talents and drives those out who join them. Their intellectual performance cannot exceed their weak intellectual commitment. Besides, the perception of low social status in the society militates against the emergence of pride in the social science profession and devotion and commitment to intellectual work.

Except for economics, there is a general lack of appreciation of the contribution the other social sciences can make toward imparting a scientific outlook to the citizens, in promoting scientific understanding of national problems and in making positive contributions to the formulation and evaluation of public policies. This is reflected in low budgetary allocations from the national budgets for the social sciences. This is in sharp contrast to the natural sciences, which receive higher allocations because of their perceived contributions to defence and to some extent, development. Status differentials and negative perceptions of the social sciences, create a hiatus between social scientists and the bureaucracy which militates against seeking advice from the former on

important policy matters and using their research output or expertise or trusting them to have access to so-called classified documents which in the absence of a law on the subject, never get declassified.

Finally, the bureaucratic state of Pakistan affects the formation and development of a cohesive community of social scientists that in turn affects the development of the social sciences. The bureaucratic state does not encourage and, in its worst form, smothers the development autonomous organisations that have the potential of undermining its bureaucratic character. The formation of autonomous organisations of intellectuals and professional scientists is barely tolerated. Organisations of associations of teachers are frowned upon and kept under strict administrative control and vigilance. Consequently, there is no common national organisation of social scientists, and it will not be an easy task to create and sustain one even if it is created. The single discipline associations are either inactive or moribund and meet infrequently. They do not exert much influence on their members to develop professional competence and excellence. Nor do they consequently promote a positive image of the social sciences and nor exert pressure on public institutions to support their development.

Working in an authoritarian environment that narrowly defines the scope of freedom of inquiry, crippled by traditional bureaucratic structures that prohibit autonomous action, the academic community in Pakistan has not become a creative force. Its inability to define such a role for itself, its failure to conceive intellectual and scientific activity to be rewarding in itself, and its lack of internal cohesion, has further contributed to this incapacity.

(ii) Insecurity of the state

Partly due to the intense political conflict preceding and accompanying its inception, the continued perceived or real fear of re-absorption by its larger neighbour from which it separated, three wars with this neighbour, the experience of the separation of East Pakistan, the persistence and occasional aggravation of ethnic conflicts, have all made the Pakistani state and society deeply insecure. This sense of insecurity has been met by Pakistani rulers through excessive use of nationalistic and religious symbols and appeals, which makes the significant social strata of the society intolerant of freedom of expression and dissent; as a result, social sciences cannot develop.

Such a sense of persistent insecurity in the state and society, together with the bureaucratic and authoritarian nature of the state, makes many subjects and issues ‘sensitive’ and barred from rational scientific inquiry. This includes problems, such as regionalism and ethnicity, the role of the military and bureaucracy in politics, defence expenditure, a dispassionate and objective

history of the Pakistan movement, the role of religion in Pakistani politics, and issues such as Kashmir and relations with India.[17]

It is probably an indication of its dependent status (discussed subsequently), that while the state does not provide access to Pakistani social scientists to unpublished or classified documents and data on the plea of such data being sensitive and confidential, it is unusually liberal with providing such data to foreign scholars, particularly American scholars. The well known Pakistani journalist Mushahid Hussain's comments are quite revealing:

> Various governments have had not hesitation in 'importing' a host of Western, primarily American, journalists and scholars who have been entrusted with vital information on various matters, including access to classified information. Following the 1965 War, the British journalist Neville Maxwell was commissioned to write a book on the war and he was given all official files and documents relating to the conflict, including intelligence files. Strangely enough he never wrote the book! During the mid '70s, the American writer Selig Herrison was also provided access to classified files for his study on Baluchistan. In the late '70s Prof. Stephen Cohen, who was undertaking a study on Pakistan Army on a grant provided by the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was provided a Brigadier for an escort and he travelled to various military formations of Pakistan Army meeting and interviewing Corps Commanders.[18] Such facilities have never been granted to any Pakistani writer or journalist. (Hussain, 1989).

(iii) The modernising state

The Pakistan state in its ideological orientation, has gone through mainly two phases: the modernising phase which reached its climax during the Ayub period, and the 'Islamisation' phase blooming during General Zia ul Haq's period. As a modernising state it sought legitimacy in the 'modernisation' of the society through marginal and symbolic changes in it without attempting to restructure social and power structure. This ideological orientation of the state influenced the character, quality and direction of the development of the social sciences. The process of modernisation (as opposed to genuine development)

[17] Some of the East Pakistani social scientists indeed, chose to write on some of these issues particularly on regional problems affecting East Pakistan. But such studies were generally discouraged by state and when East Pakistan broke away, some of the Pakistani bureaucratic rulers attributed its separation partly to these studies thus further strengthening the bias against studying these issues by social scientists. A few notable studies on these subjects include Rizvi, 1976, and Tahir Amin, 1988.

[18] It may be significant to note that Professor Cohen had written a book on the Indian army before he was invited to write on the Pakistan army. For confidentiality sensitive generals of the Pakistan army who provided him all facilities for the purpose, normally this fact should not have enhanced the credentials of Cohen to write on the subject.

requires what may be called 'bureaucratic rationality' for its planning, execution and monitoring. It needs organisations that mobilise people and diffuse modernisation goals as well as personnel, which possess certain types of attitudes, skills and knowledge. As these are value neutral and technocratic, social sciences facilitate this process by imparting the needed 'rationality', knowledge, skills and attitudes, and hence the need for promoting such social sciences.

Since the Second World War, as the US has become involved in shaping the character and direction of development in the Third World, it has been much more involved in the conceptualisation of development and identifying effective strategies of achieving it. Almost every traditional social science discipline has developed a sub-discipline with a suffix or prefix of development, such as development economics, development politics, development administration, etc. As development is equated with modernisation in these disciplines, they have retained the original conservative thrust. With the training of a considerable number of Pakistani teachers and some civil servants facilitated by technical assistance and cultural exchange programmes, the transfer of these conservative social sciences has occurred quite rapidly as both the transferring and receiving regimes found such transfers beneficial to their interests.

This explains why there was greater development of technocratic, apolitical and value neutral social sciences during the regime of Ayub Khan, since it was the most modernising amongst all the Pakistani regimes. They provided the regime with knowledge for achieving its goals without inquiring into the nature of the social and political orders on which the power of the regime rested.[19]

The civilian regime of Z.A. Bhutto did not promote autonomous social sciences, partly because of the continuity of the structure of the state which remained essentially modernising-bureaucratic under Bhutto, and partly because he added two contradictory dimensions to it -- the populist and the feudal, the latter gradually weakening the former. The bureaucracy, as noted earlier, retained its traditional control over the academic and research institutions during the Bhutto period. In spite of his conscious effort to break with the Ayub regime and offer an alternative conception of state and society, Bhutto could not overcome the conditioning influence of working in the Ayub

[19] For details about the efforts of the Ayub regime to promote social sciences in Pakistan, see Braibanti (1966, 338-339). It may also be noted that the Ayub regime, indeed, established a large number of commissions and committees to prepare reports on various aspects of society. But most of these commissions and committees were manned by civil servants and supporters of the regime which in most cases made recommendations which they anticipated the regime would accept. Only two reports deviated from this pattern, the report on administrative reforms and the report on the constitution. The first was not implemented. The second was accepted to the extent it did not restrict the presidential power of Ayub Khan and mode of his election.

regime and transcend the limits imposed on him by his feudal background, the bureaucratic polity, and increasing penetration of the feudal class of his party and political apparatus through which he governed (Burki, 1980) -- a class known for its anti-social science bias. Therefore, the state he ran was essentially authoritarian and intolerant of dissent and debate, and unconducive for the development of the social sciences in spite of his being himself an intellectual of high calibre.

In the 'Islamisation' phase, the basic structure of the state became more authoritarian and bureaucratic. Therefore, there was continuity of the social science tradition of the modernising phase. However, this phase promoted the process of the 'Islamisation of knowledge' which though added a new dimension to the social sciences in Pakistan. The impact of this process on the development of social sciences has been discussed earlier.

(iv) The dependant state

Pakistan is, and has been in the past, a dependent state in the sense that it depends on western capitalist societies, particularly the USA, not only for material aid, but also for science and technology. Social science in Pakistan has primarily come from the US, reinforcing its colonial social scientific legacy, and is not an indigenous product growing out from traditional scholarship. The hold of American social sciences continues to be strengthened through the training of a considerable number of social scientists and senior civil and military officers in the US and by large scale use of American text books.

It is unlikely that the social sciences in Pakistan would have achieved their present level of development on their own and without these contacts and assistance. However, the nature of the context in which they have been transferred has affected their character making them subordinate to the interest of the Pakistani state, which in some area was and is subordinate to the western powers. Consequently imported social science provided an intellectual legitimacy to the military-bureaucratic state of Pakistan underpinning its alliances with the West.

The over-integration with, and exclusive exposure to, the Anglo-Saxon social scientific tradition has deeply affected the character, and the pattern of growth and style, of the development of the social sciences in Pakistan. This over-integration to one intellectual tradition conditions the social sciences in Pakistan to uncritically accept paradigms, theories, conceptual frameworks, and definitions of significant problems from the Anglo-Saxon social sciences.[20] Naturally, intellectual dependence produces intellectual sterility.[21] The

[20] Writing about sociology Hafeez states: 'Only American sociological theory is known to exist in Pakistan. Little or no awareness exists on the part of Pakistani sociologists about the development of sociological theory in the socialist countries, European countries and the third world countries (in Hashmi, 1989: pp. 142).

[21] See Galtung (1981).

segmentation of the social sciences and their uneven development is also the result of this dependence.[22]

Conclusions

This paper has attempted to evaluate the quality of the social sciences in Pakistan on different criteria, concluding that the social sciences in the country remain underdeveloped both in terms of quantity and quality. Awareness and knowledge of basic issues arising out of contending epistemological approaches to the social sciences remains inadequate, leading to misconceptions about the nature of the social sciences and canons of scientific methodology. The nature of the relationship between theory and data is frequently misconceived. Accumulation of data by itself is often considered to be the proper pursuit of science. In several crucial areas of the social sciences, the level of objectivity remains low and that of ethnocentrism high. The importance of creativity in social science in Pakistan is not fully appreciated, which leads to the borrowing of theories and methodologies from the Anglo-Saxon social science tradition, increasing intellectual dependence and causing intellectual sterility. This exclusive dependence on one tradition imparts an emulative orientation to social science in Pakistan.

Like social science in the West, the social sciences in Pakistani also remain highly fragmented, leading to an inadequate and partial view of social reality. When such knowledge is applied to solve social problems, it frequently fails to produce the desired results, as policies or solutions based on one social science discipline cannot manage the complex social reality, which a single discipline cannot adequately deal with. Most of the teaching and research in the social sciences in Pakistan, remains single discipline oriented. There are no interdisciplinary courses offered at graduate level; few researchers use insights from different social science disciplines to understand a social problem.

The relevance and use of the social sciences produced in Pakistan for the understanding and development of Pakistani society is low. The social science knowledge produced is primarily for the use by state agencies and only marginally for creating social awareness of societal problems among the people, most of whom being illiterate cannot understand and benefit from it. The textbooks used for undergraduate and graduate studies are mostly imported, lacking relevance to the local context, they are unable to illuminate local problems.

The institutional capability for the development of the social sciences is inadequate in many respects. Though a considerable number of social science teaching departments and research institutes have been created during last forty years, they do not provide a very conducive environment for creative research

[22]For detailed discussion of this thesis see Galtung (1981).

and teaching. Besides lacking necessary infrastructure, such as libraries and physical environment, they also suffer from a limitation of inadequately motivated and trained staff. There are not many journals of high quality where young social scientists can publish and not many forums where social science output can be professionally evaluated providing a stimulus for improving the quality of work. Of course, the situation varies with different disciplines, economics being in a much favourable position compared to other disciplines.

Most social science literature produced in the institutions located in the state sector lack an autonomous and critical orientation and, therefore, are unable to delve deep into the social processes that determine the structure of the social order and offer a scientific critique of it. In the absence of such literature, national development policies are based on conjecture and without much input from social scientists.

There are many causes for the underdevelopment of the social sciences in Pakistan. The two most crucial are, the structure of the state and the cultural outlook of the religious authorities. The Pakistani state being essentially bureaucratic, authoritarian, modernising and dependent does not place a high value on the production of autonomous and critical social sciences. It regulates their production in a way that they become an intellectual vehicle for reinforcing the status quo rather than a means for transforming the social order and creating a better society.

The effectiveness of the state to allow only apolitical, technocratic and supposedly value neutral social sciences lies in the fact that most institutions producing social science knowledge are located in the state sector. This enables, indirectly and sometime even directly, the state to determine what type of knowledge is produced rather than letting the scholars choose their own research agenda and freely express their professional judgement on vital national issues. The Pakistani state places a narrow limit on a number of important issues that can be discussed openly even with scholarly detachment. Many important documents needed for research remain confidential and secret without any time limit. There is a general lack of trust between the scholar and the state officials who make many official documents classified and inaccessible to scholars for research.

Unlike the state, the cultural outlook of religious authorities affects the production of social scientific knowledge indirectly and subtly. Socially acquired religious beliefs, the fear of being dubbed heretical by religious authorities for studying problems protected from scientific inquiry, and the social need to avoid public controversy and disapproval prevent many a social scientists from choosing their subjects on the basis of their scientific and social significance. Socio-political constraints within which the social scientists work, over-dependence on knowledge borrowed from the West and lack of critical orientation toward indigenous intellectual heritage, have resulted in cultural

sterility in Pakistan. If cultural renaissance and intellectual fermentation is to be achieved by Pakistani intellectuals particularly social scientists, they must adequately face the following challenges.

Firstly, while critically examining western social sciences for their cultural and historical specificities, ethnocentrism, and their possible subordination to the political goals of the societies in which they developed and are developing, they must commit themselves to the task of contributing to the greater universalisation of the social sciences. Secondly, they must subject their own ethnocentrism to critical scrutiny, freeing it from the mistaken notion that once they engage in professional scientific work they become socially disembodied persons liberated from all biases and prejudices just because they use the scientific methods and quantitative technique. Ethnocentrism can be cured if one can muster the courage to face the reality as it exists, by broadening one's loyalties to the whole human race and owning both man's failures and achievement in whatever societal and historical context they occur. Finally, given the constraints imposed by the state structure and the cultural outlook of a significant part of the society, on freedom to express and dissent, creativity in scientific work cannot be achieved without a concerted and united struggle. Such a struggle can bear fruit if Pakistani social scientists, in spite of ideological divisions, can realise unity and can achieve professional excellence.

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2

Economists and Pakistan's Economic Development: Is there a Connection?*

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to show what role, if any, the economists of this country and the economics profession in general have played in the country's development. The purpose is not to apportion blame or credit for the pace and pattern of its growth in the past five decades on economists in general or a particular group or individual in particular, but to learn from the mistakes in the past and see how much more the profession as a whole could contribute to the country's development in the future.

The paper tries to raise the following issues in the context of Pakistan's development: experience:

(a) Does economic management really matter for economic development? How much has it mattered in the Pakistani context? What have been the determinants of economic research in Pakistan? What has been the role of economic research institutes, government departments and universities in promoting economic development, directly or indirectly.
(b) Are economic ideas which are accepted by practical men, especially governments, always based on the latest research findings or, as Keynes in his oft-quoted remarks implied, are these of a defunct economist? [Keynes (1936)]. Which economic ideas and which kind of economists have been able to influence economic development policies in Pakistan.
(c) Are economic ideas more powerful than vested interests?
(d) How can the economics profession in Pakistan play a more effective role?

The paper does not attempt to deal with these questions either sequentially or comprehensively, but tries to respond to the concerns implicit in them. The paper endeavours to combine the history of Pakistani economic development with that of, for want of a better term, the economic management infrastructure, which includes economic policy-making, research, education and information on economic issues. After defining the subject of the discourse in the Introduction,

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the next session discusses the developments in the early years. The third section deals with the manner in which Pakistani planners went about setting up the rather elaborate machinery for planning in the 1950s and 1960s. The fourth section focuses on the important role foreign advisers and foreign aid played in the first four Five Year Plans of Pakistan. The fifth section analyses the problems faced by the secession of the Eastern Wing of the country, the departure of the foreign advisers and the nationalisation policies of Mr Bhutto. The sixth section deals with the developments in the 1980s when populism and *ad-hocism* became the predominant determinants of economic development policies. The seventh section examines the serious crises of economic management in the 1990s, which have defied solution despite the efforts of two elected governments, two caretaker governments, two IMF agreements and two significant interventions by the army. The eighth section tries to focus on some lacunae and imbalances in the economic infrastructure which have hindered various actors in the economics profession from making a fuller contribution to the profession. In the concluding section the paper tries to draw some lessons for the future.

In invoking the oft-used quotation of Keynes, ably analysed by Professor Naqvi in his Presidential address to the second session of these meetings, [Naqvi (1985)] it must be remembered that Keynes was discussing the role of economics in the context of developed, rather than developing economies. None the less, developing economies have also been taking economics quite seriously, some would say too seriously, in recent decades. To the extent that the world is getting closer together, no country can ignore the basic principles of economics without seriously endangering the welfare of its citizens. The relationship between the way a country is governed and the way its economy is managed, is becoming more intimate than ever and political economy is increasingly becoming the most important subject of the discipline, both nationally and internationally.

Despite its growing importance, however, economics continues to be a discipline with rather undefined boundaries and has become the favourite hunting ground of many dilettantes. It may be argued that since economics affects everyone so intimately, everyone has a right to dabble in it. But so does electricity, for example, but one does not meddle with it except at the risk of getting a serious, sometimes, fatal shock or causing severe damage to one's electrical appliances. Despite this, the subject looks deceptively simple and has been prone to much contention by both experts and laymen. These days economic issues outshine the political ones in newspaper headlines and columns, offering great temptation for those who claim to know something about economics to play to the gallery and to seek the limelight by oversimplification, exaggeration and sensationalism. While popularising economic issues is a legitimate task of journalists, it is not easy for them to respect the underlying assumptions or the limitations of economic data in popular journals, sometimes even in columns of learned economists. Although

economists cannot prevent the trespass of journalists into their domain, they have the duty to see that their discipline is not vulgarised.

The best insurance against this, however, is for economists themselves to take interest in the development of economic science in their country and to see that the standard of discourse and debate is continually elevated, both at the academic and research level and at the level of popular perception of economic issues. Indeed the two are inter-related. Unless the universities and other institutions of higher learning produce well-trained economists and high quality research, we will gain neither the capacity to solve our economic problems, nor will we be able to provide a better understanding of these problems to the general public, without whose appreciation and understanding we will not be able to mobilise the political will which is so often needed to undertake institutional reforms for promoting growth with efficiency and equity. The neglect of economics education and research in universities and other institutions is, one of the more serious and persistent causes that has stood in the way of economists' contribution to Pakistan's economic development.

To rephrase Viner, economists do, what the state of economics is at a given time and in a given context. Good economists try to take it a bit further. Economists can be put in many categories, based on what they do or think they do: economic theorists, economic analysts, economic policy advisers, economic model builders, and econometricians, to give a rather incomplete inventory of the various castes, with changing hierarchies. Finally, we have the generalist civil servant, ubiquitous in Pakistan, who exercises great influence, more through experience than qualification, in matters relating to economic policy. It is useful to note that, just as a generalist civil servant (known as a CSP) often dabbles in economics, economists often dabble in administration, for which they have neither qualifications or experience. It must be acknowledged, however, that with few exceptions, the CSP has performed better as an economist than the latter has done as a bureaucrat.

Like all other disciplines, there is considerable tension in economics between the theorist and the applied economist and even more so between the academic economist and the practitioner. The theorist has the advantage of being in control of his starting point and is free to make his own assumptions, which may often be too simplified. The applied economist or the practitioner is never quite sure of the real facts, which must be the basis of his inquiry. Sir Alec Cairncross, who has had a distinguished career both as an academic economist and as the chief economic adviser to the British Government, has brought out the distinction succinctly between 'the theorists who seek to trap the inner secrets of the economy in their models' and 'the practitioners who live in a world of action where time is precious, understanding is limited, nothing is certain, and non-economic considerations are always important and often decisive' [Cairncross (1985)].

Economists sometimes take a rather conceited view of their role in economic policy-making and sometimes even think that their discipline can help make or unmake the destinies of nations. However, the fact is that over wide areas of public policy, the judgements of politicians and public officials, as well as public opinion in general, have been and still are formed to a large extent by beliefs and perceptions about the working of the economic system, and about national interests and the welfare of the community, which owe little or nothing to economic theories, past or present, and result from collective or individual interests, prejudices and experiences. The ideas that do indeed rule the real world are often the intuitive and simplistic perceptions of ordinary people, rather than the more elaborate systems of thought which occupy the minds of trained economists. Public decision-making is very often determined by a peculiar hybrid of intuition, common-sense, gut feeling and a smattering of simple economic concepts, which have been ably summarised by David Henderson as 'do-it-yourself economics' or DIYE [Handerson (1986)].

This does not, however, mean that there is no role for trained economists in the framing and delineation of public policy. They have the important task of clarifying and dispelling notions which superficially appear to be right but actually result in adverse consequences (i.e., counter-intuitive but rational) and in evaluating the consequences of lobbies for various causes (interest neutral analysis or counting the cost). More importantly, especially, in macroeconomic debates, they have the important role of identifying the long-term effects of public policy decisions, instead of the immediate or short-run benefits, which are often exclusively emphasised by decision-makers or the do-it-yourself economists. The unsavoury fact remains, that in the ultimate analysis, economic arguments, however sophisticated and well-founded on research, remain only one of the many inputs, seldom the most important, in public policy.[1] This fact has made many brilliant economists of our times leave the profession in despair and participate more directly in political and social activism.[2] Whether such an act offsets the loss to economics by the gain to politics or society at large depends very much on the individual's motivation and capability. Even without taking such a drastic step, many economists have shown the capability to display a lively social conscience and employ their analytical skills in the service of causes they consider worthy of support, such as poverty, equity, land reforms,

[1] Hasan (1998), laments, 'Unfortunately, for Pakistan the emotive appeal for non-economic factors has at critical junctures often outweighed the cold economic calculus', p. 113.

[2] Leon Strachey, Hugh Gaitskell, Alexander Papenderou and Hirofumi Uzawa are some of the famous names that can be cited as examples. Two of the author's own former colleagues at Islamabad (now Quaid-e-Azam) University, Prof. Md. Anisur Rahman and Prof. Aly Ercelawn have largely given up economics as a lost cause and have taken to more intellectually stimulating and spiritually satisfying pursuits such as Tagore songs and participatory development.

tenancy and minimum wage legislation, environment, human rights and gender discrimination, among others.[3]

The Early Years

In Pakistan, for a variety of reasons, the economics profession has been dominated by practitioners, initially bureaucrats, rather than by those who have academic and research interests. This was partly because the bureaucrats played not only the role of the midwife in the birth of the new state, but also of the nurse of the nascent economy. The bureaucrats who came to Pakistan were well-trained by the British in the art of crisis management and the 1950s provided plenty of opportunities for them to deal with such crises ranging from the settlement of refugees, division of assets between India and Pakistan, non-devaluation of the Pakistani rupee, the Korean boom, the disruption of trade with India and the establishment of a new Central Bank. They were thus able to put their indelible stamp on the management of the economy, as well as on the development of the economics profession.

However, after the initial period of crisis management, it came to be realised that mere familiarity with economic issues and common sense was not enough to deal with the problem of a complex developing economy and trained economists were needed if Pakistan was to achieve its development objectives of rapid growth, industrialisation, diversification of trade, monetary and fiscal management and the provision of necessary physical and social infrastructure. Realising that this would involve not only the day to day management of the economy, but the allocation of resources over time and increase in savings and investment, the government decided to set up the Pakistan Planning Board. Until 1951, the government's main concern, was to establish a functioning government apparatus and the commitment to economic development remained low [Burki (1981)].

With the demise of Mr Jinnah and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan as the first two chief executives of the new state, with no roots either in the bureaucracy or in the feudal power structure that emerged after their demise, indigenous political and social forces began to assert themselves [Hasan (1998)]. Although the Planning Board was established in 1953, under the chairmanship of Mr Zahid Hussain, who as the first Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, had already displayed considerable ability as economic administrator, efforts at planned economic development did not find much favour with the vested interests operating at that time. In fact, the First Five Year Plan (FFYP) produced by the Pakistan Planning Board was one of the first to raise the question of land reforms in the country but its radical proposals were ignored by the government and probably resulted in the replacement of Mr Zahid Husain by a senior civil servant from the Police

[3] The most notable and outstanding example of this is, of course, last year's Nobel Prize winner, Professor Amartya Sen (about whom more later in this paper).

Service. The FFYP was also notable for its emphasis on education, human development and infrastructure development [Waterson (1963)].

Despite the limitations of staff and the paucity of data, it is universally acknowledged that the FFYP was the best analysis of economic problems of the country that had been prepared until then. However, most of its recommendations, specially those on land and administrative reforms remain unimplemented even today and, given the backlog of the unfinished agenda of economic, social and institutional issues that it emphasised, the FFYP can still be considered as being 'ahead of its time', as it was characterised by some four decades ago. The main reasons for the lack of the implementation of the FFYP, were largely because of the resistance of vested interests and the lack of consensus between the political leadership of East and West Pakistan, which represented divergent political and economic interests. The failure of the FFYP demonstrated that the availability of economists is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the economic development of Pakistan. If the political will had existed, the recommendations of the Plan formulated through the vision of an able technocrat, with reliance mainly on foreign economic experts, could have become the harbinger of rapid economic and social development in Pakistan. This perhaps can be recorded as the first 'missed opportunity' in the economic development of Pakistan.

Developing Expertise in Development

However, even if the FFYP had been implemented and had proved to be a success, it was unlikely to have had a sustainable impact without a major effort to strengthen the professional capacity for economic management based on Pakistani nationals. While in the 1960s, such efforts were indeed made and largely succeeded in producing a sizeable corps of economists in the country, the outcome had many shortcomings and elements of unsustainability.

In the event, the launching of the FFYP under Mr Zahid Hussain did, however, spawn serious efforts towards the development of domestic economic expertise, largely with the assistance of the Ford Foundation. Mr Zahid Hussain had earlier succeeded in establishing a small group of economists at the State Bank of Pakistan's research department, headed by Dr S. A. Meenai.[4] Many of these economists, including Dr Mahbub ul Haq, Dr Parvez Hasan and Dr Moeen Baqai, were to later form the nucleus of the Pakistan Planning Commission, reorganised under the Ayub regime with generous financial assistance from the Ford Foundation. The re-organisation stemmed from a stronger commitment of the Ayub regime to economic development and the conviction that a professionally competent and politically strong Planning Commission could

[4] The group also included Dr Azizali F. Mohammed, who later joined the IMF and Dr Ziauddin Ahmed, who rose to become the Deputy Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan in the 1980s.

alone establish its credibility for mobilising larger foreign aid and overcome the bureaucratic hostility and indifference evidenced during the preparation and implementation of the FFYP.

The pursuit of planned economic development made it necessary to remedy the general shortage of economists trained in social science. When Prof. Edward Mason of Harvard University was asked by the Ford Foundation to remedy the dearth of economics in Pakistan, he was initially inclined more towards the establishment of a social science research project in Pakistan, but the lack of an appropriate academic institution to undertake such a programme made him give up the idea. As a result, the Ford Foundation undertook a two-pronged strategy. First, to overcome the lack of expertise and place reliance on foreign advisors, and, secondly, to support the building of general scholarly and research capacity of the economics profession in the country, outside the direct government policy-making areas.

The first function was carried out initially by foreign advisors sent to the Central Planning Board in Karachi and to provincial Boards in Lahore and Dhaka. It was believed that 'since there was far less sensitivity to the advisory role of foreigners in Pakistan than in India, the Advisors in Pakistan could play far more observable and significant role in economic policy-making in that country than in India' [Rosen (1985)]. In 1962, the Ford Foundation supported the Harvard Advisory Group in the Planning Commission until 1962. From 1962 to 1965 it was jointly supported by the Ford Foundation and the USAID. After 1965, the Foundation ended its direct support which was replaced by the World Bank, USAID and the Pakistan government funding. The Foundation however, supported the establishment of the Development Advisory Service at Harvard in 1962. It worked with the Planning Commission in Pakistan from 1962 to 1970 and the Foundation's interest in the Planning Commission remained high. The total funding for the Project over its entire life was approximately $6 to $7 million of which the Ford Foundation's direct share between 1963 and 1965 exceeded 44 percent.

A related project was the setting-up of the Institute of Development Economics (IDE), also launched with the support of the Ford Foundation, which grew in part out of the realisation of the need for better trained economists, a fact which was underscored during the course of launching the Harvard assistance to the Planning Commission. The Institute was founded to enable the conduct of research, relevant to, but not directly connected with, the Planning Commission. It received grants of almost $3 million from 1959 to 1969.

The economics profession in Pakistan in the 1960s was perceptibly divided across regional lines, with few opportunities for interaction and meaningful exchanges. The East Pakistani educational institutions, specially in economics, were generally much better developed and more committed to scholarship and research than those in West Pakistan. Secondly, this often meant that a much

higher proportion of good students from East Pakistan were inclined towards academic and research careers than those in West Pakistan, who preferred administrative and civil service and military careers in which the region already had more than its proportionate share. Thirdly, there was a similar asymmetry in regional preferences of those returning after training from abroad. The East Pakistani trained economists tended to prefer academic and research jobs while for the West Pakistanis, the administrative and government jobs provided a greater attraction. The asymmetry in the allocation of investment and the resultant disparity in the economic growth rate was reinforced by the concentration of West Pakistani economists in key decision-making positions and the 'relegation' of leading East Pakistani economists to academic and research pursuits. This further exacerbated the differences between East Pakistani and West Pakistani economists and intellectuals, which fast became irreconcilable and accelerated the movement towards the tragic end.[5]

It is interesting to contrast this formative period of Pakistan's economics profession with that of the corresponding period in India, which was relatively well endowed with qualified economists and strong research and academic institutions. Despite this, India also sought and received foreign technical assistance in the field of economics as part of development assistance. In the early years after Independence, India too was confronted with a situation of considerable political turmoil in its vast territory, including communal riots, integration of princely states, linguistic tensions and land reforms to which the Congress Party had committed itself.

Although Nehru continued to hold the office of the Prime Minister of the country uninterruptedly until his death in 1963, there was considerable disagreement on economic policies in his Cabinet in the initial three to four years. It was not until the death of Sardar Patel, who represented the conservative wing in the Congress, that Nehru was able to consolidate his power and articulate his 'socialist' vision for the development of India. As a result, the approaches reflected in the draft outline of the First Plan that had been adopted in August 1950 and the First Five Year Plan which was approved in 1952 were considerably different. While the former favoured modest government policy to encourage expansion of private enterprise in both industry and agriculture, the latter advocated greater control over the private sector and industry immediately, promised a larger role for public sector industry in future and formulated a policy of major social changes in the rural sector as a basic for achieving future growth in output.

Like Pakistan, the Indian Planning Commission was given a higher profile after the completion of the First Five Year Plan. Initially, its role was narrowly

[5] Reports of the Panel of Economists on the Five Year Plans. By the time of the Fourth Plan review, the divide had become so wide that separate reports were written by East and West Pakistanis.

circumscribed to one that was purely advisory to the cabinet and the purposes of planning were defined in rather narrow terms. By 1955, however, the Commission's status and powers were dramatically increased. 'The demarcation originally envisaged between the advisory functions of the Planning Commission and the decision-making responsibility of the government grew blurred' [Frankel (1978)]. Nehru himself played a key role in the Commission as its Chairman, while other Cabinet members were included as Commission members and the status of the Commission member was raised to cabinet level.

Although India had the technical expertise for framing and formulating its five year plans which were undertaken with almost no involvement of foreign experts, nevertheless, Indian leaders and planners were interested in foreign experiences in economics and interaction with foreign experts. However, India was sensitive not only to having foreign advisors helping in its development but its stand of neutrality and non-alignment, unlike Pakistan, inhibited it in seeking assistance from western donors alone. To prevent it from being seen as dependent on foreign expertise in its development plans, India did not encourage the working of foreign advisors in the Planning Commission directly, but channeled the technical assistance of foreign economic experts through research and educational institutions, especially the Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) whose head Professor P. C. Mahalanobis was Prime Minister Nehru's Principal Economic Advisor and personal friend. The Institute invited such luminaries as John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul Baran, Norbert Wyner, Nicholas Kaldor, Ragnar Frisch, Jan Tinbergen, Oscar Lange, Michael Kalecki, Charles Bettleheim and Herman Wold for lectures to Indian economists to familiarise them with the latest developments in economic theory, development planning and econometrics. The quantitative grounding of top Indian economists was among the highest anywhere in the world and even in early 1950s many Indian statisticians, economists and econometricians were invited to hold visiting appointments in foreign universities.

The technical assistance provided to India in the field of economic development and planning, unlike Pakistan, was not being given in a vacuum of ideas or personnel. The Indian political parties had in the period before independence given considerable thought to economic policy and the framework for India's economic development. The idea of planning was not new to India at the time of independence and considerable debate had taken place in the two decades prior to independence on the shape of the Indian economy and society after independence. There was considerable fascination for the Soviet models and for the ideas of Fabian socialism and many of the plans and proposals were formulated without much reference to western economics. Indian economists, both within and outside the government, were actively discussing these issues not only in the newspapers but also in academic journals and magazines such as the *Economic Weekly* which has since become the *Economic and Political Weekly* (EPW) and provides a lively and unique forum for the interaction of both academic and non-academics on a variety of economic issues.

It is also significant that the foreign assistance provided to assist economic research activities in India was channeled in a rather different manner than in the case of Pakistan. Although much of the western foreign assistance was channeled through the Planning Commission, operational activities were conducted through academic institutions such as the Delhi School of Economics, the Department of Economics of Bombay University and the Indian Statistical Institute's Planning Unit in Delhi. The focus of the international assistance was in being responsive to Indian needs as articulated by the government. Indian ideas and economic policies were largely independent of foreign thinking and were driven by such objectives as raising agricultural and industrial output and poverty alleviation.

In contrast to Pakistan, the Indian economic decision-making process depended marginally on foreign advisory services and relied most on able civil servants such as V. T. Krishnamachari, S. R. Sen, J. J. Acharya and Pitambar Pant, and well known academics such as A. S. Krishnaswami, I. G. Patel, K. N. Raj and V. K. Ramaswami. In later years, Sukhomoy Chakravarty, Raj Krishna, B. S. Minhas, Manmohan Singh and A. M. Khusro, among others, served as members of the Planning Commission. Overall, Indian economists and administrators had greater versatility and depth in the economic planning management process than in Pakistan.

The Role of Foreign Advisers

In the period up to 1970, Pakistan's economic development was greatly influenced by the presence of foreign economic advisors especially from the period 1960 to 1970. During the 1950s, although foreign assistance in macroeconomic management was also available, it played more of a catalytic than a direct role in economic decision-making. Technical assistance in the establishment of the Planning Commission and provincial planning boards as well as in a number of sectoral areas played a predominant role which it acquired in the 1960s as a result of closer economic and political relations with the United States under the military regime of General Ayub Khan.

Although other western agencies, such as USAID and the World Bank, had also given advisory support to Pakistan, the Harvard Advisory Group (HAG) sponsored by the Ford Foundation was the major source of economic advisory services to Pakistan. When the first two Harvard advisors came to Pakistan in April 1954, the nascent Pakistan Planning Board had a staff of only a few professionals; by the middle of 1965 when most of the work of the First Five Year Plan had been completed, the staff consisted of 55 professionals. The number of HAG advisors and persons rose to a peak of 17 in January 1965.

The foreign advisors played a leading role in the preparation of the draft of the FFYP. However, the Chairman of the Board, Mr Zahid Hussain, wrote not only

the introductory chapters of the plan which set forth the social and cultural planning framework in Pakistan, and the necessity for radical and cultural change if economic progress is to be achieved. He wrote the controversial chapters on public administration and land reforms, and reviewed the current conditions before going on to urge significant changes in the government administrative set up and policy and the structure of land ownership. In addition, he also edited all drafts of all the other chapters which were initially prepared by members of the HAG.

The role of the HAG in the Pakistan planning and economic management process was greatly enhanced during the Ayub regime and took a major turn with the arrival of Richard Gilbert in September 1960 as the field supervisor of HAG in Pakistan. Gilbert was an economist with a great deal of experience in the USA and was the product of the Keynesian Revolution, hence a strong advocate of government intervention in the economy. Gilbert held the view that the Planning Commission needed HAG assistance for a longer period than Edward Mason and David Bell had recognised. He saw a more active role for the Planning Commission and for its survival. Gilbert succeeded in upstaging the second Chairman of the Planning Board, Mr G. Ahmad by working his way into President Ayub's corridors of power. He succeeded in getting PL480 for Pakistan to support the Public Works Programme in Pakistan and in starting the Comilla Academy for which President Ayub Khan chose Mr Akhtar Hameed Khan as the Director. His second achievement which impressed President Ayub Khan was the substantial increase in the consortium aid for Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan [Mason (1966)], even though it was achieved through some embarrassment to the Planning Commission which had earlier submitted a much lower estimates of foreign assistance requirement, its Chairman, Mr G. Ahmed had also been removed.

Gilbert's achievements induced President Ayub Khan to strengthen the Planning Commission. His major selling point for a stronger Planning Commission was that it would enable Pakistan to get more foreign aid.[6] The President and his

[6] This was best articulated in the following memo to the Government of Pakistan on behalf of HAG: in part [Pakistan's comparative lack of success] is based upon a failure of Pakistan to put its best foot forward in negotiations with the West ... [The] United States and the Western world generally, believe that India's administrative capacity and her ability to use aid effectively are greater than Pakistan's ... [It] is true that the Indian planning operation and machinery for negotiating with the aid giving powers is superior to that of Pakistan ... The [Indian] Planning Commission has the utmost prestige ... [It has a large staff] and includes outstanding experts in all fields. The Commission plays the key role as central staff to the government. No important action is taken ... in economic [policy]… without ... analysis... by the Planning Commission. The aid programme ... is a major concern of the Commission, and there is close ... contact between India's representatives in the world's principal capitals and the Planning Commission staff. Pakistan's machinery for planning and for negotiating foreign aid.... Falls far short of India's ... [and] far short of its own capabilities. The Planning

cabinet accepted the suggestions for the enhancement of power and for strengthening of the staff of the Planning Commission. At the same time, however, the Ford Foundation was persuaded to continue its advisory services beyond 1963. As a recognition for his services for Pakistan's development, General Ayub Khan awarded Gilbert one of Pakistan's highest honours, the Sitara-i-Pakistan at the 1965 independence day ceremony. This was the first time that such a high honour was awarded to any economist in Pakistan, domestic or foreign, and remained the highest such honour for economists until the posthumous award of Nishan-e-Pakistan to Dr Mahbub ul Haque in 1998.[7]

The total number of advisors was raised to 13, seven in the Centre, four in Dhaka and two in Lahore. The Ford Foundation financed six of these while part of the PL-480 funding was used by USA to finance the other seven advisors. Commission staff were doubled by the end of 1962 and a number of famous Pakistani economists including Dr Mahbub ul Haq joined the Commission. Dr Mahbub ul Haq became the most articulate Pakistani economist endorsing the growth philosophy of Ayub's regime, which was now based on massive foreign aid inflows. In the Preface to his book on Economic Planning in Pakistan, he stated his contention 'that no low income society has yet evolved a painless way of stimulating capital formation and at the same time distributing income more equally' -- the author does not stand for social justice, he stands for economic growth. It was not until almost a decade later that he reverted his position and became an ardent advocate of social justice, without abandoning his love for high growth.

Both the Harvard Advisory Group and General Ayub Khan saw in the strengthened Planning Commission the means to their respective end. The aim of the Harvard Advisors was to commit Pakistan to a set of market-oriented policies such as the liberalisation of imports, relaxation of economic regulations and the introduction of private enterprise and the replacement by private enterprise of publicly owned industries. These policies were not only important in themselves but were also necessary to keep Pakistan in the western camp and reduce its temptations to move closer to the Soviet Union. For President Ayub Khan higher growth and large inflows of concessional foreign aid was needed to legitimise his regime and ease pains of development which would defuse popular unrest. It also served the purpose of maintaining a high level of defence expenditure which would, in the absence of foreign aid, cause a reduction in development expenditure.

Commission does not serve as central staff ... the Ministries are operating, for the most part, without benefit of economic counsel. The Planning Commission ... Has no continuous responsibility for preparing application for aid', Quoted in G. Rosen, *op. cit.*

[7] Dr Haq was awarded Tamgha-i-Pakistan during Ayub Khan's regime. To my knowledge, Professor S. N. H. Naqvi, is the only other economist who received the Sitar-i-Pakistan award in 1990.

These policies led directly to a massive increase in foreign aid to Pakistan from the Western countries from one percent of GNP in 1955-56 to 5 percent in 1959-60 and over 6 percent in 1964-65. There was an increase from 15 percent of Pakistan's development expenditure in 1955-56 to 44 percent in 1959-60, declining to 38 percent in 1964-65. On a per capita basis, foreign aid more than doubled from 1960-61 to 1964-65, and is probably the main reason for Pakistan's more rapid rate of growth than India's, which received 60 percent lower per capita foreign aid, during that period. The strategy also resulted in a handsome political dividend for Ayub Khan who won his Presidential Elections in 1965. Although doubts were raised about the genuineness of the election results, they provided substantial support for Ayub's policies and optimism for the future. As Dr Mahbub ul Haq was to recall later, the country appeared to be poised to the threshold of take-off [Baqai (1969)].

The foreign economists working as advisors in the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics performed a somewhat different and less unenviable role than their counterparts in the Planning Commission. Most of them were associated with teaching in American universities and their main interest was of gaining experience in a developing country which would help them rise on the economic ladder at home. In the 1960s, development economics was a growing and exciting discipline and most of the advisors at the PIDE were looking for opportunities to make their mark in the new discipline. One of the first advisors was Professor Gustav Ranis who was appointed the first Joint Director of the Institute. With the collaboration of the late Professor John Fei, who arrived at the Institute a year later, the two produced a seminal work in development economics extending the theory of Professor W. A. Lewis of a labour surplus economy and generalising it to the transition to a mature economy. They also laid the foundation of a training programme in quantitative methods and planning techniques, which was continued in later years with varying degrees of sophistication. The Institute in this initial period of its existence also worked closely with the Planning Commission and developed a synergy which was unfortunately not maintained in later years.

Amongst others who made significant contributions in development economic research at the Institute, were Professor Richard Porter, Professor Henry Bruton, Professor John Powers, Keith Griffin and Professor Stephen Lewis, Jr. The Institute provided a good vehicle for the search and selection of young Pakistani economists who were later sent for studies at good universities abroad. It also provided a place for mentoring young researchers by the advisors. The usual pattern was to select a fresh Pakistani graduate with a Masters degree and ask him to work on a problem of his choice with one of the advisors. After one or two publications, the staff economist was sent abroad for foreign training. On his return, he was expected to undertake research independently. In the decade of the 1960s, however, most of the successful returnees were from West Pakistan. With the transfer of the Institute to Dhaka, most of the West Pakistani economists found jobs outside the Institute, either within Pakistan or abroad.

Just as West Pakistanis dominated the Planning Commission, the East Pakistani economists had a proportionately larger presence in the PIDE. With the appointment of Dr Nurul Islam as the first Pakistani Director of the Institute, this difference became even more conspicuous. Nevertheless, much of the research published in the *Pakistan Development Review* (PDR) during the 1960s, was conducted either by foreign advisors or by East Pakistanis. West Pakistani economists were a junior partner in the Institute and generally felt frustrated. When the Institute was re-established in 1972, no senior West Pakistani economist was available and only a handful at the junior level turned up to join it in Islamabad. The suggestion to attempt to develop a cooperative relationship between the Institute and the Department of Economics of Quaid-e-Azam University, which by that time had built a modest reputation for teaching, but needed to be strengthened further to develop its full potential, was vehemently opposed and stymied by the then Director. Despite the passage of more than a quarter century, turf considerations have still not allowed the flowering of the promise of a fruitful collaborative relationship between these two institutions and the realisation that such collaboration would serve to constitute a much larger sum than the parts represented by them working in isolation, has not been able to cross the impregnable barriers of self-interest and institutional rivalries that are so pervasive in Pakistan and have caused immense damage to institutional growth and excellence. If that idea had been pursued seriously, a first-rate economics centre in Pakistan may well have emerged by now.

The Ravages of Political Ill-Winds

The Harvard episode ended rather abruptly towards the end of 1970 in the wake of the economic difficulties faced by Pakistan after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 and the accompanying political fall out in the form of Bangladeshi nationalism led by Mujibur Rahman's Awami League and of West Pakistani populism led by Mr Z. A. Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The decline in foreign aid and the insistence of a larger share for East Pakistan brought the end to the growth miracle and, in the end the overthrow of Ayub Khan's regime and eventually the end of foreign advisory services both for the Planning Commission and for the PIDE. With the shifting of the Institute of Development Economics to Dhaka and its eventual transformation into the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS), the Pakistani economics profession paid the price for the neglect of research and academic activities as a result of its overemphasis of, and zeal for, policy-making and planning functions.[8] PIDE in

[8] Bangladesh, on the other hand, got a ready-made research facility, which involved itself heavily in the government's planning and development work. The Planning Commission of Bangladesh was manned by Bangladeshi academics and researchers, who had been largely excluded from the planning process in Pakistan. This also serves to demonstrate that it is far easier for economists to play the role of policy-makers and planners than for the latter to undertake research and academic pursuits.

Islamabad had to be built virtually from scratch. The professional staff in the Planning Commission also gradually left and by the end of the 1970s, it became a ghost of its former self.

Despite the apparent differences, the two decades of the 1970s and 1980s can be characterised as the decades in which economics took a back seat and political considerations reigned supreme. Although the superstructure of planning inherited from the 1960s continued into the 1970s and 1980s, it did so with considerably reduced influence and eroded authority. During the Bhutto period a number of wide-ranging and far-reaching economic decisions were made, but their main motivations were to cripple the political and economic power of the regime's opponents and to enhance the resources available to the state not in order to use them for development and raising the standards of living of the people, but to strengthen the grip of the ruling party and its autocratic leader on the state apparatus for his whimsical designs. There was very little input from academic and research economists—many of whom were sympathetic towards the PPP—into his policies, which were formulated in terms of a broad policy agenda, based on populist slogans without any attempt to analyse their feasibility, consistency or implications.

Ironically, the severest blow to the planning process in Pakistan was received during the Fourth Plan period (1970–75), after the resumption of office by Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto. Indeed, the process of planning was shelved and the Planning Commission assumed a subsidiary role, with the Ministry of Finance regaining the pre-eminent role it enjoyed before 1960. One of the main reasons for giving planning a low priority was that the Fourth Five Year Plan (1970–75) was formulated and adopted during the Ayub regime and its basic strategy was unacceptable to the new government. The new government summarily scrapped the plan. However, the government was unable to formulate a new five year plan to replace it as it became too involved in the immediate political and economic problems facing the country. Also, both the ongoing projects and many more such as the Steel Mills, the Power Project, Heavy Engineering and Electrical Complexes, which had already received priority, hardly left any room for additional projects to be undertaken.

It may seem ironic that Pakistan chose to follow a pro-socialist agenda at a time when serious self doubts about socialism had begun to arise even in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The logic of adopting this particular path in Pakistan arose from the concentration of income and wealth which resulted in an acute form during the last days of the Ayub era. The twenty-two families slogan, popularised at the end of Ayub Khan's rule, by its Chief Economist, Dr Mahbub ul Huq, over-simplified the growth versus equity debate in Pakistan and

deflected attention from the much more basic problems of agrarian structure and other institutional changes.[9]

The populist economic policies introduced by Bhuttos's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) included, among others, a second and more energised attempt to introduce effective land reforms. These reforms were perceived to be more vigorous than those implemented by President Ayub Khan, a decade and a half earlier, although both were carried out under the umbrella of martial law. The Bhutto land reforms were particularly handicapped by their poor implementation and political thrust, which greatly diluted their impact, often through fictitious land transfers and the resumption of tenanted land for self cultivation.

The period also coincided with a boom in the international demand for economists, especially in international agencies, such as the IMF, the World Bank and the United Nations and its specialised agencies. The professional competence of the Planning Commission has attritioned partly through a process of neglect and partly through the brain drain, which became pervasive in the 1970s and has shown little signs of reversal since then. However, the Planning Commission did have some very dedicated professionals such as Moinuddin Baqai and Jawaid Azfar—both of whom suffered strokes and died in harness—who resisted external temptations and kept alive its professional reputation to a considerable extent. That breed, unfortunately, is now extinct, largely because of our failure to recognise good economists as an endangered species in this country.

The Ascendancy of Populism and *Ad-hocism*

Although it was relatively easy for General Zia to politically overthrow Bhutto, it was much more difficult to exorcise the latter's populist appeal which not only haunted him until his own death but also continues to obsess his political legatees to the present day. Ironically, the latter were compelled to pay him their tribute in the form of imitating his populist follies. As a result, Gen. Zia became preoccupied with the need to legitimise his own rule, through deliberate attempts to discredit the latter rather than by any serious efforts to reverse or replace his policies. Unlike Ayub Khan and to a limited extent Bhutto, Zia delegated all the authority to the technocrats rather than taking personal command of the economy [Burki (1989)]. Although the planning process, largely suspended during Bhutto's regime, was revived, development policies became more ad hoc and devoid of political vision, notwithstanding the return of Dr Mahbub ul Haq, who served in various ministerial capacities during the period. The reaffirmation of the bureaucracy in the decision-making hierarchy, symbolised by the ascendancy of Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the country's top bureaucrat, who later succeeded Gen. Ziaul Haq, was a salient feature of the Zia period.

[9] A number of authors, including Rashid Amjad, Jawaid Azfar, Akmal Husain, M. H. Khan and S. M. Naseem initiatd research on the problems of industiral concentration, agrarian structure and poverty during the period.

The resumption of growth, however, occurred through such fortuitous factors as favourable weather conditions and increasing worker's remittances, rather than through deliberate policy interventions or improved economic management. While the main preoccupation of the planning process in Pakistan has been the achievement of high growth rates of GDP, largely through attracting large amounts of foreign resources, its record in attaining balanced development, especially in the social sectors, and in mobilising domestic resources, has generally been considered deficient. Planning and economic management in Pakistan have since the 1970s been conducted as ad hoc exercises in short term crisis management.

However, this preoccupation has resulted in the neglect of the longer-term goals and strategic objectives and the creation of many structural imbalances in the economy. The belated realisation in the late 1980s of the country's lag in social development did lead to some initiatives, such as the Social Action Programme (SAP), but these too were half-hearted and in the nature of crash programmes and relied heavily on donor support, rather than systematic and well-designed plans to integrate social concerns into policy-making [Naseem (1998)]. After the lifting of martial law and introduction of limited political democracy in 1985 and the restoration of full parliamentary democracy in 1988, there was a considerable rise in social expenditures, motivated largely by dispensing them as patronage to political allies. Little attention was, however, paid to the structural problems which have been responsible for the continued social backwardness of the country.

In the absence of a clear economic and social agenda, which required political support to be effective, and in order to legitimise the regime, the support of the Islamic clergy and, through them, of the common people, was sought by appealing to their religious sensibilities. A number of measures to Islamise the economy, without affecting the basic economic structure in any significant way, were introduced towards this end.

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the resulting decline in foreign aid, Pakistan's economy faced serious fiscal and balance of payments imbalances, resulting in the resort to structural adjustment assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, as well as short-term external borrowing. The implications for this for economic management was a further erosion in its reliance on domestic capability, which was gradually supplanted by lender advice and technical assistance. This gave rise to the syndrome of the low-level international expert negotiating with the highest-level government functionary (Secretary and above) and a progressive decline in the reliance on and motivation of, domestic experts. This side-tracking of domestic expertise arose from a perversely asymmetrical relationship based on the lenders' leverage to influence domestic policy decisions.

In contrast to the 1960s, the post-1980s situation in regard to the respective roles of the generalist civil servant, the domestic expert and the foreign expert in macroeconomic management, has changed significantly. The domestic expert has suffered in terms of status and influence both to the generalist civil servant and the foreign expert (generally a visiting junior staff member of one of the lending agencies). Over time, the role of the top echelons in the civil service has changed from being a generalist with no presumed understanding of the field he was heading to that of 'policy management' which did require some technical knowledge of that field, but more importantly, a capacity to formulate workable policies in that area. In contrast to the past, the formulation and implementation of long-term policies has been increasingly the preserve of the civil servant rather than the economic expert.

A peculiar trait of the generalist civil servant during this period has been his aversion and inability to make his decisions on the basis of informed judgement, based on the research of, much less, in consultation with, available domestic expertise. The underlying reason for this seems to be that this makes him look a much lesser decision-maker than if he had made such a decision on the basis of intuition, gut feeling, spunk or even pure whim.[10] Unlike the resident foreign advisor of the 1960s, the present day itinerant expert from Washington or Manila generally has little stake in the country's economic development and is busy trying to extort unrealistic promises from the government in the form of conditionalities which cannot be fulfilled without basic structural changes in the economy. While Pakistan has been stigmatised as a 'one-tranche' country, the IMF officials who had negotiated the defaulted loans are promoted, rather than censured for the lack of their prescience in anticipating the outcome. The domestic experts, whose quality has gone down over the years, tended either to stand as silent onlookers or obsequiously endorse the recommendations of the generalist bureaucrat and the itinerant foreign expert.

The decline in the importance of the Planning Commission, the low status that professionals have vis à vis the civil service bureaucrats, along with the lure of high paying jobs in the international market (and lately in the domestic market by well-heeled NGOs and international agencies including the World Bank) for well-qualified economists have all contributed to the declining morale of the economists working in public sector institutions. These problems have become even more pronounced in the 1990s.

The Crisis of the 1990s

During most of the 1990s Pakistan's economy has been in a virtual state of siege. The early years of the decade had held out considerable hope that the nation's economy will enter a new phase of economic growth. With the ushering

[10] I am grateful to Arshad Zaman, a former Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, for an informal conversation on these issues.

in of a new era of democracy and open economic policies it was hoped to take advantage of a number of favourable trends in the world economy. By refocusing attention on and redirecting resources towards social sectors, institutional issues and environmental concerns, further gains could be made. The regional climate was also beginning to be conducive to stronger growth with the possibility of meaningful economic cooperation in South Asia and the prospects of benefiting from and establishing linkages with, the miracle economies of East Asia, which had blazed the trail of a new development paradigm distinct both from those of centrally-planned and capitalist market economies.

Against these hopeful prospects were the stark realities of an unstable political climate in the country which had been vitiated by the repeated disruption of the democratic process through the intrusion of martial law or arbitrary dismissal of elected governments and had divided the country along regional, ethnic and often narrowly-based, group interest. As a result, the political process did not deliver the kind of leadership required to pull the country of its deep and multi-faceted crises. Indeed, the politicians instead of providing a solution to the problems facing the country became an addition to its burgeoning list. Neither Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif, each of whom was given two chances to head the government within a decade and who emerged as leaders of two rival political parties, failed to live up to the expectations of those who voted them to power. While both were young in years, they were unable to unshackle themselves from the political legacies they had inherited from their mentors.

These adverse political developments began having a serious impact on the economy, which had already suffered considerably due to the neglect of long-term development during the Zia years. Agricultural growth and remittances, which had provided the greatest impetus to growth in the Zia years had considerably weakened and the country faced new challenges after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War in 1990-91. These trends caused a slowdown in the growth of the economy.

The unfolding developments in the economic field, in turn, had a profound impact on the political arena, giving rise to a chain of periodic crises between 1993–97. As many as six Prime Ministerial changes—three of which involved caretaker heads of government and two involving Mr Nawaz Sharif—and three changes in the Presidency have taken place during the 1990s. As a result, a major instrument of governance emerged during this period by bringing in neutral caretakers in order to give some semblance of independence to the electoral process.

By 1993, however, economic management became an important issue as Pakistan's economic growth began showing signs of fatigue and fiscal deficits and external debt started assuming alarming proportions. The neglect in the social sector and Pakistan's lack of diversification in industry and exports also

came home to roost. The confluence of these factors at a time when Pakistan was being willy nilly dragged into integration into the global economy under the aegis of a structural adjustment programme of the IMF and the World Bank, produced a number of crises which its weak political and economic institutions were unable to bear.

Both political and economic compulsions necessitated the resort to a new political instrument in the form of caretaker governments in the 1990s, which consisted largely of technocrats, acted as a buffer between political democracy and military rule (both with varying degrees of purity), the two forms of government that have almost equally shared the country's half-century of turbulent existence. The sudden emergence of Mr Moeen Qureshi on Pakistan's political horizon in the late summer of 1993 dramatically symbolised the intermingling of political and economic issues. Whatever reservations one might have about the desirability of caretaker governments, Mr Qureshi's three month sojourn in Pakistan did prove to be a breath of fresh air in the somewhat turgid environment of Pakistan.

He succeeded in initiating a series of economic reforms, which may not have had a deep or lasting impact on the economy or polity of the country, but did have a decisive influence in setting the terms of the debate in a more meaningful fashion than had been attempted thus far. Apart from raising the question of default of bank and other public loans, which continues to haunt the government and agitate the public mind to this day, without any tangible sign of solution, Mr Qureshi made accountability, corruption and good governance an inalienable part of the lexicon of political debate. He also was responsible for initiating the move to give autonomy of the State Bank, although that too has proved to be a rather elusive goal.

However, when the caretaker arrangement was invoked again some three years later, its effectiveness became even less evident. For unlike the previous attempt, the caretaker government headed by Mr Meraj Khalid, while comprising more and perhaps abler technocrats than before, lacked a sense of direction and seemed to be increasingly enamoured with the possibility of an extended tenure. In contrast to Mr Moeen Qureshi who assiduously tried to work himself out of his job in three months, the new caretakers seemed to be more inclined—perhaps with the inspiration of the President who saw no political future for himself, as turned out to be the case—to find a more lasting political niche in the country's polity. The only real gain of the last caretaker experiment seems to have been that it has largely cured the country of the belief that technocracy can ever be a political panacea for its ills. The country's social and economic problems are deeply structural in nature and can be solved only through continuous and unremitting institutional changes, rather than quick, one-shot measures which may succeeded in particular contexts.

The basic idea behind the caretaker experiment as a tool of strengthening domestic economic management capability and bringing some measure of neutrality has much merit. However, the way it has been used in Pakistan is to administer shock therapy to the existing establishment which is *prima facie* blamed for the crisis which is sought to be remedied by the periodic influx of expatriate Pakistani economists and other experts to repackage a set of new policies. This has proved counterproductive and is hardly conducive to the building of a dedicated core of economists in key ministries and the nurturing of self-confidence among them so that they could be expected to deal with these crises on an ongoing basis. After the Caretakers or the expatriate experts leave, there is business as usual, often with a vengeance, and a sigh of relief.

It would indeed be much better if the services of these and other visiting experts are used towards imparting training and holding workshops and seminars to strengthen the capability for economic management as well as enhancing analytical abilities among other economists, including academics and researchers. As yet there is a total absence of initiatives to use the considerable reservoir of outstanding Pakistani economists in a systematic way towards strengthening the economics profession in Pakistan. The opportunity provided by the Pakistan Society of Development Economists (PSDE) meetings are too limited to make more than a transitory impact on a rather small group of potential beneficiaries. India and Bangladesh make a much more effective use of their expatriate economists. Even in Pakistan, doctors and bankers seem to have put their act together, but the economists have not been able to do so.

A perceptible change in the pattern of macroeconomic management and the sociology of economic decision-making in Pakistan seemed to be emerging with the strengthening of political democracy in the late 1990s, in which the technocrat and bureaucrat is being steadily edged out by political appointees. With the demise of Dr Mahbub ul Haq, who continued to be an ardent supporter of and advisor to the present government until his death, the shifting of Mr Sartaj Aziz—who belonged to the same cohort and metamorphosed from an economic bureaucrat to a politician—to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the rather unexpected resignation of Dr Hafiz Pasha, a reputed and relatively young Pakistani academic, who joined the two caretaker cabinets of 1993 and 1996 and decided to stay on as the present government's chief economic policy advisor and its main interlocutor with the IMF and the World Bank, there is no competent senior adviser to the government on economic affairs. Some may consider this as a cause for celebration, but in the absence of accompanying measures to adopt an alternative strategy of development and the strengthening of the government's economic expertise, it is more a cause for concern.

In Mr Nawaz Sharif's second tour of duty as Prime Minister, the technocrats have been losing out to party stalwarts and close confidantes of the Prime Minister, in the management of the economy, especially since the relationship with the IMF has soured and taken a more political turn in the wake of the

sanctions imposed by the U.S. and the G-5 as a result of the nuclear tests in May 1998. All this reflects a changing pattern of management of the Pakistani economy, which itself is the result of the interaction of political and economic factors and the continuous crises that the country has faced.

It also is partly attributable to Mr Nawaz Sharif's demonstrated dislike of technocrats whom he perceives as often standing in the way of implementing his populist agenda and strengthening his political base, through fiscal concessions (often camouflaged as supply side economics). Mr Sharif's open quarrels with two former Presidents, Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Mr Farooq Leghari, both of whom he succeeded in consigning to political oblivion, were also based on his perception of them as being the representatives of bureaucracy and technocracy. He has also been emboldened in his cavalier disregard for professional advice by his successes in ousting an Army Chief and a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court when they offered counsel unacceptable to him.

Some Missing Ingredients

The preceding discussion about the role of the economics profession in the economic development of the country makes it evident that while economists did play a significant role, the political leadership failed to pay sufficient attention to ensure the profession's sustained and balanced development over time. This stemmed as much from the myopic view of the role of economists as from the inherent biases in the development strategy against egalitarian and human capital development.[11] By concentrating merely on augmenting the supply of economists working for the government in the fields of economic planning and macroeconomic management, the broader vision for social and economic development was restricted and lost sight of by default.

Among the most unfortunate victims of social apathy and neglect inherent in the growth-centred development strategy of the 1960s have been the institutions for promoting education and research in the social sciences, which were never very strong in the first place. The social sciences in Pakistan have suffered in their development not only from the relatively greater paucity of resources allocated to them, but also from the induced perceptions of their inferior usefulness to society. This has happened despite a growing realisation that the social science disciplines have to play an increasingly important role in the tasks of national reconstruction and development, often in a close complementary relationship with natural sciences, especially in the fields of health, bio-technology, human settlements and environment.

The state of economics education, which is the subject of a separate paper [Naseem, Qureshi and Siddiqui (1998)] (Chapter 3 in this collection – Ed.) and is also the main target of the critique of the profession by Professor M. H. Khan

[11] For a recent critique of these biases in Pakistan, see Husain (1999).

and Dr. Nadeemul Haque, [Haque and Khan (1998)] (Chapter 4 in this collection - Ed.) can hardly be considered as satisfactory and has been the victim of neglect by all of us. Since I have spent the best part of my professional life in Pakistan as a teacher, I will try to abstain from identifying what went wrong in the past. The best that the profession has done to rectify the situation is to move from an ostrich approach to what I would call an 'oasis' approach, which has involved the setting up of private, elitist institutions to ensure the supply of good economists. The approach can hardly be considered an improvement on the HAG approach, although not for the same reasons. It also seems a rather strange way of reversing the elitist bias of our state and society which is becoming the mission statement of many of our colleagues.

Academics, barring a few exceptions, have generally played a very limited role in guiding the shape of development policies in the country. Before 1971, our academic colleagues in what was then East Pakistan, did play an active part, both directly—notably, Professors M. N. Huda and A. F. A. Husain—and indirectly through the Pakistan Economics Association and its journal, as well as through their active role in the Panel of Economists set up by the government to review the Five Year Plans. Only a few academic economists, such as Dr Akmal Husain and Dr Hafeez Pasha have been actively involved in economic policy making since then. After holding its first meeting in Islamabad in 1972, the Pakistan Economic Association has become defunct and its demise has become an embarrassment to the profession. The PSDE, which is a part of PIDE, while playing the useful role of holding a profile international meeting, is a poor substitute as a forum for having free and open debates on economic issues and for organising activities which would invigorate the profession. The absence of any serious and sustained efforts to revive the Pakistan Economic Association is evidence of the profession's revealed preference in favour of official, donor-funded institutions and activities held in five-star hotels, which the profession has become hooked to during the last two decades.

Again a comparison with India, brings out a rather startling difference, to the point of being a polar opposite. The number of research institutions and the amount of funding—both among all disciplines and within the framework of social sciences—attributable to the area of economics are easily the largest. Among disciplines in universities, while management science is somewhat prestigious, economics continues to wield significant clout [Reddy (1998)]. During more than 80 years of its existence, the Indian Economic Association has missed only one annual session. Its sessions are held all over India and not in the capital, Delhi, but are generally hosted by universities on their campuses. Indeed, Dr I. G. Patel, a former Director of the London School of Economics who served in several prominent capacities in the Indian economic establishment, once complained that: 'the teachers of economics in our universities enjoy a degree of esteem, publicity and financial support which is the envy of their colleagues in other departments. And yet, there are a great many among our fraternity whose attitude towards issues of economic policy is

one of indifference or skepticism. Even in our more exuberant moods, we often bring to our profession an air of unreality or controversy which is hardly calculated to sustain the present boom in the demand of our skills' [Patel (1996)].

In Pakistan, however, the tribal hierarchy among economists is opposite to the prestige system which Professor Gailbraith describes: 'It assigns, and for good reason, the very lowest position to the man who deals in everyday policy. For, this individual in concerning himself with the wisdom of a new tax or the need for an increased deficit, is immediately caught up in a variety of political and moral judgements. This puts him in communication with the world at large. As such, he is a threat to the sharp delineation which separates the tribal group from the rest of society and thus to the prestige system of the profession' [Gilbraith (1971)]. As has been pointed out earlier, in Pakistan, the government economists and bureaucrats have generally enjoyed a much higher pecking-order than their academic or research counterparts in the Pakistani economics establishment.

The tendency among academic economists to deprecate the work of 'official economists', often arises from the inability to appreciate the unenviable and constrained environment in which such a colleague works, especially in a developing country. He/she has to not only improvise and respond to practical questions with approximate solutions based on inadequate, incomplete and outdated data, but he/she also has to comprehend, interact and influence a host of non-economic factors, as well as to convince his/her colleagues within and outside the government.

Very often the official economist is not only forced to extrapolate from the unreliable figures of the present into the uncertain future, but also from a dubious past to a credible present situation. Few government economists are able to deliver their best analysis of reasonable policy options in fair and comprehensible terms, without having to trim their views to suit the presumed wishes of those who seek their advice or oversee their work—which is easier said than done. There is a great degree of diversity of professional commitment among economists, but the majority tends to be of those who 'supply on demand', rather than those who show initiative and originality, which is often scoffed at by the superiors. Apart from its inadequacy, they have to reckon with possible delays in getting data and the pressing need, sometimes, to preliminary estimates as 'final results' for the secretary who is keen to impress his minister or the minister who is eager to impress the cabinet and the Prime Minister!

The situation in this regard is not unique to the economics profession. Politicians also ask for the delivery of 'quick justice' from law and order authorities and the police often has the temptation to convict the wrong person in a hurry by adopting rather dubious means of investigation. The courts are, however, expected to ensure that such miscarriage of justice does not take place. Official economists are sometimes under similar pressure to diagnose the ills of the

economy (or, more often, issue certificates of its good health and announce it on the media) and prescribe remedies without sufficient evidence and analysis. Some Government economists have a penchant for exposure on the media, especially electronic media. While it is often necessary to 'package' some economic measures for highlighting and even canvassing public support for a proposal (as distinct from explaining or elaborating a proposal) there is a risk of the economist spilling over into an alien territory viz., that of politicians. Unless undertaken with extreme care, such activities can often destroy the credibility of both the policies and the protagonists.

To counter this trend, it is necessary to have peer reviews, both internal and external, of government reports, before their approval and acceptance. In Pakistan, unfortunately, such peer review has largely been conspicuous by its absence, not only in the government but also in research and government institutions. There has also been little tradition to encourage freedom of expression and debate in a genuine fashion, either in-house or outside. In the absence of peer interaction and review, regardless of one's position in the hierarchy, it is no wonder that the quality of research output is what it is. Individual consultation with, and supervision by, senior staff members is hardly a substitute for open interaction with peers. The highly centralised and bureaucratised (some would say, feudal) work culture that survives today in most of our academic and research institutions, notwithstanding the rhetoric about modernisation and globalisation, stifles initiative and participation among the research staff.

While government economists have played a central role in the development of Pakistan's economy in the past, their role has increasingly become that of a mechanic maintaining an obsolete machine. They are seldom put in the driver's seat and even as chauffeurs, they have little knowledge where they are headed or what the best route is to a given destination. When the ride gets bumpy, they are some times the first to be off-loaded and replaced by a new driver. It is, of course, not necessary for the economist to be incharge of running the country's economy. His role should be that of helping to provide a better understanding of how the economy works and how it can be managed to achieve the goals that the people through their representatives, express their desire for. The temptation to promise what cannot be achieved given the resources and the external and domestic constraints, must be avoided.

Conclusion

The economics profession in Pakistan, to the extent that it has an autonomous existence from other professions and elements in society, does share, if tenuously, some credit for the little that went right and considerable blame for a lot that went wrong with its development. It is difficult to construct an accurate balance sheet of the profession's contribution. In the case of Pakistan, the economic profession did exercise considerable influence earlier on, but in recent

years, its influence has eroded considerably and has all but disappeared in the last decade or so. Much of the contribution of the economists was made by those who worked with the government. However, it is difficult to identify the contribution of policy makers functioning as civil servants, either individually or as a group. For example, it is never possible to say what bad decisions were averted, or which good policy measures were initiated at their instance, since some decisions are taken on the advice of, and some in spite of, the advice of economists. One can only sympathise with the heroic battles some of our professional colleagues are reported to have fought against ignoramus and self-seeking politicians and overbearing foreign donors.[12]

The historical evolution of the economics profession in Pakistan as described in this paper provided very little space for the contribution to the country's economic development by economists outside the government, especially those in the universities and research institutes. This stands in sharp contrast to other South Asian countries, especially India and Bangladesh. The contrast between the stories of evolution of the economics profession in and its contribution to economic development in India and Pakistan can best be captured in terms of the career of the late Dr Mahbub ul Haq and Professor Amartya Sen, last year's Nobel Prize winner in economics, who were not only contemporaries at Cambridge, but shared a long personal and professional friendship. Each in his own way achieved international celebrity status as economists and contributed to the development of their country and had a deep impact on the economics profession of their country.

Dr Haq started his career in the Planning Commission and rose to its highest professional post at well under 40 years of age. For better or for worse, his name became synonymous with planning and development in Pakistan. The Planning Commission never regained the stature it had when he was its Chief Economist, not even when he became a Minister of Planning almost two decades later. Much of the rest of his professional life was spent in the World Bank and UNDP where he made outstanding contributions in influencing the direction of policy thinking on poverty, human development and foreign assistance. Many of his critics accused him of inconsistency and shifting his position dramatically, especially on the issues of growth and social justice. Even so, he had a great savvy for knowing when the time had come for a given idea or strategy and then went for it—be it growth, 22 families, poverty, human development, trade with India, defence expenditures, Siachen glacier, Kashmir or even the nuclear bomb. Dr. Haq raised the image of his country in the international donor community as no other single person has done. In the 1980s he chose to join General Ziaul Haq's government in the hope that he could influence the policies of the

[12] The chronicles of such disputes are available in the recent writings of former policy-makers. See, for example, 'The Minister and the Bureaucrat' by Hamza Alavi, *Dawn*, 11 October, 1997, describing his experiences in the early years of the State Bank of Pakistan.

government and make them more rational. Here he failed rather miserably and was outmanoeuvred by the politicians, especially when he tried to hit their vested interests.

Professor Sen, on the other hand, decided to choose the opposite path of academic teaching and research and stayed away from not only politics, but even working for the government. When asked by a reporter what is the first thing he would have done, had he been appointed as the Finance Minister of his country, he is reported to have unhesitatingly replied, 'I would have resigned'. Professor Sen, along with other eminent economists, such as K. N. Raj, Jagdish Bhagwati, Sukhumoy Chakravarty, Pranab Bardhan and A. L. Nagar laid the foundation of one of India's leading centres of economics teaching, the Delhi School of Economics. Once the school had established its reputation, its PhD graduates were not only hired by the School itself, but also by leading international universities. It also started attracting other Indian scholars and PhDs from foreign universities. When Professor Sen and others, such as Jagdish Bhagwati, left India in the late 1960s to take up appointments at prestigious foreign universities, there was no vacuum in the Indian academic institutions of economics. In fact, their departure abroad made them more useful to the profession in India who drew inspiration from the seminal work that they produced abroad. Sen's contribution, for example, is not confined to development economics but covers a wide range of fields, including collective choice, capital theory, income distribution, poverty, hunger and famines.[13]

I do not mean to be either facetious or invidious in making this comparison. My purpose is to use it simply to illustrate the differences in the evolution of the economics profession in the two countries and how it affected the choices of two leading economists with apparently similar intellectual abilities and with access to broadly similar career opportunities. It was quite possible that if Pakistan had paid a less unequivocal emphasis on the development of expertise in economic management and planning and more on the development of academic and research institutions, Dr Haq and many of his other contemporaries would have been attracted to an academic career and would have helped the creation of a minimum mass of academics to develop at one place and allowed such centres to spread all over the country.

Of course, it can be argued that brilliant economists are neither a necessary or a sufficient condition for sound economic development policies. Indeed, Jagdish Bhagwati made this telling comment about the contrast between India and the Asian tigers; 'It is not entirely wrong to agree with the cynical view that India's misfortune was to have brilliant economists: an affliction that the far-eastern super performers were spared'. To that extent, Pakistan's policy of benign neglect towards the economics profession may appear justified and its better

[13] For a perceptive review of Sen's work, see Kaushik Basu, Amartya Sen and the Popular Imagination: In the Wake of the Prize, *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 50, December.

economic performance may be attributed to the more subdued role of its economists. More seriously, however, there is a need to learn from the mistakes of the past. The peculiar conditions in which Pakistan was created led to the creation of the infrastructure for economic management, economic education and research which served its purpose fairly well in the initial years.

However, after 1971 the system has been in a complete disarray and *ad-hocism* has ruled the roost. Political instability and economic imbalances have not allowed any serious rethinking about how this structure can be reorganised to remedy its weakness. Indeed here too the responses have been slow, short-term, fragmentary and lacking in an overall vision for the emerging needs. Various international agencies have provided assistance to repair the system at places where they have felt it needed to be improved, but no one has looked at the overall needs and how sectors or activities in which donor or lending agencies are not interested can be supported. This relates particularly to the agenda of research, which is today almost totally articulated by donor agencies and is undertaken through consultancies to individuals or consultancy firms. While regular funding of academic and research institutions is stagnating or declining, consultancy has emerged as a major growth industry in the economics profession and has upset both research priorities and incentive structures to undertake serious economic research in Pakistan.

The requirements of economic management are far more demanding than those in the fifties and the task has become far more complex and multi-faceted in nature than four decades ago. Unfortunately, our infrastructure has hardly kept pace and arguably, has deteriorated at various critical points. While there is a general realisation that the development paradigm which exclusively emphasised growth, needs to be changed and made more inclusive to accommodate emerging concerns, there is little effort to think about the accompanying changes needed in our economic and social management.

The most disquieting thing is that there is little willingness in the profession to create the fora to discuss these issues in a sustained manner and to form a pressure group to highlight and canvass support for them. We seem to be awaiting a new paradigm imposed on us which we will willynilly accept after making some inaudible noises in the newspapers. If that continues to happen, I am afraid professional economists in Pakistan will become an endangered species and their profession will cease to matter much in the shaping of future economic policies. The best they can hope for is an annual migration to the winter sanctuary in Islamabad provided by the PSDE meetings, thanks to the thoughtful initiative and prescience of Professor Naqvi.

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3

Conditions of Teaching and Research in Economics: Some Preliminary Findings*

S M Naseem, S K Qureshi and Rehana Siddiqui

Introduction

This paper reports on the preliminary findings of a study initiated two years ago, at the initiative of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) to review the problems of teaching and research in economics and related subjects[1] during the last two decades. The need for such a study has been felt for some time not only because of the common perception of declining standards in higher education generally and, economics, in particular, but also from the perceived competition economics has faced from other disciplines, especially business studies and computer science, as a passport to the job market.

After having enjoyed a relatively robust period of growth in the 1960s largely through the assistance of foreign donors such as the Ford Foundation, economics and related subjects in Pakistan have suffered in their development not only from the comparative paucity of resources allocated to them, but also as a result of an adverse change in the perceptions about the primacy of their usefulness for policy purposes. The demand for economics has also suffered some decline as a result of the diminished importance of the public sector and of planned development during the last two decades. While special branches of economics, such as finance, project evaluation, transport and energy economics have shown increased demand, mainly in the private sector or donor-related institutions, the demand for general economic analysts is not as strong as in the past and does not provide many gainful opportunities for professional advancement. Due to the continued disadvantage in terms of salaries and other rewards, the academic profession, remains unattractive.

A cursory survey of the research and academic institutions in the field of economics and related subjects established both within the universities and outside, since independence is sufficient to justify the need for an in-depth study of the malaise affecting both teaching and research in economics. While some of

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[1] These disciplines now include demography, social anthropology, econometrics and human development.

the research institutions are relatively well endowed with human and other resources and have even acquired an international reputation, the system as a whole has failed to deliver a continuing stream of high quality research in areas of changing relevance to the economy and to provide well-trained economists to users in the government and the private sector.

The main objective of the present study was, therefore, to identify the causes of decline in quality of graduates and researchers in economics and identify possible solutions. The study has relied on both direct interviews with the institutions and on two small questionnaires, one for educational institutions and one for research organisations employing economists. We were able to visit about a dozen institutions and sent the questionnaires to twenty-four educational institutions and research organisations. However, the response rate for the questionnaires was not very encouraging, as less than half the organisations responded. The study's scope was limited as the funds needed for a full-scale study could not be obtained from potential sponsors and the PIDE funded the travel and related costs from its regular budget. Both the lack of support by sponsors to fund such a study and the poor response to the questionnaire reflects the apathy in the profession and its institutions towards common issues beyond the scope of immediate concerns.

Since it seemed unlikely that the project could be carried on much further without a more formal and concerted effort, it was decided to present its preliminary results in order to evoke wider interest and provide a basis for discussion of the underlying issues. In order to make it self-contained, the paper is structured in the following way. The next section tries to focus on the sources of demand and supply for economics teaching and research during the last two decades. The third and fourth section surveys the state of education and research in the universities and research organisations, respectively. The fifth section tries to put forward some suggestions for improvements in the present structure of academic and research institutions in the economic field. The last section points out the gaps in the present study and the need for more comprehensive work in this area.

The Source of Supply and Demand for Economic Expertise

While an important part of the supply of economic expertise in Pakistan has resulted from foreign training at the graduate level, the higher educational system of the country will continue to be the most important and reliable source. In Pakistan, the number of universities and total enrolment has increased substantially during last fifty years. The number of universities has gone up from 4 in 1960 to 25 in 1997 (for recent data see Table 1). The enrolment increased from 4870 students in 1960 to 71819 in recent years, however, the expansion in female enrolment is much higher. Similarly, the number of teachers has expanded very rapidly. These numbers show a rapid expansion in supply of and demand for higher education. However, the expansion in the supply has generally been at the expense of quality of graduates at the higher level, due to resource constraints and

due to decline in the quality of inputs. This erosion seems to have had a more pronounced effect on the social science disciplines, of which economics is an important part.

Table 1
Data on Higher Education

Year	No. of Univ.	No. of Students Enrolled		No of Teachers	
		Total	Females	Total	Females
1959-60	4	4092	778	382	31
1990-91	22	61,857	11,667	4,744	640
1991-92	23	65,944	12,727	4,926	674
1992-93	23	68,301	14,856	5,728	747
1993-94	24	69,085	15,564	5,995	793
1994-95	24	70,263	16,628	6,396	846
1995-96	24	71,441	17,692	6,797	899
1996-97	25*	71,819	17,956	6,998	952
Annual Growth Rate (1990–97)	2.13	2.49	7.19	6.48	6.62

Source: *Economic Survey, 1996-97*.
*Ten additional private universities were granted charter by the government.

The universities are gradually losing their standings as institutions of higher learning, particularly in the fields of economic and related subjects. The only area showing some signs of progress is the area of business studies after the initiation of economic liberalisation programmes in the early 1990s. But this expansion has been largely brought about in an unsustainable way through the engagement of part time teachers and an influx of foreign trained MBAs.

After having enjoyed a relatively robust period of growth in the 1960s largely through the assistance of foreign donors such as the Ford Foundation, economics and related subjects in Pakistan have suffered in their development not only from the comparative paucity of resources allocated to them, but also as a result of an adverse change in the perceptions about the primacy of their usefulness for policy purposes.

A much more serious question being faced in the development of economics and related subjects in Pakistan, is the steady deterioration of higher education. It is a common perception that the quality of higher education, in general, and in the social science fields in particular, has declined sharply. Centres of higher learning especially in economics, are gradually losing the well-trained and qualified staff through the process of both, an internal and external brain drain. Even those who have been able to resist monetary temptations are discouraged by the deteriorating administrative financial and disciplinary environment in the university.

A major constraint in the improvement of standards of teaching and research in economics is the availability of qualified staff. Table 2 shows the changes in the number and composition of staff in seven universities and three research institutions which responded to our questionnaire. It also reports on the number of students in postgraduate economics classes in the seven universities. While there has been a significant increase in both teaching and research staff, as well as the number of students, the student teacher ratio has risen somewhat. However, in two major institutions, Quaid-e-Azam University (QAU) and Government College, Lahore, where the self-financing scheme has been introduced, the ratio has risen sharply. Thus in the QAU, the number has risen from 6.2 to 16.7 as a result of a fourfold increase in the number of students and only 50 percent increase in the number of teachers. In the Government College, although there has been only a moderate (12.5 percent) increase in the number of students, this has been accompanied by a 30 percent fall in the number of teachers.

Table 2

Quantitative Indicator of Teaching of Economics

	Number of Teachers		No. of Students (M.A. and Mphil.)	
	1975	1995	1975	1995
1. Quaid-e-Azam University	8(5)	12(8)	50	200
2. Government College, Lahore	10(4)	7(4)	80	90
3. University of Punjab	7(1)	9(2)	125	130
4. Institute of Development Studies, Agricultural University, Peshawar	6(1)	14(7)	–	10
5. State Bank of Pakistan*	36(5)	85(2)	–	–
6. University of Peshawar	6(1)	15(2)	80	124
7. Gomal University, D. I. Khan	–	10(0)	–	50
8. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics	46(7)	49(21)	–	–
9. Sindh Agricultural University, Tandojam	9(2)	9(2)	–	–
10. University of Arid Agriculture, Rawalpindi	–	5(1)		50
Total	128(26)	215(49)	335	654
Teaching	40(13)	81(26)		
Research	88(13)	134(23)		
PhD/Staff Ratio	20.3%	22.8%		
Student/Teacher Ratio			8.4	8.6
PhD/Teaching Staff Ratio	32.5%	32.0%		
PhD/Research Staff Ratio	14.8%	17.2%		

*For State Bank of Pakistan and Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, we have number of researchers not number of teachers. The number in parenthesis represent members with a PhD degree.

In terms of the quality of staff, the ratio of PhD staff members to total staff members in all the ten institutions has increased from 20.3 percent to 22.8 percent, indicating that only a little over a fifth of all economists in the profession have PhD degrees. What is interesting, however, is that this ratio is considerably higher in teaching than in research institutions. This is largely due to the low ratio of PhD staff in the State Bank of Pakistan's research department, which has fallen considerably over the years. The ratio among university teachers although high, has remained stagnant. A more detailed analysis of individual institutions is undertaken below, based on direct personal interviews of 13 different educational and research institutes (their list is given in appendix-A) and clarifies some of the reasons for the trends noted above.

Demand Conditions

While supply conditions have been perceived to be important in explaining the deterioration of standards, the changing nature in the demand for economic expertise has received less attention. As the economy has become less dependent on the public sector and public policy, the governmental demand for economic expertise has declined both in terms of quantity and quality. Public 'policy management' has become more an art than a science, with only a minimal technical knowledge and understanding of economics, but with a greater capacity to formulate workable policies. This narrow utilitarian view has done great harm to the economic profession and has adversely affected the demand for economic expertise in governmental decision-making. The substitution of domestic economic expertise, which requires considerable academic training and researc`h, by the generalist civil servant, who prefers to rely on his intuition or the advice of a foreign expert, in the formulation and implementation of sustainable policies has greatly diminished the role of domestic economic professionals. Another reason for the decline in the demand for economists in recent years has been the slowdown in the growth of the economy and the expansion of rent-seeking and unorganised activities which do not have much use for economic expertise. While private sector activities both in the economy at large and in the educational sector in particular have increased substantially, they have not yet realised the need for engaging highly trained economists or of conducting sophisticated economic research.

The Teaching Conditions in Pakistani Universities[2]

Faculty

A pervasive problem facing most of the educational institutions in Pakistan is that they are not able to retain good teaching staff because of the inadequate

[2] This section is based on direct interviews with a number of universities and educational institutions. The qualitative response is summarised in Table A-1.

incentive structure. Among the worst affected has been the University of Karachi, which has suffered a serious erosion of its teaching cadre during the last two decades. At the present time, there is a dearth of senior teaching staff and the faculty does not have any full Professor or PhD Most of the senior teachers have either retired or have left for lucrative jobs abroad or elsewhere in Pakistan. One of the major reasons for the decline in the teaching staff is that of the non-return of the faculty members who went abroad on scholarships for foreign training. The price for this is, unfortunately, being paid for by current faculty members as a result of the discontinuation of leave and scholarship to them, which has made the teaching profession even more unattractive.

Another source of haemorrhage of good faculty members has been the emergence of private universities and educational institutions who offer considerably more attractive packages of remuneration to the teachers. Although they do not provide the security of service and other facilities, the economic incentives are sufficient to attract them. The university has tried to give some financial incentives to the teachers by involving them in teaching in the self-financing programmes, where the teachers receive at least Rs 400 per lecture, it can sometimes raise the teacher's salary to 80 percent of the regular pay. The current faculty of the Department of Economics at Karachi University is mostly at the junior level and their educational qualifications are either local M.Sc. or Mphil degrees or a foreign masters degree.

Another problem being faced by many universities where senior faculty members have left a vacuum is the problem of lack of academic leadership. In some case, one or two senior faculty members who are still working do not have the academic or research credentials to inspire the confidence of their younger colleagues, while the latter are denied the opportunities to develop a leadership from among themselves. Often this has led to in-fighting among faculty members which diverts attention from academic and research work and takes a heavy toll in terms of lack of motivation

Despite the fact that enrolment in economics has not increased at a very high rate, the student-teacher ratio has increased in most universities. This increase in the burden of teaching not only discourages teachers to undertake research, it also results in the ability of teachers to improve their stock of knowledge and improve their teaching. The promotion criteria for teaching staff at colleges and universities differ. The college teacher is promoted on the basis of years of service whereas for the university teacher, publications are also required. As a result, sometimes college teachers with the same qualifications get promoted before university teachers (see Table A-1 also).

The ban on recruitment has also deteriorated the availability of teachers and the quality of teaching staff. In some instances it was reported that previously they were able to hire good teachers from other educational institutions in case of a

teacher shortage in a particular field of economics. This option is no longer available to the colleges and universities.

Students

One of the important questions that we were interested in learning from the project is whether economics continues to enjoy the strong preference of students with high academic standing. On this, the evidence was mixed. The perception of teachers about the quality of students varied across educational institutions. For example, at the Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS) the quality of the incoming student has not changed significantly. In fact, the quality of these students is better and people are paying for quality teaching. Consequently, the graduates of LUMS are quickly absorbed in the job market. In Punjab University, on the other hand, the quality of incoming students opting for economics seems to have declined over time but it is still better than in many other disciplines. For the 75 seats in the M.A. classes in economics, the University receives over 1000 applications. At the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Peshawar, economics did not rank as high as business administration and computer sciences in the preference ordering of the students entering the university. As a result the quality of the students coming to the economics department seems to be falling over the years. For instance, whereas a majority of students entering the IDS programme in the beginning had degrees in their B.Sc., currently, only 2 to 3 first class students were applying for admission in economics.

A related issue was the employment preference of economics M.As. The trend for employment seems to have shifted from the civil service (CSS) to private sector employment. Academic jobs were less preferred to other government and private employment, while research was considered inferior to teaching in the career preferences of students and as well as in public perception. If a generalisation could be made on this limited evidence, it would seem that the preference of the students is correlated with the perception of the quality of teaching in an institution. It may also be the case that students with access to publicly funded institution have different career goals than those entering private institutions.

The decline in the quality of the students entering the Masters degree programme in economics was also a reflection of the poor quality of graduates coming out from the colleges. The existence of two separate mediums of instruction namely, English and Urdu, was also responsible for a fall in the average quality of the students. It seems that a higher proportion of Urdu-medium students were now entering the University than in the past, since the better trained English-medium students were siphoned off to business administration and other disciplines. Schemes for remedial courses to improve the average quality of students need to be devised to correct the situation.

Another reason cited for the decline in the preference for economics, was the more technical and mathematical requirements of the subject.

One interesting finding, especially brought out in the interview with the Government College, Lahore, faculty, is that the gender composition in the field of economics has changed significantly, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In the Government College, where students are admitted on merit, 90 percent of the successful candidates are girls. The number of applications for girls has not changed but their performance has improved. In fact the number of applications for boys has declined as they opt for commerce, business administration and computers science.

Other reasons for the decline in the quality of the students which emerged from discussions with our academic colleagues are briefly listed below.

(i) *Lack of Reading Habits*: Reading habits are not instilled. The students study just to pass the examination. This has adversely affected the development of intuitive thinking and creative talents.

(ii) *Discipline*: Lack of discipline, in general, is affecting not only the quality of students but also the working environment in the universities. This lack of discipline with lack of motivation is the major constraint in producing good economic graduates.

(iii) *Library*: The Libraries do not have updated reading material, because of in sufficient funding. For example, Government College, Lahore received only Rs 10,000/- for library funding this year.

(iv) *Research Orientation*: The need for professional economists is evident; but due to lack of research orientation at the educational institutions the supply of indigenous trained economists is inadequate.

(v) *Student-Teacher Interaction*: The interaction among the teaching community and students is minimum. The increase in student teacher ratios has made it difficult to develop such a linkage and to reap the benefits of effective small group teaching.

(vi) *Curriculum*: What, and how is economics taught today? These are important issues. So far there is no standard and updated curriculum for students. The curriculum should be developed in such a way that it reflects the changing needs and developments in the subject, and it should improve the employability of economic graduates.

(vii) *Examination System*: Use of unfair means to pass the examination, rote of sample questions and 100 percent choice in the examination are the major problems in our examination system. Since determine the merit of the student use of unfair means to pass exams is rising. However, despite these unfair practices the pass percentage is low in the field of economics.

(viii) *Political Interference*: The students are attached to political parties, which affects their work environment and discourages the serious community to take an active role in teaching. This also disrupts the

process of learning and causes significant loss in terms of time and money.

Solutions

In order to improve the situation, the following suggestions were made:

(i) *Incentive Structure*: Teachers should be offered a better salary structure, so that they can concentrate on teaching and the educational institutions do not suffer from brain drain.

(ii) *Teacher Training*: Arrange refresher courses for teachers, which can help them to learn modern methods of teaching and communication. By improving the quality of teaching methods the teachers can make learning economics challenging and interesting. This could be done by arranging workshops and refresher courses.

(iii) *Self-Financing Schemes:* The self-financing scheme may offer some resources to the educational institutions which can be used to improve the teaching environment. The Punjab University has started self-financing for 10–15 percent of the student in the class. The self-financing scheme, however, involves a considerable amount of additional work and integration which is often undertaken at the expense of teaching the regular classes. Another problem with the self-financing scheme is that since most of the students pay a high fee, they expect the teaching to be of a level that would ensure their success in examinations. However, since the students admitted to the self-financing programme are those of a lower calibre than in the regular classes, a percentage of them do not, in fact, clear the exam.

(iv) *Updating the Curriculum:* In this regard the University Grants Commission (UGC) can play an important role. Either they can try to implement a quality curriculum or they can give more independence to educational institutions to develop their own curriculum with the supervision of UGC. By standardising and updating the curriculum we can incorporate the recent changes in the global economic environment and the extensions in the subjects of economics. This will help us to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of the education of economics. This will also enable the students to think like economists.

(v) *Examination System*: In order to improve the examination system, we can develop an internal examination system. The incoming students should be evaluated by the university first. We can have a centralised system of examinations like the Banking Council examination, at the end of the university education. Furthermore, there is an urgent need to control the use of unfair practices in the examination.

(vi) *Autonomy of Universities*: Universities should be able to set up their own policies regarding admission, curriculum, hiring of teaching staff and the examination system. Now the emphasis should be on what is taught, how it is taught and its relevance to the job market. The primary responsibility is that of universities as Kabra (1996) emphasises, ‘let

the universities become agents of social transformation based on the relative autonomy of social scientists and scholars and intellectual workers'.

(vii) *Incentive Structure*: A performance based reward system should be introduced for teachers and researchers.

(viii) *Research Funding*: In order to promote research, grants should be given to the teacher/researchers. In regard to resources, there seems to be no increase in resources to hire senior researchers/faculty members. There was also very limited allocation of resources for computers and other research requirements. The University has a policy of not supporting any research which is not funded by other agencies. Thus there is considerable dependence on the funding from external donor agencies to conduct research. Traditionally, government research organisations face competition from private consulting firms for external funding and often the private sector gets the project because they are better endowed with resources. Sometimes, government research institutes and the University staff work clandestinely for such consulting funds.

(ix) *Applied Research*: More business and market oriented courses should be introduced at the college level so that the graduates are quickly and gainfully employed in their relevant fields.

The Problems Facing Research Institutions[3]

Applied Economics Research Centre (AERC)

The Applied Economic Research Centre which was founded in the early 1970s with the assistance of the Ford Foundation and the Government of Sindh has during the last two decades, emerged as a major centre of teaching and research in economics in the country. In addition to undertaking high quality research of the areas of public finance, agricultural economics and urban development, the Centre has also conducted an MAS/MPhil programme in economics taught by well-known economists of the country. It has also tried to lay the foundation of peer participation in the decision-making process and peer review of the academic research undertaken by the Centre.

In recent years, AERC has seen a rapid erosion of its research staff who have left for other more lucrative jobs abroad or elsewhere in the country. The number of PhD staff members in AERC has declined to four from its peak level of 13 in the past. Lately, the Centre has experienced serious competition from a number of directions including private schools and universities as well as foreign donor agencies, commercial banks, investment firms and private consultancies and research institutions. Recently, the University of Karachi has also tried to regularise the service structure of the core staff of the Centre who are employed on the basis of the recurring annual grant from the UGC. The

[3] The qualitative response of these organisations is summarised in Table A-2

salary schemes of the research staff are broadly in line with those of the University teachers. The autonomy of the Centre has also been compromised to some extent and has resulted in some degree of interference from the University administration. The core research staff of the Centre can also supplement its income by a substantial amount by participating in contractual research undertaken by the Centre. In addition, the Centre has created a core research fund which allows a faculty member to undertake research in his own area of interest and be compensated roughly equivalent to that from contractual research. This is an innovation which needs to be strengthened by the Centre and emulated by other research institutions.

The Centre depends heavily for its success on two areas. The first, the availability of researchers and to retain them in the face of strong competition from outside. Secondly, the Centre needs to sustain its Masters/Mphil programme in Applied Economics. The strength of the faculty in the Centre works as both a cause and effect of the success in the two major areas. In recent years, the Centre seems to have experienced considerable difficulties on both these counts which has consequently resulted in the depletion of its faculty. A more intangible reason for the progressive downside of the centre has been the erosion in its top leadership and lack of harmony in the aims and objectives of the Centre as perceived by its members. The assertion of bureaucratic authority and the delusion of the Centre's autonomy and peer participation have also resulted in the Centre's present decline.

Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE)

The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics is the country's premier economic research institution with a history of more than four decades.[4] However, it had to be re-established in 1972, after the creation of Bangladesh and relocated in the Quaid-e-Azam University Campus, Islamabad. During the quarter-century of its rebirth, the Institute has experienced many changes in the strength of its research staff. The Table 3 below shows that a rapid increase in its staff occurred after the resumption of its activities in 1972, with only a skeleton staff which returned from Dacca and some trainees abroad who joined it later.

However, the rapid increase in the research staff plateaued by the end of the 1970s when the first regular Director of the Institute, the late Mr. M. L. Qureshi was replaced in 1979 by Dr S. N. H. Naqvi who retired in 1995. In the first half of the latter's 16-year tenure, the Institute's research staff strength again experienced rapid growth, rising from 66 to 81 in 1988 when it achieved its peak level. Since the early 1990s, however, the Institute's research staff has experienced a steady erosion in its strength which by now has been reduced to the level of 1975. During the 20-year period, 1975–95, as many as 124 research

[4] For a detailed history of the pre-1972 period of the Institute, see George Rosen.

staff members have left the Institute, while an almost equal number have been recruited. This seems to be a rather high rate of turn-over.

The situation with regard to the PhD staff, who constitute the core of the research strength of the Institute, has also varied considerably over time. Although their number increased from 7 in 1975 to 17 in 1995, it has remained almost constant since 1980 at around 18. What is even more significant is the high number of PhDs who have left the Institute during the period. According to Table 3, a total of 24 PhDs have left, almost half of them since 1988. This erosion of PhD strength has been offset almost exclusively by the retraining of non-PhD staff, rather than by infusion of new PhDs, which has been a minor source of replenishment, especially in the second half of the period under review. The prospects of further deterioration in the strength of the PhD staff are now greater, as the opportunities for higher training dry out and as the number of junior staff members declines as a result of the ban on further recruitment. Indeed, the ratio of junior research staff, represented by those without PhDs, to those with PhDs has declined from 6.57 in 1975 to 2.18 in 1995. This has serious adverse implications for the Institute's role of providing on-the-job training to younger economists who can then enrol in PhD programmes in foreign universities. Since very few foreign-trained Pakistani PhDs are returning home and many resident Pakistani PhDs are seeking jobs abroad, this has rather disturbing implications both for the PIDE and other institutions.

The State Bank of Pakistan's Research Department

The Research Department of the State Bank of Pakistan has recently been re-organised into three major areas (i) General Economics Research, (ii) Monetary and Fiscal Research, and (iii) International Economics Research. The work in all these areas is overseen by the Economic Advisor of the Bank, a post which is currently lying vacant. The three research sections work more or less independently of each other under the overall supervision of the Chief Economic Advisor and the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. The General Economics Research Section has three areas of responsibility: (a) real sector investment, (b) macro modelling and forecasting, (c) Islamic economics. The research department has recently recruited research officers after a considerable lapse of time. These young officers selected from all over the country are possibly amongst the best graduates produced by different universities of Pakistan. They seem to be highly motivated. However, there is a general lack of research environment and even those who like to do research are over burdened with routine work. The research department, like all other departments in the bank, has a bureaucratic structure which lacks the motivation for undertaking research. The training programmes instituted recently under the auspices of IMF narrowly focused on financial programming and are not helpful in the development of worthwhile research. The higher echelons of the Bank, including the Governor, seem to be conscious of the need for undertaking independent research in the Bank. However, the pressures of being the advisors

to the government on monetary and financial matters, and of regulating the banking system, leaves it little time and energy for paying attention to research. Under these circumstances, the Bank seems to have adapted the strategy of getting outside consultants to undertake research for specific issues, (e.g. inflation and domestic savings) who work in the bank for specified period of time. However, this does not result in any benefit in strengthening the research capability in the Bank or in the country at large.

Despite the granting of the degree of autonomy to the State Bank, the primary function of the research department of the Bank seems to be that of a government department which is constantly entrusted with the preparation of briefs. The depletion in the technical staff of economic ministries and departments had the impact of using the research department of the State Bank to the point where it cannot engage in any field of research on issues of concern to the Bank.

The Bank employs a substantial number of economists in its three Research Departments. In all, there are about 70 officers working in these Departments. At present, the Department has only three PhDs and 15 who have post-M.A. degrees (Foreign Masters degree, MPhil. or M.B.A.). The rest of the staff have local M.A. degrees, a majority with a vintage that is five or more years old. Given the low and deteriorating quality of the M.A. economics degree (which in most foreign universities is treated as no more than a first degree) in our universities, the bulk of the research staff is in need of a substantial degree of upgrading of skills in economic analysis. At present, there exist few opportunities for the staff to do this, except through on the job training, which is often confined to routine computational work or writing reports in a rigid, repetitive format.

Thus the present makeup of the research staff is quite bottom heavy, while lacking in high quality leadership. For some years, the Bank has been unable to fill the post of Deputy Governor (Policy) and Economic Adviser and their roles have been performed by stopgap arrangements. The Bank management does seem to be aware of the problem and has periodically tried to address it. Its approach, however, seems to be conditioned by its desire to get quick and assured, if mediocre, results, rather than addressing the more serious underlying problems which could yield potentially larger benefits.

While the weaknesses in the composition of staff will take considerable time to remedy, the better utilisation of existing human resources, which are quite considerable both in quality and quantity, offers a more feasible avenue for improving the current level and quality of the Bank's research output. As the literature on growth tells us, much of the growth in the modern world has occurred not through increases in factor inputs, but by such residual factors as innovation, organisation and environment. It is in this context that the current environment for research in the Bank is in need of a great deal of improvement.

Good research is very often the product of interaction, team work and a sense of belonging, as well as fair competition, among those working in an institution.

The Institute of Development Economics (IDS)

This Institute emerged from the Board of Economic Enquiry (NWFP), which functioned from 1953 to 1980 and was engaged primarily in the collection of data and the conduct of surveys in the rural areas of NWFP. (A similar Board existed in the Punjab and was converted into the Punjab Economic Research Institute (PERI), Lahore.) The conversion was facilitated by a USAID-funded programme called TIPAN which functioned from 1984 to 1994. The Institute's staff consist of about a dozen researchers, half of them women, the majority of whom have a Master's degree in Agriculture obtained through scholarships provided by USAID. In addition to doing research, mainly in the area of agricultural economics, the Institute conducts a teaching programme in M.Sc. Rural Development (Honours). The average enrolment in the programme since it was started in 1986-87 has been ten students per year. Thus the Institute's teaching programme enjoys a highly favourable student-teacher ratio of almost one to one. The minimum qualifications for admission to the M.Sc. (Honours) programme is B.Sc. Agriculture degree from any agricultural university of Pakistan. The programme also competes with M.Sc. (Agricultural Economics) conducted by the Agricultural Economics Department, Peshawar University. There is some ambiguity regarding the overlap between the two programmes being run on the same campus. It was emphasised by the staff of IDS that this programme was a more broadly based social science and rural development programme, than the agricultural economics programme which centres more on core economic issues. Both the Agricultural Economics and IDS are members of Faculty of Rural Social Sciences in the University which consists, apart from these two disciplines, on agricultural extension, Pakistan Studies and the mathematical science departments. The Director and staff of IDS felt that the courses introduced by them had generally helped in good job opportunities after graduation.

A new generation of research institutes with a somewhat different orientation than the old established research organisations discussed above, have emerged in the 1990s. Among these, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, the Social Policy Development Centre (SPDC), Karachi and the Mahbubul Haq Human Development Centre (MHDC) deserve particular mention. They differ from the older research institutes in the following way;

(a) They do not receive any direct funding from the government, but depend either on endowments, consultancy contracts or donor support. They have their own Governing Boards, with no ex-officio representation.

(b) They are small in size, with very few core staff members, and their work depends on domestic and external consultants. Their salary or

total emolument structure is closer to international agencies than domestic employers.

(c) They are concerned mostly with social development, the environment, gender and other emerging issues in development. They generally do not undertake basic research on core economic issues, but engage in advocacy roles, information dissemination and policy research.

Although these newer institutions have not yet directly impacted on the supply or demand for economists as much as the older institutions have done, their presence is to be welcomed as they provide not only stimulus to new ideas, but can also have a favourable influence on the older institutions in terms of organisation, staff relations and peer interactions, which the latter greatly lack.

The Need for Some Bold and Overdue Initiatives

The lack of a working relationship between the research institutes and the universities has proved detrimental to the interests of both, as well as to the development of economics related subjects generally. The fostering of a symbiotic relationship between the two will have considerable social benefits, which have been frittered away in the past due to considerations of turf and institutional and personal rivalries. The minimisation of the latter through mutual discussions for co-operative arrangements is likely to yield rich dividends and lead to the reinvigoration of the economics profession. In this regard, the two major research institutes, the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad and the Applied Economics Research Centre, Karachi, which were both established with substantial assistance from the Ford Foundation and receive large grants from the Federal and Sindh Governments, respectively, bear significant responsibility. The Research Department of State Bank of Pakistan was also in the past known for its ability to produce able economists and quality research, although largely for the internal use of the Bank, could also play a useful role. The State Bank, with its recently acquired autonomy and considerable discretionary funds at its disposal, should have a special interest and responsibility in promoting economic education and research in the country which would enhance the country's capability for better economic management.

Educational institutions and research organisations must cooperate with each other more closely than in the past in applied training of the students. At present most of the faculty members in universities are only marginally involved in undertaking research. They often complain that they have too much of a teaching load and too little incentive to undertake any research. In particular, there is a strong case for much closer collaboration between the Economics Department of the University of Karachi and the Applied Economics Research Centre (AERC), although some of the teachers are involved in research projects undertaken at the Centre. The AERC also provides the Department teachers to occasionally teach in their MPhil Programme. There is, however, a lack of a

structured relationship between the department of economics and the AERC which often gives rise to tension between the two entities. There has been a history of a lack of a close relationship between the Centre and the Department of Economics largely as a result of personality clashes and because of the disparity between the environment in both settings, a fact which is not well received by the staff of the Department. There seems to be no attempt to reduce the tension between the Department and the Centre with a view of profiting from each other's experience and promoting both teaching and research. A similar situation has existed in varying degrees over the years between the Quaid-e-Azam University and PIDE. The lack of such co-operation leads to the underutilisation and suboptimal use of resources at a time when the country faces an extreme shortage of overall resources. If these problems could be ironed out, there is a likelihood that two first-rate graduate programmes in economics, with the potential of awarding PhD degrees, could emerge.

There is a strange feeling that somehow, we are back to where we started two decades ago. The problems identified by Robinson (1967) and Lewis (1975) still persist (see Table A-I). The problems currently being faced by the teaching and research institutions in economics have reached crisis proportions for some time. The observation made by Professor John Perry Lewis at the end of 1975 that 'compared with the country's needs and inherent capabilities, the state of Pakistani economics is really quite disgraceful; it is in crisis',[5] is perhaps more valid today than it was two decades ago when the economic profession had started showing some signs of renaissance.

If economic teaching and research is not to become marginalised, some bold steps to revive it from its present predicament will have to be taken. In view of the over-centralised and bureaucratised nature of our educational system, the first thing that is needed is to free these institutions from their official shackles. There is a need to give the university and other non-official economists and researchers a voice in the way in which the institutions can be rebuilt and energised.

There is also a need for decentralising the administration of educational institutions and research institutes and entrusting them to peer groups for their revival. Instead of the current practice of giving annual budgetary grants to run these institutions, the government as well as interested domestic and foreign donors should create a foundation or Trust for carrying out educational and research projects in economics. Almost all developing countries have created autonomous social science research foundations which provide funding for research programmes drawn and approved by peer groups. The Trust should receive contributions either in lump sum intended for disbursement over not less than three to five years, or a commitment to provide annual contributions over periods of similar duration. The Trust could then disburse them to educational

[5] John Fairy Lewis (1975) Economics in Pakistan and the Ford Foundation, November 18, 1975.

and research institutions either as research funds or for the creation of endowed chairs or for support of research projects. The governance of such a Trust should be wholly Pakistani with a majority of academics and researchers in the governing board. The Trust itself should not operate as a research or teaching organisation but should fund and monitor research and academic activities. The Trust's concept should also be replicated at the individual institute or university level to mobilise more public funds for education. The Trust idea for raising and utilising public funds for the social sector, helps overcome the current concerns about the credibility, responsibility and prudential behaviour of the government. Despite the growing awareness and realisation among people, including the lay public, about the country's poor image in terms of human resources and social development as well as the willingness and the ability, especially among the affluent, these concerns have hindered generous donations to education. In order to inspire public confidence, such funds should be channelled through endowments to autonomous public institutions, with independent governing boards. The Draft National Education Policy (1998–2010) had recommended the creation of an Endowment Fund for Research,[6] without specifying its modalities, but the idea seems to have been dropped from the Final Draft.

There is also need for periodic review of the research needs and agenda in the field of economics and related subjects. Pakistan is, perhaps, amongst the few countries in the world which does not have a national body to promote, fund or otherwise facilitate, the conduct of social science research and teaching in a systematic way. As a result, the quantity, quality and diversity of research output on economic and social issues in Pakistan compares very poorly with those in India or Bangladesh, with whom we have a shared political past. Greater collaboration and more frequent interaction among the research and academic communities will lead to the enhancement in the quality of research output in the country.

Faculty Improvement: Brain Drain and Overseas Training

As the results of the preliminary survey of economic and research institutions reveals, the most endemic problem facing them is the scarcity of well trained staff. As the university and the research institutes have been unable to maintain a sustainable supply of qualified staff, who were perennially wooed by outside temptations, the Pakistani economic profession has become entrapped in a particularly poor pattern of leakages abroad. The Pakistani foreign trained economists working in Pakistani universities and research institutes are greatly outnumbered by those working with the World Bank, IMF, and other international agencies, both abroad and in Pakistan. This constant leakage of trained Pakistani economists needs to be plugged, both by taking bold

[6] Draft National Education Policy, 1998-2010, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1998, Clause 9.5.30.

administrative measures to induce those who have left these institutions to return to them, not only by offering attractive salaries but also the congenial, less bureaucratic and more peer centred work environment. There is also the need to retain those who have returned from abroad by giving them greater responsibility and providing them opportunity for self-improvement. For this purpose, a special fund may be created to plug this leakage through various incentives. The creation of a minimum core of academics and researchers in a given period could also succeed in strengthening the institutions on a sustained basis. There is also a need to recreate the environment in which scholars feel that they receive recognition and respect for their research and academic achievements, even without being directly useful in policy-making.

Gaps in the Study and Need for Further Research

As pointed out in the introduction, this paper is the product of a preliminary study into the problems of teaching and research in economics in Pakistan and does not pretend to present definitive or startling results. It does, however, point to a number of inadequacies in the present institutional arrangements and offers some suggestions for improvements in them. The best it can hope for is that it will stimulate serious discussion on these issues and would become a precursor of a more comprehensive and well-organised study which would go into many of the details that the present effort has been unable to capture.

The discussion in this paper has centred on universities and research institutes which directly contribute to the production of better economists in the country. However, the concentration on the postgraduate degree programme has deflected attention from the much more important task of producing good undergraduates at college level. This study did not focus on degree and intermediate colleges whose academic standards appear to have deteriorated even more than in the universities; indeed, the present trends towards private education has adversely affected the standard in public institutions which provide the bulk of students to the universities. Unless considerable resources and attention are diverted to the undergraduate colleges in the public sector, the improvement in the universities will be that much more difficult to achieve. The paper has also not been able to assess the demand for economists and the changes in such demand that have occurred in the past and that are likely to occur in the future.

A more comprehensive study will also have to focus on the reservoir of expatriate economic experts which must be tapped not simply as a way of short-term alleviation of scarcity of economic expertise in the country, but also by giving them a role in rebuilding the institutions of research and advanced studies in the country.

Appendices

Appendix A

The following educational and research organisations were visited to conduct interviews:

1. Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), Lahore.
2. Government College, Lahore.
3. Punjab University, Lahore.
4. Punjab Economic Research Institute (PERI), Lahore.
5. Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan.
6. Institute of Development Studies, Peshawar.
7. University of Peshawar, Peshawar.
8. University of Karachi, Karachi.
9. Applied Economic Research Centre (AERC), Karachi.
10. State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi.
11. Gomal University, D. I,. Khan.
12. Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad.
13. Arid University, Rawalpindi.
14. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad.

We are grateful to all individuals in these organisations for their invaluable contribution.

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Table 3

Changes in the Research Staff, 1973–95

Years	Non-PhDs.				PhDs.				Total			
	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D
1973	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	29	–	–	–
1974	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	20	–	–	–
1975	–	–	–	46	–	–	–	7	18	–	–	53
1976	4	1	3	49	0	1	1(2)	8	4	1	5	57
1977	8	7	0	49	2	0	3(1)	11	10	7	3	60
1978	3	6	–4	45	1	1	1(1)	12	4	7	3	57
1979	12	3	5	50	1	1	4(4)	16	13	4	9	66
1980	7	5	0	50	1	1	2(2)	18	8	6	2	68
1981	11	8	1	51	0	2	0(2)	18	11	6	1	69
1982	7	3	3	54	0	1	0(1)	18	7	4	3	72
1983	0	8	–8	46	0	1	–1	17	0	9	–9	63
1984	12	5	6	52	1	3	–1(1)	16	13	8	5	68
1985	8	8	–1	51	–	–	1(1)	17	8	8	0	68
1986	9	0	8	59	0	2	–1(1)	16	9	2	7	75
1987	9	3	5	64	0	0	1(1)	17	9	3	6	81
1988	1	4	–5	59	0	2	1(2)	18	1	5	–4	77
1989	6	7	–2	57	1	2	1(1)	19	7	8	–1	76
1990	4	5	–1	56	1	2	0	19	5	6	–1	75
1991	1	5	–4	52	0	3	–2	17	1	7	–6	69
1992	1	2	–4	48	0	2	2(3)	19	1	3	–2	67
1993	0	1	–1	47	0	3	–3	16	0	4	–4	63
1994	0	3	–4	43	0	1	0(11)	16	0	4	–4	59
1995	0	4	–6	37	0	1	1(2)	17	0	5	–5	54

Note: Those who obtained PhD. during service are reported in parenthesis.

A = Recruitment; B = Departure;

C = Net Addition; D = Present Strength.

Net Addition = A – B – those who obtain PhD during service.

Table A-1

Qualitative Indicators of Teaching of Economics

		Govt. College Lahore	Univ. of the Punjab	Univ. of Peshawar	Gomal Univ.	Institute of Dev. Studies Peshawar	Quaid-e-Azam University	S T
1.	Teachers Mobility to other Jobs	–	9	2	–	–	7	
	Retirement	–	1	2	–	2	–	
2.	Perception about Working Conditions: Salaries	S	Inad.	Ad.	Inad.	Inad.	Inad.	
	other Benefits	S	Inad.	Ad.	Inad.	Inad.	Inad.	
3.	Has the Quality of Economic Education Improved	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
4.	Is There a Linkage between Working Conditions and Teaching	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
5.	Are you Satisfied with Status of Teaching of Economics	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	
6.	Do you Think Teachers Need Further Training:							
	(i) In Pakistan	Yes	Yes	–	Yes	Yes	Yes	
	(ii) Abroad	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
7.	Do you Think your Graduates are Sufficiently Trained to Enter Job Market.	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
8.	Is There a Need to Develop a Linkage between Educational Institutions and Job Market	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
9.	Perceptions about Availability of Information and Scholarships for Higher Education	Inad.	Inad.	–	Inad.	Inad.	Poor	
10.	Are you Satisfied with the Present Curriculum in Economics	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
11.	Change in Number of Teachers between 1975 and 1995	Declined	Increased	Increased	–	–	Increased	N
12.	Change in No. of Teachers with PhD. Degree between 1975 and 1995.	No Change	Increased	No Change	–	Increased	Increased	
13.	Change in Enrolment between 1975 and 1995	Small	Small	Increase	–	–	Increased	
14.	Student-Teacher Ratio	Increased	Declined	Declined	–	–	Increased	

Note: S = Satisfactory, Ad = Adequate, Inad = Inadequate.

Table 2-A

Qualitative Response of Employers

		SBP	Univ. of Pesh-awar	IDS, Peshawar	PIDE
1.	Are you Satisfied with the Performance of Research Staff	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.	Is there a Need for Further Training in: (i) Pakistan (ii) Abroad	 Yes Yes	 Yes Yes	 Yes Yes	 Yes –
3.	Length of Required Training (i) Short-term (ii) Long-term	 Yes –	 Yes Yes	 Yes Yes	 Yes Yes
4.	Is on-the-job Training Programme available in Your Organisation	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
5.	Is there a Need to Develop Interaction between Educational Institutes and Job Market.	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
6.	How Many Researchers have Left during 1975–95	14	–	–	124*
7.	Incentive Structure in your Organisation	Attracti-ve	–	–	Attractive
8.	Has the Research Staff Increased during 1975–95	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
9.	Has the Research Staff with PhD. Degree Increased	Declined	–	Increased	Yes

Notes: *Out of these 124 Researchers, 6 Retired/Expired and 12 were dismissed.
SBP = State Bank of Pakistan. IDS = Institute of Development Studies, Peshawar. PIDE = Pakistan Institute of Development Economics.

4

The Economics Profession in Pakistan: A Historical Analysis*

Nadeem Ul Haque and Mahmood Hasan Khan

Institutions, Organisations and Economic Development

Economics is a policy science: its claim is to describe policies that can improve peoples' lives. Its usefulness for policymaking, therefore, depends on how well economists understand and interpret economic behaviour. In other words, successful economic policy entails a good understanding of the dynamics of economic change. In turn, a model of economic change requires analysis of institutions and organisations in the society. Institutions are the informal conventions (customs) and formal rules by which the members of a society organise the production and distribution of goods and services. Organisations are the players in the economy, including the state (executive, legislature and judiciary), private businesses (profit-seeking individuals and corporate entities), and private non-profit associations (NGOs, professional groups and bodies). Both institutions and organisations change with the evolution of each society and economy. Much as economists disagree on the underlying assumptions and interpretation of 'facts' about economic change, they have a broad agreement that the discipline of economics must be embedded in the study of interactions between institutions and organisations.

A major factor in the development of Western Europe (including North America) since at least the seventeenth century was the realisation that knowledge, based on rational thought and empiricism, was valuable hence to be pursued to empower the self and society. It is with the application of this knowledge to natural resources that much capital has been accumulated and incomes increased. It is also true that the accumulation of knowledge and expansion of markets were accomplished by changes in institutions and organisations of the society. Both of these changes reinforced each other. The relative failures of the Chinese and Islamic societies can also be explained within this perspective. Modern colonial empires were sustained by the strength of capitalist institutions and the associated technology used in commerce and war. A vast majority of underdeveloped countries as colonial societies—

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devastated though their people and resources were in many respects—have inherited institutions and organisations implanted by the colonialists.

The literature on economic development since the end of World War II has made significant contribution to the economics discipline as the discipline itself has contributed to our understanding of how economies change and how do institutions and organisations play their roles in this process. A society first needs a legitimate state that the populace generally supports: it has achieved a consensus for governance to promote peace. It establishes a legal framework that clearly defines property rights, enacts laws and rules for contracts and maintains a rule of law. The judicial and administrative structure should have the capacity to enforce the laws and rules. The roles of organisations—the state, private businesses and non-profit entities (NGOs)—should dovetail their function without doctrinal rigidity. The state should (i) maintain a facilitating environment—including expansion of property rights and stable macroeconomic policies—for the other two organisations and (ii) invest in public and merit goods that the private sector may not produce or provide in optimum measure. Businesses (farms and firms) must play by the rules in the marketplace without reliance on public subsidy, open to competitive forces both internal and external. NGOs should help expand the base of civil society to ensure that the state and businesses do not injure the public interest. Of course, these roles evolve through time as experience accumulates, reflecting clearly the dynamics of economic development embedded in changes in technology and institutions.

The Economics Profession and Economic Development

For our purpose a profession can be defined as a group (body) of persons practising an occupation requiring intellectual abilities and training. Contemporary intellectual and professional specialisation is the result of the growth of accumulated knowledge in natural, physical and social sciences in the last four centuries. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the growth and evolution of modern (complex) industrial society and economy have fostered the development of professions. The development of professions has in turn contributed to our understanding of how economies, societies and polities function and what works and what does not. The rise of the economics profession—a critical mass of influential people with specialised knowledge—can be traced to the emergence of modern industrial economy in the 19th century. Economists found their place not only in the academia teaching and doing research but advising private businesses engaged in finance and manufacturing and governments in their central banks, treasury, colonial and war offices. They established professional associations to exchange and publicise their ideas and results of researches through conferences, journals, pamphlets, and books. Peer recognition and institutional support became important to economists for their reputation and influence in the professional circle and society. Universities became the competitive reservoir of

professionals—teachers and researchers—producing knowledge and young professionals carrying that knowledge to the rest of the society. The deepening of the economics profession, as of other professions, has been an integral part of the development and evolution of a corporate culture and civil society in the industrially advanced countries.

The economics profession has developed its strength and influence on public policy in the industrially advanced countries because of several factors. For one thing, it has generally been allowed an environment of free inquiry and public support through investment in the infrastructure necessary for acquiring and disseminating knowledge. Seekers and distributors of knowledge and ideas have been respected, recognised and adequately rewarded. Intellectual competition has induced creative ideas and use of the scientific method. Competing paradigms—classical, neoclassical, Marxist, Keynesian, Monetarist—have developed according to differences in ideology and interpretation of events (facts). Economists have borrowed methods of inquiry from physical and natural sciences and adapted the language of logic and mathematics to test their hypotheses and theories. All of this allows the professionals to describe, explain, analyse and propose policy prescriptions: what works or does not work. Of course, given the complexity of issues related to human behaviour, there is much in economics that is controversial. Public sector investment in and support for education and research in economics and the growth of private sector institutions—financial and corporate sectors—have also been important factors in the development of the economics profession.

We cannot make similar generalisations for the economics profession in underdeveloped countries. For one thing, with some exceptions in Latin America, there was almost no economics profession in these countries before they achieved political independence as nation states after end of World War II. Almost all economists were employed in a limited number of colleges and universities—engaged almost exclusively in undergraduate teaching—without any influence on policy-making since government policies were established by the Centre's political élite and private interest groups and carried out by colonial administrators. The demand for economists in the colonies was limited and met by the expatriate professionals and bureaucrats. A second problem was that training in economics did not equip individuals with concepts and methods necessary to make critical analyses of the received economic theory and interpretation of economic facts. Similarly, resources were not available to establish the infrastructure necessary to conduct economics research. Finally, the institutional environment was dominated by feudal and tribal social structures with a limited role of competitive markets for ideas, resources and products. The colonial governments did not much encourage (intellectual) competition in the colonies since it was thought to be potentially subversive. In fact, for most of the educated élite in underdeveloped countries—a vast majority of them belonged to the well-connected feudal, merchant or tribal families—the two professions with

the highest pay-off were the government's administrative services and practice of law or politics.

The structural conditions in most underdeveloped countries after World War II were quite similar in that their economies were dominated by feudal (tribal) and mercantilist institutions. These countries also inherited a colonial political structure in which the only dominant player was a non-representative and highly centralised state with little or no accountability to the people it ruled. What is even more important is that the new political élite—to whom the colonial masters transferred power at independence—were deeply impressed by the idea that the state had a major (if not a central) role to promote economic development. In some cases it was ideological, but for many it was simply expedient. Their positions were greatly strengthened by the dominant development paradigm and competing sources of foreign economic assistance. The development paradigm most popular and influential at that time had at its core the idea that economic growth—capital accumulation and technological progress—required an activist state since private markets were weak, fragmented and unreliable. Foreign economic assistance—both from multilateral and bilateral sources—was likewise premised on the assumption that the state must take the lead in directing the development process. Also, the economics profession was dominated by this idea due to the writings of John Maynard Keynes, Marxist ideology and the 'socialist' experiment in the former Soviet Union, and a particular interpretation of historical growth in Japan and Western Europe. In many countries, a major consequence of all this was an uncritical reliance on the beneficent power of the state and foreign economic assistance.

The Economics Profession in Pakistan: Background

This case study offers us a unique perspective to understand the issue of the development of a profession, because at independence Pakistan inherited very few trained economists. Since independence numerous government and donor inspired efforts have been made to develop professional economists and the profession of economics. Our analysis focuses primarily on these efforts to see how a broad-based profession of economics can be developed in Pakistan. This study also has implications for governments, foreign donors and other groups that seek to catalyse such developments in other underdeveloped countries. It is common knowledge that at independence in 1947 we did not inherit a large stock of professionals in any field. While the stock of professionals in several fields has increased quite significantly, we have not taken stock of professional development in Pakistan. There are no analyses available of any profession to see how we have developed from what we inherited. Such analysis is important to see whether the development of professions has been relatively healthy or not. It is in this spirit that we attempt to develop a history of the economics profession in Pakistan.

It is necessary first to layout the major institutional and structural conditions that Pakistan inherited at independence in 1947. First, Pakistan's economy was based mainly on agriculture with little industrial production: this region of the Indian economy was exporting food and raw material in exchange for manufactured (industrial) goods from other regions or abroad. Further, most of the commercial and industrial activities were controlled by non-Muslim entrepreneurs who left Pakistan after the partition of India. Second, Pakistan's society was (a) dominated by primordial (feudal, tribal and caste) relations and (b) divided between the rich few and rural masses. Third, the political élite—who came mainly from the feudal families—exercised power through the state machinery in which the civil administration played a dominant role. Finally, the professional class was very small and without much influence: there were almost no professional societies or entities. Most of the professionals were working in the public sector organisations, including colleges and universities. The small educational system—with limited number of institutions, enrolments and faculty—was based on curricula that emphasised disciplines and skills needed to assist the colonial administration.

There were few economists in Pakistan, working in universities and colleges and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). There was no institution involved in applied economics research, except for the Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry and the Agriculture College in Lyallpur. It should, however, be added that the academic economists (from East and West Pakistan) established the Pakistan Economic Association in 1950, which started to publish its journal, *Pakistan Economic Journal* (PEJ), in the same year and held annual meetings until 1968. Many of the contributors to PEJ were well-known international economists and others were Pakistani academics (mainly from East Pakistan).

The First Twenty-Five Years: From Independence to Dismemberment (1947-71)

In the first five to six years after independence, the federal government initiated two programmes for the development of professional economists to work mainly in the public sector. The State Bank of Pakistan initiated a programme whereby economists were attracted to the Bank as it offered a reasonably attractive professional career. Some of them were sent overseas for a PhD in economics. As Haq and Baqai (1988) note, 'the first generation of economists in Pakistan was trained in the remarkable tradition of the State Bank of Pakistan'. At the same time, the government established overseas training scholarships for young economists working in universities and the government. While some of the trained economists returned to Pakistan, but others joined international organisations to pursue their individual careers. No attempt was, however, made to encourage the college and university faculty to improve their knowledge or education. In fact, a high proportion of the university and college teachers were attracted to join the civil service of Pakistan to improve their well-being and social status in view of the growing influence and status of bureaucracy.

In the early to mid-1950s, two important developments initiated the growth of the economics profession Pakistan. First, there was rapid expansion of teaching institutions (universities and colleges) and government departments (e.g., State Bank of Pakistan, Central Statistical Office, and Planning Commission) that required trained economists. Second, foreign economic assistance started to provide the necessary resources to support local and foreign education and training. The Commonwealth and Colombo Plan were the first major multilateral sources of assistance, including scholarships for foreign education. However, in the second half of the 1950s, the United States official bilateral assistance—with additional support from the Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, and U.S. Educational Foundation—became the more important source of institutional support and individual training and educational scholarships. In fact, the first major crop of economists was harvested with the advent of American aid—under the Point-4 programme—and involvement of the Harvard Advisory Group (HAG) from Harvard University Centre for International Affairs in the affairs of Pakistan's economy in the mid-1950s.[1]

The active involvement of the United States in Pakistan's economic affairs was part of the Cold War alliances in which Pakistan became an active regional partner in the mid-1950s. With the rise of General Ayub Khan into power in 1958, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance was cemented and bilateral economic aid from the United States became a very important source of foreign resources for the 'planned' development of Pakistan's economy. In fact, the First Five-Year Plan (1955–60) —which was launched in 1957— became the foundation document articulating the official development strategy later endorsed and reinforced by Ayub Khan. The policy framework of the time envisioned an activist government to be led by the modernising élite with benevolent sentiments for the well being of the population. All that was needed was to graft and develop economic expertise. It is in this context that the HAG advisors became influential in designing Pakistan's economic policy in the Ayub era (1958–68). In this they had strong support of the international aid community. Their vision for Pakistan also included a large infrastructure for the development of economics and economists in Pakistan. Primed by the desire to promote and catalyse rapid economic growth in Pakistan, the HAG thinking (perspective) underlying these institutions was to quickly develop some policy analysis units appended mainly to the government.

In line with this thinking, the HAG advisors strengthened the Planning Commission and, with assistance from the Ford Foundation, established the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) in 1957. In the following

[1] The term Harvard Advisory Group (HAG) has been used loosely in view of the fact that this group came to dominate economic policy and thinking in the country. In the early period, there were a number of U.S universities and funding agencies (Ford Foundation in particular) seeking to work with Pakistani institutions.

year, PIDE started publishing its journal, *Economic Digest*, which was replaced by the *Pakistan Development Review* (PDR) in early 1961. The Directors of PIDE and Editors of PDR were Americans until the end of 1965. The first Pakistani Director of PIDE was appointed in early 1966 — supported by HAG advisors —who remained in that position until the PIDE ended its work in Dhaka with the dismemberment of Pakistan in December 1971. Economic aid from the United States and the HAG advisors helped to equip the Planning Commission, State Bank of Pakistan and PIDE with some of our most eminent economists—who have continued to loom large on the economics profession in Pakistan—in the 1950s and 1960s.

This trend culminated in the establishment of the fields of development studies and public administration that in any case were closely associated with the generalist education offered to the civil servants in the Civil Service Academy. Edward Mason at Harvard University, who had considerable influence on development studies and the U.S. aid programme, encouraged young Pakistani civil servants and others to acquire training in Public Administration from U.S. universities. The famous Edward Mason programme was set up in Harvard University—to award a Master in Public Administration (MPA) degree—to which senior and influential bureaucrats were sent and came back to dominate the economics profession. Because of their bureaucratic associations and the backing by donors these holders of MPA degree were quite important in the economics profession in Pakistan. In fact, this programme further margnalised the role of the academic institutions.

It is worth noting that very few economists were added to the academic institutions because of the relatively low economic and social status of universities and inadequate infrastructure for serious research. The academic economists in Pakistan started to appear in small number in the 1950s. However, the colleges and universities did not receive large-scale financial and institutional support to create a research-friendly environment. Further, the internal administrative structure in the Departments of Economics was highly hierarchical, giving almost uncontested power to the senior faculty who had not been exposed to economics research or inquiry. A few who returned from abroad in the late 1950s to mid-1960s did not survive and others resigned themselves to routine teaching. Consequently, there was no economist engaged in serious research in the academia. But that is not surprising given that academia was ignored and its management structure was almost feudal. Perhaps the only exception to this model was the Department of Economics at the Quaid-e-Azam University created in the late 1960s. But this too did not last for too long, thanks largely to the infighting among the faculty, and came to a sad end towards the end of the 1970s. Since then its record has been no better than other Departments of Economics in the country.

The HAG vision was flawed in three major respects and sowed the seeds of distorted development of the economics profession in Pakistan. First, it did not

attempt to develop an economics profession that was rooted in the country. The HAG economists left the universities and colleges in a state of neglect, using most of the domestic and foreign resources to build the largely non-academic, semi-bureaucratic institutions, and attempted to give these institutions the role of leadership in the profession. Without the seed of the profession being nurtured and jealously guarded in academia, the profession was bound to have distorted growth. Second, the HAG-trained economists were very different from the mainstream economists of the time in the West. The HAG-sponsored training was development-oriented and specific to Pakistan. They were not encouraged to do any theoretical or pioneering research. They were instead trained to assist policy-makers design plans and projects within the overall development vision of the time. Third, given the influence of HAG and the new institutions, and the symbiotic relationship between these institutions and the bureaucratic and political structure of the time in Pakistan, the HAG-trained economists acquired a large and visible role in the economy. These visible economists have not only played an important role in Pakistan's history, but also by and large distorted the perception of economists, the economics profession and economic policy in Pakistan.

To drive all these ideas home, let us contrast the Pakistani economists with the Indian economists of the time. First, all major Indian economists are rooted in their academic institutions, having taught at home and in major universities overseas. Second, they have engaged in theoretical and fundamental research, and not just development economics, and have published widely in major academic journals and not just on the Indian economy. Third, they have had limited visibility in the corridors of power in India, other than through their international prominence. Interestingly, the Indian economics profession matured in the 1970s in the sense that the domestic teaching and research institutions reached a level of self-perpetuation where its products are internationally recognised. The implicit proposition here is that had the HAG vision been based on rooting the profession on sound academic lines in academic institutions in the country, perhaps Pakistan would have seen a wholesome development of the profession.

Let us now turn to the dominant economic ideas planted by the HAG advisors in Pakistan. By design and reflecting the development thinking of the time, the HAG group was interventionist and oriented to plan and budgetary allocations.[2]

[2] It is interesting to note that Haq and Baqai (1988) point to the 'widening in the choice of subjects in research' in the 1960s and 1970s. Their choices include. 'analysis of planning expertise'; 'powerful question of regional disparity'; 'question of dual exchange rate'; 'effective protection'; type of industrialisation'; and the 'effect of the tube wells on agriculture'. They also note, somewhat disparagingly, that the 'focus of economic literature in the fifties was on monetary analysis, fiscal policy, deficit financing and inflation'. These statements illustrate our point that the issues of concern to the development economist in the 1960s and 1970s were interventionist and distributional and not those dealing with macroeconomic stability backed by a market-oriented regime.

They largely mistrusted the market and arrogantly assumed (even claimed) that planners and bureaucrats had better (more) information than the market and the rest of society.[3] Interestingly enough, the HAG training of development economics was collapsing on itself by the early 1970s. Because these people had no behavioural relationships in mind and no faith in markets, they did not merely push policy levers and study response lags and dynamics. Instead, they developed lengthy plans or wish lists and used the bureaucratic structures to control the environment to make these plans happen. The control-oriented and market-mistrusting civil service loved this new intellectual force given to their view.

A second element in the thinking of the HAG economist was the increasing concern with poverty and inequality. Haq and Baqai (1986) note with concern that 'early writing on economics in Pakistan surprisingly did not contain much reference to poverty related themes.' It is interesting that most of the early econometric or behavioural research is done mainly by the HAG advisors, whereas the work on measuring poverty, productivity is done by the Pakistani economists. Before anything about the economy was understood, poverty and regional inequality indices, and decline in real wages (when the wage data were hardly available) were the main areas of concern as is reflected by articles in PDR.

The manner in which the first-generation economists were trained itself created a certain perception of economists in Pakistan. They were trained to be policy-oriented development economists. A sharp distinction was made between such economists and those who studied more theoretical and academic economics. The erroneous impression was unintendedly cultivated that the study of theory or more rigorous economics was of limited use to the country. Such pursuit was considered a luxury that the country could ill-afford. This view has persisted and developed over time and reinforced the perception that to be a good economist for Pakistan a grounding in economic theory is not only not required but perhaps may even be a hindrance. The result is that there is a tremendous disrespect for academic and theoretical economics. The term 'ivory tower' intellectual has been used to describe anyone who attempts to read and keep abreast of academic economics. Instead, an amalgam of general knowledge and mild development verbiage has been established as sound Pakistani development economics.

The Post-Bangladesh Period (1972–97)

By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the HAG era was ending and fragmentation in the nascent economics profession was already visible. In the late 1960s,

[3] See Hussain (1988), who argues that 'the logic of planning is that the existing set of world prices is not an appropriate indicator of resource allocation,' and concludes that the 'sixth five year plan constitutes an abandonment of…planning in the strictest sense of the term....since it adopts world prices and comparative advantage as a basis for the abandonment of national economic planning'.

Bengali economists started to take lead in the academic field, but their major interest was to highlight the so-called interregional inequality and resource transfer. The West Pakistani economists were following the HAG design and were totally enmeshed with the civil service and the political scene in developing the annual budgets and five-year plans. The Bengalis felt marginalised from this and were heading off in the direction of laying the ideological and economic foundation for the emerging state of Bangladesh. The separate reports of the Bengali and West Pakistani economists for the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970–75) remain perhaps the most important evidence of the contradictory visions of development in Pakistan. The State Bank group was frustrated by the relative lack of importance of the Bank and monetary policy and the domination of the Bank by the civil service. The possibility of an independent and professional Bank had apparently become more remote. Indeed the State Bank of Pakistan never developed a core economists given to serious research.

The academic and research environment for the economics profession in Pakistan started to change in the 1970s in several ways. First, Pakistan's dismemberment in 1971—splitting into what are Pakistan and Bangladesh now—had profound implications for the profession. The main institution for economic research, PIDE, was moved from Karachi to Dhaka in 1969 and the main economists who were running it were Bengalis. The result was that the Institute was virtually moribund. Second, even the Pakistani economists who remained were induced overseas by a combination of better incentives in international agencies. To this a feeling of devaluation of professional skills was added in the Bhutto era (1972–77) which was dominated by the rhetoric of socialism accompanied by large-scale nationalisation of banks and industries. The visibility that professional economists had acquired in the Ayub era was lost by now. They had little to contribute to public policy during the 1970s and the Planning Commission lost its earlier importance.

By the early 1970s, the HAG-trained economists had been marginalised by the political movement led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, dominated by the ideas of nationalisation and socialism. Politicisation of the civil service further weakened the influence of professional economists in government services. However, after the imposition of Martial Law in 1977, the civil service was rehabilitated to its former dominance in policy-making. The political rhetoric of the militrat regime led by General Zia ul Haque shifted to a full-steam programme of 'Islamisation' with a large dose of foreign aid. These changes fragmented the economics profession further. Some economists used their international development contacts to retreat to the international agencies where, as we all know, they have had sterling careers. At this stage, the first Pakistani academic economists also emerged not through the government or donor inspired scholarship schemes but through individual career choices. Some of them started publishing in overseas journals and occupied prestigious positions in universities and international organisations. However, given the dearth of academic institutions, incentives

and academic respectability in Pakistan, all of them have stayed abroad. Attempts were made to compensate for these losses by means of some institution building.

Building Research Institutions

The PIDE was re-established in Islamabad in mid-1972, followed by the creation of Applied Economics Research Centre (AERC) as a 'centre of excellence' in the University of Karachi. This eventually paved the way for several institutions for ostensible economic research. These institutions as they were formed received substantial financial assistance from the federal government, USAID and the Ford Foundation. A large number of young professionals from these institutions were sent overseas, particularly to the United States, for the Master and PhD degree programmes with financial assistance from one or another donor agency. Some economists from universities were also sponsored to complete M.A. and PhD degrees under different scholarship programmes. These institution-building efforts during the 1970s and 1980s have not borne fruit as they were plagued by at least four major difficulties.

First, universities were not able to attract or keep the newly foreign trained economists for lack of a favourable work environment—feudal management structure, poor research infrastructure (books, journals, computing facilities, etc.) and low material incentives. Some of these academics moved to public sector organisations or international organisations. There is not one Department of Economics in Pakistan today with a credible programme in economics. The academic quality of graduates at the M.A. level is by and large low and uneven between universities, and quite inferior to a middling B.A. in any international university. However, this reflects the larger national crisis in Pakistan's post-secondary education system.

Second, PIDE—which was the supposed leader and a model of economic research—was also unable to attract and hold a core group of competent economists. AERC, which has made a significant reputation for itself largely through its entrepreneurial leadership, too was unable to develop a significant grouping of economists. Both of these institutions had access to scholarships for several young economists to study mainly in the U.S. throughout the 1980s. It is important to note that PIDE and AERC, for more or less similar reasons, have lost several well-trained economists to public sector institutions and international agencies in the last decade.

Third, interestingly enough, throughout this period, the fragmentation of the profession mentioned earlier has persisted, reflecting the poor institutional development in Pakistan. Whether the HAG-trained economists, who went overseas, took no interest or were not allowed to work does not matter since the result is the same. The new professionals who never really worked in Pakistan

attempted to do so, but have found that they cannot contribute or are used for purposes of internal institutional politics rather than professional or institutional development.

Finally, the visible fragmentation and institutional decline are further evidence in that the State Bank of Pakistan has stopped virtually all in-house research and its publications since the mid-1970s. Moreover, all of the research centres and institutes, including PIDE and AERC, have largely excluded from their programmes and studies the involvement of faculty from the Departments of Economics in universities in Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar, and Hyderabad. There is almost no formal joint study and research programme at any of these places. On the contrary, there is unhealthy competition for scarce resources and skills and even mutual resentment and hostility.

Considering the migration of skilled economists to overseas positions, the supply of quality economists in Pakistan has remained quite limited. Notwithstanding the limited skilled resources, the push for creating new 'research' centres and institutes accelerated through the 1980s. Several new centres (institutes) were established during this period: the Centre for Applied Economics Studies in the University of Peshawar, Economics Research Centre in the University of Sindh, Punjab Economics Research Institute (formerly the Punjab Board of Economic Inquiry) in the (Government of) Punjab Planning Board, Institute of Development Studies in the Agriculture University in Peshawar, and Islamic Economics Research Centre in the International Islamic University in Islamabad. The available resources were spread too thin so that no core grouping of professionals has been formed anywhere.

It seems that there are two major reasons for this mushroom-like growth of the so-called research institutions: (i) build new regional or specialised capabilities for economic research as competing empires vis à vis Departments of Economics in universities and (ii) use them as institutional vehicles to attract projects and studies funded by governments and foreign donors. The proliferation of institutions was also accompanied by an increase in the number of universities in Pakistan. The traditional centres of learning in Pakistan, such as the Punjab University or Government College in Lahore, meanwhile were denuded of funding. The case of the Islamic Economics Research Centre is somewhat special in that the establishment of the International Islamic University coincided with the policy of Islamisation in the Zia era. Several relatively young economists were drawn into the teaching of and research on 'Islamic Economics' in the International Islamic University. It is fair to say that most of the research centres and institutes have so far neither created a favourable environment for academic research nor published any research output. The result of all this has been to reinforce the notion established in the earlier period that the profession of economics was to be nurtured outside the university centres.

Developing Professional Associations

At the meta-institutional level, an effort was made to revive the Pakistan Economic Association (PEA) in mid-1972, which held its 16th—and as it turns out the last—Annual Meeting in Islamabad in early 1973. As stated earlier, PEA had held its annual conference from 1950 to 1968 and maintained its quarterly journal, PEJ, to which papers were contributed by some well known international scholars and academics that enjoyed respectability within academia. However, after its meeting in 1973, PEA went into a state of inaction from which it has not recovered to this day. The moribund state of PEA and its revival were discussed in several public fora in the late 1970s (University of Karachi) and early 1980s (University of Punjab), but without results. PEA was effectively controlled by a small number of senior (academic) economists, and its last president did not hold the usual annual meeting for a number of years.

As an alternative to the defunct PEA, PIDE established the Pakistan Society of Development Economists (PSDE) in 1983. PSDE was established as an instrument of PIDE for its own purposes and not necessarily for the development of the profession. Its membership was not open. Professional associations normally select the president on the basis of intellectual stature and for a limited tenure, usually a year. An important function of the president is to conduct some key proceedings of the association to further his/her scholarly agenda. That is how a professional association remains alive and gets invigorated. Contrary to this standard professional practice, the Director of PIDE is also appointed the president of PSDE under its charter. PSDE activities have, therefore, highlighted the personal agenda of the Director of PIDE. The annual meetings of PSDE have usually attracted some international economists (funded by foreign assistance from Germany and the Ford Foundation endowment fund) and some Pakistani economists from outside PIDE. But these PSDE annual meetings are perhaps more distinguished by the prominent Pakistani economists that were often excluded from participation.

Considering the checkered life of the PEA and activities of PSDE so far, it is clear that Pakistani economists have been unable to create a forum that would disseminate economic thought and ideas and subject all shades and hierarchies of the profession to peer opinion and discussion. Indeed this failure has been an important reason for the stunted development of the profession. The key question for the future is to lay the foundation of a professional association in the environment where hierarchies and titles are less important then exchange of ideas through open debate and discussion under the critical scrutiny of one's peers in the profession.

Research and Professional Journals

A detailed evaluation of research output from PIDE and AERC—the only relatively active research institutions in the country—in the last 15 years is hard

to make, thanks to lack of detailed information about their research programmes and research output. However, some meaningful comments can be made on the basis of published articles in PDR and PJAE and occasional papers and reports issued by PIDE and AERC.[4]

The PIDE research programme seems to cover a variety of issues or themes, driven mainly by their 'relevance' to Pakistan, availability of funds and research staff. The research areas range from demography (population and migration) to industry (productivity and protection), agriculture (terms of trade, use of inputs, farm productivity), and monetary and fiscal economics (money demand, government spending, inflation). Articles published in PDR are contributed both by the research staff of PIDE and outside contributors. Some of these articles are products of project or programme-based reports prepared by the PIDE staff for the government and/or international donor organisations. Other articles are of some academic standing, based on doctoral dissertations of the PIDE staff and other contributors. A large volume of the papers published in PDR are presented at the annual meeting of PSDE, for which they are not even internally screened much less refereed. It is worth noting that a high proportion of the PIDE papers are co-authored, reflecting 'team work', but usually carrying the name of a senior economist in PIDE.

In 1982, AERC started its own biannual journal, *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics* (PJAE), to publish the results of in-house research and contributions by outsiders. Looking at the issues of PJAE and AERC occasional reports, it seems that much of the in-house research has been driven by contractual project studies completed for governments, public sector agencies and international donors. The contractual 'research' studies completed by the AERC staff reflect a limited number of areas: crop production, farm credit, local administration, urban growth, education and employment, and fiscal federalism. It is worth noting that the PJAE editorial staff are unable to publish the journal regularly even two times in the year: the time-lag has increased from one to two years.

Both PIDE and AERC seem to have very little to offer in their research programmes on the topical issues since Pakistan, like so many underdeveloped countries, has been slipping in or out of structural adjustment programmes since the early 1980s. For example, they have not examined the micro and macro aspects of the structural adjustment programmes, e.g., distorted markets for products and resources (land, labour and capital); effects of taxes and subsides on private sector efficiency, consumption and savings; financial repression; trade liberalisation; privatisation, etc. Despite the exhibited vulnerability of the

[4] PJAE and PDR are the main economic journals in Pakistan. Like the proliferation of 'research' centres or institutes, a number of in-house journals, periodicals and magazines of uneven quality are issued by small colleges and departments of economics. They usually reflect vanity publication efforts. Also, it may be added that economic journalism in Pakistan has also increased, but it is still weak and uneven in quality. Perhaps only one weekly magazine, *Pakistan and Gulf Economist*, has achieved a respectable status in recent years.

country to repeated supply shocks to its main export, cotton and its products, none of these two institutions has had anything to say on the issue. It seems that expensive projects with dubious payoffs or esoteric value have received extensive patronage without any input from external referees or peer review. Also, there are very few examinations of the important social and economic questions of the time: quality of governance, fiscal federalism, regional resource transfer and income disparities, and the declining quality of life in the country.

Academic Management and Incentive Structure

The major factors affecting the volume and quality of academic research in economics include: the internal management structure, work environment, and the reward system in academia and research institutes. Reflecting the pathology of the larger feudal-bureaucratic social order in Pakistan, the senior management generally follows the national model of centralised power without consultation and participation. A high proportion of the junior research and teaching staff finds itself in a patron-client relationship, in which the patron has considerable power to punish and reward individuals. The personalised nature of power breeds mediocrity since salary, scholarship, and promotion are rarely based on merit and personal achievement. Some of the senior research staff and faculty have achieved their positions through this system and suffer from a sense of insecurity.

Rather than publication and the development of academic ideas, status and title are considered worthy of merit. For example, a PhD certificate has been regarded by many seniors academics and professionals as the end of their scholarship and research. They, therefore, set an example that young professionals are expected not to transgress if they want to build their careers.[5] Often, in the academic and teaching institutions, one finds that the volume and quality of research published by the senior research staff are indeed very limited. In addition, it is rare to see the names of Pakistani economists in local universities and research institutes as authors of papers in journals outside Pakistan.

It is worth noting that universities, including Departments of Economics and Centres of Excellence (like AERC), have enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in their management since they are not governed directly by federal or provincial governments. They receive their funding through the Universities Grants Commission (UGC). This, however, does not mean that are entirely free from government interference since public sector representative carry substantial weight in the Board of Governors, etc. As stated earlier, the internal management structures are by large non-participatory, based on hierarchy by

[5] In fact, a larger social problem in Pakistan, especially among the 'intellectual' (technocratic) élite, is that the PhD degree grants the individual the right to add 'Dr' as a prefix to his/her name, it simply acts as a status symbol and gives membership to the exclusive club.

seniority. The reward system follows the national model of patronage. Finally, in the early 1970s, academics and professionals misguidedly fought for and received the national grade (and salary) structure followed in the civil service. However, they have not enjoyed the perks and rent-seeking opportunities available to civil servants. Salaries for most academic and professional economists are quite unrelated to one's work and needs, leading to increased dependence on 'moonlighting' or the more lucrative private consultancy work.

It terms of management, the case of PIDE is special since it was established as an 'autonomous' entity in the federal government. Its Board of Directors is chaired by the Federal Finance Minister and includes secretaries of the Ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs, Planning, and Education. Other members of the Board are Governor of the State Bank, Chairman of UGC, five members of the Council of Senior Fellows of PIDE. The Director of PIDE is ex-officio member of the Board. The Board Chairman enjoys substantial power because of his/her official position. The Council of Senior Fellows, with 15 members includes representatives from regional universities and professionals selected by the Director of PIDE. In theory, the Council supervises the research, training, publication, and professional functions of PIDE. In reality, the Council members act as 'friends' of PIDE and often rubber stamp the Director's programme or agenda.

Resources for Research: Aid and Consultancy

There is little funding for economic research in the country, reflecting the general lack of investment in education and research in Pakistan. An academic has no way of finding funds for what he/she or his/her peer group might consider interesting or necessary for research. The only funding available is that which donors consider necessary for their operations. But then this funding is available to meet the priorities of lenders or donors and not to conform to the needs of the local community of economists. The donor agenda in Pakistan, as in many other countries, has not been consistent over time, since it has changed according to the shifting development perspectives of the political élite in the donor countries and senior managers of donor agencies. Similarly, donor funding has been unreliable, dependent largely on the changing priorities and moods of those in power in the donor countries and agencies.

A new and somewhat ominous phenomenon started to emerge in the early 1980s: careers in the consultancy industry. It has affected the economics profession in a disastrous way in Pakistan. Consulting on economic issues at the individual and institutional level is clearly associated with the growth of project and programme-based foreign 'aid' from multilateral (e.g., World Bank and Asian Development Bank) and bilateral (e.g., United States, Japan, the European Union countries, Switzerland, and Canada) donors. Pakistan's dependence on foreign aid and its foreign debt liability have increased significantly in the last 15 years or so, hence increased involvement of the multilateral and bilateral

donors. A major effect of donor involvement and inflow of resources for projects and programmes, mainly in the public sector, has been the growth of demand for local consultants (individual and institutional) as partners with foreign consultants or as independents to produce (feasibility and evaluation) reports on projects and programmes.

Consultancy has become a profitable industry for professional economists inside and outside universities and research institutes. Given the largely unfavourable environment for academic research in economics and the lucrative monetary gain and social status from consulting services, this industry has drawn the energy and time of almost every academic economist in the country. In fact, most of the so-called research agenda and output in almost all of the academia and institutes is driven by the demand for studies and reports by donor agencies and government departments or organisations. Coincidentally there has been impressive growth of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) throughout the country, again based largely on foreign resources.[6] The NGOs, working in the economic and social sectors, have been able to attract many economists to work for them. Almost all of this work has no serious academic or research content—in fact it is anti-intellectual since it wants immediate answers to self-serving propositions or questions—but its pecuniary benefits are generally much higher than in academia and provides greater exposure to the wheels of power. The economists involved in consulting—and all of them are—have found a symbiotic relationship with the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan and officials of donor agencies. They need each other for their survival and growth. It seems that the economics profession is too well caught in this privately profitable but non-academic enterprise. Can it be saved from this malaise? It is hard to say at this stage.

Conclusion

Today there are very few Pakistani economists who have really seriously published and achieved a modicum of respectability in the academic world. They are to be contrasted with the HAG tradition in Pakistan of acquiring a doctorate and then doing high profile and catchy things in newspapers and magazines in Pakistan. Sadly enough some younger economists are continuing that tradition and they use every means at their disposal to decry the profession that they practice by making claims like ‘much of it may not be applicable,’ and ‘theory is only for advanced societies’. Suffice to say that the old HAG divide continues!

To gauge the extent of the fragmentation in the profession, we recently conducted two simple investigations in Pakistan.

[6] The question, whether an appropriate domestic research or policy agenda can be formulated when the local academics and professionals depend so much on donor funds, is open to investigation. See Samad (1993).

First, we surveyed the younger professionals to find out what sort of contact they had had with their more senior counterparts, especially the first crop of Pakistani economists. The answer was uniformly 'no professional contact'. In addition, many of them also said that, if ever they met, the first crop either patronised them or found some innuendo to deride them (e.g., 'when are you going to get off your ivory tower and do some real work'). None of them felt comfortable with the contact noting that the first crop claimed hierarchical privilege and felt very uncomfortable with an equal debate of issues. The culture of Pakistan too does not help here, for age can often interpret a genuine difference of opinion as rudeness. This claim has often prevented dialogue.

Second, in looking at the development of professions and professionals in more advanced societies, we see that much of skill transfer takes place through mentoring by senior professionals of junior professionals (apprentices). All the younger economists denied that they had received any mentoring from their more senior professionals. In fact, many of them found the first crop to be unapproachable. More interestingly, upon searching, we could not find any professionals that the first crop had mentored.

The avalanche of economics consultancy since the early 1980s has exacerbated the plight of the young professional in Pakistan. Pakistani economists, instead of attempting to create their own professional associations, develop peer review and evaluation, and set their own research and policy priorities, are investing their major efforts into finding ways to please donors and to compete not often and only on the basis of professional competence but for the favour of the donor.

The building of an edifice on weak foundations is extremely difficult. Unfortunately, Pakistan did not inherit a tradition of learning and research. That in itself was a difficult obstacle to overcome. But it was capped by the advent of ideas from the donor development expert that did not root the academic profession in the cradle—the academic institutions—that would regenerate it. Instead, they created the visible, development economist of Pakistan. These development economists have been seeking a political role and have contributed nothing to the development of the economics profession in Pakistan. They have always displayed an impatience for growth and development. It is not surprising that they have missed out on the fundamental truth in theoretical economics that economic development is not mere 'plan allocations' but human skill development. After all they have no respect for the 'ivory tower' intellectual. The problem of academic study of economics and the development of professionals in Pakistan has become even more serious in recent years in light of the decline in the standard of education in the academia and the growth of consultancy and NGO industry. If only all Pakistani professionals will seek to develop deep and broad professions in their own respective fields, meaningful development can and will occur. Economic development will be the sum total (and maybe even more) of the development of these professions.

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5

Contemporary Sociology in Pakistan*

Hassan N Gardezi

The growth of sociology in Pakistan covers a brief historical span. Full academic recognition of the subject came in 1955, seven years after the inception of the new state, when Punjab University inaugurated the first department of sociology in the country. From this perspective, one could regard all academic sociology in Pakistan as contemporary. However, the student of contemporary sociology must attempt to cover at least three basic steps while investigating the current state of the discipline. In our view these steps include: (i) the search for dominant trends and orientations in the literature with respect to methodology, philosophical assumptions, and any ideological bias; (ii) an explanation of these trends with respect to some criteria of validity and relevance; and (iii) forecasting the course of future developments.

In Pakistan, as elsewhere, the production of sociological thought and analysis did not await the introduction of sociology as an academic discipline in the universities of the country. However, once the first university department of sociology was opened in 1955, sociological teaching, writing, and professional application, became quickly dominated by university-trained sociologists. It is with the work of these scholars, formally labelled as sociologists, that this chapter will be concerned.

Early Influence of American Sociology

With a few exceptions, all these sociologists received postgraduate training after 1955. A strong influence of American (U.S.) sociology became remarkable in their work and orientation at the outset. American scholars, training facilities, and textbooks exercised a powerful impact on the initial planning of sociological teaching and research projects in Pakistan. Professors and experts assigned by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) played major roles in founding the sociology departments and socio-economic research projects of the Punjab University and the West Pakistan Agricultural University. In addition, some Americans became involved with the newly created departments of

* This article was first published in Mohan, Raj. P. and Arthur S. Wilke, *The International Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Sociology*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1994.

Sociology at the Karachi and Dhaka universities through the Fulbright and UNESCO projects. Almost all Pakistani foreign-trained professors and research administrators received their education in American universities during the period 1955-70.

As an outcome of this extensive influence, Pakistani sociology in teaching, research, and professional application, adopted a course which has been predominantly ahistorical, eclectic, and narrowly empirical. This was particularly the case in the Punjab University, which was a major producer of trained sociologists and sociological research during the period 1955-68. The syllabi and courses of reading at this institution reveal attempts to copy closely the graduate and undergraduate programs of American universities current at the time.[1] Similarly, dissertations written as part of the requirements of the M.A. degree in sociology, with very few exceptions, indicate an exclusive preoccupation with testing of propositions derived haphazardly from American sociological literature.[2] For example, one student thesis tests correlations between 'broken homes', 'permissiveness', 'overprotection at home', 'lack of parental affection', 'working mothers', and so forth via frustration and aggression to the crime of homicide among a sample of Pakistani women convicts taken from a local jail.[3] The frustration-aggression hypothesis is, of course, credited to the works of American authors J. Dollard and others.[4] No cognisance is taken of the fact that in Pakistan an overwhelmingly large proportion of female homicide convicts continue to be those who have murdered their husbands.

Generally, the extensive infusion of concepts and propositions with primary validation in American sociology and sociocultural realities had an overpowering effect on the thought and work of Pakistani sociologists right from the inception of the discipline as a formal enterprise. 'Sir, all my hypotheses have been disproved,' was a common protestation of the bewildered sociology students at the Punjab University, who had been carefully instructed in operationalizing borrowed concepts by their mentors and testing statistical relationships between variables. The instructors were often themselves puzzled at these results because of insufficient awareness that such middle-range theory as they were using, along with survey and research techniques, had received its primary validation in the middle-class, Western, urban, industrial societies.

[1] Punjab University, Department of Sociology, *Prospectus, 1965-67*. Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1965.
[2] Fayyaz, Muhammad and Qaiyum Lodhi, *Thesis Index, 1957-67*, Lahore Department of Sociology, Punjab University, 1968.
[3] Malik, Irshad, 'Crime of Murder among Women Convicts of the Women Jail', (M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, Punjab University, 1958).
[4] Dollard, J, et al., *Frustration and Aggression*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

A review of the master's theses written in the sociology departments of the Punjab and Karachi universities, two of the largest in the country, since the 1970s suggests that there is a continued reliance on survey analysis of attitudes toward different issues and social events within the previously mentioned frameworks. One exception to this observation is a new trend to undertake descriptive studies of the social organisation of tribal groupings and case studies of deviant behaviour.[5]

Since the 1970s there have also appeared a number of textbooks catering to the needs of undergraduate students, as more and more colleges have introduced sociology at the B.A. level. These books, both in Urdu and English, have also borrowed conceptual frameworks, terminology, and methodological approaches from the American/European textbooks Their only redeeming feature lies in attempts to introduce illustrative material from local sources, such as the national census and socio-economic studies conducted by governmental and nongovernmental agencies. Textbooks literally translated from English into Urdu are also commonly used in teaching Sociology at the undergraduate level.

The Professional Organisation of Sociologists

As the decade of the 1960s began, almost all major universities and colleges in the country were offering formal programmes in sociology, and the number of Pakistani sociologists increased considerably.[6] Some of them began to see the need to form a professional body that could sponsor periodic conferences of the country's sociologists. A wider exchange of ideas, and discussion of the unique problems of Pakistani sociology, was seen as one way of resolving some of the critical issues that the practitioners of the new discipline were facing. The Pakistan Sociological Association was formed in April 1963 and was followed by a national Seminar held in June of the same year at the Dhaka University in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In this seminar, for the first time several participants expressed concern regarding a number of issues affecting the sociological practice.[7] These issues revolved around the consequences of a heavy and uncritical reliance on western substantive sociology, its philosophical and methodological premises, and its techniques and models of research. Not all the delegates were equally critical of the ‘imported sociology.’ Some felt that the fundamental principle of sociology and corresponding methodological premises are universal and flow from a common and continuous tradition which was simply carried forward from its Mediterranean origins to Europe and North America. According to this view, contemporary American sociology was as good a ground for initiation into the discipline as any.

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[5] To cite two random examples: Hussain, Manzoor, ‘A Study of Social organization of Thori Tribe’ (M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, Punjab University, 1976); and Razzak, Muhammad, ‘A Case Study of Swindlers’, (M.A. thesis, Department of Sociology, Punjab University, 1978).

[6] Gardezi, Hassan N, ed., *Sociology in Pakistan*, Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1966.

[7] Afsaruddin, M, ed., *Sociology and Social Research in Pakistan*, Dhaka: Pakistan Sociological Association, East Pakistan Unit, 1963.

Nevertheless, others persisted in noting that the unique elements of the culture and social organisation of Pakistani society called for the development of concepts and theoretical models bearing greater relevance to the indigenous social experience. Although no concrete course of action emerged from this seminar, it did arouse a lasting interest in examining the fundamental problems of practising sociology in Pakistan. Thus, in the following year when the Pakistan sociological Association held its first annual meeting, the issue was given poignant expression by one of the participants:

> There is the impossible alternative of inventing an *ad hoc* Sociology, custom tailored to local conditions, from a nationalistic point of view, an attractive prospect. This will lead to as many so-called sociologies as there are cultures and subcultures in the world but this would be the death of Sociology in any objective *scientific*, universalistic sense of the word and Sociology will become vulnerable to increasing diversion for political ends. The other alternative is to continue the application of concepts and techniques rooted in a western industrial society to the rural social system of the East. In this direction lies barren scholasticism, where our students continue to memorise definitions that baffle understanding in any empirical context known to them.[8]

Such reminders continued to be registered at the annual meetings of the Pakistan Sociological Association. As late as 1966, the president of the Association reminded his colleagues:

> We will be closing our eyes to reality if we deny that in a hurry to establish separate departments of Sociology in various Pakistani universities, we have almost blindly depended on such type of textbooks which have little or no relevance to our society ... It is time that we take the warning against the pitfalls that lie hidden in the unexamined application of theory and methodology of certain Western writers for the study of our society. Sociology like any other science is, doubtless, universal in its approach, but society being the outcome of many particularistic and parochial forces has to be understood in the context of those forces.[9]

These reminders did not produce any significant immediate shifts in the orientations of the country's sociologists. Unfortunately, the Pakistan Sociological Association itself was allowed to die after the movement of some of its active members out of the country and the later secession of East Pakistan.

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[8] Barash, M, 'Prospects for Sociology in Pakistan: A Comparative Analysis,' *Pakistan Sociological Studies*, Lahore: Pakistan Sociological Association, 1965, 8-9.

[9] Karim, A. K. Nazmul, 'Presidential Address to the Third Annual Conference,' in Chaudhari, Haider Ali, et al., eds., *Pakistan Sociological Perspective*, Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1968, p. 78.

Focus on Rural Life

Since Pakistan is a predominantly rural society, studies of social organisation and change in the rural setting became popular at an early stage of formal sociological work. A number of such studies were produced from 1959 onward by the Social Sciences Research Centre of the Punjab University, the Department of Rural Sociology of the West Pakistan Agricultural University, and the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development. These studies reflect two major foci of investigation.

The first has to do with interest in investigating villagers' responses to programmes of induced change and agricultural innovation. This interest was strongly promoted and sustained by USAID funds and personnel. All the previously named institutions, along with several rural development centres, were in fact established in Pakistan at the initiative of USAID advisors. Most of these advisors came from land grant colleges and universities, which had laid the foundations of research and extension work credited with the transformation of agricultural production and rural life in America. Thus, a number of village studies using statistical survey methods replicated research already conducted in the United States to identify the social and behavioural characteristics of farmers most likely to use new agricultural practices recommended by experts. The respondents were divided into categories such as ‘non-adopters’, ‘low adopters’, ‘medium adopters’, and ‘high adopters’. These categories were correlated with independent variables such as age, literacy, social class, attitudes, and values with statistical limits of confidence.[10]

An interesting extension of this type of research involved constructing ‘modernity scales’, based on the theoretical frameworks developed in American sociologists David McClelland, Daniel Lerner, and Alex Inkles with all their veiled racist assumptions.[11] A Pakistani researcher, for example, asks a sample of Punjab peasants if they believe in *bhootnas* (hobgoblins) to determine how free from superstition, and therefore, modern, they are.[12] Whether this has anything to do with modernity or not, the existence of *bhootna*, a cultural construct, will be hard to deny if one has had the experience of venturing out on the unlit, dark, and spooky night of rural Punjab.

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[10] For a typical example, see Chaudhari, Haider Ali, Eugene C. Erickson, and Ijaz Ahmad Bajwa, ‘Some Social Characteristics of Agricultural Innovators in Pakistan,’ in Chaudhari et al., eds., *Pakistan Sociological Perspectives*, 1968, 95-102.

[11] Lerner, Daniel, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Midle East*, New York: The Free Press, 1958; McClelland, David C, *The Achieving Society*, Toronto: Collier MacMillan, 1961; Inkles, Alex, *Making Men Modern*, in Amitai Atzioni, ed., *Social Change*, New York: Basic Books, 1973.

[12] Raza, Muhammad Rafiq, *Two Pakistani Villages*, Lahore: Department Sociology, Punjab University, 1969. (A publication based on the author's doctoral thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1966.)

A second and more fruitful trend in the study of rural life focused on the social organisation of village communities in Pakistan. Initially, studies in this perspective were descriptive. They seemed to assume an audience of non-villagers, Pakistani upper-class urbanites, curious foreign tourists and development experts. Village life was described for this audience with some demonstration of scientific objectivity and statistical expertise, for example, an analysis of sampling errors.[13] Apart from the atomistic description of villagers' material possessions, institutional performance, and management of life crises, a few references are made to certain authentic elements of the social organisation of Punjab villages, such as factionalism *biradri*, *zat* and *qaum* distinctions, *syep* contracts, and so forth. However, these elements of the social organisation are rarely used as a meaningful conceptual basis for analysis, and a predominant tendency is to subsume all particularistic patterns of differentiation of social structures under the generic and hackneyed concept of *caste*. An improvement over these works is an independent village study by Zekiye Eglar, which investigates kinship networks in depth as a basis for mutual duties and obligations and patterns of interaction within the village community.[14]

However, the earlier studies by and large, present a static and closed view of rural life in which the villager seems to be caught as a passive object of manipulation by internal and external forces. The basic elements of the village social organisation are not treated as a set of possibilities and constraints through which the villagers actively realise their survival goals in an environment of economic hardship and political pressures. Significant departures from this orientation began to appear in the late 1960s with another independent village study by Hamza Alavi.[15] Here the author develops a dynamic framework as he carefully observes how the villagers pragmatically and innovatively solve their day-to-day dilemmas and problems; how they translate their positions in various networks of kinship, tenancy, government, and market systems into concrete strategies of action. Thus, the social organisation of the village is given a refreshingly original and vivid portrayal as a working and ongoing dynamic.

This outstanding departure from the past orientation was soon followed by two other major studies undertaken in 1964-65 and 1978-80.[16] By now the

[13] Slocum, W. L, Jamila Akhter, and A. F. Sahi, *Village Life in Lahore District*, Lahore: Punjab University Press, 1959.
[14] Eglar, Zekiye, A *Punjabi Village in Pakistan*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.
[15] Alavi, Hamza, 'The Politics of Dependence: A Village in West Punjab, *South Asian Review*, January 1971, pp. 111-28.

[16] Ahmad, Saghir, *Class and Power in a Punjabi Village*, Lahore: Punjabi Adbi Markaz, 1977 and, Rouse, Shahnaz, 'Systemic Injustices and Inequalities: Malik and Rayia in a Punjab Village,' in Gardezi, Hassan N, and Jamil Rashid. eds. *Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian Slate* London: Zed press, 1983. (The latter publication is a preliminary report. For the completed work, see the author's

countryside in Pakistan had several years of experience with adult franchise, land reforms, and projects of modernising agriculture through innovations associated with the 'green revolution.' Focusing on the impact of changes, both of these latter studies demonstrate that class and power relations are more fundamental for the villagers' life experiences than their membership in kinship circles and caste-like status groups. While sociocultural phenomena do play a role, the system of property relations sets the boundaries within which classes relate to each other and the struggle for survival takes place for an overwhelming segment of small landowners and landless cultivators. The researchers conclude that the introduction of agrarian reforms and innovations have had the cumulative effect of increasing the political and economic power of big landowners, while at the same time creating a small class of middle farmers and reducing a majority of the village population to an impoverished rural proletariat.

It is significant that some studies of rural life in Pakistan in the early 1980s were aware of the realities of class and the distribution of power while investigating the issues of social organisation and change.[17]

Applied Sociology

Sociology in Pakistan adopted an applied orientation from the beginning. In a society with a low level of development of productive forces and a history of colonial exploitation, a strong concern with problems of a practical and developmental nature was almost a prerequisite for the acceptance of the discipline. Heavy emphasis on the study of social problems was also a reflection of the American sociological tradition. P. A. Wakil estimates that between 1957 and 1967, 327 master's theses were submitted to the Punjab University, out of which over 95 percent addressed social problems.[18] Topical areas included crime, poverty, overpopulation, deterioration of educational standards, status of women, agricultural production, and various urban 'vices'. The definitions of social problems were generally derived from American sociological literature;

PhD. dissertation, 'Agrarian Transformation in a Punjabi Village: Structural Change and Its Consequences' submitted to the Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin). It should be noted that the recurrence of Punjab as the regional focus of village studies is not a coincidence. This province, having the largest number of villages and the bulk of the country's oldest irrigated lands, has attracted the greatest resources for agricultural research and development.

[17] See, for example, Freeman, David M, Hosein Azadi, and Max K. Lowdermilk, 'Power Distribution and Adoption of Agricultural Innovations: A Structural Analysis of Villages in Pakistan,' *Rural Sociology*, 47, no. 1, 1982; Freeman, David M, and Hosein Azadi, 'Education, Power Distribution, and Adoption of Improved Farm Practices in Pakistan,' *Community Development Journal* 18, no. 1, 1983; Khan, Mahmood Hassan, 'Classes and Agrarian Transformation in Pakistan,' *Pakistan Development Review* 22, no. 3, 1983.

[18] Wakil, PA, 'Sociology in Developing Nations: The Case of Pakistan,' paper presented to the Seventh World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, 1970.

Richard Fuller and Richard Myers's framework was the one most popularly used.[19]

However, since 1965 the trend of conducting social problem surveys within arbitrary and negative definitions of social situations has been balanced to a degree by applied research in the framework of change theory. Reviewing a volume of collected papers, presented at the meetings of the Pakistan Sociological Association, Raymond Ries remarks: 'The empirical studies represented in these collections represent the practical sociological concerns of a developing society, and it is in this area that more innovation and originality appear'.[20] Such concerns have continued to dominate recent social research, with or without an elaborate theoretical framework, as humanistic awareness of the problems of the underprivileged section of society has intensified. To the list of subjects for sociological inquiry popular in the earlier decades (e.g., fertility control, modernisation of agriculture, community development, and crime), have been added new areas of investigation having to do with the growth of rural and urban poverty, health and sanitation, the plight of children, the status of women, and rise of religious fundamentalism. The salient features of the latter type of studies are noted in our subsequent discussion.

A few studies focusing on rural and urban poverty that have appeared more recently have been conducted in the context of changes introduced through the adoption of official plans and strategies of change in the economic and technological spheres. A statistical survey of poverty in Pakistan covering the period 1950-80 revealed that while growth-oriented industrialisation policies adopted in Pakistan produced remarkable increases in the country's gross national product (GNP), that had little impact on the reduction of poverty.[21] The statistical findings of this survey were corroborated by another study which provides a theoretical connection between poverty and high growth rates. The author argues that the regime of accumulation developed in Pakistan's peripheral capitalist mode of production makes a highly exploitative use of human labour, which explains the coincidence of poverty and economic growth measures in terms of increases in the country's GNP.[22] Similarly, another study indicates that the aggravation of rural poverty and economic disparities to a large extent the

[19] Fuller, Richard C, and Richard R. Myers, 'Some Aspects of a Theory of Social Problems,' *American Sociological Review*, February 1941.
[20] Ries, Raymond,'Pakistan Sociological Perspectives: Book Review,' *American Sociological Review*, February 1970, p. 181.
[21] Naseem, S M, *Underdevelopment. Poverty and Inequality in Pakistan*, Lahore: Vanguard Publications, 1981.
[22] Gardezi, Hassan N, 'Labour, Poverty, and Growth in Pakistan's Peripheral Accumulation,' *South Asia Bulletin* 8, nos. 1 and 2, 1988, pp. 12-19.

result of the 'elite farmer strategy' followed in conjunction with the measures introduced to promote the so-called green revolution.[23]

Focus on Age and Gender

Since the 1970s Pakistani sociologists have also turned their attention to age- and gender-specific issues. This has partly been a result of global interest in the welfare of children and women. A number of studies sponsored by UNESCO are exploratory fact-finding projects with the aim of effecting improvements in the life situation of children in Pakistan. Two recent studies have collected extensive information on the educational, health, nutritional, and environmental conditions and needs of children in the sociocultural milieu of the rural society.[24]

Greater social concern and maturity of sociological formulations begin to appear from 1970 onwards in studies pertaining to the position of women in Pakistani society. These studies can be divided into two categories. First, there are studies that go beyond the earlier preoccupation with more or less descriptive expositions of the female role and status in the traditional, patrimonial, household economy, marriage, and family, along with discussions of customs such as dowry and *purdah* (seclusion of women). These studies, while still basically descriptive, examine the impact of wider societal changes on the socio-economic status of women. One of the studies based on a series of surveys, for example, focuses on the impact of urbanisation on the position of women. These surveys show that working women lag far behind men in terms of salaries, promotions, and working conditions; and that they suffer from the negative attitudes of bureaucrats, who are invariably men.[25] Other studies aimed at compiling socio-economic and demographic data are often sponsored by governmental and nongovernmental agencies interested in improving the life and work of the female population.[26] The sociological importance of these

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[23] Alavi, Hamza, 'Elite Farmer Strategy and Regional Disparities in Agricultural Development,' in Gardezi, Hassan N, and Jamil Rashid, eds., *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, pp.* 290-307.

[24] Anwar, Muhammad, and Muhammad Naeem, *Situation of Children in Rural Punjab*, Lahore: Department of Sociology, Punjab University, 1980; Muhammad Anwar, *Maternity and Child Care in Rural Mianwali*, Lahore: UNICEF, 1982.

[25] Hafeez, Sabiha , *Metropolitan Women in Pakistan*, Karachi: Asia Printers and Publishers, 1981.

[26] Abbas, M. B, *Socio-Economic Characteristics of Women in Sind*, Karachi**:** Sind Regional Plan Organization Economic Studies Centre, 1980; Shah, Nasra M, ed., *Pakistani Women: A Socioeconomic and Demographic Profile*, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1986; Anwar, Muhammad, *Female Work Load/Time Use Patterns*, Lahore: Department of Sociology, Punjab University, 1991; Rauf, Abdur, 'Rural Women and the Family: A Study of a Punjabi Village in Pakistan,' *Journal of Contemporary Studies* 18, no. 3, 1987, pp. 403-15; Shaheed, Farida, and Mumtaz Khawar, *Invisible Workers*, Islamabad: Womens' Division, Government of Pakistan, 1986.

studies can hardly be overemphasised in a society in which much of women's life and work remains invisible.

Although progress had been made, however modest, in creating awareness of the socio-economic conditions of Pakistani women and protecting their fundamental rights through legislation since independence, a setback occurred with the imposition of a new military regime in 1977. This regime, under the presidency of General Ziaul Haq, produced several ordinances throughout the 1980s curtailing the rights of women -- ostensibly to 'Islamise' the society of Pakistan. The challenge of these attempts to reverse the gains made by women in their struggle for equality was picked up not only by female activists but also by female social scientists, who refused to put up with the age-old patriarchal system that was not necessarily of Islamic origin. It was in this context that the second category of sociological literature, on women by women, began to appear in Pakistan. This literature is not only politically better informed and critical but more sophisticated in making use of empirical information to theorise on the work of Pakistani women. Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed, for example, produced an important study of the structural and political basis of oppression of Pakistani women in the context of culturally evolving asymmetrical gender relations.[27] Needless to say, a sociological understanding of the roots of gender inequalities in Pakistan, as elsewhere was accompanied by an earnest debate over the course of action to be followed to mobilise resistance against male domination and abuse. Some women argue that the issue of women's rights is a secular one of human rights and therefore, should be treated as such, while others feel that in order not to be perceived as alien there is a need to mobilise the women in Pakistan for the recovery of their rights around a cultural, and therefore, an Islamic, discourse.[28] The debate highlights the power of the Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan, who have used religion as a weapon to perpetrate patriarchal gender relations in society.

Focus on Political Economy

Although Pakistani sociologists showed an early interest in developing an indigenous disciplinary perspective, for a considerable time their research represented little more than replications of western empirical methodology and theoretical orientations. The vogue of structural functionalism of the North American variety was in particular responsible for giving Pakistani Sociology a non-historical character whereby the existing institutional arrangements, systems of social stratification, and mechanisms of social control, were taken for granted. Social change was viewed as a product of discrete, unrelated events, caused by internal strains, accidents, or reformist (modernising) interventions.

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[27] Mumtaz, Khawar, and Farida Shaheed, eds., *Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back?*, London: Zed Books, 1987.

[28] Gardezi, Fauzia, 'Islam, Feminism and Womens' Movement in Pakistan,' *South Asia Bulletin* 10, no. 2, 1990, pp. 18-24.

However, the situation began to change as a succession of political and economic crises began to transform Pakistani society in ways not conductive to general well-being. The rise to power in the 1950s of a bureaucratic-military oligarchy, and its collaborators among the landed gentry and an emergent class of industrial capitalists, led to the dismantling of the country's federal structure through a highly unpopular amalgamation of ethnically distinct provinces. The 1958 martial law produced conspicuous class and regional inequalities, tied Pakistan to western power through neo-colonial alliances, and eventually led to the dismemberment of the nation in 1971. After an interlude of civilian government from 1972 to 1977, Pakistan once again came under military dictatorship, this time initiating a rapid process of decline in the autonomy and integrity of civilian institutions. Furthermore, in its pursuit of total power, the state under this long military regime resorted to unprecedented physical and ideological coercion, which brought to the surface serious gender, communal, and ethnic conflicts.

It was in the context of these socio-political realities that some Pakistani sociologists turned to investigate the dynamics of their society using the multidisciplinary approach of political economy. Hamza Alavi was one of the first to develop a theoretical framework to analyse the social significance of class and state in societies situated in the periphery of world capitalism.[29] He applied this framework to a detailed analysis of the social base of authoritarian rule in Pakistan and substantiated the now-famous thesis of the relative autonomy and over-development of the state in post-colonial societies relative to other civil institutions. The relationship between state, society, and ideology has emerged as a central focus of a number of studies that deal with some of the pervasive conflicts that have characterised the recent history of Pakistani society. These conflicts crosscut the spheres of class, gender relations, religion, and ethnicity. It is therefore not surprising that sociologists using the holistic approach of political economy have succeeded in dealing with them most effectively and have in the process produced a coherent body of research and theoretical formulations distinctively based on Pakistani experience, without being parochial. It is not possible to discuss the content of all the relevant individual contributions in the short scope of this chapter, but a few significant ones are listed in the notes.[30]

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[29] Alavi, Hamza, 'The State of Postcolonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh,' in Gough, Kathleen, and Hari P. Sharma, eds., *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia,* New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973; Alavi, Hamza, 'Class and State,' in Gardezi, Hassan N, and Jamil Rashid, eds., *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship, the Political Economy of a Praetorian State,* London: Zed Books, 1983.

[30] For one of the first major works in this perspective, see Gardezi, Hassan N, and Jamil Rashid, eds., *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship,* 1983. See also Ahmed, Feroz, 'Ethnicity and Politics: The Rise of Muhajir Nationalism,' *South Asia Bulletin* 8, nos. 1 and 2, 1988; Khan, Muhammad Asghar, (ed.) *Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan*

Conclusion

The formal discipline of sociology has a short history in Pakistan. Its methodological and theoretical orientations have been strongly influenced by North American sociology. The restrictive nature of this influence is still evident in the mainstream teaching, research, and writing of Pakistani sociologists. However, over time there has also emerged a noticeable trend toward the use of more flexible research strategies, such as participant observation and historical analysis, as well as the application of concepts better suited to study the social realities of Pakistani society. Soon after independence from colonial rule, this society has faced growing social and political conflicts giving rise to new issues and problems. New dimensions have been added to the study of rural life, inequality, communalism, gender, and ethnic relations. In order to study these issues a number of Pakistani sociologists have turned to the interdisciplinary perspective of political economy. Their work shows the promise of developing into a more relevant and distinctively Pakistani tradition of sociological discourse.

Experience, London: Zed Books, 1985; Alavi, Hamza, 'Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology,' in Halliday, Fred, and Hamza Alavi, eds., State *and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan*, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1988; Gardezi, Hassan N, *Understanding Pakistan: Colonial Factor in Societal Development*, Lahore: Maktaba, 1990.

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Mass Communications Research as a Social Science Discipline: Problems and Opportunities*

Fazal Rahim Khan, Hashmat Ali Zafar and
Abdus Sattar Abbasi

This paper is built on the assumption that the social scientific paradigm of mass communications research developed in the United States has generated, over the past fifty years, a sufficient theoretical and methodological body of knowledge to form a useful springboard for founding and organising a communications research discipline in Pakistan. It analyses the status of mass communications research in Pakistan, and identifies some technical and general systemic problems. An institutional apparatus for a national level model institute of journalism and mass communications is proposed as a strategy for developing the social science discipline of mass communications research in the country. Various opportunities are identified within areas of mass communications theory as a research agenda for the proposed institute.

Mass Communications Research as Social Science: An Overview

Mass communications consist of tri-nodal processes of production, consumption and consequence. These processes engage humans at multiple levels of their existence, ranging from micro-individual to macro-social (Pan and McLeod, 1991). Each of the three nodes may be taken as surrogates for multi-dimensional and multi-level classes of variables and their intra-and interlevel, relationships.

The phenomenon of mass communications consists of persons having roles and positions in specialised organisations with linkages to other subsystems of an overarching macro-social system. For instance, mass media organisations as sub-systems are directly or indirectly linked with legal, judicial, executive, business and other cultural sub-systems within a society. These specialised organisations produce diverse messages consumed in varying ways and in varying contexts by multiple consumers and of categories of consumers. This interaction of probably multiple transactions of characteristics (McLeod and

* This paper was first presented to a South Asian Journalism Educators' Conference held in Colombo, Sri Lanka in January 1997 and later appeared in the *Asian Journal of Communications*, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1998.

Becker, 1981), of messages, channels, contexts and consumers result in intended-unintended, manifest-latent, functional-dysfunctional (Wright, 1986) cognitive-affective-conative, contingent-average (Chaffee, 1977) direct-indirect, immediate-delayed (McQuail, 1983) types of consequences.

The inherent complexity of the processes of mass communications has perhaps been adequately reflected in Paisley's (1972, 1984) characterisation of communications research as a 'variable field,' in his widely known levels-variables matrix of behavioural fields. Communications researchers, being 'variable-researchers' and unlike the researchers of the level fields of psychology, sociology and anthropology are required to eclectically study their focal variables across levels of analysis. That is, mass communications researchers are compelled to take multilevel perspectives because of the complexity of mass communications processes and because of the ontological interface of the field of mass communications research with other behavioural sciences.

In the US, frameworks for multilevel investigations of prominent mass communications theories, though rare, have been discussed, attempted and recommended (Pan and McLeod, 1991; Nassau and Reeves, 1991; Price and Roberts, 1989) and a sufficient body of knowledge with considerable epistemological credence and relevance has been generated over the years. Mass communications knowledge has been accumulated primarily under a social scientific positivist or empirical paradigm – critical and interpretative paradigms being the other two minor contributors (Potter, et al., 1993).

Social scientific empirical paradigms may be said to have broadly operated within a Lasswellian framework of who controls or (communicator analysis), says what (content or message system analysis), to whom (audience analysis), with what effects (effects analysis). This broad framework has been modified to take into consideration a multiplicity of channels or technologies of communications and contexts of message production and consumption, etc.

Investigations of mass communications phenomena in the US under the social scientific paradigm were first conducted by such founding fathers as Paul Lazarsfel, Wilbur Schramm, Robert Merton, Kert Lewin and Carl Hovland, but in a rather fragmented way. These researchers, belonging primarily to the level fields of sociology, psychology and social psychology, also helped found institutes of mass communications research in US universities. Over the ensuing decades, these institutes trained a sufficient number of communications researchers, and communications research has matured as a separate social science discipline. These disciplines offer doctoral programmes built around distinct theoretical and methodological specialisation. Several professional associations of researchers providing for a for annual conferences and a sizeable number of communications research journals have also exerted a major

influence over the development of mass communications research in the United States.

In sum, the manner in which communications research as a discipline has evolved in the United States, the level of theoretical and methodological sophistication reached there, and the kind of evidence generated through statistically multivariate social scientific designs of surveys, experiments and content analyses yield enough insight to serve as a springboard for launching native programmes of mass communications research in any developing culture or country.

It must not be construed, however, that the US research experience should be implemented lock, stock and barrel. This is neither feasible nor advisable. Instead, the native research programmes will have to be prioritised on and organised around all sorts of native ground realities. This paper, informed by the communications research experiences in the US, attempts to describe the status of mass communications research in Pakistan, identifying hindrances to be overcome and opportunities to be tapped.

Mass Communications Research in Pakistan

In Pakistan, mass communications issues are looked at in various institutional settings: universities, mass media audience research cells, advertising agencies and in nongovernmental organisations.

In universities, mass communications students and teachers conduct research for different purposes. Most universities offer masters level programmes and a few periodically register candidates for the award of doctoral degrees. Students usually conduct content analyses of newspaper issues and sometimes conduct surveys as part of a thesis towards their degree. Their work almost always remains unpublished.

Teachers, on the other hand, publish their research in omnibus research journals produced by almost all the country's universities. For promotion to various cadres, they require a certain amount of publications to their credit. Although service structure puts a premium on high quality research, the work *mostly* fails to generate sound scientific knowledge or offers solutions to problems. Nevertheless the university teachers have published some noteworthy researches in reputable foreign journals that have addressed and or credibly investigated a whole range of issues relating to mass communications phenomenon in the country. Some of these empirical studies are also founded in known theoretical traditions in mass communications research (Mujahid, 1970, 1991; M. Khan, 1992, 1999; Sheikh, 1990, 1992, 1994; Fazal Khan, 1992, and Fazal Khan, et al., 1999).

For instance, Mujahid (1970) has looked at the nature of coverage given to Pakistan

in US newsmagazines. The study is significant in as much as its findings shed useful light on theoretical issues of international communications. Similarly, Mujahid (1991) provides an insightful overview of press systems in Pakistan from the standpoint of the sociology of mass communications. Whereas Sheikh (1990) takes a largely descriptive tack of development communications, Sheikh (1992) and (1994), address the issues of media-framing through the use of case study approach to illustrate non-western perspectives on global communications. Fazal Khan (1992), investigates and profiles the youth viewers of Pakistan television (PTV) through the use of multivariate statistical techniques of discriminant analysis and has generated some useful empirical evidence on some of the linkages in the enculturation model of Islamisation. Similarly, Khan, et.al., (1999), a replication of cultivation effects hypothesis in Pakistani setting, is a novel illustration of utilising the cultivation effects hypothesis to delineate the role of newspapers in ethnic conflict resolution in the province of Sindh. Khan and Paracha (1992), and Masrur Khan (1999), discuss the role of development communications in topical areas of agriculture and environment through the use of various theoretical orientations found in mass communications research traditions in the West.

The above work notwithstanding, theoretically grounded empirical researches of mass communications phenomenon continue to remain a rarity in the country's academe. The University Grants Commission (UGC) sponsors teachers' research projects. Proposals are invited and funds are allocated for research on an annual basis. Some research work, chiefly of an historical and descriptive nature by Prof. Sharif al Mujahid[1] – the foremost pioneer of mass communications education in the country, and by far the most prolific writer on such issues – has been published in the form of the government's Planning and Development Division's monographs on mass communications. However, prioritisation criteria and elaborate bureaucratic red tape involved in the funding procedures generally keep researchers from sending research proposals to the Commission.

Audience research cells in various media organisations are another institutional setting where audiences of mass communications are looked at. Data on an audience's reading, viewing, and listening behaviours are collected. Although Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) and Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) have provisions for research cells, these are often poorly staffed, and rely mostly on letters to producers of a 'self-selected' sample of audience. The same goes for most of the leading newspapers, where an additional research activity includes qualitative, yet rudimentary, analysis of the content of competing newspapers in the market. Whatever their research output, the work of these research cells goes unpublished, used primarily by the organisations themselves in planning their programmes or content genres.

[1] Sharif al Mujahid has published in national and international research journals on a wide range of mass communications issues. His chapters in leading books on press and mass media in South Asia, published outside Pakistan, provide baseline data on some extremely important areas of mass communications research in the country.

National advertising agencies study audience members' media use. Audience members, demographic profiles and consumption behaviours are statistically described. This information is sometimes shared with mass media organisations and other clients to help them make commercial campaign decisions. Orient-McCann, for example, publishes periodic profiles of audience exposure to PTV programmes.

With the recent economic liberalisation and market expansionism in the country, public opinion pollsters have started taking interest in mass communications and related issues. For example, Gallup Pakistan – an affiliate of Gallup International – conducts national level surveys for various clients and sometimes publishes summaries of findings in news media.

Nongovernment organisations, involved in project related development work, are also showing interest in mass communications research. These economically well off agencies have links to foreign donors. Such agencies sometimes possess the necessary research wherewithal, and generate credible baseline survey data on development related knowledge-attitude-practice (KAP) issues. These data also describe community-specific communications phenomena. UNICEF, FAO, the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), the Asian Media Information and Communications Centre (AMIC), and South Asia Media Association (SAMA), etc., are some of the agencies that help fund research, and often publish data in the form of handbooks, manuals and monographs. UNICEF, in particular, has invested considerably in generating data sets on the issues of child health and population welfare.

Some qualitative work focusing on the work environment of journalists, from the journalists' perspective, has also surfaced (Niazi, 1987 and 1994). This work has examined organisations' links to government regulatory bodies and other socio-political and ethnic entities, and the challenges posed to the professions.

Mass communications research in Pakistan suffers from an interrelated set of technical and systemic problems.

Technical Problems

Qualitative research is not only limited in the scope and range of topics studied, but it also lacks a sound philosophical and critical approach. Historical studies are seldom based on underlying linked with, or contributing to, any substantive body of knowledge. Conclusions linking mass communications phenomenon with other social structural, cultural and economic entities o society are missing.

No light is shed on such philosophical issues as mass media institutions and national development, mass communications and its interface with 'Zeitgeist,' or with what Rosengren (1981), labels as polity, economy and integry. In fact, in the absence of any philosophical foundations of elaborate interrelationships of

phenomena, and in the absence also of systematic standards of social scientific research, most work is at best of a 'wish and myth' nature.

In particular, quantitative studies of content analysis and social surveys symbolise a poor grasp of social scientific research methods. The principal author's experience as theses examiner for master's and doctoral level thesis work and as referee for most of the research journals in the country, shows that content analyses are done without regard for setting up properly pretested reliable content categories. Nor is any effort made to match-up the content categories to research questions and conclusions. Absent too, are applications of sampling and reliable coding procedures. So internal validity and external validity of the work are non-existent.

Similarly, social surveys are merely an exercise in data crunching. Problem formulation and identification are not broad enough, and often lack any real social significance; literature reviews are neither meaningful nor exhaustive. Questionnaire construction and correspondence to concept measurements are not understood by the researchers. Neither are the concepts of questionnaire pretesting, reliability and validity, concept explication, measurement levels and probability sampling procedures. Information on these aspects is often rehashed in individual theses from texts on research methods, but establishing their relevance to the particular research topics in hand are lost on the researchers. In sum, no attention is given to the real interdependence between and among such stages of scientific inquiry like planning, data collection, data reduction, analysis, presentation of findings and discussion.

The KAP type surveys done by NGOs are mostly community specific. No national-level data or KAP profiles are available. Gallup Pakistan sometimes claims national-level data approximations, but with no information on the type of probability sampling procedures used, and more so without any knowledge of the particular sampling frames used, no pronouncement can be made about these claims. More importantly perhaps, all types of quantitative studies are done without any attention to the importance of deductive or theory driven research. No attempt at explicating concepts or interrelating them into simple bivariate or multivariate theoretical propositions, or into rigorous theory is made. On the theoretical front, unfortunately, it is all gloom and doom. Similarly, the empirical data, generated in any one or a group of studies in whatever form, is never translated inductively into empirical generalisations. Perhaps the concept of inductive reasoning is given scant attention by the researchers in Pakistan.

This wish and myth research work in the country has not generated any systematic body of knowledge. Instead, our conviction is that it is tantamount to meaningless and fragmentary explorations into aspects of a process, which is not only very complex, but is also intrinsically linked to all of human existence, from the micro-individual to the macro-social level. On the other hand, the available training facilities do not equip researchers to plan, describe, explain, or

predict mass communications processes in the country, or for that matter, to have any theoretical or empirical payoffs for conducting 'science of the concrete' (Levi-Strauss, 1966).

Systemic Problems

These mass communications research deficiencies principally exist because communications research as a social science discipline has, for a long time, remained underdeveloped in Pakistan. A social science discipline primarily acts as a guide to research, providing and prescribing: (a) priority research methods; (b) preferred methodologies; (c) standards for competence; and above all (d) forums for practising grand norms of science (Paisley, 1972).

In terms of these criteria, and given the organisational and operational framework of mass communications education in the universities, existing mass communications departments may be said to have hampered the evolution of communications research into a social science discipline in Pakistan. Perhaps this failure has broadly resulted from specific structural-cultural and policy dialectics in the country since and prior to its inception.

For example, whereas theoretically at the macro-societal level, development and communications have been posited as having dialectical relationship in all three principal paradigms of development: modernisation, dependency, and multiplicity paradigms (Servaes, 1989), development planners in Pakistan have largely ignored this theoretical nexus. As a result, development plans do not accord any consideration to the role of communications policy and planning in what, philosophically, is an interdisciplinary and a holistic process of national development. This omission of a macro-development policy perspective from national plans has resulted in the present primitiveness of the discipline.

Absent, also, has been the important factor of a strong competitive market. With Pakistan's largely mixed-market economy, and with a protectionist native market, the market driven needs for studying mass communications processes have seldom been felt. A developed market plays a key role in promoting communications research by providing funding for testing cognitive, affective and behavioural strategies of communications campaigns, and the interface of those strategies with message contents formats, and message-distribution systems. Although in developed markets this is done for sales promotions, and at times for other market related objectives, communications theory and methods are also the ultimate beneficiaries. Furthermore, the primitiveness of communications research in Pakistan may also be traced, in part, to the lack o a general research culture in Pakistan society.

Mass communications, being inherently multidisciplinary, could have attracted social scientists from such fields as sociology, psychology, and anthropology etc. But unlike the experience of the United States, the phenomenon has not

engaged the fancies of Pakistani researchers in these older fields. Perhaps this omission did not occur by design, but due more to the incidence of a mind-set uninterested in genuine scientific inquiry. Perhaps in Pakistan, such a mind-set has been born out of particular dialectics of historical, cultural and socio-structural realities. Is not contemporary Pakistani culture merely a consuming rather than a producing culture in today's interdependent or an inter-independent world (Servaes, 1989)? Do the reasons for this not range from the cultural heritage of a colonial past through the successive military dictatorships to continuing low investments in education, to international cultural and economic arrangements, or even to a contemporary religious order that has thoroughly short changed Islam's fundamental stress on the pursuit of knowledge and rationalism, for obscurantism and religious intolerance?

At a more specific level, mass communications research may be said to have remained underdeveloped because of the way mass communications training has been organised within departments of journalism and mass communications in national universities over the past decades.

For one, early courses of studies did not include courses on research methods, mass communications theory, or theory in the allied fields of sociology, social psychology, psychology and anthropology, etc. The training centred mainly on teaching reporting, editing or press history courses. Early course offerings essentially reflected the limitation of the trainers themselves. These courses have now been modified to include some focus on theory and methodology, but still the multidisciplinary and social scientific component is missing.

Secondly, this change has been only marginally useful in contributing toward mass communications research, mainly because the trainers themselves generally lack training in these fields. Consequently, the change in course titles and content is inefficacious in terms of objectives of social scientific research. In effect, a catch-22 scenario exists whereby trainers of limited capacity are producing graduates with limited social scientific training in theory and methodology. These graduates, in turn, take up jobs in universities and colleges and end-up multiplying scientific ignorance in the field. To these graduates, mass communications is equivalent to learning newspaper, radio and television news production and editorial skills.

The thesis work produced as part of the syllabi remains of a poor scientific quality. Effectively a saga of ignorance is repeated year after year generating, as it were, a lot of heat but no light of useful knowledge. The present system of mass communications education is thus based on inadequate foundations for supporting the institutional structure of mass communications research scholarship in the country.

Opportunities

Although various training and research tracks can be taken to overcome the problems, the systemic approach looks more promising. Specifically, we feel, mass communications research can develop as a behavioural discipline on scientific lines through setting up a model institutional apparatus of a National Institute of Journalism and Mass Communications (NIJMC). Such an institute can be systemically linked to the present mass communications departments to provide training and research resources, curriculum development support, and programme accreditation.

This institute should have a two-pronged focus: a professional or skills training focus and a research training focus. The professional prong should offer training at two levels of sophistication: a penultimate bachelor's degree or generalist level; and an ultimate master's degree or specialist level. Various professionally specialised sequences: news editorial, radio/television production, public relations, advertising, mass media management etc., should be made available. In addition to enlisting qualified teachers from the national universities and abroad under the existing bilaterally agreed intergovernmental instruments (USEFP's Fulbright schemes etc), or under some new intergovernmental modality, leading media practitioners in the country may also have to be drawn upon as a training resource for the professional prong.

The research prong should offer masters as a penultimate degree with doctorate in mass communications as an ultimate degree. To begin with, such an institute will have to pull together for staffing from a few properly trained native staff scattered in various universities, and at the same time import trained manpower resources from abroad. They should reflect the multidisciplinary focus of the mass communications field. Specifically, scholars from maturer 'level fields,' 'fundamental variable-fields' and 'complex variable fields' (Paisley, 1972) should be represented. Over time, however, local graduates will take over.

Initially, the institute should have an annual journal for publishing research in the areas of journalism and mass communications. Structurally, the journal can act as a central mechanism for the promotion and dissemination of research. Research carried out at the institute by teams of researchers can form the core of the material as well as including research done elsewhere. Additionally, this journal can be made, through the UGC's assistance, into the only accredited national medium for publishing mass communications research for national universities. This will bring mass communications research under expert scrutiny at the institute, and out of the inadequately refereed present omnibus journals of research at the universities. Thus mass communications research will become more fully and qualitatively tied to the universities' criteria for job promotion.

Research conducted at the institute can rely for funding on several sources ranging from the institute's own budgetary provisions to governmental and nongovernmental bodies, to political advertisers and other market based commercial entities etc. Funding can also be requested from intergovernmental regional bodies committed to co-operating for development; e.g. the SAARC Forum for Co-operation in Science and Technology. Funding constraints can be overcome in a limited fashion by pooling students' research money, and by creatively building data collection into research methods training and communications theory courses at the institute. This latter scheme has successfully been experimented with and comprehensive data-sets are generated through it at the Mass Communications Research Centre (MCRC) of the department of journalism and mass communications at Gomal University. Students are sent out to collect survey data or generate message system profiles of Pakistan television under the supervision and the basic planning of a trained core of four faculty members. Dividends for the students lie in meeting their 50 points individual research projects for the methods course and thesis work evaluated for 100 points. Dividends for the MCRC come in the form of generated datasets for elaborate testing and replication of the existing mass communications theories; e.g. cultivation hypothesis, agenda setting and spiral of silence hypothesis. While cultivation effects have been interestingly replicated in a media ethnicity project (Khan, et al, 1994) the date for the other two are still being analysed.

In sum, the proposed institute can strengthen mass communications education and research in the country in several ways: Firstly, it will produce properly trained graduates who will serve as a trained manpower resource for the existing mass communications departments to tap. This resource will have the potential to bring about qualitative change in the department from within. Secondly, the institute's programmes will have a demonstrative model value for the mass communications departments, against which to evaluate their own methods and standards of training and course content. Under market dynamics, these departments will become obliged to bring their programmes on par with those of the institute to remain competitive. Thirdly, existing trainers in mass communications departments will be apportioned special seats for enrolment. The present trainers in the country's journalism training institutions will also find it facile and economically possible to enrol in the institute's programmes, rather than wait for rare funding opportunities of going abroad for further qualifications. Upon graduation, these trainers will be obligated to return to their own organisations, where their professional and research skills will be in big demand. Fourthly, the institute's research programmes will promote the communications research discipline by acting as a forum for practising 'grand norms of science.' Specifically, its research publications will set standards of theory and methodology for communications researchers at the existing departments. Social scientific research standards will further catch on, if the universities are obligated to credit only those publications as research papers that are published in the institute's research publications. Fifthly, given the

institute's theoretical and methodological training resource of proven quality, mass communications research at the institute will succeed in generating knowledge with a sound epistemological base. This knowledge will serve as points of departure for systematic research activity in other journalism departments in the country.

Research Agenda for the Research at the Institute

Research at the institute, by teams of professors and students, should focus both on baseline data generation and theory driven, relationship testing, perhaps under the elaboration paradigm (Babble, 1979). Both these research activities should engage classes of variables at all three composite nodes – media productions, consumptions and consequences of the mass communications process.

In the absence of indigenously developed theory, theory driven studies will help replicate, explain, interpret and specify relevant theories developed in western settings. Also, baseline data generations, far from being 'arid empiricism,' may yield considerable univariate or joint distributions that could be developed through inductive reasoning into useful empirical generalisations.

Additionally, research efforts at the institute should be built around diverse programmes of knowledge generation inclusive of all the three paradigms of communications research: empirical, critical and interpretative (Potter, et al., 1993). The last two are mentioned to broaden the scope of research so as to not only include attention to legal, historical and ideologically inspired policy studies, but also to focus on message encoding and signification through semiological and other 'framing,' 'bracketing,' and 'formatting' strategies (McLeod, et al., 1994).[2] Also, the last two paradigms can accommodate exploring both 'fact' and 'value' within broad contextual factors. Studying questions relevant to mass media and ideology – underlying theory of society – may provide an integrative influence on communications research programmes (Halloran, 1982), and thus keep them from fragmenting into `bits and pieces' research.

At the methodology level, within these paradigms, use will have to be made of not just the known social scientific techniques of experiments, surveys and content analyses, but also of such methods like ethnomethodology, phenomenology, hermeneutics and semiotics, perhaps through some triangulation (Web, et al., 1966) or combination of procedures.

[2] These authors define framing as the use of metaphors and other visual images: bracketing as strategies of placement of evaluative information surrounding the story; and formatting strategies as parameters of story length and size, length of sound bites and quotes, congruency of audio-visual tracks etc.

The following research areas and questions at each of the three nodes of the mass communications process appear relevant.

At the production node, the research area of media sociology in its broadest sense needs to be examined. That is, media sociology, nor merely in the descriptive or explanatory sense of internal and external influences on mass media content production (Shoemaker and Reese, 191), but also as regards variants of critical theory as brought out by McQuail (1983: 59-63). Issues and questions of interest at this node should span normative 'values' and empirical 'facts.'

For example, normative expositions may focus on expounding interrelationships between philosophies of development and philosophies of communications, inclusive of, but not coterminous with, concerns ranging from infrastructural organisation of communications channels, to import, adoption and distribution of new media technologies, to training, ownership and control issues, to issues of cultural pluriformity, cultural development (Hamelink, 1989) and national integration etc. Questions of the relationship and integration of media owners with other elite power groups in society, and the implications for mass media performance and theories of the press (Akhavan-Majid, 1991), particularly developmental media theory (McQuail, 1983), will have to be addressed, as will the issues of information accessibility for journalists and audiences. What may or may not constitute 'the public good' and the national interest' as distinct from 'sectional objectives' (Halloran, 1982).

Empirical research opportunities at the production node appear overwhelming. Issues of journalists, professionalism, levels of qualification and socialisation, systems of incentives, service structures, ethnic composition and occupational role dilemmas (McQuail, 1983: 107), in-house standards of ethics and freedom, and their socio-demography and psychography may be cited as examples that will have to be empirically described.

Perhaps also pertinent are the issues of media or content pluralism. What specific content domains are available in the variety of media channels? How are they similar? How are they different? Why do certain issues enjoy a certain degree of salience in the media whilst others do not? What are the intra- and extra-media antecedents of the media agenda? What framing, bracketing and formatting strategies are resorted to? What images do people hold of the native and the non-native media (cf. media images have implications for processing strategies? What different mass mediated message systems (Gerbner, 1969) exist in the country's media fare? Could a cultural indicators profile (Gerbner, 1969; Rosenberg, 1981) for the nation be put together out of these message systems? And lastly, in an explanatory vein, why are the contents the way they are? Specifically, what micro-individual and macro-social level categories of explanation (Shoemaker and Reese, 1991) can be offered for these message systems, or be inductively built-up, on the basis of these questions?

Coming to the consumption node of the mass communications process, the major research areas of interest will be those examining mass media use as a dependent variable in its various senses, ranging from exposure to attention to information processing and storing strategies, etc. An empirical priority will thus be to statistically describe and map out media use behaviours at different levels of analysis, with an eye to identifying patterns of behaviours in terms of activity (Levy and Windahl, 1984) and types of users (cf. selective scanners, active processors and reflective integrators (Kosicki and McLeod, 1990). How message and channel characteristics interact to engage individuals and groups in various exposure situations (Reeves and Thorson, 1986; Thorson et al., 1985), and how various types of media users are distributed within society. Contexts of exposure or exposure situations should also be looked at; e.g.. primary vs. secondary exposure situations, or exposure in single, peer group, formal or informal family settings may also be described. Exposure situations mediate effect, and may explain differential effects for the same message. This, or other more meaningful data-suggested types of audience configurations, should have considerable heuristic value in explaining mass communications effects – concern most central at the third node of the process. For example, differential distribution in society of selective scanning, active processing and reflective integration exposure behaviours, might have implications for effects gaps in society on information resource, conflict and consensus, and cultural configurations. This is because all three processing strategies are related to different conceptual frames that people use to interpret and understand public issues (McLeod, et al., 1987).

The uses of gratifications research tradition may also be posited as a candidate for a research focus at the institute. Particularly, an inventory of motives leading audience members to exposure situations would need to be generated. This inventory will provide an opportunity to determine why people use mass media. Gratification sought from the media has implications for intended and unintended effects (McLeod and Becker, 1981). Determining the social and psychological origins of exposure motives and differential distribution of these motives within society may explain several related social phenomena. Perhaps these are the actual barriers to media impact that are to be understood and overcome. Once equivalence of exposure is obtained through equalising distribution of exposure motives in society, equivalence of effects may be a small inferential leap (McLeod, et al., 1979). This area too, if examined at different levels, holds considerable promise for understanding the third, or the consequence node, of the mass communications process.

On the consequence node, twin-focused programmes of both applied and pure research can be instituted. On the applied side, areas of significant topicality can be identified as proposed problems for study around which research questions can be generated. Research in these areas can proceed under various theoretical programmes developed in the West. Findings under these programmes of study

can, on the one hand, yield policy implications and, on the other, help in developing conceptual repertoires for clarifying and modifying various theoretical frameworks. In the process, new theoretical spin-offs can also be struck, since this is how knowledge evolves.

A number of phenomena at the individual and social level need to be examined in Pakistan. There are scores of topical areas whose linkages to mass communications processes need to be established. Classes of variables identified at the production and consumption nodes can all be posited as antecedent, intervening or contingent conditions to predict, explain and specify many aspects of socially significant, if not pervasive, phenomena.

Indeed, contemporary society in Pakistan may be said to manifest, at various levels and with varying degrees of intensity and extensity, a paradox between the professed and the practised values, norms, orientations and policies. Sometimes what are professed at individual and collective levels may be ideals and objectives as distinct from policies and practices at these levels.

Some of these sets of paradoxes may be identified as: professed honesty vs. practised corruption; meritocracy vs. favouritism; religious tolerance vs. sectarianism; cultural pluralism vs. ethnic exploitation; futurism vs. adhocism; national good vs. Family or bradari promotion; popular participation vs. political and cultural elitism; institution-centred perspectives vs. individual-centred perspectives; democracy vs. authoritarian feudalism; civic responsibility vs. civic indifference; cultural identity and protectionism vs. cultural transnationalism; socio-economic and gender egalitarianism vs. exploitation; socio-political and religious rationalism vs. sentimentalism; population control vs. population growth; respect for law and human life vs. soaring crime and violence; equitable resource distribution vs. inequitable resource allocation and hoarding; pursuit of knowledge and information vs. obscurantism; production and export improvements vs. consumerism and soaring imports; urge for organised social action (population welfare: environment, child labour, public health, education, empowerment of women etc.) vs. potential for social inaction, lethargy, and status quo maintenance or resistance to change; perceived socio-political efficacy vs. inefficacy; public trust and accountability vs. resource misappropriation and waste etc.

How might the above phenomena be announced for? What has mass communications to do with them? Specifically, how do the processes and patterns of mass communications production and consumption that research will describe at the earlier nodes, relate to the above contradictions at the different levels of analysis?

These questions and the above sets of paradoxical polar attributes may engage mass communications theory in several areas: development communications and public information campaigns, political communications & public opinion

formulation, and the area of cultural communications. Several specific theoretical frameworks of some heuristic value, under which the above composite concepts can be explicated, and elaborate effects propositions developed at various levels of analysis can be suggested. For example, the structural tradition of communications effects gaps, suggests much wisdom on what communications campaigns can and cannot accomplish. How motivations for exposure and knowledge use might be distributed within the present social structure, and how best to conceptualise information, not just from the sender perspective, but also from the receivers' perspective (cf. Derive, 1981: 71). Could aspects of the observed phenomena be due to stratified effects of the campaigns that failed to equalise resource distribution because of some structural, motivational, and message barriers? Or, to what extent the messages failed because of the cognitive responses of the audience members, or how knowledge acquisition fails to translate into attitude change because of the processing route taken by audience members, or engaged by the message content and format (cf. peripheral vs. central processing of the elaboration likelihood model ELM) of persuasion literature (Petty and Priester, 1994).

Similarly, the agenda setting and spiral of silence theories can fruitfully examine many of the above phenomena as dependent variables. For example, the agenda setting model can help us investigate public agenda, and can shed some light on the dynamics involved in pushing some issues into silence for some segments of audience members and not for the others. How can investigative journalism effect various civic reforms in areas such as health, crime, corruption, ethnic and religious intolerance and sectarianism? What is being primed (Severin and Tankard, 1992: 215) in the minds of audience members? How is the media's differential attention to some issues changing the evaluation criteria of audience members in society? Are priming effects on certain issues nested within some groups and not others? What implication will this have for general consensus in society? Lack of meaningful agenda setting may have systemic consequences in restricting the governmental decisions to immediate appearances and short-term payoffs (McLeod, et al., 1994).

In terms of spiral of silence theory, is there a societal hardcore against corruption in society? To what extent is this societal hardcore vocal, and how might the message system of mass media be effecting audience members' perceptions of the distribution of opinion in society? Which opinion might win out and why? And, when and how will public opinion on the issue internalise into practice etc?

Alternatively, what cultural role do the mass media in Pakistan play? What do the message systems in the media cultivate? Do different media systems cultivate different cultural configurations (cf. native media vs. satellite transmissions)? Are many of the social paradoxes listed above related somehow to the cultivation of culture through different message systems? What priority cultural cultivations are needed? In the event that media cultivation is a reality,

how can these message systems be made to promote a sense of nationhood, institutional outlook, family cohesion. And how might the practised norms be brought in closer correspondence with the professed ones? To what extent are the mass media responsible for ethnic violence in the province of Sindh, for example? Do the electronic and print media play different roles in the ethnic interchange in Sindh? What is meant by Sindhi and Muhajir ethnicity, anyway? Are ethnicity and ethnic origins conceptually isomorphic? Could the phenomena of ethnicity be explained by the cultivation, spiral of silence and agenda setting/agenda building models? Which one would be amore parsimonious explanation and why? What policy implications could be derived for the press?

In sum, research opportunities are simply inexhaustible. Of course, the research challenge for the institute would be to use all sorts of theoretical and methodological subtleties to understand and explain the socio-economic, political, cultural and communicationss tangle called Pakistan. This will require commitment of resources at the national level, the careful assembly of teams of researchers with the necessary specializations in the field, and co-ordinated programmes of training and research at all the nodes of the mass communications process. Perhaps, mass communications research as a social science discipline has to develop, not serendipitously, but more by conscious planning and resource commitment, into a series of co-ordinated and sustained programmes of research, that pick up at the third node, as focal 'criteria' the above identified sets of social paradoxes and explain them through antecedent or intervening predictors identified and developed at the other two nodes of the process.

For the purpose of the development of this discipline, this huge research agenda will need to be pursued at the pure and applied levels in a systematic and sustained manner under the proposed institutional umbrella of national institute of journalism and mass communications. Disparate and unintegrated efforts by individuals or groups of individuals may, at best, amount to an ad hoc – hit and miss – approach.

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7

The University Historian*

K K Aziz

There are several good reasons for looking closely at the performance of the Pakistani university historian. In this category I also include the people teaching at the post-graduate colleges, all those who teach political science (because at every university there is a compulsory paper on the politics of modern Muslim India in the MA. syllabus of political science and an obligatory part-paper on the same theme in the B.A. syllabus) and all those who teach the hotchpotch called Pakistan Studies.

Firstly, they are, or should be, the principal users of the source material that is available. Secondly, they can, if they are so inclined, help in eliminating the biases, prejudices and distortions that exist. Thirdly, they are, directly or indirectly, responsible for writing textbooks which are a cruel travesty of truth. Directly, because they approve and prescribe these books; indirectly, because all the authors of these textbooks have been taught and trained by them. Fourthly, in every country it is the university historians who produce the largest amount of historical scholarship. How well the Pakistani university historian has performed these tasks is the theme of this chapter.

One essential fact should be noticed here. We don't have any university in the normal, generally accepted sense, of a body of undergraduates, a very small number of graduate students, and a large well-educated, trained, academic-minded and hardworking group of teachers. Such a thing does not exit in Pakistan, due to the peculiarities of our university structure. First, we have a number of technical universities, training people in engineering, technology, medicine and agriculture; which means that there are no faculties of these disciplines in the general universities. Thus we start with the assumption that technology is not a part of learning, that an undergraduate need not know anything about science in its application and therefore shall never be able to relate his knowledge with the facts and problems of his age of technology, and that C.P. Snow’s two cultures have been effectively separated by our university system.

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Secondly, we have bifurcated the functions performed by the university in the West by asking the colleges to admit, teach and prepare a seething, unruly, badly-schooled mass of undergraduates of vastly varying backgrounds and quality, for a degree examination whose curricula, syllabi, question papers, marking assessment and conduct are determined, made, controlled and conducted by the university. Thus the University of the Punjab will award the same second class degree to an alert, mentally developed, well-taught, socially aware boy of the Government College, Lahore, to a dim-witted, backward, ill-taught, ill-informed boy of the Government College of a small, out-of-the-way town, and to a hard-working, backward, untaught, badly-schooled and unguided boy who never went to a college and has appeared as a private candidate. The same grade, a second class, is earned by the three boys of my example because the syllabus is so rigidly formal, the textbooks are so regimented and uniformly bad, the teaching is so inefficient, the question paper so stereotyped, and the marking so unconscientious, that a boy of less than average ability and application can memorise the prescribed books and get a degree without ever entering a library or thinking for himself or, in the case of the private candidate, going to a lecture hall. But that is not all. Once this boy has graduated and wants to study further, he joins a university. Thus the university is a purely examining body for the undergraduate and a teaching-cum-examining body for the graduate student. The western idea of a university as a place where the school-leavers are thrown together in an academic life, made to learn as much from each other as from their teachers, required to work very hard, and taught to think independently, does not apply to a Pakistani university.

But the confusion is not yet complete. One university situated in the capital city has no undergraduates. It is merely a centre of post-graduate research, not a university in any meaning of the word. Worse still, a few hundred colleges also run post-graduate classes, without adequate staff, books or other facilities. Then there is a very large group of students taking their post-graduate degree as private candidates with no teaching at all. All this makes nonsense of any idea of a university. Add to this confusion the fact that both teaching and examining are being done on all levels in two languages, Urdu and English, and the student chooses the stream according to his proficiency in either language, though in fact he is proficient in neither. The academic mischief is now all ready to brew.

Third1y, all universities are State controlled (the two private universities of Management Sciences in Lahore and of Medicine in Karachi are irrelevant to our present study), all the Government Colleges, of which there are several in each district, are of course official bodies, and since 1972-73 all private colleges are also government institutions. This is a high hurdle in the path of independent and impartial inquiry in every field. A civil service regulation obliges every teacher to submit what he has written for publication to the ‘competent authority’ before sending it to the publisher. It is his responsibility to obtain prior written orders approving the publication of the matter which was submitted. A clerk of a junior officer in the department concerned will read the

manuscript, write a note on it and send it to the next higher level. Theoretically, the permission is granted by the highest authority in the Ministry.

The draconian rule may not matter so much to a lecturer in physics or biology except injuring his self-respect if he has any (civil servants can't enjoy the luxury of possessing this commodity in our bureaucratic structure). But it shackles the teachers of political science and history; discouraging some, forcing others, against their conscience, to change and amend what they have written, and silencing many. The government is not embarrassed by the rule or by the consequences of its operation. The Sharif Report defended the interdiction with the unashamed argument that it was absurd to demand academic freedom in an institution which was financed by the government. The matter rests there. A college or university teacher can express, in lecture or writing, only those historical truths which meet the approval of the government. Stanley Wolpert was a foreigner and so escaped any penal action for writing his *Jinnah of Pakistan*, but the import of the book into Pakistan was banned. A Pakistani author is more vulnerable, and in his case official disapproval may range from a simple warning to behave himself, to rigorous imprisonment. No government regulation could have killed historical research more effectively and completely.

What passes understanding is that with such crippling restraints in existence the federal and provincial governments and their universities go on merrily establishing and multiplying research centres, institutions and academies, all formally equipped with libraries, research staff, supporting services, telephones, transport, buildings and the rest of the paraphernalia of an office. Is it worth their while to spend millions of rupees on producing official versions of history which are so uncritical and unbalanced that no respectable historian, native or foreign, will take them seriously or quote them, except for the purpose of illustrating the Pakistani historian's inaptitude in handling history.

However, these disadvantages from which the university and college teacher suffers cannot be offered as an argument in defence of their inactivity. Every law is open to circumvention. The great tin god on the top can be influenced, pressurised, cajoled, deceived or bribed. All these approaches are simpler and easier when the target is the low-level functionary who is going to prepare the all-important note on the file. There is no subsequent risk for the author, for normally no one reads a scholarly work and the delinquent's indiscretions may never be discovered by the erring or dishonest officialdom. There are other ways to exploit the ignorance of the bureaucratic superiors. An actual case illustrates this. A lecturer wanted to publish his doctoral thesis written at a foreign university in which he had been critical of the government. He went and saw a Deputy Secretary who, duly impressed by the name of the foreign university, agreed to help the lecturer, called in his private assistant, and dictated a note saying that as the book had been written at the prestigious University of --- it would be in the national interest to allow it to be published. Nobody demanded the typescript for scrutiny. The senior officers did not even read the Deputy

Secretary's note, and in due course the written permission arrived. I don't know of any case where a request was turned down. But, of course, the prohibition acts as a damper.

My own experience illustrates some not so well-known dimensions of the exercise of obtaining the required permission. In 1954, when I was teaching at the Government College, Lahore, I completed a book entitled Comparative Constitutions, which explained the political systems of Great Britain, the United States, France, Switzerland and Pakistan, and was meant for political science undergraduates. I wrote out an application, appended it to the typescript, and submitted it to the Principal, who forwarded it to the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Several weeks passed by and I did not receive any reply. I mentioned the matter to the Principal, and he suggested that I should go and see the officer concerned. I did so and found myself in the presence of a gentleman styled 'Officer-in-Charge, Collegiate Education, Punjab', who had been a lecturer in chemistry before occupying his present position. I explained the purpose of my visit. He summoned his clerk and asked him to bring my 'file'. After a quarter of an hour the 'file' was on the desk. When opened it was found to contain my typescript and my application and nothing else. The officer looked up and inquired:

'Is this your application?
'Yes', I answered.
'Well....', he mumbled.
'I have been wailing for a reply all these weeks', I enlightened him.
'Yes. Is the matter urgent?' he asked
'For me it is', I said, 'The sooner it is cleared the earlier will the book be published'.
'I see. Is there anything anti-government in it?' he asked.
'No. It deals with some foreign countries. But there is one section on Pakistan'.
'Ah! Are you sure there is nothing anti-government in that section?', he inquired with boredom etched on his face.

'I am certain. I know I am a government servant. How can I write against my own government?' I argued.

'I guessed so. We must all be loyal to Pakistan, you know', he impressed upon me.
'Of course', I assured him.
'Now I must deal with the second point. You know the rules about side income?' he asked.
'I don't', I said. 'Are there any such rules?'

‘Oh yes, there are’, he said, with reproach in his eyes, saddened by my ignorance. ‘The government can't allow you to make unlimited money as long as you are in its service’.
‘Are there any limits?’ I wanted to find out the constraints under which I had, without knowing it, put myself by becoming a lecturer.
‘Oh yes. Let me find out’. He again called his clerk and asked for a certain file. This time it took him only ten minutes to locate and bring it. The official opened it, flipped over certain sheets, flipped back, then turned over a couple of pages, began to read a paragraph to himself as if it were the scriptures, repeated it twice; said ‘Ah!’, looked up and ‘1 have found it’, he said, ‘I knew it was in this file, you know’. Then he paused, as if waiting to be, complimented on his excellent memory and efficiency.

‘I am sure you are on top of your work’, I could not keep him waiting for a (metaphorical) pat on the back.
‘I am. I always have been. When I was a lecturer……’ There followed a 5-minute monologue on his lecturing days, his conscientiousness, punctuality and a few other virtues. Then he returned to the present. ‘Now, let us see. The rule says that you can derive from this book, if and when it is published, if, mind you; I have the authority to stop its publication if I like, yes, what does the rule say? Here it is. The rule says that you can derive from this book a material benefit not in excess of Rs. 1,500 per annum. Is that clear?’
‘It is quite clear’, I hastened to assure him before he would embark upon a translation or paraphrase. ‘Let me make it quite clear’, he could not be balked of his wish to enlarge upon the obvious. I let him make his little speech, and then I asked,
‘But, Shaikh Sahib, if the book sells well and my royalties go above the maximum allowed by you, what happens to the excess money?’
‘Eh!’ he burst out. ‘The excess money? Where does it go? I don't know. Let me look at the rules again.’

To cut the entertaining story short, I left the official's room after 45 minutes of wasted time and irritating conversation, but with a slip of paper bearing the sarkar's generous permission to me to become an author.

I learnt a few salutary lessons from this encounter with the government. First, if as a lecturer you want to write a book get ready for a humiliating experience. Second, be sure you don't write anything which the government thinks is critical of it (I was later told by an author of a botany textbook that he, too, was

interrogated on this point). Third, try not to write a good book, otherwise only your publisher will gain from your skill and talent.

Many years later, when I again found myself in the government, not only did I refrain from submitting my manuscripts to any authority but asked my research staff to do the same. But I did do one thing. I sent to the Prime Minister a short memorandum on the subject, condemning the rules, conveying my inability to abide by them or to apply them to my staff, and giving reasons for my decisions. A copy was posted to the Minister of Education. Acknowledgements were received from both, but neither dissent nor disapproval. But this time I was not teaching at a college in a lowly capacity but holding the highest non-political appointment in the country and also acting as a policy adviser to the Prime Minister. Axiom: it is not your person that matters but the pedestal under your feet.

But such rules cannot be used by the college or university historian even as a pretext for his failure. I grant that he cannot attempt a study of Jinnah's political career or even an ‘acceptable’ biography. But I can't think of any unfavourable factor that inhibits him from working on, say, Nawab Muhsin-ul-Mulk, Seth Abdullah Haroon, Zafar Ali Khan, the Raja of Mahmudabad, Hasrat Mohani, lnayatullah Khan Mashriqi, Sahib Zada Sir Abdul Qayyum, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, Sir Muhammad Shafi, Mian Fazl-i-Husain or Shibli Naumani (I have not mentioned any Bengali Muslim because the material for that kind of work does not exist in Pakistan). We have books on some of these people, like Zafar Ali Khan, Hasrat Mohani and Muhsin-ul-Mulk, but these are not works of political or historical scholarship.

Again, 1 concede that it will not be easy for our historian to produce a history of the All India Muslim League of its Pakistan movement years or of the Pakistan Movement itself which wins the approval of the government and is also a balanced assessment (though all the source material is available in the country). But what stops him from embarking upon a history of the municipal government in Lahore, or a study of the origins and development of the Punjab Legislative Council and Assembly, or an inquiry into the status of the tribal area in the north-west, or an examination of the working of local government in Sind, or an assessment of the role of the Punjab Civil Service, or a study of the influence on history of one important Urdu newspaper like the *Paisa Akhbar* or the *Zamindar* or *Inqilab*, or an account of the big landholding families of the Punjab and their collective impact on the history and politics of the region? The list of such themes is very long, and the sources required for the purpose are available within the country.

It may be argued that some of our professors put so high a value on their integrity that they prefer silence to made-to-order research. But there is a flaw in the reasoning. How did a professor of such a tender conscience find it possible and convenient to teach for thirty years what he knew to be wrong or perverted

or merely conformist history? Was his sense of right and wrong so selective that it was active in one department (writing) but moribund in the other (teaching)? Further, if we suppose, for an instant, that such a paragon of virtue and self-abnegation exists, another question has to be answered by him. Why does this honest historian not write something after his retirement from service, when the official regulations don't apply and he is a free citizen? I don't know how he will answer the question. But the fact is that a man who has not held a pen in his fingers since he wrote his doctoral thesis (which he had to do to earn the degree) has lost the skill to handle a pen. A professor whose reading has been limited throughout his career to his lecture notes (made several years ago and not even brought up to date) will not, cannot, begin to develop the habit of study at the age of sixty. To expect this transformation is to do him an injustice. To ask him to change his nature falls in the category of cruelty to man. Let us leave him in the enjoyment of his well-earned old-age obscurity.

Money has an irresistible attraction. Some of these professors, who avoid scholarship as if it were the plague, have the time and the inclination to write textbooks. A few among them will stoop to flatter, cajole and beseech a publisher to commission them to prepare a textbook. Others will persuade, influence, or bribe the official Textbook Boards to appoint them as textbook writers, for in this lies a great deal of money. Still others, who have never written anything, will use their resources to obtain editorial and supervisory positions in the Boards. Every official textbook, even on the school level, has to have an author, an editor or a team of editors and a supervisor; sometimes the book is revised by a third person or team. This complicated and completely unnecessary machinery has been invented, not because it produces satisfactory textbooks, but because it is good business for everyone who is a part of it.

The professor has some other avenues to explore in search of extra income. One is to be appointed a paper-setter. This is good for his ego and brings in some money. Another is to become an examiner, of any kind ranging between the middle class of schools and the PhD thesis. This is a source of considerable income if he is honest, and of much income if he is not. Still another is to manage an appearance on the television. This is deeply satisfying, for it makes him known to the public, and the payment is generous. One professor of history at a well-known university told me that for ten years he earned, consistently, three times as much as his salary from his work for the radio and the television; and, in the bargain, almost every radio listener knew his name and every television viewer his face. In exactly thirty-four years of teaching he had published one slim volume of 200 pages and his doctoral thesis. Still another pre-occupation for our professor is to seek the membership of the Boards of Studies and of every kind of academic and administrative committees and sub-committees. Nomination to these bodies brings a rich harvest of influence, prestige, patronage, travelling and daily allowances, and an added qualification at the time of promotion; for the unscrupulous it can also mean extra income.

I have dwelt on these extra-scholarly activities and ambitions of the professor to prove that his indifference to writing cannot be explained by lack of time or aversion to work or want of ambition. The real and primary factor which makes the professor a drone of the academic world is the decision of the universities themselves to encourage and nurture ignorance and lethargy and to discourage learning, scholarship and hard work. In 1973 when the academic staff of all the universities in the country was asking for a revision of their salaries and an improvement of their terms and conditions of service, a high-level deputation of professors with plenipotentiary powers arrived to negotiate with the Federal Minister of Education. In these protracted talks, besides other points, two significant demands were made by the deputation: salaries of the university teachers must be integrated with the national pay structure of the civil service, and the qualifications prescribed for appointments and promotions should be those suggested by the staff itself.

The first demand was conceded without much haggling, and the professor was given Grade 20 (equivalent of a federal Joint Secretary), the associate professor Grade 19 (Deputy Secretary), assistant professor Grade 18 (Assistant Educational Adviser or the old Assistant Secretary) and the lecturer Grade 17 (Section Officer or the old Assistant or Superintendent). The poor dons could not control their excitement on their elevation to a platform which was only a little lower than the one occupied by the bureaucracy. That was the limit of their ambition in worldly goods and official status.

The second point is more relevant to what I am discussing. When the question of qualifications for the two highest appointments arose, the deputation recommended that, besides the degrees required and the length of experience, what the teacher should have written and published was of secondary importance and it was quite enough if he had written a few articles. This surprised the Minister, though he was not a scholar. He asked the deputation if a teacher who had lectured at a university for 10 or 20 years was not expected to have written any books, and why was so much work being done at the universities in other countries. But the deputationists knew that if any requirement higher than a few articles were prescribed, nearly all the senior dons would find themselves dismissed or stuck at their present ranks. They had already persuaded the Education Secretary, who had never written a book, to support them. Ultimately they won their case, and rules were framed to grant official and statutory recognition to the university teachers' refusal to tread the path of scholarship. Since then, an assistant professor, to be qualified to be promoted to an associate professorship, is only required to have published five research papers in his field in 'a journal of international repute'. To be a full professor the number of such articles must be eight.

This is best illustrated in the following advertisement which appeared in all the newspapers in the summer of 1989, inviting applications for two posts at the National Institute of Pakistan Studies at the Quaid-e-Azam University,

Islamabad, and which was signed by the Director of the Institute by name, who himself did not fulfil any of the qualifications:

Rank:	Minimum academic qualifications and experience:
Professor (Iqbaliayat)	Master's Degree/M. Phil. with 18 years teaching and Research experience in a recognised University plus 8 Research Publications in Journals of International repute.
	or PhD. with 15 years Teaching and Research experience in a recognised University plus 8 Research publications in journals of International repute.
Associate Professor (Government and Politics of Pakistan)	Master's Degree with 13 years Teaching and Research experience in a recognised University or professional experience in the field in a National or International Organization plus 5 Research Publications in Journals of international repute
	or PhD. in – with 10 years Teaching experience in a recognised University plus 5 Research Publications in Journals of International repute.

Thus no university teacher is obliged to write a book; the statutes as they stand ru1e out even an expectation of such an achievement. The articles required of him are left undefined. You can write an outstanding piece of research, analysis and re-interpretation which will become a landmark in the literature of your discipline, or you can prepare a pedestrian descriptive narrative based on secondary sources and of no academic value whatsoever. The same journal may publish both, because sometimes even the best journals show an uneven level of quality. There are cases of a review article making a major contribution to knowledge, but there is no place for it in the rules. The emphasis on ‘research’ is an absurdity that exposes the ignorance of those who run the universities.

A few concrete examples will show this. A detailed, profound and original paper on ‘The Meaning of History’ or ‘What History Teaches Us?’ or ‘What is a Historical Fact?’ may be a work of independent thinking and wide learning, but since it has no footnotes and long quotations from other writings it does not qualify as ‘research’. An article discusses the question ‘Would Pakistan have been created if Jinnah had died in 1945?’ with deep insight, a clear mind and incisive arguments. It gives no references and uses secondary sources (there are no primary sources here) in its support, because it is an analysis of events and

not a narration. Of course, this is not 'research'. A lecturer, who has read more widely than a professor and thought deeply on the implications of the creation of Pakistan for the Islamic world, writes an interpretation of the event which has all the virtues of historica1 scholarship at its best clarity, vision, understanding, poise, commanding reasoning, flashes of original thought. He quotes no authority, refers to no books, furnishes no bibliography; but he uses his mind. It is published in a leading American journal. Our universities will not accept it for his promotion: it is not 'research'.

The ultimate height of the stupidity of this rule is attained in the following hypothetical case. An Englishman applies for a full professorship at a certain university of Pakistan. He has a doctorate from Oxford. He has taught at his own university for 25 years, where he now holds a distinguished chair in his subject. He is also a Fellow of All Souls. He has published 12 books, all of them well received by the world scholarly community, 5 of them are by now classics. It is a pure accident that he has not published an article in his life, though the editor of every outstanding journal has been begging him for one; but his books were taking up all his time and he could not oblige the importunate editors. The Pakistani university will not even entertain his application, not to speak of considering it, because he does not fulfil the basic and minimum qualification laid down in the advertisement for the post: 8 research articles or papers.

The irony is that, if he cared to inquire, he would find out that the university which has returned his application marked 'does not qualify' has given professorships to some of his old students who had taken years and years to finish their doctoral work, who had not published any book in thirty years, not even their PhD thesis, and who had not written even the required 8 articles. How will the rejected candidate react? Let the reader pause, and ponder on our madness.

The rules are also vague, to the convenience of everybody in the university. They do not clarify if a published PhD thesis will be accepted as a substitute for the 5 papers prescribed for the associate professorship. If it will be accepted, then an assistant professor (who usually has a PhD) need not take pen in hand for ten years, just go on publishing chapters from his thesis at regular intervals, and he will be fully qualified for the next rank. This subterfuge could have been stopped by adding 'after obtaining his PhD degree' at the suitable place in the rules.

The condition that the articles or papers must have appeared in a 'journal of international repute' also suits the university if left as it stands. Who will decide the quality of the journal? Is there a list of such journals for each discipline kept in the university office or in the Ministry of Education? Does any Pakistani journal fall in this eminent category? What is 'international repute'? Such questions are left to the decision and discretion of the referees, though the vice-chancellor has many ways of conveying his wishes to these external judges.

Some universities, in order to add prestige to their names, appoint referees from abroad, generally from American universities; but this is no guarantee of impartiality or integrity. I personally know a case where, as a referee, I had to return the papers to the university on the ground that the applicant was a relative of mine and known to be so. In fact, he was not qualified to apply under the rules. Two months later he got the full professorship, with one favourable report from a referee from Columbia University (I don't know who the other referee was). I discovered that the vice-chancellor wanted the man to be promoted and the Columbia professor wished to be invited to the Pakistani university with all the privileges of a guest. In my next meeting with the American expert I mentioned this case and was told that promotion papers from Pakistan were dealt with in keeping with the standards and practices of the country. He showed no embarrassment when I made an oblique reference to the injustice and professional improbity at which he had connived.

Since then I have seen more serious offences committed by provincial governments who control their universities. Several professors have been granted extension in service after the age of retirement. None of them had published a book, some of them not even an article. Presumably the university was rewarding them for their extraordinary performance – extraordinary, indeed!

I have gone into this matter at some length because the issues of qualifications and appointments impinge directly on the scholarship we are entitled to expect from the departments of history in the universities. The largest circle from which research and publication should have come in the normal course has thus excused itself from the burden (and the rewards) of writing national history. But, is it just to blame the university teachers for a fault not entirely their own? It is their employers who have told them that research is only a small part of their statutory duties, and that their continuity in service and promotion depend on other things. Then, why should they tire themselves in the performance of a duty from which a generous providence has set them free? The blame lies on the master, not on the slave. But I sometimes wonder if it has ever occurred to the deputation which saw Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada in Islamabad that by forcing the government to agree to such rules they had, for God knows how many years to come, condemned the universities to sterility, obloquy and shame.

The universities have abridged the role of research in their departments of history (and all other subjects), but they are still obliged to run a number of research institutes and study centres, where research and writing are supposed to be the primary functions. The performance of these institutions has been far from satisfactory, and the responsibility lies solely on those who head them. At one university there are two such centres (one on Pakistan and one on South Asia), and for several years both were headed by the full-time vice-chancellor who had not yet put his name on the title-page of a book, while the person who

actually looked after the centres was a PhD student at the same university. On his retirement the vice-chancellor took over as a full-time director of both centres, still without having written a book. At another university, there was till last year a director of an institute and a full professor who had neither earned a doctorate, nor written a book, nor published any articles. Then there are Area Study Centres and 'centres of excellence' and centres of other titles and descriptions, and most of them have been headed by persons whose qualifications should have taken them elsewhere.

Our universities may not count research and writing among the duties of a teacher, but certainly they still recognise (I hope) teaching as a work that he must do to earn his keep. What kind of history is taught at the universities, and in what manner? A good, part of the answer is supplied by the textbooks and suggested readings in use. A few other oddities and wonders may be noticed.

Archaeology, which is the mother of history as a discipline, has no department to itself, except at Peshawar. On the undergraduate level the subject does not exist. Further, no university teaches historiography, theory of history and philosophy of history competently or seriously and as a compulsory part of the syllabus. Both the theory and the philosophy of history are essential training grounds for understanding history. We can't understand without asking questions. The theory teaches us how to ask them and why. It discusses the nature and meaning and dimensions of 'fact', and tells us how a historical fact can be very different from a material fact or a philosophical fact. History is made up of facts, but who has seen or experienced facts? Only the contemporary witness. All others have borrowed their knowledge of the fact from him. All history is second hand. But, in taking or borrowing facts, each historian has added something to them, subtracted something from them, viewed them from a different angle, put them in a different context – in one word, reinterpreted them. What we call history is a jumble of facts arranged and re-arranged, interpreted and re-interpreted, by a large number of writers. What the eye-witnesses had seen and reported or chronicled is buried, almost unrecognisably, under the heap of glosses and commentaries and translations and selections and omissions.

Is the historical fact the truth? What is the truth? Is it what one saw with one's own eyes or heard at first hand and directly? Can an eye-witness render an exact report or description of what he has seen? Is there not a good possibility that in reporting what he saw he will, unconsciously and perhaps in spite of his resolve to be truthful, let his bias or opinion or conviction or commitment colour his description? He will report the incident from his own point of view. That is inevitable and unavoidable. Add up all the interpretations put on the original reported 'fact' by the generations of chroniclers, and what we have today is not the historical truth but what we may call the historical fact. Fact and truth are not the same this things. What I call a fact may not be true history. What I call truthful history may not be based on facts.

The non-university research institutions of history, some of which are national in stature and importance, have been, for the most part, headed by non-historians or scholars whose merit and published work would not get them a lectureship in an obscure European university.

As every history is an interpretation, every historian's work is a new history, a fresh look at facts. Given the same theme, the same source material and the same terms of reference, ten historians writing at the same point of time will produce vastly different accounts. As every age stands at a vantage point different from every other age, it will produce its own history and interpret the past in its own way.

Thus, if every age and every historian writes history afresh, there is no such thing as standard history, true history, or accepted history. Every period and every writer views the past, ancient, modern or recent, in its or his own image. There is no escape from it. Even in the rigidly ideological states of Israel and USSR each generation has been re-writing their national history. For two hundred years France has been engaged in interpreting the greatest phenomenon of her modern past, the Revolution. From Alexis Tocqueville to Francois Furet every historian has made his own assessment of the cataclysmic event and its contribution to French thought, life and politics. Foreign commentators from Burke and Carlyle to Simon Schama have participated in this grand debate. The task of interpretation and discussion will continue as long as mankind lives. No State or government or society has ever ordered an end to such debates or declared one interpretation as the standard or official history.

By refusing to teach the theory of history, preferably at the undergraduate level, the Pakistani universities have become major partners in a conspiracy of silence. The young student, in his third year in the college, should begin his serious study of history simultaneously with a course on the theoretical framework of historical knowledge. He should be asking basic questions on what is history? What is a fact? What is true history? What is an interpretation? as he is reading an account of what happened. He should be taught to examine and investigate at least the broad aspects of what is presented to him as history. He should be trained to be critical, to perceive the inner movement of events, to view each development in its context, to question the given interpretation, to disagree with the book, to interrogate his teacher, and to refuse to accept the authority of the printed word without a debate.

In the absence of this training, he becomes a passive recipient, not an active receiver, of what is fed to him; he collects information, he does not gain knowledge; he is a captive audience of a monologue, not a participant in a discussion. His study should be a dialogue between the book and his mind, not an empty exercise in swallowing prescribed assertions. He should be treated as what he is: a student who has come to the college to develop his mind; not as an empty vessel into which some pearls of received wisdom are to be poured. He is

there to study the past, not to memorise a chronicle; to learn history, not a dogma; to understand himself in the perspective of the bygone ages, not to be told the official version of history; to see his present as an extension of his past so that he can visualise his future, not to be regaled with stories of a glorious past and official versions of the present and pleasant hopes of a great future. He has come to master a discipline, not to be admitted into a new church. The consequences of teaching history without its theory are disastrous. The student arrives with a vacant mind, he leaves with an empty one.

This determination to teach him history in a vacuum does not stop here. It extends to a blinding blackout of all dimensions of history except the political. As an undergraduate, the student is not permitted even a glimmer of the various factors which lie behind and mould political developments. When he is reading for the master's degree, he is given no opportunity to study social, economic and intellectual history. For him history has only one dimension: the political. This uni-dimensional approach leads to a view of history which is imperfect, incomplete, incredibly distorted and totally meaningless. Let me illustrate this by a consideration of how the creation of Pakistan is taught in the colleges and the universities.

On all levels, events are mentioned in their bare loneliness, political developments are recounted, a few selected personalities are said to have played a major part, the hostility of the Hindus and the Indian National Congress is referred to, and the negotiations with the British are dealt with briefly. There are a few paragraphs or pages on Muslim rule in India, highlighting only its more favourable aspects. In the officially prepared and prescribed textbook, which every undergraduate in every discipline (arts, science, engineering, medicine, agriculture, law) must study and be examined in, there are short, abrupt and incoherent chapters on the role of the students in the Pakistan movement, the role of the ulema, the role of the journalists, and so on (only those in the movement). The creation of Pakistan and the winning of independence are attributed solely to the All India Muslim League (as it was between 1940 and 1947) and Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah. There are a few short paragraphs, at places a few lines, recalling the 1857 ‘war of independence’, the Aligarh movement, the foundation of the Muslim League, the annulment of the partition of Bengal, the Khilafat agitation, the Hindu-Muslim riots, Iqbal's Allahabad address, the Round Table Conference, separate electorates, the 1935 Act, and the Lahore Resolution. On the M.A. level exactly the same pattern is followed, with more pages to read, longer repetitions, greater emphasis on the more ‘positive’ achievements of the movement, and higher praise of the leadership.

All students, from standard One to the finals in the MA. class, have this stuff, pushed down their throat for sixteen years. Some of them become civil servants of various grades, and carry this information into their careers. A few take to school teaching, and all over the land the tender impressionable minds are

brainwashed with the same doctrine on which they themselves were brought up. A fewer number are appointed to lecture in history, political science and Pakistan Studies at colleges and universities, charged with the duty of producing copies of themselves. This last groups existence is an assurance of undefiled perpetuation of a view of national history which is uncritical, undocumented, romantic and deeply satisfying. The cycle goes on from year to year and decade to decade, producing robots instead of thinking graduates.

The Pakistan movement of 1940-47 did not strike out its first shoot in a virgin soil in March 1940. The field had been ploughed and worked and watered for many years before that. The roots were deep and long, many of them connecting the visible trunk with the Afghan and Mughal ages of history, some even linking it with pre-Muslim Indian history and culture. The Pakistan movement was the culmination of several centuries of history and culture and of several decades of politics. It was the end-product of a much longer Muslim nationalist movement, which in its turn had many bonds of sympathy and empathy with the larger and older Indian nationalist movement. As a manifestation of nationalism, this movement had dealt, bartered, negotiated and fought with two other national movements: the British and the Hindu. This part or aspect of the movement makes up our political and constitutional history.

But the political goals of protection, safeguards and finally separation, were rooted in the social and economic conditions and problems of the community. The poverty of the Muslims, their backwardness in material development, their status as the proletariat serving the non-Muslim capitalist system, their relative absence from the professional classes, the tension and stress caused, by a poor nation being led by its wealthy and dominantly landholding elite their failure to join the industrial and entrepreneur classes, their inability, caused by poor education, to compete with the Hindus for government employment – this was the social milieu in which Muslim nationalism grew up and came to maturity. This forms the social and economic dimension of our nationalism, which cannot be studied outside social and economic history, and without which our students can neither see the underpinnings of the nationalist struggle nor relate Pakistan's contempora1y problems with the past.

There is still a very important side of the nationalist movement – perhaps the most significant – of which political history takes no notice. What made the Indian Muslim what he was? What shaped his mentality? What moulded his thought and convictions, his beliefs and commitments, his prejudices and predilections, his ideas and opinions, his habits and traditions, his way of life? Political history has no answers to these questions: cultural history has. His culture determined his politics; his politics did not change his culture. Considers these things: the faith and practice of Islam, links with the Islamic world, use of Islamic languages (Arabic, Persian, Turkish), the birth of Urdu, the traditions of the Mughal courtly life, the training in maktabs and madrasas, the riches or Muslim literature, the impact of sufi ideas, the interest in Islamic art, Muslim

personal law, dietary preferences and inhibitions, customs associated with birth, marriage and death, family life, status of women, the script of the languages, passion for poetry, individuality in dress, the shape of houses, the design of the mosque – the list is unending. His educational ideals, literary tastes and intellectual interests set him apart from the other Indians.

In other words, there was in India an Islamic or Muslim culture, which drew such a sharp line between the Muslim and the non-Muslim that neither political compromises nor constitutional concordats nor social mingling could erase it. The line become a divide, and dictated a physical separation.

To write and teach this cultural history we will have to summon special help from our fund of honesty and forbearance, because this involves answering some simple but controversial questions. A Muslim culture born in a predominantly non-Muslim society could not be completely Islamic. Muslims, despite their status and position of imperial rulers, could not isolate themselves from their surroundings. Several centuries of living together was bound to create a few shared values and some common interests. In its history of expansion Islam has always borrowed or accepted or tolerated something or a great deal from the culture and practices of the people it conquered or converted; even in its original home it took over into its system of beliefs and ritual several things from pre- Islamic Arabia, Judaism and Christianity. Egyptian and Syrian Muslims have an Arab culture, which shows in its everyday manifestations many Christian influences. Indonesian culture has been deeply marked by Hinduism. Thus, in some of its aspects Indian Muslim culture was a synthesis of Islam and local history, traditions, religion, geography, civilisation and values.

The relevance of a careful study of our cultural background the problem of determining the contours and contents of Pakistani culture is self-evident. Views will clash and opposite theories will be propounded. Politics will inevitably intrude into the debate. The conservative ‘nationalist’ historian will not even discuss the possibility of a Hindu element in Pakistani culture. Was Pakistan not created, he will point out, because Hindus and Muslims had nothing in common? His critic will cite the history of India of the last 1,200 years, the impact of Hindi on Urdu and of Sanskrit on Muslim Bangla, Hindu influence in the Mughal court, the amount of Hindu blood running in the veins of the Mughal emperors, the Sufi doctrine of universal tolerance, and a hundred other things which were born of Hindu-Muslim interaction. The discussion is on its way.

The geography of the partition of India added another complication to the cultural debate. Many of our cultural centres and landmarks were left behind in India (and some more now lie in another foreign country, Bangladesh). The All India Muslim League was dominated by the United Provinces’ elite, and a general impression was created that Muslim culture owed everything to the UP and Delhi areas. This false or dangerous notion is still current; false because it dismisses all the regions now constituting Pakistan, and dangerous because it

caused the secession of East Pakistan. This impression was elevated into a dogma by the UP and Delhi migrants to Karachi, who wanted to dominate Pakistani culture as they had dominated the All India Muslim League (without noticing the contradiction involved in their abandoning the home of their culture in favour of a country whose native culture they despised).

Thus Pakistan was subjected to the double yoke of an Aligarh imperialism and an Urdu colonialism, both more aggressive and rampant than British imperialism and English (language) colonialism. Aggressive, because this time the foreign imperialists had the same colour of skin as the Pakistani and because they claimed to be natives not, foreigners (though they were foreigners, and also more haughty than the British). Rampant, partly because the complex-ridden Punjab chose to stand up in their support (thus annoying and alienating the smaller provinces), and partly because the country, in desperate search of a national language, decided in favour of Urdu (thus driving East Pakistan out of the federation). About 8 per cent of the population of Pakistan, now beginning to call itself a separate nationality, wants to impose its language and culture on the other 92 per cent. All of them have migrated to Pakistan in the last 30 – 40 years, all have refused to learn any Pakistani language and are therefore ignorant of the literature existing in local languages and of its superiority to anything that Urdu has produced, and all are creating an explosive political situation in the country. Why are they doing it? Only a careful and detailed study of our cultural history can supply the answer.

The reader will now realise how imperative it is to teach social and cultural history. To continue to teach the political element alone (and even that incompetently and with a built-in bias) is to refuse to see the past in the round.

It is a great pity that our history teaching attaches no importance to social and cultural history. It has no place at all in the undergraduate syllabus. In the universities it is dismissed with a few short chapters, more often with a blank. As generally Pakistani historians only write what can be useful to the students, and since social and cultural history is not on the curriculum, it is not written about. There are a few political historians, but of social, economic and cultural historians we have none.

There is another defect in our history teaching which, to begin with, may be only a pedagogic malpractice, but ultimately it affects the quality of the graduates and through them the approach and understanding of the historians. All undergraduate teaching is done in the colleges, but it is the universities which lay down the curricula and syllabi, hold the examinations and award the degrees. Therefore the universities are to be held responsible for the point I now wish to make.

History is not studied as a subject in combination with allied or related disciplines. Had our higher education system been like that obtaining in Europe,

we could have followed the foreign practice and produced graduates with honours in a particular subject or with a degree in one subject. But the subject combinations allowed in our colleges at the B.A. level produce a chaos instead of a system. An undergraduate can choose any two subjects (plus English) as long as they are either from among the natural and physical sciences or from among the social sciences, humanities and arts. If he wants history to be one of his subjects, he is free to combine it with Arabic, geography, Persian, philosophy, psychology, education, economics, political science, Islamic Studies, fine arts, Urdu, English literature, French language or what else is available at his college.

His own choice is determined by two factors or rather expectations: first, which combination would be of greater use in the civil service competitive test at which most graduates want to try their luck; secondly, which other subject is reputed to bring more marks in the B.A. examination (it is generally believed, and rightly, that the courses are easier and the examiners more generous in Urdu, Persian, Arabic and education, and that high scoring is possible in mathematics and statistics). Some students prefer history because, as it is taught here, it is a straightforward subject, without any practical work as in education or fine arts, without any theories to master as in economics, without any recondite matter to be comprehended as in philosophy, and, above all, the easiest to learn by rote. Another attraction is that if you study history you need not devote any time or labour to the preparation of the minor but compulsory paper on Pakistan Studies, which is nothing but very elementary history.

The universities abolished the honours system many years ago, for reasons neither demanded nor given. Under the old system a student could take up honours in any one of his three subjects, and it involved preparing for three more papers (in addition to the two carried by every pass subject) in his honours subject. This extra work, carried on at a respectably high level, added much to his knowledge, tested his ability earned him the prestige of an honours degree, improved his qualification for a job, and increased his chances of doing well in his M.A. examination if his M.A. subject was the same in which he had taken honours (which it invariably was). The abolition of this system deprived the undergraduate of an opportunity to show his preferences, to read further in the subject of his special interest, to try to prove his superiority over his ‘pass’ class-fellows, and to prepare for his post-graduate work.

In the present-day non-honours system, the least that the universities should have done is to rationalise the subject combination. There must be some relationship, academic or causal, between the two subjects the student takes up for study. If he selects history and Urdu, it needs no wisdom to see that he is not serious about either. When, the students don't use their mind, they should be guided. The universities ought to name the subjects which may be taken in combination. For example, history should be permitted to be studied in conjunction with economics or political science or philosophy, but not with

French or statistics or Arabic or education. By failing to do this, the universities are allowing history to be studied in a vacuum, unrelated to germane fields, and divorced from other disciplines which share its substance and approach – with the result that the history student loses a good opportunity of better understanding his subject with the help of an allied discipline.

In passing, it may be mentioned that it is impossible in Pakistan to study law in combination with any subject whatsoever. Law is considered a technical field, a professional specialisation, for the study of which there are separate law colleges which teach nothing but law. Moreover, one can join the law college only after graduation. There is no department of law in any university. In most places, even the building of the law college is not situated on the campus. There are absolutely no dealings between the law teachers and the university dons (though the law college is a part of and under the control of the university). A similar sentence of excommunication has been passed by the University of the Punjab against the departments of Persian, Arabic, Urdu and Punjabi, which exist and function in a separate colony of untouchables called the Punjab University or Oriental College. Why? For Heaven’s sake, why?

Several results follows – all detracting from the quality and opportunity of the education offered by the universities. An undergraduate cannot study law, and is therefore unable to combine what he is reading with a knowledge of law, however desirable that may be. A law student is debarred from reading law in conjunction with allied subjects (apart from what he had earlier studied for his BA. examination). A post-graduate student reading political science or history or philosophy (all the three having a deep interest in law) has no law in his syllabus, cannot attend lectures on law, and does not find any law books in his library. When a distinguished lawyer or judge delivers a lecture at the Law College the university teachers and students don't even know of the event. Conversely, when an outside historian comes to the university to speak on feudalism in Europe or a political scientist to address an audience on the constitutional problems of Pakistan or a philosopher to discuss Plato's dialogue on Laws, the Law College faculty and student body are neither invited nor even informed. Moreover, there is no sharing of teaching between the Law College and the university departments.

Frustration of a like order is the portion of those dons or, students who have the misfortune or the folly of having an interest in their own literature or in oriental studies: fulfilment is beyond their reach. A visiting scholar may be lecturing on Sayyid Ahmad Khan's *Tahzib-ul-Akhlaq*, a professor of Oriental College may be speaking on Abul Kalam Azad as a journalist, another lecturer may be giving a course on Zafar Ali Khan and the *Zamindar*, or on the Urdu press of the Punjab, or on the poetry inspired by the 1857 events, or on the historical novels of Abdul Halim Sharar, or on the Punjab's role in the origin of the Urdu language, or on the meaning of Iqbal's *Javidnama* – all topics of essential interest to, and parts of the courses pursued by, the university students of history, political science,

philosophy and Islamic Studies – but these lectures and addresses are supposed to be meant for the Oriental College alone or to be its own business.

A similar lack of contact or intercourse exists among the university departments which function and are situated on the same campus. University teaching in the West, and at some other enlightened places also, is an inter-disciplinary and inter-departmental enterprise, This helps everyone. Every department does not have experts on all the courses it wants to teach; so it asks someone at another department to come and take charge of it. Then there are certain papers or parts of a course which are better taught by a scholar from another discipline. Take a few examples. Political philosophy is taught by a philosopher, not a political scientist. Constitutional and international law are taught by a man from the department of law, not by a political scientist. Political thought of Islam is left to an Islamist, not to a philosopher or a political scientist. Karl Marx's philosophy may be the responsibility of an expert in the history of economic thought from the department of economics or of someone from the department of philosophy who has specialised in nineteenth century European philosophy or of a political scientist who has written a good book on Communism – the task is allotted to anyone of these who is available and willing.

History teaching is in the greatest need of, and profits most from, such collaboration, because its field is so large and its sweep so wide that even a well-staffed department cannot teach all the courses it wants to competently, to the satisfaction of the students, and covering all the compulsory and optional papers on offer. Only a scholar of recognised merit in his field should lecture on his field. Ideally (and in most European universities the ideal is the practice), only that lecturer should take charge of a paper on which he has published two or three books.

Given these describable goals, inter-departmental collaboration becomes necessary. Take the history of modern India as a case in point: look at its various aspects and dimensions and periods. Consider the economic, religious, constitutional, educational, political, cultural, social, intellectual and regional contents of what you have to teach. Common sense demands that no reliance can be placed on picking up one of the lecturers, asking him to read a few books and prepare some notes, and ordering him to start teaching from the first of October. A good student will immediately gauge the depth of the man's knowledge or more often the ignorance. If this is done to all the courses, the entire teaching will fall to pieces, you will have over-worked and frustrated lecturers and unsatisfied and resentful students, examination results will carry the tale and the reputation of the university will dip and disappear. But this is exactly how our universities go about their task of teaching history.

Now consider the alternative. The department teaches only what it can, leaving the rest to colleagues from the neighbourhood. (In what it teaches by itself, too, it may invite outside scholars to supplement its own efforts). In the political

history paper, the constitutional developments are taught by a man from political science. If there is a paper on constitutional history it is allotted to the Law College. Part of social history is done by the house staff; part is left to a group of an anthropologist, a sociologist and an economist. Cultural history is shared by several colleagues the concept of culture as explained by someone from the sociology department, literature is taught by man from the Oriental College, education by one from the Education Department, art by one from the Fine Arts Department, religious thought by an Islamist, philosophical thought by philosopher, the theory of history and the philosophy of history also by a philosophy man; in this paper, the department's own lecturer should confine his work to co-ordination, the joining of threads, speaking on some broad themes, and taking the seminars.

In Islamic history the department can enlist the help from further afield, Scientists can be invited to lecture on Islam's contribution to their disciplines, engineers on its history of technology, archaeologists on its ancient remains, doctors of medicine on its achievements in their field, scholars of Persian, Turkish and Arabic on its literature, and musicians on its classical science and practice of melody. But this is only possible if all the faculties teaching these subjects are a part of the university system and function on the same campus. Unless our centres of higher learning become universities in the proper sense, maintaining faculties covering all fields of instruction, teaching from the undergraduate level upwards, imparting knowledge instead of information, and giving equal attention to leaching and research, the programme outlined above will remain an unfulfilled dream.

The last area of darkness in our historical teaching and research to which I wish to refer, is regional history. I don't mean area studies, in which the historical component is very slight, and for which all our universities are running completely useless centres. Pakistan must be the only country in the world which can afford to have study centres on American, Latin American, European, North African and Central Asian history and economics and politics and what not, but does not have facilities for collecting, passing on and interpreting substantial and correct information on its own provinces and regions. With the exception of the Institute of Sindhology in Jamshoro, there is no institution, centre or academy, in the other three provinces which collects material, conducts research and publishes studies on the province.

One great advantage accruing from these provincial efforts will be that the spotlight of inquiry will be focussed on many minor turnings and crossways in the history of the province. National historians and scholars of one province are apt, for good reasons of lack of material and want of interest, to overlook much that is relevant, even crucial, to the development and history of other province. Examples of such minutiae are not difficult to list.

I will take the Punjab which is more familiar to me: histories of town which have an important past (e.g., Chiniot, Jhang, Bahawalpur, Pakpattan, Sialkot, Multan); histories of institutions which have played a significant role in modern politics, education, society and culture (e.g., Government College, Aitchison College, Islamia College and Oriental College, all of Lahore, Universally of the Punjab, Gymkhana Club, Punjab Club, Anjuman-i-Hamayat-i-Islam, Punjab League Halqa-i-Arbab-i-Zauq); histories of buildings and landmarks (e.g., shrines of Multan, the tombs of Hir and Ranjha in Jhang, Badshahi Mosque, Wazir Khan Mosque, Shalimar Garden, Barkat Ali Muhammadan Hall, and the city gates of Lahore); histories of political parties (e.g., the Punjab Muslim League, Punjab Muslim Students' Federation, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-lslam, Khaksar movement, Punjab National Unionist Party); histories or provincial newspapers (e.g., The Lahore Chronicle, the Civil and Military Gazette the Tribune, The *Paisa Akhbar*, *Zamindar*, *Inqilab*, *Wakil*, *Ehsan*); histories of major Urdu journals (e.g., *Adab-i-Latif*, *Humayun*, *Makhzan*, *Alamgir*, *Adabi Duniya*, *Nairing-i-Khyal*, *Ruman*, *Hazardastan*); histories of prominent families (e.g., the Mians of Baghbanpura, the Tiwanas of Shahpur, the Daulatanas, the Noons, the Legharis, the Jamalis, the Hayats of Wah, the Qureshis of Multan, the Sials of Montgomery (Sahiwal), the Qizilbashes of Lahore, the Gurmanis of Muzaffargarh, the Nawabs of Bahawalpur); biographical studies of influential persons (e.g., Sir Abdul Qadir, Malik Barkat Ali, Ghulam Rasul Mihr, Abdul Majid Salik, Sayyid Abdul Latif (the historian of Lahore and the Punjab), Salahuddin Ahmad, Ghulam Bhik Nairang, Chaudhri Sir Shahabuddin, Mian Abdul Hayee, Justice Shah Din, Mian Bashir Ahmad, Khizr Hayat Tiwana, Sikandar Hayat Khan, Raja Ghazanfar Ali, Mian Muhammad Shafi, Mian Ahdul Aziz); critical studies of men of letters and poets (e.g., Waris Shah, Sultan Bahu, Bulleh Shah, Baba Farid, Hafiz Mahmud Shirani, Akhtar Shirani, Ahmad Shah Bukhari Patras, Hafeez Hoshiarpuri, Yusuf Zafar, Nasir Kazmi, Mukhtar Siddiqui, Miraji); studies or political and administrative institutions (e.g., Punjab Legislative Council and Assembly, Punjab Chief Court and High Court, Punjab Secretariat, Punjab Civil Service, Lahore Municipality and Corporation, local government system, district administration); studies of agriculture nature (e.g., canal system revenue administration, water supply, farm marketing, cooperative societies, zamindara banks); social and economic relations, practices and institutions (e.g., legal profession, feudal system, rise of the middle class, caste system, baradari relationship, village life, rural development, internal migration, electrification, expansion of education, railway system, health facilities); etc.

This random and very incomplete list indicates the immensity of the work yet to be done. Most of it must become the responsibility of the provincial historian. The national historian tends to concentrate on the wider scene and has less or little interest in the affairs of the provinces. Scholars belonging to other provinces have their own priorities, interests and handicaps. It is quite natural that they should want to work on their own areas. It is also understandable that their primary interests lies in their own history and institutions. It is also clear that they are better equipped to study the area and problems with which they are

familiar. Then the language problem creates barriers. A Punjabi must learn Pashto to be able to study Khushhal Khan Khattak or the history of the tribal belt or the Red Shirts movement. The Sindhi scholars must master the Punjabi language before he writes anything on Waris Shah's Hir or the village life or the middle class of the province. The Pathans historians cannot be a specialist on Sindh unless he attains a high level of proficiency not only in the Sindhi language but also in the art of understanding the mind and culture of a different people.

These considerations mean one thing: we must have strong provincial cadres of historians working for several years in their own field and publishing their findings. Only when the fruits of their labour are available will the national historians have sufficient data and knowledge to write comprehensive and broad studies. This must not be taken by the national historian of any province as a licence to do nothing but wait for the flow of books to start arriving from his provincial colleagues. In the meantime, he can utilize whatever is available in the archives to write on the Muslim League and the larger nationalist movement. What I am emphasizing is the urgent need for creating, encouraging and strengthening regional studies in, and outside, the universities.

8

History, Social Studies and Civics and the Creation of Enemies*

Rubina Saigol

Creating National Memory: The Organisation of Social Knowledge in Pakistan

Pakistan as a nation-state was formed in a process that involved a violent rupture from another, bigger entity, the Parent state that was India. The process of partition was drenched in blood, suffused with hatred and represented a painful tearing apart of previously forged and assumed unities. In another partition, Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan in a struggle equally dripping with blood. The stories of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are tales equally of sorrow and triumph, loss and pride, suffering and glory. The Parent State in each case mourns the split, and remembers the entire event as a narrative of sorrow, loss, pain and suffering. The seceding entity often celebrates the coming into being of it-self with a glory and triumph underwritten by unforgettable sacrifice and suffering. Opposing tales are then woven by the Parent and emergent states for their future generations, which are brought up amid estrangement and alienation from the Other, who was once the Self. The remembering on both sides is selective as each one struggles to come to terms with the pain of the rupture. India and Pakistan tell rival tales of the partition of 1947[1], and Pakistan and Bangladesh narrate the events of 1971 within divergent perspectives. In official remembering, there is denial and repression of the stories that do not fit into the fabric woven by the Self in opposition to a hostile other. What is often forgotten, with a will to never remember, is that the Other was once the Self, and the Self will always be partly an Other. Estrangement from the Other is also estrangement from the deeply hidden or denied parts of the Self. It is left to folklore, legend and popular memory to hold on to and recall the lost Self, to remember what official history chooses to forget with a vengeance.

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[1] Kumar, Krishna, *Prejudice and Pride*, New Delhi, 2002

History, as taught in the middle and high schools in Pakistan, is the tool of official remembering. It determines how we remember, whom we choose to forget, how we choose to forget and what we must, for our survival in Otherness, remember. History, as official narrative, selects, chooses, excludes, includes and determines the boundaries of memory that can be safely crossed, and those which must never be trespassed. History is the official censor that tells the story of the nation by screening out the unacceptable and inventing the digestible. Official history, like folklore and legend, becomes a fairy tale of heroes, villains, oppressive rulers, battles for justice, greatness, sacrifice, pride, sorrow, victory, defeat, love and hate. It enables the younger generations, which did not participate in the bloodletting ritual of the break, to weave for themselves a reality that allows them to be a part of the nation and state with pride, and without remorse or repentance. The older generations, who cling to memories that fracture and interrupt official narratives, ultimately capitulate and forget what they should not, or are not allowed to, remember if they are to be parts of the new and proud nation. The past slowly recedes from the minds and hearts, as it does from the pages of history. The omnipresent Present dominates all memory and restructures not only the past, but also the future – what the emergent nation should want and aspire to attain. This is the process that educational experts name 'nation-building', that is, telling the nation the story of how it came to be, and what it will some day become.

Newly created nation-states deploy educational systems for the production of knowledge about the nation and state.[2] Collective national memory is designed to forge new national identities based on altered consciousness and shifts in the sense of collective belonging. Regional and ethnic identities must now surrender to national ones in the process of national integration.[3] Local identities are submerged into more centralised, statist ones in the form of modern citizenship. The nation-building process, as it is referred to in educational discourses, relies heavily on the subjects of history and civics in the construction of the national and the citizen. History creates national identity by showing the continuity with the collective past of the group, especially by giving rise to the impression that the group already existed as a cohesive group prior to its separation from the 'other'. History provides the dimension of time and a feeling of permanence to identity. Civics offers the future to the identity of the citizen. By constructing modern citizenship, civics promises development, modernity and prosperity, but above all, it offers political power and a share in the matters of the state. Civics broadens the scope of identity by promising participation in the wider identity of 'citizen', as opposed to narrower loyalties based on purely ethnic, religious or sectarian belonging. History and Civics tend, therefore, to be the most highly ideologically laden subjects

[2] Educationists Krishna Kumar and Andy Green argue that the educational systems in most states, and even more so in newly independent states, are used for nation-building. See Kumar's *Prejudice and Pride*, p. 6; and Green's *Education, Globalization and the Nation-state*, pp. 181-183.

[3] Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959.

implicated in the formation of national identity. Along with geography, which refers to the dimension of space and territory in identity formation, the three subjects form what is known as 'social studies', introduced in Pakistan during the era of Ayub Khan (1958-68). National identity in Pakistan is formed and re-formed within the interlocking discourses of time (history), space (geography) and power (civics).

Pakistan has added another discursive formation to its identity-forming knowledge arsenal in the form of Pakistan Studies. Pakistan Studies, a compulsory subject within the state educational system, also includes history, geography and civics, but the focus is entirely on Pakistan. Furthermore, this subject has added Pakistani economics, foreign policy, development paradigms and cultural aspects to the study of society. It draws upon various social disciplines to create the 'Pakistani identity'. The ideological need to construct and consolidate national identity underlies the entire discourse of Pakistan Studies. Read together history, civics, geography and Pakistan Studies tell the official story of Pakistan – how it was created, who opposed it, who fought for it, why it was important to create it, and where it is headed. In the process they also tell us who we are, who we are not, how we should think, act and behave, what we should feel and aspire to and what we must, for the sake our very survival, forget. The repetition of the same stories, in almost the same words in all the history sections of social studies, civics and Pakistan Studies, reinforces a national identity formed in alienation from an Other, who poses a perpetual threat to the Self.

Pakistani children study social studies from Classes I through VIII, which represent age groups from about five or six to thirteen or fourteen years. Social Studies textbooks comprising separate sections on history, civics and geography are produced by the Textbook Boards of the provinces. At the level of matriculation, Pakistan Studies are introduced in Classes IX and X when the children are about fifteen to sixteen years of age. Pakistan Studies continue at the Intermediate Level where the age group is around seventeen and eighteen. Social Studies and Pakistan Studies are compulsory subjects for education within Pakistan. Civics, as a separate but elective subject, is introduced at the Intermediate level. Pakistan Studies and Civics textbooks are produced by the Textbook Boards of the provinces, but also by independent writers who follow the curricula. The textbooks are produced based on the curriculum guidelines developed by the Bureau of National Curriculum, Ministry of Education, Islamabad. The curriculum is thus highly centralised, but it finds regional and provincial expression through the four provincial textbook boards which introduce their own variations based on regional requirements.

In this paper, civics, history and Pakistan Studies textbooks, as well as the curricula, at the middle and secondary levels are examined for the kind of stories they tell of the many and changing Others of the official Pakistani Self. It is at the middle levels (Classes VI to VIII) that the ideological and identity

forming content acquires primacy. Ideological content does exist at the primary levels, but owing to pedagogical concerns, there is somewhat lesser emphasis on burdening children with abstract ideas beyond their capacities to comprehend. When the child is about twelve or thirteen at the middle levels, she/he is considered capable of absorbing complex abstract material. Curriculum developers and textbook writers seem to consider it their duty to infuse the 'national spirit' among children at this stage in order to make them 'good, patriotic citizens'. The ideological content increases manifold as the children reach the higher secondary levels. It is assumed that at the stage of early adulthood (sixteen to eighteen years) Pakistani children must be fully incorporated into the nation by being immersed in the official norms of nationhood and Pakistani citizenship. The social studies textbooks selected for this study includes the Punjab Board's Textbooks for Classes VI to VIII. The Civics textbooks have been chosen for Classes IX to XII and Pakistan Studies for Classes IX and X. This selection provides a fairly representative sample of the textbooks used for these subjects. The textbooks produced by the Boards of the other three provinces do not reflect a widely divergent view in terms of official ideology, but differ only in detail and occasionally in the selection of events to be included.

Multiple Others and the Singular Self

Identities emerge, and are elaborated and consolidated, in situations of conflict. The national self that emerges in conflict has to be continuously renewed and revitalised through reiteration and re-enactment of the rituals of the nation. The hoisting of the national flag, singing of the national anthem, parades and marches on national days and the rendering of patriotic and war songs, are among the paraphernalia of the nation's desire to remember itself. Such rituals are performed for public memory on national days, but in schools they form a part of the daily routine. One of the formative aspects of national remembering is the renewal of national enmity. Without the enemies surrounding the nation, lurking on its borders and residing within its core, there is no self either. The self can exist in opposition to its detractors. Without conjuring up enemies, the nation finds it difficult to cement national bonds. Threat has to be invoked not only from the outside, but also from within in order to enable the participation of people in the national project. Every love must have a corresponding hate, every remembering entails a forgetting of what it is not, every inclusion implies an exclusion. The hate and exclusion, necessary for national self-renewal, are provided by the enemies that keep us alive as a nation.

Education is called upon to construct and elaborate upon these many enemies, to explain the threats they pose, and to reiterate how the self has survived their designs and, therefore, needs to be vigilant. Knowledge about permanent and ubiquitous enemies is carefully crafted, packaged and disseminated through the school systems of the state, mainly in the form of social studies, Pakistan Studies and Civics. The wide variety of Pakistan's reliable enemies includes the Hindus, Christians, Jews,

Sikhs and finally the enemies within – the regional, religious and ethnic minorities which threaten to once again rupture the fabric of national oneness. In the latter case, the formation of Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) constitutes an episode that official history has chosen either to forget, or to remember with excruciating pain, and as a lesson in 'remaining forever prepared'. Since each of these enemies relates to a somewhat different dimension of Pakistan's national narrative, they are discussed separately. However, all of them play some role in the construction of Us versus Them and receive a slightly different treatment in textbooks. The main sources of the construction of the Pakistani Self, are Indians in general, and Hindus in particular. Since Pakistan emerged within the political paradigm of the two-nation theory, which poses the Hindus and Muslims as two irreconcilable communities, most identity-forming textbooks revolve around the story of the two nations. The latter consideration allows Hindus to play the major role of the national demon.

Inherently Evil: The Hindu Other

> …the Hindu and Muslim nations of the sub-continent have been, throughout the whole history and society of India, like two rivers which have flowed parallel to each other but have never met or merged into one. These differences between the Hindu and Muslim nations which have characterised their whole history, social life, culture, customs, religious beliefs, world-views and lifestyles in the past and in the present, are the basis of the Two Nation Theory.[4]

Without the use of the Hindus as the absolute opposite other of the Pakistani Muslims, the national narrative cannot be constructed as it is then bereft of its reason for being. Krishna Kumar explains this point with regard to school histories of both India and Pakistan in the following passage:

> The history of the freedom struggle taught to school children in India and Pakistan is framed by a deep awareness of the 'other'. In both cases, the sense of what happened in the past is intertwined with the current and evolving perception of the 'other'.[5]

The idea of the complete otherness of Hindus and Muslims receives the most vehement articulation in a Civics textbook for Intermediate Classes by Mazhar-ul-Haq who writes:

> The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor intermingle together, and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their views on life and of life are different. It is quite

[4] Haq, Mazhar-ul, *Civics of Pakistan*, p. 227.
[5] Kumar, Krishna, *Prejudice and Pride*, p. 29.

> clear that Hindus and Mussulmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is the foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state'.[6]

Mazhar-ul-Haq's explication of the two-nation idea is strongly representative of the way in which it appears in most social studies, civics and Pakistan Studies textbooks. The emphasis is on two completely different and conflicting civilisations that seem to have nothing in common. However, the description of this difference does not tell us anything about either civilisation. The differences in their conceptions, philosophies or literatures are not elaborated upon as the intention seems to be to emphasise that they are different but not on how they are different. Detailed knowledge of the other, even as an enemy, is missing. This passage lends credence to Krishna Kumar's suggestion that

> Indian and Pakistani children do not hear about each others' country as part of their formal learning. Yet, their everyday reality is steeped in the consciousness of the 'other'…school education forcefully frames out any knowledge of the 'other' for both Indian and Pakistani children'.[7]

The absence of detail and specifics renders the text to ideological manipulation. The demonising and mythologizing of the 'other' becomes easier as the gaps and silences on the precise differences and conflicts between Hindus and Muslims enable the reader to fill in the blanks with potentially wild imagination. Considering that the reader has little access to alternative sources, especially within the education system, and the official media consistently reinforces the mythologized 'other' as demon, only one picture is likely to prevail. The essentialist use of the all-encompassing categories 'Hindus' and 'Muslims' obfuscates the awareness of internal differences within each group. The presentation of two monoliths confronting each other in eternal enmity makes it easier for the material to be reproduced in the examination. The erasure of complexity arising from multiple and contradictory voices, for example Muslims who were opposed to the two nation theory and partition, and Hindus who were sympathetic to the Muslim perspective, enables the story of the two irreconcilable nations to achieve a coherence that the idea lacked in reality. Right from the beginning of the educational ladder, children's national memory is shaped into a binary mould by suppressing the multiplicity of voices that formed part of the discourse.

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[6] Haq, Mazhar-ul, *Civics of Pakistan*, 6th Edition. 2000. Lahore: Bookland. p. 19.
[7] Kumar, Krishna, p. 237.

In support of the claim that it had become imperative for the Muslims of India to create a separate homeland, the Hindu 'other' is represented as racist and fundamentalist. One sub-heading in Mazhar-ul-Haq's book on Civics is 'Hindu Revivalism and Fundamentalism'. The intentions of the Hindu other are described in the following way:

> The Hindus had become very ambitious during the 19th century. They were dreaming of making this vast sub-continent an Hindu land by driving out the British rulers and exterminating the Muslims whom they called Malichchas or dirty people. It was the same kind of racialism and race-hatred that is found in all aggressive peoples and nations, like the ancient Aryans who called the non-Aryans as Dasyus or black-demons, or like Americans and Europeans who call the non-white peoples of the world as 'gooks', etc.[8]

One fails to see how the author discovered that all the Hindus had become ambitious during the 19th century, and how did he have access to what they were dreaming about. Nonetheless, these assertions are made in the text along with the claim that the same kind of racialism and race-hatred is found among all aggressive peoples and nations. The examples given are the Aryans, Americans and Europeans. Here all the perceived 'others' are lumped together and provided with the attribute of aggression which allegedly 'all of them' possess as a natural trait. Since the construction of the 'other' is simultaneously a construction of the Self as the absence of all that the 'other' represents, it is implied that Muslims are not aggressive or ambitious and do not have expansionist dreams. The history of the sub-continent gives the lie to such a suggestion, but then what is often missing from this kind of history is History itself. Once again detail is absent to prove the points that all 'others' are aggressive and racialist. The writer next asserts that 'There were many Hindu leaders in the 19th century who preached revivalism and fundamentalism among the Hindus'.[9] These lines are followed by the information that Gangadhar Tilak called the Muslims dirty and asked his followers to rise against the Muslims, how he founded anti-cow killing societies and demanded that Hindus should be allowed to play music outside mosques: 'Here was a proof, if any proof was needed, for Sir Syed's views that the Hindus and Muslims could never be one people'.[10] The selection of some facts from a vast array of available and contradictory knowledge, and the focus on one person from among a variety of leaders with differing views, enables the writer to prove his point to the students that Hindus, as one single unbroken category were against all Muslims.

A few pages later in the same text, the writer presents Gandhi as a Hindu fundamentalist leader 'who skilfully twisted the Khilafat Movement of the

[8] Haq, Mazhar-ul, *Civics of Pakistan*, p. 5.
[9] Haq, Mazhar-ul, *Civics of Pakistan*, pp. 5-6.
[10] *Ibid*. pp. 5-6.

Indian Muslims, to his own ends'.[11] This discourse continues in the tone that Gandhi played political tricks upon Muslims and was clever in his manipulation of their sentiments. By dealing in this perfunctory way with the vast complexity that was Gandhi, the text manages to deprive the reader of the rich texture of the freedom movement. It blunts any possible curiosity that may arise in the student to know more about why and how the freedom struggle ultimately bifurcated into two separate states. It would not suit the formation of national memory to provide the details of Indian Hindu and Muslim leaders and their actions that fed into the separatist agenda. The rest of the pages of the Civics text are filled with words such as perfidious, extremist and intransigent for Hindu leaders with no mention of those who dissented or of those among Muslims leaders who did not agree with the Muslim League. The entire text suffers from the compression, speed and sketchy formulation of historical narratives that Krishna Kumar highlights in his book, *Prejudice and Pride.* According to the writer, as a result of Hindu imperialist ambitions two states, Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan were created.

As the text reaches close to the end of the chapter on the Pakistan Movement, the Hindu 'other' takes on increasingly sinister aspects. With regard to the issue of Kashmir and the plebiscite that was never held, the writer's words take on a harsher tone. According to him, 'Hindu Machiavellianism, or better still, Chanakyanism, had come into operation'[12] because plebiscite was to be held in Muslim majority areas *only after* British left. As a result the Indian army entered Kashmir and 'the gates to Hindu Machiavellianism were thus opened'.[13] The collapse of the categories 'Indian' and 'Hindus', and their interchangeable usage throughout the text, is a denial of the multiplicity of India where a large Muslim minority lives alongside other religious communities.

India is declared as 'our most hostile neighbour' and the writer passes the judgement that while the Pakistani nation can be united with any other nation or people living outside its boundaries, it cannot do so with India if 'we are to remain a distinct nation'.[14] The fear of merger, of losing a distinct and separate identity is evident here. The fear that India will engulf or devour us is rooted in the national psyche that India has never accepted our existence and wants to destroy us as it partially did in 1971. This is the corollary of the Indian national story that Pakistan sends militants into India to break it up as a revenge against India breaking up Pakistan in 1971. According to the writer, 'India is our closest but most hostile neighbour. This unfortunate relationship is only due to the hostility and antagonism which India has shown towards Pakistan from the very first day it came into being or rather before Pakistan came into being. The Hindu majority community of this sub-continent and its militant parties and leaders always dreamed of establishing a Hindu State over the whole sub-

[11] *Ibid.* p. 9.
[12] *Ibid.* p. 21.
[13] *Ibid.* p. 24.
[14] *Ibid.* pp. 228, 236-237.

continent called Akhand Bharat where the Hindu culture and Hindu language will dominate and the traces of Muslim culture, civilisation and language will be wiped out'.[15] All hostility is attributed to India based on its designs to wipe out Pakistan. Pakistani hostility towards India is silenced. The writer asserts that India developed one plan after another to destroy Pakistan one way or another and this is the reason why their relations have been hostile and unfriendly since 1947. Since no reasons, causes or dynamics of this alleged one-sided hostility are provided, the student has no idea why India is forever and permanently so hostile. This reinforces the idea that India is inherently evil, some kind of a demon whose nature it is to be hostile to us. Since there is no History in this history, or no politics, economics or culture, one is left with the bare minimum of a 'natural monster' or fiend lurking on our borders. The self is cleansed of all responsibility, all blame or even agency in this construction of the active and masculine 'other' and a passive, quiescent and feminised self.

The discourse of the hyper-masculinization of the hostile Hindu 'other', and the feminisation of the besieged and pacifist Self, is carried further in the description of India's 'Hindu nuclear bomb' and its missiles named after its gods, Agni, Prithvi and Akash.[16] Pakistan is defined as a peace loving country which had to develop nuclear weapons in response to India's perpetual threat. Since Pakistan's nuclear weapons have often been called the 'Islamic bomb', the need is to project this on to the 'other', just as earlier the reply to the charge of 'Muslim fundamentalism' led to the equal and opposite charge of 'Hindu Revivalism and Fundamentalism'. There is a subtle but discernible shift in the gendered nature of the discourse of the self and other. In my earlier study of the textbooks of the Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq eras, I argued that textbook writers tend to create the Muslim heroes in highly masculine, active, potent and virile terms, while constructing the Hindu 'other' in feminised terms such as weak, unable to fight, timid and passive.[17] While this is still the case in many textbooks which glorify Muslim conquest and warriors, there is a perceptible tendency in the current textbooks to construct the 'others' of Muslims in terms that are aggressive, masculine, active and potent, even though negative. When Muslim conquest, glory and imperial pursuit are discussed, the masculinist discourse becomes celebratory. The heroes of the Muslims are great, strong, brave and valiant. However, when the 'other' is discussed in active and masculine terms, the discourse shifts to a different moral ground. In the case of non-Muslims, the desire for war is aggressiveness and Hindus are aggressive, ambitious, hostile, war-mongerers and anti-peace. The Muslim Self takes on feminine postures vis a vis hostile 'others' who have evil designs against them.

This subtle but sure shift in the discursive style of textbook writers could possibly arise from various sources. One may simply be the contemporary

[15] *Ibid*. pp, 236-237.
[16] *Ibid*. p. 242.
[17] Saigol, Rubina, *Knowledge and Identity*.

sensibility in which the so-called 'international community' expects countries to speak in pacifist terms and glorifying military adventures, war and conquest are considered archaic pursuits, notwithstanding the current 'war on terror'. Pakistan has been under donor and international pressure to instil the values of peace and human rights in its curricula. However, the changed posture might also have resulted from the worldwide Muslim sense of being a besieged community against whom 'others' are aggressing. From Palestine to Kashmir, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan, Muslims all over the world find themselves in defeated postures and under siege from the so-called Western world, India and Israel. Not only are Muslim countries under threat of war, conquest and occupation, there is a consistent and derisive media campaign to depict them as 'terrorists', 'militants' and 'evil'. The media war, coupled with actual aggression against Muslim countries, and the reference to them as the 'Axis of Evil' as well as other derogatory slurs by people in highly sensitive and responsible positions, have all led to Muslims feeling beleaguered and under fire. Muslims belonging to vastly different countries and cultures, classes and regions, sects and political affiliations, all seem suspect in an environment that is increasingly hostile and unsympathetic, and fails to distinguish between one Muslim and another.

In the face of the immense firepower acquired by powerful Western countries, Israel and India, Muslims across countries feel relatively powerless to defend their lands, homes, women, cultures, ways of life and beliefs. The sense of being a besieged community on the receiving end of the world's ire, coupled with the inability of the world to delve deeper into the causes of Muslim discontent, the tone of textbook writers in the contemporary context seems to have become defensive and passive. The powerful 'others', armed with the most advanced technology of death and destruction, are constructed in hyper-masculine but negative terms. The hapless Self, unable to defend itself in the face of superior firepower, constructs itself in passive and pacifist images of femininity. The change seems to have come with the defeat of Iraq at the hands of the Allies, the overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the failure of Palestinians to get their lands free of Israeli occupation, and the failure of the Kashmiris to achieve their right to self-determination. The earlier textbooks produced during the era of General Zia did not express a defeatist mind set, rather the notion of *Jehad* played a central role in the formulation of the curriculum and textbooks, and Muslim heroes such as Mahmud of Ghazni and Mohammad Bin Qasim occupied a definitely masculine space.[18]

However, occasionally the ultra masculine Muslim image as conqueror, invader and warrior appears in the social studies textbooks written in 2002 but produced under the influence and curriculum guidelines of the era of General Zia. The curriculum prepared by the National Curriculum Committee, Ministry of Education in 1984 requires that the spread of Islam and Mohammad Bin

[18] Saigol, Rubina, *Knowledge and Identity*.

Qasim's invasions in India be taught to students.[19] Under 'Affective Objectives' the curriculum includes 'aspirations for *Jihad*', love and regard for Islamic values, and among the concepts to be given to students, the curriculum includes martyrdom, valour and the idea of a cannon.[20] The activities suggested for students include drawing the picture of a cannon, tracing Mohammad Bin Qasim's conquest route and discussing Islam's advent into the sub-continent. The following passage from the social studies textbook for Class VI illustrates how the curriculum of 1984 is realised in a textbook of 2002:

> In the middle of the city of Dabel there was a Hindu temple. There was a flag hoisted on top of it. The Hindus believed that as long as the flag kept flying, nobody could harm them. Mohd. Bin Qasim found out about this belief. The Muslims began to catapult stones at the temple and at the flag, ultimately making it fall to the ground. The whole city became tumultuous and the Hindus lost heart. Some Muslims clambered up the walls of the temple and forced open the door. Qasim's army entered the city and after conquering it, announced peace. The Muslims treated the vanquished so well that many Hindus converted to Islam.[21]

This description of breaking down the barriers of the sacred space of the 'other' and making a forcible entry to take over is typical of several other depictions that appeared in the textbooks of the era of General Zia. A very similar account of the forced and violent entry of Mahmud of Ghazni into a Hindu temple, along with the defeated and begging postures of Hindus, appears in a Class V textbook produced in 1987.[22] The scene in this story starts with the idea of a flag hoisted atop a temple and the belief that as long as it keeps flying nobody could harm the Hindus. This description is akin to the maintenance of virginity and its public announcement. The next image is one of Muslims catapulting stones at the temple and the flag making it fall down, and then *clambering up the walls* of the temple and *forcing open the door*. The connotation of rape by Muslims and the loss of Hindu 'virginity' is unmistakable. Sacred and protected space is violated by force and then desecrated. A number of descriptions of conquest and victory bear resemblance to rape. However, immediately after this triumph of the Masculine Muslim Self, the posture of peace is assumed. The feminine side re-emerges and the kind treatment of the Hindus is announced. The sudden shift from a violent act against the Hindus, to the announcement of peace and good treatment is not explained. One fails to understand how such a scenario could have led to peace and such good treatment that many Hindus *voluntarily* embraced Islam. The great deal that has been left unsaid, the gaps left open in this compressed account would explain the puzzling

[19] Social Studies Curriculum, National Curriculum Committee, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Islamabad, 1984. p. 16.
[20] *Ibid*. p. 16.
[21] Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, Lahore, p. 63.
[22] See Saigol, Rubina, *Knowledge and Identity*, p. 231.

shifts. However, compression serves to create the impression that despite excessive aggression, the Muslims were basically peace loving and the moral Self is retrieved. We need to remember that in most stories told to children, aggression is attributed to the 'others' and peace to the self. Page 72 of the social studies book, produced in 2002, highlights the idea of *Jihad* against foreign rule, recommended in the 1984 curriculum guidelines.

Another continuity that one notices from the textbook of the era of General Zia is the construction of Hindu/Muslim polar opposition in the description of architecture. The social studies textbook for Class V produced in 1988 contrasts a Muslim mosque with Hindu temples in a manner which shows the Hindu temple as dark, narrow and enclosed and the Muslim sacred space as open, well-lit and clean.[23] In my work on the Zia era textbooks, I argued that the contrasting description of sacred space is gendered in that Hindu sacred space has associations with femininity (narrow, dark and mysterious, internal), while the Muslim space represents masculine power (open, well-lit, spacious, wide, external). In the Class VI social studies textbook produced in 2002, similar images are transferred on to wider secular and profane spaces. This is how the Class VI textbook describes 'Muslim Contributions to the Architecture of the Sub-Continent':

> The Muslims made valuable contributions to the architecture of the sub-continent. Prior to the advent of the Muslims, the people of the sub-continent resided in narrow, congested and dark houses. The architecture of the Hindus exhibited narrowness, labyrinthine complications, layer upon layer of complexity and conical shaped structures. The architectural refinement of the Muslims exhibited openness, vast spaces and external glory. They built open, airy and grand structures.[24]

The association of narrowness, congestion and darkness, which in the earlier discourse was associated with Hindu sacred space, is now transferred to the Hindu home. The image of 'labyrinthine complications, layer upon layer of complexity' seems designed to suggest that the Hindus were somehow 'not straight and simple' and that there were deeper, darker layers in their psyche that suggest 'something crooked' or 'mysterious'. This description fits in with the notion that Hindus are devious. The Muslim contribution is defined as 'architectural refinement' exhibiting openness (read honesty), vast spaces and external glory (read imperial domination). The word 'open' is used again in the last sentence to underscore the idea that Muslims are somehow more honest and transparent than the more 'opaque' Hindus. Since the discourse is written within the two nation differentiation, the Hindus represent all that is denied and repressed within the Muslim Self.

The continuities with the Zia era textbooks are a consequence of the fact that the contemporary textbooks have been written within the guidelines prepared in

[23] See Saigol, Rubina, *Knowledge and Identity*, p. 235.
[24] Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 67.

1984 by the National Curriculum Committee. The stated purpose of this curriculum was to implement the national education policy of 1979 which required that curricula be revised 'with a view to reorganise the entire content around Islamic thought, giving education an ideological orientation so that Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger generation and to help them with necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets'.[25] In this curriculum one of the cognitive objectives, number 3 is 'to understand Buddhism as revolt against Hinduism'. Under Contents corresponding to this objective, the curriculum states 'Buddhism as revolt against Hindu social system'.[26] The Class VI textbook for social studies produced in 2002 translates this 'cognitive objective' in the following words:

> During the time of Buddha, people had become fed up with the caste system and the unjust ways of the Hindus. Hence Buddha started to reform the unfair system of the Hindus.[27]

The caste system is provided as yet another proof of the Hindu 'other' as an unjust and uncivilised creature. What is omitted from the discourse is the fact that Pakistani society too is torn by a form of caste system and biradari system, despite the claims of Muslim equality. What is also not mentioned, in the politics of commission and omission, is that caste ideology is against the constitution of India and a large number of Indians oppose the notion of caste for being undemocratic. This is not to argue that the caste problem does not plague Indian society where religion is invoked in its defence. The argument is that the presentation of all Indians and all Hindus as steeped in caste ideology, essentializes Indian society. The other and many voices that disrupt and rupture the narrative of caste are excluded. The child reading the text gets the impression that there is no dissent and that each and every Hindu is a staunch believer of caste. In contrast, and by implication, the Muslim Self is good because it is based on equality and justice**.**

The curriculum guidelines produced in 1984 for social studies teaching in Class VIII are realised in the social studies textbook for Class VIII produced in 2002 by the Punjab Textbook Board. The curriculum recommends the following objectives for the chapter on 'The Pakistan Movement' to be covered from 1857 to 1947. Objective 1 is to 'get acquainted with the efforts of the Muslims of the Sub-continent for separate Identity and Liberation'. Objective 2 is to 'get acquainted with the difficulties faced by the freedom fighters and the corresponding content for objective 2 is a discussion of the Congress Ministries of 1937. The Congress Ministries receive a resounding condemnation from all textbooks whether social studies, Pakistan Studies or civics, with virtually identical stories of the oppression

[25] Preface. Social Studies Curriculum, Prepared by National Curriculum Committee, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan. 1984. Islamabad.
[26] *Ibid*. p. 15.
[27] Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 60.

of Muslims by the Hindu Raj. Pakistani textbooks treat the Congress Ministries as a turning point for the North Indian Muslim Movement and as the final proof of Hindu insincerity towards Muslims. According to the social studies textbook for Class VIII produced in 2002, the Congress Raj inflicted great cruelties upon Muslims, the Hindus hatched conspiracies against Muslims, the government incited Hindu 'goondas' (this word meaning 'goons' is used in the children's textbook) to kill Muslims, and Muslim life and property was destroyed.[28]

It is said that nationalism relives and reiterates its wounds in order to renew and reinvigorate itself. Suffering and sacrifice are here used as instruments of Muslim national consciousness. The extent to which this is officially recommended memory of suffering and sacrifice is evident from an examination of the Pakistan Studies Curriculum for Classes IX and X produced in 1986. In the chapter on Pakistan Ideology and the Two Nation Theory, the Affective Objectives of the Curriculum include 'feeling for suffering of Muslims of the sub-continent', Affective Objective number 2 which reads 'consciousness of Hindu-British antagonism', and Objective number 3 which reads 'appreciation for the sacrifices rendered by Muslims who migrated at the time of partition'.[29] These objectives of the Zia era curriculum are realised in the Pakistan Studies textbook produced in 2002 in which Muslim suffering and exploitation in Bengal at the hands of the Hindus and the English are highlighted[30], and a few pages later the Muslim suffering at partition at the hands of Hindus and Sikhs is detailed.[31]

The memory of the wounds of the nation is not restricted merely to physical wounds. Psychological and ideological injuries inflicted by the Hindu 'other' are also remembered. The Wardha and Vidya Mandir Schemes introduced as Basic Education Schemes are roundly condemned as devices to destroy Muslim culture and civilisation. Particular reference is made in virtually every book of Pakistan Studies, Civics and Social Studies to the fact that Muslim children were forced to salute the Congress flag, worship Hindu gods and Gandhi's picture and the Bande Matram, an allegedly anti-Muslim national song was foisted upon Muslim children. The Wardha Basic Education Scheme and the Vidya Mandir Scheme are declared to be the designs for the Hinduisation of society, and the final nail in the coffin of Hindu-Muslim unity of the days of the Lucknow Pact and Khilafat Movement. The Shuddi and Sanghatan Movements of conversion to Hinduism are used as further examples to prove that there was no point of convergence or meeting of the minds – the two communities had each gone their own way. Krishna Kumar expresses surprise at the absolute rejection of the Wardha Basic Education Scheme, arguing that Gandhi's intentions were not examined by the Pakistani textbook writers, nor

[28] Social Studies for Class VIII, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002, pp. 104-105.
[29] Pakistan Studies Curriculum for IX and X, National Curriculum Committee, National Bureau of Curriculum and Textbooks, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1986. p. 4.
[30] Pakistan Studies textbook for Classes IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, p. 29.
[31] *Ibid.* p. 32.

were the efforts of Zakir Hussain, Chairman of the Wardha Committee to explain the scheme to the two communities understood.[32] However, by this time the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust had grown to such an extent there was a collective forgetting of earlier commonalities, shared dreams and experiences of the past and joint struggles against the East India Company. Collective national memory works through the process of forgetting as much as it does through remembering the past - what the ideologues on both sides of the communal divide *chose* to forget at this point were shared memories of communal harmony and togetherness.

The needs of the present demand that the past be reconstructed by erasing what does not conform to the image of the national self or fails to fit into national memory. An occasional line representing the shared past slips through and is quickly balanced by knowledge of the 'other' dictated by present compulsions. The Class VIII social studies textbook produced in 2002 reflects this ambivalence:

> During the Khilafat Movement the Hindus and Muslims were completely united and like brothers and they started to co-operate and live in peaceful togetherness. But as soon as this movement ended, Hindu hatred of the Muslims re-emerged.[33]

The repressed memory of shared aspirations and peaceful co-existence appears in the context of the Lucknow Pact and the Khilafat Movement, and occasionally with reference to how the two communities fought the British together in 1857. The latter story is punctuated in many instances by making sure to mention that the Hindus convinced the British that only the Muslims had fought against them, thus bringing all their wrath solely upon the Muslims. For example, the social studies textbook for Class VIII states that, 'although both Hindus and Muslims took part in the war of independence of 1857, the Hindus used their cunning to convince the British that only the Muslims revolted'.[34] At other times the story of the shared past and loved commonalities, especially between ordinary people, is laid to rest under the accumulating debris of communal hatred. When it is retrieved from the dark realms of forgetfulness, the story of co-operation is sometimes given ominous dimensions as Gandhi's trickery designed to incorporate Muslims into the secular nationalist struggle of the Congress. Stories of Hindu Muslim friendship and unity sit uncomfortably on the landscape of a fractured national memory. They interrupt the smooth national narrative and interrogate the violent rupture that was partition.

In the quotation above, the Hindu hatred of the Muslims allegedly 're-emerged' as soon as the Khilafat Movement ended. Re-emergence implies that some kind of primordial hatred was always there ready to be mobilised. It was temporarily

[32] Kumar, Krishna, *Prejudice and Pride.*
[33] Social Studies Textbook for Class VIII, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, p. 100.
[34] Social Studies for Class VIII, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2001, p. 90.

suspended during the movement for political purposes, but this hatred is somehow a part of being Hindu. The assumption is that we *know* them, and we know how the *real* 'Hindu mind' works. Krishna Kumar points out the unique absence of curiosity about the 'other' in both Pakistani and Indian contexts. He writes that 'both countries live with the assumption that they *know* the other. The 'other' is after all, a former aspect of the 'self'; hence there is no room for the curiosity that foreignness normally awakens'.[35] However, the consciousness of the 'other' as not only a former but current aspect of the self is absent in any book of social studies, Pakistan Studies or Civics.

In every articulation of the two nation theory, any commonality of culture, music, dress, history and food is denied under the blanket assertion that the two were always completely different in every way. By not elaborating upon these differences, obviously because the uncomfortable similarities would reveal themselves, knowledge of the 'other' can be relegated to the domain of mythology. All history is mythologized into two eternally warring groups representing opposing values. Every Hindu is a prototype of all Hindus, every Hindu stands in for all Hindus. This mythologized and demonised homogenisation of the complex and contradictory 'other', is matched by an equally mythologized and homogenised Self. Internal differences that characterise both the Self and the Hindu 'other', as well as the overlaps and mixtures of the other in the self and vice versa, are erased in the construction of national memory based on oneness. The mythological tale of two nations, a story curiously akin to the Mahabharata in some of its elements, becomes so dominant in textbook consciousness that it overrides any knowledge of other communities residing in the region. The Civics textbook for Class IX and X produced by the Punjab Textbook Board in March 2001 claims that there were two nations residing in South Asia, Hindus and Muslims – by a single sleight of hand the Buddhists of Nepal and Sri Lanka, and the Christians residing in all of South Asia are vanquished.[36]

In sum then, virtually every Pakistani social knowledge textbook defines the two nation story as the 'Ideology of Pakistan' and its raison d'être. In the two nation mythology, the essential Hindu appears as the chief villain and takes on many characteristics that are attributed to simply being Hindu. Needless to say, these characteristics are negative and the identity building textbooks are unanimous in attributing these to the Hindu 'other'. The Hindu is immoral as polyandry and matriarchy, which are symbols of a backward and immoral society, exist in certain parts of India.[37] The Hindu, constructed as the opposite other of the Muslim and

[35] Kumar, Krishna, *Prejudice and Pride*, p. 3.
[36] Civics For Class IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2001, pp. 78-80.
[37] Matriarchy and polyandry are discussed in Civics textbooks as backward and immoral forms of the family existing in certain parts of India and Tibet. See *Elements of Civics: Principles of Civics*. Part I. 2000. Lahore: Bookland. Also see Rubina Saigol's paper 'His Rights, Her Duties: Citizen and Mother in the Civics Discourse' in *Symbolic Violence*, pp. 192-235.

Pakistani, is ambitious, racist, hateful, aggressive, fundamentalist, revivalist, oppressive, cruel, trickster, perfidious, expansionist, anti-peace, extremist, intransigent, wicked, conniving, Machiavellian, chanakyanist, neo-imperialist, antagonistic, casteist and perpetually inclined towards the destruction of Muslims.

The Muslim Self is the absence of all this, the opposite of all these characteristics. India and Hindu are conflated in nearly all the textbooks and internal differences, competing voices and the multiplicity of perspectives within India and among Hindus are erased. Since religious identity is accorded primacy in the construction of national Pakistani memory, neither the Hindus nor Pakistanis have any other characteristics or differences emerging from regional, class, sect, caste or gender belonging. The Congress is almost always referred to as a Hindu body ignoring its Muslim membership, and the differences among its various leaders over secular nationalism and communal distinctions. Similarly, the Muslim League is depicted as representative of all Muslims despite the fact that its influence was confined to Northern parts of India. The privileging of religious identity over all other sources of identity, allows the textbook writers to use the notion of 'Hindu India' to create 'Muslim Pakistan'. In the process, the multiplicity of each entity is shrouded in the mist of collective forgetting and an obstinate refusal to remember.

The perpetual need to justify and re-enact the violent rupture from India, requires innovative interventions. Memory cannot be trusted and may, at any time, break through the layers of repression and confront us mercilessly. The Other, that is created simultaneously with the Self, must be incessantly formed and re-formed, lest we forget why we broke away. The Other must also be given negative and undesirable attributes, not only to make it as unlike the Self as possible, but also to make us hate it so that we may not even articulate the desire for merger, for contact, for bonding, for friendship. The perpetual demonising of the Hindu Other becomes a State imperative – the Other is greedy, wicked, hateful, aggressive, unjust, violent and lives in Savage times. The Self, which has to depend upon the Other for its very survival as a *different* Self, is contemporaneous, peaceful, quiescent, just, good, worthy of respect and demands belonging, loyalty and sacrifice. It is also endangered, threatened by the Other's nefarious designs against which it must brace itself permanently by arming itself to the teeth. History textbooks are a perpetual reiteration, not only of the necessity of the break, but of the demonic character of the Hindu Other. They go to great lengths to show how devilish the Other was and how fortunate one is to be severed from it. We have been saved, we are told, from the tentacles of a monster that would have devoured us whole. Our Saviours, like Syed Ahmad Khan, Iqbal and Jinnah, must be remembered with gratitude and admiration for seeing through the designs of the monster and enabling us to get away.

Trickster and Cheat: The English/Christian Other

Having come into being within the dichotomous paradigm of two irreconcilable nations, Hindus and India are the primary sources of Muslim Pakistani identity.

However, Pakistan has a multiplicity of 'others' each one of which performs a somewhat different function in the construction of the self and national memory. The Christian and English 'other' also plays a significant role because of the interlocking history of British imperialism and Indian and Pakistani nationalism. The English seem to stand for Christianity as well as the West in general. In the context of the Indian struggle for independence, the 'other' is referred to either as 'the English' or 'the British', the latter term being usually reserved for the discussion of imperialism. In the context of the crusades, the reference is consistently to Christians as the 'other'. In the case of the freedom movement, the religious identity of the third interlocutor in the English-Hindu-Muslim triad is not paramount. Rather, the national identity of Englishness is the preferred mode of speaking about the English, in sharp contrast to the preferred mode of speaking about the Hindus only in religious terms. For textbook writers, the Hindus and Muslims constituted religious communities while the British were a secular force. This representation contrasts with the preferred form used by Indian textbook writers to refer to the Congress as secular and the Muslim League as communal.[38]

In nearly all the references to the English or British within the context of the independence movement, the English appear as conspirators, tricksters and cheats.[39] Cruelty is also attributed to them, especially when referring to the Jallianwala Bagh and other incidents of massacre, but their primary characteristic appears to be cleverness, trickery and a propensity towards conspiring. For example the Class VI social studies textbook states that 'after conquering, the English treated the local population with great cruelty. They murdered thousands of men women and children with cruel abandon. They destroyed the property of the local people. They exiled the last Mughal King to Rangoon'.[40] In this description the English are cruel, murderous and uncivilised as they murdered women and children with cruel abandon. The British argument about the uncivilised and savage natives is turned upon its head to show lack of civilisation of the rulers. The story of the cruelty of the British 'other' recurs in several textbooks, partly to justify independence and partly as a rebuttal of the charge of Muslim cruelty and lack of civilisation.

In almost every case, the British conspire in league with the Hindus against the Muslims. The only reason provided for the English preference for Hindus in all textbooks is that the British were suspicious of the Muslims who had ruled over India for a millennium and had risen up in revolt in 1857. It is historically correct that it was Mughal rule that ended as a result of the uprising of 1857 which brought

[38] Krishna Kumar in his *Prejudice and Pride* states that Indian textbooks are written within the binary of secular versus communal identity and struggle, p. 207. The Indian textbooks oppose secular nationalism to communalism. The Pakistani textbooks, as I have argued in my book *Knowledge and Identity* are overwhelmingly within the two nation binary which is based on opposing religious identities. However, the English are seldom, if ever, referred to as Christians while discussing the freedom struggle.

[39] See for example the social studies textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 75-77.

[40] Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, p. 77.

India under British rule in 1858. It is also true that the East India Company seized power from the Muslims in Bengal and Mysore. But it is also true that many non-Muslims fought in the skirmishes of 1857 alongside the Muslims. However, the replacement of Persian by English in 1837 as the official language, and other measures, were perceived by Muslims as antithetical to their culture and civilisation. In the 1920s the Khilafat Movement also aroused anti-British sentiments among Muslims in India. The sense of being a besieged community was strong among Muslims having lost the Mughal Empire in 1858, the Ottoman Empire in the 1920s as well as power and privileges that were enjoyed as rulers.

Stories of Muslim greatness, invincibility and superior power could not be upheld in the face of defeat on various fronts, especially at the hands of the British. It was important to explain the loss of power and privilege by resorting to other means in the face of contrary evidence. Conspiracy theories and internal weakness, as well as arguments based on treachery, deceit and betrayal filled the void left by lack of introspection. Two of the favourite stories of Muslim defeat as a result of the enemies within betraying us and committing treachery are those of the Muslim hero Siraj-ud-Daula of Bengal who was defeated by Robert Clive at Plassey in 1757 and Tipu Sultan of Mysore, another Muslim hero who was betrayed in the Deccan. These two stories of defeat underline the importance of the internal 'other', the stranger within the house who wounds from within. The idea is to emphasise upon the young readers that the Muslims did not decline in courage, valour or greatness, but fell prey to unscrupulous traitors. The mythology of invincible Muslim power can be kept intact by showing the enemy residing within.

The British were excellent at conniving with the Hindus to humiliate the Muslims, our children are told. Here is how the British 'other' appears in the Civics textbook by Mazhar-ul-Haq:

> …the British rulers decided to humiliate and suppress their Muslim subjects by all means at their disposal. They showered favours upon the Hindus, while they denied all opportunities for education, employment, wealth and progress to the Muslims.[41]

As no explanation is offered for the showering of favours upon the Hindus, the British come through as merely prejudiced. There is no historical explanation based on politics, economics or culture or the dynamics of Indian politics. The child has to just believe that the British, for some deeply mysterious reason, favoured the Hindus. Most of the textbooks are littered with phrases about British-Hindu imperialism as though this were some kind of joint project. The Class VIII social studies textbook narrates the stories of Muslim suffering by stating that 'the English seized all Muslim lands and gave them to the Hindus', that the English had destroyed Muslim cultural spaces, welfare institutions, education and employment

[41]Haq, Mazhar-ul, *Civics of Pakistan*, 6th Edition, 2000. Lahore: Bookland. p. 1.

opportunities[42], that the Hindus had convinced the British that only the Muslims had fought against them in 1857[43], and that it was ultimately Syed Ahmad Khan who convinced the English that the Muslims had protected them by risking their own lives.[44] An almost identical account of English atrocities appears in the Pakistan Studies textbook prepared in March 2002 by the Punjab Textbook Board, but it adds that the English engaged in genocide of the Muslims in which the Hindus co-operated with them in return for financial benefits.[45] This discourse creates the impression that the Hindus were not fighting imperial rule and thus cancels the entire Indian struggle for freedom. What is excluded here is Muslim imperialism which usually tends to fall under the categories of 'conquest', 'glory', 'greatness', and the holy duty for the 'spread of Islam'.

It is in the context of a wider, pan-Islamic consciousness, as textbook writers move outside India, that we first encounter the Christian 'other'. The English 'other' is included in this; however, this time not in terms of nationality but robed in religious identity. Pan-Islamic concepts of 'Ummah' form a corollary of the two nation idea. The 'imagined community' called 'Muslim Ummah' extends to all Muslims and Muslims living in all countries. The constitutive idea underlying the construction of the Ummah is that all Muslims, irrespective of regional, sectarian or geographical distances and differences, essentially constitute one nation, one community. In this sense, all Muslims are insiders, part of the self, just as all Hindus are outsiders and not a part of the self. Along the dimensions of difference and sameness, the Hindus represent the first pole of otherness and difference, while the Muslims symbolise sameness and continuity. Empirical evidence contradicts the notion that all Muslims anywhere in the world are essentially the same. Not only are differences across countries patently obvious, within each country there are differences by sect, ethnicity, caste, class and language. Muslims are as diverse a group as any, yet the notion of Ummah essentializes them into a community based on shared norms and value systems.

The notion of Ummah, implying the inclusion of all Muslims within the religious imaginary, also at one level contradicts the two nation construction. If all Muslims are one nation, then are Indian Muslims part of the Indian nation or Muslim nation? This question is a matter of personal choice for Indian Muslims who may prefer to privilege their religious or national identity or neither one. However, in the politics of identity, such a choice is manipulated by both Pakistani writers and ideologues of Hindutva, who feel that Muslims are foreigners and should leave India. Pakistani textbook historians use the terms 'Hindu' and 'Indian' interchangeably overlooking the fact that according to their pet two nation theory, 'Indian' also includes Muslims who are, within their own logic, part of the Muslim nation. However, contradictions and ironies are

[42] Social Studies for Class VIII, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 91.
[43] *Ibid.* p. 90.
[44] *Ibid.* pp. 92-93.
[45] Pakistan Studies, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2002. p. 17.

dealt with by compartmentalising them in the mind and in the knowledge system. Contradictions that cut across chapters, and are discernible even within the same chapter, are not addressed so that a curious and probing student would find no answers to thorny questions of belonging and identity.

However, it is at the level of Class VII, when children are about twelve or thirteen years old, that they are suddenly taken out of India and placed in a pan-Islamic context. The social studies textbook for Class VII produced by the Punjab Textbook Board in January 2002 once again reflects the curricular emphasis of the era of General Zia when Islamization was an overriding imperative of state policy in Pakistan. The curriculum produced by the Ministry of Education in 1984 recommends the organisation of the textbook around the imagined notions of 'The Muslim World' and 'Islamic Society'. The curriculum of 1984, as well as the textbook of 2002, divide time into before/after dimensions with a view towards showing that the time before the advent of Islam was immoral time and after the rise of Islam time was pure and moral. The tendency to divide time along the before/after, pure/impure, immoral/moral axes was discussed was discussed in my book *Knowledge and Identity* with regard to the books belonging to the earlier era.[46] The division of time along a religious axis serves as a prop for the pan-Islamic theory and its counterpart, the two nation theory. Time, in such construction, loses its historical character in which real people and events shape history. As I argued earlier, time becomes mythical and takes on fairy tale notions of 'forever', 'never' and 'once upon a time'. Real dates and locations are ignored when time is thus deployed in the construction of ideology. In the curriculum of 1984, cognitive objective One, is 'to understand religious, political and economic conditions of the people of Arabia before Islam', and objective number Two, states: 'to get acquainted with the mission of the Holy Prophet and to understand Islam as a complete code of life'.[47] Among Affective Objectives, the following are listed: 'love for Islamic values', 'pride in being a Muslim' and 'pride in being a Pakistani'. The curriculum suggests the following concepts to be taught to students at the level of Class VII: 'Muslim', '*Kufr*' (absence of belief in Islam/Allah), '*Kaafir*' (infidel), '*Iman*' (faith, in this case belief in Islam), '*Munafiq*' (hypocrite), '*Tableegh*' (preaching and proselytism), '*Jihad*' (holy war), '*Shahadat*' (martyrdom in the cause of Islam), 'sacrifice', '*Ghazi*' (brave soldier fighting for the cause of Islam), and '*Shaheed*' (martyr in the Islamic cause).[48] The identity of young twelve year olds is expected to be moulded in the direction of war and militarism.

The curriculum suggests that while teaching about 'colonial rule in the Muslim world' (colonial rule over non-Muslims is excluded) the cognitive objective should be 'to understand the diplomacy of foreigners'.[49] Here the word

[46] Saigol, Rubina, *Knowledge and Identity*.
[47] Social Studies Curriculum, Ministry of Education, 1984, p. 21.
[48] *Ibid*. p. 21.
[49] *Ibid*. p. 23.

'foreigners' is used to denote all non-Muslims, and the fact that Muslims themselves were initially foreigners in many countries including India, is repressed. Objective Two is 'to get acquainted with the intentions of the foreigners to rule upon the Muslims'. How the curriculum writers were able to reach the 'intentions' of others to rule specifically over Muslims, and why they should have such intentions, is left to the imagination of the youngsters. The Affective Objective listed her is 'feelings of resentment against the colonial rule'. How such affective objectives are expected to be achieved, is not clear but the idea of pedagogy is to instil such sentiments.

One is hard pressed to see how this kind of pedagogy would promote intellectual development and critical thinking or the ability to analyse among students. Pre-set, unrelated and unexplained 'facts', selected from among a vast array of available knowledge, are designed to create impressions upon students to enable them to feel a certain way. Other 'facts' are framed out, as are any connections and linkages between 'facts' that would draw a more comprehensible picture of 'reality'. Information, in little bits and pieces, without any underlying principle tying the pieces together, works in the construction of identity by enabling a mass, collective amnesia of the unspoken and of the unwritten relations or contradictions between bits of knowledge. In the age of information, fast flowing and unrelated 'facts' packed together thickly but without explanation, are substituted for real detail of an event, and a deep and penetrating understanding. Information sans analysis and interpretation passes for knowledge. The values of quantity and speed (declared to be necessary for quality education) replace reflection, thoughtfulness and understanding.

The social studies textbook for Class VII, produced in 2002, faithfully realises the curriculum objectives of 1984. This is how it conjures up a picture of time *before* Islam:

> Before Islam, people lived in untold misery all over the world. Those who ruled over the people lived in luxury and were forgetful of the welfare of their people. People believed in superstitions. They worshipped false gods … In the South Asian region the Brahmans ruled over the destinies of the people. They believed that certain human beings were untouchable. There was an all-powerful caste system. The untouchables lived worse than animals. Human beings were sacrificed at the alter of false gods … In Arabia, before the dawn of Islam, people were beset by many evils. They had no vision of a higher purpose of life. That is why they were subject to many bad customs. People took pride in family and colour. They performed strange acts around Kaaba. Slavery was freely practised and slaves were treated very badly. Women were not given proper respect. People gambled and gave cruel treatment to the womenfolk … There was no just law in their society nor any proper political system. People

> knew nothing of government. The people of Arabia were nomads. Their customs and habits of living were the law for them.[50]

As in the earlier textbooks of the Zia era, pre-Islamic Arabia and pre-Islamic India are conflated as though they were the same society. Two vastly different entities are collapsed in one paragraph. Their entire culture, customs, beliefs, practices and habits are covered in this highly compressed, completely non-analytical paragraph. Many of the accusations in the paragraph are true of societies today, including Muslim societies. But the textbook historian claims a little later that Islam removed these evils and created an order based on peace, justice, equality, brotherhood, fairness, just distribution of wealth and rationality.[51] The idea of course is to show how good, moral and pure these societies became after conquest by Islam. The two societies together provide the basis of the two nation theory, and the resource for creating the 'Muslim Pakistani' as the moral opposite. However, the stage is also being set here for the next chapter in which Islam, as the true religion, spreads to other parts and purifies and cleanses them by getting rid of the immoral Christian 'other'. Muslim imperialism needs moral justification and it is found in the same kind of rhetoric utilised by the 'Christian world' to legitimise its imperial pursuits – purging societies of infidels and ushering in a moral order. One justification for Muslim imperialism is provided by stating that the helpless people suffering under tyrannical non-Muslim rule themselves invited Muslims to come to their rescue, and 'they considered their salvation in the victory of Muslims because Muslims treated their subjects extremely well'.[52]

However, the Christian 'other' is presented in the following way:

> The people of Africa requested the Muslims to invade their lands to save them from the tyranny of their Christian rulers who extorted taxes from them.[53]

The Christian rulers are not only tyrannical, they extort taxes from their subjects. The excluded piece of knowledge is that Muslims also extracted taxes from Muslims as well as Jaziya (religious tax) from non-Muslims. The depiction of tyrannical Christian rulers requires a contrast with the self which is provided in the following way:

> History has no parallel to the extremely kind treatment of the Christians by the Muslims. Still the Christian kingdoms of Europe were constantly trying to gain control of Jerusalem. This was the cause of the Crusades.[54]

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[50] Social Studies Textbook for Class VII, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore. January 2002.
[51] *Ibid*. pp. 13-17.
[52] *Ibid*. p. 21.
[53] *Ibid*. p. 21.
[54] *Ibid*. p. 25.

The self is constructed as kind as opposed to the tyrannical 'other'. The cause of the crusades is quickly attributed to the militarist and expansionist designs of the 'other'. No historical, political, economic or social explanation is attempted, nor the complex dynamics of the crusades are provided. One singular cause is attributed to the prolonged conflict. One form of the reproduction of ideology, and with it identity, is oversimplification – removal of all complexity by reducing conflict to Them and Us categories. The aim of this pedagogy is not the inculcation of understanding or intellectual reflection, but creation of religious identity.

The Christian 'other' is also a liar and cheat. In spite of the kind treatment of the Christians by Muslim rulers, the former had inexplicable proclivities toward lying. As the textbook historian states:

> Some of the Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem fabricated many false stories of suffering. If they were robbed on the way, they said it were the Muslims who robbed them.[55]

Tales of suffering under Muslims are mere fabrication and Muslims are of course incapable of robbing. The textbook historian then bemoans the fact that all the Christian countries united against the Muslims and sent large armies to attack them and justified it by saying that Jesus Christ allowed it. 'The Pope was caught in a religious frenzy' says the textbook. The Christian 'other' thus also had tendencies toward needless 'religious frenzy'.

The Christian 'other' was not obviously brave enough to fight and win. Thus, tells us the textbook, the Christians were defeated at many points and driven out of Asia 'but the Christians took to their traditional tactics of conspiring against the ruler (Imad-ud-Din Zangi). This time too they were successful. They got Imad-ud-Din murdered by one of his own soldiers'.[56] Conspiracy is a 'traditional tactic' of Christians who are now also murderers. Once again it is the enemy within, his own soldier, who murders the Muslim ruler. The self can only lose when there is weakness within. The 'other' succeeds only with the help of conspiracy and trickery.

Another characteristic of the Christian 'other' is jealousy of the superiority of Muslims. According to the textbook historian

> During the Crusades, the Christians came in contact with the Muslims and learnt that the Muslim culture was far superior to their own. Muslim knowledge and technology, their manufactures and their

[55] *Ibid.* p. 26.
[56] *Ibid.* p. 27.

> inventions were introduced to Europe. The Europeans learnt methods of trade, agriculture, and architecture from them.[57]

After having established Muslim superiority, Christian envy is highlighted:

> The Christians and the Europeans were not happy to see the Muslims flourishing in life. They were always looking for opportunities to take possession of territories under the Muslims.[58]

The Christians, to whom now are added all Europeans, were conniving and scheming due to their jealousy over Muslim superiority. Nationalism, constructed in alienation from 'others' defines the self as morally and civilizationally superior. The same desire to tell children that Muslim nation and culture are far superior to all others, appears in the Class VI social studies textbook also:

The Muslims ruled the sub-continent for over a thousand years. They were, therefore, superior to all other nations residing there. In terms of Knowledge, art, technical expertise, civilisation, no other nation could compete with them. After the war of independence, the English took revenge upon the Muslims and confiscated their property, harmed their businesses, threw them out of jobs and over a short period of time, destroyed their lives and they started to lag behind in every field.[59]

The English and the Christian 'others', jealous of Muslim superiority, destroyed the Muslim due to vengefulness. The Muslims lag behind only because of the English, not because of historical dynamics within their own community. The curricular objective to instil 'pride in being a Muslim' is fulfilled in the construction of the self in terms of superiority. All forms of nationalism seem to partake of the ideas of the superiority of the self as the basis for the hostility of the 'other' towards the self. In the process, one's own conscious or unconscious hostility is elided.

In sum then, the English and Christian 'others' appear in Pakistani textbooks as tricksters, cheats, liars, conspirators and schemers. They only succeed because of their 'natural and innate traits' of deceit and conniving. The Muslims lose to them only because of conspiracies and tricks, not due to inferiority. The saviour self constructed in this opposition is obviously moral, upright and truthful.

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[57] *Ibid*. p. 28.
[58] *Ibid*. p. 31.
[59] Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, pp. 77-78.

The Greedy Usurer: The Jewish Other

The Jewish 'other' of the Muslim self does not figure very prominently in middle and secondary level textbooks. This omission is noteworthy because anti-Semitic sentiments are widespread in Pakistan where people overwhelmingly support the Palestinian cause. One possible reason for this relative silence within textbooks may be because of the physical distance between Jews and Pakistani Muslims. There are hardly any Jews living in Pakistan who could pose a direct threat to the Pakistani self. Although the Hindu minority in Pakistan is also minuscule, the geographical contiguity of India reflects the proximity of this threat. And, as already stated, the story of the two permanently inimical nations is a Hindu Muslim story. While varying 'others' may enter the construction of Muslim Pakistan, it is primarily the blood stained severance from the Hindu 'other' that incites memories of pain and sorrow.

However, as in the case of Indian and Hindu, no distinction is made between Jews and Zionists. When the Jews do appear in textbooks they are almost always as Zionists, and there is no concept of a non-Zionist Jewish person. Pakistan's official foreign policy is anti-Israel, and at times the impression one gets from public discourse is that all Jews are perceived as Israelis. All Israelis are to be condemned as all of them are cruel, wicked and imperialists. Fine distinctions between Jews, Israelis and Zionists are seldom made in public discourse or textbook representations. There is generally scant mention of Jews except while discussing Pakistan's foreign policy or in the process of constructing a pan-Islamic identity.

Whenever the Jews do appear in textbooks, they almost always play the role of Shylock – the greedy, bloodthirsty usurer. They are forced into a singular and narrow identity of the moneylender who charged very high rates of interest and destroyed the lives of people. The Hindu moneylender (referred to as *baniya* in Pakistan) and the Muslim moneylenders do not figure highly in the curricular discourse. The stereotype of the tight-fisted and parsimonious Jew obliterates the possibility of a poor or destitute Jewish person. Such a creature, it is assumed, does not exist. A generous, magnanimous, friendly or large-hearted Jewish person is also unthinkable since textbook categories are not prone to dealing with complex categories.

In the construction of the Jewish 'other' once again there is continuity from the textbooks of the earlier eras, which go as far back as the time of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. A social studies textbook for Class VI produced in 1975 contrasts the time *before* Islam and *after* its advent as dark/immoral/bad time versus good/moral and enlightened time of Islam.[60] After making a series of anti-

[60] Saigol, Rubina, *Knowledge and Identity*, pp. 225-226.

Christian statements in which Christianity is presented as a source of corruption and evil, the textbook historian turns towards the Jews and one of the first sentences is about how rich trade had made them. This envy is followed by accusations of how they corrupted their faith and misled and deceived the Holy Prophet of Islam. The social studies textbook for Class VII, in the course of a discussion about 'Islamic Society', has this to say of the Jews:

> Some Jewish tribes also lived in Arabia. They lent money to workers and peasants on high rates of interest and usurped their earnings. They held the whole society in their tight grip because of the ever increasing compound interest … In short there was no sympathy for humanity. People were selfish and cruel. The rich lived in luxury and nobody bothered about the needy or those in suffering.[61]

The Jews are thus primarily moneylenders who have no sympathy for humanity and are selfish and cruel. The alleged Jewish tendency to accumulate wealth is contrasted in the subsequent pages by asserting that Islam prescribes a just distribution of wealth and caring for the poor and needy.[62] This kind of contrast of the self and other is designed to create both religious communities as mutually exclusive categories that are morally opposed.

The Knife-wielding Butcher: The Sikh Other

The Sikhs constitute another minority in India where Hindus form the majority religious community. The Sikhs are, therefore, not a strong or direct threat to Pakistan. On the contrary, Pakistan tacitly supports the occasional rumblings of anti-state feeling in Eastern Punjab. However, when the Sikhs do make an occasional appearance, they are dressed in militant attire, wielding the *Kirpan* (sword-like knife) as butchering, murdering and marauding hordes. The stereotype of the 'martial race' is conjured up in the representation of the Sikhs, who appear as those who challenged Muslim rule.

Usually two occasions are reserved for the appearance of Sikhs on the stage of textbook dramas. One is their take-over of the Punjab after the decline of the Mughal empire, and the second is at the time of partition when they appear as looters, marauders and killers. At other times, the Sikhs simply disappear into the mist of 'history' lying somewhere waiting to be 'discovered' as actors in the historical drama by some less forgetful textbook writer. Their function in the politics of textbook writing in Pakistan seems to be to underscore the sufferings inflicted upon hapless Muslims who sacrificed for the Land of the Pure. Their only role is that of the villain in the shadows who appears suddenly from nowhere to kill the hero of the drama, the besieged Muslim.

[61] Social Studies for Class VII, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, January 2002, p. 13.
[62] *Ibid.* p. 18.

The first type of appearance of the Sikhs, as invaders of the Punjab, is exemplified by a social studies textbook written for Class IV in 1998. According to this representation:

> After the death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707, the Mughal dynasty became weak and mutinies began in several provinces. When the government of the Punjab became weak, the Sikhs began to increase their influence and started plundering the larger cities of the Punjab. Lahore and Multan were plundered and looted several times by the Sikhs who murdered the people and unleashed terror and violence upon them. Finally, the Sikh ruler Ranjit Singh established his hold over the Punjab and the Sikhs and the Hindus together committed many atrocities and cruelties upon the Muslims. They particularly desecrated Muslim holy places and shrines.[63]

When the hero of the textbook story, the Muslim assailed from all sides, becomes weak, the Sikh butcher enters the stage as plunderer, looter and murderer. The Muslim takes on the feminised posture of suffering as atrocities and cruelties are committed upon the self by highly masculine 'others' who join hands to inflict misery upon the defenceless self. In the story of the 'independence movement', the British collude with the Hindus against the Muslim who is besieged from all sides. In the story of the decline of a Muslim empire, the Sikhs collude with the Hindus against the Muslims. The 'others' of the self seem to invariably collude in the conspiracy against Muslims. As all political, social and historical dynamics are written out of the story of blood and violence, the reader is left with no clue as to the causes of the alleged 'collusion'. The impression that is left on the young minds is that it is the nature of the beast to shed blood. The projection of all violent tendencies on to the 'other', serves to cleanse the moral self of any aggressive propensities.

The second appearance of the murdering, knife-wielding Sikh around the time of partition can be viewed in the following depiction taken from the Pakistan Studies textbook for Classes IX and X produced in March 2002:

> When the Hindus and Sikhs realised that Pakistan is being established, they started riots in parts of the Punjab. As a result hundreds of thousands of Muslims were wounded and murdered. In this difficult time, the Muslims of the Punjab did not let go of fortitude and strength and welcomed the refugees from Indian territory and were generous to them. They proved that Muslims always help each other.[64]

In the gory tale of wounding and murdering at partition, the story of killing and murdering by Muslims is a silence in the text. It has been recorded by many noted scholars, that during partition violence, rape and murder were committed

[63] Social Studies Textbook for Class IV, 1998. Punjab Textbook Board. p. 82.
[64] Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 32.

by all religious communities against all others.[65] The idea of the textbook storyteller is to underline the sacrifice and suffering of Muslims in the blood-drenched drama of the creation of state and nation. The wounds are reiterated lest we forget how our blood was spilt for the homeland. This kind of reiteration of injury is a nationalist remembering, as it adds poignancy and urgency to the tale of the making of the nation. The Sikhs perform their 'historical' role as those who shed our innocent blood as we departed on our way to the homeland.

Deprived of any other knowledge of the Sikhs, as indeed of Hindus, Christians or Jews, the student is left with a one-dimensional picture of the 'other', the inherently evil Hindu, the conspiratorial Christian, the usurious Jew and the butchering Sikh. The Muslim represents the absence of all that is attributed to these various, shifting and multiple 'others'. The appeal of Shylock as in 'when you prick us, do we not bleed', is not allowed to these 'others'. *They* do not suffer, bleed or sacrifice, only *we* do. *They* do not have any noble moral intentions, generosity, kindness, justice, fairness or forgiveness – only *we* do. *We* do not have any cruel, murderous, imperial or conquering impulse – only *they* do. In this manipulation of knowledge, textbook tellers of tales, construct our fractured, broken and denuded identities rooted in 'otherness', 'difference' and alienation. Our common or shared past experience with others is written out of the tale of the two nations.

The Back Stabber: The Bengali Other

The focus so far has been on the varied and multiple external 'others' of the Muslim Pakistani self. However, the self is not an unbroken whole. It is a partitioned and fractured self which is ruptured from within by internal 'enemies' residing in its core. The national narrative is interrupted at many points by 'others' residing within its territory and pushing at its seemingly inviolable boundaries. The stranger in the house comprises the religious, parochial, provincial and regional minorities who have never been fully included into the shifting self. At times, these dangerously close 'others' have been rudely catapulted out of the definition of the national Muslim self, for example, when the Qadianis were declared non-Muslims in 1974. At other times, these parts of the self have violently ruptured through the layers of repression built around them and broken away, as the East Pakistanis did in 1971. A nation defined as Muslim has never been at ease with the non-Muslims residing within its territorial boundaries, as their loyalties are forever suspect. While the national self may be engaged in a perpetual war of self-definition in relation to the many inimical and hostile external 'others', it is also at war with itself. Its boundaries, both ideological and physical, keep shifting in renewed efforts to define and re-define itself. Pakistan perhaps has the unique distinction

[65] See Menon, Ritu, and Kamla Bhasin's *Borders and Boundaries* and Butalia, Urvashi, *The Other Side of Silence*, for details of the kinds of atrocities committed by all sides against all sides in the formation of the nation.

of being the only country from which the *majority* seceded in 1971 and formed a separate homeland.

The violent tearing apart of East Pakistanis is the most traumatic event in Pakistan's history. The nation as a whole has not yet fully come to terms with the break – the second partition in less than a quarter of a century. Another partition dripping with blood and gore, the formation of Bangladesh is a painful memory of dismemberment. The latter word, used frequently to describe the rupture of the Eastern wing, suggests torn limbs, a painful tearing apart of the body. There is intense moral ambivalence among Pakistanis regarding the events of 1971. When the quarrel is with a Hindu, Christian or Jewish 'other', religious justifications are easily invoked in support of the besieged self. When the quarrel is with fellow Muslims, not only does the story of the two nations become transparently fictional, the religious basis of holy war cannot be invoked. Bangladesh becomes a gaping hole in national memory. The only way to speak about it is through silence. This 'other' is a *part* of the self, is not *really* an other. It is not *really* the self. The only way to define it is to not define it. A self so constrained and confined within a religious self-definition, has no language with which to speak of other definitions based on language or ethnicity. They can only be erased from consciousness.

This is precisely what the textbooks do – they erase Bangladesh by not telling the tale. There are many ways of *not* telling. One of these is to tell a *different* story, to speak *half* the truth. The story of Bangladesh is silenced between half truths, and full lies. If ever speech is used to create silences, it happens in the case of Bangladesh. One liners and short phrases on Bangladesh at the end of chapters cover up oceans of unspoken horrors. The idea that language is the 'cloak of thought' used more to conceal and mask than to reveal, was never truer than in the case of the genocide of 1971. Independent estimates of the rape of Bangladeshi women by 'defenders of the faith' range between 150,000 and 200,000. The mass murder of 1971 has been recorded by the 'international community' in films, reports and documentaries. In Pakistan, however, it was only after the publication of the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission Report released in 2000 by an Indian newspaper, that the government made some noises about acknowledging the atrocities. The refrain was that 'we must forget'. As passionately and obsessively as we remember partition, as obstinately as we cling to the memory of the murder of Muslims at partition, the official desire expressed by the President of Pakistan regarding the events of 1971was that we should 'forget the past'.

The compulsion to *not* remember requires the expenditure of energy on the *different* story. Here is how the untold story of Bangladesh appears in the Civics textbook for Class IX and X produced in 2001:

> Certain political elements began to propagate that nation depends on language and ethnicity instead of religion. This led to an increase in

> provincial prejudices. Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rehman took full advantage and started telling the people that the people of West Pakistan were exploiting them. He had the support of India and other enemies of Pakistan to break Pakistan up into pieces. He started to sow hatred into the hearts of the Bengalis. The Bengalis were influenced by this propaganda and as a result the Awami League won the election overwhelmingly. Mujib started to propagate a confederation and said that East Pakistanis can only develop under his 6 point formula. This was an evil design dressed in the garb of provincial autonomy. The Awami Leaguers and the so-called *Mukti Bahini* began the mass murder of non-Bengalis. They destroyed public property. In this storm of murder and looting, nobody's life and property was safe. At every step the law of the land was violated. Bangladeshi flags were flown all over the land. Finally in order to overcome this revolt, the Pakistan army was given authority. India started to pass statements to incite the Bengalis against the Pakistan army. India convinced them that the Pakistani army is inflicting cruelty upon them. Finally Mujib-ur-Rehman was arrested and India, which was fully part of the conspiracy by Mujib, made a great noise over this arrest. India used the insurgents and miscreants and started a poisonous campaign against Pakistan all over the world. When India saw that it is achieving its nefarious designs, it attacked Pakistan. The Pakistan army fought with full courage for the sake of the pure land, they sacrificed their lives. If they had been allowed to go on fighting, the enemy would never have succeeded, but because of incompetent leadership in Pakistan, they had to surrender. So, finally East Pakistan became separate from Pakistan due to treason of Awami League, and Indian aggression. The whole Pakistani nation was tormented and writhing in the pain of this deep wound.[66]

The entire episode of the formation of Bangladesh is relegated to the dark and insidious realms of conspiracy. The Bengalis 'stabbed us in the back' by joining hands with India. *They* committed the murder of non-Bengalis, *they* looted and *they* destroyed property. The Bengalis started the violence and were responsible, along with conniving and scheming India, for the deeply wounding break of Pakistan in 1971. There is a great deal of silencing in this story. Why were the Bengalis so easily misled and convinced by India's propaganda? Why did they start killing non-Bengalis? Why did they believe that the Pakistan army was committing atrocities upon them? None of these questions are answered. The brevity and compression used here to describe events that have a long history and background in Pakistani politics and economics, forestalls any critical thinking about what parted us. What is absent here is also the role of the Pakistani military, which receives plaudits for its exploits but no disapprobation or condemnation of its well-known acts.

[66] Civics for Class IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2001, pp. 112-114.

The 'dismemberment' of Pakistan is referred to by using bodily metaphors, such as 'the whole Pakistani nation was tormented and writhing in pain of this deep wound'. Nationalism rejuvenates itself by speaking its wounds and holding up its suffering, and in this case the wound is a reminder that we should be prepared to defend the 'motherland' against future 'conspiracies'. A number of textbooks in fact do end the minute section on Bangladesh with a stern warning to young children to be forever prepared to foil the enemy's evil designs against the motherland. For example, the social studies textbook for Class V, produced in 1998 says, 'after the war of 1965, India with the help of Hindus living in East Pakistan, incited the people of East Pakistan against West Pakistanis. In December 1971, the Indians themselves also attacked East Pakistan. As a result of this conspiracy, East Pakistan separated from us …We should all receive military training so that we can foil the designs of the enemy'.[67]

The warnings point to the evil from the savage past from which one has already escaped, and also to the potential evil inside our wombs ready to emerge in the future. Hence the regional and ethnic Enemies Within, which is the part of our Self connected to the Other through the Past, must surrender to the dominant narrative of oneness. They must forget that they were once an Other, that they are different. We must retain our integrity, our wholeness and our oneness as the Other is just outside the walls of our fortress/home, ready to engulf and destroy us. This fear, written on the pages of every history book, binds us together in our myths and enables us to live together in a peaceful falsehood. This silence is broken only when those who must re-write and reclaim their histories, rise up and shatter jealously guarded myths. This is what the Bengalis did when they tore apart the story of the two nations, and retold their own story in a different language. We were shocked, horrified and awoke from the deep slumber of decades of living in our fairy tale world of eternal joy and immortal peace. But that is what the real story of history is – a horror story punctuated by rude awakenings and sudden shocks. It is not a story of 'living happily ever after', but one of shame, human degradation, exploitation and conflict. It is a story of human suffering, loss and the empty victories of long-forgotten heroes lying buried in a million graves.

The reference to peace, supposedly established by the military, appears in the Intermediate level Civics textbook by Mazhar-ul-Haq which accords the following peremptory treatment to the whole episode:

> Awami League's victory in East Pakistan encouraged the internal and foreign enemies of Pakistan to hatch a conspiracy against the unity and solidarity of the country by inciting a revolt in East "Wing" of Pakistan … This was indeed a scheme of international conspirators … Though

[67] Social Studies textbook for Class V, 1998, Punjab Textbook Board, pp. 112-113.

> the army succeeded in restoring peace and order in East Pakistan, but some of the Awami League leaders fled across the border to India. They were welcomed by the Indian Government which was then preparing its army for the invasion of East Pakistan. The Awami League leaders set up a "Bangladesh Government" at Calcutta in Bharat, which was promptly recognized by India and her friends, like the USSR … A few months later the Indian army launched an aggression against Pakistan and after a month of fierce fighting in East Pakistan, Dacca, its capital, fell to the Indian aggressors on December 16, 1971.[68]

The conspiracy to create Bangladesh is internationalised and there is now a multiplicity of conspirators who collaborate to break up Pakistan. Various 'others' are here together in crime against a beleaguered self. The military succeeded in restoring peace and order, says the textbook but what it does not say is that it was a repressive and unjust peace and an authoritarian order that were restored. In the rest of the book, there are two or three sentences about how India sent infiltrators into East Pakistan and incited Bengali secessionists to revolt. This project, claims the writer, had British sympathy. In a textbook that splurges on the Pakistan movement and allots a generous number of pages to the details of 'Hindu Machiavellianism', this remarkably curt, brief and compressed account of the formation of Bangladesh in fact speaks volumes of silence about what really happened. What is said contains the unsaid as its 'other'. Beneath the layers of censoring and the suppression of the truth, lies the truth - unsilenceable, unspoken but vivid. What is *not spoken* in the story of Bangladesh becomes manifest by the *way it is spoken about*. The brisk manner and the dismissive treatment themselves bear testimony to the fact that something is being hidden, something being deliberately forgotten.

The social studies textbook for Class VII, produced in 2002 dismisses the whole episode in a one liner: 'due to some internal as well as some external factors, East Pakistan was separated from Pakistan and became an independent country of Bangladesh in 1971'.[69] The Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X, produced in March 2002 virtually repeats the same account in about two or three sentences. According to this textbook, after the elections of 1970 the country was plunged into crisis and East Pakistan separated. This was a national tragedy. At another point in the same textbook, one more sentence is devoted to this 'national tragedy' along the lines that in 1971, when the East Pakistani government was in political turmoil, India used the opportunity and attacked us as a result of which East Pakistan broke away and became a separate country.[70] Why was the East Pakistani government in turmoil? We are not told. Why was the country plunged into a crisis after the elections of 1970? No answer.

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[68] Mazhar-ul-Haq, *Civics of Pakistan*, 6th Edition, Lahore: Bookland. pp. 75-76.
[69] Social Studies Textbook for Class VII, Punjab Textbook Board, January 2002, p. 40.
[70] Pakistan Studies for Classes IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, pp. 41-42, and 147-148.

Students who may wonder about such questions would have to look elsewhere for analysis, interpretation and history. In telling half the story, the textbook historians fail to mention that the Awami League of East Pakistan had won the 1970 election overwhelmingly but the elite establishment of West Pakistan refused to transfer power to a duly elected party. This failure was at the centre of the crisis of 1971. The myth of the moral and upright self would fall apart if the real story were to be told instead of half truths and full lies. The fiction of oneness, implied in the story of the two irreconcilable nations, would also fall apart – the Muslims of India were not one or united even among themselves. They were instead divided by ethnic, class, sectarian and language barriers. This is the unsavoury truth that cannot be allowed to escape through cracks in the dominant construction of Pakistani memory and national identity. Bangladesh defied the two nation theory and gave the lie to it.

In spite of attempts by the state to re-order the unacceptable past, fragments of that forgotten past sneak into collective memory and create disturbance. The repressed 'others' in the national Self are ruthlessly crushed by the State, which names them 'traitors', 'anti-nationals' and outsiders. These outsiders reside within the territory of the State – they are the strangers within. They represent an uncomfortable continuity with the past and refuse to be welded into an incoherent and homogenised new wholeness. These are the regional and ethnic entities that participate less in the power of the Centre, and remember their connections to earlier belongings, long before the nation-state ever emerged. They hold on to their languages, their unique cultural expressions, and their own political and social vocabularies. They resist the Centre's pressures to forcibly weld them into the new imaginary of the State/nation. And they are duly punished, as the militaries of the State appear with full force to make them forget forever who they once were and who they wanted to be.

But in a dialectical way, the very instruments of power used to make them forget, become tools which help them remember. The more the Indians tried to cling to what was becoming Pakistan and drifting away, the more strongly did the new entity assert its independence and broke all ties, not only political and economic, but cultural, social and emotional. The more violent and angry its break, the more vociferously Pakistan enacted and re-enacted its separation. In the same way, the more the Pakistani military tried to hold on to East Pakistan, drenching every home there in blood and semen, intruding into every space where nothing but hate prevailed for it, the more angrily did the Bengalis push it out, never to let it in again. Harsh memories on all sides, made harsher with every passing year, created many tales of blood and gore, tales that eventually found their way only partially and in sanitised form into history textbooks as officially sanctioned truth. Each sorrow on one side was a triumph on the other, every loss on one side was a symbol of victory on the other. Some stories are silenced as they disrupt the official truth, others find their way into obscure accounts that do not see the light of day. But lying deep somewhere in the conscious and unconscious memories of ordinary people, are tales not told in

textbooks. These are poignant tales of love across the nation's divides, stories of friendship and bonds beyond the borders, narratives of common hopes and dreams shared with the Other.

The other within is far more threatening than those outside as it ruptures the core of the self. This is the reason that every educational policy from the Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959[71] to the National Education Policy of 1998[72], emphasises the need for national integration and cohesion and calls upon education to undermine parochial and provincial sentiments. This is also the reason that in the construction of citizenship in Pakistan, the Civics textbook for Classes IX and X produced in 2001 divides citizenship along religious lines by outlining differing rights and duties of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. It is only in the duties of non-Muslim citizens that loyalty and allegiance to the country are included.[73] In a nation defined by religion, the loyalty and allegiance of non-Muslims remains suspect.

Summary and the Self in the Current Global Scenario

Educational systems in all countries, but especially in newly independent post-colonial states like Pakistan, are called upon to engage in nation-building processes. The latter process in Pakistan refers not only to economic development and progress, but also to the creation of a sense of belonging to the new centralised entity by diminishing parochial and provincial sentiments. This requires the conjuring up of novel identities by giving up narrower belongings from the past. The latter process entails the reconstruction of the past based on the national imperatives of the present. Pakistani Muslim identity had to be forged by subverting the identities of Bengali, Punjabi, Balochi, Sindhi or Pathan. The widespread perception that the centre was dominated by one ethnic group, the Punjabis, led to disaffection and secessionist tendencies in other provinces. Education was called upon to rely upon religion as binding force to create the Pakistani identity as primarily Muslim. This in turn required the construction of Hindus, Christians, Jews and Sikhs as the 'others' of Muslim Pakistan. The Self and 'Other' were constituted simultaneously in a binary formulation derived from the two nation idea. In creating the 'others' as polar opposites of the moral self, implying the complete absence of the other in the self and the self in the other, each category was imagined as being internally homogenous. This implies the denial and repression of internal otherness and the essential multiplicity of the Self. Education was called upon to erase internal otherness of the self, while constructing opposition and alienation from religious outsiders. This process of 'nation-building' was named 'national integration'.

The primary forms of knowledge that produce and reproduce identity are the

[71] Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959.
[72] National Education Policy, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, 1998.
[73] Civics for Class IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, pp. 75-77.

discursive formations of social studies, civics and Pakistan Studies. These were and are relied upon to create the Self as Muslim Pakistani, and the 'others' as Hindu Indian, Jewish Israeli and Christian West. The processes implicated in the construction of national memory were the re-formation of history as mythology and mythology as history, the exclusion and forgetting of 'facts' which do not fit nationalist remembering, selection of 'facts' that show Muslim suffering, sacrifice and cultural superiority, erasure of political, social and economic dynamics in the construction of 'historical events', and the compulsive telling of a different story to silence truths that create dissonance. The overarching technique is to reduce large internally diverse groups into caricatures such as the butchering Sikh, the conspiring Englishman and the greedy Jew. The identity constructed by the discourses of state-sanctioned social knowledge was primarily a religious identity, designed to override other sources of identity that disrupt or puncture the official monolithic one.

History textbooks, like other educational discourses, inflict untold violence upon their readers. They tell half the story. They tell fake stories. They do not narrate the bonds, the love and the longing for the lost Other, the lost Self. They justify the rupture, indemnify all hatred, and make sacred and immutable what was once mere imagination. They play with emotion – fear, hatred, desire, longing, need, power, loss. They teach the new generation to surrender to official reality – reality as constructed and sanctified by those whose power makes and breaks our memories. Those who want to retain or retrieve little bits of a lost past, a lost sense of Self, are either punished or sink into oblivion. Our States reconstruct our past, and provide us with new labels of identity that we must carry into the future. We have no choice as the past is rejected with a vengeance born of fear – the fear of re-alignment, merger with what was lost. With time, the tales of the rulers become the myths of the state which are, only with difficulty, punctured by the legends of the people.

Official history weaves a tangled web as it practices to deceive. Even as it inflicts its violence in severing all our ties, it tells us that 'all is well', we are 'forever one' and we always were and will be one. This is the biggest lie that it tells us as state/nations divide and sub-divide, new entities come into being, older ones dissolve in a relentless historical march that follows only its own dictates, disregarding human desire. Official narratives create for us timeless tales, existing outside of history, to give us a sense of primordial belonging and oneness. Violent events, catastrophic happenings, human capacities for resistance and conflict, interrupt the smooth and neat narrative shaped by State historians caught in a time warp of communalist, nationalist and racist histories. Their disregard for real time, for the shared past, for loved commonalities does not make time amenable to their control. They are forced to live inside real time, and face the violence and upheaval of human existence, even as they remain oblivious to the inexorable march of history. They may use collective amnesia for convenience, but time creeps up on all of us as much as we would like to keep things stable, predictable and under control. The unpredictability of

real life mars the attempts by nationalist and communalist historians to fix images and memories in a stable, unaltered, homogenised and frozen time. This is the reason that their carefully crafted tales sometimes end in disbelief. The very generations expected to benefit from their nationalist insights, lead their frozen histories into dead ends and blind alleys, where the pat answers are missing, where the conclusions may be different. Many a student challenges the textbook tale on the basis of some bit of information or knowledge picked from everyday life, from folklore and legend. Stories of the State may succeed to an extent, but they also fail as popular knowledge exhibits contempt for adroitly woven tales.

While the official Pakistani Self is constructed and consolidated as Muslim and pious, honest, brave and kind, the many Others of this Self appear in the narratives as morally weak, greedy, devious, threatening, conspiratorial and deceitful. The shifting Others of the Pakistani Self are most often Hindus, but sometimes all Indians, in some instances Jews, Zionists, the British, all Christians, the West and occasionally the Sikhs. Careful distinctions between categories are seldom made. Historical interactions with all of these Others come into play in their construction as the opposite of the good Muslim Self. Polarised and mutually exclusive categories are employed for the construction of the Self and the Other in simultaneous binaries. The wide variety of shifting Others, provides the precarious and threatened Pakistani Self with various sources of identity formation. This makes the officially fabricated identity not only rich and varied in construction, but also complex and contradictory. As elements of the Self are denied and seen in the Other, and elements of the Others repressed and seen within the Self, the fluid identity constructed in history books undergoes variations and interesting permutations. The Self is sometimes oppressed and mistreated, at other times brave, sacrificing and unrelenting. It is kind, just and good, but there are also subtle admissions of the cruel and inhuman Self.

The discourse of the self and other is deeply gendered. The others are conjured up as demons, threatening enemies hovering menacingly along our sacred borders, ready to tear apart the limbs of our nation, the way that they once dismembered us before. In this construction, the ‘others’ are masculine, strong, powerful and frightening. The self is threatened, weak, impotent and unable to protect itself, in other words, feminine. At other times the roles are reversed and the ‘others’ appear in feminine postures, that is, as weak, impotent and unable to defend themselves, while the self is aggressive, strong, virile, potent and courageous.

There seems to be a historical continuity of identity formation from the era of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Zia-ul-Haq. Prior to the events of 1971, social knowledge textbooks do not indulge in the excessive hate-mongering visibly perceptible in those produced after Pakistan’s defeat. A Civics textbook for Class VI produced in 1953, developed along the lines of modern education of

the Punjab curriculum, is devoid of any construction of the 'enemy' or the religious 'other'. The entire emphasis is on modern citizenship and civic virtues.[74] A History and Civics textbook for Class III, produced by the West Pakistan Textbook Board in 1963 contains chapters that are full of praise for Jesus Christ, Buddha and the Hindu god Ram.[75] Both Christ and Ram are praised for their teachings of peace, kindness, forgiveness, tolerance, love and charity.

One of several possible explanations for the change in this tolerance could be that prior to the war of 1965, when Pakistan was a new country looking forward to a prosperous future, nationalism was forward-looking, progressive and based on the dominant notions of modernisation and development.[76] After 1965, but especially after the humiliating defeat of 1971 in ignominious circumstances, nationalism took a backward-looking turn and began to seek 'enemies' within and 'enemies' without as a device to achieve failed national cohesion. Religion was more urgently deployed as a state weapon of forced homogenisation, especially on the 'enemies' within. General Zia intensified religious nationalism, particularly in the context of the Afghan war against the 'ungodly' Soviets.

The puzzling question is why do the textbooks, produced in 2001 and 2002, continue to reproduce the ideology of hate and otherness. Over the last decade there have been attempts, under international pressure, to incorporate the values of peace, human rights and religious tolerance within the curricula and textbooks. Why has this not materialised, and why are the textbooks of the present based on the curricular imperatives of the eras of Zulfikar Bhutto and General Zia? The only answer that comes to mind is that the imperatives of the 'security state' have not changed. As a state, Pakistan continues to privilege militarily defined 'national interest' above the interests of the population. The construction of religious nationalism, derived from the two nation theory, remains the dominant ideology of the state which seeks to use education to bind people into a forced religion-based unity wholly inimical to India. In an ironic way, the state becomes the biggest Madrassah with a vast bureaucratic educational set up to disseminate the values of *Jihad*, martyrdom, valour, conquest and militarism. Those who look merely towards Madrassah education as the training ground for *Jihadis*, miss the vast official machinery that can access the most remote areas for the spread of militant ideology.

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[74] Civics for Class VI, Part I, 1953. Lahore: Publishers United.

[75] Civics and History for Class III, 1963, West Pakistan Textbook Board, pp. 24-28, and 35-38.

[76] This is the predominant view expressed in the nationalism of the Ayub era and can be found in the Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959. I have discussed the issue in detail in my paper. See Rubina Saigol's '*Glories of the Past, Aspirations for the Future: Time as a Dimension of National Education in Pakistan.*' Unpublished paper (forthcoming in 2003) presented at the Education Workshop organized by the Center for Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin, Germany, May 2002.

The project of militant nation building through education is assisted by its counterparts in India. The massive re-writing of history within a predominantly Hindutva paradigm under the BJP-led NDA government, is a process that is encouraged by and in turn encourages similar endeavours in Pakistan. The Indian Supreme Court's decision to allow the use of NCERT textbooks written from the perspective of Hindutva ideology, is a major setback for secularism, and in particular for secular education in India. While the two types of textbooks may not be mirror images of each other,[77] they can use each other to exacerbate the process of a hate-filled, exclusive and militant brand of nationalism on both sides. Recent events in the Western state of Gujarat involving the mass genocide of Muslims with the state 'standing by and looking on', have added fuel to the two nation brand of otherness. Similarly, the consistent failure of the Indian State to allow the right of self-determination in Kashmir, has allowed textbook writers to use these events as 'proofs' of the 'inherent evil' of the Hindus. On the other hand, the Pakistani military's incursion into Kargil in 1999 is used as 'proof' of Pakistan's alleged desire to dismember India.

The predominantly antagonistic media-constructed view of *all* Muslims as 'terrorists' and 'blood thirsty militants', the siege of Afghanistan without any proofs of involvement in the destruction of the WTC towers, or due process of law, the impending attack on Iraq, again without solid proof of the ownership of WMD are all serving to harden the picture of the aggressive, hostile, hyper-masculine 'other' of the Muslim Self. Muslims feel besieged by the so-called 'West', Israel, Russia and India on various fronts. From Afghanistan to Chechnya, from Bosnia to Kosovo, and from Kashmir and Gujarat to Palestine, Muslims feel that they are under siege militarily and ideologically. The global media (CNN, Fox News, BBC) demonises the Muslim 'other' as inherently evil, bloodthirsty and uncivilised, living in savage times. The massive global onslaught against Muslims is serving to harden the religious basis of 'Muslim identity' which has enormous internal diversity. The overwhelming election victory in 2002 of the political parties of the religious right in the provinces bordering on Afghanistan, is one symptom of the global offensive against all Muslims essentialized as the demonic other. The process of mythologizing and demonising seems to be working both ways and each side uses the 'other' to substantiate its point. Textbook historians find evidence for their highly simplified arguments in the contemporary global scenario.

The emerging global threat from 'others' further ensures that the primary defining characteristic of the Pakistani Self is religion. Its external Others, therefore, are mainly Hindus and Jews and Christians. Its perpetual interrogators are those belonging to other religions, who provide the means for self-definition. The internal Others of the Pakistani Self are ethnic, sectarian,

[77] Krishna Kumar argues that Indian and Pakistani textbooks are not mirror images of each other, but rather use 'facts' selectively and interpret the same past differently to produce their respective 'national memories'. *Prejudice and Pride,* pp. 75-77.

religious and regional minorities residing within Pakistani territory. These Others within are sometimes perceived as belonging to the external Other. The fear of mixture and intermingling is therefore intensified. However, these internal Others provide further sources of the elaboration of the Self – they enable one to say who one is and who one is not. Incessant reiteration, elaboration, explication and explanation are relied upon to impinge upon the mind the permanence, immutability and stability of the contested national identity. As Other histories tell their own stories, further stories are invented by the beleaguered Self to counter these, in a process of the constant Making and Un-Making of the nation.

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9

The Dismal State of the Social Sciences in Pakistan*

S Akbar Zaidi

Introduction

If one were to pose the following question to a variety of Pakistani social scientists: 'Has any Pakistani social scientist, in any of their fields in the last three decades, developed, reconstructed, reformulated, expanded upon, disputed or rejected, any theory or theoretical formulation, qua theory, or even in the specific context of Pakistan?' the answer would probably be a simple 'no'. Or perhaps, one, or two, or at best three, names would be mentioned by some of them, almost always with many qualifications, from amongst the many thousands of social scientists produced by Pakistan across the diverse disciplines. What would be contested though, is whether indeed, any of these handful have actually contributed anything original in order to be considered different from the other social scientists, or whether they too have merely restated a problem.

Whether it is in the discipline of history, politics, sociology, anthropology, or even economics, by far the most dominant of the social sciences in Pakistan, it would be difficult to find social scientists who have made a marked impression even regionally, leave alone globally, on the expansion in ideas, theory and knowledge related to their disciplines. At best, a few may have made some impressive empirical contributions, but little else. Pakistani social scientists continue to apply theoretical arguments and constructs to Pakistani conditions, without questioning, debating or commenting upon the theory itself. If there is any agreement and consensus amongst Pakistani social scientists, it is that the social sciences in Pakistan are in a dismal state and, that things, if they possibly can, are getting far worse. What is it about the Pakistan social science 'condition' which accounts for this situation?

This question, perhaps to start with, needs to be answered with recourse to some strands from what one can call a 'political economy' approach, or from what

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would broadly describe a 'sociology of knowledge' construct. In order to address this question, we would need to identify some characteristics of Pakistan's society, state and economy, which would have an impact on the production and nature of social science. Based on our reading of Pakistani society and on discussions with a large number of social scientists over many years and also specifically for this paper,[1] we identify such characteristics of Pakistani society which, in order to keep the scale and scope of this paper within manageable limits, are not explained in sufficient degree and hence are liable to question, debate and contestation. Nevertheless, we feel that these assumptions or claims, emerge from some sort of consensus amongst social scientists in Pakistan, and are largely legitimate and valid. Before we lay out the general premises which form the main theme and direction of this paper, some general comments about the social sciences need to be made.

For the purposes of this paper, in the context of Pakistan, the broad generic term 'the social sciences' specifically include the disciplines of political science, history, sociology, economics, anthropology, international relations, demography, Pakistan studies, and what are known as (the different) Area Studies. In terms of number, prominence, power, privilege, influence and visibility, economics dominates all the social sciences collectively, by a large multiple.[2] For this reason, there is far greater published research on the state of economics in Pakistan, on the teaching of economics, on institutions where research on economics takes place, and on economists. In this paper too, this dominance of economics is reflected in many places.[3]

[1] Fourteen of Pakistan's better known and more prolific social scientists were interviewed for the SSRC study.

[2] Inayatullah, (writing in the mid 1980s) argues, that of the total number of social scientists working in the country, 30 percent were economists, 19 percent political scientists, and 11 percent historians. Since he includes far more disciplines in the social sciences than we do, this proportion is likely to be much higher, and also, as we show in this paper, far higher in 2001 than 1983 -- also see Appendix 1, for our critique of this quantification. See, Inayatullah, 'Social Sciences in Pakistan: An Evaluation', in Hashmi, SH (ed), *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan*, Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan, Islamabad, 2001. [This is a reprint of Conference Proceedings first published in 1989].

[3] See for example, Naseem, SM, 'Economists and Pakistan's Economic Development: Is there a Connection?', *Pakistan Development Review*, 37.4, 1998; Naseem, SM, et.al., 'Conditions of Teaching and Research in Economics: Some Preliminary Findings', *Pakistan Development Review*, 37.4, 1998; Haque, N and MH Khan, 'The Economics Profession in Pakistan: A Historical Analysis', *Pakistan Development Review*, 37.4, 1998; Robinson, EAG, 'The Problems of Teaching Economics in Pakistan', *Pakistan Institute of Development Economics*, monograph, May 1967, Karachi.

Establishing Broad Parameters[4]

As a first premise one can probably state, that given the nature of the Pakistani State, where institutions have been subverted and side-stepped, and where there is a strong tendency for authoritarianism, the groups who hold power over the State thrive on the *State's power to offer patronage and largesse*. State patronage, which ignores and over-rides institutions, norms and even legality, and is in a position to distribute privileges, will probably give rise to a sycophantic culture, where individuals and groups, even those belonging to some section of the intelligentsia, will appease the representatives of the State in order to benefit from its largesse. It is improbable that dissenting individuals, creative or otherwise, and those who do not 'toe the line', will benefit from the structures and institutions of the State. This situation is also likely to breed conformity and conservatism, with intellectuals and their pursuits compromised in their quest for power, recognition and acceptance. Perhaps the poor quality of output of social scientists, particularly in terms of intellectual pursuit (as opposed to problem-solving) can be explained by this need for social scientists to find acceptance by the institutions and representatives of the State.

If the State dominates, and if the bureaucracy plays a key role in influencing and running society and, importantly, where alternative organic institutions (such as mass based political parties) do not exist, the road to power and influence must travel through the bureaucratic/State route. This seems to be specifically so for economists who are required in the Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance and other government departments to provide advice and formulate policy. Over the years, they have become influential and powerful members of the State, and still are able to remain economists, unlike say, anthropologists or historians, who if they joined the civil service, would cease to remain rooted in their academic disciplines since their particular expertise would no longer be required for the purposes of 'problem solving'. Not so for economists.

If the acquisition of power, and influence, and perhaps even prestige, is an important goal for an economist, then the career path for such economists will have to be through government. No academic economist wields power or much influence in Pakistan. As Naseem demonstrates in his historical evaluation of the economics profession in Pakistan: 'for a variety of reasons, the economics profession has been dominated by practitioners, initially bureaucrats, rather than by those who have academic and research interests',[5] and that 'Government economists and bureaucrats have generally enjoyed a much higher pecking-order than their academic or research counterparts in the Pakistani economists establishment'.[6] One must also add that, given the acknowledgement that the institutions of the State in Pakistan are highly corrupt, government sector jobs,

[4] For some preliminary ideas on this theme, see Zaidi, SA, 'The Intellectual Crisis', *Economic and Political Weekly*, September 26, 1998.
[5] Naseem, op.cit., 1998, p.405.
[6] *Ibid*, p. 424.

while providing power and prestige, also provide opportunities for untold wealth. In a society which values wealth for itself and as a means to other goals, this gives added impetus.

While the route through the structures of the State has been the traditional route to power for economists, over the last decade or so, the route has shifted to the International Financial Institutions, in particular to the World Bank and the IMF.[7] Numerous high profile cases in the last decade suggest that a stint in either of these two international institutions can, before or after completion of service, lead to a prominent – ministerial – position in government in Pakistan. The status of even junior staff members of the lending agencies stands far higher than that of the generalist civil servants, and particularly with regard to that of the domestic expert. For those economists seeking either power or recognition, the signals and route are well defined. For these reasons, perhaps, there has been 'very little space for the contribution to the country's economic development by economists outside of Government [and the IFIs], especially those in the universities and research institutes'.[8]

If the acquisition of power, privilege and wealth through the added structure of State patronage, is the first premise which may help explain the state of social science and particularly of economics in Pakistan, the next premise is felt to be social values, incentives and clear alternatives which dissuade budding academics and social scientists to seriously take up social science as a profession. Teaching is no longer considered to be a 'noble' profession as it was in the past, in sections of society which are rapidly upwardly mobile and where economic gain and the acquisition of wealth now determine the new set of personal and social values.[9] Members from the elite and from the upwardly mobile classes who could play an important role in the establishment of social science as a profession, are not likely to turn to academics as there are few social and material returns from investing in such professions, especially given an environment where business administration and computer and technology related fields offer far more lucrative opportunities. Perhaps this is why there is only one private sector university which has only recently begun to offer undergraduate degrees in the social sciences, while there are literally hundreds of colleges, universities and institutes in the private sector which offer degrees in management, Information Technology, and medicine.

Added to the above observation about incentives, opportunities and priorities, and with comments made about State patronage and the bureaucracy, there is another aspect which has been expressed by social scientists in writing and as part of this Study. There seems to be an obsession with 'policy relevant' research in Pakistan. Particularly for economists, and not them alone, there is the

[7] Zaidi, SA, op. cit., 1998.
[8] Naseem, op. cit., 1998, p.426.
[9] The papers by Naseem, op. cit.., 1998, and Haque and Khan, op. cit., 1998, give ample emphasis to this theme.

need to determine what *role* they can play in the 'development of the country' and how they can contribute to the 'country's development'.[10] One explanation by other social scientists for the dominance of economists is precisely this, that economics and economists play *policy relevant roles*, unlike political scientists, anthropologists, historians, etc., and that is why economics dominates the social sciences in Pakistan. In the context of Pakistan there seems to be no research in the social sciences which expands the spectrum of knowledge and ideas, and Pakistani social scientists are primarily in the 'business of giving advice.'[11] Unfortunately, there is no such thing as policy *irrelevant* research in the social sciences in Pakistan.[12]

One general explanation given by some social scientists for the poor status of social science in Pakistan, is the lack of a culture promoting free floating discussion and debate.[13] Many social scientists would argue that Pakistan is an intolerant society made up of individuals who are not willing to be criticised, and hence, there is no tradition of an exchange of ideas. Some link this to the absence of democracy, even in its symbolic, electioneering form. The lack of democracy is a favourite whipping horse for many social scientists, and while this could be a cause for many of the problems faced by Pakistan, including the lack of a vibrant social science culture, it is an *insufficient* explanation as it does not explain how in numerous other countries, authoritarianism and a lack of democracy, produce a thriving opposition to government supported by an active social science community. Significantly, Pakistan lacks both.

A convincing argument, on which most academics concur, which explains the dismal state of the social sciences in Pakistan, is related to the marked and highly visible decline of all sorts of institutions, particularly those in the public sector. This 'crisis of governance' in World Bank parlance, is manifest in the visible demise of public sector educational and research institutions in Pakistan. This theme reappears on many occasions in this paper with regard to specific institutions and disciplines. A major conclusion from discussions held with social scientists is that most of the social science research in the public sector in Pakistan *is done by individuals* who happen to be based there, and *not by the institution*, as such.[14] If these handful of individuals who are active in research are placed somewhere else, they would continue doing research regardless of

[10] Although very well meaning, even Naseem suffers from this problem. See for example Naseem, op. cit., 1998. However, he is not the only one: most of the authors in Hashmi, SH, op. cit., 2001, have exactly the same sentiments.

[11] Zaidi, S A, 'The Business of Giving Advice: Pakistan Economy and Society', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 35, No. 19, 2000

[12] This does not seem to be a uniquely Pakistani disease: see Weiner, M, 'Social Science Research and Public Policy in India', *Economics and Political Weekly*, Vol. 14, Nos. 37 and 38, 1979.

[13] See for example the numerous papers in Hashmi, SH, op. cit., 2001.

[14] This point was emphasised in exactly so many words, without any prodding, by every single academic interviewed for this Study.

where they happen to be; their former institution, on the other hand, would probably have no research output to speak of. Institutions in the public sector no longer provide a base for social scientists to congregate as they once did three decades ago*; there is no academic or intellectual community*. Having said this, however, there is an important caveat which needs to be added: while individuals are becoming very important, in some cases even bigger than the institution itself, the individual *must* be based at an institution. There is no credible category of the free-floating 'independent' research scholar.[15] (This theme of the individual/institutional also appears with regard to other questions, such as links with South Asia, discussed elsewhere in the text). Interestingly, some private sector and donor funded research institutions, and some nongovernmental organisations, may have emerged in recent years to replace the public sector institutions as homes for research and may in fact, have been able to 'institutionalise' their research.

To summarise then, there are a number of *encompassing premises* or *parameters* through which one should examine the state of the social sciences in Pakistan. These are: the patronage role of the State; the prominence of the bureaucracy and its power and privilege; social and cultural values which encourage the acquisition of power, privilege and wealth; an intolerant culture where dissent and debate are discouraged; and, the lack of any effective, working, institutions to speak of, and hence, outcome and output is based on individual effort and endeavour.

The Five Phases of Social Science Research in Pakistan

In order to extract some general premises on which much of our discussion and themes are based in the substantive part of this paper, we have above, made recourse to issues related to the State, to society, institutions, structure and culture. Now, in this present section, where we need to examine some general and historical trends in the social sciences, we will need to identify key aspects of Pakistan's history which will help us in locating and determining these trends.

It is not possible to examine the nature of social science in any country without understanding and studying broad trends in the political economy and the

[15] This point is based on personal experience after many years of doing 'independent' (non-institutionally located) research, which was brought home time and again during the course of this Study. I visited one University department, one autonomous institute, and various departments of the University Grants Commission, amongst many other departments/centres. At these three places, I was not given any material regarding their activities (material which was available in published form publicly, such as flyers, Annual Reports, etc.) because I did not represent an institution. I was told, in so many words, that no one does or can do research 'on their own', as I said I did, and hence they were highly suspicious of me and my activities and felt that I could not be trusted with publicly available published material. As my legitimacy was questioned, I was told to apply through an institution if I wanted the material, although I was told some of it was confidential.

history of that society, even in the case of countries which have followed a somewhat steady trajectory or evolutionary path. However, in the case of Pakistan, it is not possible to talk about the social sciences *at all*, or much else for that matter, without identifying important developments in the past, many of which have been turbulent and disruptive of steady, evolutionary, trends.

There have been a number of phases in Pakistan's history, each with its unique and distinctive features having an impact on the evolution of the social sciences. For our purposes, perhaps the first phase 1947-58, can be called a phase of the continuation of many of the traditions from the times of pre-independence India, particularly with regard to education and the social sciences. The next phase from 1958-71 can be considered to be one where the military-bureaucratic nexus set the rules for much of the administrative structure of modern Pakistan, where the huge presence and influence of the US was most visible, in military, economic, administrative, and even academic terms. These two phases also constitute the 25 years of United Pakistan, a factor having a significant impact on the social sciences in the country. The third phase is the first democratic era in the new Pakistan, from 1971-77, an era which was far freer and liberal, and perhaps creative, than any we may have known. It was not just the ideology and ethos of the ZA Bhutto regime which through its policies left a critical mark on the academic environment in Pakistan, but also, that this was the formative phase of the new Pakistan.

The 1977-88 era marks yet another structural shift in the political economy and evolution of Pakistan with its imprint of the 'Ideology of Pakistan', and the state/public assertion and use of Islam. Without a doubt, this ideological expression had not just a hugely significant impact on its own times, but perhaps, redefined Pakistan once again. Present day Pakistan is the legacy of the Zia era, despite having attempted to break free from this past. The period between 1988-99 or even to the present, could be treated as yet another significant period in Pakistan's evolution, and as we show in subsequent sections, due more to global and regional changes rather than to national ones, having an impact on the social sciences and on research in all disciplines.[16]

In the first two phases following Pakistan's creation, research output in the social sciences was constrained by the dearth of institutions, such as universities, and was largely restricted to the universities of the Punjab, Dhaka, and to Karachi, Pakistan's first capital. It was also limited to the fields of demography, politics, history and of course, economics. The composition of research scholars of that era was primarily Urdu speaking migrants (the latter day *muhajirs*) who migrated from India to independent Pakistan, and Bengalis. Pakistan's social and economic formation was largely weekly-developed capitalism, with the urban population a mere eighteen percent of the population and literacy only 15 percent. In the discipline of history, the focus of research was on Muslim United

[16] For a social and economic history of Pakistan see, Zaidi, S Akbar, *Issues in Pakistan's Economy*, OUP, 1999.

India and the Freedom Movement in a nationalistic Islamic guise, on the Muslim League, and on the period from the early 20th Century up to the Partition of India. This trend in history continued well into the 1960s and even later. What was significant in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, was the influence of economic planning and of the Planning Commission, and of administrative and managerial concepts related to political science and political administration, ala Barrington Moore and Samuel Huntington and their ilk.

The Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) set up in Karachi in 1957 with the help of the Ford Foundation, began conducting research on economics and in demography and since it was, along with the Planning Commission, the main source of employment for 'professional' economists, attracted the best economists at that time from both East and West Pakistan. Their focus of research was very significantly focused towards solving young Pakistan's numerous economic problems and the Institute played an active role in giving 'policy relevant' advice. An interesting differentiation between economists drawn to academics and those drawn to the policy relevant, problem-solving bureaucracy, has been pointed out by Naseem: 'a much higher proportion of good students from East Pakistan were inclined towards academic and research careers than those in West Pakistan, who preferred administrative and civil service and military careers'.[17] The consequence of this difference, according to Naseem, was expressed when East Pakistan became Bangladesh when it was quickly able to set up the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, unlike Pakistan, where the 'economics profession paid the price for the neglect of research and academic activities as a result of its overemphasis of any zeal for policy-making and planning functions'.[18]

Pakistan's first twenty years, particularly the second ten years, were very heavily influenced by western, and particularly, American contacts.[19] The Pakistani intelligentsia was very closely linked with the West, and the bureaucracy had close links with Britain and the US. Not only was the curriculum of university courses in political science and in economics drawn almost exclusively from primarily US and from some British texts and sources, but many of the well known western political scientists of that era, came and worked, taught, and wrote in and on Pakistan. Samuel Huntington, Gunnar Myrdal, Gustav Papanek, and Ralph Briabanti, to name but a very few, all had had stints in Pakistan, either as advisors, or doing research and/or teaching, although as one observer has written about economists, 'their main interest was of gaining experience in a developing country which would help them rise on

[17] Naseem, op. cit., 1998, p. 408.
[18] *Ibid*., p. 414.
[19] For a very interesting contrast with India, see Sathyamurthy, TV, 'Development Research and the Social Sciences in India Since Independence', *DERAP Publications* No 171, Norway, January 1984. Sathyamurthy writes that 'there are indeed very few instances of research institutes in the social sciences in India that were started with foreign resources' (p. 52), which is in complete contrast with the Pakistani situation.

the economic ladder at home'.[20] In fact, it is difficult to think of any analysis in the form of a book produced by any Pakistani economist until well into the 1960s; all the research in that era was undertaken by British and American economists. Interestingly, as Inayatullah points out, unlike the 1950s and 1960s when a 'large number of social scientists were imported as teachers, advisers and consultants, in [the] '80s there are very few foreign social scientists working in Pakistan'.[21]

The Ayub Khan government's heavy dependence on the US, in terms of advice and economic and military aid, with additional assistance for education and institutional development from the Ford Foundation, and USAID, and with the presence of the Harvard Advisory Group, meant that not only were American policies and theories taught, but not surprisingly, many Pakistani scholars also developed their empirical work strongly located in the Anglo-US academic tradition in the political and economic sciences. Mainly American, and some other western political scientists, anthropologists and management advisors were sitting at the heart of academic and administrative Pakistan, documenting and supporting Pakistan's modernising economic and political agenda.

Towards the end of the sixties as it became clear that East Pakistan was being discriminated against, in the eastern province, and eventually amongst well established mainstream social scientists, studies and research began to emerge which showed the extent and nature of this discrimination. Social science research took on a noticeably *political* colour, perhaps for the first time, a trend which was to continue till about 1977. The political revolution which took place from the late 1960s onwards in what was left of United Pakistan, had a democratic and leftist colour, which was reflected in the type of research being undertaken. Studies were published which showed the extent of income and regional inequality, some on the rising expression of different forms of nationalism, on the state, and many other subjects. This was a highly political and politicised era which had also enlarged its composition to include a newly emergent middle class, which was vocal and had played a key role in the movement to bring democracy to Pakistan. New colleges and universities were opened in the public sector to cater to this group which allowed these social groups to acquire education for the first time, and the policy of nationalisation of education also contributed in allowing middle and lower middle income students to go to school. This was an active period of research in the social sciences, when research was far freer and open, secular, political, interventionist and activist.[22] With the end of the Bhutto regime, a new, Islamic, ideology began to dominate every single aspect of Pakistan's existence, and social science was, perhaps, at the forefront of this reaction.

[20] Naseem, op. cit., 1998, p. 413.
[21] Inayatullah, op. cit., 2001, p. 32.
[22] It is important to point out that not everyone agrees with this position and there are many academics who think that this was a period of severe civilian authoritarianism.

As Islam and Islamic ideology became the hallmark of the Zia regime, we began to see deep structural influences of this ideology on different aspects of society. Research under the banner of Islam began to thrive and there were considerable attempts to recast Pakistan's identity. There was a conscious move on part of the military government of General Zia to dislodge Pakistan from its South Asian roots and to re-orient Pakistan into a Muslim, Middle and Central Asian nexus. A new sense of identity and identification was invented with Islam playing the pivotal, cementing, medium.

Given the basic premise of the role of the Sate and its power and hegemony over patronage, as discussed above, aspirants to power and higher office in universities and in research institutions, began to toe the line and became part of the Islamic 'resurgence'. Economics became 'Islamic economics', anthropology, Islamic anthropology, research in history started focusing far more on the Islamic dimension, and the only sort of history which began to be promoted was that related to the Pakistan Movement and the Muslim Freedom struggle in United India. Also, with attempts to reinvent Pakistan's 'ideology' in Islamic terms, much of the research in political science and other social science disciplines could not have but been influenced by these important macro trends. The establishment of the International Islamic University in Islamabad in 1980, is part of this trend.

A key phenomenon which emerged most forcefully in the 1980s, though not related to the government's policy of Islamisation, which was to have major repercussions on the nature of social transformation in Pakistan, was what is called the Gulf Boom. Large amounts of remittances from Pakistani workers in the Gulf states made their way back to Pakistan and much of this money helped create new and wealthy social groups in dispersed regions across the country. One of the many manifestations of this newly rich class was the demand for better education, at all levels. The response by the State was not an attempt to improve the quality of public sector education, which was in decline, but to allow a private sector parallel system, particularly at the higher levels, to emerge.

Pakistan in the post-Zia period is still much affected by the major changes brought about by the military government between 1977-88 and change since then has been noticeable but slow. Probably the greatest single change that has come about since the end of the 1980s, which has had an impact on society and the social sciences in Pakistan, is that of globalisation in its different forms and manifestations. Moreover, not surprisingly, the post-Soviet world has also had an impact on research in politics, history and the social sciences. Yet another important phenomenon in the context of Pakistan, is the highly visible presence of donors and of nongovernmental organisations, many of which were involved in research themselves or funded research institutions and projects.

Pakistan's economy since the end of the 1980s, became dependent upon and dominated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund who imposed their advisors and programmes on Pakistan. Pakistan's economic policies became the IMF's structural adjustment programmes, where cuts in the budget and support for the private sector, played a key role. This then had an impact on education. However, significantly, research in economics was affected considerably by the World Bank/IMF economic programme. While government economists and the various government institutions and departments churned out data and reports justifying the economic policies which all governments were following since 1988, there was some revival of political academics amongst some economists, with some researchers arguing against the imposition of structural adjustment showing its deleterious consequences. There was never really an exchange of ideas or debate between the government and nongovernmental economists, but those who carried out research to show the negative consequences of these policies were increasingly listened to by the public at large.

With the end of the Cold war and with the demise of the Soviet Union, disciplines like political science and international relations, changed considerably, also on account of the changing Pakistan-US relationship. In the Cold War era, much of the research in these disciplines was concerned with US-Soviet relations and their impact on the region and on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Later there was a shift towards nuclear issues and a continuing interest on India-Pakistan relations with Kashmir being the pivotal issue. However, although Kashmir and India have defined Pakistan's domestic political economy and along with Afghanistan, Pakistan's foreign policy, research on the Kashmir/India issue, both in terms of quality and quantity, does not reflect the centrality of its presence.

With a considerable and sharply growing donor influence in Pakistan since the 1990s, much of the research agenda is now determined, if not dominated, by donors, NGOs and by international themes and issues, not all of which are relevant to Pakistan. Not just economists, but political scientists, sociologists and others, have increasingly been working on themes propagated by the International Financial Institutions and other donors, themes such as Governance, Decentralisation, Local Government reform, and the like. Foreign NGOs and other donors, fund projects with a specific angle and projects which are far more applied and problem-solving oriented, than those which have academic or intellectual ambitions. This means that academics are drawn further away from academic and intellectual pursuits, and join bureaucrats and donors to 'solve Pakistan's problems'. Another very important aspect of the role and presence of donors in Pakistan, is that they have the money to pay for whatever research they want done. Funds are short in the public sector and with far greater opportunities emerging outside academia, many researchers are able to stay on in the public sector by supplementing their incomes through consulting for

donors and other NGOs, although very often this does take them away from 'academic' research.

We conclude this brief history of the social sciences in Pakistan with a number of points which relate to this chapter. The first relates to Pakistan's academic diaspora. Amongst the points of unanimous agreement amongst social scientists in Pakistan, one which must surely be ranked near the top, is the consensus that of the Pakistani academics who have made a name for themselves, all, without exception, have made that name while living and working abroad. In the last thirty years certainly, no Pakistani social scientist based in Pakistan, has made much of an intellectual contribution to their discipline.[23] This is not a recent revelation, for Inayatullah in the 1980s writes, that 'the best work by Pakistani scholars has been produced by those living in the West',[24] a view shared by Qureishi: 'those living and working abroad have been more prolific and more articulate because they have better facilities and congenial environments'.[25] While the structural reasons given here 'better facilities and congenial environments' may be contested, what is not, is the supremacy of the diaspora in the Pakistani social science hierarchy.

An issue which emerges continuously throughout this paper, concerns the lop-sided regional coverage given to the social sciences. The main centres for the production of social science research and teaching are, Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. With Islamabad housing two large universities – the Quaid-e-Azam University and the International Islamic University – and with government and donors located here, there are a number of active NGOs which undertake 'research', and there are research institutions supported by government and donors. Islamabad, hence, not surprisingly, is a 'natural' centre for social science production/output. Karachi, also, has the advantage of being the old capital and the largest city and has a large population of students, institutions and social scientists. Lahore has a long tradition of social science and intellectual output, and has some of the oldest educational institutions in South Asia. Also, since it is the second largest city in Pakistan, with an extensive hinterland, it has access to numerous students and scholars from around the province. The case of Baluchistan and the NWFP is different in terms of structure and institutions and one can see that in the case of institutions, authors or scholars, almost none from the NWFP or Baluchistan feature in the main arguments regarding social science research/institutions in Pakistan. This is simply because they do not have a presence. In the review of journals or books undertaken,[26] very few authors from these two provinces appear; the same can be said about the papers presented at the Pakistan Society of Development Economists discussed in a section below. There are no journals or donor-funded research institutions, as in Karachi and Islamabad, nor many government or non-government centres or

[23] See Zaidi, op. cit., 1998, on this.
[24] Inayatullah, op. cit., 2001, p. 44.
[25] Qureshi, MN, 'Whither History? The State of the Discipline in Pakistan', in Hashmi, op. cit., 2001, p. 119.
[26] In the larger SSRC Report, not in this shortened version.

institutions which feature in almost any of my lists. *Clearly, both Baluchistan and the NWFP, do not register on the Pakistani social science map*. Perhaps the only exception is one Centre at Peshawar University which has students, some faculty and also publishes papers and a journal. In terms of South Asian connections, both provinces are, literally, far removed, and hence, have few connections if any at all, with South Asia.

It is important to state that what constitutes social science in this Study, is exclusively *social science in English*; Urdu and other languages have been excluded. This is likely to be a contentious issue for some readers, but most social scientists interviewed for this Study, support the general premise that 'social science' in Pakistan is only undertaken in English. Almost all university-level education – professional or general – takes place in English. English, hence, is required to teach, read and understand the social sciences, despite the fact that very few Pakistanis actually read or write English. This also means that we have a very narrow and pointed pyramidal education structure which accounts for so few tertiary-level students.

This does exclude much of the work done in Urdu, Sindhi, Baluchi or Brahevi, but many academics would exclude these works for numerous reasons, primarily for it not being 'academic' or researched, enough.[27] Punjabi and Baluchi do not have active and effective scripts in use, while the script for Pushto is limited largely to a public or newspaper-reading level. Sindhi does have a vibrant and historic script which seems to have slowed in its development as a script over the last few decades. While there is a large Sindhi literature, it seems to be limited to contemporary politics, literature, poetry and to information/news. Sindhi does not have a dynamic social science literature and at best some translations of articles from the English language are available. The case of Urdu is similar, though not as bad. Urdu has also not developed a modern social science lingua/discourse, although is widely used and read mainly in the form of newspapers, magazines and information, as well as for primary and secondary level education texts. It does not have a social science culture especially at higher levels of abstraction. However, a number of attempts to translate English language texts in history, politics and international relations (and some in economics) into Urdu does take place frequently, and it seems, is effective. However, while there is a very large reading public in Urdu, a large number of books are about politics, biographies, and histories. Perhaps what constitutes 'social science' in Urdu is rather different and very general, compared to even the not-so-good output produced in English. Clearly, this is an unresolved, debatable and even controversial, issue.

Social Science Output: Journals

[27] However, as this paper argues, this criticism applies to much of what goes under the guise of academic social science in English in Pakistan, as well.

The main theme of this paper has been that social science in general, and social science research in particular, in Pakistan, is dying a visible death. Perhaps much of the evidence and information presented in various sections of this paper supports this claim which is unanimously agreed to by almost every single serious social scientist in Pakistan. This judgement is made even stronger when we consider the state and frequency of academic journals in Pakistan.

Twenty-two 'journals', perhaps complete the list of journals published in Pakistan in the social sciences. It is clear, that of our seven disciplines chosen for analysis, there are no journals dedicated to political science, anthropology, demography, history (other than Islamic/Muslim history) or sociology. Most journals are multidisciplinary, rather than specialist journals. Also, most importantly, *only three of these 22* are refereed journals. The quality (if that is the right word) of many of the papers published in Pakistani 'journals' suggests, that these papers are not even internally screened by the editorial committee of the publication.

While some journals have been around for two or three decades, even they are now running well behind schedule and many have even ceased publication. As an example, if we take two of the three main (only) economic journals *Pakistan Economic and Social Review*, and the *Pakistan Journal of Applied Economics*, both are two and three years behind schedule, respectively. Clearly, in a country where economics dominates in the social sciences, *this pattern suggests a growing and sharp crisis in the field of economics specifically, and in the social sciences, more generally.*

Journals are less an avenue to deliberate upon academic issues related to enhancing knowledge related to a particular discipline, but have become sources for academics and scholars located at the host institution (of the journal) to further their careers. This we observe in the case of the PSDE and the *Pakistan Development Review*, but is not uncommon elsewhere. Two examples emphasise this trend adequately. The *Journal of Research: Humanities*, from the Bahauddin Zakariya University in Multan, produced one volume each in 1999 and 2000, comprising of a single issue both times, each with about 140 pages in all. Of the twenty papers in these two issues/volumes, 17 were from the humanities and other social sciences departments *of the same university*. Karachi University, one of the two largest universities in Pakistan, earlier this year produced its *Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*. What is important to note, is that it took five years for it to do so and the inaugural issues is the single 150 page joint Volume 1 and 2 *1996-2000*! Moreover, of the twenty contributions (many of them joint papers) as many as *nineteen are from Karachi University itself*. These are just two of numerous examples which abound in Pakistan which confirm the view that what is produced in the name of social science in Pakistan, is rather suspect.

Change and Transition

If one looks at the change in research projects over time, our broad trends in an earlier section would be very suggestive of the nature of research in economics and the rest of the social sciences. In economics, research has shifted in line with the government's priorities and analysing the impact of its policies. For example, there was a great deal of research on Plans and on Planning, in general, in the 1960s, followed by an emphasis on agriculture in the 1970s and especially on the consequences of the Green Revolution. Many theses and papers were also written on the industrial sector and on inequality. The Islamic economics school of thought flourished in the 1980s, while in line with Pakistan's subservience to agenda set by donors, the 1990s onwards have seen research largely, on global issues, such as the environment, and other governance related themes. Public Finance, Poverty and Public Debt have also been popular themes, as has the Structural Adjustment Programme. These changes are reflected in the publications record of scholars at various institutions. Moreover, as donor money began to determine research, individual initiative gave way to expediency and to the need to supplement one's income. *Research now, does not take place unless someone funds a 'project'.*

A huge percentage of academics in the past in almost all disciplines, were mainly foreign trained, as grants and scholarships from USAID, the Ford Foundation and other sources allowed many academics to go abroad to study. Now, with grants fewer than in the past and with more potential recipients chasing them, it is becoming difficult to go abroad for a few years to study. Many students go for a year or so, to do another Masters degree after having done their Masters locally, but when they return, they are also liable to drop out of academics/research and do other things altogether. Compared to the past, it seems that there are far more Pakistani trained social scientists working in the country than ever before. This is not surprising just given the arithmetic, with more institutions producing more students and with more opportunities opening up. However, this is mainly the case in subjects such as international relations, political science, history and Pakistan Studies, but not so in economics. Surprisingly, Karachi University which has been around for fifty years and has 8,000 students enrolled, has produced only one PhD in economics in all these years. Despite the high ambitions which are mentioned in the brochure of the Applied Economics Research Centre (AERC) at the University of Karachi, since 1986 it has awarded degrees at the MPhil level to only a handful of students. The International Islamic University has produced some PhDs in economics as have the Punjab and Quaid-e-Azam universities. Even the Lahore University of Management Studies which has mainly been a Business School, has only just recently started an undergraduate programme in economics, and is now thinking about a Masters level programme.

Karachi University reveals an interesting situation which differs significantly from the Pakistani stereotype, that as much as seventy percent of the student population is female. In fact, there are a number of departments in the social sciences and in humanities, where there are no male students. Interestingly, a similar position emerges at the Government College, Lahore, where ninety percent of students in

economics are girls.[28] While this huge proportion may not be reflected in other universities, particularly Baluchistan and Peshawar, there is no denying the fact that compared to say two decades ago, girls and women have begun to be highly visible at all levels of society. The NGO sector is probably dominated by professional women from all backgrounds, including the social sciences, and there are at least thirty percent, if not more, women faculty members in all subjects. There has been a remarkable transformation in Pakistani society as a consequence of the revolution which has taken place in the lives of women and girls.

Unlike perhaps other South Asian countries, there does not seem to be a large class divide between faculty and students, particularly in the social science disciplines. This would have been the case, if the members of the elite in Pakistan studied social science at public sector institutions especially at the tertiary level, as it is in such institutions where the faculty is largely 'middle class'. Yet, because the elite, as has been argued in the paper, strive to go abroad to study (and may not end up doing any social science as such), this apparent gap does not exist between them and the faculty. Some members of the elite, (the few that exist in the profession in the first place) do, however, increasingly teach in private universities and work in the NGO and donor sector. Yet, because the students/younger peers at these institutions also belong to the elite or more westernised/anglicised social groups, the social, class and cultural divide is, perhaps, limited between the two. In public sector institutions, both the faculty and students would tend to belong to what could be best described as broadly, the middle or lower-middle class.

Professional Associations

There are at best, only two or three professional organisations which are active in Pakistan. In this section we analyse the role of that of the most prominent one.

The Pakistan Society of Development Economists (PSDE) is an autonomous body based at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad. The Society is supposed to 'provide a forum and a platform to academics and policy-makers for an exchange of ideas on the pressing economic and social problems facing Pakistan'. Since its inception in 1982, the Society has arranged sixteen Annual General Meetings and Conferences which have been attended by researchers and policy-makers from Pakistan and abroad. When the Society was formed in 1983, it had 252 members which increased to 571 in 1994 (the last year for which figures are available) of which 403 were paying members and the rest ex-officio.

PSDE has a number of Distinguished Lectures at each of its Annual Conferences. It is worth examining the selection of speakers at these conferences over the five conferences from 1995-99. The most prestigious,

[28] Naseem, et. al., op. cit., 1998, p. 459.

Quaid-e-Azam Lecture, has been given by either World Bank serving or retired officials and/or American academics. In these five years, only one Pakistani has given the Quaid-e-Azam Lecture and he worked for the World Bank in Washington. In 1999 and 1998, the same American Professor gave the Iqbal Lecture, while in 1996 and 1995, this was given by an American and British academic, respectively. The Mahbub ul Haq Memorial Lecture has been given both times by retired or serving Pakistani officials at the World Bank. The World Bank Pakistani who gave the Mahbub ul Haq Memorial Lecture in 1998, also gave one of the Distinguished Lectures in 1999 and in 1997.

Of the 31 lectures given as part of Distinguished Lecture series, 11 were given by academics from the US and the UK (many of whom gave these lectures more than once), 9.5 were either retired or serving Pakistanis at the World Bank and the IMF, two each were World Bank retired or serving employees from the US, Egypt and Bangladesh. There was one academic each from France and Australia, and one paper each was presented by a member of the International Food Policy Research Institute in the US, a German from OECD, and a US Consultant. Of the 32 papers presented at the five PSDE conferences between 1995-99, *only two papers have been presented by Pakistani academics* both of whom live and teach abroad. In the sixteen conferences held by PSDE, in the Distinguished Lecture series, only three Pakistani academics all of whom live abroad, have been invited to lecture, two of whom have done so more than twice. *There has not been a single paper presented in the Distinguished Lecture series by a Pakistani academic who lives and works in Pakistan*. Perhaps there is no stronger comment on the state of the entire range of Pakistan's social sciences, and not just economics, than this observation.

The absence of academics and researchers from universities and other institutes is noticeable at these conferences, which despite all reservations, is the only forum for economists to present their work. There has not been a single presentation at these conferences in recent years (perhaps ever) from teachers at Karachi University, one of the two largest in Pakistan. At the other end of the spectrum, it is worth pointing out that *not a single professor* (none of the 30 foreign PhDs) at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, *has presented a paper at the PSDE conferences*. Perhaps for these reasons, PSDE is considered to be 'a poor substitute as a forum for free and open debates on economic issues and for organising activities which would invigorate the profession'.[29] Haque and Khan also add their strong criticism at the PSDE and say, that these 'meetings are perhaps more distinguished by the prominent Pakistani economists that were often excluded from participation'.[30]

[29] Naseem, op. cit., 1998, p. 423.
[30] Haque and Khan, op. cit., 1998, p. 443.

Scholarly Collaboration

One of the symptoms of the crisis of Pakistani social science is that there is too little collaboration between scholars at the same institution, and between institutions, although interestingly, there are some exceptions to both these norms, coming primarily from the non-public sector and donors.

Collaboration between senior and junior scholars/academics at the same institution is very infrequent as reflected by published output. However, this is not always the case, and in many instances, senior faculty make use of junior faculty mainly as data collectors or its more glorified version, as Research Assistant. This is particularly so in the field of economics a fact which is well reflected at the Pakistan Society of Development Economists' conferences and in its Proceedings. Also, given the fact that the donor-funded projects which are given to institutions of economics research are usually very large and require a number of members of that institution to collaborate, there is substantial division of labour (perhaps a better term than 'collaboration') in those projects, which may or may not find an outlet as a publication. In some research institutes, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Islamabad, in particular, a conscious effort is actually made by senior faculty to work with junior staff and this is amply reflected in their published output. Another important case where one sees substantial collaboration, is in the Department of International Relations at Karachi University, where the large number of books edited and published by the Department, usually as Conference Proceedings, clearly show the large contribution made by junior faculty.

In this regard, Nadeem ul Haque and Mahmood Hasan Khan having spoken to a number of young economists found that there was 'no professional contact' between the younger economists and their senior colleagues. These young professionals said that they hardly met these older economists, and if they did, they were patronised and derided for being more interested in theory (ivory tower economics) than in doing 'real work'. The senior economists, according to the young professionals, 'claimed hierarchical privilege and felt very uncomfortable that they have to debate issues on the basis of equality'.[31] According to Haque and Khan, 'the culture of Pakistan too does not help here, for age can often interpret a genuine difference of opinion as rudeness. This claim has prevented dialogue'.[32] They argue that 'younger economists denied that they had received any mentoring from their more senior professionals. In fact, many of them found the first crop to be unapproachable'.[33]

Collaborations between institutions is also limited, especially between public sector institutions. For example, the Economics Department at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad, is housed next to the Pakistan Institute of Development

[31] Haque and Khan, op. cit., 1998, p. 448. Quotation slightly changed for clarity.
[32] *Ibid*., p. 448.
[33] *Ibid*., p. 448.

Economics, just as the Economics Department at Karachi University is housed a short walk from the Applied Economics Research Centre. Yet, there is no interaction or collaboration in any meaningful sense between the two sets of institutions. Instead, the research centres see themselves as far superior and more able than the lowly teaching departments, from where, incidentally, both the research centres draw their student/research body. Moreover, it is not just at the same university, but between PIDE and AERC too, there is no collaboration. This attempt to control the turf, limits the interaction between institutions, as do personal rivalries and 'personality clashes'.[34] As Haque and Khan argue, 'all of the research centres and institutes, including PIDE and AERC, have largely excluded from their programmes and studies the involvement of faculty from Departments of Economics in universities in Karachi, Islamabad, Lahore, Peshawar and Hyderabad. There is almost no formal joint study and research programme at any of these places. On the contrary, there is unhealthy competition for scarce resources and skills and even mutual resentment and hostility'.[35] In other disciplines, if we return to one of our *Encompassing Parameters*, that of the individual being the institution or greater than the institution, then we do have numerous examples of *individuals* collaborating with other institutions, but this is rather top-heavy and very individual-specific. Institutions do not collaborate.

While there are many thousands of NGOs operating in Pakistan, perhaps very few do what one would call 'research', and social science research would be done by fewer still. Some NGOs would probably report their activities and perhaps write something about their project area, but this would probably be *information/documentation* rather than researched output. Also, the scope of the information or research would be highly focused and very narrow. There is also a problem of the dissemination of the research. Many nongovernmental organisations guard their work and are not very open about what they publish and about their activities and prefer to work in a low-key manner. The distinction between information and research is related to the *purpose* of the output which will have an impact on the quality of the output/research. If reports are meant either for internal circulation or for donors and for funding, the product will be focussed towards the specific requirements of the client. If research or output is to be widely disseminated, then it is probable that the issues, theme and characteristics of the study/research will be broader and could be included in the category of social science 'research'. One agrees with Haque and Khan who argue that, 'the NGOs working in the economic and social sectors have been able to attract many economists to work for them. Almost all this work has no serious academic or research content – in fact, it is anti-intellectual since it wants immediate answers to self serving propositions or questions…'.[36]

[34] Naseem, et. al., op. cit., 1998, p. 469.
[35] Haque and Khan, op. cit., 1998, p. 442.
[36] Haque and Khan, op. cit., 1998, p. 447.

Because there are no forums where such reports are reviewed -- whether for their methodology, content, style, or scope – the output is likely to be very highly varied. Some NGOs do hire well-educated, though untrained, (usually young, foreign qualified) social scientists who usually work on their own under little academic/research supervision. Because of these factors, it is very difficult to generalise about the output of NGOs. Having said that, one cannot also deny the fact that there are some organisations which are producing research of better quality and also have the desire and confidence to widely disseminate their output. Not surprisingly, however, most of the research output of these organisations is related to their line of work and expertise, and is often project-specific. Most NGOs simply provide *information/documentation* related to their own projects although some claim that 'they do research' and have researched publications and monographs which support this claim, yet much of this output is out-sourced and undertaken by researchers working elsewhere who are paid an honorarium to contribute something to the research output of that particular NGO.

During the course of this study, all the academics interviewed were asked to name ten of the major or main research institutions in the country. *Not a single scholar could come up with even ten names*. No one came up with more than five names, and four institutes were more or less on everyone's list, with maybe one or two added on by one or two of the scholars; some names they themselves rejected since they did not inspire any confidence. There could be no better telling commentary on the state of social sciences and on social science research in Pakistan.

With the advent of NGOs and donors, however, there is some change in this attitude which often calls for collaboration between institutions. Many organisations are specialised, and hence, unable to carry out much multidisciplinary work and, therefore, turn to others to prepare joint proposals and work together on projects. One does not see intra-institutionally published papers though, and much of this collaboration is limited to funded projects. Another new development is organisations out-sourcing studies or hiring time from academics and researchers to collaborate on projects. This too is not reflected in joint academic publications. Many international organisations, based in Pakistan and abroad, also locate their projects in Pakistani centres (the 'local' partner) and hence one can call this 'international' collaboration, but this too depends on the project and the funds. Some such projects have given rise to academic publications which have had Pakistani and foreign scholars collaborating. Another form of 'collaboration' although that is a misnomer in this context, is to hold international conferences where foreign scholars read papers which are then published in the conference Proceedings

Relevance

This section tries to address the question of the 'relevance' of social science research in Pakistan. Is it possible to get a sense of how the relevance of social science research was defined two or three decades ago and how it is being redefined now? If we look at one or two of our *Encompassing Parameters* listed earlier, this question would be well answered. In some ways, as we have tried to argue in a number of places in this paper, *relevance is actually the problem*. In trying to be relevant in a problem-solving 'useful' way, Pakistani social scientists, particularly economists, have become clerks or at best bureaucrats, trying to find ways of how to improve things. Knowledge is defined as something concrete, something which must have a practical use. Abstract thinking is discouraged and academics are told to 'get out of their ivory towers'. In a sense, for all the reasons described earlier in this paper, 'relevance' has limited the growth of the social science discipline and social science research, as a medium for the search for knowledge. It is merely a search for solutions, often without even understanding the problems and/or their links with the wider whole.

On the other hand, some academics have complained that their disciplines are not considered 'relevant' by the authorities/government, and no one 'listens to them', and hence, political science and history, for example, are not considered 'relevant' enough to attract students to these disciplines. Unless these subjects are made as 'relevant' as economics, in an advise-giving manner, few students will be attracted to these disciplines. Clearly, academics are not supposed to do policy-irrelevant research.

Given this need to find acceptance by Authority as we argue in our *Encompassing Principles*, much research is limited by its 'relevance'. For example, in history, almost all the historians and students pursuing higher degrees, do so on the Pakistan Movement and there is great emphasis to justify the two-nation theory. As a consequence, there is no historian in Pakistan who works on the theory of history, for example, or on social and cultural history, and neither on the British period, or on the Mughals. All the work is related to Jinnah, the Muslim League and perhaps some to Muslims in India prior to Partition. The colonial period has been ignored, and there is no regional/provincial history, either.[37] Some historians feel that history has always been subordinate to political science and we have numerous dilettantes and untrained non-historians trying to do the work of the historian.[38]

[37] Chris Bayly make an excellent point regarding the profession of history in Pakistan, which is worth quoting at length. He says, 'The creation of a separate history for Muslims resulted in the virtual abandonment of historical writing in the future Pakistan. If Islam, rather than the historical experience of Muslim people living amongst their Hindu neighbours, was to be the touchstone of national memory, then history was itself a valueless category. In Pakistan, modern history has largely been dropped in favour of the vacuous "Pakistan Studies"'. Bayly, CA, 'Modern Indian Historiography", in Michael Bentley, *Companion to Historiography*, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 683.

[38] A Pakistani historian tried to organise a South Asian forum of historians in which five

When Islamic ideology dominated in terms of state ideology, many social scientists rediscovered Islam and its relationship and relevance to Pakistani society, and started doing research with an Islamic angle, primarily because this was considered a useful means to be accepted by Authority and was a means to legitimise one's self. This was particularly so in the period during Zia ul Haq's reign, and has now acquired its own historical and institutional dynamics. Even anthropology was recast in a Central Asian context in order to draw links with Pakistan's Muslim heritage in that region negating or minimising the South Asian links. For these reasons, some scholars have found that the 'relevance and use of social sciences produced in Pakistan is low. The social science knowledge produced is primarily for the use of state agencies and only marginally for creating social awareness of social problems…'.[39] Oddly enough, despite this anti-knowledge relevance, Pakistan's best known sociologist has argued that in order to promote 'socio-economic development', 'like senior economists, why can't we have senior sociologists in the Planning Commission to begin with?'[40]

In some cases, research is relevant, because donors fund it and they have far more pressing, applied, and related needs to address specific problems. For example, the huge bandwagon on Poverty research in Pakistan is led by the World Bank in association with local institutes, and the interest on poverty is due to its very noticeable growth. Much of the research in the social sectors five to ten years ago, was also funded by donors prior to their launching a huge social sector development programme. The current buzzword is the World Bank and other donors' notion of Governance and all it entails.

Writing mainly about economists since they are in the greatest demand by donors, Haque and Khan identify a bigger problem which affects social science in general. Addressing the consulting scourge, they write that careers in the consultancy industry have 'affected the economics profession in a disastrous way in Pakistan' a phenomenon associated with the rise of foreign aid and donor funding. They write that, 'given the largely unfavourable environment for academic research in economics and the lucrative monetary gain and social status from consulting services, the industry has drawn the energy and time of almost every academic economist in the country. In fact, most of the so-called research agenda and output in almost all of the academia and institutes is driven by the demands for studies and reports by donor agencies and government departments or organisations'.[41]

Pakistanis were invited. Two of them were political scientists and one was a sociologist.

[39] Inayatullah, op. cit., 1998, p. 52.

[40] Hafeez, S, 'Development of Sociology as a Discipline in Pakistan', in Hashmi, SH, op. cit., 2001. p. 145.

[41] Haque and Khan, op. cit., 1998, p. 447.

Accountability

Based on our interviews and other sources, one can try and assess some of the following issues: the mechanisms of self-regulation, such as peer reviews, review committees, accreditation procedures, etc; to what extent are they seen as effective? Mechanisms of regulation by others, such as government bodies or funding agencies; the autonomy of institutions and the autonomy of scholars; working conditions including security of tenure, fixed scales of pay, contract employment, sharing of consultancy remuneration between the scholar and the institution. How do these affect the productivity and the autonomy of scholars?

In most academic and research institutions world-wide, publications play an important role in the accountability of the professional, and determine credibility and tenure/promotion. Given the state of journals in Pakistan, this is not likely to have a significant impact on the quality of research. If non-refereed in-house journals are going to be used for promotion/tenure, then clearly this will give rise to a closed club, where those who control/manage the 'journal' will determine who publishes. Also, in many of the non-refereed journals, articles are solicited from friends or 'noted' scholars who have pretty much a free hand in what they want to say. In some cases, especially having been invited to write, quality is severely compromised. There are these double standards at work here: everyone knows that a particular journal is of poor quality, yet in order to be promoted, one needs a number of publications and we find dozens of cases where supposedly respected and established researchers publish in poor quality un-refereed journals, mainly trying to add to their list of publications.

This phenomenon is even more evident when we consider book publishing. While most publishers do not have their manuscripts reviewed, nevertheless, because they have to sell/market the book, they must meet certain standards. This is not the case with in-house journals. Perhaps this explains the fact, that given the few hundred social scientists that we have in Pakistan, a mere handful have written academic books. As a passing example, of the eleven PhDs in economics at the Applied Economics Research Centre, not a single one wrote a book, when they were there, or later (other than a couple of edited books based on Conference Proceedings). At the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, considered to be the 'premier' institution for economics research, the situation is no better. In the other social sciences, there are again, a small handful of academics who are conspicuous for their books and published work, because they are far too few and tend to write far more frequently.

Since academics in the social sciences publish so infrequently, they rise the professional ladder through the number of years of service served in government. Although, technically, all are required to publish, they manage to get by by publishing in lesser known journals or with another collaborator. Peer reviews are usually done locally and it is not uncommon to receive requests to 'clear' a candidate. In a society whose rules are determined by patronage,

agreeing to or denying such requests has serious consequences. Moreover, many academics interviewed are disgusted by what goes by in the name of 'research', and feel that there are major flaws in refereeing with no laid down procedures or rules, and hence standards are very varied and arbitrary.

Some scholars feel that research (in economics in their example, but this is generalisable) suffers on the account of the following constraints: 'the major factors affecting the volume and quality of academic research in economics include: the internal management structure, work environment, and the reward system in academia and research institutes. Reflecting the pathology of the larger feudal-bureaucratic social order in Pakistan, the senior management generally follows the national model of centralised power without consultation and participation. A high proportion of the junior research and teaching staff finds itself in a patron-client relationship, in which the patron has considerable power to punish and reward. This personalised nature of power breeds mediocrity since salary, scholarship, and promotion are rarely based on merit and personal achievement. Some of the senior research staff and faculty have achieved their positions through this system and suffer from a sense of insecurity'.[42] One cannot but agree with this impression, and indeed, it reflects the very sad state of accountability in public sector institutions in Pakistan.

Haque and Khan continue and say that, 'the internal management structures are by and large non-participatory, based on hierarchy by seniority. The reward system follows the national model of patronage'.[43] Naseem adds that 'there has also been little tradition to encourage freedom of expression and debate in a genuine fashion, either in-house or outside. In the absence of peer interaction and review, regardless of one's position in the hierarchy, it is no wonder what the quality of research output is. Individual consultation with and supervision by senior staff members is hardly a substitute for open interaction with peers. The highly centralised and bureaucratised (some would say feudal) work culture ... stifles initiative and participation among research staff'.[44] Inayatullah adds a broader perspective to this condition when he argues that, 'working within the framework of government controlled and government funded academic institutions, some of the Pakistani social scientists opt for the convenient and possibly twisted meaning of value neutrality and adopt the perspective and preferences of those whoever happen to be in power regardless of the nature of the rule they impose on the society and degree of their political legitimacy'.[45] Drawing from our *Encompassing Parameters* again, it seems that State patronage gives rise to a thriving culture of sycophancy and toadyism, and that Pakistanis, given the nature of the State, are probably better at this than most.

Some academics have argued that Pakistan's authoritarian history has affected

[42] Haque and Khan, op. cit., 1998, p. 445.
[43] *Ibid*., p. 446.
[44] Naseem, op. cit., 1998, p. 425.
[45] Inayatullah, op. cit., 2001, p. 19.

the nature and quality of research and accountability in our academies. Inayatullah, for example argues, that Pakistan's bureaucratic and military 'highly authoritarian' state, placed 'narrow limits on freedom of enquiry, expression and dissent', and that with reference to the 1960s, he quotes Ralph Briabanti approvingly: 'the conduct of scholarship and the limits on scholarship are determined by government, not by the scholar'.[46] Such factors did compromise the nature of social science at public universities and institutes for many years and may have laid the foundations for the rot to set in. However, such constraints do not exist in Pakistan today, and there is far greater freedom of expression than in the past.

While one can generalise greatly from these comments, there are only a very few institutes in the donor/private sector which are free from these petty biases and structures, which exist in the public sector for, after all, many of the new institutes have been set up by individuals with many years of having worked in the public sector themselves having known no other model. Clearly, how an institution is run and the norms and signals given, and the institute's culture, are very much *determined by who leads that institution*, and how it is managed and governed by that one individual. Some academics feel that the culture in universities is to prevent others from doing work, and with so many political appointees and retired bureaucrats and military personnel serving as vice chancellors and heads of centres and institutes, 'accountability' tends to be based on non-academic criteria and largely related to patronage. *The imprint of one's personal style has made and destroyed numerous institutions in Pakistan*. A simple change in leadership can transform an institution, for far better or for far worse, quite dramatically.

Conclusions

It is surprisingly easy to find agreement amongst social scientists in Pakistan regarding the state of their collective disciplines. Almost all agree that the state of the social sciences in Pakistan is in a depressingly decrepit state. They all agree that not much research of any quality takes place in Pakistan, and the little that is undertaken by Pakistani social scientists, is by those who live and work in the West. Moreover, they may cite the cases of a few of their colleagues who have produced good quality research in Pakistan while being based here, but will add that this is largely individual endeavour, and that the contribution by the institution where they are located is incidental.

While there is wide agreement for the way things are, there is also considerable consensus on the reasons. Many would argue that patronage at the private and at the State level has distorted the environment under which research in the social sciences takes place, developing a conformist, if not sycophantic, toadyist, mindset. Others feel that there is a bias against a culture of dissent, debate and

[46] *Ibid*., p. 42.

discovery, brought upon, perhaps, due to State authoritarianism and due to the over-developed nature of the bureaucratic arm of the State. Other, more simpler reasons, include the fact that the incentive and salary structure in public sector institutions is dwarfed by the visible freedom and economic incentives in the vibrant private, donor and NGO supported sectors. Clearly, all these reasons are relevant.

There are still other more interesting factors which are all inter-related and have had a bearing on the noticeable deterioration of the social sciences in Pakistan. For some of the reasons mentioned above, many of the best Pakistani social scientists have left for other countries causing a haemorrhaging brain drain. There is hence, no community of academics or scholars left to interact with, to share ideas with, few journals, and almost no professional associations. Moreover, many Pakistani social scientists feel that those western social scientists who work on Pakistan are second rate scholars at third rate universities, a fact which does not help the Pakistani social science cause, either.

Identifying a number of broad Encompassing Parameters, this paper has presented a large amount of data and evidence which only underscores the dismal truth about the dismal state of the social sciences in Pakistan. Sadly, all indications suggest that things are likely to get worse.

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S Akbar Zaidi is a Karachi-based social scientist who undertakes research on social, economic and development issues. He has published in numerous international journals on themes as diverse as devolution, health sociology, local government, fiscal policy, and on international financial institutions. He has also published nine books.

COSS Publications

Books:

1. **Published**
   a. S. H. Hashmi (ed.), *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan*, 2001
   b. Inayatullah (ed.) *Towards Understanding the State of Science in Pakistan*, 2003
   c. S. Akbar Zaidi (ed.), *Social Science in Pakistan in the 1990s.*

Monographs:

a. Ayesha Jalal, *Religion as Difference, Religion as Faith: Paradoxes of Muslim Identity*, 2002.
b. S. Akbar Zaidi, *The Dismal State of the Social Sciences in Pakistan*, 2002.
c. Rubina Saigol, *Becoming a Modern Nation: Educational Discourse in the Early Years of Ayub Khan (1958-64)*, 2003.

Bulletin:

a. COSS Bulletin No. 1, 2000.
b. COSS Bulletin No. 2, 2001.
c. COSS Bulletin No. 3, 2002.
d. COSS Bulletin No. 4, 2003.

Publications under Preparation

1. *The Social Sciences in Pakistan, 1985-2003: Identification of their Trends, Problems and Future.*

2. The State of Professional Associations of different Social Science Disciplines

3. History of Science and Technology in Pakistan

Contents of COSS Website www.coss.sdnpk.org/.

1. Introductory brochure
2. Four bulletins
3. The book, *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan*
4. Two monographs one by. Ayesha Jalal and other by S. Akbar Zaidi.
5. Two papers, one by Prof. Abdul Haque on "Development of Psychology in Pakistan" and the other by Prof. Hassan Nawaz Gardezi "Contemporary Sociology in Pakistan."
6. List of Members of COSS with telephone numbers and postal and email addresses
7. Bibliography on poverty by S. Akbar Zaidi
8. List of Pakistani Journals of Social Sciences.
9. Names and telephone numbers of chairpersons of Social Science Departments in public universities.

Ad hoc Organisational Structure of Council of Social Sciences (COSS)

Before the elections of its office holders and members of Working Committee in a General Body meeting, COSS is presently functioning with five ad hoc office holders.

President: Dr. Inayatullah

Secretary: Dr. Kamran Ahmad

Treasurer: Dr. Zarina Salamat

Member: Dr. Rais A. Khan

Member: Dr. M. Naeem Qureshi

Current Research Projects of COSS

Studies:

COSS has undertaken the following studies with funds provided by UNESCO:

1. "The Social Sciences in Pakistan, 1985-2002: Identification of Trends, Problems and Prospects." The book will contain 18 discipline-specific and five general papers.

2. The study of national, regional and departmental professional associations of six social science disciplines which include Philosophy, Political Science, History, Economics and Psychology.

3. Publication of a handbook of PhD and M. Phil theses since the emergence of the country. The publication will include the name of the public university, the name of scholar, the name of the supervisor, the title of the theses and the year of its acceptance.

4. Compilation of data about the number of social science departments, the number of teachers in each department and their qualifications from 1963 to 2001.

Awards

Preparing to establish Akhtar Hameed Khan Award to be given to the best book in the field of social sciences and social work written during a year.

Introduction to Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan [COSS]

Registered on 3rd June, 2000, Council of Social Sciences, Pakistan (COSS) is a service oriented, non-profit and autonomous organisation of social scientists. It is committed to:

- Work towards evaluating and raising the standard of social sciences.
- Fostering interdisciplinary orientation in social sciences and strengthening their links with natural sciences.
- Building and strengthening a community of social scientists belonging to different disciplines and working in recognised universities, research institutes and civil society organisations by providing them a platform that promotes interaction among them.
- Foster scientific approach among the public through means such as seminars, discussions in the media and dissemination of non-technical versions of outstanding works of social scientists in national and regional languages.

By June, 2003 COSS had 227 members. They include 36 life members, 189 regular members and two institutional members. Of them, 109 are located in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, 34 in Karachi, 33 in Lahore, seven in Peshawar, four in Quetta, two in Multan and one each in D. I. Khan, Jamshoro, Khairpur, Hyderabad and Gilgit. Thirty three members come from abroad. Since its inception COSS has reprinted the book *The State of Social Sciences in Pakistan* and published two books *Social Science in Pakistan in the 1990s* and *Towards Understanding the State of Science in Pakistan.* It has also published three monographs one by Ayesha Jalal "Religion as Difference, Religion as Faith: Paradoxes of Muslim Identity," second by S. Akbar Zaidi "The Dismal State of the Social Sciences in Pakistan and third by Rubina Saigol "Becoming a Modern Nation: Educational Discourse in the Early Years of Ayub Khan (1958-64)." It has issued four bulletins, which carried reports on developments in Academia, publications and activities of social scientists, and on seminars and conferences in which COSS members participated.

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